Introduction

          The idea that the human person was created by God as a rational being possessing a free will, and as a consequence of this, that his choices are not predetermined, is central to the whole of Jewish thought as it is found in the biblical texts and in the teaching of the Rabbis.  My paper is divided into three sections; the first section deals with man’s creation and his dominion over the earth.  In this section I will try to highlight what this teaching implies about the nature of the human person, and in order to give greater depth to the concept of man’s creation in the image of God, I will briefly examine the texts dealing with the creation itself, the garden of Eden, the story of Cain and Abel, and the hardening of Pharaoh’s heart.  Next I will examine the biblical concept of covenants, and what abilities man must possess if he is to be able to fulfill his duties as a party to such an agreement.  Finally I will look at the concepts of necessity and freedom and how these two ideas must be understood and balanced.  My paper will of course be limited in its scope, because the issue I am dealing with would require a work the size of the Talmud, if one were to try and be comprehensive, and even at that length the study would not be exhaustive.

[1]  Image of God and Dominion over the Earth

          In the first chapter of the book of Genesis God said, “‘Let us make man in Our image, after Our likeness.  They shall rule the fish of the sea, the birds of the sky, the cattle, the whole earth, and all creeping things that creep on earth.’  And God created man in His image, in the image of God He created him; male and female He created them” [Genesis, 1:26].  There are two elements in this statement, both of which deal with the subject of man’s nature and his freedom of action.  The first concerns the statement that man is created “in the image of God,” but how is this statement to be understood?  It is obvious that Judaism would absolutely reject the idea that man is physically created in the image of God, because even when the biblical texts speak of God in an anthropomorphic way, they do so in a metaphorical sense, and not in a literal sense.  This is the common view of the Rabbis and it is the view of Judaism to this day.  Because man is not physically created in the image of God this statement must refer to man in some other sense, a sense which concerns the very nature of the human person, and which distinguishes him from every other creature on earth.  The element within man that makes him an image of God is the light of reason, and thus he is a rational being, possessing the faculties of intellect and will.  Reason includes both the intellectual ability to understand the nature of things, and the ability to act on that knowledge through a decision of the will.

          The second element within this verse is related to the first, in that, for man to have dominion over the earth and its creatures he must have the ability to understand his environment, and then based on this knowledge he must be free to act in order to manipulate his surroundings.  Knowledge has no meaning if one is not free to act upon what one has learned.  In fact the Rabbis would hold that knowledge (wisdom) requires action for it to truly be good.  In the Mishnah Rabbi Eleazar ben Azariah explained this in a parable, when he said that, “He whose wisdom is more abundant than his works, to what is he like?  To a tree whose branches are abundant but whose roots are few; and the wind comes and uproots it and overturns it . . .,” he compares this first man to one whose works are greater than his wisdom, and says that this man is like “. . . a tree whose branches are few but whose roots are many; so that even if all the winds in the world come and blow against it, it cannot be stirred from its place . . .” [Danby, Aboth 3:18, 452].

          The point of Rabbi Eleazar ben Azariah’s parable is that knowledge is not an end in itself, and that for a rational being knowledge only has meaning in and through its proper use, thus it is only fulfilled through an act of the will.  This is what Rabbi Hannina ben Dosa meant when he said that, “‘He whose fear of sin comes before his wisdom, his wisdom endures; but he whose wisdom comes before his fear of sin, his wisdom does not endure.’  [In addition] he used to say, ‘He whose works exceed his wisdom, his wisdom endures; but he whose wisdom exceeds his works, his wisdom does not endure’” [Danby, Aboth 3:10, 451].  The Greek philosophical tradition tended to emphasize theoretical wisdom, while the Rabbinic tradition mainly extolled practical wisdom.  The Rabbis thus see an intrinsic connection between the intellect and the will, because for them one without the other is pointless.  One must come to know the good that should be done, and then one must will to do it, or if one perceives evil in an action, one must, through an act of his will, refrain from doing that action.  Thus the biblical text’s affirmation that man is created in the image of God and that he has been given dominion over the earth, means that man must be seen as a rational being, and that his rational nature necessarily includes the powers of intellect and will.  So it follows that man is a free being, who can make choices just as God does, albeit to a lesser degree and in a dependent sense, for man’s free will is a participated reality (i.e., it is limited by his finite nature) and thus is dependent upon God ontologically for its existence, but even though man’s will is created and thus is not an absolute end in itself, it is still true that man is not bound by any compulsion to a predetermined end.

