1812 - Treaty
Setting The Scene, Part 2 - 1812 - Bessarabia, Moldavia and the way ahead.
Summary / Overview: both parts
A comprehensive introduction to the creation and first decades development of Bessarabia; a new (unforeseen pre-1812) carved-out state, whose northern pure-Moldavian lands would ultimately metamorphose into The Republic of Moldova. These accounts also reference the principalities: “West Moldavia” and Wallachia, plus relevant Russian empire elements.
(“1812 Bicentenary” account published on Google sites from 2010 and fundamentally developed to 2012, after which more changes/additions have been made).
As before, all italics are mine – for emphasis.
Thanks again to so many authors for the quality material so freely provided. Please note sources listed at base where more in-depth information can be looked up. This is not an exhaustive list; others at least provide local histories, prompts, clues and views which are usefully thought provoking and informative. Plus, it’s useful to check maps for/from the era.
Introduction: new material
This Part 2 account examines the short path to the 1812 Treaty of Bucharest. It additionally focuses on the regional environment circumstances pointing towards Bessarabia’s creation, and its new found role and status.
Subsequent circumstances and factors would contribute to the new state’s evolution by stages, along with state policies to justify and shape Bessarabia’s individually crafted status and role - its “raison d'etre”, (For those, see “1812 Bicentenary”). Developments which would underpin the long-term survival of this state.
Excellent starter / summary source: 1812 and the Emergence of the Bessarabian Region… by Victor Taki, 2015 (English & Romanian). See base for fuller title details.
At the outset, two rhetorical questions to consider… the creation of the new state of Bessarabia was:
(a) An aberrant, chance outcome of 1812 power politics, and/or
(b) An obvious, logical, even predestined resolving outcome of the warfare between the region’s (two) major powers – sensibly defining territorial limits. Broadly in line with the (universally accepted) balance of power orthodoxy.
A binary choice? The possibilities of each option are arguably both found within the fabric of contemporary thinking and events.
Additionally, to assess this, are we (on the ground in this new state) in 1812 looking forwards… or looking back (many decades later) with the benefit of hindsight..?
For the latter assessment also refer to the “1812 Bicentenary” page. This follows the developing Bessarabia story through the decades. It starts with a step-by-step account of the post 1812 treaty events by which this new state was formed.
Creating Bessarabia: the start of the story: six-months before The Treaty of Bucharest
In mid-November 1811, the prospect of advancing Russia’s border to the Prut river by formal treaty was an almost unthinkable possibility.
Both the Russian and Ottoman Empires desperately wanted to end their nearly six year long ruinous war. Both (weakened) empires were threatened by Napoleon; they had to find agreement.
On the table, mid-November in Giurgiu facing Russian and Turkish negotiators was the Tsar’s proposal for setting the Russian empire border at the Sereth (Siret river) – absorbing most of Moldavia. The precedent for arbitrarily carving up Moldavia had already been set with the creation of the new Austrian empire state of Bukovina in 1775, which Russia had assented to.
The Tsar’s 1811 Sereth demand was a retreat from the previous Russian demand for the whole of the principalities (Wallachia and Moldavia). This had been stated in an imperial ukase in January 1810. The Tsar’s reduced (and reducing) demands primarily caused by Napoleon’s expected invasion of Russia. But (as events in the previous century had shown), Austrian empire hostile diplomatic manoeuvring, even escalating to outright opposition to a (largescale) territorial Russian grab of the principalities was a real possibility. It was also well known that Austria had pretensions on Wallachia, especially the western part. Note Russia’s then Minister of War’s advice (next section, para 7).
Additionally, Napoleon had a strong, threatening hold over the Habsburgs, which consequently could therefore (most unwillingly) face Russia on the battlefield. The very capable Austrian army operating in conjunction with Napoleon’s massive invading force (in a pincer action) would be a very dangerous prospect (for Russia’s generals).
The possible dangers given above of hostile Austrian empire action in response to formalising the existing Russian empire occupation of the principalities are described by Istanbul based British ambassador, Stratford Canning (source: Lane-Poole) in a letter in September 1810:
“Austria looked upon the act of annexation with extreme jealousy, and had thoughts of trying to bring about a peace, corrective, perhaps of that measure, through the mediation of Buonaparte.”
Early November 1811 saw both the start of serious peace talks and spectacular Russian military successes. A large part of the Ottoman army had been trapped in the Danube delta region, with no way out. This was the latest brilliant success for General Kutuzov who (also as a multi-lingual, accomplished statesman and diplomat) was a major negotiator in the run up to and conclusion of the Treaty of Bucharest signed in May 1812.
On the ground, in November in desperate circumstances, the Grand Vizier had conceded the Russian demand for the Sereth, but by mid-November the Sultan had refused to endorse this. Discussions continued until the next phase of changes in late November / early December 1812. At this point, with the escalating threat from Napoleon, taking the border back (further) to the Prut was seriously discussed.
Who first proposed the Prut river as the new Russian empire boundary, and with what sense of (plausible / endorsable) authority was it formally tabled and bilaterally discussed in late November 1811..?
There is no clear, certain answer to this question, which is covered in the section after next. The Tsar refused to endorse this proposed concession at the time, and for many months afterwards.
Metternich, Austria’s brilliant, well informed foreign minister asked at that time:
“Will Russia proceed from strongly-asserted pretensions to important conquests? This question I find myself little able to answer decidedly, as the course of Russia’s policy towards the Porte is inexplicable”.
Memoirs of Prince Metternich 1773 – 1815: November 28th 1811, letter to Austria’s Emperor Francis
The six-month run up to the creation of Bessarabia (fore-runner to the Republic of Moldova) is as those who know it, an intriguing part-told story. It especially involves three main players: a fabulously wealthy polyglot Armenian grain merchant, the newly appointed, inexperienced British ambassador to the Ottoman Empire and General Kutuzov. Their revealing backstories (outside of this account), are well worth looking into.
By early May 1812, Napoleon’s imminent invasion caused a frantic two-week final diplomatic push, putting at least two of these individuals centre-stage. Each demonstrated a wealth of talent and ability. Was there one single powerfully influential individual amongst them? Did they conformally accept an obvious, compelling rationale as to where the Russian empire should (finally) fix its southern Black Sea frontier? Also, were they operating within an agreed envelope of possibilities set by the Tsar and the Porte; narrowed down to absolute priorities? Were (the needs and requirements of) other powers such as the Austrian empire factored into this decision? “Yes” is the likely correct answer to each of these questions.
The selection of the Prut frontier was a carefully and widely considered (if rushed) outcome for its participating powers in 1812. So, was there a strong underlying rationale; a set of compelling reasons for setting the border at this point? The next section makes this case.
Skip the lengthy next section / chapter if you want to go straight onto the path to, and conclusion of The Treaty of Bucharest.
The limits of empire(s) - delimiting the Bessarabia territorial space – stability, defence and development of regional strategic-commercial interests
In 1739, an invading Russian army created a series of basic defence positions between Hotin and Iaşi, at 39 verst intervals (about 41.5 kms), integrated with bridges over the Prut.
Detailed 1739 plans were drawn up for the defence of Iaşi. These actual and planned defences were the work of Field Marshal Von Münnich on behalf of Empress Anna of Russia (who died in 1740). A piece of expeditionary-colonialism: hard to place in an historical context.
(As an aside, Von Münnich was the inspiration for multi-award winning film: “The Adventures of Baron Munchausen. “The fantastic tale of an 18th century aristocrat, his talented henchmen and a little girl in their efforts to save a town from defeat by the Turks.” The film was created by Terry Gilliam of Monty Python comedy fame).
Obvious question is what wider territory would or could underpin a Russian controlled sliver of land from Hotin to Iaşi (close to the Prut)? In Iaşi, defences continued to be built decades later, for example 1769 – 1774 during a subsequent Russian occupation. Note that the medieval fort at Khotin/Hotin was overlooked by hills and vulnerable to cannonfire – the Turks there had surrendered to Von Münnich without a fight – Hotin would benefit from a buffer zone to buy time in the case of a Turkish invasion…
Some support might be obtained from Austria’s Bukovina 1774/5 acquisition. Later, we will look at how the Russian and Austrian empires were unwaveringly long-term allies in practical terms within mutually acceptable boundaries. For now, note that Russia and Austria exchanged control of Moldavia: Austria: 1787 – 1788, Russia: 1788 – 1789, Austria again: 1789 – 1791.
In 1812 and for at least many years previously, the Russian Empire had needed to establish a firm, sustainable and defendable southern (Black Sea territory) border. The backdrop being the unsustainable cost of multiple and increasingly threatening wars on different fronts, especially from 1806 - rising to the 1812 crescendo.
The need for this peace and stability was perhaps ironically better recognised by Russia’s generals than (most of) its Tsars. (Touched upon in “1812 Bicentenary”, sections “The Russian take-over” and “History, nature and causes of Bessarabia’s creation”).
Minister of War, Barclay de Tolly’s advice to the Tsar in early 1812 on the Tsar’s 1811 reduced territorial demand back to the Siret – “[…advising against a policy that would] extend our military forces too far and will always provide pretexts for Austria and Turkey, two powers that in the current circumstances should be closely allied to Russia".
De Tolly was one of Russia’s most experienced and successful military officers, Governor-General of Finland and then Minister of War. Of part canny Scottish origins (Barclay clan), his good leadership in the early part of the campaign against Napoleon caused the destruction of part of the invading army. De Tolly then, (late August) handed overall command to Kutuzov who had travelled back from the principalities.
In May 1812, General Kutuzov played a leading role in determining the new province’s boundaries in the Treaty of Bucharest. We’ve already looked into his thinking (“1812 Bicentenary”), but there’s more… Kutuzov was one of Tsar Paul’s few (capable) confidants and advisers. Extracts from Wikipedia, Paul I of Russia tell us more: “[Tsar Paul] opposed… expansionary wars…and instead preferred to pursue a more peaceful, diplomatic path. Immediately upon taking the throne, he recalled all troops outside Russian borders.”
In May 1811, Kutuzov had taken over a military over-reach situation in the principalities. With a largely worn-out army, in June he defeated a larger Turkish army at Rousse (Ruse). Then, “Mikhail Kutuzov, in accordance with his cautious character, evacuated Silistria and slowly started to retreat northward.” (Wikipedia).
Kutuzov’s predecessor had also responded cautiously to the over-reach, as British ambassador, Stratford Canning in his memoirs attests for March 1811:
“The Russians are withdrawing their troops: they suffer much by sickness.”
Both sides had fought each other to a near standstill position, approaching the limits of their resources with heavily weakened morale.
Furthermore, there were serious riots in Bucharest in the late summer of 1811 involving merchants and boyars (!) as well as ordinary people. Disturbances due to widespread starvation and spread of diseases such as syphilis from Russian soldiers alongside oppressive military impositions. In the previous century, ahead of a Russian invasion, Bucharest’s citizens had attacked and chased out Ottoman forces there. Now, they could call on Turkish forces, and were not to be under-estimated. The other side of the Prut with fewer and smaller towns was likely to be quieter, and more compliant.
So now let’s step back to overview these circumstances placed in a wider regional context, with pointers to the way ahead.
In 1811, in the southern Black Sea region, the need for longterm peace, stability, security and economic development was addressed by two significant inter-related solutions. The first was the Russian empire tie-up with the Austrian (Habsburg) empire. The second was the related (financial) solution of developing commerce and trade - especially the valuable, major new development of Odessa. For the latter, the great value of a stable, settled trading environment is demonstrated by the following extract from Hommaire de Hell’s book:
“… during Napoleon’s wars, its [Odessa’s] commerce, completely stationary, did not exceed five or six millions of roubles. After the events of 1815, during the horrible dearth that afflicted all western Europe, the exports rose in 1817 to more than 38,000,000… During the war of 1828-29 they sank to 1,673,000.”
