PART 1

          In The Quest for Certainty, John Dewey is arguing for a radical reappraisal of how we understand and do epistemology.  He wants to refocus epistemology on action, and on the active interplay between the knower and the known; in other words, how the knower affects the known.  The present problems within epistemology “. . . spring from the doctrine that knowledge is that which has being prior to and independent of the operations of knowing,” he goes on to say that this type of epistemology sees “. . . knowledge as a grasp or beholding of reality without anything being done to modify its antecedent state” [Dewey, 157].  So the present traditional systems of epistemology separate the knower and the known, and thus they divorce knowing from action and from practical application, and in doing this they lead to either dogmatism or skepticism about man’s ability to know.

          Though at a certain level the broad explanationism of Moser and the views of Dewey coincide, they ultimately approach epistemology from different angles.  Moser’s views of explanation do not establish a real connection between the knower and the known as Dewey proposes, and thus Moser continues to see the knower as a spectator.  In chapter of nine of The Theory of Knowledge, Moser says that “. . . human knowers are primarily theorizers rather than simple fact-gatherers” [Moser, 183].  This statement though similar to the position of Dewey in holding that explanation is part of the process of knowing, ultimately falls short of his critique of what is wrong with epistemology.  Moser is continuing the traditional view of a separate knower and of the propositional nature of knowledge, while Dewey is arguing that percepts (i.e., sensations) and concepts are instruments that are used to come to knowledge; but that knowledge itself is eventual (i.e., something future).

          Moser, even though endorsing a form of explanationism that appears similar to what Dewey is advocating, is actually proposing a continuation of the previous epistemological system that sees concepts and percepts as distinct from each other and which also holds that objects of knowledge are antecedent to experimental operations.  Dewey is arguing for a radical change in epistemology, and thus wants us to see percepts, concepts and action (doing through experimentation) as the way to gaining knowledge and leading to knowledge, but not being knowledge in itself.  He is saying that “. . . the object of  knowledge is eventual; that is, it is an outcome of directed experimental operations, instead of something in sufficient existence before the act of knowing” [Dewey, 136-137].  The first part of this statement by Dewey can in part be fitted into Moser’s broad explanationism, but the last part of the statement cannot, because Moser continues to hold to the view of the object of knowledge as something distinct, something separate from and antecedent to the knower.

          Dewey is arguing for a truly practical understanding of knowledge, and thus neither empirical perceptions nor theoretical conceptions are knowledge properly speaking, but are instruments that lead to knowledge through a process of action.  The data we receive through our senses are not to be seen in isolation from the subject of experience, as he puts it, “. . . smells, tastes, sounds, pressures, colors, etc., are not isolated; they are bound together by all kinds of interactions or connections, among which are included the habitual responses of the one having the experience” [Dewey, 141].  Concerning theory, he says that our “. . . conceptions are frankly hypothetical” [Dewey, 153], so one set of conceptions can be discarded in favor of others as knowledge progresses.  Real knowledge comes through the action of investigating the sense data we receive and then by developing conceptual theories to explain them, yet the concepts we develop are not the knowledge itself, nor are the sense data.  The sense data can be seen as presenting a problem which we resolve through the development of concepts that lead to a conclusion which is itself knowledge.  The knowledge is the know how provided by these experimental operations, as they are put into effect, and thus practical action is primary, as he puts it, “. . . all knowledge is the product of special acts of inquiry” [Dewey, 154].

          Moser in his presentation of the topic in chapter 9 of his book, seems to see explanation as knowledge itself or a form of knowledge, and through his abductive inference we come to know about new things from the things we already know, so that “. . . explanatory knowledge is descriptive knowledge of a particular sort” [Moser, 174].  Dewey in opposition to this would hold that explanation is an instrument, and he criticizes traditional theories because they “. . . treat all reflective or inferential knowing as cases of explanation, and by explanation is meant making some seemingly new object or problem plain and clear by identifying its elements with something previously known, ultimately something said to be know immediately and intuitively, or without inference” [Dewey, 145].  So, when Moser and Dewey talk about explanation, they mean different things by the term, and Moser ultimately, like traditional epistemology in general, holds that explanatory knowledge is propositional in nature through a system of identification with previously known things.  This is exactly what Dewey is arguing against.  Although Dewey’s system uses explanation, it does not stop there, but Moser’s appears to do just that, he continues to see the knower as distinct from the known, while also holding that knowledge is simply propositional, and that action is unimportant.