Biblical Examples

          The first example I will give in support of the position I stated above (i.e., that man possesses a rational nature) is found in the second and third chapters of Genesis.  In the second chapter of Genesis man’s intellect is displayed, in that Adam names the various creatures, and thus he knows their nature; while the fact that he possesses free will is shown in the command of God concerning the tree of knowledge, where the Lord says, “‘Of every tree of the garden you are free to eat; but as for the tree of knowledge of good and bad, you must not eat of it; for as soon as you eat of it, you shall die” [Genesis, 2:16-17].  This command only makes sense if man has the power to choose between various possible courses of action.

          The Rabbis noticed that when Eve repeated the command of God concerning the fruit of the tree of knowledge to the serpent, she added to the command, and said, “‘You shall not eat of it or touch it, lest you die’” [Genesis, 3:3].  But the prohibition not to even “touch it” [Genesis, 3:3] was not in the command as it was given by God to Adam.   So, the Rabbis believe that Adam added this stipulation to the original command in order to place a fence around it, and in the view Rabbi Hiyya, Adam went beyond the principle involved in the command and thus opened the way for the serpent to deceive Eve, for the serpent “. . . saw her thus lying, [and] he took and thrust her against it” [Midrash Rabbah 1:150].  In other words the serpent used the extension of the command (i.e., about not even touching the fruit), which the Rabbis say Adam added, in order to trick her.  The serpent was able to deceive Eve because of the clause added to the original command by Adam, for when Eve touched the fruit and did not die, the serpent pointed out to her that, “. . . just as you were not stricken through touching it, so will you not die when you eat it” [Midrash Rabbah 1:150].  Adam freely added this clause, which allowed the serpent to deceive Eve, yet Eve’s action in eating the fruit still flows from her freedom to choose, even though the information she was basing her decision on was defective.  It should be noted that this Rabbinic teaching does not lessen the idea of Adam and Eve’s freedom, it in fact emphasizes the principle that they are free.  But if one were to deny that Adam’s actions were free, it would reduce Rabbi Hiyya’s exegesis to nonsense.  So, Adam and Eve can only be held responsible for their disobedience in eating the fruit of the tree of knowledge if they really had the ability to freely choose to eat of it or not to eat of it.  If God predetermined their actions in this regard, it would be God himself who disobeyed his own command, and Adam and Eve would merely be his puppets and would bear no personal responsibility.

          The second example is from the biblical pericope involving Cain and Abel, and it shows that man has the ability to choose to do good or evil; and how in this case, sadly, Cain chose to do evil by murdering his brother.  Now, “Abel became a keeper of sheep, and Cain became a tiller of the soil.  In the course of time, Cain brought an offering to the Lord from the fruit of the soil; and Abel, for his part, brought the choicest of the firstlings of his flock.  The Lord paid heed to Abel and his offering, but to Cain and his offering He paid no heed.  Cain was much distressed and his face fell” [Genesis, 4:2-5].  The biblical text does not explain why God rejected Cain’s offering, but the Rabbis say that Cain brought the inferior part of his crop (cf. Midrash Rabbah 1:182).  Now at this point the pivotal part of the narrative begins, “And the Lord said to Cain, ‘Why are you distressed, and why is your face fallen?  Surely, if you do right, there is uplift.  But if you do not do right sin couches at the door; its urge is toward you, yet you can be its master’” [Genesis, 4:6-7].  The Rabbis dissected these verses in order to show that man’s destiny is his own, and that he can resist sin.

