Hans Jonas

          In his essay Hans Jonas first gives a brief overview of the historical development of epistemological thought through time, thus explaining to the reader how the theory and purpose of knowledge was understood in the ancient world, and how it has been understood for about the last 400 years.  The ancient philosophical view knowledge saw it as an end in itself, while in the modern period knowledge has been seen as a means to an end, and that end being the benefit of the human race through technological progress.  As Jonas explains, this view is foreign to the ancients and although ancient philosophy could say that there are innate uses for knowledge, it would assert that these uses are secondary to the contemplation of knowledge itself, which for them was the real goal.

          It is in the modern period that, Francis Bacon puts forward the view that knowledge is a means to an end rather than an end in itself.  As Jonas points out, for Bacon “the use of knowledge consists in the ‘fruits’ it bears in our dealing with common things” [Jonas, 337].  The twofold purpose of knowledge as Bacon and those who follow after him saw it, was to preserve human life and to better man’s condition.  Now whether this view of knowledge as a tool is essential to its nature or whether it is accidental is an open question, [cf., Jonas, 340].  But Jonas himself believes that for modern theory, “practical use is no accident but is integral to it, or that ‘science’ is technological by its nature [Jonas, 340].  Over the last 300 or more years, knowledge and theory have become inextricably connected.  Due to this connection the idea that nature possess an intrinsic form is lost, and nature becomes something which man can manipulate.  As a consequence of this view, a type of quantitative reductionism occurs, and so “the parts are called upon to account for the whole, and that means that the primitive has to account for the more articulated, or, in older parlance, the lower [accounts] for the higher” [Jonas, 342].  This way of viewing reality is the result of “the fusion of theory and practice,” which are seen as “inseparable in a way which the mere terms pure and applied science fail to convey” [Jonas, 343].

          The result of all of this is to subject man to, “What Nietzsche has called ‘sovereign becoming’,” so that, “ theory, far from having somewhere to stand beyond it, is chained to its chariot, in harness before it or dragged in its tracks – which, it is hard to tell in the dust of the race, and sure it is only that not theory is the charioteer” [Jonas, 345].  What Jonas points out is that science and technology are no longer controlled by man, but man is in a sense controlled by them.  In addition, although they claim to be ‘value free’ in fact they are not, for science has already established the goal of happiness, and in it’s view happiness is “indulgence in the use of things” [Jonas, 346].

          In concluding his article Jonas indicates that it is not possible to “return to the classical position open to honesty and logic” [Jonas, 346], though I do not agree with his reasoning in this area, he does assert that the forward motion of technology is irreversible, because it has a momentum all its own.  This portion of his essay is the weakest part, for he merely assumes that technology is unstoppable, and bemoans this fact.  What he advocates in some mysterious way is for man to use the present scientific theory, but to then look beyond it to a “trans-scientific theory.”  The very “fact of science,” he says, “can provide a clue for a theory of man, so that we may know again about the essence of man – and through it, perhaps, even something of the essence of Being” [Jonas, 346].  This of course remains to be seen, but though he denies that he is calling for a return to a contemplative view of knowledge, this is precisely what he is calling for, but not in order to replace the modern view, but only to in some sense infuse elements of the ancient view of contemplative knowledge into the modern view.

Paul K. Moser, Dwayne H. Mulder, and J. D. Trout

          When Moser, Mulder, and Trout give their reason for studying knowledge in itself they say, “People commonly emphasize the importance of having knowledge or at least the resulting power,” but right after this statement they modify their initial comment just slightly, when they say, “Sometimes we pursue knowledge simply because we love to learn.  Sometimes there are external pressures on us to acquire knowledge” [Moser, 2].  Jonas’ question to the author’s of the book The Theory of Knowledge would be this:  Why do you connect knowledge with power, what is it that you see that intrinsically unites these two concepts?  Jonas would ask this question because the authors of the book presuppose this connection to be so, but never really indicate why it is so.  Throughout the opening portion of chapter one, the authors merely assume that knowledge is valuable because of what we can do with it, and not because it is an end in itself.  Though of course they do have the one cursory statement I quoted above, that “Sometimes we pursue knowledge simply because we love to learn” [Moser, 2].  But in actuality they have taken a utilitarian view of the importance of knowledge accepting uncritically the modern view.  Jonas would want them to explain themselves on this point with greater depth and clarity.

