Passages from the Republic implying a philosophical kind of art
To illustrate the neglected thought that Plato advocates a kind of art for truth-seekers, consider the following passages from Plato’s Republic, in which Socrates refers to what he does in terms of the arts.
“Suppose, then, that someone came up to us while we were painting a statue and objected that, because we had painted the eyes (which are the most beautiful part) black rather than purple, we had not applied the most beautiful colors to the most beautiful parts of the statue. We’d think it reasonable to offer the following defense: “You mustn’t expect us to paint the eyes so beautifully that they no longer appear to be eyes at all, and the same with the other parts. Rather you must look to see whether by dealing with each part appropriately, we are making the whole statue beautiful.” Similarly, you mustn’t force us to give our guardians the kind of happiness that would make them something other than guardians.” (Rep. 420c, Grube trans., in Cooper, ed.).
“Do you think that someone is a worse painter if, having painted a model of what the finest and most beautiful human being would be like and having rendered every detail of his picture adequately, he could not prove that such a man could come into being?” /No, by god, I don’t.’ Then what about our own case? Didn’t we say that we were making a theoretical model of a good city? 472d. Grube/Cooper
“The question you ask needs to be answered by means of an image or simile./ And you, of course, aren’t used to speaking in similes!/ Are you making fun of me now that you’ve landed me with a claim that’s so hard to establish? In any case, listen to my simile, and you’ll appreciate all the more how greedy for images I am. What the most decent people experience in relation to their city is so hard to bear that there’s no other single experience like it. Hence to find an image of it and a defense for them, I must construct it from many sources, just as painters paint goat-stags by combining the features of different things.” (488 Grube/Cooper, p. 1111).
“When the majority realize that what we are saying about the philosopher is true, will they be harsh with him or mistrust us when we say that the city will never find happiness until its outline is sketched by painters who use the divine model?” (500d-501c)
“Like a sculptor, Socrates, you’ve produced ruling men that are completely fine.” “And ruling women, too, Glaucon . . . .” (540c Grube/Cooper, 1155)
Recall, furthermore, that Socrates portrays the form of the good not dialectically, but by a series of images—the sun, the divided line, and the allegory of the cave.
Regarding the selections from the Republic . . .
First, here's some background in ancient Greece of “the quarrel between philosophy and poetry.” Poetry in general (poiein = making) is distinguished from poetry as a specific techne (art, craft, know-how). “There is more than one kind of poetry in the true sense of the word—that is to say, calling something into existence that was not there before . . . but all the same, we don’t call them all poets, do we?” Poetry is “the one particular art that deals with music and meter”[as they pertain to speech]. (Plato Symposium 205b)
Some ancient Greeks regarded the best poetry as inspired by a superhuman source (e.g., a “muse”). The Greeks themselves cherished no holy book, and they did not take religion as seriously as the peoples of the Middle East who have since then believed themselves to have a divinely revealed book. Nevertheless, they did cherish their poets, especially Homer and Hesiod, as the literary sources of their traditions about the gods.
The poets conceived of the gods as similar in form to human beings, anthropomorphic, superhuman in power and immortality, normally invisible, yet able to take on various appearances, so as to be able to pursue their strategems under the guise of some human figure. They attributed excellent qualities to the gods, and also behavior humanly scorned: murder, adultery, castration of the father by the son, mutual intrigue, petty jealousies, vengeance.
The “quarrel between philosophy and poetry” emerged as philosophers challenged traditional ideas about the gods. The philosophers deanthropomorphized the concept of God. Xenophanes (fl. 530 B.C.E.) wrote, “Both Homer and Hesiod have attributed to the gods all things that are shameful and a reproach among mankind: theft, adultery, and mutual deception” (Fragment 11). “Ethiopians have gods with snub noses and black hair; Thracians have gods with grey eyes and red hair.” “Of oxen (and horses) and lions had hands or could draw with hands and create works of art like those made by men, horses would draw pictures of gods like horses . . . .” He moved in the direction of monotheism, not seeking revelation but persistently inquiring, gaining results that were plausible at best, not certain.
Heracleitus called his hearers and readers to wake up to the logos common to all and to God as the unity of opposites. He wrote, “Homer deserves to be flung out of the contests and given a beating,” and “Much learning does not teach one to have insight; for it would have taught Hesiod.”
