1916 – start of the war in Romania: events prior to the successful defence of Moldavia

Queen Marie and the Hun*

In the autumn of 1916, shortly after the war began in Romania, German High Command drew up a plan for German planes to bomb a special target.

Instead of the usual bombing of Bucharest, this would be the first ever royal assassination by aircraft. The target was Queen Marie of Romania, while she was staying with her children at her lover Prince Stirbey’s summer residence.

Queen Marie was the granddaughter of Alexander II of Russia, and also Queen Victoria with her beloved husband Albert (a German aristocrat). Marie’s mother was a Russian Grand Duchess and Marie had been raised in England until the age of seventeen. She saw herself as thoroughly English and passionately asserted the allies’ cause to her German aristocrat husband, King Ferdinand. In this matter, Queen Marie had the full support of the Romanian people.

The German military command’s intelligence was accurate. But fortunately the bombs with Queen Marie's name on were never loaded onto German biplanes. For unknown reasons, Marie postponed her visit to Prince Stirbey. According to the American ambassador, Charles Vopicka, this change of plan saved her life, and those of her children.

The Road To War

In 1916, neutral Romania was surrounded by the Central Powers, except to the east where she bordered on Imperial Russia. There was great pressure placed on senior Romanian figures by each of the grand military alliances. Should Romania stay neutral? There was no immediate military threat to her…or should Romania join either of the power blocs?

The problem was that the Romanian armed forces were ill equipped and led. If Romania declared war on the Central Powers she would be attacked on three sides simultaneously. If she took action to strengthen her army without declaring her intentions, there was a real risk the Central Powers would invade anyway. The Central Powers knew that on balance the king, the government and the ruling elite clearly favoured joining the allies.

In 1915, fluent French speaker, Lieutenant-Colonel Thomson of the British army had been dispatched to Romania to examine the state of its armed forces. The Romanian army was large: 620,000 men. But it was deficient in horses, modern heavy artillery, ammunition, aircraft and even uniforms. Furthermore, Romania lacked the military – industrial capability to support its own army. Thomson’s report strongly advised his superiors against encouraging Romania to declare war on the Central Powers.

Thomson estimated that the Romanian army would need 300 tons of supplies per day to fight a war. The means of delivering this was not available through the inadequate railway networks in Russia and Serbia. Then later in 1915, Serbia was over-run. Until the summer of 1916, Russia hadn’t demonstrated any enthusiasm in having Romania join The Triple Entente. So there was a question mark over her sudden commitment to supporting the Romanian military. A question mark connected with (the future of) Bessarabia.

During the summer of 1916, the Brusilov offensive had seen Russian forces successively defeat and drive back Austro-Hungarian forces across Bukovina, and Galicia (now in south-west Ukraine). By August, the Russian army had reached the Hungarian border! A major British documentary series - World War 1 In Colour – demonstrated how close the Russian army came to defeating the Central Powers on its own.

Contemporary witnesses were amazed at the sheer endurance power and suicidal bravery of Russian soldiers (in this offensive). Set against the near collapse of the Austrian army. Austro-Hungarian forces contained many Slavs who surrendered to their fellow Slavs in huge numbers. 200,000 prisoners were taken by the victorious Russians. The German army had to divert large forces which arrived in August to save the situation. Fierce fighting continued in Galicia, with further territory captured by the Russians well into September.

Could the Russians hold on to their gains in Galicia, north of Transylvania?

Romanian people desperately wanted to seize and unite Transylvania with Romania; most of its population was Romanian. They would overthrow the oppressive Hungarian overlordship. Even the Austro-Hungarian empire’s ambassador in Romania had said:

"…a policy of suppression of the nations was not tenable in the long run, and that no future was in store for Hungary unless she definitely abolished that policy and allowed the nations equal rights."

(From a pre-war pamphlet by Count Ottokar Czernin before he was ambassador).

But for Romania to invade Transylvania meant war with Austro-Hungary and therefore also with Germany to the north-west, Bulgaria to the south and Turkey to the south-east. Young Romanian men demonstrated they were very willing to take on this fight; a battle against centuries’ old oppressors. To this end and generally, Romanian people supported France and Britain, expecting their considerable assistance.

The Treaty of Bucharest (1916) was signed by all parties that August. In addition to absorbing Transylvania, Romania could take over Bukovina (then under Russian control) and other named territories. The allies would send 300 tons of military provisions daily. Britain and France would attack Bulgaria.

Romania declared war on Austro-Hungary on August 27^th 1916. The Romanian Army invaded Transylvania and drove back the forces there. Its resident Romanian people enthusiastically greeted, fed and billeted the army.

But after two months of fierce fighting in Transylvania, the Romanian divisions were driven back to their former border.

In the south, initially successful offensive actions by the Romanian army had also run into trouble. The tide was turning…

Britain and France had done nothing to help Romania, and still didn’t. Russia supplied on average 80 tons of ammunition per day (of the 300 promised). Plus limited military forces which acted in a very independent minded manner – a feature of the growing Russian military presence for the rest of the war. Overall, the promise of help had been shamefully dishonoured.

The departing German ambassador said to his escorting Romanian officer as they passed over the Siret (Sireth) river: “here is the future frontier between Austro-Hungary and Russia!” The Siret was the boundary between Wallachia and Moldavia. It represented the shortest and easiest line to defend from a Russian perspective. A proposal partly echoed by the Chief of the Russian General Staff, General Alekseev. His view expressed the previous summer was that Russia could only defend Romania from behind a certain line. That he said, did not include Transylvania.

Less than four weeks after the start of war in Romania, General Alekseev suggested a pull-back to the Siret. Three months later, the Romanian army was driven back to this position. Tens of thousands of equally desperate refugees accompanied them. Only Moldavia remained to be defended.

Loss of Wallachia

From December 1916, the Central Powers plundered Wallachia. The previous summer had produced a bumper harvest (although many of the grain stores were destroyed by retreating Romanian troops). This province was one of the most agriculturally productive in Europe. The armies of the Central Powers desperately needed these supplies.

In Britain, the authorities had set up “The Land Army”; a large volunteer force of mainly women farm workers trained to use tractors, combine harvesters etc. But Germany never properly organised its agricultural production. A reversal of what most people would expect.

So Wallachia would supply much of the food that formed part of the meagre rations that would sustain German people and troops in 1917 - 1918. Plus feed the soldiers that would fight Romanian and Russian forces in Moldavia.

Another part of this act of folly was predicted to be the yielding of the badly needed Ploieşti (Ploești) oilfields. Needed much more by Germany than the allies. Britain had bought up much of Romania’s oil supply before August 1916.

In November 1916, Thomson, author of the 1915 report, along with British specialists and Romanian forces sabotaged and destroyed the Ploieşti oil wells and oil stocks. The Germans were dismayed.

Bucharest was captured by the Germans in December.

Defence of Moldavia

By Christmas the remaining Romanian forces were sheltering behind and defending the Carpathian mountains and Danube Delta in Moldavia along with growing Russian forces. The fighting was still intense. Without Russian support pouring in, the Romanian army’s life would have been numbered in weeks. They both occupied pre-prepared defensive positions facing the wrong way. Designed to defend Wallachia against a Russian invasion, they were adapted so that Romanians and the much larger Russian forces could defend Moldavia.

By mid January 1917, the front had stabilised and no large scale action would take place until the summer. Leading to the famous and decisive battles of Mărăști, Mărăşeşti and Oituz, fought over July - September 1917.

* The Hun: common British label for the Germans, especially the German military until the Second World War and afterwards for thirty plus years. Explanation of this thinking in chapter 50 of my book, Welcome To Moldova !

___________________________________________________________________________________

1917 in Moldavia & Bessarabia

Moldavia in January – a new home

In late December 1916, Prime Minister Ion Brătianu had formed a new cabinet in Iaşi (Yassy). This, the capital of Moldavia would become the new capital of the Romanian state. Brătianu, head of the National Liberal Party, invited Take Ionescu and other Conservative leaders into the government.

January 1917 saw the Romanian parliament meet at Iaşi. Enthusiastically it approved the prosecution of the war to a finish.

The front was stabilised broadly along the line of the Carpathian mountains and Siret (Sireth) river. It ran from the border with (the former Austro-Hungarian province of) Bukovina in the north to the major port of Galaţi (Galatz), and from there to the Danube Delta region.

From November, hundreds of thousands of Russian troops had arrived in Moldavia to defend it. By the end of January, a million Russians were on station in a frontline which was largely Russian determined. The Romanian army, weakened by war in so many ways, had been reduced to about a quarter of a million soldiers, the bulk of which manned a twenty mile stretch of the front.

Behind the new defensive line, the Romanian army was rebuilt. The harsh winter prevented any serious offensive action after mid January until the spring.

