Watching Ivan

Reconnaissance operations in the Mediterranean took on quite a different aspect compared to the flaming hot war in Asia we had just left.  But there were some significant confrontations with our global adversary.

IN 1968-9, the Soviet Navy was building up its presence in the Mediterranean.  Ships and fleets have a long logistics tail requiring an extensive infrastructure and more or less continuous resupply.  The US Navy, in fact, has a separate branch of the officer corps dedicated to solving this problem, known as the Supply Corps (nickname "pork chops" because the resemplance of their  officer insignia. ) This is a implementation of the observation of Gen Omar Bradley that "Amateurs talk strategy; professionals talk logistics."

In any case, the US Navy had in place the ships, shore facilities, and training to support fleets at sea for lengthy periods of time.  Even on the line on Yankee Station in tthe Gulf of Tonkin, conducting high intensity bombing, the task group was able to stay on line for weeks at a time.  Oilers and other resupply ships steaming alongside were a nearly daily occurrence, even during flight operations.  Also nearly daily was the announcement over the 1 MC (ship's loudspeaker):  "The smoking lamp is out throughout the ship while loading ammunition."

The Soviet Navy had neither the equipment nor the expertise to conduct these underway replenishments.  So to conserve fuel and other expendables, they spent much of their time in anchorages scattered around the Mediterranean.  Our job was to keep an eye on them.

These missions were generally straightforward.  We were accompanied by an F-4B Phantom escort, equipped with Sidewinder and Sparrow missiles for defense against interceptors, perhaps from nearby Soviet client states since the Soviet Navy didn't have any integral aircraft capability at this time.  We generally didn't fly directly over the Soviet vessels, but offset a mile or two.  The camera set up we used would still get acceptable images.   Navigation to the anchorages was super easy if the inertial system was working: just plug in the coordinates for the anchorage, tell the pilot to  select "Roll:Nav" and the plane would fly to the anchorage by itself.  If the inertial  system was off, navigation by radar was a good backup.  If both were unavailable age-old dead reckoning was called into play.

For cross training purposes, a few NFOs in RVAH-12 switched seats with  Radar Intercept Officers in the F-4B squadrons, in this case from Fighting 74, the "Be-devilers."  It was quite interesting to fly in the back seat of an F-4.  The clear canopy was one big difference.  The cockpit was quite a bit smaller than in the RA-5C.   The radar display, designed for air to air interception didn't give nearly as good a ground map as the ASB-12 in the RA-5C, but was useable.  The F-4 cockpits were located well aft of the nose gear, making for a sturdy ground operations  in comparison to the RA-5C, whose cockpits were well forward of the nose gear.   Sometimes the yellow shirts (plane directors) would taxi the aircraft so that the cockpits were over the ocean.  In the back seat, it was always unsettling to look at the viewfinder and see nothing but ocean.

Another difference was carrying live ordinance:  in this case, AIM-7 Sparrow and AIM-9 Sidewinder air to air missiles.  Once on the catapult we were required to raise our hands so they were visible while the missiles were armed.  It was thought that the Forrestal fire was caused by arming the missiles while parked in the pack led to a inadvertant launch, perhaps as a switch was turned in the cockpit.  A very expensive short cut.

During these missions the RA-5C had the navigation lead.  On this particular flight', though, the RIO in the RA-5C was unable to locate the target and passed the lead to us.  After much fumbling with the unfamiliar radar, and assisted by the pilot (who had previously been an F-4 RIO), we found the target.   In retrospect, it was unreasonable to expect a  RIO to pick up the knack of operating the complex RA-5C radar quickly.  This monopulse multimode radar was quite advanced for its day.  

Not to put too fine a point on it, but operator ability may have something to do with it.  Attack Naval Flight Officers were selected from the upper half of  graduating class.  F-4 RIO's had no such requirement.  In fact, the anchorman in my class at NFO school was assigned  to F-4's, a fact I never let my F-4 buddies forget.