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Abdel Hernandez San Juan

Self and acervo

The Self and the social between writing, culture and research

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Book VII

Individual Authorial Work/Theoretical Writings

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Author: ©Abdel Hernandez San Juan

The author rights of this book belong to Abdel Hernandez San Juan, its author, conceiver, writer and composer

Title: Self and acervo

Subtitle: The self and the social between writing, research and culture

Type of Work: Literary of theoretical essays/book

Destination:  Books Libraries and biblioteques

Sides of Covered and Print Publications Sides: 22.5 cm x 15 cm

Number of Pages: 200, Reproduction: from 1 to 5000 exemplars, Covered Conservation and Protection Sides: 21.59 cm x 27.54 cm, Covered Lectures Sides: 21.59 cm x 27.54 cm

Contents

Being and world in American modernity

Self and acervo

Exploring Narratives and Collages of Text in Urban Settings. By Abdel Hernandez San Juan 

Between Acervos and Backgrounds. By Abdel Hernandez San Juan

The Cognitive Turn. By Abdel Hernandez San Juan

The Evacuation of the Substance. By Abdel Hernández San Juan

The Interweaving of language, of what in language is purely language, and of the other threads of experience, constitutes a fabric. The word Verwebung leads to this metaphorical zone: the strata are woven, their imbrication is such that the weft of the warp cannot be discerned. If the stratum of logos were simply laid on top, it could be lifted and allowed to appear beneath the underlying stratum of non-expressive acts and contents. But since this superstructure acts, on the other hand, in an essential and decisive manner, on the unterchichts, we are obliged, from the beginning of the description, to associate with the geological metaphor a properly textual metaphor, since fabric I mean text, Verweben here means say texere. The discursive is related to the non-discursive, the linguistic stratum intermingles with the prelinguistic stratum according to the regulated system of a type of text.

Jacques Derrida

Notes on the phenomenology of language

In fact, precisely in this opposition of both worlds their difference has disappeared, and what would have to be a world in and of itself is the same a phenomenal world and vice versa the Phenomenal world is the same an essential world, the phenomenal world and the world in itself are, therefore, each one in itself the totality of the identical reflection with itself and of the reflection in its other, world in itself and Phenomenal world, one would have to be only reflected, the other only in itself, but each one continues in its other and therefore it is in the same the identity of both moments, what is therefore present is this totality that by itself breaks into two totalities, one is the reflected totality, the other is the immediate, both are above all independent but they are such only as totalities and they are such because each essentially has in it the moment of the other. The different independence of each one, of the determined as immediate and of the determined as reflected, is therefore now placed in such a way that each can be only as an essential relationship with the other and have its independence in this unity of the two 447- 448

Hegel, Science of Logic

Being and world in American modernity

©Por Abdel Hernandez San Juan

Seen from the world of everyday life Intramundane Horizonts and focusing the modern medias such as the internet, the cyberspace and television, while affording under the age of marketing and high quality services of the free market world, including publicity, environmental, citizenship and social services issues, this paper discuss several of my books in and from the united states offering a retheorization on main issues such as world, being, soul, subjectivity and pragmatism called the attention of phinisecular philosophy in Europe at the end of the century but seen and understanded from a united states perspective specifically my point of view from Texas 

the paper discuss an innovative perspective over previous ways to afford issues on the united states modernity rediscussing phenomenological sociology, pragmatism and various things on the background of Daniel bell postindustrial society, Junger Habermas modernity and communicative rationality or Frankford turns to explore ways to afford philosophizing issues of modernity and progress 

Keywords: united states, modernity, high technologies, the internet, the world of everyday life

The privilege of the present, Gegenwart predomine yet Parmenides poetry, Legein, noein, the present under the form of persistence and permanenships, something nearly, accessible, available, affordable by the gaze Vorhandenheit, a presence presenting, apprehended in legein and noein according to a process to which a temporal structure is a pure presentation, maintenance, reinen: Gegenwarttigens, the one who exist, the existent only shows itself in presentation, explained and comprehended by a present, captured as presence in the present of a pure presentation, as ousia

Jacques Derrida, Ousia and Gramme

  There is a point at which the most abstract philosophizing about the self, being, spirit, technology, modernity and many other questions that require answering for the invariants of language, logic, subjectivity and abstraction since Greek antiquity and thought classic, one cannot help but consider or avoid, although this is presented as a diatribe for philosophizing in the sense of how one deliberates the relationship between defamiliarization and typicality, abstraction and worldliness, dematerialization in the modes of philosophizing and its correlates, hermeneusis, empiricity, referentiality, phenomenality, worldliness, etc., which did not stop being raised in different ways at the beginning of the 20th century, both for logical positivism and for formalism and other tendencies, the very question of how theorizing is related to same with society as a whole.

