1.  John Searle and the Mind-Body Problem

Searle’s attempt at a solution to the mind-body problem is a valiant effort, and elements of his system have great merit, but in my opinion he falls short in his efforts because he centers too much on a physicalist interpretation of reality.  He gives an excellent explanation of the origin of the mind-body problem and explains in detail the four most important features of this philosophical dilemma: the first being the problem of consciousness; the second concerning intentionality (which includes mental states such as, “beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, love, hate, lust, disgust, shame, pride, irritation, [and] amusement” [Searle, 16]; the third feature being the problem of “the subjectivity of mental states” [Searle, 16]; and the fourth feature which he calls “mental causation” [Searle, 17].  In order to solve the mind-body problem Searle turns to the science of physics and the distinction it makes “between micro- and macro-properties of systems – the small and large scales” [Searle, 20].  Ultimately Searle is of the opinion that mental states (i.e., macro-properties) are “. . . caused by processes going on in the brain at the neuronal or modular level, and at the same time they are realized in the very system that consists of neurons” [Searle, 22].  One of the problems I have with his theory is that he reduces mental states to a superficial form of existence, though I admit he constantly tries to mitigate this accusation by stating that mental phenomena are not only “caused by” but are also “realized in” [cf. Searle, 22] these micro processes.  Another problem I see with his theory concerns the fact that he fails to recognize the possibility that mental states may cause physio-chemical changes in the brain.  His view of reality is one sided, and this became clear to me in the paragraphs of his book where he described pain.  In those paragraphs he only discussed pain caused by physical stimuli and ignored pain caused by emotional (i.e., non-physical) trauma.  I know from my own personal experience that pain caused by emotional distress can be far greater than pain caused by physical injury.  In 1987 I broke my back and was paralyzed for eight days and was unable to walk for seven months.  The pain I felt during those months was often severe, but was minor in comparison with the pain I felt when my father died in 1989.  His death did not physically touch me, but it touched me profoundly at the mental and emotional level.  This mental pain was the cause of many physical responses within my body, and as I see it, my mental states caused physical reactions and this is the opposite of what Searle’s theory would expect.  As far as his ideas about freewill are concerned, it appears to me that he wants to have it both ways, and though he admits a certain amount of mental causation in biophysical reactions he doesn’t follow through logically with this position.  He admits the idea of “top-down causation over a passage of time” [Searle, 93], but ultimately undermines this statement by saying that it works “only because the mental events are grounded in the neuro-physiology to start with” [Searle, 93].  He goes on to say that, “As long as we accept this conception [i.e., a physicalist view] of how nature works, then it doesn’t seem that there is any scope for the freedom of the will because on this conception the mind can only affect nature in so far as it is a part of nature.  But if so, then like the rest of nature, its features are determined at the basic micro-levels of physics” [Searle, 93].  The whole error of his system in my view is that he is doing physics, not metaphysics.  He tries to have it both ways, physical determinism at the micro-level and at the same time a form of experiential freedom, I believe his solution is inadequate.

2.  The Fallibalism of Charles Peirce

Fallibalism is Peirce’s way of accounting for growth and change in human knowledge, as  Gallie points out, “Peirce calls this general conception of knowledge ‘fallibilism’ because of its frank admission that there is an element of untested assumption in all our claims to knowledge, and hence that the correctness of any such claim depends on the correctness of the premises or prior beliefs on which it is based” [Gallie, 71-72].  The scientific method is like Peirce’s fallibilism, it differs in the sense that it investigates only physical reality, while Peirce’s method is applied to the metaphysical realm.  The scientific method develops theories for observable phenomena based on experimental procedures, but its theories are always open to revision if future experiments prove a theory to be inaccurate or merely imprecise.  For Peirce the individual does not apprehend the truth in isolation, as he see’s it, the truth is where the community settles down.  For him the only important criterion for truth is reality itself, known to us through experience, not at the level of the individual, but at the level of the community at large.  Thus the truth is open to revision as the human community develops and gains new insights into reality.  As I see it, all three of these concepts are connected in the sense that they see reality itself as primary, and the human perception of it as secondary.  The only weakness I see in the three concepts is the scientific method and its restriction of reality to the phenomenological realm.  But I do not believe Peirce falls into this trap himself, because his realist position prevents him from limiting reality to the physical realm alone.  As you said in your lectures, Peirce recognizes that the Generals (Universals) possess a form of reality; much like the future, though not actual, is at the same time not nothing.  But in this case Peirce the scientist does not allow the scientific method to lead him astray and thus become a weakness; instead, he makes it a strength by centering on experimental protocol which measures the particular in order to find its relation to the general.  His theory has great potential, in that it allows for the advancement of human knowledge with the passage of time.