Socrates challenged the coherence of Euthyphro’s notion of acting to please the gods, interrogated contemporary poets and found them unable to explain the meaning of their work, showed up the tragedian Agathon as a charming narcissist, showed his respect for the Delphic oracle by trying to refute it, and challenged Athenian smugness on the basis of his own philosophic insight and spiritual experiences. Socrates was sent to his death by an Athenian jury, having been brought to trial by Anytos, a representative of Athenian poets, and Meletus, who (taking Socrates for a sophist) accused Socrates of atheism and of corrupting the youth.
Plato criticized the poets insofar as they offered emotionally influential images without basing their work on knowledge of the truth of the eternal forms: the just, the beautiful, the good.
Consider the following two arguments (philosophers use the term “argument” to refer to a sequence of statements such that the conclusion is said to follow from the premise(s).) Argument analysis is one of the skills cultivated by philosophers.
This first argument is a simplified reconstruction of Plato’s argument in the Republic.
Premise 1: If poetry portrays divinities as unworthy (e.g., being deceitful and petty and engaging in morally repulsive acts such as adultery), or if poetry portrays sons of the gods as flooded by cowardly emotion, then such poetry tends to corrupt human character.
Premise 2: The state should censor poetry which tends to corrupt human character.
Conclusion: Therefore, the state should censor poetry which portrays divinities and sons of the gods as unworthy.
Please observe that one can reject the conclusion because of disagreement with the second premise, while being open to whatever grain of truth there may be in the first premise. Remember that there is often some degree of irony in what Socrates says, and that, in the end, Homer is accepted back in, so to speak. Thus the prohibition against such poetry in Book II melts away in Book X.
Now consider a second argument.
Premise 1: Plato held that there are eternal and divine standards of truth, beauty, and goodness and that poetry should be written with regard for these standards.
Premise 2: Plato advocated censorship, which is a repressive and totalitarian betrayal of human liberty.
Conclusion: Whoever makes a claim to eternal standards of excellence is suspect of having a tendency to be repressive and totalitarian.
Some people talk as though they might be implying some such argument; but the argument is invalid, for one may reject censorship and thereby avoid the conclusion, even while upholding premise 1.
I have chosen problematic arguments from opposite sides of the question; wisdom involves being able to find grains of truth wherever they may arise, and to be critical of errors that may crop up in arguments that may seem to provide support for one’s own conclusions.
To consider the issue further, let’s ask whether young persons or adults can be harmed by what connoisseurs would classify as a work of art? If so, what follows? Let’s try to break down this emotional question into a variety of questions in order to think in a more thorough way about the issue.
Can persons be harmed?
What concept of human nature, interests, or destiny is involved in the notion of harm?
Can persuasion (obvious or subtle) promoting anti-values harm persons?
Does art inevitably influence our valuations? Does it sometimes try to do so?
Can art harm persons? By cheering on deliberate revolt against what is acknowledged to be good? By denying the reality of central values? By appealing to one-sided valuations? By dogmatism in promoting values?
In discussing these questions many people make empirical claims where, research in psychology and related fields is relevant. In seeking wisdom, it is well to recognize when empirical claims are made or implied, to consider what kinds of research are relevant to those claims, and to learn something about the research or at least to acknowledge our ignorance of the research.
Is there an opportunity for parents, schools, and communities to give guidance regarding the arts?
Is there an obligation for parents, schools, and communities to enforce restraints regarding the arts?
Is it a mistake to be paternalistic towards someone as old as a teenager? Does it matter how many persons are harmed or how likely the harm is, or how many persons value the exercise of freedom more liberally defined?
Do artists have responsibilities? To truth (which may be different from popular opinion)? To beauty (as distinct from what is sensational?) To goodness (not the same as moralism)?
To recipients have responsibilities? To be open, to persevere, to appreciate, to screen (for self or others), and to make considered judgments about what they see?
Do critics (including teachers, exhibition commentaries) have responsibilities? What sort?
