Philosophy of Science after Feminism

Janet A. Kourany, Philosophy of Science after Feminism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010)

A quick outline of Chapter 1

1. There is evidence of serious, world-wide mistreatment of women (3-4).

2. Science can help with these problems, but often does not (examples: psychology, biology, history, economics, medical research).

3. There are reasons for science to be more egalitarian (to promote equality more) (6c-7a, 12c, 14a).

4. The social responsibility of science (SRS , 14-17) is characterized in terms of equality and as involving questions beyond epistemic questions (that is, questions of whether and how science really knows what it claims to know).

5. The sequence of the following chapters is guided by information and by important questions.

Previous points in our course relevant to this inquiry

· Affirm our common humanity, study differences, and appreciate each unique personality.

· Intuitions, especially when sharpened to insight, furnish premises for arguments, and wisdom synthesizes arguments from very diverse perspective. Thus, just because JK may be characterized as a radical feminist does not mean that she should be rejected (or supported) on that account. (Your experiences?) Rather, we want to learn from her argument and from opposing lines of intuition and reasoning. The motto here is “First understand, then criticize.”

· The pattern of sequencing inquiry in terms of truth, beauty, and goodness inclines us in the direction of the thought that we do well to withhold goodness conclusions until after the truth work has been done. If this suggestion is honored, it would imply that it is not wise to constrain scientific inquiry by imposing a political agenda on it. (Your ideas?)

· On the other hand, the Crito pointed toward a mutual dependence of inquiry into fact (the political significance of the fact of Socrates as a life-long Athenian citizen found guilty of a capital crime) and value (the practical significance of S’s and Crito’s long-standing commitment to justice). If this suggestion is honored, it may increase our receptivity toward JK’s advocacy of the social responsibility of science. (Your ideas?)

Additional thoughts to amplify the inquiry

The concept of justice here is held up in abstraction from any historical understanding. History is largely presented as a story of the oppression of women (though some recent steps of progress are noted). But the more progress women make the weaker the argument for radical remedies becomes. A broader perspective on history might possibly weaken JK’s case.

The concept of equality is taken as a self-evident and supreme value with very little analysis or supporting argument. One may agree that there is a problem of gross inequality of wealth and power, and that social equity—to be realized over time—is an important goal. Nevertheless, equality is only one value of many to be sought in social, economic, and political contexts. Some other rights are military defense, preservation of peace within national borders, education, and individual liberties including rights regarding property, freedom of speech, religion, and so on. It may distort things to exalt just one value.

Philosophical reflections on sex and gender have begun to develop difference theory as well as equality theory. In what ways are women and men equal? What if men and women are both equal and also complementary? (Some of the research results reported on page 5 may be interpreted in these latter terms.) If complementarity is part of the story, then we need to think in what ways they are equal and in what ways they are complementary. Moreover, if either dimension is held up without leaving room for the other, the result will be one-sided, foolish, and harmful.

Kourany chapter 2. The legacy of twentieth-century philosophy of science

(See summaries of this chapter, pp, 105-08)

This chapter gives a 20^th century historical background (not in chronological sequence) for the debate about the politicization of science (bad? good? inevitable? how best to do it?).

The professionalization of philosophy of science. Hans Reichenbach (1938) said that philosophy of science should do rational reconstruction of scientific reasoning (“the context of justification”) setting aside the psychological and sociological factors in the actual reasoning process of scientists (“the context of discovery”).

Obstacles to success. Mid-20^th C. philosophers of science recognized the narrowness of [Reichenbach’s] project, on account of its inability to grasp the importance for science of e.g., (a) the ability of a theory to predict novel phenomena and (b) the “progressiveness” (Lakatos) of some research programs, e.g., Newton’s (26).

A further obstacle. Thomas Kuhn’s blockbuster 1962 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (covered in chapter 4 of the Okasha text) pioneered the social explanation in the history of science (29). Despite the progress in “historicizing” and “socializing” philosophy of science, there was a failure to “contextualize” it—to explore how science interacts with society, for example, in the influence of U.S. military policy on science. Note the implications of “historicizing” (which in context means paying attention to historical factors in the development of science, but which also has relativist overtones—cf. the spectrum ranging from “scientific-realist value-free science” and “scientific-relativist social-constructivist” science in the “Science Wars debates” (46). Radical historicism says that there is no objective truth, just truth for this or that historical time. “Socializing” refers to the attention paid to social factors, but also has connotations relevant to leftist and socialist politics.