Winter of 1917 - survival and preparing the break-out

The main threat to the masses huddled into Moldavia in the winter of 1917 was the severe shortage of food, persistent harsh weather, and disease. Typhus was raging across town and countryside. 300,000 Romanians out of a total population of six million were to die that winter from disease and starvation.

From Christmas, military equipment from Britain and France started to come through. 150,000 rifles, 2,000 machine guns, 1,300,000 grenades, 355 artillery pieces etc. However according to the British representative, Lieutenant-Colonel Thomson, about 60% of all ammunition sent by the West was stolen in Russia.

French General Berthelot had from September 1916 ably advised and assisted the Romanian army. In Moldavia he supervised a 1,600 strong French military training force. As witnessed by Thomson:

“The French…[demonstrated] an immense display of energy. Hundreds of officers and men were incorporated in the Rumanian Army, who by their spirit and example did much to raise the morale of the troops.”

General Berthelot’s leadership and thoroughness was a significant factor in re-energising the Romanian army. Enlarged that winter by 150,000 Moldavian recruits.

So in the spring of 1917, 400,000 Romanian soldiers were ready for action. Their forces included two cavalry divisions and twelve squadrons of aircraft – spread across a reorganised front line.

Bukovina and northern Moldavia were defended by the 9th Russian Army. Heading south were the 2nd Romanian Army in the Mărăști-Oituz sector, the 4th Russian Army and 1st Romanian Army in the Putna Valley, and the 6th Russian Army on the river Siret.

People shaping events – Romania’s leaders, their roles and beliefs

Queen Marie steps boldly off the page of history. More than just a much loved monarch, her positive, powerful and practical influence was indisputable. King Ferdinand, her husband was ineffectual by comparison. Along with leading military figures, Queen Marie was a party to the decision to withdraw to Moldavia.

As in Romania’s previous wars, Queen Marie busied herself looking after wounded soldiers. She toured the hospitals in Bucharest and turned The Royal Palace into a hospital.

After the move to Moldavia, Queen Marie visited soldiers in their often waterlogged muddy trenches. Towards the end of the winter, when the roads became just passable, Queen Marie visited remote villages. Her car would take her so far, then she walked. Helping local people where possible and the soldiers billeted with them. Starvation and disease had struck down many of them. Marie, the foreign queen had a genuinely close bond with Romanian people.

One of the best witnesses of the period, with access to all the main parties, was the Austro-Hungarian ambassador, Count Ottokar Czernin. His revealing accounts of Queen Marie fit with other accounts of the time.

“One of the Queen's friends told me afterwards that when our armies, from south, north and west, were nearing Bucharest, when day and night the earth shook with the ceaseless thunder of the guns, the Queen quietly went on with her preparations for departure, and was firmly persuaded that she would return as ‘Empress of all the Roumanians.’ I have been told that after the taking of Bucharest Brătianu collapsed altogether, and it was Queen Marie who comforted and encouraged him. Her English blood always asserted itself.”

Prime Minister Ion C. Brătianu continued to lead the Romanian government from its new base in Iaşi. The son of a renowned Romanian politician, he began his career as an artillery officer, followed by engineering training in France. Brătianu had a great sense of his own importance. Representatives from other powers often found his statements inaccurate and exaggerated. A British diplomat later described him as: “a forceful humbug”.

In 1916 and prior, Brătianu had been engaged in what was regarded by other parties as a shabby, horsetrading exercise with each of the main power blocs to see who could offer Romania more from an alliance. The trouble was that both parties knew Brătianu was pro-Entente. They also knew what was potentially being traded. Count Czernin kept a running tally in his “Red Book”.

On a human level, Brătianu’s pronounced lack of straightforwardness was an encouragement to others to try twisted approaches in dealing with him.

Joining the Brătianu cabinet in Iaşi as minister without portfolio was Take Ionescu; a popular and influential politician of longstanding reputation. He had broken away from the Conservative party to set up his Conservative-Democratic party in 1908. Take was passionately pro French and pro British; a fluent French speaker; great diplomat; well liked, and respected abroad. He had been influential in bringing Romania into the war; powerfully leading a campaign to achieve this outcome. Warm, ebullient and larger than life, he had an equally cheerful English wife, and frequently visited England. Take had many important years in government ahead of him.

Nicolae Filipescu had left the Conservative party in May 1915 with a group of others who favoured joining the war on the side of the Entente. Another passionate Francophile, in February 1916 Filipescu travelled to Russia and intervened with the French ambassador in a private capacity. Filipescu was most concerned that if Romania went to war on the side of the Entente, that large Russian forces would promptly be dispatched to Dobrujda to confront what he saw as a very real threat from Bulgaria. His concern was that Russia would be reluctant to do this because of historic close ties with its Slavic neighbour. The French ambassador, Maurice Paleologue tried to reassure him on this matter. Filipescu said he would report back to Brătianu on the subject.

During 1916, Filipescu’s health failed him. In November 1916 now very seriously ill, he united his group with Take Ionescu’s. Bulgarian forces and others were closing in on Bucharest. Filipescu died just before they arrived.

Present in Bucharest, to meet the invading Germans was Alexandru Marghiloman, head of the Conservative party. There in his capacity as head of the Romanian Red Cross. Marghiloman was a known German sympathiser along with senior Conservatives and former prime ministers: Carp and Maiorescu. Carp’s son-in-law, Alexandru Sturdza who was a Colonel in the Romanian army defected to Germany in January 1917.

The Conservative Party was one of the two main political parties in Romania. Its members were largely and strongly pro-Entente, as were some of its leading figures. Marghiloman its leader simply saw Germany as a better economic partner for Romania. A role Germany had fulfilled for some time thanks to King Carol. Much of Romania’s infrastructure had been financed by the German state, its banks and private investors. The economic and business connections had been close for decades.

As events unfolded, Marghiloman’s endorsement of Germany as a partner would be a relevant requirement. Marghiloman would play a significant role in Romanian politics as his patriotism wasn’t seriously in doubt.

It’s important to understand that all pro-German Romanian politicians were strongly anti-Russian. It had to be like that as it was a strict either/or choice. The strategic and political reasoning behind this was firstly Russia’s aim to control the Dardenelles, choking and threatening Romania’s trade as it had done before the Crimean War. Secondly, it was clear to Conservatives that Russia would never be powerful enough to help Romania defend itself against the Central Powers.

In the realpolitik of the 1916 situation, many Conservatives promoted continued neutrality. In a sense, they were right. What did Romania gain from the war? The question being: what was offered to Romania after the war which was more than what she could have gained by staying neutral? Especially given the terrible price Romanians paid in the war. What on balance did the allies gain by Romania’s intervention?

The Conservative rationale combined both patriotism with elitism and self interest. Nationalism being a quality rather than an ideology. While there are question marks over Carp’s values and loyalties, clearly the others were undiluted patriots. Titu Maiorescu, for example (who died in June 1917), refused to co-operate with the Germans when they invaded Bucharest.

King Carol’s shadow hung significantly over proceedings in 1916 and 1917, although he had died in October 1914. Passionately pro German, of noble German blood and highly respected. King Carol was tortured at the start of The Great War by the understanding that his people were pro French and pro British. Count Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador describes his situation.

"The terrible distress of mind felt by the King when, like a sudden flash of lightning from the clouds, he saw before him a picture of the world war…the conflict between his personal convictions and his people's attitude…"

The fatal moment of truth came in August 1914. The king summoned a crown council to his palace at Sinaia. Present were: Brătianu, Carp, Majorescu, Marghiloman, Ionescu, Filipescu, Crown Prince Ferdinand and a handful of others. King Carol wanted their endorsement for Romania joining the Central Powers. Only Carp supported him. Filipescu was for action against Austro-Hungary. The others supported a policy of neutrality or wait and see.

By the beginning of October, the king appeared to have lost his mind. Count Czernin again:

"King Carol's death was caused by the war. The last weeks of his life were a torture to him; each message that I had to deliver he felt as the lash of a whip."

In 1916-17, while the German army rampaged all over Wallachia committing all manner of violations against Romanian people and property, the Royal palaces were left alone. The German hierarchy felt a deep sense of respect for King Carol’s memory - his legacy could and should be recovered. King Ferdinand was of German blood and weak enough to be swayed. Carol’s prime ministers Carp and Maiorescu (educated in Germany) had been sympathetic to the King Carol’s beliefs. This is what Count Czernin had to say on the subject.

“…it was more difficult to arrive at a satisfactory settlement in foreign affairs with Bratianu than it had been with Majorescu, as the former was thoroughly conversant with all West European matters, and at the bottom of his heart was anti-German. One of the distinctions to be made between Liberals and Conservatives was that the Liberals had enjoyed a Parisian education: they spoke no German, only French; while the Conservatives, taking Carp and Majorescu as models, were offshoots of Berlin.”

