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What role does rationality have in the policy making process? The extent to which evidence and knowledge inform policy making.
Introduction
This discussion will examine the rational-comprehensive method of policy-making. It will also look at other methods of decision-making such as bounded-rationality and incrementalism. It will be seen that politics is an important part of the policy process. This reduces the significance of rational inputs into decision-making, such as cost-benefit analysis. The discussion will examine policy in the context of debates over health, poverty and genetically modified crops. Evidence and knowledge should be a considerable part of the decision-making process but often this is not the case.
Evidence can be defined as the use of information, to develop an impartial policy. “Knowledge is what is known” and is associated with what is perceived to be the truth (Kennerly and Mason 2008, 7). “Decisions should be better informed by available evidence” and should be improved with the use of “rational analysis”. It is suggested that policy, which is based on systematic evidence, produces better outcomes (Sutcliffe and Court 2005, iii).
There are different types of rationality. Two relevant definitions are technical and economic rationality. “Technical rationality is a characteristic of reasoned choices”. It involves the comparison of alternatives, according to their capacity, to promote effective solutions to problems (Dunn 1994, 274). Economic rationality is similar. It focuses on the promotion of efficient solutions (Dunn 1994, 274). Rational decision-making suggests that there should be a “consensus among all relevant stakeholders” (Dunn 1994, 275). In practice, this is problematic. It is often not possible to measure societal benefits because they are not agreed upon. It is often only possible to measure the impacts of policies on particular groups in society (Dye 2001, 17).
Dilemmas in Decision-Making: Health and Poverty Contexts
Debates over health rationing highlight a major dilemma at the start of the policy process. A fundamental health debate is over whether rationing should be undertaken on the basis of age and quality of life. In other words, an elderly patient whose health is unlikely to be improved significantly, by treatment, could be denied treatment. The rationale for such a decision would be that resources could be better allocated elsewhere. Alternatively, a patient’s lifestyle, such as whether they smoke, could be used to determine whether they receive treatment. The National Health Service in the U.K. tends to rational healthcare on the basis of the former criteria of age and quality of life, rather than lifestyle. However, there will not be universal agreement on which approach to rationing is appropriate. Therefore, there is not a significant scope for evidence to generate a consensus on this dilemma.
To summarise, it is difficult for decision-makers to rationally define a problem. There is also a fundamental debate over whether resources should be devoted to preventative health which forestalls problems in the future; or whether resources should be devoted to the quality of health care such as “good medical care” and “accessible hospitals” (Dye in Puentes-Markides 2007,45).
A similar problem can be seen with an examination of poverty. Contrasting definitions of poverty complicate policy–making (Dye 2001, 117). For example, there is uncertainty over whether poverty is caused by “a lack of knowledge, skills or training” (Dye 2001, 117). Therefore, how the problem is framed is important and will determine what evidence is collected. Policy will be informed to a greater extent by how this problem is understood, than by the evidence which is subsequently obtained.
The Rational Model of Decision-Making
The rational model was defined by Lindblom (Hughes 2003, 124). There are 5 main stages. These are (1) the clarification of aims; (2) the listing of ways, of achieving the aims (i.e. a listing of possible policies); (3) an investigation into the important consequences that would follow from each of the alternative policies; (4) a comparison of the consequences of each policy; and finally (5) a choice over the policy. This would be the policy, which most closely matched the aims.
A rational policy aims to achieve “‘maximum social gain”. This is where the benefits, of a policy, exceed the costs “by the greatest amount” (Dye 2001, 16-17). Any policies where benefits do not exceed costs should be avoided. A policy can be described as rational, if it is favourable when compared to the other alternatives. In other words, the overall gain is greater than any other option (Dye 2001, 17). Rationality implies that the policy process should be undertaken in “a logical, reasoned and neutral way” (John 1998, 33).
