May, 28, 2021, h. 16-18 CET --> Postponed to July, 2, 2021, h. 16-18 CET

This paper examines the relationship between the Semantic View of scientific theories (SV) and the issue of Scientific Representation (SR). We focus on two criticisms raised against SV because of its focus on structures. The first criticism rules out SV as an account of SR, while the second concedes that SV could serve as an account of SR only at the price of implying a form of structuralism about SR. We argue that SV, at least in its early formulation, is immune to these criticisms. To this purpose, we first review what the early advocates of SV posited about the relationship between theories and SR, with particular emphasis on some aspects that are often overlooked – if not misunderstood, i.e., the role ascribed to both formalization and actual scientific practice, and the neutrality with respect to ontological commitment . We then draw upon these tenets to argue that the Semantic View is not a legitimate target for the criticisms considered.

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