          The second question that Jonas would propose to Moser, Mulder and Trout, would concern the evaluative element in epistemology, he would ask them the following:  Can epistemology be divorced from a normative understanding of justification that is not based on an ethical understanding of the nature of the things known?  When the authors seem to dismiss the deontological theory of Chisholm, they seem to be embracing the view that Jonas attacks in section three of his article and in concluding section as well.  Jonas argues that objects have value in themselves, and this is part of his attack on the “sovereign becoming” of technological knowledge.  Jonas is arguing against the scientific reductionism that sees value as something that man assigns to things once he begins to utilize them.  Moser, Mulder and Trout in rejecting this view are once again emphasizing the view that knowledge is simply a means to an end, a means to power.  Jonas sees in this mentality the slavery of theory to automatic technological change without “comprehending the essence of those elements themselves” [Jonas, 342].  He would question the authors about their view in this matter because as he points out, although science claims to be value free, it in fact is not; and, “The nature of things is left with no dignity of its own.  All dignity belongs to man, what commands no reverence can be commanded, and all things are for use” [Jonas, 337].

          The third question as I see it would concern the principle of charity, which though poorly formulated by Francis Bacon, and although the formulation of the theory by Donald Davidson is not the best either; this theory should not necessarily be rejected in it’s entirety by Moser, Mulder, and Trout.  His question to them would concern an element of their rejection of it:  Since you say that “sensitive interpretation at times requires that we find others mistaken in most matters, and that there is no special number of false beliefs that precludes our interpreting the behavior of others intelligibly” [Moser, 47], could it not be that you (Moser, Mulder, and Trout) are mistaken in this very matter?  Seeing that at times we must “find others mistaken in most matters” [Moser, 47], perhaps the authors are mistaken here.  Jonas of course explains the weakness of Bacon’s view of the principle and I think Davidson’s view is not any better, because his view could lead to complacency.  But a view of the charity more akin to Plato’s would be of benefit, and would actually satisfy the objections of Moser, Mulder and Trout, because Plato’s view concerns the action of the one who has gained knowledge assisting those still in the cave, and not simply assuming that one is correct in his assertions.

Willard Van Orman Quine

          The question Jonas would put to Quine is obvious.  How can you reduce epistemology to a scientific theory based in psychology, by which you empty it of any normative aspects, and thus reduce knowledge to simple representations of sensory input?  It is clear in his article that Jonas disagreed with this way of viewing knowledge, especially in sections two where he points out that the modern view sees no dignity in things, the objects of knowledge in themselves.  While in section three of his article he explains that a theory of knowledge (one similar to Quine’s) which makes man the arbiter of value through science, leads to the horror of “sovereign becoming.”  And finally in section five where he sees the outcome of this scientific approach as an emptying of external reality of any real objective existence, as he puts it, “’images and symbols’ formed and use are not the immediate external objects such as rocks and trees, or even of whole classes or general types of such, but symbols for the residual products of a speculative analysis of the given objects and their states and relation” [Jonas, 341].  The weakness in Quine’s theory is in understanding the relationship which exists between the sensory input and the set of representations, or world view, subjectively made by the cognizer, and  radically interpreted by him in order to establish a belief about the external world.  Jaegwon Kim points out a major weakness in this theory, when he writes, “It is none of the naturalized epistemologist’s business to assess whether, and to what degree, the input ‘justifies’ the output, how a given irradiation of the subject’s retinas makes it ‘reasonable’ or ‘rational’ for the subject to emit certain representational output.  His interest is strictly causal and nomological” [Alcoff, 272].  So, when Quine says, “Why not just settle for psychology?” [Alcoff, 256].  The whole tripartite structure of epistemology collapses in Quine’s theory.  From Jonas’ and Kim’s perspective Quine is no longer doing epistemology.  In all of this Quine seems to be reducing knowledge to sensory stimulation and observational sentences, because in Kim’s view he discounts rationality and consciousness, two elements that are central to understanding what knowledge is, because they make knowledge coherent.  This is not to discount the possibility of studying epistemology from a descriptive perspective, but one should not throw out the normative model in doing so.