Regarding the selection from Plato's Symposium
Please see notes on the web: http://www.personal.kent.edu/~jwattles/sympos.htm
In the Symposium translation used in our text, Jowett butchers a key passage on p. 62. Here's a better translation by Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff: “First, if the leader leads aright, he should love one body and beget beautiful ideas there; then he should realize that the beauty of any one body is akin to the beauty of any other and that if he is to pursue beauty of form he’d be very foolish not to think that the beauty of all bodies is one and the same. When he grasps this, he must become a lover of all beautiful bodies, and he must think that this wild gaping after just one body is a small thing and despise it.”
In the excerpt from the Symposium in the Ross anthology, Socrates will speak first of the being and nature of Eros, and then of his works (56c). Diotima proved Eros neither beautiful [“fair”] nor good. Intermediate. Neither mortal nor immortal, but one of the spirits [daimon] mediating and communicating and interpreting between mortals and the gods (57b). Originated in Plenty and Poverty (57c).
Eros is desire for the beautiful . . . to possess the beautiful (58c) [one of the ways toward the good and happiness which each desires for himself (59b)], which they can only love if they take it to be good (59c).
Eros is “love of the everlasting possession of the good” (59c).
Eros seeks “birth or procreation in beauty, whether of body or soul” (59d)
Love is of immortality (60b): physical . .
Those who are more pregnant-creative in their souls than in their bodies (61c) bring forth wisdom and virtue, which brings order to states and families; and they devote themselves to the education of young persons.
On the Ion, note the difference between the knowledge for which Homer is reputed and the knowledge Homer lacks. Nor is Ion inspired, despite S’s ironic praise, since he shows himself a crafty manipulator of crowds. Nevertheless, the image of inspiration flowing from the muse, to the poet, through the e.g., rhapsode (performer), to the audience is suggestive of an insight in philosophy of mind to which Plato never obviously returns in the dialogues. Note the concept of techne = know-how (a certain knowledge is involved, not merely a knack), also translated craft or art (but not to be confused with poesis, making).
In the Republic, grasp that Socrates’ critique (how much of this character’s critique is Plato’s?) of “mimetic” poetry (mimesis=imitation, in Kant’s terms, representation) is that it fails to seek the truth of the things that it copies from the natural world and thus characteristically tends toward simply arousing the lower emotions to gratify the masses and tends toward error in conceiving the character of divinity (God should be perfect, good, wise, beautiful, all knowing) and the grandeur of genuine character achievement (the hero should not be afraid of death, but resolutely courageous). Socrates is continually dropping words that suggest his self image as a poet, but one who seeks the truth (the eternal forms—you may look at the early portion of this: http://www.personal.kent.edu/~jwattles/forms.htm though it was never required nor presented as a handout, but some of the thoughts there were expressed in the lectures). The eternal pattern (the bed in heaven—how marvelous to sleep on! [irony here?]) is deliberately conflated with the eternal form (bedness/the structure of the bed that the carpenter must know (but not the mimetic artist). Then there is the bed that the carpenter makes and the bed represented in painting. Presumably, the Platonic artist would make a point of learning something of what the carpenter knows (if not the techne, at least the blueprint).
Plato’s opponents were the sophists, who denied the forms, denied any eternal truth, any transcendent beauty or goodness, and who asserted cultural difference (in today’s terms, “Beauty is in the eye of the beholder”=the version Kant criticizes, “Everyone has his own taste”) as the last word on the question of standards.
Plato does not teach the aesthetic view that “Beauty is in the eye of the beholder.” That view not only makes the point—which all philosophers recognize—that people differ in what they find beautiful. That view also claims that there is no standard beyond individual opinion (anyone’s view is as good as anyone else’s). Plato holds that there is an eternal form of beauty, “the beautiful itself,” which is not a subjective affair of what any person happens to prefer. According to Plato, some are more advanced than others in their realization of beauty. What I did say was that Plato recognizes the grain of truth in that theory when he implicitly acknowledges that people’s views differ regarding the beauty of bodies, customs, and so on.
Let me also clarify that Plato never says that everything is beautiful. The beauty in beautiful bodies is akin, he says; but this is not to say that every body is beautiful.
Even the Navaho concept of walking in beauty implies that we humans have a responsibility to restore beauty.