Odessa was a short distance along the coast from Bessarabia – and the Ottoman empire frontier. This frontier fringed one of Odessa’s main arteries - the Dniester (or Nistru) river running along the Russian held territories of Kherson & Podolia - and the newly carved out Austrian state of Bukovina. All faced serious, credible ongoing threats, obstructions and difficulties from Ottoman Empire sources and actors.
Bessarabia’s Budjak coastal region had contained (for centuries) some of the Ottoman Empire’s finest cavalry. These Tartar horsemen represented one of the main powerfully destructive and dangerously unpredictable elements Russian generals regularly had to contend with. But from 1806, time had been bought for Odessa’s 1803 large-scale resumed start by Russian successes against the Ottoman Empire. But for how long..?
In the spring of 1812 treaty negotiations, for Russia to (additionally) cede the (hard-won) Bessarabia-east Moldavia territory would mean that Odessa wasn’t affordably defendable (on a sustainable basis).
Odessa’s foreign merchants could easily be frightened away along with its trade-enabling banking and insurance services. The latter necessarily encompassed long-term contracts underpinned by an expected long-term stable and predictable environment. The nearby supporting Dniester operation itself would require the reliable ongoing, mutually beneficial (friendly?) co-operation of the Ottoman Empire with its own trading requirements. How sustainable was that? Here’s a contemporary view, from a major publication:
European Commerce… by J Jepson Oddy, 1805:
“As matters stand at present, the Black Sea trade is a very casual one; every misunderstanding betwixt Russia and Turkey, will put an instant stop to the commerce on that side, and must always be a check to every prudent commercial mind.”
The solution (to protect Odessa) was obvious: seize and secure a large enough buffer zone in the Bessarabia-Moldavia region, expel the (remaining) Tartar cavalry.
Tsar Alexander was very clear that the new carved out territory would not be yielded. In April, the Tsar’s instructions to Admiral Chichagov (authorised to take over the negotiations from Kutuzov), were to yield other named, stated, mainly territorial concessions to the Turks if need be. None of these covered the Dacia region; there was to be no retreat from the Prut. Furthermore, the final treaty agreement removed the secret preliminary clauses requiring the destruction and permanent removal of the fortresses at Chilia and Ismail.
In the post May 1812 period before The Treaty of Bucharest was finally ratified in July, there were very threatening noises from the Sultan and the Porte (see “1812 Bicentenary” account). In answer to a different offer of pacifying concessions from Chichagov, the admiral recorded in his Paris mémoires the Tsar’s response: “Il refusa de rétrocéder la Bessarabie.”
There is another significant, related element as well: the long-standing, ongoing co-operation of the Habsburg monarchy which with its relatively new states of Galicia and Bukovina shared eastern Moldavia-Bessarabia’s northern border, along with Podolia. There was a shared Germanic / German speaking input which ran all the way from Bukovina along the Dniester to the Black Sea. Also, from 1811 into the Budjak, (thanks to General Kutuzov’s specific April 1811 colonisation order for all Christian settlers). (German settlement is detailed in the “1812 Bicentenary” account: “Nation Status… and colonisation” section).
Remember also that the Russian royal family was essentially (ethnically) German: there is a bias there:
“… Russians think of the good old German honesty and truth, of which they are so fond of talking…”
So said Kohl (publishing in 1844, title at base), on visiting the Duchy of Bukovina from Russian territory.
The Russian and Austrian empires were effectively in practice long-term allies within mutually acceptable boundaries (we will explore this more later). Both recruited German settlers who for religious, political or other reasons weren’t welcome in their own territories. Bukovina was the more attractive, containing on its 1775 acquisition, most of Moldavia’s longstanding German population.
The new conjunction of the Habsburg and Russian empire territories with their inter-operable supporting and defensive positions was clearly positive for both parties.
The Hapsburg monarchy needed a more sustainably economically productive and defensible territorial position. For the Austrian state was burdened with a large and increasing debt from wars (especially with France). By 1801, its massive increase in paper currency led to inflation and a deflation of confidence.
Compared to Russia, the Austrian empire’s rulers were more concerned with economic security, supported by effective industrial policies.
The Austrian empire was arguably more capably focussed on the containment (of threats) using a very finely judged foreign policy, and effective order and control methods underpinned by effective regulations. These policed by a competent and reliable civil service and military. Strategic decisions were carefully pragmatically calculated, with little weight attributable to any visionary philosophy.
Tsar Alexander 1st was enamoured by Metternich, Austria’s brilliant foreign minister, and chancellor from 1815. Metternich however was very wary of Russia “under the feeble rule of Alexander I”, and with Russia’s ambitions for which the acquisition of eastern Moldavia represented a disturbing development, especially with Russia’s access to the Danube. Although Austria was happy to be compensated with preferential trading access. Here’s one of Metternich’s perspectives from a long letter to Emperor Francis on November 28th 1811:
“Judging from former experience, I never reckoned on any steadfast political system in Russia. The steps of the Russian cabinet and their incoherence have even outstripped my expectations, and given the most undoubted proofs that the Emperor Alexander, on the present occasion, as in former times, follows the impulse of a party, without taking into consideration the dangers of an undertaking which even to the superficial observer appear enormous.”
Memoirs of Prince Metternich 1773 – 1815
The Austrian regime had little appetite or sympathy for (expensive, destabilising) military adventurism in the principalities. Later example: rebels Ypsilanti, 1821 & Cuza 1848 imprisoned. Compare Ypsilanti’s treatment to Russian treatment of Cantacuzino in the 1821 Greek revolt, suggest: 1812 – Bicentenary: "The Limits of Empire…", mid-section.
In 1777, the Austrian empire’s ruler, Maria Theresa had revealingly recorded:
“Unhealthy provinces, without culture, depopulated by perfidious and ill-intentioned Greeks, would be more likely to exhaust than to augment the forces of the monarchy”.
The Austrian leadership (when empowered to do so) gave more attention given to limiting, controlling, preventing activity in the principalities rather than seeing separate (and potentially threatening) political developments there. Expressed in modern terms, the principalities were seen (collectively) as a “failed state”, and should be maintained like that in their view, free from any new foreign intervention.
Revisiting Metternich’s revealing November 28th 1811 letter to his Emperor Francis, captures that perilous pivotal moment six months before the Treaty of Bucharest:
“At the probable approaching outbreak of war, we stand surrounded by enemies, in the midst of this horrible federation which leaves us no peaceful frontier, except that of Turkey.”
Note that, despite the shocking behaviour or effects of the Ottoman and Russian regimes in the principalities, there were pro-Russian and pro-Turkish elements there. There was no pro-Austrian element, because there would be nothing behind it (as Maria Theresa’s statement reveals). However, the Austrian leadership under her direction had seen an opportunity there…
The Austrian investment in Bukovina (acquired 1775) had proven successful and profitable with its large, rapid expansion in agriculture, industry, solidly built towns, infrastructure, and with an expanding well-integrated, multi-cultural population from an inherited primitive, destitute Ottoman base.
Good source: “The Bukovina-Germans during the Habsburg Period” by Sophie Welsch
Tsar Alexander was impressed by the Austrian regime’s success as a pointer to how to get good results, as were others. In 1817 Scarlat Callimachi. instituted a civil code in Moldavia partly based on the Austrian civil code of 1811, and governor Bakhmetiev adopted it in Bessarabia in 1818. See 1812 – Bicentenary, base of section: "The development of civil rights".
So now let’s examine the underlying case for Russia’s new Bessarabia territory, continuing for now with how the important Austro-Russian relationship developed.
The Habsburg–Russian empires had formal agreements, but formal treaties at this time often worked less well in practice than agreements based on informally-implied-understood-pragmatic meeting of minds understandings. An example of the latter was the important role, backed by power that Russia had in mediating between the German states and Prussia Vs Austria to prevent war. For a formal treaty example look up the unsustainable 1807 Treaty of Tilsit, and its many surrounding issues.
In terms of the power of informal agreements between Russia and Austria and the twice carving up of Moldavia. First in 1775, the state of Bukovina was created which involved a side deal between Austria and Russia as a follow-on to the 1774 Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. Secondly in the formation of Bessarabia and considering Austria’s interests, note the important role of Manuc Bei (Manuk Bey) in the Treaty of Bucharest. Manuc was certainly at least a double agent, and possibly a triple agent. After Manuc Bei (like other “infidel” servants) fell dangerously out of Ottoman Empire favour, he (surprisingly) fled to Austria first - to be warmly welcomed… Later in Vienna, Manuc Bei was warmly greeted by the Tsar.
Many sources including travellers to the region at the time describe the Habsburg and Russian empires as “allies”. This covered much of the eighteenth century to beyond the Crimean War. They agreed formally and informally within compelling interlocking interests.
In 1781, Joseph II of Austria had agreed a pact with Catherine II of Russia (Catherine The Great) that in case of war between the Ottoman Empire and Russia, Austrian forces would attack Ottoman Empire territories. In return Russia would support Austria in any conflict with Prussia.
Despite this, at times, senior foreign advisers to the Tsar suggested, or flirted with the idea of forming alliances with other parties (countries, empires) against Austria in the constant jockeying for advantage or supremacy between regional powers: that was always a non-starter. For Austria’s part, especially during the winter of 1811/12 when under Napoleon’s very serious threatening influence, Austria formed part of a proposed alliance with the Ottoman Empire against Russia. Meanwhile in the principalities:
"It appears, that while these two provinces were held by Russia, they furnished both corn and cattle, including horses, not only to that power, but to Austria; and Moldavia, particularly, made those traffics most abundantly.”
Travels in Georgia, Persia, Armenia, Ancient Babylonia etc. during the years 1817 – 1820 by Sir Robert Ker Porter, 1821
In June 1813 (two months after General Kutuzov’s death), Austria joined Russia and Prussia’s successful but stalled offensive against Napoleon for the final coalition push - ultimately taking them to Paris and victory. (Useful background reading: Austria’s legendary foreign minister Metternich’s relationship with Napoleon). Returning to the principalities:
It was mainly both the Russian and Austrian empire’s relations with the powerful, but weakening third party – the Ottoman Empire which shaped events. The latter’s decline adjusted the regional power politics; leading to the carve-up of Moldavia.
The next big step was the Russian sponsored 1830’s inception / implementation of The Organic Statutes in the principalities. The run-up to this had seen European powers marking an increased presence in the principalities, heightened when Russian forces invaded the principalities, 1828-9, and then secured commercial control of the Danube delta territory by the 1829 Treaty of Adrianople. This would have serious trading consequences (See 1812 Bicentenary, section: “The limits of empire…developing a new border”). The view from Wikipedia, Phanariots:
“The Danubian principalities grew in strategic importance with the Napoleonic Wars and the decline of the Ottoman Empire, as European states became interested in halting Russian southward expansion (which included the 1812 annexation of Bessarabia). New consulates in the two countries' capitals, ensuring the observation of developments in Russian−Ottoman relations, had an indirect impact on the local economy as rival diplomats began awarding protection and sudit [suditi: protected foreign subjects] status to merchants competing with local guilds. Nicholas I of Russia pressured Wallachia and Moldavia into granting constitutions (in 1831 and 1832, respectively) to weaken native rulers.”