          As far as Jaegwon Kim goes, I looked on his article as actually quite helpful in critiquing Quine, and I think that Jonas and Kim together make for a good rebuttal to Quine’s position.  But I suppose Jonas’ question to Kim would be:  Why do you not question the connection between technology and theory, and thus confront the dilemma of “sovereign becoming”?  Kim like all three of the articles in Alcoff tends to simply accept the connection between the two.  Though by defending the normative view of epistemology Kim can be used in coordination with Jonas to refute some of Quine’s assertions.  Examples of this can be seen in part five of his essay, where he points out problems with Quine’s views on the relationship of input to output, and on the norms of rationality, as he says, “every belief must be rational in certain minimal ways” [Alcoff, 274].  But I’m sure that Jonas would hold that Kim accepts uncritically the Baconian view of knowledge as a mere means to an end, or as power, and this would be what he would question Kim on most.

          I enjoyed Phyllis Rooney’s article, and enjoyed the portion of the treatise on noun-sense versus verb-sense epistemology.  But I think that Jonas would question the scientific studies on the human person that form a major part of Rooney’s essay.  Jonas’ question to Rooney would be:  How can you prevent your system of epistemology from reducing man to an object lower than himself?  Because you rely so heavily in section three of your paper on the scientific study of the human person, and “since all scientific theory is of things lower than man the knower” [Jonas,339], so this ultimately reduces man to an object of manipulation.  Though I understand and sympathize with Rooney in her use of gender studies, I do not think that Jonas would, he would see in it a reduction of the human person to, as I indicate above, an object of manipulation, as he says, “ man-lower-than-man explained by the human sciences – man reified – can by the instructions of the sciences be controlled (even ‘engineered’) and thus used” [Jonas, 339].  I think Jonas would see Rooney’s discussion of ‘alpha’ and ‘beta’ preferences [cf., Alcoff, 298], as in some way an expression of what he talks about in the quote above.  As a side note, seeing that there is a type of philosophy that is called ‘feminist,’ I think that some gender differences go beyond culture and that the activity of women in this field of study will hopefully bring greater balance to its treatment.

          Finally, Quine would question Jonas’ assumption of transcendence, as Jonas puts it in relation to Plato’s cave:  “scientific theory leads not out of the cave; nor is its practical application a return to the cave, it never left it in the first place” [Jonas, 346].  Jonas asserts that without transcendence science itself is not possible, because though “science is of the cave by its objects and its uses, by its originating cause ‘in the soul’ it is not” [Jonas, 346].  The problem in this for Quine is twofold, first it is too metaphysical in nature for his theory of epistemology, seeing that he is trying to produce a naturalized epistemology.  The word for nature in Greek is physis, and what Jonas is advocating goes beyond simple nature, which is evident by his reference to the ‘soul’; which, even though in Aristotle the soul is not properly speaking metaphysical, yet it does form a bridge between the physical and the metaphysical.  But the real problem in this for Quine is that it would support and require a normative view of epistemology, and not simply the descriptive understanding that he advocates.  As you pointed out in your lecture here we have to different ways of looking at the world, Quine in a way representing the American and British view, and Jonas representing the Continental view.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Linda Martin Alcoff.  Epistemology:  The Big Questions.  (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998).

Moser, Mulder, and Trout.  The Theory of Knowledge: A Thematic Introduction.  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).

Hans Jonas.  "The Practical Uses of Theory."  Social Research: An International Quarterly 51 (1984).

Historical Developments in the Theory of Knowledge

by Steven Todd Kaster

San Francisco State University

Philosophy 610: Epistemology

Professor Anton

17 April 2001

Copyright © 2001-2024 Steven Todd Kaster