Embedded Files
Operation Rolling Thunder was reaching a very high intensity as the Summer of 1967 approached. As we now know, there were serious concerns with the effectiveness and suitability of the operation. Here is a May 1967 memo to President Johnson from the Secretary of Defense Robert S. Macnamara (co-initialed by Dep SecDef Cyrus Vance). Their plan was to forego bombing north of 20N latitude. This would basically exclude Route Packages 6A and 6B, which include Hanoi and Haiphong. Hanoi is located at roughly 21N latitude.
Excerpts from the memo are shown below. Note the rationale, dismissal of Westmoreland's objections, and the detailed plan to explain this to the American people. (items 4-6). Full memo shown nearby.
Wonder what happened? This memo was never acted upon. Instead, the Administration began a policy that seemed to be based on implementing pauses in the bombing if the North Vietnamese showed signs of cooperation. This naturally let nowhere and lasted until Nixon, losing patience, unleashed the Linebacker aerial campigns in 1972 that brought the NVN to the peace table.
McM Memo Jun 67.pdfMay 9, 1967
SUBJECT: Proposed Bombing Program Against North Vietnam...
2..."As General Wheeler said when General Westmoreland was here, "The bombing campaign is reaching the point where we will have struck all worthwhile fixed targets except the ports." We do not believe ports now should be struck nor closed by mining because of the confrontation this might cause with the Soviet Union."
4."The military gain from destruction of additional military targets north of 20 North will be slight. If we believed that air attacks in that area would change Hanoi's will, they might be worth the added oss of American life and the risks of expansion of the war. However, there is not evidence that this will be the case, while there is considerable evidence t at such bombing will strengthen Hanoi's will...."
"5. Nor is bombing in the northern area necessary to maintain the morale of the South Vietnamese or of the American fighting men. While General Westmoreland has fully supported attacks against targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong area and has said that he is "frankly dismayed at even the thought of stopping the bombing program, " his basic requirement has been continuation of attacks in what he calls the "extended battle zone" near the DMZ.
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"6. We, therefore, recommend that all of the sorties allocated to the ROLLING THUNDER program be concentrated on the lines of communications - the "funnel" through which men and supplies to the South must flow - between 17-20N , reserving the option and intention to strike (in the 20-230 area) as necessary to keep the enemy's investment in defense and in repair crews high throughout the country."----
8. Publicly, when the shift had become obvious (May 21 or 22), we should explain
(a) that as we have always said, the war must be won in the South,
(b) that we have never said bombing of the North would produce a settlement by breaking Hanoi's will or by shutting off the flow of supplies,
(c) that the North must pay a price for its infiltration,
(d) that the major northern military targets have been destroyed,
(e) that now we are concentrating on the narrow neck through which supplies must flow,
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