  Thus, many of the questions that decide on the structures of the works and, to no lesser extent, on crucial epistemological decisions, are related to how one deliberates or settles this matter; for example, along the lines of Durkeim, a work will always try to Its social correlate is given by the relationship between the structure of the literary work and the social structure understood through its rules, that is, how these are presented in the social now here, this relationship, as also in Saussure, displays all the correlative and correlational horizon, relative to the social world, according to language guidelines and rules that involve practice, learning rules, transmission rules, communication rules.

  Meanwhile, to refer to the classics of sociology, Weber's comprehensive sociology makes its cut of the social correlate in an entirely different way, since it prioritizes not precisely the invariance inherent to the stability of the structures, but the fact that these structures are evolutionary, that is, they come from a development, they were not always like this, and that development is, with regard to our modern society in the USA, essentially secular, that is, it is governed by an extensive process that lasted for centuries, for through which our society became secularized, separated into disciplines, specialties, techniques, professions, functions, etc., the whole of the modern society that we live in today in the high development of the Internet era in the USA, is the expression more evolved than that process, it was optimized in technologies.

  With these three books I offer my own answer on how to deliberate these cuts of the relationship between my literary works as authorial compositions and the social whole, that is, structural, sociological, aesthetic and correlational with regard to the horizons of mundanity, everyday life , referentiality, correlates, contextures, and other aspects related to that social world deliberated in them as a modern philosophizing of the modern world through its high technologies and its means, The Intangible, The Linguistic Presentational, The Given and the not Given, and the essays that make up chapters in each one, the relationship between these essays and each one and their relationships with the literary and philosophical whole, also stylistic, well, let's say, in terms of classical thought, strictly speaking, my own thinking and writing. This, in the first place.

  For me, it is not so much about writing about the United States in the literal sense of a circumstance specific to the country, but rather about the simple fact, first, of my own experience in daily life to which these books refer, and second, that the United States means for the human being and all planetary development Today, a sinequanon.

  The classical philosophical literature in which we ask decisive questions, which we call ultimate questions, about being, spirit, man, consciousness, evolution, culture, modernity, media, was in my opinion stagnant, had reached a point from which it was not seen how it could take off towards new directions, we needed to take this issue towards innovative, renewed possibilities, we could not continue referring to previous literature, we needed something current, and those are my books at the forefront as an avant-garde thinker .

  That literature, clearly due to this or that aspect, was increasingly partial, narrow, limited and impoverished, there even came a time when many of us came to think that it was preferable to read all those books that proliferated so much after the eighties, around of the nineties, in my opinion excellent, on marketing, target, market niches, quality control, customer service, how to develop a company or simply read computer and cybernetics manuals, let's say that in a certain way in the nineties the literature technique took a wide advantage over classical philosophy, it was more philosophical and appropriate to the invariances of classical philosophy since Aristotle, to read a good technical book on computers or on marketing, than to read the books that came out on the subject.

  For all this we had to move towards a new stage, and this took me years of reflection, not only because in Europe philosophy and thought did not stop for a single moment from continuing to objectify, think and reflect, with everything that old Europe continues to evoke through its experience, if Europe continues to think of itself, not as Europe itself, but as the ultimate question of man, as modernity, as development, and increasingly, it is not conceivable that the United States will not do so, or will not do so. purpose of the United States, and among other things this happened because in a certain way the United States undoubtedly has the advantage precisely in technical terms, that is, in terms of the development of advanced models, it is not in vain that I get the advantage that I get in terms of development .

  But this advantage was accompanied, as always happens when one thing is developed more than the other, almost two decades in which the United States produced very little, or almost nothing in these terms, we could say that while the United States was ahead in terms of modernization economic and technological, in terms of technical literature, Europe was ahead of the United States in terms of a classical philosophy that was advancing a series of issues, while we have a gap of almost twenty years in the United States in this other sense with the sole exception of Rorty.

  And it is in this tradition that these three books are inserted from my own deliberations of thought, that is, in them the reader will find the original vision, unique if you will, of a young thinker, an author, myself, who had been there for several decades concerned with the theorization of these issues in use, analyzing the question of society, of the societal, how the media interacted with the societal spaces of daily life, and vice versa.

  That they could be significant books at a national level today in the USA as a country? It is possible. Chomsky published Language and Responsibility a few years ago, it came out in New Press in NY, if we are going to talk about thematizations, because national for the country they can be books that do not necessarily thematize the United States as a country, or that do so according to a certain specialized secular aspect. Although focused on language with chapters, for example, on semantics, Chomsky dedicates some chapters to issues of use as a country, but there is not much.