          The Rabbinic teaching as found in the Midrash Rabbah concentrates on two points in the verses cited above, the first point concerning the statement that “sin couches at the door,” and the second concerning sin itself, where God says that, “you can master it” [Genesis, 4:7].  In reference to the first statement Rabbi Akiba said, “At first it [sin] is like a spider’s web, but eventually it becomes like a ship’s rope” [Midrash Rabbah 1:185].  Rabbi Tanhum ben Marion explains this through the use of a parable, he said, “There are dogs in Rome that know how to deceive men.  One goes and sits down before a baker’s shop and pretends to be asleep, and when the shopkeeper dozes off he dislodges a loaf near the ground, and while the onlookers are collecting (the scattered loaves) he succeeds in snatching a loaf and making off” [Midrash Rabbah 1:185].  Thus sin appears to sleep at your door, but it is actually waiting for you to let your guard down, so that it may make you its servant.  As Rabbi Abin said, “If one indulges his evil bent in his youth, it will eventually rule over him in his old age” [Midrash Rabbah 1:186].  But one must not forget the second point in the verse, which concerns the fact that man can or may master sin.  He is not predestined to sin.  Concerning the Tempter which couches at the door, Rabbi Hanina said, “If your Tempter comes to incite you to levity, cast him down with the words of the Torah, as it is written, ‘The evil imagination, when near to thee, thou shalt combat’ (Isaiah 26:3) . . . [for it is] written for you in the Torah, ‘And unto thee is its desire, but thou mayest rule over it’” [Midrash Rabbah 1:186].  The Rabbis will not countenance the idea that man’s actions are predetermined, and their exegesis of this biblical pericope is quite straight forward and takes the text at face value, in other words it is not a tendentious interpretation.

          The third and final example in this section concerns the pericope which deals with the Lord’s hardening of Pharaoh’s heart and whether this action proves, as some people claim, that man does not have free will.  In chapter ten of Exodus it says, “Then the Lord said to Moses, ‘Go to Pharaoh.  For I have hardened his heart and the hearts of his courtiers, in order that I may display these My signs among them, and that you may recount in the hearing of your sons and of your sons’ sons how I made a mockery of the Egyptians and how I displayed My signs among them – in order that you may know that I am the Lord’” [Exodus, 10:1-2].  If one were to take this text in isolation it would seem that God manipulated Pharaoh as a puppet master manipulates a puppet, and thus Pharaoh was not free to choose a different course of action.  But in the last two verses of chapter nine it is seen that Pharaoh and his servants hardened their own hearts before God spoke to Moses:  “When Pharaoh saw that the rain and the hail and the thunder had ceased, he became stubborn and reverted to his guilty ways, as did his courtiers.  So Pharaoh’s heart stiffened and he would not let the Israelites go” [Exodus 9:34-35].

          Clearly, the Rabbis were aware of the difficulties resulting from this text, as Rabbi Johanan said, “Does this not provide heretics with ground for arguing that he had no means of repenting” [Midrash Rabbah 3:152].  But to this Rabbi Simeon ben Lakish responded, “Let the mouths of the heretics be stopped up . . . when God warns a man once, twice, and even a third time, and he still does not repent, then does God close his heart against repentance so that He should exact vengeance from him for his sins.  Thus it was with wicked Pharaoh.  Since God sent five times to him and he took no notice, God then said, ‘Thou hast stiffened thy neck and hardened thy heart; well, I will add to thine uncleanness’, hence for I have hardened his heart” [Midrash Rabbah 3:152].  In this case Pharaoh hardened his own heart and God only acted after giving him several chances to repent; and when Pharaoh failed to change his ways, God confirmed Pharoah actions in order to make an example of him and convict him of his guilt.  So ultimately this text also supports the concept of human freedom, while it simultaneously supports the idea of divine judgment.

[2]  Covenants:  Agreements and Responsibilities

          The next point I will consider is the concept within Judaism of covenants offered by God and accepted by man.  A covenant is a binding agreement between two or more responsible persons or parties.  By implication both parties must be free in order to uphold their respective promises in the agreement.  Now admittedly there is an infinite gulf between God and man, but this does not negate the fact that the agreement between them requires the freedom to choose on the part of both parties, yet it does mean that God, an infinite being, in some way limits himself in order to give man, a finite being, certain rights and responsibilities.