3.  The Nominalist Approach of Bruce Aune

I found as did most individuals in the class that I could not agree with Aune’s nominalist approach to reality.  Because of his extreme nominalism I don’t see how he can hold any view of human freedom, his physicalist position and denial of reality to the universals should lead him to an absolute form of determinism.  In his attack on the Libertarian position he says that, “. . . the scientifically most plausible conception of human beings is that they are complicated organic systems whose ability to think and act is a function of their nervous systems, these systems being constituted by aggregates of physical entities that obey the laws of physics” [Aune, 193].  Based in his own metaphysical understanding of reality Aune should deny freedom of the will, but he ultimately betrays his own atomistic view of the world and attempts to justify a modified form of the reconcilers view of freedom (i.e., the freedom of spontaneity).  In his example of throwing a rock at a snake and accidentally hitting a cat instead, he fails to distinguish between intention and will.  The will is the mental faculty by which one chooses a course of action, intention is the goal to be achieved.  The fact that the individual unintentionally hit a cat’s tail with the rock instead of hitting the snake does not mitigate the freedom of the action in throwing the rock itself, that action remains free even though the intended goal was not achieved.  This in my view is only one of many problems with Aune’s position, but the main problem concerns his nominalist and atomistic metaphysic.  Based on his metaphysical view of reality he should deny human freedom and  hold to an absolute determinism, but if there is one thing I realized about him in reading his book, it was that he is not consistent.  As I see it, if we restrict reality to the physical realm alone it is impossible to reconcile freedom and determinism, and one must hold a deterministic view of the world.  But if reality includes the mental or spiritual realm, then the human person is more than a simple collection of micro-properties and bio-chemical reactions; instead, he becomes a rational and free being who can choose a course of action and determine his own future.

4.  The Problem of the Universals

The problem of the universals has been argued about for centuries, by both the ancient Greek philosophers and by the Mediaeval Scholastics.  Aune and Peirce hold opposing views on this issue:  Aune is what I would call an extreme nominalist, while Peirce is what I would refer to as a realist.  Realism holds that the universals are more than names or concepts, they in some sense possess existence, nominalism disagrees with this view and see’s the universals as mere names with no independent reality.  In Aune’s philosophy the universal is nothing more than a logical fiction, but he does attempt to affirm that they possess some form of existence.  He tries to affirm the existence of the universal in a derivative sense, he uses the example of a corporation, saying that, “Corporations are legal persons and, thus, legal or logical fictions.  But to call them fictions is not to say that they do not exist in any sense at all.  They do exist – derivatively, as we have seen.  The fact that their existence is derivative does not mean that they are imaginary, unimportant, or not worth thinking about.  They simply do not exist in the fundamental sense in which people exist” [Aune, 24].  The problem with Aune’s position is that it never remains stable, he tends to vacillate between affirming in a very weak sense that universals possess some form of existence, and denying that they have any existence.  In talking about a piece of paper Aune asks, “Does creamy whiteness have a surface, so that it can reflect light?  Can it possess a square shape and have black letters typed upon it?” [Aune, 46], from these two questions it appears to me that Aune does not comprehend what a universal is.  The questions he asks are at the level of the particular, not at the level of the universal, which is abstracted from the particular; so they are in no way an obstacle to the reality of the universal.  He then goes on to say that no “. . . one who expounds such a view of creamy whiteness is confusing an alleged universal with something else – in this case the surface of a piece of paper.  We can easily see the surface of a piece of paper and observe that the surface is square in shape and has, perhaps, some words typed on it.  In such a case we are seeing a creamy white surface, not some abstract component” [Aune, 46].  Once again he is stuck at the level of the particular and seems to be confusing it with the universal.  His example is not proper, he should speak of two pieces of creamy white paper, the pieces of paper are obviously distinct, but they share the common quality of creamy whiteness.  This common quality is the abstracted universal, not the surface of the paper, he appears to miss the point.  Peirce’s philosophical system is much better when it comes to understanding the nature of the universal, and this is no doubt related to the fact that he was a scientist.  It is the scientist in Peirce who emphasizes the necessity of being able to compare particular objects of the same kind by abstracting the universal or general quality from them; if this cannot be done all scientific experimentation becomes meaningless.  As Gallie points out, Peirce adapted the realism of the scholastic movement to suit his own purposes, he rejected the idea of substantial realism in favor of relational realism.  So for Peirce, “. . . from the subjective side, the meaning of a hypothesis depends on our dispositions or capacities to act (or imagine ourselves acting) in certain specifiable ways; while from the objective side, its meaning presupposes the reality of some general laws governing the relation of the facts supposed in the hypothesis to certain other observable facts which will, in some measure, confirm the hypothesis if it is true” [Gallie, 157].  I also have been influenced by the scholastic movement, but unlike Peirce I do accept the concept of substantial realism.  The universals are real, but they are real only in the mind or intellect and within the particular itself.  This is known commonly as a moderate form of realism, and is the position taken by St. Thomas Aquinas.  The particulars are real in a concrete sense independent of the mind, while the universals are real in an intellectual sense, and are thus more than mere names or concepts, but separate from the mind they have no reality except within the particular.  This is the position I hold and that is why I feel quite comfortable with Peirce’s views even though there are differences between our positions.  I can accept his views as in some sense an expression of the position I hold, while I absolutely reject the position taken by Aune.  If Aune is correct, human beings can really know nothing about reality, if Peirce is correct then we can discover the truth, and with the growth of knowledge over time come to a deeper apprehension of reality.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bruce Aune.  Metaphysics:  The Elements.  (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995).

W. B. Gallie.  Peirce and Pragmatism.  (Edinburgh: Pelican Books, 1952).

John Searle.  Minds, Brains and Science.  (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984).

A Brief Survey of the Metaphysics of Searle, Peirce, and Aune

by Steven Todd Kaster

San Francisco State University

Philosophy 605-01:  Metaphysics

Professor. Helen Heise

24 May 1999

Copyright © 1999-2025 Steven Todd Kaster