Denotes a socio‑political spatially bounded entity at the center of which is to be found a formally and coercively organized hegemonic central political authority. While the state simultaneously exists as both an abstract as well as a concrete entity, it should not be confused with what is commonly referred to as the government.[1] In its concrete manifestation, however, the state is readily visible via its various coercive “apparatuses” (e.g., the legislature, the bureaucracy, the judiciary, the army, etc.) that together constitute what is popularly known as the “government.” [2] Behind this seemingly benign definition of the state, it is necessary to stress that there is considerable controversy among political scientists over its nature and function stemming from this key question: In a modern capitalist democracy, whose interests does the state really represent? While seemingly easy to answer, this question has caused much acrimonious disagreement—and viewed historically, contention over this issue in some other parts of the world (as in the former Communist countries) has been the basis of revolutionary upheavals.[3] The conventional wisdom of course (especially in the West) is that the democratic capitalist state serves everyone’s interest, not a particular group’s interests. It is a neutral arbiter among competing interest groups in a context where its principal function is to supply public goods (services) and to regulate and facilitate the operation of the capitalist market for commodities (understood in the broadest sense to mean anything that can be bought and sold). People who hold this position (such as Baumol 1965, and Verba and Nie 1972) may be termed pluralists. Others hold that the state is an epiphenomenon of the economic base where its principal function is to serve as an instrument of the capitalist class (the wealthy and powerful who own the major means of production)—via the state’s monopoly of the power of coercion—in order to dominate the working class economically and politically. Those who hold this position (such as Becker 1977 and Miliband 1969) may be called instrumentalists. Still others, such as Althusser 1971 and Poulantzas 1978 (who may be called the structuralists) hold that the state, while serving the interests of the capitalist class, does so in such a way that members of this class do not even have to be directly involved with the state (e.g., occupying a particular bureaucratic position). This becomes possible because of the way modern capitalist societies are structured where the function of the state is to (a) maintain societal cohesion via ideological transformation of bourgeois interests into general societal interests in the face of disintegrative tendencies arising from class antagonisms; (b) engender class cohesion within the bourgeoisie in the face of disintegrative tendencies arising out of competition between individual capitalists; and (c) engender disunity within the subordinate classes so as to prevent a concerted opposition against the bourgeoisie. The coincidence of bourgeois interests with the interests of the state is a product of the objective relationship between the state and the capitalist socio‑economic system and not a subjective relationship between the state and the bourgeoisie; therefore, the bourgeoisie do not have to occupy positions of power within the state apparatuses.
Then there are those such as Habermas (1976), O’Connor (1973), and Offe (1984)—who may be called systems theorists—they theorize that the state should be seen as a political input‑output mechanism that exists to guarantee capitalist accumulation—necessary in part to allow for the state’s own reproduction. In this role it requires an input of mass political loyalty in order to generate an output of autocratic administrative decisions aimed at correcting the inherently crisis ridden characteristic of capitalism. This role of the state, however, is contradictory because intervention within the economy on the side of the capitalist class leads to an erosion of its legitimacy within the rest of society—as its apparent neutrality is stripped away—producing for it a crisis of “legitimation.” Consequently, the capitalist state is immeshed in a crisis laden political system and the solution to which can only emerge via the replacement of capitalism with socialism. People such as Altvater (1973) and Hirsch (1977) represent those who may be termed derivationists; their position is that the specific form of the capitalist state cannot be divorced from the inherently exploitative nature of the capitalist relations of production, on the contrary it is derived from these relations. However, in order to obfuscate and thereby render palatable this exploitation of the working class by the capitalist class, the state creates a dichotomy between the “economic” sphere and the “political” sphere. The domination of the state in the political sphere then allows it to create the illusion of a democratic political and economic system via its stance of apparent class neutrality—thereby ensuring mass loyalty to the state and through it the capitalist system, even as the state (as an “ideal collective capitalist”) engages in actions aimed at countering the inherent tendency for the rate of profit to fall in capitalist systems.[4] These actions include: securing those external conditions necessary for maintenance of the capitalist relations of production that cannot be entrusted entirely to market forces (e.g., infrastructure); redistribute revenues and/or intervene in the circulation process so as to favor economically strategic capitalists and/or secure the reproduction of wage labor; promote long-term development of productive forces through such various measures as funding “research and development” programs; and providing support assistance for the entire capitalist class in their competition with other capitalist classes on the world market (e.g., erecting tariff barriers, intervening diplomatically and/or militarily where possible when situations call for it in the world, and so on).
