Perception and Action: Weekly Schedule
SLIDES FROM PREVIOUS SESSIONS
Seminar 1: Introduction
Seminar 2: The Body in Action
Seminar 3: The Sense of Body Ownership (by Betty Mohler)
Seminar 4: The Comparator Model I (by Axel Lindner)
Seminar 5: The Comparator Model in explaining the Sense of Agency (by Matthis Synofzik)
Seminar 6: Dissociations between Visual Perception and Action (by Marc Himmelbach)
Seminar 7: The Gibsonian Perspective (by Sally Linkenauger)
For topics/readings of past sessions scroll to the bottom of this page
AUGUST 15, 2011 -- ESSAY DUE!!
PAST SESSIONS:
SEMINAR 1
April 11
How do Perception and Action Relate?
The instructor will give an overview of the seminar and the issues to be covered during the course of the semester. The aim will be to trace connections between the various issues and provide a sense of how philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience can fruitfully interact in answering these questions.
Eilan, N. (2010) "Explanatory Role of Consciousness", in T. O’Connor and C. Sandis (eds.) A Companion to the Philosophy of Action (Blackwell).
Bargh, J. A., and Chartrand, T. L. (1999) “The unbearable automaticity of being”, American Psychologist, 54: 462 - 479.
O’Shaughnessy, B. (1992) “The Diversity and Unity of Action and Perception”, in T. Crane (ed.) The Contents of Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 216-266.
Eilan, N., and Roessler, J. (2003) "Agency and Self-Awareness: Mechanisms and Epistemology", in J. Roessler and N. Eilan (eds.) Agency and Self-Awareness (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Hurley, S. (2001) "Perception and Action: Alternative Views", Synthese 129: 3-40.
*No seminar on April 18 - Hong Yu away for workshops
*No seminar on April 25 - Easter holiday
SEMINAR 2
May 2
The Role of the Body in Action?
*Marcel, A. (2003) “The Sense of Agency: Awareness and Ownership of Action”, in J. Roessler and N. Eilan (eds.) Agency and Self-Awareness (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 48-93.
*Wong, H. Y. (2010) “Bodily Awareness and Bodily Agency”, in T. O’Connor and C. Sandis (eds.) A Companion to the Philosophy of Action (Blackwell).
[This short piece provides an overview of the area.]
O’Shaughnessy, B. (1995) “Proprioception and the Body Image”, in J. Bermúdez, A. Marcel, and N. Eilan (eds.) (1995) The Body and The Self (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), pp. 175-203.
Kammers, M., de Vignemont, F., Verhagen, L., Dijkerman, H.C. (2009) “The Rubber Hand in action”, Neuropsychologia 47: 204-211.
de Vignemont, F. (2010) “The body schema and the body image—Pros and cons”, Neuropsychologia, doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.09.022.
Dijkerman, H. C., and De Haan, E. H. F. (2007) “Somatosensory processes subserving perception and action”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30: 189-201.
Peacocke, C. A. B. (2003) “Action: Awareness, Ownership, and Knowledge”, in J. Roessler and N. Eilan (eds.) Agency and Self-Awareness (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 94-110.
[Difficult but rewarding commentary on Marcel (2003).]
SEMINAR 3
May 9
The Sense of Body Ownership
Guest lecture: Betty Mohler (MPI Biological Cybernetics)
*Tsakiris, M. (2010) "My body in the brain: A neurocognitive model of body-ownership", Neuropsychologia 48: 703–712.
*de Vignemont, F. (2007) "Habeas Corpus: The sense of ownership of one’s own body", Mind and Language 22: 427–449.
*Slater M, Spanlang B, Sanchez-Vives MV, Blanke O (2010) "First Person Experience of Body Transfer in Virtual Reality", PLoS ONE 5(5): e10564. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010564
Longo, M. R., Schüür, F., Kammers, M. P. M., Tsakiris, M., Haggard, P. (2008) "What is embodiment? A psychometric approach", Cognition 107: 978-998.
Normand J-M, Giannopoulos E, Spanlang B, Slater M (2011) "Multisensory Stimulation Can Induce an Illusion of Larger Belly Size
in Immersive Virtual Reality", PLoS ONE 6(1): e16128. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016128
de Vignemont, F. (2011) "Embodiment, ownership and disownership", Consciousness and Cognition.
de Vignemont, F. (2010) "Body schema and body image-pros and cons", Neuropsychologia 48: 669–680.
Presentations: Gregor Hochstetter (Philosophy) - de Vignemont (2007)
SEMINAR 4
May 16
The Comparator Model I: History and Basic Physiological Mechanisms
Guest lecture: Axel Lindner (Hertie)
Download all readings for this session as RAR file
*Lindner A, Thier P, Kircher TT, Haarmeier T, Leube DT. (2005) Disorders of agency in schizophrenia correlate with an inability to compensate for the sensory consequences of actions. Curr Biol. 15(12):1119-24.