Biblical Examples

          In the seventeenth chapter of Genesis God makes a covenant with Abram, thus renaming him Abraham.  God appears to him and says, “‘I am El Shaddai.  Walk in My ways and be blameless.  I will establish My covenant between Me and you, and I will multiply you exceedingly numerous’” [Gen. 17:1].  In this statement God identifies Himself and then tells Abraham what he must do, that he must “walk in [the Lord’s] ways” and “be blameless.”  This implies that Abraham is a free being who can do these things of his own accord, the statement makes no sense if Abraham is an automaton pre-programmed by God to behave in a certain way and to perform certain actions for which he is not responsible.  In this text God promises to give Abraham the land of Canaan, and to give him many descendants, and make him into a great nation.  God then tells Abraham what he must do in order to fulfill his part of the agreement; he must circumcise the males in his household on the eighth day after birth.  Abraham agrees to this covenant and circumcises himself and all the males in his household.  God also stipulates that “. . . if any male who is uncircumcised fails to circumcise the flesh of his foreskin, that person shall be cut off from his kin; he has broken My covenant” [Genesis, 17:14].  This verse makes no sense if God predetermines everything that happens in an absolute way, as opposed to His determining things contingently upon His foreknowledge of man’s possible actions.

          In the second and final example in this part of the paper, I will briefly look at the Mosaic covenant and the freedom that God gave to the Israelites in determining whether or not they wanted to enter into this agreement with Him.  While the Israelites were encamped in the Sinai wilderness, the Lord spoke to Moses and said, “‘Thus shall you say to the house of Jacob and declare to the children of Israel:  You have seen what I did to the Egyptians, how I bore you on eagles’ wings and brought you to Me.  Now then, if you will obey Me faithfully and keep My covenant, you shall be My treasured possession among all the peoples.  Indeed, all the earth is Mine, but you shall be to Me a kingdom of priests and a holy nation.  These are the words that you shall speak to the children of Israel’” [Exodus 19:3-6].  The italicized phrase is highly important, in that it shows the condescension of God, who limits Himself in order to allow the Israelites, a group of finite beings, to have the freedom to determine their own future even after all the wondrous things God had done for them.  To the Lord’s offer of a covenant scripture says, “All the people answered as one, saying, ‘All that the Lord has spoken we will do!’” [Exodus, 19:8].

          Now, in doing this the people were agreeing to limit themselves, from that moment on they would be governed by the Torah revealed at Sinai.  Once they had entered the covenant with the Lord, the people had agreed to limit their own freedom, but there is a difference between limiting something and not having it at all.  That is why in Deuteronomy it says, “See, I set before you this day life and prosperity, death and adversity.  For I command you this day, to love the Lord your God, to walk in His ways, and to keep His commandments, His laws, and His rules, that you may thrive and increase . . . I have put before you life and death, blessing and curse.  Choose life” [Deuteronomy, 30:15-16, 19].  So the free will of the Israelites was not destroyed by the covenant, and they still had to decide to keep their part of the agreement.  The language of scripture is clear in regard to man’s freedom, and because man is free scripture emphasizes that he is also responsible for his actions.

          One final note must be mentioned in regard to the covenants, and that concerns the failure of one or the other of the parties to uphold an element of the agreement.  Of course God will never fail to uphold his part, He is infallible and His covenants are irrevocable, but man as a finite and contingent being is quite fallible and often fails.  What is a man to do if he fails to keep a part of the covenant?  He must repent.  The very concept of repentance implies that man possesses free will and can change his mind, unless one wants to hold the view that everything is staged by God and that what we think of as freedom is nothing but an illusion, but such a view is hard to reconcile to what scripture itself says and to the reality we see around us.  By looking at chapters 29 and 30 of the book of Deuteronomy one can see how repentance works itself out in the biblical tradition.  It is first necessary to identify the crime, “Perchance there is among you some man or woman, or some clan or tribe, whose heart is even now turning away from the Lord our God to go and worship the gods of those nations . . .” [Deuteronomy, 29:17].  Here the crime is idolatry.  Next one sees the result of the crime:  “And later generations will ask – the children who succeed you, and foreigners who come from distant lands and see the plagues and diseases that the Lord has inflicted upon that land . . .” [Deuteronomy, 29:21].  The result is punishment.  After “all these things befall you . . . and you take them to heart amidst the various nations to which the Lord your God has banished you, and you return to the Lord your God, and you and your children heed His command with all your heart and soul, just as I enjoin upon you this day, then the Lord your God will restore your fortunes” [Deuteronomy, 30:1-2].  Here ones sees the result of the punishment, and that it is medicinal in nature, for it brings about repentance and redemption.  This whole system only makes sense if man is truly free, for if he is not free it becomes nonsensical.