As if these are not enough, there are still more theories of the state: there is the managerial theory of the state. Here people such as Birnbaum (1981), Block (1980), Dahrendorf (1959) and Evans, Rueschemeyer, Skocpol (1985) argue that the state is controlled by bureaucrats called “state managers” and not capitalists. However, the coincidence of interests of capitalists and those of the state managers is a function of the need for the state to maintain its revenue base, as well as guarantee its legitimation vis-à-vis the public. The need to maintain “business confidence” therefore underwrites state activities in the area of reproduction of capitalist relations and accumulation. The state functions as an autonomous actor, placed intermediately, between the working class and the capitalist class. Then there is the corporatist theory of the state; its proponents include: Cawson (1986), Grant (1985), Panitch (1980), and Schmitter (1974). Their position is that the state is the embodiment of the common good and this serves as the basis for its legitimacy. Therefore, the state does not have to reflect the democratic will of the people. In a corporatist society the state as an independent political authority mediates between, as well as directs, select state licensed organizationally‑based economic interests (e.g., employer organizations, trade unions, and so on). In such a society, political participation occurs only through these officially sanctioned organizations. Corporatism is the logical (and desirable) outcome of the decay of pluralism. Yet another theory is the racial theory of the state that posits the state, such as the one in United States, as comprising a panoply of institutions—but considered together with, in the words of its chief proponents, Omi and Winant, “the policies they carry out, the conditions and rules which support and justify them, and the social relations in which they are imbedded,” —in which race (depending upon the institutions and historical moment in question) occupies “varying degrees of centrality” (Omi and Winant, 1994: 83, emphasis in the original). Here, one can also add some of the work of the critical race theorists as constituting contributions to a formulation of the racial theory of the state.[5]
This summary of the major theories of the state will end with one more: it may be called, for want of a better term, the articulated theory of the state. Chief proponents of this theory are Alford and Friedland (1985). Their argument is that all theories of the modern capitalist state can be categorized into three principal sets: pluralist, managerial (statist) and class (Marxist). Each set of theories has a home domain in which the cogency of their analysis is unrivaled: for the pluralists it is at the micro‑level analysis of the state (e.g., the individual, such as the chief executive officer of a corporation), for the managerialists it is at the meso‑level (e.g., the organization, such as a business corporation) and for the Marxists it is at the macro‑level (e.g., society, such as the capitalist social formation). Each of these three theoretical sets, despite their claims to an all‑encompassing analytical validity, has little theoretical value outside their home domains. Therefore, a comprehensive analysis of the state must rest on an articulation of these three principal sets of theories, each providing a unique and cogent insight into a specific level of analysis (to which it is best suited) of the advanced capitalist state.
Which among these different theories, then, is the correct theory about the nature and function of the state in modern capitalist democracies? The answer is that all of them but only when considered together. This position in actuality is the one adopted by Alford and Friedland (1985) in their articulated theory of the state (though this is not what they call it; in fact, they deny that they have constructed a new “theory of the state”). Each of the theories indicated above address a particular dimension of the role of the state; though they all think that they alone have the full grasp and understanding of this role; which in truth is impossible to achieve given its enormous complexity, in terms of both its composition and functioning.[6]
[1]. One way to comprehend the difference between the state and the government is to look at the example of political systems—such as constitutional monarchies and parliamentary political systems—where the head of state and the head of government reside in two separate offices. In other words, governments (or administrations as they are referred to in this country) can come and go, but states are generally permanent and are symbolically represented by things like the flag, the national anthem, the currency, and so on.
[2]. Folks, this term should not be confused with the term “state” as used to denote a fragment of a federal political system (e.g., as in “New York state, Michigan state,” etc.).