The Conservatives were tied to Germany and not Austro-Hungary which occupied Transylvania. But they hoped Austro-Hungary would give up Transylvania and those other territories with a mainly Romanian population. Lands ruled oppressively from Budapest. The slim possibility of that gain seemed stronger under emperor Franz Ferdinand. But he was assassinated in Sarajevo in 1914 (which by the turn of events led to the First World War).

“War is the pursuit of diplomacy by other means”, said German military genius Clausewitz, (loosely translated), and diplomacy had not succeeded. Many of Romania’s army officers wondered whether the German military (approach) was the solution. The Prussian military model was still the one to aspire to and for officers to emulate. Many of Romania’s army officers had been trained in German military academies. They were also likely to be Conservative minded.

But strategically, a large, effective military machine needed a necessary constant supply from domestic heavy industry. The Conservative party was naturally geared to light industry, arts and crafts. It was essentially the landowners’ party. As in other parts of Europe including Britain, many in the ruling elite felt themselves above such dirty industrial activity. Despite this, most of those other countries had more keenly embraced the new realities of a changing industrial landscape. Romania wasn’t ready for war. To fight it would require being allied to one or more industrial countries which could supply and support it reliably.

So enter Prince Sturdza who persuaded other senior Romanian officers to defect to the German side. Prince Colonel Alexandru Sturdza was the son of four times Romanian prime minister, Dimitrie Sturdza (educated in Germany). They were descended from a centuries renowned family of Romanian leaders. We pick up the start of the story from Count Czernin.

“There lived at Bucharest a certain Lieutenant-Colonel Prince Sturdza, who was a noted braggart and brawler and an inveterate enemy of Austria-Hungary”.

The Count continues in his usual good style with how Sturdza abused him in the press for no apparent reason and how the Count sought permission to challenge him to a duel. This was refused. Skipping on:

“I assured Bratianu…I would in future arm myself with a revolver, and if he attacked me shoot the man; if one lived in a country where the habits of the Wild West obtained, one must act accordingly. I sent word to the Lieutenant-Colonel that each day, at one o'clock, I could be found at the Hotel Boulevard, where he would find a bullet awaiting him.”

A bit further on in his story:

"This man, whose nature was that of a daring adventurer, afterwards deserted to the Russian army, and fought against us at a time when Roumania still was neutral. I then completely lost sight of him."

Colonel Alexandru Dimitrie Sturdza fought and helped drive back Austro-Hungarian forces in eastern Transylvania, before the Germans intervened. "A brave and excellent tactician" was how General Mannerheim whom he later served, described him.

In October 1916, Colonel Sturdza was in charge of the 7^th Mixed Brigade, based at Soveja (south of Oituz). A new unit formed from the remnants of three fortress garrison regiments, the remains of the 2^nd Graniceri Regiment, destroyed at Turtucaia (Tutrakan), six artillery batteries and a company of cyclists.

By December, Sturdza was in command of the 12^th Cavalry division and an infantry brigade, part of the Romanian 2^nd Army in the Marasti-Oituz sector. Then he and his units were moved north to Bukovina. There he was placed under the command of General Mannerheim, a Finn serving in the Russian army who led the Wrancza group. This included other Romanian and Russian units. Mannerheim who was under General Averescu’s overall command was unusually skilled in operating Romanian and Russian forces together. These were overstretched, exhausted and under equipped, defending a thirty-six mile wide front. Colonel Sturdza was stationed on the right flank, close to what is now the Romania – Ukraine border. He saw action at Putna, successfully defending the railway station there.

Accounts differ as to what followed next. But it appears that at the end of December 1916, Sturdza organised a successful attack on enemy positions only to find that other Russo-Romanian units had retreated on his left flank.

At this point, he seems to have decided that the army’s position was hopeless. He persuaded Lieutenant Colonel Wachman to defect with him to the Germans and also Lieutenant-Colonel Crainiceanu who attempted to join them. Shockingly, Sturdza’s plan was to deliver over his own forces to the Central Powers. In German hands, but on Austro-Hungarian territory, Sturdza’s case was referred to the Habsburg ambassador, Count Czernin amongst others for guidance. The advice was that he was a friend of the Central Powers and should not be treated like a prisoner.

All three officers were tried by military court in Iaşi and sentenced to death. Crainiceanu who had failed to escape was court marshalled and executed.

Sturdza’s motives were clear. He believed that Romania could only be saved by reaching a separate agreement with Germany. Sturdza attempted to persuade Romanian prisoners of war of this and worked closely in support of the German foreign ministry and intelligence service in Bucharest.

Despite all this treachery and a follow up propaganda effort by the Germans, Sturdza’s former comrades, worn out junior officers and soldiers bravely stood their ground and fought the enemy. General Mannerheim had been away when this happened and was kept in the dark. A close friend of the Tsar, Mannerheim was at a meeting with the Tsaritsa at Tsarskoye Selo in February, when he praised Colonel Sturdza’s courage and ability. The Tsaritsa responded by asking if this was the same Sturdza who had gone over to the enemy? Absolutely not possible was the reply; “he was prepared to stick his hand in the fire” as a guarantee that Sturdza was not capable of such a deed. When Mannerheim returned to his hotel, a message was waiting for him with the truth.

Some observers believe that had Sturdza waited and remained loyal for a few months, he would have seen the outcome of the greatly improved situation on the Romanian front and not have betrayed his country.

Looking at Romania’s military leaders, most of the army’s senior officers had proved most capable in the 1916 - 17 conflict. This included General Prezan who commanded the northern army, then managed the difficult defence and withdrawl from Bucharest, ably supported by Antonescu his Chief of Staff. Ion Antonescu was an outstanding officer who influenced Prezan’s decisions throughout the war, gaining rapid promotion. Antonescu would of course achieve both great fame and great notoriety during his life.

General Eremia Grigorescu would take most of the credit for the victory at Mărăşeşti that summer. This triumph was an outstanding example of co-operation between Romania’s most brilliant military minds. General Averescu was the senior general at that time. A Romanian born in Izmail (Ismail), Bessarabia. Averescu’s father, of noble birth had served as an officer in the Russian army and retired to Iaşi. Young Averescu was raised and educated in Izmail, then studied in Bucharest. He joined the Romanian army where he saw active and distinguished service. Later, he became minister of war in the Dimitrie Sturdza government. Amongst his many great achievements - the major reorganisation of the Romanian army before the war.

In 1916, Onisfor Ghibu who would awaken Bessarabians’ sense of identity and political consciousness had arrived in Bessarabia to take centre stage. Onisfor Ghibu was a highly educated Romanian Transylvanian escaping conscription from the Austro-Hungarian army. In 1916, he described Bessarabians as Tsar Nicholas II’s most loyal subjects and found practically no Romanian books anywhere in Bessarabia. It was his suggestion that the Moldavian National Party was founded in spring 1917. Its April 4^th programme was drafted by Ghibu. He would continue to be significantly influential during the birth pains of this hoped for independent nation to be.

Moldavia & Bessarabia – emergence of the new politics

The February 1917 revolution in Russia evoked a great resonance in Bessarabia and Moldavia. The Tsar abdicated and a provisional government of socialists and liberals took control.

In March, a Workers Soviet was formed in Chişinău (Kishinev). Days later, the Moldavian National Party was formed. This broadly based party of national unity sought political autonomy for Bessarabia. It pledged to guarantee its citizens social, economic and political rights under a new constitution. The Moldavian language (Romanian), Moldavian cultural heritage, religion and customs would be preserved and upheld.

In the West, the relatively moderate February revolution was seen by many as a positive step. Optimistically expected to revitalise the Russian people in the struggles ahead.

In Moldavia itself, the February revolution reduced military discipline and morale amongst Russian troops, with some minimal, temporary disruptive effects amongst Romanian forces. The decline in Russian forces’ morale also stemmed from the effects of the Brusilov offensive to the north. The especially brutalising manner in which this had been advanced, left deep mental and emotional scars to add to any physical ones.

The February revolution suggested to Russians a way out of their situation. It generated a sense of comradeship and common cause which crossed all barriers and spread through different regions. On the frontline in Moldavia, Russian and German soldiers were even fraternising with each other. As spring turned into summer, the fighting capability of Russian forces was progressively weakened.

The situation for Romanians was very different. The National Liberal Party (whose views were illiberal to non Romanians) had given a commitment in the 1913 election to land reform for Romanian peasants. Although the commitment had been dishonoured year after year, Romanian peasants could see their role in an enlarged Romania.

In April 1917, King Ferdinand addressed his Romanian troops. He promised them land, electoral reform and greater participation in public life.

Facing the 1917 summer campaigning season - lessons from 1916

To understand the position in Moldavia in spring 1917, we have to understand where and how the Romanian campaign went so horribly wrong between September and December 1916. Mistakes were certainly made, but part of the cause was the formidably effective, rapid German military response. Astounding, even given that it was largely predictable.

Prime Minister Ion Brătianu has been criticised by many commentators for his failure to fully grasp the military realities of the situation in August 1916. Why couldn’t he see that the Brusilov offensive (to the north) was running out of steam?