However, these issues are problematic and difficult to implement in practice. For example, decision-making involves a calculation “of all social, political and economic” costs and benefits; not just those that can be measured in money (Dye 2001, 17). There is a complexity when attempting to measure factors which are not tangible. It could be difficult to measure the costs to society, of air pollution on health. It could be complicated to incorporate such costs, into a cost benefit analysis; to act as a basis for rational decision-making. “The quantification of intangible costs is ... based upon ... estimates which are abstract from the real world” (Henson and Traill 1993, 159). Evidence, on intangible costs, is not readily available and could be contested given its indefinable or elusive nature. The extent to which such evidence could inform policy-making could be questioned. The role of evidence can be overstated. The use of evidence cannot go further than an informational role, as it not sufficient on its own to make a decision (Hughes 2003, 127). Arguably, quantitative methods, such as cost benefit analysis, have been oversold (Hughes 2003, 122).
When examining quantitative analyses, it is useful to consider that these figures are a measurement, which may reflect relatively narrow aims. For example, a road construction project could be seen as viable on cost benefit grounds. There may be a quantifiable benefit in terms of reduced traffic congestion. However, this may overlook external concerns such as air or noise pollution. This is the problem, with reducing evidence to a unit of impact, such as money (Vining 1992, 220). For this reason quantitative measures may not dominate decision-making. Policy makers have resorted to qualitative methods of examining costs and benefit. Rather than attempt difficult valuations, they could rely on theoretical arguments to appraise impacts (Vining 1992, 220). This leads into a discussion of other limitations of rational decision-making. Often evidence will not settle policy debates. In general, there can be a variety of different principles to be considered. Policymakers may not be able to reconcile these differences of opinion.
The policy-makers themselves are relevant and may hinder rational decision-making. Evidence can be secondary to the needs of managers. Such managers may not be motivated to make decisions on the basis of societal needs, but rather on the basis of their own desires (Dye 2001, 17). Civil servants have their own employment, pay and status to consider. Evidence of the need to cut public spending, in the areas where they are employed, could therefore be overlooked (Williams and Simmons 1994, 30-31). The rational decision process can be regarded as too narrow as it overlooks politics, and the power of relevant vested interests, which can constrain the choices that are available (Hill 1993, 198).
Another barrier to rationality is time. There is also the availability of data collection and its cost. The use of evidence for policy may be lacking at present because it is expensive to undertake research projects. Research projects are easier to cut in times of austerity, because they do not involve the direct provision of services to the public. Another problem is that it is often not possible to foresee the consequences of policy options (Dye 2001, 19). “The rationalistic approach is utopian. Most policy decisions have many unanticipated consequences (Hill 1993, 199). The result is that “decisions are not that neat, and evaluation is not that systematic” (Hill 1993, 199).
Nevertheless, the rational decision-making model has been widely employed in the Civil Service. It has been seen as a useful exercise involving “forward planning, the listing of objectives and the consideration of a range of options” (Burch and Wood 1989, 26). The rational framework could also be seen as a safeguard against unwise political decisions. The model remains useful because it helps to identify “barriers to rationality” (Dye 2001, 17). If these barriers are political then perhaps they can be confronted. The acknowledgement of such ‘barriers’ is necessary for policy-making to be improved. The need for a more pragmatic rather than a fully rational and comprehensive approach is the topic for the next section.
Satisficing
As argued previously, it is not possible to acquire and evaluate all the possible evidence that is available due to time constraints. Therefore, policymakers restrict the amount of information that they obtain. They have to be pragmatic about the policy making process. Rather, than searching for the best possible solution they are willing to accept a satisfactory outcome. This method is described as a ‘satisficing’ approach. The decision-maker only needs to consider alternative policies which produce a reasonable overall cost-benefit gain (Dunn 1994, 279).
Satisificing is prudent because it recognises the limits of ‘rational policy making’ (Dunn 1994, 279). Satisficing can be considered to be rational behaviour itself, as it acknowledges the costs “of acquiring information” (Dunn 1994, 279-280). It attempts to make the best decision while recognising constraints, such as trying to manage too much evidence (Dunn 1994, 279). Policy-makers operate well under these constraints of limited or ‘bounded-rationality’. A similar point can be made about actual business decision-making. This conforms more to theories of ‘bounded rationality’ than ‘perfect rationality’ (Simon 1978, 357).
