Wilhelm Dilthey

It was some time after the death of Hegel before that outline of vitality became the central theme of a new point of view, the “life-philosophy” of Wilhelm Dilthey. He understood “life” not only as psychic life but as a unity found in that permanent change of state in which consciousness, constituted in relation to the external world, is a moment of subjective identity of this structure in process. Time is the form of correlation between subjective identity and the world. The passage of time appears as an experience and has a teleological character: It is a process with direction. Dilthey has a clear intuition but does not claim to construct a scientific edifice. For him, in the end, all truth is reduced to objectivity, and, as Zubiri points out, applying this to any truth means that everything, even the principle of contradiction, will be a simple fact. In this way, though he is reluctant to seek a foundation of a scientific nature, Dilthey’s brilliant intuitions in the philosophy of life will have a powerful influence on the new current of thought.

Dilthey explains history from “within,” from where it is given, within life, but he does not stop to describe with precision the nature of becoming. It is here that we encounter phenomenology, which, after successive and exhaustive approaches, promises to confront the fundamental problems of historiology. Surely, the difficulty phenomenology faces in justifying the existence of another “I,” different from one’s own, and in general in showing the existence of a world different from the “world” obtained after the epoché, extends to the problem of historicity inasmuch as it is external to lived experience. It is often said that phenomenological solipsism turns subjectivity into a monad “without doors or windows,” to use the phrase so dear to Leibniz. But is this really the case? If so, the possibility of basing historiology on indubitable principles, like those obtained by philosophy treated as a rigorous science, would be seriously compromised.

It is clear that historiology cannot simply take its guiding principles from the natural sciences or mathematics and incorporate them without further ado as part of its own legacy. Here we are speaking of justifying historiology as a science, and hence there is a need to assist its emergence without appealing to the simple “evidence” of the existence of the historical event, in order to then derive from it a science of history. No one can fail to notice the difference between simply being occupied with a field of facts and transforming that field into a science. As Husserl comments in discussion with Dilthey, it is not a question of doubting the truth of a fact, but of knowing whether one can be justified in raising it to a universality of principle.

In: Historiological Discussions, Silo

Chapter 3: History and Temporality, 3.1 Temporality and Process

Wilhelm Dilthey (1833 - 1911)

Photography by the Studio (Atelier) Dührkopp (Berlin), Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

Theologian, teacher, philosopher.

Biographical information

1833 Born on 19 November in Biebrich, Germany
1852 Begins studying theology, history and philosophy in Heidelberg under Kuno Fischer; later moves to Berlin to study under Leopold von Ranke and Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg.
1856 Theological exam in Wiesbaden; in the same year, philological state exam in Berlin.
1864 Doctorate in Berlin with a thesis on Schleiermacher's ethics and Habilitation in the same year with the ‘Attempt at an analysis of moral consciousness’
1866 Professorship in Basel.
1868 Professorship in Kiel.
1871 Professorship in Breslau, where his friendship with Count Paul Yorck von Wartenburg became important for his historical-philosophical works.
1882 Professorship in Berlin.
1905 End of teaching at the university in order to devote himself entirely to his research.

1911 Died on 13 May in Seis am Schlern/today: Italy

Topics

Epistemology of the humanities: Dilthey sought to establish an epistemological foundation for the humanities in order to ensure their methodological independence from the natural sciences. This included the development of methods aimed at understanding and comprehending human experiences and actions.
Hermeneutics: Dilthey developed hermeneutics as a method of understanding and interpreting texts and human forms of expression. He considered hermeneutics to be central to the humanities, as it enables the original expression and creative process to be understood.
Life philosophy: In contrast to the naturalism that was widespread at the time, Dilthey developed a life-philosophical foundation that placed human life and subjective experience at the centre. He emphasised the importance of feeling, imagination and will in understanding the humanities.
Psychology: Dilthey worked on a descriptive and analytical psychology that differs from the natural science of psychology.

Major works

‘Introduction to the Humanities’ (1883): This work is considered his major philosophical work, in which Dilthey formulates the foundations of the humanities and distinguishes their methodology from that of the natural sciences.
‘Ideas about a Descriptive and Dissecting Psychology’ (1894): In this programmatic essay, Dilthey differentiates between humanistic and natural science psychology and lays the foundation for interpretive psychology.
‘The Experience and the Poem’ (1905): In this work, Dilthey examines the connection between experience and artistic expression, emphasising the importance of subjective experience.
‘The Structure of the Historical World in the Humanities’ (1910): This work, published posthumously, deals with the structure of the historical world and its significance for the humanities.
‘The Young Goethe’ (1884): In this biography, Dilthey analyses the life and development of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, which illustrates his hermeneutic method.

Influence

Dilthey is considered the founder of the epistemology of the humanities, in that he secured their methodological independence from the natural sciences and emphasised the importance of understanding human experience.

His hermeneutic approach and emphasis on inner experience helped to establish the humanities as independent disciplines, which significantly influenced the development of subjects such as psychology, sociology and history.

Dilthey's work not only shaped the academic discussion of the methods of the humanities, but also had a lasting influence on the understanding of culture and society in the 20th century, which is reflected in the further development of the social sciences.

Why is he mentioned by Silo in ‘Historiological Discussions’?

Silo: ...Dilthey will explain history to us from the ‘inside’ and from where it arises, namely from life...

Dilthey argued that the humanities require a distinct methodology, aimed at understanding human experiences and expressions of life. This emphasis on inner experience also leads him to the rather intuitive realisation that ‘life’ (and thus history) is a process with direction, although he does not scientifically substantiate the acting temporality.

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