          Dewey has challenged the spectator view of epistemology in his book, but Moser continues to hold that knowledge consists of objects that are outside the knowing subject, and so for Moser, the two (i.e., the knower and the known) are still disconnected because his epistemology remains trapped in a traditional form.  For Dewey knowledge is the last stage in the process of knowing.  Dewey says that something qualifies as knowledge if it works, so unlike Moser he is not a foundationalist and really is not a coherentist either.  Dewey would drop the truth element from epistemology and put in its place an idea of warranted assertability.  His epistemology is almost and anti‑epistemology, if one takes the term in its traditional sense.

          I do not believe that Moser has addressed Dewey’s position on the naturalization of intelligence either, and his association of intelligence with judgment.  Dewey rejects the traditional view of reason (logos) or mind (nous) “. . . the organ . . . by which [the] universal order is grasped” [Dewey, 170].  Dewey rejects the traditional idea that underlying “. . . changing things [there is an] . . . ultimate fixed standard–the law physical phenomena obey, [and] the norm human action should obey” [Dewey, 170].  In its place Dewey would put intelligence which he associates with judgment.  Once again Dewey stresses the practical and as he puts it, “In the large sense of the term, intelligence is as practical as reason is theoretical” [Dewey, 170].  Intelligence is that quality by which we make practical judgments, thus knowledge is action, it is not contemplation.  Moser continues in the traditional view, and this is why he must still concern himself with a defense against skepticism, because he continues to divide the knower and the object known, and simultaneously separates perceptions from conceptions.  Moser’s broad explanationism ultimately remains in the traditional mode.

          The main area where I see that Moser has moved somewhat toward the newer epistemologies is in his acceptance, albeit in a limited way, of the social nature of knowledge.  As he says, “. . . each one of us is an epistemic agent who must determine what to believe just from one’s available personal sources of knowledge, such as perception, reason and memory.  On the other hand, we realize the greatly increased power of a collective social pursuit of knowledge, reaching far beyond what any individual human could accomplish.  We also realize how much we depend on others for even much mundane knowledge we have of the world” [Moser, 122].  This concession is important, and is a break from the traditional viewpoint.  With this said, I now will move on to the second part of the paper which will deal with two additional readings.

PART 2

          In the first section of part two of this paper, I will look at the views of Schmitt and Mills and examine the ways in which they can be seen to correspond, at least in a limited sense, with the epistemological position advocated by Dewey.

          Schmitt says that rather than abstracting to a non-specific or non‑special knower, one must bring in the concept of multiple knowers and thus develop a composite view.  His position is thus egalitarian.  For him the knower is a social subject, and therefore all the differences must be taken into account and brought into the knower.  The knowing subject must not be abstracted away.  As he points out, there are social ramifications when one makes the knower a generic quality, and it in some way promotes social stratification. As he puts it, “The claim that knowing is separate has made an important contribution to this project of justifying actual inequalities by means of its conception of knowledge. . . . Separate knowers are separate not only from one another, and from what their knowledge is about, but also from what they know” [Schmitt, 132].  In saying this he is aligning himself somewhat with what Dewey has said about the separation of the knower from the known.  He then goes on to say that knowledge is propositional, and that because of this it can be expressed in language, but importantly he then moves on to the concept of love.  Love is a true form of knowledge, it is an unfolding relationship between two persons, it grows, but once it is fully realized, one can know that they are loved, and yet “. . . knowing that I am loved is not propositional” [Schmitt, 133].  Knowledge that you are loved “cannot be forced on you by evidence and proof, you must accept the others love” [Schmitt, 133].  Just as love is not propositional, so “it is not separate” [Schmitt, 134].  What he is showing with his example of knowing that one is loved, is that philosophy has had a bias for propositional knowledge, and that this presupposition has itself controlled the way in which epistemology is structured.  In what he is saying about knowledge as being more than propositional, I believe that he and Dewey agree.

          Schmitt holds that one of the most vital components of the knower is his social situatedness.  Schmitt criticizes traditional epistemology because it is centered on the idea of separate knowers, in other words people do epistemology as individuals rather than doing it in a collective sense.  But separate knowing is abstract, and no one ever actually knows in isolation, and because of this abstraction of the knower, and the resulting isolation it causes, the ultimate result is that epistemology tends to fall into skepticism.  This happens because all responsibility is put on the individual, and under the weight of this burden skepticism is the logical result; but if knowledge were based on a social subject, skepticism would be less necessary and less palatable.  Knowledge, for Schmitt, is thus relational.  He is calling for an enlarging of the concept of the knower, and he wants to include those who have been traditionally excluded.  Schmitt also wants to avoid privileging one culture over another, and he wants a democratic principle to be applied which would help to overcome the present prejudices.  No culture should take precedence, or be privileged over any other. 