  In the last twenty-odd years in the United States, all that proliferating literature that I mentioned was produced and I disagree with Deleuze in undervaluing it, all that marketing literature that I celebrate and consider positive because it is aimed at quality and what quality entails humanizes, qualifies, supposes a social good. But it is true that the universities were more concerned with not failing to publish as much as possible what was being thought in Europe.

  In no way do I think that this is a reason to think about a crisis, I do not share the idea that the United States is in a crisis, in Europe I don't know why I haven't traveled to Europe practically since '88, it has rained a lot there here, but in the United States there is certainly no crisis in any way, on the contrary, I think that the United States is in the most progressive stage of its evolution so far and that it is moving towards much more progressive stages, the new generations have completely removed from the national panorama, it is another country, a new country.

  I see the United States at a crucial moment, illusions, hopes, optimism, love, desire to build, conscience, moral integrity, values, communities, beautiful people as beings everywhere, and it was also time to address this in an eloquent way. , constipated if you will, but it was better as something restrained, adhering to a new pragmatics, and not that cynicism, that nihilism and that destructive tendency that dominated until not long ago perhaps as a reaction precisely to what I explained before.

  That trend had to be reversed, Rorty said it, we had to move towards a positive, constructive vision of things in the country, with these three books I contribute my humble perspective, it is a very big country, no one, no single author can cover one reality So much for it, many authors are needed to offer their own perspectives. Books like these of mine open up at least, like a new vision, epistemes, possibilities and horizons for some things, and others will open them in relation to other things.

  But our futures would not be conceivable as scholars, as writers and as beings who need communication, mutual explanation, understanding, optimization and efficiency and even mutuality, without these means. More than pro, I could say, that without technology I do not see an optimistic, progressive and evolutionary future not only for us men of letters, humanities, science, art and creativity, but in general for the human species, for the evolution of our ecosystems. , for our environment.

  In the same way that communication speeds increase to unsuspected levels, man's ability to make his communications more efficient increases while at the same time recovering a more humble and certain relationship, somewhat smaller, but also much more efficient and responsible between your communications and your habitat, your communications and your environment.

  Internet technologies are far from being external monitors out there to which we go or which we have, as if this did not involve our ecosystem, not only because we literally have all transformations of our habits and customs at home, it is not the case. It is the same to be a netizen or a viewer, or not only because we have equipped rooms in our universities, libraries, bookstores or cafes, full of computers, but because the culture of computing and online life relates you in a different way to everything, the city, the libraries, the bookstores, the services, the communications, the markets, and this, since our entire reality is like this, since we are all beings who live with the services of the computer and the Internet, also the Cities and urban spaces receive and are modified with this culture, the relationship between technology and the environment is immediate, and is a priority.

  It is not true that technologies are a versus for the environment, rather on the contrary, we must perceive how technologies make our relationships with the environment and with ourselves more ecological, playful, interactive, less irresponsible and more open. No less than a decade ago I said in an essay that what we have learned little about is how to be more ecological with ourselves and today I can maintain that undoubtedly the turn that the world of technologies has taken since the second half of the nineties towards The new millennium has been a first response without the slightest doubt optimistic in this direction.

 I have developed my own response, my own elaboration, in a way my literary works can be understood as my own responses to this phenomenon as well. In these literary works my own style.

  Creativity is a preponderant form of the forms of life in the worlds of life and of the forms of evolution that is in the current world of technological development that man is facing in city conglomerates and worlds of nature and citizenship, the positive exponentiality of the world in which we live, for our children and for us, it is creative

  In the same way, the monadic character and the philosophizing of this in its most abstract forms, according to our sensory impressions in our sense of being and becoming in environments, cities and architecture, is preponderant in the worlds of life, as much as creativity is. and presentationality, related to increasingly environmentalized and architecturalized worlds in cities and technologies, as well as in communications.

  In my own style of thinking and writing they are works of authorial composition made up of essays, there is nothing in this life that I am more passionate about than the hard sciences. I am going to give examples of how this works for me, one explores and finds one's own creations, with the exception that the people I am going to mention below and I are between thirty and fifty years old, that is, they are people who are at least between thirty and fifty years older than me, some are on their way to seventy, others are past eighty, others have died.

  I read and write on the topic of reason, but I am aware that Habermas has devoted a wide variety of efforts to this topic, it makes no sense to try to build another edifice on reason parallel to Habermas's,Communicative Action Theory I and II, SciencesConstructive and Reconstructive: Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, EssaysChosen over Reason, one decides to write certain essays on reason in which to propose and develop certain advances that one considers necessary, but respecting the fact that it is Habermas who has dedicated a vast and extensive work to this.

   One has to become classic with one's own thinking and what others did makes no sense to repeat except because of what one has in the arsenal.