[3]  Necessity and Freedom

          God as an infinite being knows all things, but He knows things in two different ways.  He knows some things absolutely; while He knows other things contingently, which means that some of His predeterminations are made based on what man will decide to do.  Thus not everything that happens of necessity happens in the same manner, and one must distinguish between two forms of necessity; some things happen by absolute necessity, while other things happen by contingent necessity.  Let me illustrate my point:  when a man sits, he sits necessarily (i.e., absolute necessity) as long as he is sitting, for it is impossible for him to sit and not to sit at the same time; however, he sits freely (i.e., contingent necessity), because it is always possible for him to stand up.  God has the ability to know not only what will actually happen, but what could potentially happen as well.  That this is what Rabbi Akiva meant when he said that, “All is foreseen, but freedom of choice is given” [Danby, Aboth 3:16, 452].  So man’s created free will cannot frustrate the uncreated free will of God, because God achieves His will through man’s free will.

Biblical Example

          An example of this idea of contingency can be seen in First Samuel.  David’s men had just successfully defeated the Philistines in a battle at Keilah; the scripture then said, “When Abiathar son of Ahimelech fled to David at Keilah, he brought down an ephod with him.  Saul was told that David had come to Keilah, and Saul thought, ‘God has delivered him into my hands, for he has shut himself in by entering a town with gates and bars’” [First Samuel, 23:6-7].  David discovered what Saul is planning to do, so he told “Abiathar to bring the ephod forward.  And David said, ‘O Lord, God of Israel, Your servant has heard that Saul intends to come to Keilah and destroy the town because of me.  Will the citizens of Keilah deliver me into his hands?  Will Saul come down, as Your servant has heard?  O Lord, God of Israel, tell Your servant!’  And the Lord said, ‘He will.’  David continued, ‘Will the citizens of Keilah deliver me and my men into Saul’s hands?’  And the Lord answered, ‘They will.’  So David and his men, about six hundred in number, left Keilah at once and moved about wherever they could.  And when Saul was told that David had got away from Keilah, he did not set out” [First Samuel, 23:9-13].  In this biblical pericope the Lord foresees what will occur if David stays in Keilah, and confirms David’s fears, so rather than stay there, David and his men leave and so the foreseen events do not occur.  This episode shows the dynamic relationship that exists between what God sees as real possibilities in the future and the free decisions of man.

Conclusion

          The biblical texts affirm both the idea that God is omniscient and the idea that man is truly free, thus the two concepts must be seen in such a way that they compliment each other.  This is what Rabbi Akiva has tried to do in giving his teaching in Mishnah.  Taking into account the time constrains imposed on me for this assignment, I think I have given ample evidence both biblical and philosophical to support the idea that man really does have free will.  The biblical text itself simply assumes that God foresees everything, while it simultaneously assumes that man has free will and is responsible for his actions.  Reconciling these two concepts is not easy, but it is best to always remember that God is infinite and man is finite, thus God’s will is absolute, while man’s will is a relative participation in the divine will.  God is the primary cause, while man is only a secondary cause of what happens in this world.  Keeping this in mind will prevent one from going to the extreme position of the Calvinists and Muslims, who both tend toward a form of fatalism; or going to the opposite extreme of atheism and its complete denial of the divine and its elevation of man and his will to an absolute value.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Works Cited:

Herbert Danby, D.D. (Translator).  The Mishnah.  (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1933).

Rabbi Dr. I. Epstein (Editor).  The Midrash Rabbah.  (New York:  The Soncino Press, 1983).  10 Volumes.

Solomon Schechter.  Aspects of Rabbinic Theology.  (Peabody:  Hendrickson Publishers, Inc., 1998).

The Tanakh:  The Holy Scriptures.  (Philadelphia:  The Jewish Publication Society, 1985).

Works Consulted:

Joseph I. Gorfinkle (Translator).  The Eight Chapters of Maimonides on Ethics.  (New York:  AMS Press, Inc., 1966).

Freedom of the Will in Judaism

by Steven Todd Kaster

San Francisco State University

Jewish Studies 310:  Jewish Thought and Culture

Term Paper

Professor Nitzhia Shaked

4 May 2000 (revised 7 May 2000)

Copyright © 2000-2025 Steven Todd Kaster