And now . . . the context! The Republic is Plato's main dialogue on justice, political order, education, psychology, goodness (the form or idea of the good) . The entire work includes ten "books," totalling 300 pages. The first book sets the problem for the whole dialogue. It is possible that Book I was originally a dialogue standing by itself. S goes down to the port near Athens to see the festival, and is pressed to stay by friends. The early conversation raises the question about what justice is, and the answer of the gentle and unphilosophic patriarch, Cephalus, is easily refuted. We often think we know something about a key concept, but when we try to spell it out, we find that objections can arise. Cephalus’ universal definition of justice includes the stipulation that you should give back what you owe. Socrates then raises a counterexample to point out that in some cases it is not wise and right (just) to give back what belongs to someone).
Then Polemarchus takes up the discussion, and his proposal uses the conventional ancient Greek maxim about helping friends and harming enemies. Socrates points out that the just person, as such, has no techne (skill, art, craft—know how) that is required in any practical situation.
These criticisms provoke Thrasymachus to launch an abusive attack on Socrates himself. Thrasymachus is a cynical sophist who claims all the virtues for the unjust person, saying that the unjust person is happier, because to be just and fair puts one at a disadvantage. We observe that people in power in fact arrange matters for their own interest. It is only smart to do likewise if one can.
Thrasymachus defines justice as “the interest of the stronger.” Socrates shows the ambiguity of the definition, which could mean (1) whatever the person(s) in power want (are interested in) or call for (by making laws and issuing decrees) or (2) whatever is truly in the interest of that person. The point is that it takes knowledge (to pursue which requires philosophic dedication and humility)—which Thrasymachus resists.
To govern (rule) involves the exercise of a techne, and Socrates’ next line of argument presents an analogy between governing and other technai whose practice involves primary care for the other, not for the self. The good shepherd, for example, cares for the sheep (the weaker), not for himself.
In the structure of the typical Platonic dialogue, there is a middle section that offers more profound teaching, more directly representing Plato’s own thoughts, than in the other portions of the dialogue, where Socrates (or the philosophic protagonist) speaks with more irony so as to engage the level of thinking of the interlocutors (conversation partners). Here is a summary of the central portion of the Republic.
For the state to flourish in justice, those in power must be philosophers [and queens] (474c).
But who are the philosophers (474b)?
· Love the whole of wisdom (474c - 475c)
· Love all learning (475c)
· Can distinguish beauty (the beautiful itself) from things that have beauty (partake of beauty, participate in beauty) (475e – 476d)
· Pursue the knowledge of what truly is, rather than opinion, which is the maximum cognitive achievement regarding that which partly is and partly is not (476d – 480a)
· Have a pattern in their soul as a basis for legislation regarding the beautiful, just, and good which they draw like an artist imitating a model (484c-d)
· Strive for truth in everything and remain loyal to truth their whole lives (485b-d)
· Strive for what is whole and complete, both human and divine (486a)
· Possess the virtues that flow from regarding bodily pleasures as of little import compared with the higher pleasures of the soul (485d – 487a)
· Have a good memory (486c)
Those who criticize philosophy for cultivating uselessness (487b-e) are like a mob of sailors, ignorant of navigation, who want to take control of the ship (487e – 489d).
In a city where philosophy is not prized, those with the rare gifts for philosophy will be corrupted by the mass culture (489d – 496a).
There is a slight chance for men and women gifted with philosophic potentials to receive a proper education to develop those potentials and then gaining the power to order and administer the government (496a – 504a).
The most difficult knowledge to gain is knowledge of goodness (the idea of the good, the form of the good, the good itself, the good). Glaucon and Adamantus are not prepared for this level of education, so Socrates will give some analogies instead (504a – 507a).
1. The good is like the sun which illumines the eye, enabling it to see what is visible. (The good illumines the mind, enabling it to grasp the knowledge of true forms.) (507a – 509b)
2. Our mind has four gears for grasping the four levels of what is more or less real—which may be represented in terms of a divided line: opinion grasps perceivable images and things; knowledge grasps mathematical and other forms. Mathematical thinking relies on images and makes assumptions about first principles. Philosophic thinking does not rely on images or examples but only on forms, and it ascends to grasp true beginnings that depend on no assumptions. (509d – 511e)
3. The process of education is like being dragged painfully out of a cave into the light, where we gradually learn to see what can be seen there, and ultimately to behold the source, the sun. Philosophic education aims at the conversion of the soul, from being caught up in the things of the senses to being oriented to what is eternal, unchanging, and perfect. (514a – 519d)