  It is increasingly difficult to found, but between one thing and the other you find and develop your language, your own theories and your own style, that which is what you bring forward. I read and write something about field theory, I advance possibilities and alternatives, but the person who dedicated himself to a field theory was Pierre Bourdieu, at least the Pierre Bourdieu who has something to tell me and I care,The Rules of Art, The Autistic and Literary Field, The Field of Cultural Production, so it makes no sense to construct another edifice in field theory parallel to Bourdieu's.

   There are books that I share by Michael Foucault,Words and Things It is beautiful, also the archeology of knowledge, like his theory of discourse or his book on Deleuze, but I don't like the rest of his books.

  I also share Derrida's The Margins of Philosophy, Philosophy before Linguistics, Notes on the Phenomenology of Language, Ousia and Gramme, his communication on Austin, his analyzes of the Geneva Linguistics Circle and even, although with some objections, I prefer semiotics of Saussure, his essay on Hegel's Semiology, I do not share in the same way in that same book The Ends of Man as I consider man to be more relevant than ever before, grammatology and deconstruction are fine, but the Nietchian side is not. also present in Foucault, nor that other one that leads him to a symbolist esotericism in the style of Mercia Eliades, Cearlau and other forms of symbolism that do not seem to have known Todorov's advances in symbolic theory, an excessive mysticism and esotericism.

  Although my theory of the stratum is broader than that which Derrida subordinates to the question of Wanting to Say, I do not stop accepting that stratification can also contemplate expression. It is not that I deny being the relationship to existentialists, but I consider that the question of being should not be referred only to the question of existence but to the worlds of life and I consider hermeneutically that this question must remain together with the language, while those that were supposed to be relatable to existentials or dasein, must correspond to the question of the self, the self, the self, the sameness, the myself, the ego and the relations betweenThe Self and the Acerbo. 

  Deleuze and The Fould:Leibniz and the Baroque, Leibniz is the mathematical philosopher to whom the concept of monad is first attributed, he develops a Philosophy of the monad that develops between a very abstract Philosophy of surfaces and geometry, and a Philosophy of the soul. However, in this philosophy of the surface and the soul, Deleuze excludes being, while on the other hand he practically dissolves the question of meaning that would have been decisive in his book.Logic of Sense. Reading both of Deleuze's books was useful to me, however, in theLogic of Sense After Deleuze in the first part of the first volume develops the logic of meaning as a Philosophy on possibles and compossibles, leaving the allusions to semantics very general, almost without development, the rest of the work, second part of the first volume and the second volume, probably because it is a work from Deleuze's very early youth, becomes entirely esoteric, one published in Columbia University Press and the other in the University of Minnesota Press.

   The relationship to possibles is interesting, but later esotericism does not, at any point, furthermore, does the question of being arise in both volumes. Then inLeibniz and the Baroque If we have a very abstract philosophy on the surface that I share, but this very abstract philosophy becomes a philosophy of the soul versus a phenomenology of the spirit, the logic of the meaning of the previous books is diluted, as well as the semantics, a philosophy that entirely omits the question of being. Then inEmpiricism and Subjectivity Deleuze dedicates significant developments to the philosophy of subjectivity but the question of being is once again ignored. I don't think I have to go into much detail about my affinities with Deleuze and my distances.

  In deciding to situate the philosophy of being in relation to the monad as a form of philosophical hermeneusis about being in language and lifeworlds, I argue that they must work together by demonstrating epistemologically how and in what ways being, communication, technology, the media, the soul, subjectivity, spirituality, life worlds, reason, daily rituals.

   The United States, of course, is the world reference here, they are books about, inspired by, and whose world correlate is the USA. And of course, the social experience of the United States is different from that of Europe. As I said at the beginning after decades of technical literature on marketing, it was not conceivable that the United States would not undertake an effort like this one that I have done with my books or that it would be undertaken in accordance or according to the United States, the specificities of the social, economic experience and technological in the USA when old Europe did not stop doing it for a single decade.

  The assertive thing in me is that the whole question must be referred to the Renaissance and not to the Middle Ages, the philosophy of the monad must not be diluted in a pure philosophy of geometry spread on the surfaces as a pure philosophy of the soul but must be at the same time a philosophizing of the monad and the soul and a hermeneutical philosophy of being in language that encompasses technology, both monad and being in language, third, the philosophy of surfaces must not be abstracted in such a way that it is diluted in a monadology without correlation to being, spirit, subjectivity, technology, media, life worlds, language, but as a philosophy of the possible and in its relationship to meaning, it must work as a philosophy of mediation that solve these aspects together, as hermeneusis, that is, the relationships between the being, the monad, the soul, technology, media, spirit, subjectivity.

  Fourth, on the other hand, the philosophy of subjectivity should not be split off but rather referred to a philosophy of the secular, that is, to the philosophy of the subject according to those forms in which subject and subjectivity were secularized, separated into an infinity of sciences, specialties, divisions that are also forms of the division of consciousness, the division of bodies, the division of techniques and the division of labor, in short a science of reason.