The 1830’s Organic Statues were skilfully developed by the tactfully “liberal” General Kiselev, later hastily removed by the same now impatient Tsar Nicholas from the diplomatic negotiations prior to the disastrous 1853-56 Crimean War…
The 1853 invasion of the principalities marked a temporary part-unravelling of General Kiselev’s fine work which at its fruition would lead to the creation of the United Principalities in 1859: a first step in the foundation of Romania. But arguably implicitly underlining (northern) Bessarabia’s continuing status. With some irony, in 1856 a part of southern Bessarabia esp. Budjak region was ceded to this Romanian territory as part of the post Crimean War settlement until 1878. (See 1812 Bicentenary, conclusion of section: “The limits of empire…developing a new border”). Wisely, the Romanian regime left much of the Budjak’s Russian-type administration in place during this period.
The 1853 tripartite nations’ allied force response had led to Russian forces retreating behind the Prut into Bessarabia in 1854 where they were secure. The Austrian army protected the Russian army there while they made their retreat, underpinning (northern) Bessarabia’s strategic value to both parties.
A nineteenth century British regimental historian recounts:
“…and as Austria protected the Russians on the Bessarabian frontier, we were forced at a late period of the year to make a descent upon the Crimea…”
“We have already seen that owing to the benevolence shown by Austria to the Russians, the latter were enabled to retire from the Danube into Bessarabia unmolested by the pursuing Turks.”
A History of the Coldstream Guards from 1815 to 1895 by C.B. Ross-of-Bladensburg, 1896.
How and why did this happen? Firstly, the Austrians were all very happy to see Russian forces safely expelled from the principalities. Thinking summed up (for example) in an earlier 1840 account, with wider applicability:
“…Austria perceives at this moment that one great mass of her territory, comprising Hungary, Transylvania and Gallicia [including Bukovina], is actually enclosed on three sides by provinces which receive the law of their conduct from the cabinet of St Petersburg. Neither can she view the close approximation of so powerful a neighbour – in itself sufficiently alarming – without some apprehension as to a peculiar point of internal weakness connected therewith, existing in her own dominions.”
Austria Vol 2 by Peter Evan Turnbull, 1840
The Austrian empire was made up of many disparate parts with many problematic issues which the Russian state was well aware of. However, events took an unexpected turn with the Hungarian Revolution of 1848-9, Wikipedia:
“After a series of serious Austrian defeats in 1849, the Austrian Empire came close to the brink of collapse. The young emperor Franz Joseph I had to call for Russian help in the name of the Holy Alliance. Tsar Nicholas I answered, and sent a 200,000 strong army with 80,000 auxiliary forces. Finally, the joint army of Russian and Austrian forces defeated the Hungarian forces.”
Tsar Nicholas 1 was concerned with protecting monarchist rights, especially following "1848, the year of revolutions". Obviously, the Austrian regime shared that view. But gratitude was in short supply when their Russian saviours’ invaded the principalities in 1853. Instead, the usual stiff, ultra-calculating, protectionist Habsburg style:
“For Austria did force Russia to evacuate the principalities by diplomatic ultimatum and military demonstration in the summer of 1854…”
Good source: Austria & The Danubian Principalities, 1853 – 1856 by Paul W. Schroeder, 1969
This author (amongst others) then explains that this time, Austria intended taking full control of the (now more economically successful) principalities themselves. Schroeder interestingly examines Habsburg motivations, and how they set about this attempted take-over.
The Austrian empire’s attempt to absorb the principalities into its empire, 1853 – 6, and Europe’s response, helped to confirm the principalities’ independent status, in turn implicitly underpinning the Prut as the southerly Black Sea limit of the Russian empire.
Another important reason for the Austrian army’s intervention in the principalities from 1853 (to 1856) is more applicable to the 1812 position, which we now return to.
The Russian and Austrian empires had a real shared sense of (direct, personal) threat from the Ottoman Empire. That is, on the ground, in the region – covering the principalities, Bukovina, Galicia, Podolia, Bessarabia and Kherson province. There, the situation could look different (from high level inter-empire politics).
Local negotiations across borders depend upon building relationships e.g. Bessarabia’s supply of horses for Austrian cavalry regiments protecting the Russian Empire flank. Given what both parties had suffered and inherited from the Ottoman Empire, this (Christian religion based, pan-European) understanding was more than “my enemy’s enemy is my friend.”
At the highest level, the good relationship between Tsar Alexander and his foreign minister Nesselerode with Austrian Foreign Minister Metternich was underpinned by these professed Christian values. In 1815 when Metternich became Austria’s chancellor, this led to ”The Holy Alliance”. See Wikipedia and:
Political Reform in the Russian and Ottoman Empires by Adrian Brisku, 2017
Escaping persecution, practising Christians of different nationalities relocated from the southern Danube region to Bessarabia during the 1806 – 1812 war, such as the large Bulgarian community. These settlers collectively labelled: “Transdanubian colonists”.
Kutuzov (a prime mover behind the 1812 treaty) was from 1811, a strong promoter of the migration policy which promised many privileges and exemptions to Bulgarians for settlement in the Budjak.
As for the Bulgarians, what had they left behind? In fact, many Bulgarian families had suffered shocking abuses at the hands of Turkish officials. A real sense of their situation well conveyed in an account by the longterm chaplain of the British Embassy in Constantinople:
Narrative of a Journey from Constantinople to England by Robert Walsh, 1828.
The 1812 situation is also well overviewed in an earlier account from a Scottish doctor travelling across the then Bessarabia, and the Danube region in 1738:
“…I am persuaded that two-thirds of Moldavia lies waste at this time. It seems to have been an established system in Turkish politics to depopulate all the countries bordering on Christendom, reserving no more than may be sufficient to furnish their garrisons and troops with provisions.”
“Travels from St Petersburg…” by John Bell, published 1763.
The above taken from the section: "History, Nature and Causes of Bessarabia’s Creation" on the 1812 – Bicentenary page which further examines the separate nature of the Budjak, attributed in part to its style of occupation, looking at its relationship to the “Moldavian region”. All very particular to Moldavia, east of the Prut.
Moldavia east and west of the Prut showed a distinct separation in their characteristics of urbanisation and land ownership and control; there were a number of significant differences between the two territories. This subject has been dealt with extremely well (as usual) by Victor Taki. See:
1812 and the Emergence of the Bessarabian Region: Province Building under Russian Imperial Rule (Euxeinos) / Rom. 1812 și crearea regiunii Basarabia… by Victor Taki, 2015
Another area of difference (connected to the above urbanisation and land ownership issues) was the large population disparity between Moldavia on each side of the Prut. Census numbers (where available) and assessments of their reliability lead to subjective judgements. However, the following range is unlikely to be challenged. The population in Ottoman controlled Moldavia post 1812 would have been 1.7 – 2 times the number in the new state of Bessarabia. The number of gypsies in Bessarabia was likely to have been about 3% - 5% of the number in Moldavia province. The number of gypsies in Moldavia about a tenth of that population.
Geographically, Moldavia east of the Prut was flatter and less forested, including the area north of the Budjak.
So, taking all these differences together, it’s clear that for whatever reason(s), the new state – the Bessarabia to be – had a very different character from the other part of Moldavia. These differences were arguably temporary and political plus reflective of profound positive differences found in most other countries in the world. Diversity and plurality are (to be) celebrated.
But in the mind of the Russian conquerors… Additionally, there was a likely sense (proven correct), in the generals’ minds especially that this new regional state could be controlled better than in the Principalities, where they had terrible experiences. There, in previous invasions, the generals had occupied but not properly controlled the territories. The thinking and the mandate, especially from visionary foreign minister, Capodistria was to capture the hearts and minds of (his compatriots), the phanariots. This hands-off approach is well instanced in the following account from Alison, (see bibliography & below) in which while the Russians had effective command of the Danube:
“…yet, during the whole winter of 1809-10, they made no attempt to obstruct the navigation of that river; the Turkish and Austrian vessels continued to ply upon it as during a period of profound peace, and English goods to an enormous amount were conveyed up the stream, paid duties to the Pasha of Widdin…”
Less pleasant: an under-funded hospital for sick and wounded Russian soldiers with the most disgusting and degrading conditions overseen with callous disregard by its phanariot rulers and administrators. The Russian generals largely powerless to intervene. Kutuzov himself had much experience of the leading boyars there.
Kutuzov would also have been aware of the serious ongoing dispute over the Russian Orthodox Church’s attempts to gain control of the church and monasteries in the Principalities. Kutuzov was a highly respected supporting member of the Russian Orthodox Church.
The effect of the 1812 treaty was to strengthen the Russian Orthodox Church’s claim over the large amount of ecclesiastical property in the new Bessarabia.
Taki’s Euxeinos account addresses the church and monasteries’ large holdings in Moldavian lands east of the Prut, including all of Chisinau. The Russian Orthodox Church's long struggle to wrest control of ecclesiastical property in the Principalities, was based on rights supposedly gained in the 1774 Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji.
Pro-Russia loyalist, Archbishop Gavril Bănulescu-Bodoni continued to play a crucial pivotal role in this. As Metropolitan of the new state from 1812, Bodoni was also able to gain much fuller control; preventing in Bessarabia (unlike Moldavia) archaic practices like the unhealthy shallow reburying of dead relatives, (see 1812 – Bicentenary). Bodoni's tangled, intriguing passage to power story is clearly presented in:
Entangled Histories of the Balkans by Daskalov & Marinov, 2013
Another major issue making the case for the new Bessarabia was expanding trade, commerce and prosperity. Protecting Odessa, unfettered access to the Dniester, and access to the Danube were high Russian priorities. Much of the beneficial trade post 1812 was with (Russia's long-term ally) the Habsburg Empire. Here for example: the official 1830 export figures for Ismail by value: Total P.R. 1,916,600 of which Turkey 1,482,000, France 42,000, Austria 392,600 (20%), with about a third of the ships using Ismail that year being Austrian (source: Schloss, 1837). This durable, mutually beneficial interconnectivity underlies the protective Austrian Empire actions in the 1853 Crimean War situation (seen above).
Russia’s regular conflicts with Turkey badly damaged trade (especially between both those two powers), with the Habsburg Empire well placed and able to partly fill some gaps. For example, stepping in during Russia’s involvement in The Greek War of Independence 1821 – 1830.
The Austrian Empire’s significant, almost dominant regional trade with Russia covered both Odessa and Bessarabia itself. For the latter, here’s some highlights from the excellent recent work by Valentin Tomuleţ (in Romanian - see base for source details):
About two-thirds of Chişinău residence visas issued for trading activities 1819 – 1821 were to Austrian subjects: 98% of all craftsman and 20% of all merchants. The former, a strong specialist area (creating mutual interdependence), fits into Tomuleţ’s central (well made) case that foreign merchants had highly privileged status and access. So they (e.g. Austrians and not Moldavians), would feel (relatively) wanted, well connected, and even protected – commonly operating within state approved guilds.
The special status Austrian merchants (along with Greeks, Armenians etc.) could enjoy was effectively in place and operating even before the signing of the 1812 treaty, underpinned by three factors. Firstly, an October 1804 Moldavian law heavily restricting peasants from changing their occupation and transferring to towns and cities – implicitly, and in practice carried forward into the new Bessarabia (to be). (Remembering that from 1806, Moldavia was effectively under Russian control). Secondly, pre-1812 trade tripled between 1808 and 1811, with a slight dip in 1812. (Tomuleţ: table of commercial certification, 1808 – 12). Finally, post-1812, Moldavians were specifically denied the necessary privileges offered to foreign merchants as a matter of Russian state policy in this “ethnically and socially structured state” (Tomuleţ).