Following great exhortations and promises by the Entente, especially from the French, the Romanian army launched its military campaign. Highly respected General Joffre had stated that the Central Powers would only be able to launch a maximum of ten divisions against Romania, five of these would be run-down Austro Hungarian units. The French authorities then persuaded the British and Russian authorities to support this line. It significantly influenced Brătianu. What followed was that over three times this number then attacked Romania according to Lieutenant-Colonel Thomson who witnessed the tragedy unfold.

“The first casualty of war is truth”.

Famous statement made in 1917. By isolationist (anti-war) US Senator Hiram Johnson (re-iterating, Greek writer Aeschylus from 5th century BC).

Brătianu had expected that Bulgaria would stay out of the war. An assessment, bolstered by misinformation from the Russian foreign ministry. There were also false promises of a diversionary assault on Bulgaria forces at Salonika by the British and French. Then the Bulgarians offered peace terms. But the truth was that Bulgaria was spoiling for a fight. Unsurprisingly, they wanted to seize back territory lost to Romania in the 1913 Second Balkan War. They saw Romania’s weakness; they saw their chance. The Romanian government had its own agents in Sofia, so the truth should have been apparent.

Generals Brusilov (leading the 1916 Russian offensive to the north), and Alekseev, Chief of the Russian General Staff were both opposed to Romania entering the war. However Brusilov argued unsuccessfully with his colleague for a much larger Russian force in Dobrujda to counter the Bulgarian threat. Both could see that disaster would follow and each was right in his own way.

On its own, with no support, the Romanian army had sufficient resources to fight successfully for a limited period. That was part or most of the campaigning season. After which, due to winter conditions, the roads become near impassable and most fighting has to stop. Consolidation and re-supply then take place. To the west, the winter of 1915/16 showed the opposing Italian and Austrian forces often bogged down in stalemate positions, especially in mountainous terrain.

Romanian people passionately wanted to “liberate” the parts of former Dacia they believed belonged to them as a people; to them as individuals, families, friends, and to their neighbours. They were very willing to fight for Transylvania and the other territories. Romanian forces were motivated and courageous. Give the typical Romanian soldier a working rifle with enough ammunition and he could be relied upon.

So, other than for the reasons given above, how and why did the autumn campaign of 1916 fail so badly, so quickly?

There wasn’t the transport the army needed. There was insufficient ammunition, supplies, and heavy artillery. The transport, logistics and infrastructure defeated the Romanian army’s efforts more than the enemy forces. There were deficiencies in military training. Romanian officers were inexperienced and often insufficiently capable in fast moving situations. These problems and their likely consequences had been largely predicted in Lieutenant-Colonel Thomson’s report of 1915.

In summary, Romania did not have the flexible capacity and capability to defend itself on three sides from the simultaneous co-ordinated attacks of four powerful countries / empires. Enemies who could choose when and where and how to attack.

Moving on a few months, crucially those issues were less important when defending well laid out defensive positions. That was the situation facing Moldavia in the spring of 1917.

Early Summer 1917 – politics, not war

From January, the total front was 250 miles longer than it had been in August for both the Russians and the Central Powers. Troop numbers were down on both sides. Given that sufficient mass was required to achieve a break-through, the result was stalemate until July 1917.

In Vienna - the Austrian dominating part of the Dual Monarchy - enthusiasm for the war was diminishing. In November 1916, Emperor Franz Joseph had died and been replaced by Archduke Karl who had much less enthusiasm for the war. In fact he wanted to see a negotiated peace. There were serious differences of opinion between the leaders of Austria and Hungary as to governance issues and the way ahead. The Hungarians, especially through their leader Count Tisza, governed aggressively with a harsh, uncompromising territorial approach.

Since the defeats incurred by the Brusilov offensive, morale had declined amongst the troops. They were a mix of Austrian, Hungarian and other nationalities who often had difficulty understanding, communicating or relating to each other. The Austro-Hungarian army was now hardly a cohesive force with a common purpose. Its pride and prestige diminished further from September 1916 when (because of its failings), it was increasingly subordinated to the more militarily effective German army. It was German forces which had firstly stopped the Russian advance and saved the day. Secondly, then intervened in Transylvania to reverse the Romanian army’s offensive.

In April 1917, the Germans allowed (anti-war) Bolshevik leader, V.I.Lenin to travel from neutral Switzerland to Russia (via Sweden). He had their unstated blessing. Lenin had recently developed new, far more radical political ideas, mainly encapsulated in his “April Thesis”. In Petrograd (St Petersburg), Lenin’s entrance had an immediate dramatic impact.

In May 1917, a gathering in Odessa of Moldavian officers and soldiers re-iterated the demands for autonomy, democracy and human rights made in Chişinău in March and April. Along with Moldavian students and soldiers in Kiev, they announced the creation of separate Moldavian army units for the maintenance of public law and order in Bessarabia. They produced Moldavian language publications to support these aims.

Alerted to this, Prime Minister Brătianu decided to implement some of the vast agrarian reforms he had forcefully promised in 1913 to secure his election. June 1917 in Iaşi saw many of the reform measures promised by the King in April passed into law. But the Conservatives successfully pushed through an amendment limiting the provision of land to farmers to two million hectares. Additionally with the spoils of war, all lands belonging to foreigners, absent landowners, corporations and institutions were to be confiscated.

Russian soldiers were aware of these political developments and those with Bolshevik sympathies were most unhappy with this imperialist path. The cause of Bolshevism and other defeatist ideologies were advancing. The military death penalty was abolished. Russian troops’ discipline and morale progressively worsened. In Moldavia, cases of criminal behaviour by Russian soldiers against Romanian citizens increased.

In Bessarabia, ethnic Romanians were rediscovering a sense of shared identity with fellow Romanians. In June 1917, the first Moldavian People’s Library was opened in Chisinau. Schools for children using the Romanian language and Latin alphabet were founded in towns and villages. By the end of August, 350 trainee teachers had passed a test examination in Romanian language and history. Romanian papers in Latin script appeared, the main one being the Cuvânt Moldovensc (“The Moldavian Word”).

June also saw the Ukraine claim Bessarabia as part of its sovereign territory. A very unpopular and indeed frightening development for its people, who wondered who would protect their interests.

Summer 1917 – onto the offensive, then successful defence

A serious weakpoint in Romania’s defence was the south. The Central Powers could attack the major river port of Galaţi (Galatz), cross the Danube and Prut to invade Bessarabia. Then attack the Romanian army from the rear. Lieutenant-Colonel Thomson says the Romanian high command in Iaşi often worried about this in the winter of 1917. The port of Izmail (Ismail) in Bessarabia itself (Budjak region) was being shelled by German and Bulgarian heavy gun batteries in Tulcea. Izmail was used for provisioning Russian and Romanian vessels.

In July, Romanian navy monitors in conjunction with a captured observation balloon and aircraft attacked the artillery batteries at Tulcea. Despite being hit by enemy shells, the monitors pressed on the attack destroying the artillery pieces.

On July 1^st 1917, the Kerensky offensive began to the north of Moldavia in Galicia (now south-west Ukraine). Named after the leader of Russia’s provisional government, who was also the minister of war. The offensive was a large scale invasion directed towards Lviv (Lvov), then called Lemburg. On July 18^th Germans and Austro-Hungarian forces successfully counter-attacked and there followed an unstoppable advance into Russian territory. Under the weight of Bolshevik propaganda, the demoralised Russian army collapsed and gave way. The German rate of advance was only limited by logistical constraints.

With Moldavia’s northern flank seriously exposed, the Russian 4^th army was withdrawn to defend Bukovina. At this point, the Romanian army launched its offensive in what would see the most large-scale warfare south-west of Moldavia in three areas: Mărăşti, Oituz and Mărăşeşti.

On July 22^nd, the Mărăşti offensive began. The Romanian army in the centre was most successful, but the Russian armies on the flanks retreated after a time, leaving the Romanian invasion force in an impossibly exposed position. So it too had to retreat yielding up the 12 miles depth of front by 20 miles breadth which had been captured.

Meanwhile, a short distance north-west in the Oituz valley, the Romanian army was taking over front line positions from the Russians. Hardly had they familiarised themselves with their surroundings when the Austro Hungarian army launched a major offensive against them. The second wave of assaults involved a young German officer would become one of the most famous generals in the Second World War – Erwin Rommel. With the genius and courage he displayed in other theatres of war, his German forces captured Mount Cosna, repelling heavy Romanian and Russian attacks. German forces under Rommel’s leadership successively gained, lost and regained territory around Mount Cosna. He was formidable. So was the courage of his opponents. Fortunately for the Romanians, on August 20^th, the exhausted Rommel was evacuated with a high fever. The German advance had been contained to just a few miles.