  So the question of being and the question of the subject must go together, making the question of subjectivity implicit in secularization and finally, none of these questions must be separated from the first epistemological question of the subject and the object.

   However, despite distancing himself from Deleuze, Deleuze's developments in the aforementioned books meant a considerable and significant advance. In Hegel the question of being, like the question of essence and concept, is diluted in the question of immanence with which I disagree.

  I consider that philosophy on questions of immanence in matter, the physical, chemical or organic worlds, the in itself and the ontological question on immanence in the world of substance, physics, chemistry, astronomy, botany, biology, to name a few , should not be the same as the philosophy that deals with the objective being that feels, lives, develops, communicates and expresses itself in worlds of life, city and technology, markets, daily rituals, nor the same as that related to the objectifying knowledge, the relationship between the knowing subject and the knowable object, between the subject and the object, the objectifiable objectifications that we must understand as properly a philosophy of being and less that of the concept and the essence.

   There is no way to treat being with the same essence in which substances or matter are treated other than by assigning to matter, from a theological undifferentiation, which transfers to it and its supposed essences, bypassing the being and the supposed essences of this in the essences of that, the absolute of god more than on condition, of course, not only of believing in god, a question which is in itself a philosophical matter, but also of believing so much in god that one is willing to deal with the supposed essences of being with the same essences of matter and conversely, the same in relation to the concept, I am referring to Hegel's three volumes ofScience of Logic, The Doctrine of Being, the Doctrine of Essence and The Doctrine of the Concept.

  It will not be the occasion here to elaborate on the fact for those who accept this transfer, that a decisive percentage of the modern natural sciences that we call exact received this undifferentiation without objectifying it or discussing it, and work by virtue of instrumentalized relations with the body that are practically unobjectified. by the sciences of the body sciences, including here medicine, with a concept of biological, chemical and physical matter, the same as that studied in books, also by certain Marxists, largely theological, a differentiation whose transfer was not included in the Marxist criticisms of theology and that leaves the Marxist conceptions of the matter, also on the side of theologies, due to lack of objectification of the sciences of the sciences of objectification, a lack bypassed in forms of empiricism.

  Deleuze cannot get rid of that Hegelian immanentism, whose philosophy on being, as on essence and concept, ignores the question of being and that of immanence as an ontological question. Derrida manages to get rid of it but at the price of a psychologism and in both esotericism persists, Kristeva makes this observation at some point when she says that religious experience at its innermost limit validates an esoteric feeling.

   The fact that philosophical thought must find in the same forms of philosophizing and theorizing, forms of relations between abstractions, notions and concepts, which it obtains from what it theorizes, as happens in my books, is something that also occurs in Deleuze, Derrida and Foucault, in this, decisive, as well as in the fact that philosophy and theory are literature and writing I perceive myself closer to them and to Barthes. Hegel applies the same form of relationship to everything, it does not matter if he talks about being, essence or concept, he answers all questions with the same formula.

  I ask, why not take the question of God head on?

  But not all my analyzes of Hegel are critical. I recognize its relevance for axiology but this requires an immense work of criticism since the axiology that would rather correspond to the place that Hegel offers to the mediations of some forms in others, some concepts in others, would rather refer to the form of a Philosophy. of Philosophy, Hegel's developments on the one and the many, for example, are very good, exemplary and significant. Axiology, which is actually anthropology.

  So as in Marx, one would have to separate between what Hegel says about things, being, nothingness, the one, the many, the essence or the concept, all of which have been transferred into the undifferentiated absolute of god. to the immanence of the inanimate world, in the way in which Hegel develops the Philosophy of Philosophy, to with tweezers, specify here and there, by chosen fragments, an axiology that is visible and its greatest virtue, in my opinion its true strength .

   You can still do something with Hegel. Something that should be undertaken. I will consider it. Axiology and mediation are undoubtedly quite relevant and we must thank Hegel, however, as I have argued elsewhere, they are not sufficient either. Derrida also recognizes Hegel as a Semiology. This reading of Derrida is interesting. In the future I will deal with seeing what can be done regarding this axiology that I see in Hegel and I will pay new attention from this axiology to this semiology that Derrida finds in Hegel. I think that from this perspective and after all the clarifications I have made before, something can still be done with Hegel.

   The validity of at least the Kantian aprioris is today a sinequanon, I consider that after an intellectual effort until today not yet developed with respect to Hegel it would be possible, as in Kant's aprioris, to rescue in Hegel a theory of mediation regarding to which we would then have to see how the semiology that Derrida attributes to him fits together, but it is a work on which I have not yet focused and which requires great concentration.

  I could not fail to note with respect to everything mentioned above the fact that I assign a much greater relevance than all of them to the aprioris of Emmanuel Kant.