In 1816, Russia signed free-trade agreements with Austria (along with Prussia and Poland) which had the effect of disadvantaging (less agile) Russian merchants.
The Austrian – Russian empire relationship was never cosy or comfortable however (as we've seen). Although Austrian artisans and merchants were largely welcome in Chisinau, Russian visitors to Bukovina found themselves under a bureaucratic surveillance other foreign nationals avoided. It was a hard-edged relationship, with Austria very smartly calculating and calibrating its moves.
A significant concern the Austrian regime shared with other European powers was Russia controlling access to the Danube. So while (as we’ve seen), the Russian empire granted Austrian merchants privileged access, two years after the 1812 treaty, a new treaty stipulation was made to address this concern. Necessarily referred to in the 1830s when Russia had gained full control of the Danube mouth:
“Austria, supported by the Western states, has insisted on the principle laid down at the peace of 1814, that the free access to all rivers to the sea should not be obstructed by any powers settled on their banks…"
Austria Vol 2 by Peter Evan Turnbull, 1840
Russia extensively restricted and hindered trade and travel after gaining full access to the Danube delta region at the 1829 Treaty of Adrianople. This was a major factor leading to the Crimean War. (As can be seen in 1812 – Bicentenary: The limits of empire: marshes, disease, trade, quarantine and developing a new border).
Moving on, from 1822, as relations between Russia and the Ottoman Empire reached a serious and dangerous low, how should Austria respond to this in dealing with the Turkish authorities?
“The Austrian Internuncio had exerted himself to soothe the apprehensions which the divan entertained of Russia; and he obtained for his court some commercial advantages, by the removal or alleviation of several of the inconveniences to which Austria vessels were exposed to in the Dardanelles and the harbour of Constantinople.”
Source: Annual Register 1823, Vol 65
(For more on the context of this, again see 1812 Bicentenary, “The Limits of Empire…” mid-section).
Meanwhile, Austrian Empire trade with Odessa was considerable; the number of Austrian ships entering Odessa as a proportion of the eleven nations’ ships by year, (Schloss again):
1822 – 144/315 (46%), 1823 – 198/414 (48%), 1824 - 154/416 (37%), 1825 - 212/492 (43%),
Now for a closer look at Odessa itself, with some quotes from American citizen, Henry Dearborn, senior US military officer and future mayor of Roxbury, Boston - visiting the area shortly after Bessarabia’s birth:
“… the population of the city [Odessa] in 1811 amounted to 25,000 souls, and the environs, within a range of eighty miles, was covered with thirty thousand inhabitants, and contained forty flourishing villages.”
Dearborn (like other contemporary observers) continues with a lavish description of Odessa’s newly built excellent architecture, accommodation, parks, gardens, facilities, hospital, religious buildings, entertainment, multi-language education etc. – all of a multi-national, multi-cultural nature. As a natural port, Odessa was impressive, as Dearborn states:
“The anchorage [of Odessa] is good, the bottom being of fine sand and gravel. The depth of water within the port is sufficient to admit the largest ships of war and, being never frozen over, it has a great advantage over all the other harbours in the Black and Azof Seas, which are generally obstructed by ice, for several months, while vessels can arrive and depart from Odessa, through the whole winter.”
Odessa, Alexander 1st’s “favourite plan” (Dearborn), had seen a dramatic short-term expansion:
“in 1803, Odessa contained only eight thousand souls, and the surrounding country, for many leagues was an uncultivated desert. No sound of rural labour broke upon the ear; not a house or tree; not a spot of artificial verdure; no trace of agriculture, arrested the eye, in wandering over these extensive wastes… [5 lines later]…the ascending smoke from the carbine [light musket] of a wandering Tartar, occasionally appeared in the barren distance…”
The last part, a hint of the potential threat, but there was a determination to keep war and Odessa separate – for amongst the long list of privileges:
“…the merchants of Odessa are not obliged to have troops quartered upon them, even in time of war.”
A memoir on the Commerce and Navigation of the Black Sea… by Henry Dearborn, published 1819
A follow-on step-up in Odessa’s phenomenal growth, source J Jepson Oddy again:
“In November, 1804, its population amounted to 15,000 souls, and above 2,000 houses were already habitable, buildings were extending and plans for its magnificence multiplying.”
Odessa’s connection with the Dniester was important. Ovidiopol was established at the base of the Dniester on the Kherson (Cherson) side by Catherine The Great to serve Odessa. Also, as a protective point / lookout / alarm beacon in case of hostile Ottoman Empire activity. Dearborn again:
“Ovidiopol, stands on the northern side of lake Ovidora, opposite Akerman, and has considerable trade with Odessa, whither are sent the principal part of the products, which descend the Dniester.”
Echoing Ovidiopol’s defensive position, Count Demidov (Demidoff) states in 1837:
“The Empress Catherine II… conceived the project of erecting fortresses upon the new frontiers of her empire, Hadji-Bey was marked out as one of the points in this line of defensive works, between Ovidiopol, which was to guard the mouths of the Danube, and Tiraspol, destined to command the course of the Dniester. In 1794 the three fortresses were erected simultaneously, and the citadel of Odessa rose over the ruins of the old Mussulman fort of Hadji-Bey.”
Rapid effective communication is a vital part of any defence strategy in time of threatened hostility. Wars have very commonly been won or lost due to lack of intelligence, and sudden surprise attacks.
There was no direct communication / proper road/track connection between Chişinău and the Budjak. Post travelled as follows:
“… the Bessarabian provincial post office concentrated all the mail in Kishinev and originally maintained postal communications with other regions of the Russian Empire only via the border post at Dubossary. The latter forwarded the mail into the depths of the country by two State postal routes at Balta (Podoliya province) and Odessa (Odessa province).
The links of Kishinev and the southern part of Bessarabia with Khotin were ensured by the pre-border route along the left bank of the Dniester river, via Dubossary, Rybnitsa, Kamenka, Yampol, Mogilev-Podol’skii and Kamenets-Podol’skii. That significantly complicated the operations of delivering mail and resulted in dissatisfaction on the part of the recipients.”
Above good source: The Rossica Society, which goes on to quote Major General Garting (Harting) in the spring of 1813: “… for military reasons I must needs have the despatch of a fast Cossack postal service from Khotin to Mogilev and I ask Your Excellency to set up an ordinary postal link from Kishinev to Khotin.”
The fortress at Khotin (Hotin) was an important military defence point (which had been Garting’s base). Odessa (and other inland locations) invested in, needed protecting, but with the cost of war becoming prohibitive, better defensive positions were required. Was the new carved out territory, (Bessarabia) merely a buffer zone? How permanent was it?
At Khotin in August 1812, “Engineer-general” Garting told a visiting British General about the recent strengthening of the major fort there, adding:
“…that the line of the Pruth was not a good military line of defence for Russia.”
The Private Diary of Travels…During Mission and Employment with the European Armies in the Campaigns of 1812, 1813, 1814 by General Sir Robert Wilson, 1861
Most observers of Bessarabia in its early years saw its existence as temporary. Many of the new colonists doubted Russia’s ability to defend it easily / properly / at all. The authorities in St Petersburg similarly shared these concerns.
The 1806 Dniester based quarantine system with its security controls was continued post 1812, as one was added on the Prut; MacMichael from his 1817 visit to Dubossary:
“…the laws of quarantine… since the peace of 1812, the dominion of Russia has been extended to the Pruth, a second or interior line of frontier is still marked out by the course of the Dniester.”
Bessarabia arguably became a quarantine/security bubble. The plague had taken a grip in Constantinople from July 1812, and remained an ongoing threat in its own right. The Prut border was porous and guarded partly by muslims (!) (Covered in 1812-Bicentenary page). The failure to properly guard its length was an important part of the problem.
The governor of Odessa, Duc de Richelieu shared these concerns. In March 1812 writing to Krasno-Milashevich, president of the Principalities divans (ruling bodies), the Duke questioned whether Bessarabia (then, just the bottom third of the new state), would “…fully or completely become ours”. Refining his question, he also asked whether “the Bessarabian steppe which is now partially Russian and partially Turkish… [would]… always be a part of Russia ?”
From good source: “Migration and Disease in the Black Sea Region: Ottoman-Russian Relations in the late 18th and early 19th Centuries” by Andrew Robarts, 2016.
The Duke in the same March 1812 communication also expressed (an unusual) concern about the Bulgarian settlers. Some of these he saw as having too close a connection with muslims – there was in fact a connection.
With Odessa only a few hours (cavalry) horse-ride away, along the steppe from the Danube and Prut, it was the authorities in Odessa who retained a controlling interest in Budjak settlement. So formal complaints of mistreatment by the Bulgarian communities e.g. Ismail, 1814, led governor Garting to thoroughly investigate the alleged abuses and “…produced reports for his superiors in Odessa on the administration of migration in Bessarabia.” Source: Robarts, as above, with the details.
The necessary July / August 1812 military exodus to face Napoleon had left about 10,000 troops to defend “New Russia”. (See 1812 Bicentenary early section; “The Russian Take-over” for this and underlying issues).
In October 1811 “70,000 Turkish troops led by Lal Aziz Ahmet Pasha had crossed the Danube river to assault the Russians [behind the Prut].” Source: Wikipedia: Russo-Turkish War 1806-1812.
A sense of this new carved out state’s perceived vulnerable and tenuous existence is provided by General Sir Robert Wilson (as above) who discussed its defence with Russian generals in 1812:
“I am rather inclined to think that the demolition of all the fortresses between the Dniester and the Pruth at a general peace would be a sine qua non condition of any new arrangement.”
In July 1813, following much of the Napoleonic War, battalions in Bessarabia and New Russia were strengthened with some more troops in formations structured to give a strong emphasis on defending Ismail and Bender.
The vulnerability of (major centres in) the original (pre-1812) Bessarabia region was a contributory factor in decisions taken in 1812 and 1813 to deny residence visas in these places to ordinary (peasant) Moldavians. Firstly, July 23rd 1812, Admiral Chichagov’s instruction to Scarlat Sturdza re: Chilia. Then in 1813, Major-General Garting’s instruction to deny Moldavian peasant residence in the following only: Chilia, Ismail, Akkerman and Bender.
Garting’s successor Lieutenant-General Bakhmetiev (from 1816) wanted the capital moved to (the heavily fortified) Bender. He wrote to the Tsar in January 1817 requesting this. Part of Bakhmetiev’s argument was based on the capability of: "receiving vital supplies and local materials on the Dniester.”
Yielding the Budjak region had been one of the last and toughest negotiating points for the Porte - continuing to take a strong interest in it, and the Nogai Tartars post 1812 – many of whom were held by Russia (contrary to article 7 of the 1812 Treaty). The near final demand in late November 1811 had been for Ismail and Chilia to remain as part of the Ottoman Empire. For the (Kutuzov originated) preliminary treaty, it was agreed (within a secret treaty clause) that the fortresses at Ismail and Chilia would be demolished, and no replacement fortifications built. This was taken out of the final treaty.
Given there was no proper transport link between Chişinău and southern Bessarabia, and the province was largely flat, open country – an invading army and especially light Tartar cavalry could move quickly across it with limited resistance. This was especially true of the Budjak region in which post 1812, the Porte employed spies to monitor activities. At the same time demanding “the return” of (at least some of) the Tartars – there were 120,000 in the Crimea alone. The new province also faced another issue:
“Bessarabia… was so sparsely populated… that troops had to scatter over great distances of up to 110 versty [versts: 73 miles] from headquarters. In 1812, General-Major Berg complained about the difficulty of billeting his men, as he lacked proper maps, and the villages in Bessarabia ‘very often changed’ and left their previous location.” (!)
