Part 1

          The position of the “De Anima” in the works of Aristotle presupposes that one has already studied the “Organon,” which includes the “Categories,” the “Analytics” both prior and posterior, the “Topics”, and in addition to these the “Physics.”  The “De Anima” is the crown on the natural sciences, and thus it is like a bridge which leads into the study of the “Metaphysics.”  It is important to note that the soul is a part of the natural world; some people mistake the soul for a metaphysical principle, but it is not, it is a natural principle.  The later books of the corpus, the “Metaphysics,” the “Nicomachean Ethics,” the “Politics,” etc., would presuppose that one has already studied the “De Anima.”  (a)  What Aristotle is determined to discover from his investigation in the “De Anima” is the essential nature of the soul, i.e., what the soul is in itself.  This is of course distinct from the properties of the soul.  Some of the properties are affections of the soul, while others inhere in the composite being (i.e., body and soul as a single living entity).  (b)  The knowledge of the fact is the simple observation of things, i.e., the knowledge that something is so; while knowledge of the reasoned fact is knowledge of the cause of the observable phenomena, i.e., knowledge because of the fact.  An example of the knowledge of the fact is the observation that, an eclipse is the darkening of the full moon, this is understood through a posteriori reasoning, i.e., knowledge from effect to cause.  Knowledge of the reasoned fact concerning an eclipse of the full moon would seek to explain the cause of the eclipse, it is a priori reasoning.  So in this example of an eclipse of the full moon, the reasoned fact is the interposition of the earth between the sun and the moon.  This is a causal explanation of an eclipse.  Thus the knowledge of the fact is an explanation moving from effect to cause, while in the other case one moves from cause to effect.  The second one explains the real cause of an eclipse.  (c)  The comparison, as I see it, is that a posteriori reasoning begins with the properties, while a priori reasoning explains the essence, and so the former moves from the observable qualities to the essence, while the latter moves from the essence (i.e., the general) to the particular.  What it shows about Aristotle’s view of the mind, is that man initially learns about things by observing the properties of the things and abstracts from them (i.e., the particular) to the universal essence or form.  Though eventually in the “De Anima” he argues for the separableness of the mind from the body, this does not negate the fact that he holds that the soul is the form of the body, and that these two principles form one living being.  So (a) and (b) are in a sense connected, for in approaching the study of the soul from the properties one would be using a posteriori reasoning, while studying the soul from the perspective of the essence would be an example of a priori reasoning.  That said, a priori reasoning is the more valuable of the two for it gives the cause.  (d) The importance of the opening section of chapter 13 of Book 1 of the “Nicomachean Ethics” is that it concerns virtue and as Aristotle says in this passage, “. . . clearly the virtue we must study is human virtue; for the good we are seeking is the human good and the happiness of human happiness.  By human virtue we mean not that of the body but that of the soul; and happiness also we call an activity of soul” [1102a 13-16].  So the study of the soul is of vital importance to the study of ethics and human social interaction in general.  (e) The distinctions of matter and form, and of act and potency, are important in the study of the soul, because the soul is the form of the body which it actuates.  The matter is the potency which is characterized by the soul.  As to the last portion of this question, I am not sure I understand what you mean by the “grades of actuality,” unless by this you are talking about how cognition occurs.  If this is what you mean by the phrase, then the first grade, or better, the first act would be the soul and its powers, or abilities.  The second act is the “habitus,” i.e., the acquired abilities (the enablement); and finally, third act, which is the actual use of the dispositions acquired.  In this system third act initially precedes second act in order of time, and through it “habitus” is built up.  Once “habitus” is there, it can be utilized and thus brought into full act (i.e., third act) at will.  The initial third acts prior to the development of “habitus” are in some sense stabs in the dark, and thus by trial and error the person learns and acquires “habitus.”