  I am saying that I have developed my own clarifications and I have conceived and composed my own elaboration, that I have done it on, according to and in agreement with the United States, not without a percent of constructivism as an attitude towards our own reality in the sense pointed out by Rorty as far as the country is concerned. Those who live the USA experience like me know how these books bring a humble perspective to the issues at stake.

   Ultimately, in each book the reader also finds my bibliographical references and none of these authors cease to be authors for me. Now, I bring up the questionThe Given and the Not Given in an original way towards the crucial issue of epistemology, defining how in it both philosophy and social sciences come together. However, I have made this move, based on my own elaborations, in accordance with a vision in which ethics and morality go together, more in line with Alfred Shutz and Habermas, distinguishing myself from Gilles Deleuze who inEmpiricism and SubjectivityAlthough I share with him the prioritization of the issue and a few epistemological affinities, Deleuze pulverizes and atomizes the Given and the not Given too much. I did the work of bringing this issue to where I believe it should work properly.

    I share with Deleuze his preponderance of affectivity, but while my theory ofThe Given and the Not Given It refers to the very firstity of the subject and the object, with respect to what is given, language for language and writing, grammaticality for meanings, habits for bodies, nature and reality for sensation, the senses, cognition, knowledge. , referentiality, denotation, inscriptions for genres, tendencies for mobilities, and with respect to what is not given, languages ​​that we create with those languages, realities with those realias, life worlds, creativities and performance itself in everyday life, among other objective matters in the life worlds, which in Deleuze are atomized in the imagination and mind.

  As Derrida affirms the maximum transcendence, what is really transcendental is the very flow of life. This statement, like others by Derrida in Ousia and Gramme, definitely means to me that I am taking a position. Derrida's passage in Ousia and Gramme regarding being, as in general in his sections on being in philosophy versus linguistics and in his notes on the phenomenology of language, is decisive, as it situates and develops in the appropriate way. the intrinsic relationship between being and language, on the other hand, although Derrida is the only one who really attributes to being the place that I consider it corresponds, Derrida subordinates too much, even if permeated by Heidegger, the philosophy of being to a philosophy of time that remains abstracted in questions of ontology of time without a world correlate while, it must be said, its developments succumb, on the one hand, to esotericism and, on the other, to a Nietzschean agonism that assumes, among other things, the ends of man, much less agonistic than Deleuze, and as I said, I consider, in the end, humanist, his stated phenomenology, advances important considerations about the relationship between being and language, but does not develop that phenomenology towards the worlds of life or in relation to them, less with respect to modern technologies and media, which, moreover, takes an entirely different direction from mine, not only is there no correlation of world but also as a theory of being it derives in an aporetica, a agonizing being that becomes esoteric and the end of man is what it announces.

  My affinities and distances towards Derrida are explicit, then, I welcome his advances regarding the relationship between being and language as a phenomenological question, but my book on being, begins by placing being in relation to the monad, situated being a once located in the monad, which supposes its insides and its outsides, its environments, its worlds of life, city and architecture, between language and the liminals, the latter take the being out of the relationship to that Derridarian time, time that I do not question , but I consider that it works only in its relationship to aesthetics and not always to all the other relationships that Derrida supposes, and they bring it to the data of the senses, of the immediacy senses relative to how the world presents itself and passes at the same time. sensation, perception, sensitivity, experience, cutting and concepts as a Renaissance issue that redeems Enlightenment in the current sense.

  I also refer the being to the secular, that is, to the philosophy of the subject in its relationship with the specialization and professionalization of that being in articulated worlds of communication, practice, life and society, of reasoning that is not only theoretical, but also communicative and mundane. , from intramundane life worlds, and from secularization towards life worlds that include technology such as this occurs in tacit conditions in our modern world in the USA.

   In general we could say that my philosophy of being in and according to the USA is a very modern philosophy of being, extremely modern, it takes as a correlate and inspiration, the experience of being in high-tech worlds and specifically the diatribes of being in very high-tech worlds. modern according to how these relationships occur in the Anglo-Saxon world in the United States, and again, the Anglo-Saxon and US social experience is very different from the European one.

  Then, in addition, I include in my philosophy of being what I call the archeology of ideology, which is not unimportant, since for me being and technology merge in our modern world and not only, but also, as a spiritual matter. , but above all, in very modern conditions, as a matter of the relationship between living environments and technological environments, that is, the relationships between technology, world, environment and reality.

  The question of influences does not interest me much, I prefer Bourdieu and the distinction, I do not consider it fruitful that it serves any purpose, the only thing it does is transform the field, as Geertz says, into a hamlet of methodological souls, each person develops their own innovations, that's what counts, we all use the same arsenal, but if I had to say in terms of my own self-awareness, at this age, I would say that in terms of style and some decisive issues, I accept the influence of Jacques Derrida, I would say that my two influences are Derrida and Bourdieu, however, I also do something completely new in relation to them.

