When I was a kid,
the disaster we worried about most
was a nuclear war.
That's why we had a barrel like this
down in our basement,
filled with cans of food and water.
When the nuclear attack came,
we were supposed to go downstairs,
hunker down, and eat out of that barrel.
Today the greatest risk
of global catastrophe
doesn't look like this.
Instead, it looks like this.
If anything kills over 10 million people
in the next few decades,
it's most likely to be
a highly infectious virus
rather than a war.
Not missiles, but microbes.
Now, part of the reason for this is that
we've invested a huge amount
in nuclear deterrents.
But we've actually invested very little
in a system to stop an epidemic.
We're not ready for the next epidemic.
Let's look at Ebola.
I'm sure all of you read about it
in the newspaper,
lots of tough challenges.
I followed it carefully
through the case analysis tools
we use to track polio eradication.
And as you look at what went on,
the problem wasn't that there was a system
that didn't work well enough,
the problem was that we
didn't have a system at all.
In fact, there's some pretty obvious
key missing pieces.
We didn't have a group of epidemiologists
ready to go, who would have gone,
seen what the disease was,
seen how far it had spread.
The case reports came in on paper.
It was very delayed
before they were put online
and they were extremely inaccurate.
We didn't have a medical team ready to go.
We didn't have a way of preparing people.
Now, Médecins Sans Frontières
did a great job orchestrating volunteers.
But even so, we were far slower
than we should have been
getting the thousands of workers
into these countries.
And a large epidemic would require us
to have hundreds of thousands of workers.
There was no one there
to look at treatment approaches.
No one to look at the diagnostics.
No one to figure out
what tools should be used.
As an example, we could have
taken the blood of survivors,
processed it, and put that plasma
back in people to protect them.
But that was never tried.
So there was a lot that was missing.
And these things
are really a global failure.
The WHO is funded to monitor epidemics,
but not to do these things I talked about.
Cuando yo era un niño
el desastre más temido
era una guerra nuclear.
Por eso teníamos en el sótano
un barril como este
lleno de tarros de alimentos y agua.
Cuando llegara el ataque nuclear
debíamos escondernos allá abajo
y comer lo que hubiera en el barril.
Hoy la mayor catástrofe mundial.
no se parece a esto.
Más bien, es como esto.
Si algo ha de matar a más de
10 millones de personas
en las próximas décadas,
probablemente será un virus muy infeccioso
más que una guerra.
No misiles, sino microbios.
En parte la razón de esto es que
se han invertido enormes cantidades
en disuasivos nucleares.
Pero en cambio, muy poco
en sistemas para detener epidemias.
No estamos preparados
para la próxima epidemia.
Veamos el caso del ébola.
Con seguridad todos
han leído en la prensa
sobre esos terribles retos.
Yo lo seguí cuidadosamente
con las herramientas de análisis de casos,
como las que usamos
para la erradicación del polio.
Si se observa lo que sucedió,
el problema no fue que el sistema
no funcionara adecuadamente,
sino que en verdad
no teníamos ningún sistema.
De hecho, faltaban unas piezas claves
bastante obvias.
No había equipos de epidemiólogos
listos a viajar, que hubiesen ido,
para ver qué cosa era esa enfermedad
y qué tanto se había expandido.
Los informes llegaron impresos en papel.
Hubo enormes demoras antes
de ponerlos en internet
y además eran terriblemente imprecisos.
No había grupos
de médicos listos a viajar.
No teníamos manera
de preparar a la gente.
Ahora, Médecins Sans Frontières
hizo un gran trabajo
organizando a los voluntarios.
Pero aun así, fuimos
mucho más lentos de lo debido
en llevar a los miles de trabajadores
hacia esos países,
Para una gran epidemia se necesitan
cientos de miles de trabajadores.
No había nadie dedicado a estudiar
nuevos métodos de tratamiento.
Nadie que estudiara los diagnósticos.
Nadie que estudiara cuáles instrumentos
debían usarse.
Por ejemplo, se podría haber
tomado sangre de sobrevivientes,
para procesarla y aplicar ese plasma
a la gente sana, para protegerla.
Pero nunca se intentó.
Hicieron falta muchas cosas.
En realidad, fue un fracaso mundial.
La OMS existe
para monitorizar las epidemias,
pero no hace nada
de lo que estoy hablando.
Transposition
“we've invested a huge amount in nuclear deterrents.” → “se han invertido enormes cantidades en disuasivos nucleares.” (active “we” → impersonal passive)
“we were supposed to go downstairs, hunker down, and eat out of that barrel.” → “debíamos escondernos allá abajo y comer lo que hubiera en el barril.” (simplified reflexive/verb structure)
“The WHO is funded to monitor epidemics” → “La OMS existe para monitorizar las epidemias” (funded to → exists to; structural/verb change)
Omission
“When the nuclear attack came, we were supposed to go downstairs, hunker down, and eat out of that barrel.” → “Cuando llegara el ataque nuclear debíamos escondernos allá abajo y comer lo que hubiera en el barril.” (drops explicit “hunker down” nuance)
“lots of tough challenges.” → “esos terribles retos.” (omits “lots of”)
“The case reports came in on paper. It was very delayed before they were put online and they were extremely inaccurate.” → “Los informes llegaron impresos en papel. Hubo enormes demoras antes de ponerlos en internet y además eran terriblemente imprecisos.” (compresses, removes filler)
Modulation
“the disaster we worried about most” → “el desastre más temido” (worry → fear; semantic shift)
“If anything kills over 10 million people … it’s most likely to be a highly infectious virus rather than a war.” → “Si algo ha de matar a más de 10 millones de personas … probablemente será un virus muy infeccioso más que una guerra.” (probability framing made natural)
“Not missiles, but microbes.” → “No misiles, sino microbios.” (contrast preserved through a tighter binary phrasing)