For further reading please refer to:
Synofzik M, Thier P, Leube DT, Schlotterbeck P, Lindner A. (2010) Misattributions of agency in schizophrenia are based on imprecise predictions about the sensory consequences of one's actions. Brain. 133(Pt 1):262-71.
*Bell CC. (1981) An efference copy which is modified by reafferent input. Science. 214(4519):450-53. For further information please refer to: Bell CC. (2001) Memory-based expectations in electrosensory systems. Curr Opin Neurobiol. 2001 11(4):481-7.
*von Holst, E. (1954): Relations between the central nervous system and the peripheral organs. British Journal of Animal Behavior 2: 89-94. For the “classic” version of this paper please refer to: von Holst, E. und Mittelstaedt, H. (1950): Das Reafferenzprinzip. Naturwissenschaften 37: 464-476.
Von Graefe, A. (1854): Beiträge zur Physiologie und Pathologie der schiefen Augenmuskeln. Archiv für Ophthalmologie 1: 1-81.
Von Helmholtz (1910) Treatise on Physiological Optics 1910, Volume 3. Chapter 29. Translated from the Third German Edition, 1925 (Southall JPC, Ed.).
Sperry R. W. (1950). Neural basis of the spontaneous optokinetic response produced by visual inversion. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 43, 482–489.
Presentations: Markus Schürholz (Medical Psychology) - Bell (1981)
SEMINAR 5
May 23
The Comparator Model II: Sense of Agency
Guest lecture: Matthis Synofzik (Neurology/Hertie)
*Synofzik, M., Vosgerau, G. & Newen, A. (2008) "Beyond the comparator model: A multifactorial two-step account of agency", Consciousness & Cognition 17, 219-239.
*Blakemore S-J, Frith, CD. (2003) "Self-awareness and action", Current Opinion in Neurobiology 13(2): 219-224.
*Blakemore, S-J, Wolpert, DM, Frith, CD. (2002) "Abnormalities in the awareness of action", TRENDS in Cognitive Science 6(6): 237-242.
Bayne, T. (2009) "The Sense of Agency", in F. Macpherson (ed.) The Senses (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Marcel, A. (2003) “The Sense of Agency: Awareness and Ownership of Action”, in J. Roessler and N. Eilan (eds.) Agency and Self-Awareness (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 48-93.
Presentations: Reece Walker (Philosophy) - Blakemore et al (2002)
Eva Engels (Philosophy) - Synofzik et al. (2008)
*NOTE: Everyone is invited to the inaugural lecture of the CIN lecture series in philosophy and neuroscience:
CIN Lectures:
The Games of the Brain
Adventures in Philosophy and Neuroscience
Gerd Gigenrenzer (MPI Human Development)
'Heuristic Decision Making'
May 26, 11 am - details here.
The lecture will connect with issues that we will be discussing in the seminar with Kirsten Volz on July 4.
SEMINAR 6
May 30
Dissociations between Perception and Action: Vision
Guest lecture: Marc Himmelbach (Hertie)
*Clark, A. (2009) “Perception, action, and experience: Unraveling the golden braid”, Neuropsychologia 47: 1460-1468.
*Goodale, M. A. (2010) "Transforming Vision into Action", Vision Research.
*Ungerleider, L. G. and Haxby J. V. (1994) "'What’ and ‘where’ in the human brain", Current Opinion in Neurobiology 4: 157-l65
Himmelbach M, Karnath H-O (2007) "Optic ataxia: a gateway to the human visual action system", in F Mast, L Jäncke (eds.) Spatial processing in navigation, imagery and perception. New York, Springer, 85-105.
Milner, A. D., and Goodale, M. A. (2008) “Two visual systems re-viewed”, Neuropsychologia 46: 774-785.
Campbell, J. (2003) “The Role of Demonstratives in Action-Explanation”, in J. Roessler and N. Eilan (eds.) Agency and Self-Awareness (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 150-164.
Clark, A. (2001) “Visual Experience and Motor Action: are the Bonds too Tight?” Philosophical Review 110: 495-519. [JSTOR]
Jeannerod, M. (2003) “Consciousness of Action and Self-Consciousness: A Cognitive Neuroscience Approach”, in J. Roessler and N. Eilan (eds.) Agency and Self-Awareness (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 128-149
*No seminar on June 6 - everyone should be attending the Graduiertenkolleg Workshop on Rational Agency (June 6-7)
*No seminar on June 13 - Pfingstmontag/Whit Monday
*No seminar on June 20 - HY away at conference
SEMINAR 7
June 27
The Gibsonian Perspective
Guest lecture: Sally Linkenauger (MPI Biological Cybernetics)
*Gibson, J. J. (1979) The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, chapters 7 and 8.
*Proffitt, D. R. (1999) "Inferential versus Ecological Approaches to Perception", in Sternberg (ed.) The Nature of Cognition. MIT.
