15 September 2012
Seminal Achievements for Commons Studies
In order to progress in understanding the commons, we should share the following items, at least.
And we must continue to develop tools to analyze the commons as well as the rest of our world.
.xls file of these items is available. See the bottom or click here.
“Fig. 9.6. The First Tier of a Framework for Analyzing a Social-Ecological System”
of Poteete, Janssen, & Ostrom (2010: 235) :
See also “Fig. 1. A multitier framework for analyzing an SES” of Ostrom (2007: 15182) and
“Fig. 1. The core subsystems in a framework for analyzing social-ecological systems” of Ostrom (2009: 420).
“TABLE 9.1 Second-Tier Variables in Framework for Analyzing a Social-Ecological System”
of Poteete, Janssen, & Ostrom (2010: 237), which focuses on 56 factors :
See also “Table 1. Second-tier variables in framework for analyzing an SES” of Ostrom (2007: 15183) and
“Table 1. Examples of second-level variables under first-level core subsystems (S, RS, GS, RU, U, I, O and ECO) in a framework for analyzing social-ecological systems. The framework does not list variables in an order of importance, because their importance varies in different studies” of Ostrom (2009: 421).
“Box 2-5 Critical Enabling Conditions for Sustainability on the Commons”
of Agrawal (2002: 62-3), which focuses on 33 factors :
In this box, A. Agrawaral (2002) refers to:
- Robert Wade. 1988 Village Republics: Economic Conditions for Collective Action in South India, San Francisco, CA: ICS Press.
- Elinor Ostrom. 1990 Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Jean-Marie Baland and Jean-Philippe Platteau. 1996 Halting Degradation of Natural Resources: Is There a Role for Rural Communities?, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
“Table 3.1. Design Principles Illustrated by Long-Enduring Common-Pool Resource Institutions” of Ostrom (1990: 90) :
Notice: E. Ostrom (1990) is “not yet willing to argue that these design principles are necessary conditions for achieving institutional robustness in CPR settings” (p. 90. 日本語訳Japanese translation by h_k).
It matters also what rights (subsets of) commoners have, not only whether their resources are common or private property.
“TABLE 1 Bundles of Rights Associated with Positions” of Schlager & Ostrom (1992: 250) :
We respect individual freedom, and perverse collectivism or totalitarianism must be avoided.
The next table may be helpful.
“TABLE 1. A Theory of the Liberal Commons” of Dagan & Heller (2001: 602) :
REFERENCES
- Agrawal, Arun. 2002 “Common Resources and Institutional Sustainability,” in National Research Council (eds). The Drama of the Commons, Washington, DC: National Academy Press: 41-85.
- Dagan, Hanoch., and Michael A. Heller. 2001 “The Liberal Commons,” Yale Law Journal 110(4): 549-623.
- Ostrom, Elinor. 1990 Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Ostrom, Elinor. 2001 “Reformulating the Commons,” in Joanna Burger, et al. (eds.) Protecting the Commons: A Framework for Resource Management in the Americas, Washington, DC: Island Press: 17-41.
- Ostrom, Elinor. 2007 “A Diagnostic Approach for Going beyond Panaceas,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Science 104 (39): 15181-15187.
- Ostrom, Elinor. 2009 “A General Framework for Analyzing Sustainability of Social-Ecological Systems,” Science 325: 419-422.
- Poteete, Amy R., Marco A. Janssen, and Elinor Ostrom. 2010 Working Together: Collective Action, the Commons, and Multiple Methods in Practice, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Schlager, Edella., and Elinor Ostrom. 1992 “Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis,” Land Economics 68(3): 249-262.