On August 6^th, Field Marshall von Mackensen launched his attack at Mărăşeşti. This was the major, pivotal battle of the war. In what would see continuous fighting until September 8^th, German forces suffered much higher losses (47,000) compared to the Romanian army (27,000). Over twenty divisions were involved. Fought to a standstill, Mărăşeşti was a clear Romanian victory. Credit must also go to those sections of the Russian army which fought effectively.

That wasn’t the end of the fighting. Important engagements took place in September and October especially in Bukovina and north of Focşani. These resulted in the defeat of Central Powers forces, but little territory changed hands.

German and Austro-Hungarian forces in Romania were now heavily depleted and demoralised. The Central Powers could see they faced a formidable revitalised enemy. While the Romanian forces could see that with the collapse of Russian armed forces to the north, Moldavia (and Bessarabia) were threatened with encirclement.

The reality of life in Moldavia.

Behind the story of struggle for military success, living conditions in Moldavia were appalling. They are well described by the American ambassador, Charles Vopicka who returned to Iaşi in September.

“We arrived in Jassy September 16^th, 1917. With a normal population of 90,000, there were now over 300,000 refugees seeking aid and accommodation. The military government had taken charge and was doing everything possible to relieve the stress. Roumania was now feeling the full extent of war’s misery, and it was fully exemplified in Jassy. Typhus was raging, and the supply of medicaments for the sick, and for the wounded soldiers, was very meagre. No meat or vegetables were to be had, and bread of which there was very little, was made from potatoes with any kind of grain obtainable. There was no sugar, and no fuel of any kind. Soldiers and civilians were dying by thousands.”

Vopicka then describes meeting King Ferdinand.

“To my surprise, the king advised me not to unpack my trunks, stating that we might have to move to Russia at any moment. He said that half their officers were in Kherson, and that for three months, Roumanians had been sending their valuables there. It seemed to be the general opinion that the move would have to be made, and also that the Russians would leave the trenches on the first of October.”

Autumn and winter 1917 – political developments

The peak of the summer warfare and its conclusion coincided with an upsurge in political activity in Bessarabia, the Ukraine and Russia. In Bessarabia for instance, the mainly ethnically Romanian peasants took action against Russian nobles and landowners. Sometimes, they attacked them directly. At other times, they simply ordered them to leave.

The Romanian authorities and people only took a limited interest in Bessarabia. In February 1917, Count Czernin had met King Ferdinand and offered Bessarabia to the Romanians as part of a peace settlement.

"The King replied that Bessarabia was nothing to him, that it was steeped in Bolshevism…"

Understandably, Romanians’ focus was to recover their lands to the west and south. The unfinished business included Transylvania. All in all, a huge and dangerous task, but one from which they were not going to be easily diverted.

In Bessarabia, the sense of Romanian identity of many of Bessarabia’s citizens was slowly being awakened. Mainly due to the activities of parties from Transylvania and Bukovina, and propagandists from the Old Kingdom. These elements clashed with proponents of (non sectarian) social change who were often Russian educated.

The total failure of the Kerensky offensive and the resulting unstoppable reverses progressively undermined the Russian provisional government’s authority and legitimacy. Outside of central Russia, people increasingly rejected the government’s centralising political agenda and its focus towards further Russianisation. Against this, moves towards both self determination and support for Bolshevism gained ground and further recruits. The two paths appeared to be compatible. In Bessarabia, congresses of peasants, congresses of workers and soldiers were held, especially between September and November.

In Moldavia, Bolshevism spread and increased its grip amongst Russian troops. (Very few Romanians were converted to its cause). Political agitation increased friction between Russian and Romanian forces. More seriously, Russian troops were deserting and taking a marauding path across Bessarabia along with bands of local criminals. The Romanian army’s attempts to disarm them and prevent this occasionally resulted in armed clashes. For example a major battle took place at Fălticeni, northern Moldavia in July. The town, an important communications hub for road and rail faced an imminent Bolshevik assault with inadequate Romanian led defences. French officers hurriedly sent by General Berthelot, (leading the French mission), arrived with machine guns, rifles, hand grenades and ammunition. They then assisted in repelling a major attack that left thousands of Bolsheviks dead.

Some of these battles even took place right at the front where a bemused, passive German army looked on, sometimes receiving the surrender of escaping Russian forces. This included serious open warfare around Galaţi [Galatz]. Near German lines, this major Danube port was crucially sited over the river from the south-western tip of Bessarabia – Budjak region. If captured by the Central Powers, they could deploy a large force to invade Bessarabia, turn the Romanian army’s flank and then much worse...

After his arrival in September, the American ambassador Charles Vopicka set about touring the front, talking to Russian soldiers trying to persuade them to stay at their posts. (America had joined the war in April 1917). He starts:

“At Galatz, where the 6^th Russian Army was located, we were cordially received by the civil and military authorities, and my request for permission to address the soldiers was granted after the Soviet Military Committee had scanned the speech. My first audience numbered 16,000 men, and they received my speech so enthusiastically that I was asked to repeat it elsewhere.”

After an interesting description of follow on events, he concludes with the comment:

“Colonel Yeats and I continued our speeches until the armistice was signed, thereby aiding in delaying by over two months the intended defection of the Russian troops.”

But efforts to hold the Russian army together as a disciplined force, largely failed after the “October Revolution” in Petrograd (St Petersburg). Elections on the Romanian front in November had returned 12 Social Revolutionary Deputies, 3 Bolsheviks and 4 Ukrainians. The Bolsheviks continued to gain support.

Coinciding with the “October Revolution”, a large representative congress assembled in Chişinău. In November it created the Sfatul Tarii / Tserii (Council of State). This went on to appoint a council of ministers in a provisional government whose purpose was to govern and administer Bessarabia as an autonomous republic. Ion Inculet was elected president. The Sfatul Tarii was initially fully recognised by the Bolsheviks in Petrograd.

The council had 150 deputies, of whom 105 were ethnically Romanian. There was a fair, representative mix between firstly nationalities and secondly political and economic interest groups.

The National Moldavian Bloc had about 47% representation, with the peasant party 20%. The council took a number of important decisions regarding the army, agrarian reform, universal suffrage and the rights of workers, minorities and others.

In the “Case For Bessarabia” 1918, a high level, centre-right Russian authored submission expressed the following view of the Sfatul Tarii:

“Mr Inkulets was right, when in his opening speech…he classified the assembly he was presiding over as ‘composed of the representatives of democratic organisations, organs of self government, political parties and representatives of nationalities’ [but] by ‘democratic’ organisations and by political parties only revolutionary ones were meant.”

“The ‘Bourgeois’ elements were considered as ‘undesirable’ and thus not admitted.”

“At this very time – the end of 1917 and beginning of 1918 - the ‘Sfatul Tserey’ had to face a new and unexpected menace, not from the ‘foreign foe’ but from ‘anarchy throughout the country’. Its extreme radicalism particularly in agrarian question - let loose spirits which it was quite unable to control. A wave of agrarian disturbances, chiefly provoked by the decrees of the ‘Sfatul Tserey’ concerning the handing over of the land owners estates’ to peasants, swept over the country, and in a month’s time destroyed nearly all well-organised estates.”

Unfortunately, there were many radical groups in Bessarabia, often armed, who each claimed full rights of governance and control – not recognising the Sfatul Tarii or each other. The result: anarchy with murders and civil warfare. Fuelling the political chaos were desperate Russian deserters escaping the Romanian front.

In Moldavia, Russian soldiers murdered many of their officers – especially when they tried to gain control and exercise discipline. The Romanian state’s response was increasingly to protect the most senior Russian officers in return for them acting in authority over their own troops.

By December, the head of the Russian army in Moldavia, General Scerbacev (spelling varies) was in great danger. He had been a good leader against German forces. In early December, he discovered two serious Bolshevik plots against the Russian High Command and the monarchy. Alerting his allied colleagues, these attempted coups were prevented by Russian and Romanian troops. Dismissed from his post by Trotsky on December 10^th , days later the Romanian army had to rescue him. He went into hiding in Iaşi, protected by a detachment of Romanian troops. General Scerbacev’s position and authority was held to be valid by non-Bolshevik forces.

A seasonal pause in the war of the Great Powers

After the Bolsheviks seized power, it was apparent to them that the war had to cease. It served no useful purpose and Russia was losing badly. However, ending hostilities was not the same as a formal peace. Trotsky in particular, whose star was in the ascendant rejected any meaningful formal arrangements with capitalist-imperialist powers. He wanted the fighting to stop, but nothing more.

In early December, Petrograd ordered a general demobilisation as the Bolsheviks sued for peace with Germany. Supplies to Romania stopped.

The desperate circumstances in Moldavia could be expected to get even worse. Although King Ferdinand had been mistaken in advising ambassador Vopicka in September of their imminent move to the Ukraine, there was an overpowering desire for peace, a peaceful life and a satisfactory resolution of their situation. They were in a constant state of readiness to evacuate into the Ukraine and possibly Russia. Now that Moldavia was cut off, Prime Minister Bratianu expressed the real fear that the Germans might concentrate their armies against them and over-run their position.