Part 2

          Throughout the various passages Aristotle is differentiating between the way in which the intellectual soul is passive, and the way in which matter is passive.  In the former case the soul is passive in receiving forms through the abstraction of the agent intellect, but this passivity does not mean that the soul undergoes change in the way that matter does; instead it becomes informed by the forms of the objects it apprehends.  When he speaks of matter, he is indicating that the matter is acted upon in such a way that it undergoes change.  When matter receives a form it is locked into that form, it grabs onto the form, to the exclusion of all other forms, and so it cannot accept more than one form, but this is not the case with the intellectual soul, which can apprehend contrary forms and is thus enriched by them.  By distinguishing between the affections of the soul that involve the body and the thinking of the soul, one can argue that Aristotle is saying that the soul in some sense exceeds the body, and thus that it exceeds the matter which it actuates.  (a) It is important that “poiein” and “ergon” are translated the way that they are, what is significant as I see it, is that the soul in its receptivity is not passive in the way that matter is passive.  The soul is very energetic (i.e., ergon) in apprehending the forms.  The form of the object thus informs the mind, and so that which is unlike becomes like what it knows.  This of course is an enrichment of the soul as I said before.  Aristotle’s exclusion of thinking from the list of affections is important because he is leaving open the possibility that the act of intellection exceeds the matter, that as I indicated above, the soul as the form of the body in some sense exceeds the body which it actuates.  He is distinguishing between different kinds of movement (cf., 408a 30-32), the soul is not moved as matter is moved.  The soul can only be seen as moved when taken as a hylomorphic composite with the body, and then the soul is still only moved incidentally, not directly.  He clearly distinguishes the passivity of the soul and its movement from that of matter.  He argues directly in 408b that the mind “. . . seems to be an independent substance implanted within the soul and to be incapable of being destroyed” [408b 17-19].  So he does argue for a distinction between body and soul that would permit the soul as mind to be independent of the body it actuates.  In his example he explains that old age because it affects the body, that which is enformed by the soul, it affects the mind but only in an incidental way, because as he states the “. . . mind is itself impassible” [408b 25].  This impassibility of mind thus argues for the fact that the soul is not itself moved (cf., 408b 30-32).  (b) The addition of the word “matter” in 414a 10 is improper because Aristotle is comparing two different orders of change or movement, and the addition of the word matter destroys his subtle distinction.  Aristotle is not denying a similarity in these two cases of receptivity, but he continues to assert that they are of different types, one (matter) is purely passive in that it undergoes change; while the soul, though passive, receives the forms and is enriched by them.  He is talking about two different types of being acted upon.  In the case of an unhealthy body becoming healthy, there is contrariety, for the body cannot be healthy and unhealthy in the same way and at the same time, good health forces out ill health.  But with the soul this is not the case, contrary forms can be in the soul, because the soul’s receptivity is of a different kind, thus when health is conferred on the body this is one kind of being acted upon; a different kind of being acted upon is spoken of when dealing with knowledge.  Finally in reference to your question of “which is a case of movement, i.e., of being changed or altered?” [EXAM Q. 2].   It is the case which concerns movement from being unhealthy to being healthy.  The body undergoes a change from unhealthy to healthy, it grasps onto the new condition and the old condition is thus expelled.  While in the case of the soul this does not follow, for the soul can apprehend many forms at one time, and thus can be said to maintain or rescue the intellect, “For what possesses knowledge becomes an actual knower by a transition which is either not an alteration of it at all (being in reality a development into its true self or actuality) or at least an alteration in a quite different sense from the usual meaning” [417b 6-8].  This kind of alteration, if you want to call it that, is an enrichment of the soul, it is a fulfillment.  So, Aristotle is using the term “paschein” in a homonymous way.  As you pointed on in your lecture on 6 March 2001, “paschein” means “to undergo” in the case of matter, while it means “to receive” in the case of cognition.

