January, 15, 2021, h. 17-19 CET

The argument from the success of theories, or “no miracles argument” (NMA) is arguably the strongest one for scientific realism. This argument has been challenged on historical grounds by Laudan (1981), and more recently by Lyons (2002, 2003) and others: many past false theories were successful, hence success is no proof of truth. Deployment realists replied by circumscribing the scope of the NMA: “Individual posits which were essentially deployed in novel successful predictions are most probably true” (Kitcher 1993, Psillos 1999): the false claims of past theories either did not yield novel predictions or were not essential in deriving such predictions. (Debates on novelty, going back at least to Popper, have clarified that the relevant concept of novelty is functional, not historic, and includes improbability: Alai 2014). However Lyons (2006, 2009) criticized Psillos’ characterization of the essentiality requirement, urging to abandon it altogether. But this would block the realist defense move and mark the victory of antirealism. I suggest a notion of essentiality inspired by Psillos’ characterization, which however is simpler and avoids Lyons’ criticisms. This notion is based on Yablo’s (2014) idea of the proper parts of an hypothesis’ content. I then show how in this way deployment realists can resist a number of supposed historical counterexamples. If there were time I also would argue, against Votsis (2011), Peters (2014) and Cordero (2017a, 2017b), that essentiality (hence truth) cannot be detected prospectively, but (against Stanford 2017) that this is not a problem for realists.

The paper is forthcoming in: Contemporary Scientific Realism: The Challenge from the History of Science, edited by T.D. Lyons, and P. Vickers P., Oxford University Press, 2021

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REFERENCES

Alai, M., 2014 “Novel Predictions and the No Miracle Argument”, Erkenntnis 79, n. 2 (2014), pp. 297-326.

Cordero, A. (2017a). Retention, truth- content and selective realism, in E. Agazzi (ed.) Varieties of Scientific Realism, Cham, Springer, pp. 245– 256.

Cordero, A. (2017b) “Making Content Selective Realism the Best Realist Game in Town,” Quo Vadis Selective Scientific Realism? Conference, Durham, UK 5– 7 August 2017.

Kitcher, P. (1993) The Advancement of Science. Oxford University Press.

Laudan, L. (1981) A Confutation of Convergent Realism. Philosophy of Science vol. 48, 19– 49.Lyons, T. D. (2002) “The Pessimistic Meta- Modus Tollens,” in S. Clarke and T. D. Lyons (eds.) 2002, 63– 90.

Lyons, T. D. (2003) “Explaining the Success of a Scientific Theory,” Philosophy of Science vol. 70, 891– 901.

Lyons, T.D. (2006). “Scientific Realism and the Stratagema de Divide et Impera,” BJPS vol. 57, 537– 560.

Lyons, T.D. (2009) Criteria for Attributing Predictive Responsibility in the Scientific Realism debate: Deployment, Essentiality, Belief, Retention,” Human Affairs vol. 19, 138– 152.

Peters, D. (2014) “What Elements of Successful Scientific Theories are the Correct Targets for “Selective” Scientific Realism?” Philosophy of Science vol. 81, 377– 397.

Psillos, S. (1999) Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth. London- New York: Routledge.

Stanford, P. K. (2017) “A Difference That Makes a Difference: Stein on Realism, Instrumentalism, and Intellectually Nourishing Snacks,” Quo Vadis Selective Scientific Realism? Conference, Durham, UK 5– 7 August 2017

Votsis, I. (2011) “The Prospective Stance in Realism.” Philosophy of Science vol. 78, 1223– 1234.

Yablo, S. (2014) Aboutness. Princeton: University Press.