Embedded Files
What effect did the bombing of North Vietnam have on the overall conduct of the war?
How did the national command authorities perceive its progress?
Historians have argued these and similar questions since the guns fell silent in 1975 and we will not resolve them here. However, thanks to the availability of now declassified documents, we can gain an understanding of the perception of the US National Command Authority on the success of the bombing so far.
This table shows three contemporaneous threads related to the bombing of North Vietnam during May-Dec 1967. USS Constellation activities are shown in the second column. The "Tasking" column lists direction from US command authorities which directly task US forces. The last column, "Conclusions", lists summary reports and analysis on the success of the prosecution of the war.
CVA-64/ CVW-14
Tasking
Results
Jan-Apr
29 Apr- Depart NS San Diego
1 Mar 1967: LBJ writes to Sen Henry Jackson that the reason for the bombing is that NVN is violating two international agreements.
May
4-8 May, In port, Pearl Harbor
15 May- In- Chop
18-20 May, In-port, Yokuska
26 May In-port, Subic Bay
28 May- First line period begins
11 Jun First line period ends
14-16 Jun In-port, Subic Bay
19 Jun- Second line period begins
2 May- Rolling Thunder 56 authorizes 10 additional targets in NVN, focused on LOC targets, such as yards, repair facilities, and bridges, in addition to armed recce
9 May- McNamara/Vance issue "Proposed Bombing Program" memo, calls for scaling back effort
16 May: Monthly CIA/DIA "Appraisal of the bombing of North Vietnam" released. Cumulative equivalent effect $232M (1967$)
June
Aug
24 Jul- Second line period ends
27-30 Jul, In-port, Subic Bay
2 Aug- Third line period begins
20 Jul- RT 57 authorizes 16 new targets in NVN, mainly in NE NVN, bringing total to 46. Primary targets were RR and road bridges and bypasses, supply storage areas.
1 June- Helms (CIA) memo to McNamara: "we do not believe any of the programs are capable of reducing the flow sufficiently to affect the war in the South."16 Jun: Monthly CIA/DIA "Appraisal of the bombing of North Vietnam" released. Cumulative equivalent effect $266M (1967$)
21 Jun. CINCPAC cable highlights positive trends in the bombing campaigns.
Rostow discounts positive trends in note to LBJ, calls for more analysis.
16 Jul: Monthly CIA/DIA "Appraisal of the bombing of North Vietnam" released. Cumulative equivalent effect $321M (1967$)
16 Aug- CIA Directorate of Intelligence releases report on Effects of Rolling Thunder Program: Bomb Damage, Civilian Casualties, and Morale" finding RT has had little net effect in reducing flow of supplies and morale remains good.
16 Aug: Monthly CIA/DIA "Appraisal of the bombing of North Vietnam" released. Cumulative equivalent effect $340M (1967$)
3 Sep- Third line period ends
7-14 Sep, In-port Yokosuka
19-23 Sep In-port, Hong Kong
26 Sep- Fourth line period begins
15 Sep- RT 57a authorizes 17 new targets, 8 in the Hanoi restricted area.
Bombing campaign has limited effect on Hanoi-Kep Rail lines.
13 Oct- Fourth line period ends
17-22 Oct, In-Port, Subic Bay
24 Oct- Fifth line period beings
11 Nov- Fifth line period ends
14-15 Nov, In-port, Subic Bay
21-23 Nov, In-port, Yokuska
23 Oct- RT 57b authorizes additional new targets
Status of the Hanoi-Haiphong RR from 1966- 1968. The line was never actually closed, and shuttle operations were required only for a few months in the summer of 1967, in spite of the intensive bombing campaign by both the Navy and the AF. Data of this kind convinced many that the bombing campaign was ineffective, especially given the costs on men and material.
16 Dec- Institute for Defense Analysis publishes study that concludes that US bombing has had no measurable effect on North Vietnam's ability to support military operations in the South. The report is classified TOP SECRET.
26 Nov- Out- CHOP
4 Dec- Return to NS San Diego
Table showing the predicted effectiveness of alternative bombing strategies, in units of supplies destroyed per sortie. This can be considered a “return on investment” type estimate. Note that the operational costs associated with each strategy are not considered. Still, we need to keep in mind that this is strictly an economic consideration, and in the final analysis this war was not about economics, something we didn’t understand at the time.
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