Hauptseminar, Summer Semester 2016
Instructor:
Dr. Mog Stapleton (mog.stapleton.philosophy@gmail.com)
Philosophy of Neuroscience Group
CIN/Department of Philosophy
University of Tübingen
Cross-listed in: Philosophy, Max Planck Neural and Behavioral Graduate School
Time and Location:
Fridays, 14.15 pm
Lecture Hall, Graduate Training Centre of Neuroscience
International Max Planck Research School
Österbergstr. 3, 72074 Tübingen
In recent years there has been a trend in philosophy and the cognitive sciences emphasising the importance of the body for cognition and consciousness. But what role does the body actually play in these processes? In this course we will consider this question with a specific focus on bodily feelings and their role in experience. We will first of all consider why one might think that processes outside of the brain might play an important role in cognition, and the main current approaches to this question. We will then step back and consider a traditional question in philosophy and psychology: the nature of the relation between bodily feelings and emotional experience. Through engaging with some of the most well-known research in this field we will see several ways that recent neuroscience has proposed that feelings play a key role in both emotion and other kinds of healthy mental processes. In the final part of the course we will consider how the more recent understanding of how the brain processes feelings and emotion might relate to our more general experience of the world.
The course will not presume any previous philosophical or neuroscientific knowledge but will forge towards providing a foundation for a bridge between the two disciplines. The aim of the course will be for students of all disciplines to develop a sense of the way that neuroscience research can help us reframe key philosophical questions and, similarly, how neuroscience research itself can benefit from drawing on philosophical knowledge and expertise. In so doing we will cultivate a basic literacy in the psychology and neuroscience of bodily feelings and begin to consider how our latest understanding of neural mechanisms may change the way we address traditional philosophical questions pertaining to cognition, emotion, and experience.
Literatur:
The full seminar plan and all readings for the course will be available on Ilias at the beginning of semester.
Kurzbemerkung:
Discussion and all readings will be in English.
Zielgruppe:
All interested students are welcome. Some background in philosophy, psychology, or neuroscience would be helpful. The course will be of particular interest to those students enrolled in Philosophy, Cognitive Science, Psychology, and the Max Planck Neural and Behavioral Graduate School.
Readings: (Core texts in blue)
Part 1: Embodiment and Cognition
1. Anderson, M. L. (2003). Embodied Cognition: A field guide. Artificial Intelligence, 149(1), 91–130.
2. Chiel, H. J., & Beer, R. D. (1997). The brain has a body: adaptive behavior emerges from interactions of nervous system, body and environment. Trends in Neurosciences, 20(12), 553–557.
3. Clark, A. (1999). An embodied cognitive science? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 3(9), 345–351.
4. Clark, A. (2008). Pressing the Flesh: A Tension in the Study of the Embodied, Embedded Mind?*. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 76(1), 37–59.
5. Shapiro, L. (2007). The Embodied Cognition Research Programme. Philosophy Compass, 2(2), 338–346.
6. Wilson, M. (2002). Six views of embodied cognition. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 9(4), 625–636.
Part 2: Embodiment and Experience
1. Alsmith, A. J. T., & Vignemont, F. de. (2012). Embodying the Mind and Representing the Body. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 3(1), 1–13.
2. de Vignemont, F. (2010). Body schema and body image—Pros and cons. Neuropsychologia, 48(3), 669–680.
3. Longo, M. R., & Haggard, P. (2012). What Is It Like to Have a Body? Current Directions in Psychological Science, 21(2), 140–145.
4. Longo, M. R., Schüür, F., Kammers, M. P. M., Tsakiris, M., & Haggard, P. (2008). What is embodiment? A psychometric approach. Cognition, 107(3), 978–998.
Part 3: Internal Embodiment and Cognition
1. Damasio, A. R., Everitt, B. J., & Bishop, D. (1996). The Somatic Marker Hypothesis and the Possible Functions of the Prefrontal Cortex [and Discussion]. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences, 351(1346), 1413–1420.
2. Dunn, B. D., Evans, D., Makarova, D., White, J., & Clark, L. (2012). Gut feelings and the reaction to perceived inequity: The interplay between bodily responses, regulation, and perception shapes the rejection of unfair offers on the ultimatum game. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 12(3), 419–429.
3. Dunn, B. D., Galton, H. C., Morgan, R., Evans, D., Oliver, C., Meyer, M., … Dalgleish, T. (2010). Listening to Your Heart: How Interoception Shapes Emotion Experience and Intuitive Decision Making. Psychological Science, 21(12), 1835–1844.
4. Herbert, B. M., & Pollatos, O. (2012). The Body in the Mind: On the Relationship Between Interoception and Embodiment. Topics in Cognitive Science, 4(4), 692–704.
Part 4: Embodiment and Emotion
1. James, W. (1884). What is an emotion? Mind, 9, 188–201.
2. Lambie, J. A., & Marcel, A. J. (2002). Consciousness and the varieties of emotion experience: A theoretical framework. Psychological Review, 109(2), 219–259.
3. LeDoux, J. (2012). Rethinking the Emotional Brain. Neuron, 73(4), 653–676.
4. Colombetti, G. (2011). Varieties of Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness: Foreground and Background Bodily Feelings in Emotion Experience. Inquiry, 54(3), 293–313.
5. Ratcliffe, M. (2010). The Phenomenology of Mood and the Meaning of Life. In P. Goldie (Ed.), Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion (pp. 349–371). Oxford: Oxford University Press.