King Ferdinand had asked for a clear statement from US President Woodrow Wilson endorsing Romania’s right to all territories in which Romanians predominated or were historically Romanian. The answer at the end of November, was:

“I wish to assure Your Majesty that the US will support Romania after the war to the best of its ability and that, in any final negotiations for peace, it will use its constant efforts to see to it that the integrity of Romania as a free and independent nation is adequately safeguarded.”

This answer was considered totally inadequate and contrary to what had been agreed with the Entente in 1916. Especially leaving Transylvania’s future unresolved. It left the sense that there was little point in serving the allies’ cause. (Months later a strong sense of betrayal would be publically expressed).

The Romanian government hurriedly approached the Germans seeking an armistice. The Central Powers now had nearly one million troops tied up containing Romanian forces. An opponent which they would comfortably accept occupying Bessarabia in preference to Russia.

The armistice was signed at Focşani on December 9^th, 1917.

On December 15^th, the Sfatul Tarii proclaimed the autonomous republic of Moldavia based on Bessarabia’s borders. Unfortunately it didn’t have the resources and capability to govern or maintain law and order.

Russian troops heading across Bessarabia threatened various deposits of food, ammunition and general supplies held and guarded by the Romanian army. On December 14^th at Leova, south-west Bessarabia, just over the Romanian border, cashiered Russian troops attacked the storage depot there. The Romanian guard was overcome, its commanding officer murdered, and a huge quantity of vitally needed cereals were stolen. The rest of the store was set on fire. The Romanian army intervened, killed many of the villains, recovering some of the supplies.

Many if not most of the victims of the pillage, arson and assaults were Slavs who pre-dominated in the very north and south of Bessarabia. These local peasants had already largely taken control of the landlords’ estates when deserting Russian soldiers arrived on the scene. As the chaos and anarchy intensified, it then became progressively more prevalent in central Bessarabia with its more heavily concentrated ethnic Romanian population.

Following the armistice, the problem of departing Russian soldiers now became especially serious in Moldavia itself. Large-scale serious assaults were taking place on Moldavian citizens, their property stolen and homes destroyed. The monarchy and state itself was again under direct threat from the Bolsheviks. The Crown Council took the unusual step of appointing a reliable Russian officer to take charge of a whole division of Romanian soldiers to protect the state.

Moldavia was divided up into military districts policed by reliable units. Russians were refused access to Iaşi even if unarmed. On December 21^st/22nd, military police forces quelled a rebellion originating from Socola - a Bolshevik hotbed. The plot’s main intention had been to abduct General Scerbacev. Socola, just south of Iaşi, was a major arms and ammunition dump which 3,000 Bolsheviks had seized. The Bolsheviks were successfully and peacefully disarmed, then expelled from the country.

On December 20^th Central Powers and Bolshevik delegates gathered at Brest-Litovsk, Poland (now in Belarus) for important peace negotiations. There and then, Count Otto Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian Empire’s Foreign Minister had his first meeting with the Russian representative Joffe:

"After dinner I had my first long conversation with Hr. Joffe. His whole theory is based on the idea of establishing the right of self-determination of peoples on the broadest basis throughout the world, and trusting to the peoples thus freed to continue in mutual love. Joffe does not deny that the process would involve civil war throughout the world to begin with, but he believes that such a war, as realising the ideals of humanity, would be justified, and its end worth all it would cost."

While self determination was the stated objective, the Bolsheviks in Petrograd refused to recognise the legitimacy of the broadly based and largely socialist Sfatul Tarii. By comparison they recognised similar or less well constituted nationalist governments in other former parts of the Russian empire.

Relations between the Bolshevik regime and the authorities in Iaşi and Bessarabia descended to a new and dangerous low. The Bolshevik government became increasingly angry at what it saw as Romanian and Bessarabian counter revolutionary actions against former Russian soldiers.

From a Bolshevik point of view, revolution was a rapidly approaching inevitability (for many parts of the world). But could be delayed by engaging seriously with Bourgeois dominated bodies (like the Romanian state). That would be a terrible betrayal of the proletariat’s legitimate aspirations. So any concerns, requests and requirements from non Bolshevik parties should be avoided. The all consuming revolutionary requirement meant that any parties contracting with Bourgeois elements became the enemy regardless of the circumstances. This was so self evident that no excuses were acceptable, and no pre-warning of any resulting action was required.

But it may be possible, indeed necessary to engage with Bourgeois elements to lead them on a merry dance which would hasten their demise at the hands of revolutionary forces.

Count Czernin added the following to his (above) entry for December 20^th 1917.

"They are strange creatures, these Bolsheviks. They talk of freedom and the reconciliation of the peoples of the world, of peace and unity, and withal they are said to be the most cruel tyrants history has ever known. They are simply exterminating the bourgeoisie, and their arguments are machine guns and the gallows. My talk to-day with Joffe has shown me that these people are not honest, and in falsity surpass all that cunning diplomacy has been accused of, for to oppress decent citizens in this fashion and then talk at the same time of the universal blessing of freedom - it is sheer lying.”

Trotsky, who led the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk had a policy approach well described and explained by his slogans: “neither war nor peace” and “neither victory nor defeat”. For such concepts as victory were framed in capitalist-imperialist terms. Trotsky played a delaying game.

Meanwhile German troops had advanced well into the Ukraine. The turn of events could see them on the move again heading south and west. Under the terms of the peace agreement, the Central Powers were to retain all their troops and equipment on the Romanian front.

How would Romania and Bessarabia be placed if the Bolsheviks and Central Powers’ negotiations achieved either a successful or an unsuccessful outcome?

But unknown to the allies, the situation on the Moldavian front had greatly improved during December. On January 2^nd, reports reached ambassador Vopicka as follows:

“All the heavy artillery of the Germans has been sent to other fronts, and as a result of the removal of troops, the German force is inferior to the Roumanian. A menace to the Austrian troops on the Roumanian front lies in the friendly relations they are establishing with the Russians.”

On January 15^th, Count Czernin would telegraph his emperor from Brest-Litovsk:

“On the question of food supply we are on the very verge of a catastrophe. My informant writes: ‘Only small quantities are now being received from Hungary, from Roumania only 10,000 wagons of maize; this gives then a decrease of at least 30,000 wagons of grain, without which we must infallibly perish’. On learning the state of affairs, I went to the Prime Minister to speak with him about it. I told him, as is the case, that in a few weeks our war industries, our railway traffic, would be at a standstill, the provisioning of the army would be impossible, it must break down, and that would mean the collapse of Austria and therewith also of Hungary. To each of these points he answered yes, that is so...”

In Chişinău on December 27^th , the appalling lawlessness in Bessarabia caused the Sfatul Tarii to ask both the Russian General headquarters and the Romanian government for disciplined troops to restore law and order. Anti-Romanian elements in the Sfatul Tarii proposed inviting in Serbian and Czechoslovakian military units based in Kiev.

On December 29^th, the Sfatul Tarii appointed a president supported by eight cabinet ministers. Then laid out its plan for government. From the British Cabinet Papers 1918:

“The Council of the Land pledges itself to the election of ‘a constituent assembly of the Moldavian Republic on the basis of universal, equal, direct, secret, and proportional suffrage’…to assure liberty of the press, belief, associations and individuals…to maintain the equality of all nationalities on Moldavian territory…to spread schools and preserve their national character for all the different nationalities.”

The British Cabinet papers also warned however that the Bolsheviks were unlikely to support the Sfatul Tarii as the Ukrainian Rada also proposed the same type of policies – now perceived to be a ruse. The Bolsheviks were also very unhappy that the Sfatul Tarii only contained one delegate each from the Social Democratic and Social Revolutionary Parties.

At the close of the year 1917, the authorities in Bessarabia still believed they had a workable relationship with the new Soviet government.

But moves were afoot for the Bolsheviks to rapidly take over Bessarabia through military force.

____________________________________________________________________________________

1918 – Moldavia & Bessarabia

January 1918 (1 of 2) – the fight for the Moldovan heartlands

Russian soldiers and sailors were represented by the Rumcherod (or Rumcerod), based in Odessa. Constituted with Bolsheviks as a minority but fully recognising the Petrograd government as the representative governing body of the region.

Following its important second conference December 23^rd – January 5^th, Rumcherod officials were sent to Chişinău (Kishinev) on January 10^th as a representative body entitled Frontotdel. It immediately declared itself the true government of Bessarabia with a pro-Soviet mandate. Distributing propaganda and agitating amongst armed groups lead promptly to conflict between Bolshevik and Moldavian forces. Moldavian troops intercepted and seized propaganda and weaponry sent from Odessa.