Often it is not possible for individual research projects, such as in local authorities, to gather all the information, for all the stages of the policy process (Hill 1993, 200). Therefore, evidence is better deployed, under a model where fully rational and comprehensive policy-making is recognised as not being possible. This leads into a discussion of incremental decision-making.
Incrementalism
The incremental method has been suggested as a more appropriate method in comparison to the rational model. It views public policy as “a continuation of past government activities with only incremental modifications” (Dye 2001, 19). Policy making can be seen as a continuous process, with limited distinctions between different stages of the process (John 1998, 36). “Ends become means as one decision merges into the next” (Hill 1993, 200).
Incrementalism continuously reformulates problems and requires new information to be acquired (Dunn 1994, 275). Perhaps, this makes better use of evidence because it is used in a timely manner. In contrast, a rational model could waste information that is generated, at the start of a process, and then found not to be needed. “Incrementalism addresses the criticism of policy as a sequential process because it does not assume decision-making is linear” (John 1998, 35). Incrementalism can be seen as practical. Under an incremental approach only a small number of policy alternatives are reviewed and only a limited number of consequences envisaged and evaluated (Hill 1993, 200). Evidence can be gathered parsimoniously, which is pragmatic as it only contributes to policy only when necessary.
This approach can be seen as suitable because it is politically expedient. Agreement comes easier in policymaking when the items in dispute are incremental “increases or decreases in budgets or modifications to existing programs”. “Conflict is heightened when decision making is focussed on major policy shifts involving great gains or losses” (Dye 2001, 20). Therefore, incrementalism is important “in reducing conflict and maintaining stability” (Dye 2001, 20). There is an alternative view; that the incremental approach is less than optimal. Evidence may not be used to its full effect. The incrementalist approach can be criticised for being conservative. It may only deal with short-term changes which reinforce inertia (Hill 1993, 201).
Decisions can be made on an incremental basis, with decisions made in small steps (Burch and Wood 1989, 27). For example, if a significant investment was made in transport infrastructure then it is likely to be completed. “Large investment in existing programs and policies (sunk costs) prevent policy makers from reconsidering alternatives foreclosed by previous decisions” (Dye 2001, 17). This is where evidence is not used by incremental policy-making. Evidence could suggest that a transport scheme has wasted money. But the investments are likely to continue given the incrementalism and the inertia (Dye 2001, 20). An incrementalist approach could be extremely costly, with the costs of failing to explore radical alternatives, such as closing poorly performing transport infrastructure (Hill 1993, 202). Such an approach does not guard against ‘commitment traps’ also known as the ‘sunk cost fallacy’. A transport project which has already had significantly money spent on it is not viable if the future returns are negative.
The problem with the incremental approach is that it “offers no way informing participants that a sub-optimal solution which has emerged, is so costly” (Hill 1993, 203). The incremental approach can lead to conservative thinking. Incrementalism could be criticised for being too restrictive and for not allowing “a wide ranging review of policy” (Burch and Wood 1989, 28). “The status quo is a central concept and its persistent hold over decision-makers is the reason for less than timely responses to policy deficiencies” (Atkinson 2011, 9). Perhaps the solution is to recognise that decisions are incremental, but that additional evidence could lead to a wide-ranging review of policy; if that were required.
To improve the policy process, it could be seen as both comprehensive and incremental. Policy could be rational at the initial stages, and at later stages it could be incremental. “For example, at the beginning of a programme, policy makers may rank their objectives to select the preferred option: once the programme is in place decisions may become incremental” (John 1998, 35). This would though need to recognise the problem of inertia identified above.