  I accept the influence of both, but anyone who reads their books and reads mine in full, as literary works as a whole and as thought, my essays, if they really read them in full, will not have the slightest doubt, it is immediate and ipsofacto, Abdel Hernandez, innovation

  With Deleuze and Foucault I have affinities but not influences, The Given and the not Given is not something that Deleuze invented, it is a classic philosophical primacy of always which I work in a unique, new, different way from him, with Habermas I have a commitment , I see him as a leader, a leader whose leadership I accept, I consider him the greatest scientific eminence of the 20th century, Derrida influences me, but I distance myself from him, I admire Habermas, but not exactly an influence because I see him from my perspective. lead in the avant-garde and I try to show you that his reluctance to the avant-garde, undertaken from moral positions that I share, is not appropriate.

  I could demonstrate to Habermas an understanding of his theory of communicative action from the avant-garde according to which his own books could not escape the arsenal of the avant-garde and in a certain way it would be an expression not objectified by him because although he has paid attention to the reason and specifically communicative reason, I am referring to the three volumes of the Theory of Communicative Action that I read and studied in detail, published in Beacon Press as The Theory of Communicative Action, but not the same attention as Bourdieu to objectification and the objectification of the objectification. In this sense, Derrida remained more aware of the arsenal of the avant-garde.

   However, having read and studied these two books by Habermas, for me he is and continues to be the leader and I think he will be for a long time. Foucault said that the 21st century would be Deleuzian, I do not agree with the master of The Words and Things and the Archeology of Knowledge, in my early youth, in my 20s I came to believe that it could be, but at forty it does not fit me the slightest doubt, the 21st century can only be Habermasian from the young Habermas, not from the current Habermas.

  So I accept the influence on me of Derrida and Bourdieu, but the leader is Habermas and we have to get used to the fact that the leader does not always listen, he is absorbed in his leadership, his responsibility is far beyond each of us. That's how I see it.

  Lyotard also showed himself to be consistent with the avant-garde. Although I accept Derrida's influence, I maintain a distance, I believe that on balance, Derrida is healthy and humanist, not in vain do Rorty from the United States accept it, Foucault and Deleuze in my opinion went too far, despite Deleuze's valuable effort on the human condition in Empiricism and Subjectivity.

   We must build ourselves, make ourselves, not destroy ourselves. Regarding Alfred Shurtz in his bookKnowledge in the Worlds of Everyday Life His examples were limited to the purpose of explaining how forms of knowledge are formed in the worlds of everyday life, that is, to analyze and objectify in what ways common sense develops its forms of knowledge by resorting to acerbs, typicalities and significances.

   The examples in which Shutz placed his people described situations of everyday life in which typical people, which he defined as the awake person, were in situations given by the concept of relevance, their ways of resorting to their knowledge to resolve precise alternatives, the recurrence to the acerb, the typicality and the significance, came to form a form of knowledge in which the elements proper to prior knowledge and those proper to the specific or new aspects of the relevant situation were related as it was required to resort to acerbs that were found passive and not precisely understood as knowledge.

  There is also The Practice of Every Day Life by Certaud published at the University of California in '99, it is a book that deserves to be highlighted.

   If I am concerned with my literary works as individual authorial literature, as literary compositions, both in a stylistic and aesthetic sense, my style as a writer and the aesthetics of my literary works, as a thinker, the development and elaboration of my own thought, in my own terms.

   It is what we define today as literary philosophizing where the aesthetic, structural and stylistic whole of the literary works that you create as books is concerned.

   But I do not believe in a linear vision of life and experience, our physical time unfolds according to a certain diachrony in which our experiences over the years move from year to year, but at the same time, the individual lives and experience processes that have effects on the ways in which they internalize the processes and transform them into material for their own development and revisiting, either through individual introspection or in oral or written communication, and these processes make experiences that become significant in some years have relevance in the ways of referring to other years, when you have to say when and how you decided to be a writer, this is expressed, the writer can be situated facing a series of questions in which Attention is drawn to certain aspects and the interview itself suggests or puts you in front of yourself in different ways.

   This recalls those clarifications that Pierre Bourdieu made when, when faced with the question about the interview as a form of knowledge about society or culture, he said that the very construction of the interview must be the object of the interview. And certainly if you reach out to a group of people and ask them about the way they live, it will be decisive in how they respond to the impressions they have about the reasons for being and the reasons why you do your interview, if you seem like a outsider, it does not mean that they will necessarily lie to you, but it means that they will see themselves in the face of a certain ought to be in the ways in which they would look at themselves foreignly by reverting to perceptions of themselves, or in the face of themselves according to That way, on the other hand, if you are the interviewer associated with the store around the other corner, which they already have classified in the form of administrative interviewers of the parish, they generally have the intention of making decisions about what can be more or less convenient, the answers to the same questions will be entirely different.

