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In December, 1967 the Institute for Defense Analyses" released a study on the efficacy of the bombing campaign in Vietnam, specifically Operation Rolling Thunder. This report examines three questions with regard to the air campaign against North Vietnam:
How effective has this campaign been in achieving the stated national objectives?
What are the possible advantages of alternative bombing strategies?
Given a fixed number of sorties (monthly average of 12,000) what is the optimal strategy for reducing the flow of men and materiel from North Vietnam to South Vietnam and the DMZ
The report's response to question 1 is summarized below. IDA found no advantage to alternative bombing strategies (questions 2 and 3). The original document is shown below.
Extracts from IDA Bombing Study
As of October 1967, The U.S. bombing of North Vietnam has had no measurable effect on Hanoi's ability to mount and support military operations in the South.
Virtually all of the military and economic targets in North Vietnam that can be considered even remotely significant have been struck, except for a few targets in Hanoi and Haiphong.
The bombing of North Vietnam inflicted heavy costs not so much to North Vietnam's military capability or i ts infiltration system as to the North Vietnamese economy as a whole.
NVN has transmitted many of the material costs imposed. by the bombing back to its allies.
We are unable t o devise a bombing campaign in the North t o reduce the flow of infiltrating personnel in t o SVN.
The report was initially classified Top Secret.
IDA Bombing Accomp Dec 16 67.pdfPage updated
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