April, 9, 2021, h. 16-18 CET

The standard view about dependence holds that dependence is an asymmetrical relation between entities or types of entities: if A (or the As) depend(s) on Bs (or the Bs), then it is not the case that B (or the Bs) depend(s) in turn on A (or the As). However, some authors (Bliss, Thompson, Barnes, Nolan) have recently provided some counterexamples to this tenet. Thus, they have argued that dependence is not asymmetrical. In this talk, I shall defend the asymmetry of dependence in light of metaontological pluralism, i.e., the view according to which there are irreducibly many dependence relations between entities and/or types of entities. I shall show that, by accepting metaontological pluralism, we can preserve the asymmetry of dependence or we can at least ‘limit the damage’, so to say. In the first part, I shall introduce my favourite version of metaontological pluralism, that is based on the acceptance of distinct Respect-of-Dependence-Relations. Afterwards, I shall introduce five strategies to cope with the aforementioned counterexamples. Two of such strategies will be explicitly based on metaontological pluralism. I shall then face each counterexample and show how the asymmetry of dependence can be preserved. Finally, I shall anticipate and reply to two objections: that introducing multiple Respect-of-Dependence-Relations runs into the risk of ‘trivializing’ metaontological pluralism and of providing ad hoc responses to the counterexamples at stake; that the same responses may be available to metaontological monism by assuming that there is only one dependence relation that only holds between facts (or fact-like entities).

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