Further expanded in good source: Russia, 1762 – 1825: Military Power, The State & The People by Janet M. Hartley & Terri Elder, 2008
In 1812, and for some years, an attacking Turkish force, especially cavalry based would have been able to over-run Chişinău within hours – its few defenders would have stood little chance.
However, ultimately Ottoman Empire forces would likely have been held at the Dniester with the major fortresses at Khotin and Bender, as well as having Ismail to contend with. They would then have suffered a major counter-offensive, from the large reserves available in Poland (primarily to counter a potential Napoleon attack there).
In the few years pre the 1812 negotiations, the Turks had tacitly accepted / confirmed the Dniester as the new boundary. Overall, in the preceding decades, the (outdated) Ottoman Army had been continual losers against the Prussian-style trained and equipped Russian army. After driving Napoleon out of Russia - in the summer of 1813 - in concert with its new Prussian allies - the Russian army had largely inflicted heavier casualties, battle-by-battle against Napoleon’s forces. In June 1813, it had been joined by the Austrian army. Austria, with its large effective army, was now back again formally (and more comfortably) as Russia’s ally…
In 1805 the two armies had fought alongside each other at Austerlitz against Napoleon (The Battle of The Three Emperors). The Russian army under Kutuzov had seen Major-General Berg captured there. As above, Berg was given a prominent defence role in the Bessarabia-to-be state from 1812, under another of Kutuzov’s generals – Garting.
Seen from Istanbul, and weighing up all the risks, was the (new sixty mile wide) “Bessarabia” territory really worth the Turks fighting over? That was after they had sorted out their near-mutinous janissaries (see below). A calculation made perhaps by the proposers of this new state.
Exploring the origins of the Prut proposal: six-months to The Treaty of Bucharest
Early December 1811, and the closing of the talks at Giurgiu saw (still) placed on the table, the few days old proposal to set the Russian state border at the Prut. It’s not certain who initiated this proposal.
There was no recorded opposition to the Prut river boundary proposal from the three key influential decision makers and enactors of the 1812 treaty. These were: General Kutuzov, Manuc Bei (Manuk Bey) who was the very wealthy, trusted, highly influential Armenian merchant go-between, and finally the British ambassador, Stratford Canning.
General Kutuzov and Manuc Bei knew one another and corresponded with one another throughout the period. Manuc Bei was close to the Reis Efendi, Turkish foreign minister who Canning often had a difficult relationship with. Quick essential reading:
Manuc Bey – Secret Character of the backstage of the Bucharest Peace of 1812 by Vlad Mischevca - Limba Romana (Chişinău), 2020 – Romanian: Google Translate startpoint.
Now, we’ll take each individual in turn.
General Kutuzov (as recorded elsewhere in both accounts), had a record of advising against invading other countries, and personally opposed expanding Russia’s borders.
Kutuzov’s outlook may seem strange, and counter-intuitive, but here’s two examples: Vlad Mischevca in his well researched 2020 account states that many months earlier Kutuzov was prepared to settle for the existing Dniester river boundary (!) Ana-Maria Lepăr’s account (quoted in “1812 Bicentenary”) has the general disappointed by the Tsar’s subsequent rejection of the Giurgiu talks progress at which Kutuzov’s supervised delegation supported the Prut river boundary in late November 1811.
In the autumn of 1811, Kutuzov’s army had retreated some distance behind the (relative safety of the) Prut. Tsar Alexander was furious.
Placing the situation in context, here’s some extracts from Sir Archibald Alison’s detailed, authoritative 1860 account:
“The campaign of 1811… of necessity was laid out on a defensive plan merely.”
“[Due to the growing threat from Napoleon, the previous winter] Emperor Alexander gave orders for five divisions of the army to break-up from their winter quarters on the Danube, and direct their march, not towards the Balkan and Constantinople, but to Poland and the Vistula. This great deduction at once rendered the Russians to one-half of their former amount; and with fifty thousand men merely, it was not only impossible for Kutusoff to prosecute offensive operations to the south of the Danube, but even difficult for him [Kutuzov] to maintain his footing on the south of that river in the few strongholds of which he retained possession.”
History of Europe… 1789 - 1815, Vol. 10 by Sir Archibald Alison, 1860
The author goes on to explain that the Turks were aware of this large withdrawal of Russian forces and intended action to take advantage of it – which they did.
So, Kutuzov’s summer battles against Ottoman Empire forces were limited and defensively calculated; he was losing men, while his enemy was being reinforced.
Kutuzov’s sudden final stage withdrawal (of his tired forces) behind the Prut was seemingly (only?) a pre-planned manoeuvre to lure the new inexperienced Turkish Grand Vizier into over-playing his hand. For those with a good understanding of military strategy, suddenly creating this vacuum, in the geographical context of the delta, was a clever move.
In early November 1811, with a huge Ottoman army advancing against him, Kutuzov dispatched freshly received forces which attacked across the Prut, outflanked, heavily defeated, then trapped large Ottoman empire forces in the Danube delta region. The officers and men under Kutuzov were then surprised and disappointed when he didn’t order the attack to destroy this army, Alison’s 1860 account:
“There can be little doubt that, had this been done, it would have been carried, and the whole Turkish army destroyed. But his [Kutuzov’s] genius was essentially cautious; and he would never owe to hazard what he hoped to gain by combination.”
Instead, Turkish forces there were fiercely cannonaded losing thousands of men with their commander refusing to surrender. Meanwhile the talks at Giurgiu continued into early December, with agreement then reached on the fate of the remaining Turkish force, Alison again:
“It was stipulated that they should be fed from the Russian magazines till their fate was finally determined by the plenipotentiaries of the two powers, then assembled at Giurgevo – a condition which was faithfully performed; and on the 4th December they finally quitted their camp, in virtue of a convention by which they were to evacuate it without arms or cannon, and be quartered in the villages in the neighbourhood of Bucharest, on condition of having them restored only if peace was concluded.”
The scale and significance of the December 1811 agreement (coinciding with the Prut river border proposal) demonstrated a degree of trust, and meeting of minds between the most senior parties on each side below the level of formal government.
The Tsar was very annoyed at this maintenance of captive Turkish forces. But negotiating-wise it had and would prove to be a powerful lever.
Relations between General Kutuzov and Tsar Alexander had always been frosty. Firstly, bizarrely the Tsar’s idea of beauty was offended by Kutuzov’s disfigured face; the result of two near-identical musket-ball wounds above his eye gained in battle. Secondly, another important part of this had been the Tsar’s over-ruling of Kutuzov’s battle strategy prior to the 1805 Battle of Austerlitz, along with his disastrous interventions during the battle. Kutuzov was seriously wounded again at Austerlitz. Napoleon had privately admitted before the battle that he expected to lose.
Contrary to Kutuzov’s thinking, the Tsar had very large scale ambitions – some details of which can be found in Admiral Chichagov’s mémoires. Other generals were similarly fearful of potential over-reach and Kutuzov’s appointment had been at the recommendation of his peers. In the Russian army officer class, the esprit de corps was strong, with rivalries largely kept in check, along with a realistic understanding of the army’s capabilities and limitations.
As part of the above, Kutuzov likely had other sound military reasons for the abrupt summer 1811 withdrawal. Ottoman Empire morale and combat capability was known to be in a bad state along with poor in depth defence capability in Bulgaria as Canning’s memoirs demonstrate. Assuming large reinforcements, with the Russian army being successful, if the Russian army was successful, it would (be expected to) keep on going (as the Tsar wanted), and suffer serious over-reach, vulnerability, and then need to stay in position while maintaining its defence in depth. Additionally, further losses to the tired, under-strength Russian forces would result, especially in attacking well entrenched Turkish positions. Contrariwise, these had (despite problems with Turkish morale) usually demonstrated an Ottoman Empire strength – Russian losses per battle had run into the many thousands, and often, the Turks had won the day.
Furthermore, for Kutuzov, the imminent massive French invasion would mean few if any further substantial reinforcements to the Danube were possible, and in the months ahead the Porte could raise more military levies to attack the over-stretched Russian positions. Consequently, a treaty settlement on the basis of (more) limited gains would be less likely just as Napoleon was about to invade, or had already done so.
So, in terms of Russia negotiating more limited but sustainable, better defendable territorial gains, what would Kutuzov recommend as acceptable? Repeating the above:
Kutuzov’s supervised delegation supported the Prut river boundary in late November 1811.
Before moving onto Manuc Bei, (connected to Kutuzov), let’s look into Kutuzov’s character - maybe less straightforward than other Russian generals. Naturally capably multilingual, very culturally and politically aware, Kutuzov was a freemason who arguably at times exploited the vulnerabilities of his civilian opposite numbers / opponents / enemies in a friendly, collegiate style.
Kutuzov deliberately allowed the Grand Vizier to escape from his November Danube delta entrapment, then congratulated him on his clever escape. This was so he could (under Ottoman Empire rules) negotiate with him, but now in a vulnerable, dependent position.
Mikhail Kutuzov wasn’t a proponent of strict arm’s length relationships in his life.
Kutuzov’s leading critic, Admiral Chichagov in his mémoires alleges that Kutuzov entered into improper relationships with women connected with the Wallachian Divan, becoming bizarrely connected with the influential husband of a wife who became Kutuzov’s mistress:
“…Général Koutousoff ne s’occupant que de ses plaisirs, se genait si que lui-même, qu’un jour il fit enlever, par se affides, un membre du Divan de Valachie, mari d’une de ses maîtresses, et le fit sortir du pays?”
Further important details on this aspect of Kutuzov’s (mis)behaviour are provided by Ana-Maria Lepăr in her enjoyable article (see base).
Kutuzov would confidently get involved in tangled political situations (with opposition parties), on a very personal basis.
As we will see, Kutuzov had a close connection to Manuc Bei, who was on friendly and influential terms with senior Turkish officials. Manuc was “the organiser of intimate festivals for emissaries”, (Lepăr), who quoting from another source, also states: “the inn was a mixture of dirt and luxury and opulent indolence.” Lepăr then tells us that Kutuzov liked to spend time in the restaurant at Manuc’s Inn: a massive new luxury complex.
Later on, consider the above (including the Mischevca and Lepăr original sources), in relation to those (delegated to be) present and those individuals absent from the final treaty signing, (but still in town). To what extent was the signed treaty a (potentially deniable?) fait accompli. (Even though the Tsar, and especially the Sultan had to ratify it).
Kutuzov also had a connection to Demetrius Marusi, (Moruzi / Maruzi / Mourouzis), phanariot interpreter present at the treaty talks. Marusi had been the assistant to Chief Interpreter, Mehmed Said Galid Effendi: not in the building when the treaty was signed.
Nikolaĭ Giers, senior Russian civil servant, with many wide / high level connections across the Dacia region and Russia, was a friend of the Marusi family:
“… Kutuzov succeeded with Moruzi’s help in concluding a profitable peace.”
Grand Dragoman, Marusi, related to Scarlet Sturdza, had made it clear to the Russians that he was on their side; he was passing on secret information on Ottoman Empire foreign policy from before 1806. His contacts included Russian ambassador Italinski, present at the talks. Scarlat Sturdza’s son, Alexander was recording the treaty minutes.
