Public management reforms drivers in much of the developing world are often reduced to external events rooted in economics and market-based principles. However, in so doing, other reform drivers outside this paradigm are relegated to secondary status. We examine the influence of four non-market drivers of public management reforms in Thailand between the late 1980s through the 1990s. Whereas reform drivers are difficult to separate from each other as they tend to share common effects, we find that competing drivers of reform outside the dominant economics and market-based ones, were also equally influential, even though they may not have been dominant. 

Mutebi & Sivaraks challenge the dominant narrative that Thailand’s public management reforms were simply responses to market forces or economic crises. Instead, they argue that domestic political and institutional dynamics played equally important roles. Their study analyzes reform drivers across the late 1980s–1990s, showing how overlapping pressures, from political shifts to administrative inefficiencies, combined to shape Thailand’s reform trajectory. The authors stress that understanding Thai political development requires looking beyond economic explanations toward more holistic, internal factors.

The article critiques the tendency in development literature to treat public management reforms as primarily market-driven. By examining Thailand’s reform era from the late 1980s to the 1990s, the authors identify four significant non-market drivers: political pressures, institutional motivations, societal expectations, and crisis-induced shifts. These drivers often overlapped, making them difficult to isolate, but collectively they exerted substantial influence.

Mutebi & Sivaraks demonstrate that Thailand’s reform agenda emerged from a complex interplay between external economic influences and internal political actors, reform-minded bureaucrats, and public demands for better governance. While market-based reforms were present, the authors argue that non-market forces were equally influential in shaping the direction, pace, and outcomes of reform. The article ultimately calls for a more balanced understanding of public management change in developing countries, one that recognizes the importance of domestic context, not just global economic pressures.

1. What’s this article actually trying to prove?

It wants to show that Thailand’s public management reforms weren’t driven only by economics, the IMF, or market ideas (even though those mattered). Mutebi & Sivaraks argue that Thailand had other equally powerful drivers: political, institutional, cultural, and administrative pressures that shaped reforms just as much.

2. Why does this matter for understanding Thai politics?

Because the reform era (late 1980s–1990s) coincided with:

• rapid economic development

• political decentralization

• bureaucratic restructuring

• rising expectations of good governance

Understanding these non-market drivers gives a more complete picture of how Thailand’s state evolved, not just as a reaction to globalization or financial pressures, but from internal political dynamics.

3. So… what are these “non-market drivers”?

The authors highlight four (they overlap a lot, so they’re hard to separate):

• Political drivers: shifts in leadership, reforms demanded by political elites, democratization after the 1991–92 crises.

• Administrative/Institutional drivers: pressure to modernize ministries, address inefficiency, and reduce fragmentation.

• Societal drivers: public demand for transparency, accountability, and better service delivery.

• Crisis-driven pressures: major events (e.g., the 1997 crisis) creating momentum for change beyond just economics.

4. Did these reforms actually change anything?

Yes—Thailand saw:

• civil service restructuring

• decentralization to local governments

• new public management-style reforms (performance indicators, evaluation, etc.)

But the key claim is: these changes wouldn’t have happened if economics were the only driver. Non-market forces pushed the state to adapt in ways the market framework alone couldn’t explain.

5. Why is this article still relevant today?

Because Thailand’s reform story still gets oversimplified as “the IMF made us do it” or “market logic forced reforms.” This article reminds us that Thai political culture, institutional tensions, and internal reformers matter too—an argument that still applies to contemporary debates on bureaucracy, decentralization, and political accountability.