          Thus Schmitt is challenging the traditional view of a universal knowing subject, and is calling for a social subject in its place; while he is also attacking the idea that knowledge is merely propositional.  He is saying that one must not make all knowledge propositional, but must make it practical and relational as well.  Mills has similar concerns to those expressed by Schmitt.  He also wants to change how the knowing subject is understood, and he too wants to move away from a conception of the knower as generic entity.  He is thus calling for a more specific way of seeing the knowing subject; and in addition to this, he is for using various perspectives (i.e., feminist, black, etc.) as part of the knowing subject.  People think from a certain standpoint, and it is from this standpoint that they investigate reality; in other words they have certain presuppositions and these presuppositions cause some questions to be asked and others to be ignored.  Usually the questions that get ignored are ones which the knowing subject finds to be uninteresting to him.  They are things that do not apply to him based on his social situation.  The traditional epistemological system has tried to maintain that it is possible to see the knowing subject as undifferentiated and as objective, but this is not the case, and this traditional outlook partially explains why some questions are never asked in epistemology.  An example of how social standpoint can affect epistemology, can be seen if one looks at how a person with wealth would view the present data related to the economic situation in the United States, and then contrasts this view with how someone living below the poverty line would see the economy.  Obviously they would see things very differently, so a major weakness in traditional epistemology has been its failure to take into account the different social standpoints of the knower.  Mills does recognize that the temptation to generalize the knower is somewhat understandable, because, “Even if one is always a man or a woman, one is never just a man or a woman.  One is young or old, sick or healthy, married or unmarried, a parent or not a parent, employed or unemployed, middle class or working class, rich or poor, black or white and so forth” [Alcoff, 406].

          In spite of this difficulty, this idea of Mills corresponds in many ways with the views of Dewey, as Dewey says concerning the objects of knowledge, the ". . . original objects of experience are produced by the natural interactions of organism and environment, and in themselves are neither sensible, conceptual nor a mixture of the two" [Dewey, 138].  Knowing is done by a particular subject of experience through an interaction with the objects of knowledge, and thus it is a process, but it is a process that is particular, and not one which is merely universal.  It follows from this that one’s social situation would affect how one understands the information available to him.  So in some sense Dewey, though he never says this explicitly, nor does he speak of the matter in terms similar to those used by Mills, does accept that one's social standpoint affects how one views the information collected in their investigations, but he also has major differences in with Schmitt and Mills on this very point.

          Finally Mills would hold that the social standpoints themselves are not static, that they change with time and as cultures adapt, and this must be taken into account along with historical and other circumstances.  Mills is saying that prior to even asking questions in epistemology, one’s social standpoint must be considered.  This idea of change also fits with Dewey, especially his views about novelty and revision, as he says, “Important conclusions of science are those which distinctly refuse to be identified with anything previously known.  Instead of having to be proved by being assimilated to the latter, they rather occasion revision of what men thought they previously knew” [Dewey, 147].

          As I mentioned briefly above, Dewey would not agree with Schmitt and Mills and their appraisal of science and its claims of objectivity.  Schmitt says that, “. . . the defense of ‘science’ as self-correcting fails on factual grounds” [Schmitt, 129], science has been guilty of continuing and even promoting misogyny and other forms of discrimination.  What he is criticizing is the way in which individuals have conducted themselves in doing scientific research.  Schmitt, and I believe Mills would agree with him on this, is rejecting the idea of the objectivity of the knower in science, and in this way he is criticizing Dewey.  He even quotes Dewey to this effect, indicating that Dewey held one could eliminate “merely personal factors” in the pursuit of knowledge (cf., Schmitt, 128).  In the area of the objectivity of the knower he and Mills appear to part company with Dewey, and I think that Schmitt has the stronger case in this area.  In my own view it is never really possible for one to overcome or eliminate their personal views while they investigate a matter, Gadamer is right about the concepts of prejudice, though the individual should be open to the views of others, and there should naturally be an interaction between the two.  In this way one’s prejudices or presuppositions can be challenged and altered, but this change will simply lead to a different set of prejudices, and thus it will not lead to an objective world view.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Linda Martin Alcoff.  Epistemology:  The Big Questions.  (Oxford:  Blackwell Publishers, 1998).

John Dewey.  The Quest for Certainty.  (Carbondale:  Southern Illinois University Press, 1988).

Paul K. Moser, Dwayne H. Mulder, and J. D. Trout.  The Theory of Knowledge:  A Thematic Introduction.  (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1998).

Richard Schmitt.  Beyond Separateness.  (Oxford:  Westview Press, 1995).  

Philosophy 610:  COURSE READER.

Steven Todd Kaster

San Francisco State University

Philosophy 610:  Epistemology

Dr. Anatole Anton

24 May 2001

Copyright © Steven Todd Kaster