The Sfatul Tarii made a further appeal to the Romanian authorities (through General Scerbacev). It and its outcome is described in the British Cabinet papers 1918 as follows:

“The Council of the Land appealed to the Rumanian government to send troops into the province to maintain order. Mr Brătianu with characteristic prudence had hesitated to do this, but he now, with the approval of the Allied Powers, despatched certain divisions to Bessarabia with the announced intention of guarding life and property.”

On January 10^th, partly mindful of the serious danger of German and Bulgarian forces turning their flank in the Danube region, a small Moldavian force had crossed the Prut in answer to an urgent appeal from loyal Russian forces and concerned citizens in Cahul, (sited just over the river in the Budjak region). On January 8^th, deserters from the 6th Russian Army had launched a serious assault on the Russian army depot there and the town itself was threatened. There then followed a confrontation with Bolshevik forces which was initially resolved in favour of the Romanian army – an encouraging precedent.

On January 13^th, the Bolsheviks arrested the Romanian ambassador to Russia, Constantin Diamandi and his staff. Under pressure from other diplomats, they were released three days later and expelled from the country.

On January 15^th, the Ukrainian Rada which had in August claimed Bessarabia as part of the Ukraine, formerly renounced this claim. (Relations between the Romanian and Ukrainian governments were good. Although questions remained about the status of the Budjak and Hotin).

On January 16^th, in response to concerns from parties in Bessarabia about the intended dispatch of Romanian troops there, the allies issued “the following written guarantee”:

“This is purely a military measure, as its only object is to guarantee the normal functioning of service for the Russo-Romanian front, in conformity with the rules established in the belligerent countries. This can thus not affect in any way the actual or future politics of Bessarabia”. [My italics].

Above statements from Vopicka who adds that the purpose of the intervention was “to maintain order and protect the railroads and the food depots from the Bolsheviki”.

Following on from the above, the following statement was then issued:

“We representatives of the Allies in Roumania feel it our duty to declare that Maximalist agents are guilty of political and military treason, and of the commission of monstrous crimes. They are delivering their war material to our enemies in exchange for alcohol, and they are committing murder, arson, robbery and unspeakable crimes against women. Having used the greater part of the resources of their country, they are extending famine conditions by wantonly destroying food depots in Moldavia and Besserabia.”

On January 17^th, the Council of Ministers in Iaşi endorsed the decision to send the Romanian army into Bessarabia.

The latest appeal from Chişinău had coincided with the need to withdraw Moldavian troops from Kiev. The Ukraine-Soviet war which had begun in November 1917 after the Petrograd take-over, had spread to near Kiev. Elections in the Ukraine had shown the Bolsheviks only had about 10% support. So to gain power they launched a military campaign. In Kiev on January 18^th, conflict had escalated with a planned Bolshevik riot centred on the Kiev Arsenal Factory being forestalled, (actually only delayed), when Free Cossacks intervened, confiscating weapons there. The Moldavian regiment left for Chisinau by train that day.

Their train crossed the Transnistria region with its large ethnic Romanian population. Although more Russified than its Bessarabian neighbour, a large group there had expressed a preference for political union with Bessarabia. But it was in Bolshevik hands, and there was strong Bolshevik support in nearby Bender (Tighina).

The 850 Transylvanian (Ardeal) troops based in Kiev were expected back in Chişinău on the night of January 19^th. The battalion was largely asleep when their train crossed the border, passing through Bender whose authorities had been telegraphed as to their arrival. They in turn telegraphed the Chisinau authorities. On receipt of this information, Bolsheviks in Chişinău acted quickly.

At Chişinău station a small armed Moldavian reception committee was scattered by the 4th Cossack cavalry regiment and companies of Red Guards. The 60^th Russian battery group was installed and opened fire on the arriving train. Unwisely, largely separated from guns and ammunition, the awakening Transylvanian troops were hardly able to defend themselves as artillery and machine gun fire ripped through their train. The confused survivors partly believed it was Moldavian forces attacking them and quickly surrendered. They were severely beaten but some were saved by the intervention of Moldavian troops.

Later that day, January 19^th in Moldavia, a Grăniceri (frontier guard) detachment along with Transylvanian troops set off for Bessarabia in three groups. Largely second line or reservist quality soldiers, the original intention was that they would carry the powerful weaponry and ammunition needed by the Kiev regiment. The first two sections travelled to Ghidighici, the last station before Chisinau, where they disembarked, heading for Chişinău. With them was the Russian general Kanzerov, representing General Scerbacev as the anti-Bolshevik Russian authority.

Alerted to the presence of Romanian troops, the Bolsheviks attacked the Romanians with substantial infantry, cavalry and artillery forces at Ghidighici. A large battle followed lasting well into the night. Heavily outnumbered and now low on ammunition, with the railway cut behind, Romanian forces engaged in a fighting retreat back to the Prut.

The third force was stopped by the Bolsheviks at Ungheni by the Prut river and could not progress.

There was now open warfare between the Romanian army and Bolshevik forces in areas in Bessarabia broadly east of Iaşi – especially at Ungheni, Cornesti and Straseni. The Bolsheviks successfully used surprise guerrilla tactics, capturing and murdering senior Russian army officers. Romanian forces suffered badly as the High Command felt unable to spare a large number of its best troops and equipment from the Front (facing the Central Powers).

The Bolsheviks effectively gained control of Chişinău. Escaping members of The Sfatul Tarii met secretly to organise separate delegations to try to reach Iaşi by different routes. Their aim: convince the Romanian government of the need for a large-scale intervention.

On January 20^th, the Romanian High Command issued orders to launch a large scale effort to expel the Bolsheviks from Bessarabia and take military control of the province. They appointed General Brosteanu to lead the invasion.

Two infantry and two cavalry divisions would be deployed. The 11^th division would enter between Ungheni and Leova, advancing to Chişinău. The 13^th division would cross near Cahul and occupy southern Bessarabia. The 2^nd cavalry division would operate between the two army groups. To the north, the 1^st cavalry division would cover the region around Balti and Soroca up to the area held by the Austro-Hungarian army in Hotin (Khotyn).

On January 23^rd, 11^th division now split into two columns crossed the Prut. The southern column consisting of troops from 22^nd Brigade crossed over near Leova and marched north-east to Galbena and Hincesti, prior to heading to Chisinau. The northerly column (21^st Brigade) made cautious use of the Ungheni – Chisinau railway line for transport while marching alongside it.

Encountering some fear amongst local inhabitants due to the work of agitators, the forces offered assurances to local people as to the Romanian state’s good and honourable intentions.

General Brosteanu met Bessarabian President Inculet at Călăraşi railway station. They agreed the hoped for peaceful entry of the Romanian army into Chişinău. Romanian forces would only use their weapons if forced to defend themselves. At Călăraşi, other visiting politicians were also offered assurances as to the Romanian state’s respect for their rights, privileges, culture and freedoms. An ultimatum was issued to the Bolsheviks to leave the country by midday, January 26^th.

On the evening of January 25^th, the 21^st and 22^nd Brigades entered Chişinău separately in two places with flags flying and music playing. They were greeted by enthusiastic crowds. Meanwhile the Bolsheviks were fleeing on overloaded trains in the direction of the Ukraine.

A proclamation from General Prezan was read out. It concluded as follows:

“The Rumanian Army has no other wish than to enable you, by the order and quiet which it brings you, to gain and to improve your autonomy and your liberties as you think fit. The Rumanian Army will not trouble any inhabitant of the Republic, whatever his nationality or religion may be. As soon as order and quiet have been established, and when there is a guarantee that pillaging, robbery and murder will not begin again, the Rumanian soldiers will return to their own country.”

On January 27^th, General Brosteanu entered Chişinău officially with his general staff. The following day, he was invited to a formal evening reception by the ruling authorities.

Bender (Tighina) however was still in Bolshevik hands. On January 28^th, the 22^nd Brigade advanced to the hills north-west of Bender. There encountering Bolshevik forces, a fierce engagement followed in which they drove them off the hills. They could not advance further as the Bolsheviks had concentrated large forces and much heavy artillery in Bender fortress. Holding their positions, the brigade awaited substantial reinforcements.

On January 29^th, the Bolshevik government in Petrograd declared war on Romania.

January 1918 (2 of 2) – Moldavia & beyond: southern battles

On the Danube in January, as elsewhere, relations between the Romanian and Russian armed forces had been deteriorating since the summer. Russian troops had deserted and assassinated their officers. Russian sailors had been assaulting and insulting their Romanian counterparts.

The Romanian navy increasingly had to take over the Russian roles and military positions. They had to deal with an insurrection in their own ranks however as the Bolshevik revolution took a temporary hold on some Romanian sailors.

The Russian and Romanian fleets had faced each other since the summer – the Russians at Izmail and the Romanians at Chilia Noua.

