Hume

David Hume (Scottish, 1711-1776), Of the Standard of Taste

How can we sharpen our intuitive appreciation for beauty in the fine arts? This, I propose, is a legitimate and helpful question to help us use Hume’s classic essay in this course. The core of Hume’s answer is at the bottom of p. 87 (paragraph 23). He discusses an objection on p. 88 (par. 24-27) and a major qualification 89 (par 28.

Introduction, waking up the question.

“On account of the great variety of taste, which prevails in the world . . .” (p. 78, par. 1) “it is natural for us to seek a Standard of Taste; a rule, by which the various sentiments of men may be reconciled; at least, a decision, afforded, confirming one sentiment, and condemning another: (p. 80, par.6).

Two common views checkmate each other: (1) that every sentiment is right (p. 80, par. 7), and that some writers are obviously superior to some others (p. 80, par. 8).

The inquiry begins anew on p. 81, par 9. The rules of composition are based upon experience and are “general observations, concerning what has been universally found to please in all countries and in all ages.”

But people often do not make judgments of taste accurately, since “those finer emotions of the mind are of a very tender and delicate nature, and require . . . many favorable circumstances to make them [operate] easily and [accurately]. In order to judge beauty one needs

“a proper time and place”;

the imagination must be in a proper situation

. . . and mood.

“a perfect serenity of mind,

[with one’s thoughts collected],

[paying proper] attention to the object. [p. 82, par. 10]

Homer pleases universally; when the obstacles to proper judgment are removed, beauties are robustly manifest (p. 82, par.11).

There are “certain general principles” [principle: a very broad term, not restricted to a proposition; it can also refer to a cause or an origin] of approval and disapproval.

1. One’s senses must be healthy and unimpaired; even one’s general health affects one’s responsiveness to beauty.

2. One needs an uncommon delicacy of imagination (p. 83, par. 14-15), which is a mental sensitivity to qualities in objects that produce particular sentiments. Nothing escapes the notice, every ingredient in the composition is perceived; thus one may produce general rules or acknowledged patterns of composition, which a true critic should be able to identify in each case in which it appears (16). Delicacy of taste, a quick and acute perception of beauty and deformity, can best be detected by its response to works of art that are universally recognized as great and universally acknowledged principles (p. 84, par 17).

3. One needs lots of practice with many works, moving beyond initial impressions by coming back to the work a number of times, evaluating the merit not only of the work as a whole but of each of its parts (p. 84-85, par. 18-19).

4. One needs experience comparing different types of beauty, higher and lower (p. 85, par. 20).

5. One must be free of prejudice so as to be able to set aside one’s own perspective to adopt that of the audience for whom the work was intended (which feat may take quite a bit of study), with due consideration for the purpose of that type of work and for the way the parts of the work form a unity (pp. 86-87, par 21-22).

Indeed, good sense, sound understanding, is needed “to discern the beauties of design and reasoning, which are the highest and most excellent.” (One must judge the accuracy of the reasoning that is implicit or explicit in the work and whether the characters speak appropriately to their character and circumstances) (p. 86-87, par 22-23)

6. "The joint verdict" of such superbly qualified judges (what they agree on) is "the true standard of taste and beauty.”

A difficulty follows: But how can you find such judges? There will be disputes about that. Response: As in other disputes, do your best, bringing forth the best arguments you can muster, while you “acknowledge a true and decisive standard to exist somewhere,” namely, something that really exists as a matter of fact. (p. 88, par. 24-25) Actually, it’s not as hard as it seems, because great art stays recognized long after fashions in philosophy and theology have changed (88, 26). The great ones are so distinguished “by the soundness of their understanding and the superiority of their faculties” that they effectively teach others, who recognize them (88, 27).

A significant qualification follows: there remain two sources of variation in judgments of taste, and there is no standard to decide between them: (1) the different inclinations (“humours”) of different men, some preferring love poetry to epics, some comedy to tragedy, and (2) “the particular manners and opinions of our age and country” (89, 28-30). These differences do not affect the discernment of beauty, but they do affect the degree of approval given to particular works. Of course we tend to prefer works of our own place and time, but we learn to stretch our appreciation to works of other places and times—except when we find our ideas of morality and decency violated by the standards implicit in, say, Homer; in such a case, we can not help seeing the work as in some degree inferior due to the base standards of morality and decency implicit in it (89-90, 31-32).

It’s different with the differences of “speculative opinions” (i.e., in philosophy, theology, and religion), which change so rapidly, that we should simply learn not to be upset by such differences (91, 33-35). However, when religious principles lead to bigotry or superstition, when they pervert moral sentiments or “intrude themselves into every sentiment” (91-92, 34-36), we cannot avoid having such differences affect our opinion of the beauty of the work.