Part 3

          Aristotle begins by saying that there is “. . . no necessity that what originates movement should itself be moved” [406a 3].  He says this in order to counter the position of his predecessors (excluding Anaxagoras), that because the soul originates movement it follows that it must be self-moving.  His predecessors of course held to the inductive premise that like produces like, so since they observed that the soul caused movement in the body (or the hylomorphic composite) they reasoned that the soul must be self-moved.  Of course the problem with this premise is that it leads one into an infinite regress.  But nonetheless they supported this premise by referring to observations of the physical world, since of course they never saw anything contrary to this in the natural world.  Aristotle has no problem with the soul as the power or source (arche kineseos) of setting the composite being in motion, but from this it does not follow that the soul is self-moving.  After a brief denial in the opening paragraph of chapter three that movement is of the essence of the soul, he goes on to explain different ways of understanding movement itself.  He explains that movement can be either: (1) direct, i.e., owing to itself, or (2) indirect, i.e., owing to something other than itself, in other words, a thing can be moved incidentally.  Ultimately what he is arguing against is the idea that the soul is directly moved; because for Aristotle the soul is actually unmoved, it causes the composite being to move and in doing this it is incidentally moved, but it is not directly moved, either by itself or by another.  So, when the composite being is moved by the soul, the soul is incidentally moved, this is analogous to the sailor on a ship who is moved indirectly as the ship itself moves.  The soul is also incidentally moved when the composite being is moved by another, as he explains with reference to an animal being pushed off its course (cf., 406b 6).  As to his objection to the Platonic and Pythagorean view of the soul being in the body as a sailor is in his ship; Aristotle’s view of the soul as the form of the body prevents this, for him the soul and the body come together in such a way that the form a single being, a hylomorphic being.  When the matter is enformed by the soul, it in a sense grasps the form locking it in place to the exclusion of anything else.  The matter and form are a single thing or substance.  He explains this later in the treatise (cf., Book II, Chapter 2), where he says that, “. . . the word substance has three meanings–form, matter, and the complex of both–and of these three what is called matter is potentiality, what is called form actuality” [414a 14-17].  This section is one of his strongest statements about the composite nature of the living being, he is so forceful in it that it almost sounds like he is denying that the soul or any part of it could continue without the body, though he earlier had excluded thinking, here he goes so far as to say that, “. . . the soul cannot be without a body, while it cannot be a body, it is something relative to a body” [414a 20-21].  Of course earlier Aristotle said about the mind that, “. . . it seems to be an independent substance implanted within the soul and to be incapable of being destroyed” [408b 17-19].   And of course he clearly asserts that the mind is separable from the body (cf., 429b 4) later in the “De Anima.”  But I remember that you indicated in several of your lectures, including your lecture last year on 23 March 2000 in Medieval Philosophy, and again last week in this class as well, that the soul as the form of the body, exceeds the matter which it actuates and so it is possible that this element, which exceeds the matter, could go on without it; at least I suppose it could, though I think its existence would be in some sense limited.  As a side note, I would point out that this is why St. Irenaeus in the 2nd century argues in favor of the resurrection of the body.  He holds that the resurrection is an article of faith revealed in Christ, but when trying to explain this doctrine in his writings he argues from natural principles, and indicates that the soul alone is not the person, just as the body alone is not the person, but only the two together make up what it is to be a human person.

Part 4

          The soul and body are one composite being, so when the matter receives the form it undergoes change and is organized with the characteristics of the form.  The matter in a sense takes hold of the form and locks it in, it is thus no longer open to receiving additional forms.  The soul is different than matter in this regard, because the mind can receive many forms.  The word received here is not being used in the same way as it is when one talks about matter and its receptivity.  This being said, Aristotle makes a further distinction between the passivity and receptivity of the senses as opposed to the passivity and receptivity of the mind, he holds that they are of two different kinds.  Properties like anger, courage, appetite, etc., are composite, they affect both the body and the soul, while the intellect is in some sense separable from the body, as he says, “. . . the faculty of sensation is dependent upon the body, mind is separable from it” [429b 3-4].  In chapter three he points out that the senses are in some way limited, by their union with the body, if one sees a bright color or smells a powerful odor, one is less able to exercise these senses immediately afterward, but this is not the case with the intellect (cf., 429a 31-429b 3).  The intellect is different, as Aristotle puts it, “. . . in the case of the mind, thought about an object that is highly intelligible renders it more and not less able afterwards to think objects that are less intelligible” [429b 3-4].  Sensation is dependent on the body in a way that mind is not.  Unlike matter which locks in a single form, the intellect can receive many forms and in so doing it is enriched.  Simon uses the terms “heteronomic passivity” and “autonomic passivity” in order to distinguish clearly between the kinds of passivity that Aristotle is speaking of.  Heteronomic passivity concerns matter, and matter has no selfhood; whatever it is depends on what has taken it over, i.e., the form which characterizes it as this particular thing.  In receiving the form matter undergoes change; on the other hand, autonomic passivity does not change a thing in the same way, because it is a reception of a form by the intellect, and so it is an actuation.  Thus it is not a process of undergoing a change in the same way as matter undergoes change in receiving a form.  In autonomic passivity the mind is receptive but this does not mean that it is inert, the passive mind is actually quite energetic in apprehending the forms.  The soul may be self-fulfilling, and yet not self-moving, because immanent action unlike transitive action is not movement, it is akin to growth.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Works Cited:

Aristotle:

Richard McKeon (Editor).  The Basic Works of Aristotle.  (New York:  Random House, Inc., 1941).

Works Consulted:

Jonathan Lear.  Aristotle:  The Desire to Understand.  (Cambridge, UK:  Cambridge University Press, 1999).

Yves Simon.  An Introduction to Metaphysics of Knowledge.  (New York:  Fordham University Press, 1999).

A Brief Historical and Philosophical Examination of Aristotle's "De Anima"

by Steven Todd Kaster

San Francisco State University

Philosophy 770:  Aristotle Graduate Level Seminar

Dr. John Glanville

22 May 2001

Copyright © 2001-2025 Steven Todd Kaster