Months after the treaty, “infidel” Marusi was (predictably) blamed for his role in the treaty discussions and hacked to death at the Topkapi Palace. His brother was also murdered. The Russian state generously rewarded the Marusi family with estates in the principalities. British ambassador Strangford got into severe trouble for trying to smuggle the Marusi family out of Constantinople.
The second major contender for setting the boundary at the Prut was Mirzaian (Manuc Bei). This mysterious, enigmatic, fabulously wealthy, highly influential Armenian grain merchant is believed to have had no known political ideology. Manuc Bei (Manuk Bey) was at least a double agent, a fixer, and somehow managed to be a well liked and highly respected friend to both sides. Both the Russians and the Porte saw him as a useful go-between.
Vlad Mischevca’s very extensive research includes the mention that it was probably Manuc Bei who proposed the Prut as a halfway house between the Dniester and the Sereth (Siret).
But was this proposing or just promoting? Events on the ground had already moved to imply the Prut as a likely boundary. However, as a highly influential (very wealthy) promoter who was possibly even a triple agent, Manuc Bei should not be underestimated in that context.
Consider also, Manuc’s connection to Kutuzov. So for the Prut proposal, (which Kutuzov didn’t have the Tsar’s approval to advance), was Manuc agreeing, proposing, promoting..? Maybe all apply. Also, would the Tsar or the Sultan object to a deniable third party introducer testing the ground, when both sides keenly wanted a resolution?
Consider Manuc’s position along with an in depth understanding of the real Austrian empire position, remembering that Manuc sought sanctuary there first in 1812, to be later warmly greeted in Vienna by the Tsar. Refer to the “Limits of empire(s)…" section above. (Tsar Alexander had been secretly kept informed by the Austrians of Napoleon’s dangerously oppressive pressure on them, and what they had to agree to). Austria’s famously brilliant foreign minister Metternich (ultimately, duplicitly) out manoeuvred Napoleon.
Putting Austria’s very serious conflicting foreign policy problem into perspective, plus its “extreme jealousy” at the Tsar’s attempt to grab the whole / large parts of the principalities (See "Creating Bessarabia…" section above), points to Austria possibly welcoming the (temporary? Manuc Bei promoted) Prut border compromise proposal. Austria’s foreign policy situation was becoming crazy in 1811 and 1812. Consider the following event in August 1812 as described by visiting/assisting British General Robert Wilson:
“[Russian] General Tormanssoff is now near Kobrin. The Austrians who were opposed to him had retired, and it is pretended in consequence of some strong expression of dissatisfaction at the war.
General Tormanssoff had judiciously cultivated the good inclinations of the Austrians, has sent back all their prisoners, and on every occasion has evinced a conciliatory disposition.”
Manuc Bei in a February 24th memorandum (source: Mischevca) provides an account of Austrian imperial ambitions potentially advanced against the Ottoman Empire in conjunction with Napoleon – Manuc’s source..? Interestingly and intriguingly, both Manuc Bei and Kutuzov are immediately shown to be part of this discussion. This (Austria) revelation would likely chime with the later release by Canning of a related secret document (as below).
Manuc Bei’s personal story reveals that (for years) he knew well what usually happened to “infidel” servants when later advisers to the Porte and the Sultan were looking to lay the blame for previous events or agreements...
Manuc had secretly obtained a Russian passport, years previously. It may be an over-generalisation, but the common Romanian view is that it was Manuc Bei who was largely responsible for The Treaty of Bucharest. Romanians sometimes add to this that his role has been hidden by the Romanian and Russian authorities – a (mischievous) outlook reflected also by Mr Mischevca. Manuc Bei settled in Bessarabia in 1815, dying suddenly in June 1817 at the age of 48.
Now, finally to Stratford Canning, the British ambassador – what was his role in the Prut river boundary proposal? In a letter on December 5th 1811: (Source: Lane-Poole):
[Canning] “I rather think that the Porte is prepared to cede as far as the Pruth – provided there be no harshness in the conditions proposed by Russia and provided Russia will give some certain proof of her having no further designs upon the Turkish territory”.
Was Stratford Canning just a facilitator; just making himself useful? A view reflected in Cunningham’s 1993 book, an impressive, detailed examination of its: “Anglo-Ottoman Encounters…” One severe limitation the ambassador faced was that Britain was technically at war with Russia (!) thanks to Napoleon’s influence and the 1807 Treaty of Tilsit. However, although the practical reality was different, Canning could not open negotiations, or even discussions with Russian officials. So no liaison with Kutuzov for example.
In February 1812, Canning, on his own independent initiative, took a considerable but calculated risk. He contacted the Russian state indirectly and started discussions with ambassador Italiansky, (whom the Turks personally preferred to deal with). It turned out to be a very shrewd and productive move.
One surprising aspect to ambassador Canning’s involvement is that he was acting wholly on his own initiative. There’s a real (neglectful, alarming) absence of any instructions or direction from London.
This neglect is covered both by Canning’s memoirs and records (Lane-Poole), and Cunningham. Canning’s continual requests to London for advice and support were always ignored; one example amongst many of this neglect in Lane-Poole’s account:
“The neglect remains a mystery, and forms but one more count in the general indictment which history has brought against an incompetent administration. Wholly abandoned by his government, without a single authoritative adviser at hand, Canning was forced to trust solely to his own sound sense, and to substitute instinct and judgement for instructions and experience.”
(The British ambassador to Persia, who Canning liaised with, suffered the same neglect – Lane-Poole).
Clearly, there was no well defined British projected and promoted policy vision for control and governance of the principalities at this time.
Left to Canning’s judgement was the preservation and protection of British interests which were aggressively against French interests.
Fearful of the situation, Canning had wanted out of the position for some time, and a few times asked to be replaced. Originally the former ambassador’s secretary, he was supposed to be covering for the position on an interim basis – Stratford Canning wasn’t seemingly trying to make a great name for himself. He often gave much weight to a number of relatively minor British interest matters, annoying key Ottoman officials who Britain needed to influence for some important matters in the run up to the 1812 treaty.
However, it was perhaps the transparency of Canning’s inexperienced demands, along with his administrative efficiency, and relative straightforwardness which made the Sultan trust him more, and rely on him more than other ambassadors. Also, because British and Ottoman empire interests aligned in many ways. (Canning’s predecessor, Adair had tried hard to create a formal Anglo-Ottoman alliance). To further that good relationship was Canning’s “sound sense… instinct and judgement” (Lane-Poole). Note Canning’s words in a letter to London in 1810:
“The Russians… failing in all their attacks on the fortified positions of Shumla, retreated towards the Danube… It was to be feared that they [the Turks] would become too confident; and in their self-reliance… [the Turks] neglect the opportunity of recovering some part of the two principalities occupied by the Russian army, if not already annexed to the Russian Empire… [and for us] to fear that… the Emperor Alexander… [would have an] obvious desire to secure his Danubian conquests.
It was, of course my business to assist, as far as I could, in averting these dangers, and therefore I brought them strongly under the notice of the Turkish ministers. I explained the reasons which led me to attach only a limited importance to their late successes in Bulgaria.
[Canning] I urged them [the Turks] to reinforce their armies and to redouble their exertions, not in the idle hope of recovering their old frontier in its whole extent, but with the sober calculation of discouraging their enemy, and disposing him to peace on grounds of mutual concession.”
Canning had met a commercial agent called Mair, [See “1812 Bicentenary”, “History, nature and causes of Bessarabia’s creation”] who warned him of the Ottoman Empire’s military weakness in Bulgaria. The Lane-Poole biography of Canning’s memoirs also points to terrible morale and general weakness in the Ottoman army. Canning’s approach was predictably influenced by the balance of power orthodoxy (applying to other states (!) It’s clear he wanted a large Russian withdrawal, and wanted to see pressure applied to achieve that. Lane-Poole states:
“The policy of sending an English fleet to the Black Sea to frighten Russia into peace had been strongly urged by Adair [Canning’s predecessor and former boss], and Canning frequently pursued the same argument, to no purpose. Ships could not be spared at the time: if they had been sent the Treaty of Bucharest might have been concluded a year earlier.”
Note that in 1810, Canning was able to productively persuade the Porte to form an alliance with Persia (Iran) in opposing Russian expansionism in that region (which was also a threat to British interests, especially India), Canning again:
“I had the satisfaction of learning… that the Porte was prepared to adopt my suggestions as to Persia and the reinforcement of its army…”
So, the British ambassador had demonstrated some influence. The Porte indicated they wanted a European state “honest broker” as a necessary intermediary in negotiating with Russia. Note that (see “1812 Bicentenary”) Ottoman regulations heavily restricted the kind of “infidel” ambassadorial roles its muslim officials could become involved in. In October 1810 (Lane-Poole):
“…the Reis Efendi sent for me, and after a short preface expressive of reliance on England… that England should… force Russia into a peace with the Porte, by which the integrity of the Ottoman Empire should be secured.” A little later, foreign minister Reis Efendi continues:
“… the Sultan relied exclusively on England for assistance whether of a military or a diplomatic character. ‘The terms’ said the Reis Efendi ‘which Russia is ready to propose are so far apart from those which the Porte is willing to accept that a negotiation cannot be entered upon without the intervention of a third power’.”
The Turkish foreign minister’s personal narrative continued by eliminating one-by-one all the other major nations in Europe, for such a go-between role; leaving only England.
Britain was an obvious choice as a third party go-between. Britain keenly wanted peace between the Russian and Ottoman empires, with Napoleon defeated. Peace at almost any price? A few years before, Napoleon had been set on invading Britain, was stifling its trade under “The Continental System”, and was still a massive threat to British interests. Canning was absolutely focussed with matters directly protecting his home country’s interests from Napoleon’s France.
The November 1811 Prut river boundary proposal suited British empire purposes.
But up to this point, ambassador Canning’s position and work style usually showed him reacting to events and developments, not initiating them if they didn’t directly involve British personnel, assets and territorial / trading interests. Canning would upset Turkish officials, especially the Reis Efendi (foreign minister) in the pursuit of these (lesser) intervening matters. The ambassador had also raised ongoing suspicions over his attempted Russian contacts from November 1810, and the Porte refused the possibility of a British fleet entering the Black Sea.
Note that if the Romanians blame (“The Third Man”?!*), Manuc Bei for the Treaty of Bucharest, the French blame the British, and Stratford Canning!
Strongly recommend Andrada Ligia Manole’s article on Stratford Canning (see base).
Now, this account will cover the post December 1811 situation - the run-up to and signing of the May treaty. This is as especially described by Stratford Canning, the British ambassador.
*Author’s suggestion: Romanian viewpoint?! - Carol Reed’s famous 1949 film based in post-war Vienna.
Creating Bessarabia: countdown to The Treaty of Bucharest
In mid-January, the talks had resumed in Bucharest.
Little progress was made towards Russia and Turkey reaching agreement between early December 1811 and early May 1812. Meanwhile, thousands of Ottoman empire troops were effectively held hostage in the Danube region - fed by the Russian army. Morale and conditions there were terrible and continued to be very poor generally in Ottoman empire forces facing the Russians.
An important, sometimes under-emphasised fact for this time was that French threats to the Ottoman empire (in its then weakened state) meant that it was very much in the Porte and the Sultan’s interest to play for time until Napoleon invaded Russia.
The war’s consequent expected huge damage inflicted to both the Ottoman empire’s greatest enemies was awaited with some enthusiasm in Istanbul. Additionally, the expected large-scale distraction of effort and attention for Turkey’s adversaries was keenly anticipated; a major relief to the authorities there.
