Military-designed constitutions have been central to how the Thai military maintains long-term political influence after coups. After seizing power, the military typically suspends the old constitution, issues an interim charter that grants legitimacy and immunity, and then oversees the drafting of a new constitution that entrenches its authority. This recurring cycle has prevented stable democratic development.
A core purpose of these constitutions is to limit the strength of elected governments. They often weaken political parties through complex electoral rules and fragmented party systems.
Key features include:
electoral systems that prevent strong majority governments;
dispersed party competition that weakens civilian coalitions;
mechanisms that make populist or mass-based parties easier to dissolve.
At the same time, military-designed constitutions empower unelected “watchdog” institutions. Bodies like the Constitutional Court, the Election Commission, and the National Anti-Corruption Commission are given broad authority to remove politicians, dissolve parties, or block legislation.
These institutions act as veto points against elected governments.
They are often staffed or influenced by individuals aligned with military and bureaucratic elites.
Another major tool is the design of the Senate, which frequently includes large numbers of appointed members.
The 2017 Constitution created a fully appointed 250-member Senate.
The Senate participates in choosing the prime minister, giving the military influence over government formation even after elections.
Many senators come from military, police, and conservative bureaucratic backgrounds.
Military-designed constitutions also strengthen the security apparatus, ensuring military autonomy in national security affairs. Organizations such as ISOC and the National Security Council retain powers that allow them to monitor political activity and intervene indirectly without staging coups.
The 2007 and 2017 constitutions clearly reflect these patterns. The 2007 charter emphasized judicial oversight and party dissolution mechanisms, while the 2017 constitution further entrenched military control by imposing a 20-year national strategy that binds future elected governments.
References:
Harding, Andrew, and Peter Leyland, eds. The Constitution of Thailand: A Contextual Analysis. Hart Publishing, 2011.
Dressel, Björn. “Judicialization of Politics in Thailand: The 2006 Coup and Its Aftermath.” Journal of Contemporary Asia 40, no. 3 (2010): 400–421.
Dressel, Björn, and Khemthong Tonsakulrungruang. “Coloured Judges and the Politics of Judicialization in Thailand.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 41, no. 1 (2019): 29–55.
Chambers, Paul, and Napisa Waitoolkiat. Khaki Capital: The Political Economy of the Military in Southeast Asia (Thailand chapters). NIAS Press, 2017.
Montesano, Michael, Terence Chong, and Mark Heng, eds. After the Coup: The National Council for Peace and Order Era and the Future of Thailand. ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, 2019.
McCargo, Duncan. Thai Politics: A Critical Introduction. Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 2020.