On January 10^th, a force of about 300 Romanian soldiers had crossed the Prut in response to a desperate appeal from the authorities in Cahul (Budjak region). The appeal had been to the commander of the 2nd battalion of the 47^th Romanian regiment at Odessa. Following an agreement with Bessarabian Captain Crăciunescu of the Russian Army, the Romanian force intervened. It consisted of about three platoons of cavalry and two companies with a machine gun section. Although small, it was only expected to control Cahul and the immediate surrounding coastal area. The Romanians were supported by Ukrainian elements (as in Moldavia). Initially successful they then increasingly struggled to maintain law and order.

On January 20^th, near Galaţi (Galatz), large-scale warfare broke out between Romanian and Russian forces. A whole Russian division, and part of another, mainly consisting of Siberian troops had tried to break through Romanian lines to Russian held territory. They had been barred by Romanian forces with the usual orders not to allow armed Russian troops to pass. Siberian forces shelled Galaţi heavily with fighting involving Romanian monitors on the Danube.

On January 21^st , south of Cahul, Colonel Dragu, commander of the 47^th regiment was captured by Bolsheviks as he conducted a reconnaissance at Vulcăneşti. This was mainly populated by Bulgarians and Gagauzi. The colonel was sentenced to death. His life and that of other Romanian soldiers saved by the intervention of Professor Filanov, chief of Soviets at Izmail (Ismail). The university professor said:

“Bessarabia was Moldavian land in former times over a long period. We have enough land in Russia and not enough people to work it. We have no business here. Let the Moldavians master in peace their ancestor’s land.”

But a few miles away, further warfare ensued. The cavalry squadron was attacked by Bolsheviks supported by inhabitants of the village in which it was quartered. Captain Vaasilescu and many of his soldiers were killed, while the remainder were scattered.

Further south in Bolgrad (Bolhrad), Russian Bolshevik soldiers arrested General Kotzebue ,the Commander of the 6th Russian Army. They then launched various attacks onto the Moldavian side of the Prut in support of warring Siberian forces near Galaţi.

So on January 24th, the day after Romanian divisions started taking over territory to the north, another Romanian army division (the 13^th) crossed into the Budjak region. The force was divided into two parts.

The first “Prut Detachment” crossed at Vadul lui Isac, just north of the Budjak (in what is now Moldova). This battalion, with artillery and cavalry headed south, securing various river bank positions on the east bank of the Prut.

The second force “Bolgrad Detachment”, made up of three battalions of the 47^th regiment with additional artillery and cavalry headed for Cahul (where the other part of the regiment was). It then continued south to Bolgrad, encountering and disarming a number of armed villages, expelling Russian soldiers found there. At Vulcăneşti two 120mm howitzers with 23 wagons of ammunition, heading for Bolgrad were captured and confiscated. Bolgrad itself surrendered quickly and was disarmed. General Pergshailo, recommended by General Scerbacev was installed in place of General Kotzebue who had been taken away by the Bolsheviks.

Over the coming week in surrounding villages were found substantial arms caches which added greatly to the large supply of weapons and ammunition recovered.

On January 26^th, two Russian motor torpedo boats arrived at Sulina with Romanian scripted Bolshevik propaganda from Odessa. The next day, three senior Romanian marine officers were captured by Bolshevik forces at Izmail, but managed to escape during the night. On January 29^th, a Bolshevik crewed Russian vessel threatened a Romanian naval vessel to replace its flag with the communist red flag.

A little later, the Russian naval commander posed two questions or issues to his Romanian opposite number. Firstly, the Russians stated they would like to evacuate and take all military equipment away with them. Secondly, he enquired, what would be his attitude if on a formal declaration of war between Russia and Romania, no separate agreement had been reached between the two navies? Additionally what would their attitude be (as a navy) to accepting a Bolshevik revolution?

The Romanian Navy’s commander delivered a very hostile response. This was clear in detailing the range of adverse consequences for the Russian navy if the suggested actions took place.

Fighting near Galaţi was brought to a conclusion at the end of January when the Russians gave themselves up mainly to the Germans.

As January ended, the position showed Romanian forces in mainly peaceful occupation of those lands in Bessarabia which pre-1812 had been part of Moldavia. Territory which constituted substantially the area of modern Moldova.

___________________________________________________________________________________

Securing Bessarabia

The Romanian army faced a much tougher fight for the regions outside the Moldavian heartlands.

Bender was attacked and captured after a series of major battles February 4^th - 7^th.

Southern Bessarabia was even more fiercely contested by the Bolsheviks with the support of some local Bulgarian and Gagauzian people, Ukrainians there were more neutral.

From 1856 for 22 years, parts of the south and west of the Budjak had been incorporated into Moldavia, (Treaties of Paris 1856, and Berlin 1878). But as the fighting in January demonstrated, the inhabitants there weren’t at all keen for a return to Romanian control. There followed a series of fierce land and sea battles.

The situation would have been far worse but on February 9^th, the Ukraine and the Central Powers concluded a peace treaty at Brest-Litovsk. This agreement plus strong anti-Bolshevik sentiment in the Ukraine and the entry of German troops, blocked any land access the Bolsheviks had to Bessarabia. Partly cut off, strong Bolshevik forces in the Budjak were defeated by mid March.

In Hotin (Khotyn), northern Bessarabia, Russian Bolshevik forces withdrew on February 28^th and handed over control to the Austro-Hungarian army.

By mid March 1918, Bolshevik forces had been completely expelled from Bessarabia.

“It has been said that the Bolshevists betrayed Rumania. That accusation is unfounded and unjust. The Bolshevists were the outcome of a pernicious system, for which the Revolution had found no remedy; Rumania had undoubtedly been betrayed, but the betrayal was not Lenin’s work. When he assumed control in Russia, Rumania’s plight was hopeless, and, at least, he left her with what she might have lost – the status of an Independent State.”

Lieutenant-Colonel Christopher Thomson

Britain’s resident military representative in Romania 1915 – 1918. Delegate at Versailles Conference 1919 and later minister in a Labour Government.

In March 1918, Alexandru Marghiloman replaced Averescu as Romania’s Prime Minister. Marghiloman negotiated with the German government (representing the Central Powers). Turkey had been warring with Russia. (The latest chapter in a centuries long conflict). Turkey wanted Bessarabia kept permanently out of Russian hands.

The Germans privately demanded from Marghiloman the union of Romania and Bessarabia as part of a peace treaty which was the Treaty of Bucharest, May 1918 (never ratified). One provision lead to Hotin being returned to Bessarabia.

From this point, no direct threat to Bessarabia materialised from Central Powers forces.

On October 31^st, the Austro-Hungarian Empire collapsed.

The Central Powers surrendered at the armistice on November 11^th.

Bessarabia remained under Romanian control until 1940, when the Bolsheviks made their first return. From the historic Moldavian heartlands, they would carve out Moldova. Adding to it the more reliable Transnistria region which would be well armed and resourced to act as guarantor of this new state’s communist purity in its new stamped out soviet styled identity.

For more on events in 1918 along with a wider picture, see three language 1917-18 page, then the Bessarabia (1918 & Now) page.

_______________________________________________________________________________

Recommended Sources

For my above comprehensive introduction covering 1916 - early 1918 (in Moldavia and Bessarabia), I would like to thank the people and organisations that have made such valuable information available for others to understand, interpret and benefit from.

The following list of sources is not exhaustive.

Wikipedia

Google Books (including some of the following)

Secrets of the Balkans by Charles J. Vopicka, 1921

In The World War by Count Ottokar Czernin, 2006 & prior

Old Europe’s Suicide by Christopher Thomson, 1920

Moldova: A Romanian Province Under Russian Rule by Marcel Mitrasca, 2002

Contemporary Roumania and her problems by Joseph Slabey Rouček, 1971

Peacemakers: Six Months That Changed the World: The Paris Peace Conference of 1919...by Margaret Macmillan, 2003

Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building, and Ethnic Struggle, 1918-1930 by Irina Livezeanu, 2000

A History of the Roumanians, by R. W. Seton-Watson, 1934

The First World War by John Keegan, 1999

British Cabinet Papers, 1918 from National Archive

The Case For Bessarabia, by Russian Liberation Committee, 1918

World War I: encyclopedia, Volume 1 by Spencer Tucker, Priscilla Mary Roberts, 2005

The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture by Charles King, 2000

United Roumania by Charles Upson Clark, 1932

More Corn For Bessarabia: Russian Experience by Louis Guy Michael, 1983

The Brusilov offensive by Timothy C. Dowling, 2008

Infantry Attacks By Erwin Rommel, Manfred Rommel, 2009 & prior

Romania in World War 1 – The Eastern Front by Dan Dimancescu

Romanian civilization, Vol. 9, Iss.3, Centrul de Istorie și Civilizație Europeană (Academia Română), Fundația Culturală Română

The Emporia State research studies, Volume 39

Armies in the Balkans 1914-18 by Nigel Thomas, Dušan Babac, 2001