For the winter of 1811/12, the starting position is summed up in Canning’s memoirs:
“The year [1811] terminated without dispersing the uncertainties which hung over the question of peace or war. Circumstances, however, in some respects promised well. An armistice had been established, and the forces of the respective parties were again separated by the Danube.
General Kutuzov had consented to refer the proposition of taking the Pruth for a boundary to St Petersburg. [Canning reported Dec 24th]
After a delay of some length, the expected answer arrived. It was an angry refusal, accompanied by a fresh list of conditions, harsher than the preceding one, namely, the Sereth as a boundary in Europe…” [along with a list of other demands, Canning report Feb 6th]
[February] “The conduct of the Turkish troops furnished a strong weapon in the hands of the party of peace. They clamoured for a final cessation of hostilities, and absolutely refused to obey the orders of the Grand Vezir when he wished to retake Sistova, which the Russians had again seized in February.”
However, Canning, from December 1811 was seemingly not in a strong position to affect negotiations as disputes had soured relations, bringing out the ambassador’s “autocratic” style (Lane-Poole), for February:
“… I had serious disputes to settle with the Porte on matters affecting deeply our mercantile interests and our national honour.”
But by late February, Canning had assertively turned the situation around, especially on the important peace issue. A flowing and glowing response from the Reis Efendi, included:
“The Turkish plenipotentiaries would be authorized to adopt the Pruth as a boundary…” [Late February 1812, Porte instruction]
Canning’s February assessment of the Ottoman Empire position:
“… the resources of the empire, whether financial or military, were too much exhausted to warrant a reliance on the intentions they conveyed. The Porte en dernière analyse was not in a condition without foreign aid to do more than negotiate for the terms that Russia, having difficulties of her own, might be persuaded to grant…”
Canning, for March:
“Before the close of March, it was decided in council by the Porte that instructions authorizing the conclusion of peace on the best terms to be obtained should be sent to the Grand Vezir”.
Canning, (his active participation) for April:
“It was necessary to convince the Sultan that whether France or Russia came off victorious in the expected war, or if a reconciliation were effected between those two powers, the Porte would in any case be in a worse position for negotiating a peace, than she was at that moment, when Russia was beyond all things anxious to get Turkey of her hands before ‘the common enemy of Europe’ was upon her.”
Canning explained this further to the Turkish authorities on the basis of what he asserted were the established positions and ambitions of the other European powers. He then finally released to them a (long-held) secret document in which continental powers had agreed the carving-up of the Ottoman Empire between them – this, as expected had the necessary powerful shock effect.
Sources: Canning’s memoirs (Lane-Poole), and also Sir Archibald Alison’s account which adds:
“Russia, a party to that scheme of plunder, and intimately acquainted with all its details, revealed them fully to the Turkish ambassadors; the secret conferences of Erfurth were made known, and documents bearing the official signatures of the French plenipotentiaries were exhibited to them by Kutusoff, which left no doubt of the truth of these representations. Austria disclosed the offer made to her of Servia [Serbia] and Bosnia, if she would concur in the partition…”
History of Europe… 1789 - 1815, Vol. 10 by Sir Archibald Alison, 1860
From Austrian foreign minister, Prince Metternich’s memoirs:
“The Emperor of the French considers Wallachia and Moldavia as well as Servia as Austrian provinces, the Danube as ours, of which we must have the mouth, whether or not the Turks cede the said provinces to Russia.”
Source details: "Memoirs of Prince Metternich, Vol 2, 1880” - “Schwarzenberg’s interview with Napoleon, Dec 17th, 1811”
Canning’s memoirs biographer - Lane-Poole:
“Canning believed rightly that no more favourable time and… terms were likely to occur than those which were to be obtained in the spring of 1812, and the Porte had not only fully endorsed his opinion, but had authorized him to mediate with Russia. …one after another of the Russian demands had been withdrawn at his representation, and the final treaty had included a modicum of cession which the Turks would never have obtained if left to negotiate by themselves.”
In early May 1812, Italinsky, the Russian ambassador wrote to Canning with the Tsar’s (belated) approval for the Prut river boundary, with relaxation of other strictures. The Russian delegation was similarly instructed, and almost immediately the Sublime Porte responded positively. This kicked off the two-week treaty negotiation in Manuc’s Inn.
General Kutuzov, on learning that Admiral Chichagov had been appointed to take-over the negotiations, rapidly concluded a six-clause preliminary agreement on May 17th. It was then expanded to its final sixteen clauses. The Treaty of Bucharest was signed on May 27th.
There were a number of problematic issues delaying ratification (those relevant to “Bessarabia” are touched upon in “1812 Bicentenary”).
On July 5th, 1812 the Treaty of Bucharest was finally ratified by the Sultan.
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Postscript:
It should be apparent (from the sections above) that all non-Turkish actors at Manuc Bei’s Inn in May 1812 were of ‘one mind’; in a network promoting Russia’s position. Especially that of achieving its objective to set the border at the Prut. Furthermore, some at least of the Turks present may well have suffered Kompromat by previous activities at Manuc Bei’s Inn… How would the treaty outcome play out when brought back to Constantinople ?
Extracts from emissary, British General Sir Robert Wilson in Istanbul, July 1812. Letter, July 10th 1812 (to the Duke of Gloucester):
“The Turks have an old saying, that ‘when the Ottomans are at peace with Russia, plague re-appears’… and the symptoms… have shown themselves in the last few days.”
Sir Robert Wilson met and spent time with outgoing ambassador Canning, and his replacement Mr Liston. On July 15th 1812, Wilson reported (unaware that the Sultan had ratified the treaty):
“I fear peace between Russia and Turkey is not so certain as was presumed. The Turkish ministers seem very anxious to gain time: they may take advantage of events if disastrous to Russia.”
Next, final paragraphs from:
1812 Bicentenary: "History, nature and causes of Bessarabia’s creation"
“From July 1812, one of the Ottoman Empire’s worst plague pandemics struck Istanbul.
Lasting until 1819, (see Wikipedia). The plague effectively neutralised the Ottoman Empire militarily in the Principalities / Black Sea war sphere. In practical terms it also restricted the possibility of further Russian military or other assertive actions into the principalities. For by 1813, it (as Caragea’s plague) had spread into Wallachia and Moldavia and into Bessarabia (reported in second chapter/section), then spread again in 1819."
But it wasn’t just the plague… from ambassador Strangford’s longterm chaplain who lived and worked in Istanbul for many years, publishing in 1828:
“Within the last twenty years, Constantinople has lost more than half its population. In eighteen months, three sanguinary revolutions took place, which destroyed two Sultans, and about thirty thousand of the inhabitants. These were followed by the plague in 1812, which swept away, according to some two, and according to others three, hundred thousand more. It was known that at one time, a thousand persons a-day were brought out of the top Kapousi gate to be buried; and the gardener of the English palace told me that he was the only survivor of a family of thirteen persons: he was seized with delirium and stupor, and when he recovered, he found himself in the house with twelve dead persons.”
Narrative of a Journey from Constantinople to England by Robert Walsh, 1828
When would the plague cease..? Arguably overall, this seemingly endless, catastrophic situation helped to stabilise (or paralyse) the political situation.
Imperial Russia’s southern ambitions extended well beyond the principalities but were never fulfilled. The Prut river remained one of the frontiers of the Russian empire.
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Main Recommended Sources
Nearly all content above is available in/from multiple sources.
For Romanian and French source documents used Google Translate in conjunction with my limited French and Latin knowledge: translations partly mine.
I would like to thank the people and organisations that have made such valuable information freely available. The following list of sources is not exhaustive.
Generic multiple source host / generators / facilitators used
Wikipedia
Google Books (including many of the following in different categories)
Google Translate (now surprisingly good ! + note above)
Internet Archive (including a few of the following in different categories)
Haithi Trust (including a few of the following in different categories)
Important recommended academic sources (including those where at times bias may be an issue)
1812 and the Emergence of the Bessarabian Region: Province Building under Russian Imperial Rule (Euxeinos) / Rom. 1812 și crearea regiunii Basarabia… by Victor Taki, 2015
Russia On The Danube: Imperial Expansion And Political Reform In Moldavia and Wallachia, 1812-1834 by Victor Taki
Constructing Bessarabia: Imperial and National Models of Province-Building by Andrei Cusco / Victor Taki, 2010
Estate Interest Vs State Service: The (Un)easy, Integration of the Bessarabian Nobility into the Russian Imperial System by Andrei Cusco, 2008
Romanian Boyar Opposition to the Organic Statutes: Reasons, Manifestations, Outcomes by Victor Taki
Between Nation & Empire: Russian & Romanian Competing Visions of Bessarabia in the Second Half of the 19th and Early 20th Century by Andrei Cusco, 2008
Attitude of local Romanian population of Bessarabia towards the Russian authorities and…“reactive identity” by Cusco, 2002
The Making of Modern Romanian Culture, Literacy and the Development of National Identity… by Drace-Francis, 2006
The Traditions of Invention: Romania Ethnic & Social Stereotypes in Historical Context by Drace-Francis, 2013
Making Ethnicity in Southern Bessarabia… by Simon Schlegel, 2019
Empire of The Tsars: Romanov Russia (DVD) by Lucy Worsley, BBC, 2016
Prince Michael Vorontsov: Viceroy to the Tsar by Anthony Laurens Hamilton Rhinelander, 1990
Bessarabia: Russia and Roumania on the Black Sea by Charles Upson Clark, 1927
Tratatul de Pace de la Bucharesti din 1812, 200 de ani de la anexarea Basarabiei de catre Imperiul Rus – multiple expert contributors for international conference in Chisinau, 2012
Politici Imperiale în Estul și Vestul Spațiului Românesc, Chisinau University source, 2010
The Repercussions of Tsarist Domination Regime on Genesis and Evolution of Commercial Bourgeoisie of Bessarabia (1812-1830) in Rom. by Valentin Tomuleţ, 2012
The Budjak Region in the Aftermath of the Treaty of Bucharest (1812) by Murat Tuğluca, 2014
Beyond The Pale: The Jewish Encounter with Late Imperial Russia by Benjamin Nathans, 2004
Multilingualism in Post-Soviet countries…2008 by Aneta Pavlenko, article by Ciscel (as below)
The Language of the Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and identity in an ex-Soviet republic, 2007 by Matthew H. Ciscel
Reconvergence of Moldavian towards Romanian by Marcu Gabinschi [1997 book article]
Folklore and Nationalism in Europe During The Long Nineteenth Century, 2012 esp. contributor: Krisztina Lajosi
Moldova, Bessarabia, Transnistria by Rebecca Haynes, 2003
Moldova: A History by Rebecca Haynes, 2020
The Russian Annexation of Bessarabia: 1774 – 1828, a study of imperial expansion by George Jewsbury, 1976
Migration and Disease in the Black Sea Region: Ottoman-Russian Relations in the late 18th and early 19th Centuries by Andrew Robarts, 2016
The Organisation and Work of the Postal Service in the Bessarabian Province… (1812 – 1857) by Vladimir Babici, The Rossica Society, 2000
Considerations concerning the functionality of Bessarabia’s provisional administration…1812 – 1816 by Sergiu Cornea, 2008
Moldavian – Russian Political Relations in Recent History by Davide Zaffi, 2002
The Bukovina-Germans During the Habsburg Period…by Sophie A. Welsch, 1986
Treaty of Bucharest (and recommended) – in date order
History of Europe from the Commencement of the French Revolution in 1789 to the Restoration of the Bourbons in 1815, Vol. 10 by Sir Archibald Alison, 1860
The Private Diary of Travels…During Mission and Employment with the European Armies in the Campaigns of 1812, 1813, 1814 by General Sir Robert Wilson, 1861
Mémoires de l'amiral Tchitchagoff (1767-1849) – posthumous biographical diary & document assemblage from Admiral Chichagov, en Français, 1862
The Life of The Right Honourable Stratford Canning… from his Memoires and Private and Official Papers, vol 1 by Stanley Lane-Poole, 1888
The Making of The Treaty of Bucharest 1811 – 1812 by F. Ismail, 1979
Anglo-Ottoman Encounters in the Age of Revolution…by Cunningham and Ingram, 1993
The Script of Ottoman-Russian Treaty of 1812 (Rom, Fr., Russ.) by Ionut Cojocaru, 2012
The Role of British Ambassador Stratford Canning in the Negotiations of the Treaty of Bucharest by Şeyma Dereci, publ. St. Kliment Ohridski University, Sofia 2015
Bucharest during the Peace of 1812 by Ana-Maria Lepăr, 2015
Towards the Russo-Ottoman Peace (1810 – 1812)… [re] British Ambassador Stratford Canning by Andrada Ligia Manole, 2019
Manuc Bey – Secret Character of the backstage of the Bucharest Peace of 1812 by Vlad Mischevca - Limba Romana (Chişinău), 2020 – Romanian: Google Translate startpoint.