Early –twentieth-century philosophy of science: the Vienna Circle. The Vienna Circle (but not Carnap) had leftist social reform intentions (32) along with its anti-metaphysical “unified science” platform (wanting to bring all sciences under a single umbrella) and challenging the interests of the promoters of racist science. Otto Neurath (34) spoke for the interconnectedness of phenomena making it impossible to isolate a set of phenomena or statements (e.g., observation statements or “protocol” statements) that could be the Foundation for the rest of science. The “scientific world conception” was regarded as a tool to transform society for the better (35d).

After WWII, philosophy of science became part of the cultural Establishment and adopted centrist attitudes (where the dangers of totalitarian political distortions were far less) and philosophers of science tended to become silent on politics—despite the fact that, by the end of the twentieth century there was extensive evidence of, and widespread discussion of, the commercialization of science and the politicization of science and the mutual influence of science, business, and politics (37df).

Diagnostic reflections. Philosophers have given three problematic reasons not to contextualize philosophy of science. (a) Our interests are in the context of justification. Nevertheless, some scientists did beginning transforming their practice in egalitarian ways. (b) Philosophers’ aims are “truth—or empirical adequacy, or empirical success, or explanatory success, or something of the sort” (39). But we need lots of empirical information to determine what the aim or aims of science are plus normative considerations in order to determine what the aims of science ought to be. [Note the emergence of a hermeneutics of suspicion at 40a; I refer to the tendency of some philosophers to interpret others actions by relying on Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud to suspect (sometimes more or less accurately) hidden, unbeautiful motives (economic self-interest, the drive for power, or unconscious drives for psychological, e.g., sexual, satisfaction). (c) Philosophers of science have insisted that they were specialists in epistemology. However, in order to do the epistemology well, it is necessary to involve oneself in the historical research on the social practices of, e.g., medical research in which, e.g., AIDS victims (and now others) used aggressive tactics to accelerate the potential benefits to patients by pushing the research process away from the traditional “gold standard” of medical research: randomized clinical trials (40-42).

Prognostic reflections. (a) First of all, the classic twentieth century project of abstract logical and mathematical analysis of scientific reasoning will and should go on. It will enrich and be enriched by the contextualization process. (b) “THE GOAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE IS TO ARTICULATE SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY”—and to aid in its development (42c).

Consider the debate over the politicization of science. Voices from the left and from the right complained about their opponents distorting science for political purposes, assuming that politicization of any kind was a distortion to be eliminated(42-43).

But some defended it politicization (43d).

Another person called for a diversity of scientific disciplines, each with their “different methods, standards of proof, interests, and values, as well as different bodies of knowledge” to be represented on political science advisory groups (44b).

Another person said that political neutrality is impossible to achieve, so we need to organize the unavoidable non-neutrality by making commissions bi-partisan, for example, and by insisting on greater transparency (openness to public understanding and criticism) (44d-45a).

Another said that science is but one of many relevant fields that contribute to our decision making re: global climate change, for example (45).

There are many possible interpretations of the signing of anti-politicization documents by prominent scientists (45d-46), but however variously those interpretations may illuminate the phenomena, it is sad that philosophers of science stayed on the sidelines in these debates.

Therapeutic reflections. What’s the path forward? Feminist philosophers of science, working for years, have provided us with a model for a better philosophy of science.

INSERT: BACKGROUND ON MARXISM

Note: The following discussion is added by JHW and is not part of Professor Kourany's text. Contemporary feminism along with other egalitarian movements as they were observable from the 1960s owed much to the polarizing heritage of Marxism's social-economic egalitarianism, in both its more and less reasonable aspects. Here is one reconstruction of Marxism.

I.

Private property is the basis of modern civilization.

There is gross inequity in the distribution of wealth and power.

Many capitalists have used their power unjustly.

Social classes are key factors in history. The lower classes are not so ignorant or abject as in former ages.

The profit motive as the dominant motivation for economic activity is suicidal.