[3]. The reason for this disagreement is not far to seek: depending upon what “theory” one has as to whose interests the state really represents, one will be motivated to adopt certain political positions regarding the legitimacy of the state. Depending upon the theory in question, it can range all the way from apathetic acceptance of the legitimacy of the state to co‑operative acceptance on to apathetic non-acceptance and even further: active opposition to the state in the form of revolutionary war. The contentious basis of the question (i.e., whose interests the state represents) is, therefore, clearly evident. Any theory of the state is of necessity a composite of two dialectically related halves: the heuristic and the normative; hence this implies that a theory of the state is ultimately a program of social action. Alford and Friedland (1985) make this very point in a dramatic way when they say that state theories have “power.” This power is manifest in several ways:
(a) How one interprets state behavior at the political, legislative, or administrative levels depends on the theory one subscribes to.
(b) Theories of the state help to form the consciousness of social groups in terms of what is permissible and what is not with respect to the state, thereby pointing to the “power” of theory to dominate behavior. They give an example by saying that “a hypothesis about whether the police are likely to arrest someone for sitting‑in at the mayor’s office is a theory of probable state action” (p. 388)
(c) State theories have hegemonic power over categories of language. This is evidenced via latent assumptions about what behaviors belong to the public domain and what behaviors belong to the private domain—thus pointing to an implicit theory about state‑society boundaries. Therefore, as they explain, “[c]larity on the theoretical issues may contribute to a more precise understanding of the potential for new leaders, policies, and social movements to significantly challenge the drift into economic crises, political and cultural repression, and war. … Theories motivate people to act and rationalize those actions afterward. … If the theory is correct and the conditions under which the action takes place are compatible with the theory, the intended outcomes are more likely than not. In this respect, theory has powers” (Alford and Friedland 1985: 3–4).
Consequently, accepting an existing theory of the state, or constructing a new state theory, boils down to making a choice between accepting, for example, the present political, social and economic practices of modern industrial societies, or working toward their change for the better. For, to construct new theories of the state is to call for a change in the status quo. It is ultimately for this reason that common agreement on the acceptance of a single theory of the state becomes impossible; hence, it is not uncommon to see fur fly when the issue of the state is brought up among political scientists.
[4]. The concept of the “falling rate of profit” is used to explain the tendency of capitalist economic systems to undergo, over time, cyclic phases of “boom” and “bust.” It is defined as the phenomenon where businesses, in the face of competition from other businesses, combat both labor costs and the rising unit cost of production by resorting to increasing mechanization and automation. This increase in the ratio of machinery to labor, however, produces its own contradiction: a declining rate of profit as costs at the macro‑economic level, brought about by the increased investment in machinery, accelerates. Therefore, even though unit costs may decrease, the decrease is achieved on the basis of rising overall production costs that lead to falling profits, especially as the substitution of labor with machinery reaches the point of saturation imposed by the existing limits of knowledge and technology. The long-term consequence of declining rates of profit at the macro‑economic level is that, eventually, a system wide economic crisis (commonly known as a “recession”) is set in motion as disincentives to further investment emerge, inventories begin to build up due to lack of sales, labor is fired, and so on. For more on the concept of “falling rates of profit” see Shaikh (1982).
[5]. An excellent introduction to critical race theory is the comprehensive seminal anthology by Delgado and Stefancic (2000).
[6]. Here one has to concur with the observation by Jessop (1982) that the quest for a general or grand theory of the state is doomed from the start however desirable it may be. “For, while any attempt to analyze the world must assume that it is determinate and determined, it does not follow that a single theory can comprehend the totality of its determinations without resorting to reductionism of one kind or another.” He continues: “(t)he various abortive efforts to develop a general theory of the state get their impetus from conflating the determinacy of the real world with determinacy as a property of a given theoretical system, thereby aiming to explain the former in terms of the latter” (p. 211–12). Jessop then goes on to elaborate his point by suggesting that attempts at general theory construction invariably fall into one or more of the following three traps: (i) Reductionism: using one aspect of theoretical formulation to account for everything about the state and its politics; (ii) Empiricism: substituting an adequate explanation for a given event with a partial explanation based on either a synchronic and/or historiographical description of the event; and (iii) subsumptionism, where a particular description of a given event is considered to be “subsumed under a general principle of explanation as one of its many instantiations” (p. 212).