*Nakayama, K. (1994) "James J. Gibson - An Appreciation", Psychological Review 101: 329-335
Presentations: Daniela Schroers (Philosophy)
SEMINAR 8
July 4
The Mind - A Charioteer Driving Twin Horses of Reason and Emotion?
Guest lecture: Kirsten Volz (CIN)
*Keren, G.B., & Schul, Y. (2009). "Two is not always better than one: A critical evaluation of two-systems theories", Perspectives on Psychological Sciences 4: 533-550
*Kahneman D. (2003) "A perspective on judgement and choice", American Psychologist 58: 697-720.
*Kruglanski, Arie W. & Gigerenzer, Gerd (2011) "Intuitive and deliberate judgments are based on common principles", Psychological Review 118: 97-109
Presentations: Thea Zander (CIN) - Kruglanski & Gigerenzer
July 5
Does Neuroscience make Philosophy Irrelevant?
Workshop on the Philosophy of Neuroscience
10.00 am - 12.00 pm
CIN Seminar Room, TTR Building, Paul Ehrlich Str 17, Tuebingen 72076
Speakers: Anders Nes (CSMN Oslo)
Can there be entirely unconscious agents? The case of decorticated rats and cats
Liz Irvine (Edinburgh)
Evaluating ‘mental’ concepts: The role of scientific practice
SEMINAR 9
July 11
The Libet Paradigm: Conscious Awareness and Action Execution
*Haggard (2005) “Conscious Intention and Motor Cognition”, Trends in Cognitive Science 9: 290-295.
*Haggard, P. (2003) “Conscious Awareness of Intention and of Action”, in J. Roessler and N. Eilan (eds.) Agency and Self-Awareness (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 111-127.
*Pacherie, E. and Haggard, P. (2010) "What are Intentions?", in L. Nadel & W. Sinnott-Armstrong (eds.) Conscious Will and Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lau, H. (2009) "Volition and the functions of consciousness", in M. Gazzaniga (ed.) The Cognitive Neurosciences, 4th Edition (MIT Press).
Libet, B., Gleason, C. A., Wright, E. W., Pearl, D. K. (1983) “Time of conscious intention to act in relation to cerebral activities (readiness potential): the unconscious initiation of freely voluntary act”, Brain 106: 623-642.
Libet, B. (1985) “Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action”, Behavioural and Brain Sciences 8: 529-566.
Mele, A. (2009) Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
[Available on Oxford Scholarship Online]
Presentations: Bahadir Eker (Philosophy) - Haggard (2005)
Anja Berninger (CIN/Philosophy) - Pacherie and Haggard (2010)
SEMINAR 10
July 18
Confabulation in the Awareness of Agency
*Wegner, D. M. (2004) "Precis of The Illusion of Conscious Will", Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 27, 649-692.
Wegner, D. M. (2002) The Illusion of Conscious Will (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
Bayne, T. (2006) "Phenomenology and the Feeling of Doing: Wegner on the Conscious Will", in S. Pockett, W. P. Banks and S. Gallagher (eds.) Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), pp. 169-186.
Mele, A. (2009) Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press). [Available on Oxford Scholarship Online]
Presentations: Arndt David Graulich (Philosophy) - Wegner
SEMINAR 11
July 25
Models of Control + Philosophy and Neuroscience: Strange Bedfellows?
ON MODES OF CONTROL:
*Bargh, J. A., & Morsella, E. (2009) "Unconscious behavioral guidance systems", in C. Agnew et al., Then a miracle occurs: Focusing on behavior in social psychological theory and research. New York: Oxford University Press.
*Bargh, J. A., and Chartrand, T. L. (1999) “The unbearable automaticity of being”, American Psychologist, 54: 462-479.
ON PHILOSOPHY AND NEUROSCIENCE:
*J McDowell (1994) 'The content of perceptual experience', The Philosophical Quarterly.
Eilan, N., and Roessler, J. (2003) "Agency and Self-Awareness: Mechanisms and Epistemology", in J. Roessler and N. Eilan (eds.) Agency and Self-Awareness (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Chambon, V. & Haggard, P. (2011) "Premotor or ideomotor: how does the experience of action come about?" in Arvid Herwig et al. (eds). Tutorials in Action Science.
Shallice, T. (2006) "Contrasting domains in the control of action: the routine and the non-routine", Association Lecture of Attention & Performance XXI: Processes of Change in Brain and Cognitive Development (ed M. Johnson & Y. Munakata), OUP.
Cooper, R. and Shallice, T. (2000) "Contention scheduling and the control of routine activities", Cognitive Neuropsychology 17: 297–338
Perner, J. (2003). "Dual control and the causal theory of action: The case of nonintentional action." In N. Eilan & J. Roessler (Eds.), Agency and self-awareness (218-243). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Presentation: Veljko Dubljevic (Bioethics) - Bargh & Morsella (2009)