Religion in the past has often blessed the status quo. This must cease.

Nationalism (regarding one’s own nation as absolutely sovereign, with no responsibilities to a larger world community) must be transcended.

II.

Revolutionary change must be initiated. Evolutionary reform is a tactic of delay.

Violence is acceptable as counterviolence. Those with power will not give it up peacefully.

The institution of private property must be uprooted. The communist party, controlling state power in the name of the people, will reorganize and direct economic life, until the state power can wither away and the true egalitarian, communist society will emerge.

Journalism and science are to be practiced as tools for the revolution, and bourgeois notions of fairness and objectivity are to be disregarded (except insofar as tactically necessary).

Chapter 3. What Feminist Science Studies Can Offer

Feminist philosophers of science could not ignore the wider social context of science. To take account of that required interdisciplinary collaboration, and persons with a fine array of specialties did contribute to the effort. (49)

The methodological approach to sexism in science. Traditional philosophers of science argued that sexist results indicated failures to apply existing standards of objectivity and fairness. Whether the problem was in concept formation, experimental design, data analysis or elsewhere, the solution was to do traditional science more rigorously. Other philosophers of science wanted to change those standards in various ways in order to guard against sexism. Included in the critique was the very tendency in psychology to model its research on the physical sciences, emphasizing “physiological or biochemical variables and variables defined by performance on psychological tests or manipulation of circumstances in research situations” (53). Feminist biologists “recommended that such traditionally central scientific values as consistency with established knowledge, simplicity, and explanatory unification be replaced by such alternative values as novelty, ontological heterogeneity, and complexity of relationship” (54). These emphasizes would “help to steer theorizing away from simply dominant-subordinate conceptions of nature” (54).

The ideal of value-free science. Feminism challenges “the eighteenth-century idea that science deals with facts and that facts are distinct from values; the nineteenth-century idea that the sciences should be impartial resources for the solution of social problems; and the twentieth-century idea that the establishment of scientific truths is a purely epistemic affair” (54).

Sociology of science showed that it was normal for values to inform scientific work. “Any scientific contribution . . . was a product of a particular time and place, of a particular social and cultural location, of particular interests and values; a ‘view from nowhere,’ from a psychological and sociological vantage point, was simply naïve” (55).

Mainstream (i.e., non-feminist) philosophical analysis challenged the very distinction between fact and value.

Feminists disagreed on how to re-organize thinking in the light of these emerging considerations. Some feminists wanted more objectivity, proposing feminist questions as a way of discovering possible bias. Other feminists wanted “a new and better understanding of scientific objectivity” (55). This will be JK’s proposal: define objectivity in both epistemic and political terms—so that objective science supports the cause of social reform (57).

[THREE APPROACHES TO A FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE]

[I.] The social value management ideal of science: A social approach to sexism in science. Helen Longino proposes to represent all social values in scientific communities, but this idea does not guarantee results that are favorable to the political goals of feminist egalitarianism (58-62).

[II.] The empiricist ideal of science: A naturalist approach to sexism in science. Since much feminist science has been very successful, we will make success our criterion for science (no “apriori” requirements for the composition of scientific inquiries or rules for inquiry). What features of feminist science explain its success? There are two possibilities. It is possible that women (properly trained) have a standpoint that is advantageous to science (e.g., discovering the rationality for impoverished black teenage girls of getting pregnant and dropping out of school). To define proper education to include feminist consciousness brings standpoint theory very close to the second possibility: that women tend to have values that are advantageous to science. But it’s hard to show that progress in science conducted by feminists is due to those particular values rather than to other factors. To define good values in science as whatever makes for good scientific results is problematic since Nazi medical experimentation with no ethical restraints on what could be done to human subjects make some impressive discoveries. Thus there is again no guarantee that using the criterion of success to guide project of reforming science would produce the desired egalitarian feminist political gains. (63-68)

[III.] The ideal of socially responsible science: A political approach to sexism in science. “Scientific success must be defined in terms of social success . . .”, and this means that “implanting egalitarian values into science” (68). Does this idea sacrifice science as a source of knowledge? (69) Any science whose results tend to perpetuate harmful stereotypes is to be set aside, while innovative alternatives are created (the example is research by Carolyn West on violence in white and black communities).