Contemporary Accounts (in rough date order) – used direct quotes from most
Travels from St Petersburg in Russia… by John Bell, 1763
The Present State of All Nations… Vol 4 by Tobias Smollett, 1769
The New Universal Traveller… by Jonathan Carver, 1779
A Survey of the Turkish Empire… by William Eton, 1799
European Commerce… by J Jepson Oddy, 1805
The present state of Turkey…together with the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia by Thomas Thornton, 1807
Travels Through…Bessarabia, Moldavia, Wallachia… by Pierce Balthasar Campenhausen (Freiherr von), 1808
Campaigns of the armies of France, in Prussia, Saxony, and Poland, Volumes 3-4 by Jacques Peuchet, 1808
The Royal Military Chronicle, 1811
Report of the British and Foreign Bible Society…[1817] by the Reverend Robert Pinkerton
Travels Through Some Parts of Germany, Poland, Moldavia & Turkey by Adam Neale M.D., 1818
Journey from Moscow to Constantinople: in the years 1817, 1818 by William MacMichael M.D. F.R.S, 1819
A Memoir on the Commerce and Navigation of The Black Sea… by Henry Dearborn, 1819
An Account of the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia by William Wilkinson, 1820
Travels in Georgia, Persia, Armenia, Ancient Babylonia etc. during the years 1817 - 1820 by Sir Robert Ker Porter, 1821
Annual Register, Volume 65, 1823
Narrative of a Journey from Constantinople to England by Robert Walsh, 1828
The London Encyclopaedia… Volume 4, 1829
Travels Through the Crimea, Turkey, and Egypt… by James Webster, 1830
Travels in Russia…a residence at… Odessa by Edward Morton, 1830
The Edinburgh Encyclopaedia, Vol 3, 1830
Penny cyclopaedia of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, Volumes 3-4, 1835
A Steam Voyage Down The Danube: with sketches of Hungary, Wallachia, Servia, Turkey by Michael J. Quin, 1836
Posthumous Memoirs of His Own Time by Sir N. W. Wraxall, Volume 1, 1836
Travels In The Western Caucasus Vol. II by Edmund Spencer, 1836
Travels In Southern Russia and the Crimea; through Hungary, Wallachia & Moldavia by Anatoly Demidov, Volumes 1 & 2, 1837
A Geographical, statistical and commercial account of the Russian ports of the Black Sea… and the Danube: also… European commerce of Russia in 1835 by Schloss, 1837
Travels In The Three Great Empires of Austria, Russia & Turkey by C.B. Elliott M.A., F.RS, 1838
Commerce of the Ports of New Russia, Moldavia, Wallachia, report to the Russian Government, 1835 by Julius Hagemeister
Autobiography of William G. Schauffler, for forty-nine years a missionary in the Orient, 1839
Austria Vol 2 by Peter Evan Turnbull, 1840
Austria, Vienna…Galicia… Bukovina and the Military Frontier by J.G. Kohl, 1844
Travels in the steppes of the Caspian Sea: the Crimea, the Caucasus by Xavier & Adèle Hommaire de Hell, 1847
The Beacon: a journal of politics and literature by George Julian Harney, 1853
The Russian Shores of The Black Sea in the Autumn of 1852 by Laurence Oliphant, 1853
The Last Days of Alexander, and the first days of Nicholas by Robert Lee, 1854
Turkey, Russia, The Black Sea by Captain Edmund Spencer, 1854
The Russians of the South by Charles Brooks, 1854
The Danubian Principalities: The Frontier Lands of the Christian and the Turk, Vol 1 by James.Skene, 1854 Travels in Albania & Other Provinces of Turkey in 1809 & 1810 by John Cam Hobhouse: Baron Broughton, 1855
The Russian Empire: Its People, Institutions and Resources by Baron Von Haxthausen, 1856, re-publ. 1968
Europe: Russia. St Petersburg. Russians of the South by McCulloch & Hardman, 1856
General Gordon's Letters from the Crimea, the Danube, and Armenia. 1854 – 1858 [1884], edited by D.C. Boulger, 2010
The National Wishes of Moldavia & Wallachia Pronounced by the Divans ad hoc assembled at Jassy & Bucarest in accordance with The Treaty of Paris, 1858
Lancashire & Cheshire: Past and Present, Vol1… by Thomas Baines, 1868
Accounts and Papers of the House of Commons, 1870, by Parliament of Great Britain
The Annual Register, Vol 117 by Edmund Burke, 1876
Russia by Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace, 1877
Memoirs of Prince Metternich 1773 – 1815, published 1880
Memories of my Boyhood (Childhood Memories) by Ion Creangă, 1888
The Education of a Russian Statesman: The Memoirs of Nikolaĭ Karlovich Giers by C&B Jelavich, 1962 (Giers died 1895)
A History of the Coldstream Guards from 1815 to 1895 by C.B. Ross-of-Bladensburg, 1896
Memoirs of A Russian Governor by Prince Urusov, 1908
The Russian Conquest of The Caucasus by John F. Baddeley, 1908
More Corn For Bessarabia: Russian Experience, 1910 – 1917 by Louis Guy Michael
British Cabinet Papers 1918 from National Archive
Other useful sources - approximate usage order or identified as helpful (some recommended in main text)
The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture by Charles King, 2000
Preliminaries of Romanian-Finnish relations before 1914 by Silviu Miloiu
Modern Byzantine Law in the judicial practice of Bessarabia (1812 – 1917) by Anton Rudokvas & Andrej Novikov
Russia and the Formation of the Romanian National State, 1821-1878 by Barbara Jelavich
Archival Sources for Genealogy of Jewish Colonists in 19th C. Southern Russia by Dimitry Feldman, 1999.
The Unification of The Romanian Lands, University of Washington
Prisoner of Russia: Alexander Pushkin and the political uses of nationalism by Iurii Druzhnikov, 1999
From grand duchy to modern state: a political history of Finland since 1809 by Jussila, Hentila, Nevakivi, 1999
Southeastern Europe under Ottoman rule, 1354 – 1804 by Peter F. Sugar, 1977
Odessa, A History 1794 – 1914 by Patricia Herlihy, 1991
Ukraine, the land and its people: an introduction to its geography by Stephen Rudnitsky Ph.D, 1918
A history of the gypsies of Eastern Europe and Russia by David M. Crowe, 1996
Between Polizeistaat and Cordon Sanitaire: Epidemics and Police Reform during Russian Occupation of Moldavia by Victor Taki, 2008
Biosketches Of Scientists…in the Evolution of Tsarist Russia’s Anti-plague system by Center For Non Proliferation Studies
Germans in Bessarabia, around the Black Sea and the Volga Region, Die Gerufenen
Germans In Bessarabia: Historical Background and Present Day Relations by Ute Schmidt
Unofficial Website of the President of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic.
Roumanian Journey by Sacheverell Sitwell, 1938
Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy…, 2006 by Richard Wortman
More about the History of Quakers in Russia by Roger Bartlett
Villages on Stage: Folklore and Nationalism in the Republic of Moldova, 2011 by J.R.Cash
The Agrarian Revolution in Roumania by Ifor Evans, 1924
The Roumanians 1774 – 1866 by Keith Hitchens, 1996
Personality and Place in Russian Culture…edited by Simon Dixon, 2010
Russia in the Nineteenth Century: Autocracy, Reform, and Social Change, 1814 – 1914 by Polunov, 2005
A Diplomatic History of Europe since the Congress of Vienna by René Albrecht-Carrié, 1958
Russia against Napoleon: The Battle For Europe, 1807 to 1814 by Dominic Lieven, 2010
Reforming The Tsar’s Army: Military Innovation in Imperial Russia…by van der Oye & Menning, 2005
The Russian Officer Corps in the Revolutionary & Napoleonic Wars, 1792–1815 by Mikaberidze, 2005
Odessa: Genius and Death in a City of Dreams by Charles King, 2012
The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804-1920 by Charles & Barbara Jelavich, 1977
Biography of an Empire: Governing Ottomans in an Age of Revolution by CM Philliou, 2010
Sowing the Word: The Cultural Impact of the British and Foreign Bible Society, 1804-2004, by Batalden, Cann, Dean, 2004
Homelands and Diasporas: Greeks, Jews and Their Migrations by Minna Rozen, 2008
Russia's People of Empire: Life Stories from Eurasia, 1500 to the Present by Norris & Sunderland, 2012
Taming The Wild Field by Willard Sunderland, 2004
The Commissioner’s Daughter: The Story of Elizabeth Proby and Admiral Chichagov by Joanna Woods, 2000
Yad Vashem.
JewishGen
Jewish Life in Bessarabia Through the Lens of the Shtetl Kaushany by Yefim A. Kogan, 2012
Russian agriculture in the last 150 years of Serfdom by Jerome Blum, Agricultural History Society, 1960
A History of The Romanian Forest by Constantin C. Giurescu, 1976
Women & Society in the Romanian Principalities 1750 – 1850, by Angela Jianu, 2003
Reflections on Divorce in Bessarabia in 1st half of 19th C.(esp.) Adultery by Alina Felea, Institute of History, State & Law of the Academy of Sciences of Moldova, 2012
Wallachia and Moldavia as seen by William Wilkinson, late British Consul resident at Bukorest (1820) by Sorina Georgescu, 2015
Balkan Federation, a History… by L.S. Stavrtanos, 1942
Entangled Histories of the Balkans by Daskalov & Marinov, Constantin Iordachi, 2013
The Origins of The Crimean War by David M. Goldfrank, 1993
Russia, 1762 – 1825: Military Power, The State & The People by Janet M. Hartley & Terri Elder, 2008
The role of the Uniform in Tsarist Russia by Inna Fedorova, 2014
Memoirs of the Revolution, the Empire and the Restoration by Louis-Victor-Leon Rochechouart, from Alexander Mikaberidze, 2019
Four Russian Serf Narratives by John MacKay, 2006 esp. Nicholai Shipov
Political Reform in the Russian and Ottoman Empires by Adrian Brisku, 2017
Modernizarea Circuitului de Distribuție a Mărfurilor in Basarabia (1812 – 1863) by Andrei Emilciuc, 2019
German & Romanian Legal Terminology in Bukovina by Iulia Elena Zup
Austria & The Danubian Principalities, 1853 – 1856 by Paul W. Schroeder, 1969