The incremental model has been criticised on political grounds. It searches for a solution which is appropriate “in a particular situation” (Hill 1993, 201). The approach is therefore thought to favour the interests of the most powerful and systemically to under-represent the interests of the under-privileged and politically unorganised” (Hill 1993, 201). “The model is accused of favouring management and overlooking “low-ranking staff ... whose perspectives are in practice neglected” (Hill 1993:199). The approach fits the inheritance model, as political decision makers generally “accept the programmes they find when coming into office” (John 1998:35). The next section examines politics and its impact on policy in more detail.
The Impact of Politics on Policy-Making
The discussion will now highlight the ways in which the policy process can become political. It has been noted that managers of public policy can be political and exploit opportunities to further their ambitions. Evidence can be seen as supplementing, political aspects of the policy process (Hughes 2003, 128). Information which is meant to inform the policy process can be used as “just another form of rhetoric” for decisions which were going to be made anyway (John 1998, 33). Politics can weaken the input of evidence into policy and reduce the quality of the policy chosen.
Policy analysts have to consider how their decisions will be received. Their decisions have political consequences as people are affected by their abstract decision-making (Hughes 2003, 127). It should be acknowledged that the policy process can be political. Often there is not a single optimum solution. A solution may only be found through a policy which “survives the political process” (Hughes 2003, 129). The rational model could analyse the evidence and derive an apparently ‘optimum outcome’. However, such an approach would be undemocratic unless the solution happened to meet the needs of the electorate (Hughes 2003,126). Often decisions are made not on what is rational, but “on the shifting sands of public opinion” (Hughes 2003, 130).
Successful managers are less analysts and more like politicians (Hughes 2003,122). The problem is that many rational decisions have to be rejected because they are not politically feasible (Hughes 2003, 124). “Decision-makers are constantly faced with the conflict between technically superior and politically feasible alternatives” (Hughes 2003, 124). The debate in the UK, over pension reform, could be an example of this problem. This is because it has been politically expedient for the public not to vote for higher taxation, to pay for pensions.
The Use of Evidence and Knowledge in the GM Crops Debate
Strategists rarely follow the rational policy process. Rather there is the interplay of various opinions and different types of knowledge. This is the situation which frequently explains the strategy process (Hughes 2003, 129). Knowledge is not used in an objective way to resolve policy disputes, but to defend particular opinions. Political public policy sees evidence in an advocacy role that can be used to present a cogent case that can be fed into the political process (Hughes 2003, 129).
This can be seen with the debate over genetically modified (GM) crops. Knowledge is used to support the existing positions. For example, the former prime minister stated that “it is important for the whole debate to be conducted on the basis of scientific evidence” (Millstone 2010, 5). The problem is that policy-makers have invoked “the rhetoric of ‘sound science to provide the appearance of legitimacy to policy decisions” (Millstone, 2009, 626). Knowledge is subject to the interests of the parties involved (Hill 1993, 199). Scientific evidence has been used in the GM debate to suit particular purposes. The concern is that new evidence may not alter firmly held positions.
Conclusion
To conclude, it was thought that rational policy analysis could revolutionise public decision-making, but now it is believed that the usefulness of rational techniques is limited (John 1998, 32). “There is no inherent superiority of rational ideas” (John 1998, 33). However, the problem runs deeper than governments’ inability to make full use of the ‘rational model’. The use of evidence in policy-making depends upon the relationship between policy and politics. If knowledge is genuinely sought, then there is scope for decision-making to improve. However, if policy-making is based on coalition building and faction fighting, then the scope for the proper use of evidence in decision-making is limited.
Rational techniques are just one activity that needs to be understood as part of policy-making (John 1998, 32). Politics is important too. Recent UK administrations have seen the “relationship between knowledge and policy-making as fundamentally a managerialist ... project” (Parsons 2002, 58). The concern is that evidence can be used as interpretation, or spin, for a range of purposes (Hill 1993, 209). This could be simply to attack or defend say GM crops. In this case, perhaps the use of evidence is doing little to move the debate forward.
References
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