Where you take over the examination of the ideal of socially responsible science. The next two sections are written as a heated argument between you—the reader—and “the candidate” representing West’s study generalized into a research program.

“You” object to the egalitarian research program: what if the stereotypes are true [or have important grains of truth in them]?

The candidate replies: The egalitarian research program simply requires that differences be explained as far as empirically possible in terms of social factors of misfortune and injustice that can be socially remedied. (West’s program has a hard core [a belief that is not exposed to possible refutation], the belief that there are no [biologically or] cultural factors that make blacks "inherently" have a greater propensity to violence than whites. But even if that hard core were found to be unsustainable, the refutation would not affect the legitimacy of egalitarian social values.)

"You" continue to object: it’s better to pursue multiple research programs so as to test West’s hard core directly, thereby enabling the discovery of multiple causal factors and a more complex understanding of the subject at hand.

The candidate replies: Blacks would not cooperate with socially irresponsible research, and multiple socially responsible research programs could be pursued. Therefore there is no apriori reason to think that socially responsible research slows the pursuit of truth.

The candidate continues: In any case, efficiency in the pursuit of truth is only one of many values that science needs to consider, and finding knowledge that his helpful to, and welcomed by, the black community is more important than efficiency.

Where you come to a decision. "You" object that feminists disagree on what their social egalitarian values imply and how to implement them. Therefore, the ideal of socially responsible science cannot be applied.

The candidate replies: There is a very wide range of agreement in concerns for the welfare of women. There is an empirical question of how extensively feminist values can influence the development of science, but there is already good evidence, in primatology, for example, that scientists who do not consider themselves feminists find it to be better science not to study female primates merely as mothers and as resources for males.

JK concludes in her own voice, again challenging the reader directly. Although the chapters to come examine more objections to her proposal, she considers that enough has been said to ask the reader to take a stand: has the ideal of socially responsible science been shown to be worthy replacement for the ideal of value-free science?

Chapter 4. Challenges from every direction

Here are quick summaries of five objections and replies. Read p. 79.

1. Do scientists need autonomy regarding the public interest in order to maximize discovery? The conflicting rationales supporting this claim call each other into question and lack historical evidence to support them.

2. Look at the sad cases of historical influence on science for social goals (Nazis). But there we see bad science and bad social goals.

3. Sociologically speaking, can we not assume that the practice of science is safeguarded by the norms of different groups? This has not been shown.

4. Economically speaking, is it not the case that pure science (uncontrolled by “social values”) gives rise to technological progress? Not so, in general.

5. Political freedom of thought, research, and speech is a value. But equality is also a basic right.

COMMENT BY JHW ON STEREOTYPES

No author can define everything; and none can take on every relevant branch of thought that differs from his/her own line. In the case of JK, however, I believe it is worth examining the concept of stereotype. The term suggests that stereotypes are false and bad. Please consider the following sentences.

1. 1. Men are better than women.

2. 2. Women are superior to men, and men are inferior to women.

3. 3. Men are stronger than women.

4. 4. Men are physically stronger than women.

5. 5. On average (statistically speaking) men can bench press more weight than women can.

If there is a profound, essential, and important equality of persons, then 1 is false.

In terms of variables relevant to civilization, there is evidence that women are morally and spiritually superior. Notice that superior does not mean good, and inferior does not mean bad. Superior and inferior are comparative terms only.

Three is a generalization, and none or few would interpret that as making the false claim that every man is stronger than every woman; nevertheless, the qualification about “statistically speaking” or “on average” is absent. Moreover, there are different types of strength, and men do not excel in every kind. Nevertheless, it may possibly be that, overall, men have the edge in strength. This sentence is consistent with stereotypes, but the question is whether it itself expresses a stereotype. The sentence certainly could be used in discourse that was generalizing with no sensitivity whatsoever, but stereotypes would not seem necessarily to be connoted by this sentence. What do you think?

Sentence 4 narrows the comparison, and seems plausible on balance, though in some physical respects, women are superior.

Sentence 5 is carefully qualified and certainly true. Does JK intend to imply that such scientific statements are not objective since they do not advance the egalitarian feminist cause? It would be interesting to see her responses to this brief discussion.