Projects

1. Primitive Action: What it is, Why it is Significant, and Applications (PrimAct) (DFG 2024-2027)

PI: Prof. Hong Yu Wong (Universität Tübingen) 

Are there primitive actions – behaviour which is agentive, but which does not derive from the agent’s reasons? Tyler Burge (2009) and Helen Steward (2009a, 2012) have argued that certain examples of animal actions fall into this category. This question is of great significance for the philosophy of action, which has focused on how action is rational behaviour that derives from reason and reflection. Most discussions focus on acting on the basis of reasons – in particular, on how reasons explain actions. Almost all theories of action nowadays derive from the Anscombean or Davidsonian traditions which agree that reason is essential to action. The case of primitive agency is thus striking in challenging the core tenet of reasons being necessary for action.

The existence of primitive actions would thus require a reorientation of the philosophy of action – with implications for key questions, such as whether a theory of action that is equally applicable to human and non-human animal action is possible. In light of this, we urgently need a systematic analysis of primitive action that would address the question of what primitive action is – in light of existing accounts of animal agency from action theory, animal behaviour research, and evolutionary theory. With primitive agency in mind, we need to re-examine the foundations of action theory, especially with respect to our understanding of the relation between reason and action and with respect to our understanding of the distinction between activity and passivity. Finally, we can draw on what we learn from primitive agency and apply this to understanding animal agency and artificial agency. This project (PrimAct) proposes to study primitive agency systematically, to reflect on its significance for action theory more generally, and to explore applications of a theory of primitive agency. Primitive agency has the potential to transform our understanding of the nature of agency.

Cooperation partners:

Stephen Butterfill (Warwick), philosophy of mind and action

Klaus Corcilius (Tübingen), ancient philosophy 

Patrick Haggard (UCL), cognitive neuroscience of action

Helen Steward (Leeds), philosophy of mind and action

Claudio Tennie (Tübingen), evolution of action and learning

2. The New Concept of Mind (Templeton Foundation ACT Fellowship 2017-2020) 

PI: Prof. Hong Yu Wong (Universität Tübingen) 

Executive Summary: The scientific and manifest images of mind may have never been as far apart as they are today. The conflict urgently calls for a reconciliation. It demands an articulation of a new concept of mind for our time. The Templeton ACT Fellowship provides me with a unique opportunity to acquire cross-training in neuroscience and psychology so that I can contribute to this reconciliation. I am a philosopher of mind and have published on action, perception, and the metaphysics of mind. My goal is to acquire skills and knowledge in neuroscience and psychology which are vital for starting to develop a new concept of mind that can reconcile the scientific and manifest images of mind. This is not possible without a firm grounding in the sciences of the mind. Thus I am proposing a program of cross-training in all the major areas of psychology and neuroscience that directly impact on our concept of the mind and of ourselves as embodied, self-conscious subjects and agents. My cross-disciplinary mentor is the renowned cognitive neuroscientist, Professor Patrick Haggard (UCL) for at least the duration of the grant. My cross-training program will provide me with foundational training in cognitive and systems neuroscience and training through laboratory rotations in five thematic areas: 1. Action and Embodiment, 2. Motivation and Affect, 3. The Neuroscience of Consciousness, 4. Social Cognition, and 5. Developmental Psychology. This cross-training will allow me develop my distinctive approach of empirically informed philosophy of mind on which philosophy of mind is an autonomous philosophical enterprise, but not one that is insulated from empirical work.

3. Finding Perspective (VW European Platform 2015-2017)

with Adrian Alsmith (Copenhagen), Matt Longo (Birkbeck), Christophe Lopez (CNRS Marseille), Betty Mohler (MPI Biological Cybernetics)

News release at University of Copenhagen

4. Investigating Body Representation Distortions in Patient Populations using Biometric Self-Avatars in Virtual Reality (CIN 2014-03) (2014-2016)

with Betty Mohler (MPI Biological Cybernetics), Steffen Zipfel (UKT Psychosomatic Clinic), Hans-Otto Karnath (UKT Neuropsychology), and Michael Black (MPI Intelligent Systems)

Key words: Body Representation, Biometric Self-Avatars, Virtual Reality, Eating Disorders, Anosognosia for Hemiplegia

5. Sensory Attenuation and Agency Attribution in Voluntary vs. Involuntary Actions (CIN 2012-17)  (2012-2014)

• PONS awarded a 2 year intramural grant (70,000€) for an interdisciplinary project on the sense of agency with Axel Lindner's NoD lab (Hertie) on "Sensory Attenuation and Agency Attribution in Voluntary vs. Involuntary Actions" (awarded October 2012, Feb 2013 project start).

• Project description: Sensory Attenuation and Agency Attribution in Voluntary vs. Involuntary Actions

• We're pleased to welcome Katia Samoilova (PhD Brown) as the Project's Postdoctoral Fellow! (October 2013)

 6. How does visual embodiment influence perception and action? (CIN 2011-16) (2011-2013)

The visual embodiment project in action at the Cyberneum's tracking hall