  And when you grab here on this side, a package of things said by writers interviewed in response to more or less similar questions but who to go to themselves have had to do so facing and you have, on this other side, a package of things said by individuals from a parish, interviewed with more or less similar questions but who to go to themselves have had to do so in the face of, and you see how many different and sometimes a dissimilarity that can reach the paroxysm of entropy, images you can make of those writers and those customers, you become convinced, either that if we want to take the interview as a precept to obtain from it an objectifying vision of the realities of writers and customers, it simply does not work, since you would assume that I would have to provide you with the same image all the time, or at least more coincident, or that the theater and theatricality of the experience is much more significant than you had imagined, as is still a conclusion for some not as far removed as we might suppose, in the social sciences of years not so distant either.

  Or let's say that if we do not want to understand as theatricality what I like to define as Face to these or those questions, these or those small circumstances, whether intersubjective, bitter, typical in the forms of communications, or related to ideologies , in no way could we avoid the fact that this is a matter of anthropology that keeps us in the terrain of symbolic anthropology although this anthropology cannot help but also be an anthropology of language, urbanity and rituality. The same goes for the writer.

   The question here would be, where to start talking about yourself as a writer, say, the literary issues that motivate you recently, or the way in which you once decided in your life to be a writer.

   My most appreciated reference in this regard is the question aboutWhat is decisive Literature from formalism.

Notes

1-Books that I conceived and composed as a single author, made up of sets of philosophical essays that cover questions about language, epistemology and phenomenology of technology and the media, and in these of subjectivity, being, sensitivity, aesthetics and current phenomenology of Anglo-Saxon culture in the era of the internet in the USA today, issues that focus my own vision on the forms of writing and theorizing around daily life in the era of new media, between transcendental philosophizing, the hermeneusis and the empiria, the end of the century of a high modernity of markets in conditions of developed capitalism.

Bibliography

Bell Daniel, The Advent of Postindustrial Society

Deleuze Gilles, The Fold, Leibniz and the Baroque, the University of Minnesota Press

Deleuze Gilles, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, Paidos Studio

Derrida Jacques, Ousia and Gramme, Margins of Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press

Gadamer George, Aesthetics and hermeneutics, Tecnos, metropolis collection

Habermas Junger, The theory of Communicative Action, Beacon Press

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The Intramundane Horizont: Hermeneutic and Phenomenology of Everyday Life, Complete works, 98 Lab Books, USA

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, Being and Monad, Complete Works, 98 Lab Books, USA

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The Presentational Linguistic, Complete Works, 98 Lab Books, USA

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The Intangible, Selected Essays, 98 Lab Books, USA

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The Given and the Ungiven, Complete Works, 98 Lab Books, USA

Self and acervo

By Abdel Hernandez San Juan

This paper discuss the ontology of the self in the individual human being and how the self is defined  in between three levels the primary one, specialized in translating the internal and the internal, interiorization and socialization, the cumulative one specialized in between Acervos and experience and the self-representational one occupy an intermedia place in between Inmanence and exteriorization, self-representation, the paper theorize the self in three dimensions, the philosophical one, jornie its territories through the major classical issues on ontology and epistemology, the sociological one stablishes in between interiorization and socialization and the cultural defined between acervo and experience to focus in discussing cultural theory through the theory of the self-focused in the relation between self and acerbo.           

 The paper stablishes the I and the self as the two main opposite and complimentary poles defines the ontology and autorepresentational individual subjectivity, the I, defined by a certain invariability and the self, defined by a constant transformation given the permeability continually define the pass by of culture into individual subjectivity through which the extrinsique turn to be Intrinsique and transform the cultural level in a dimension completely reflected under the self-phenomenology. The paper focus in theorizing the deeper phenomenology of the self to late discuss cultural theory through the theorization of self-representation both at the level of the relation between language and experience, symbols and experience and at the level of socialized out there languages and symbols as well

               Key Words: theory of the self, self-representations, sociology and cultural theory

      Of probably unparalleled importance in sociology since Mead, the self has not yet been sufficiently theorized in its possibilities for the theory and research of subjectivity and culture. One of the reasons for this lack is explained from its etymology and its relationship with languages.

    Many languages ​​do not have certain concepts and words, and when the specificities and scope are analyzed, that is, the semantic diameter in the relationships of meaning that a given concept implies, we wonder how that language can do without a concept of such importance. This is what happens, for example, with the concept of reflexivity, Hegel pointed out when needing to resort to the argument, I have this concept taken from another language because we do not have it in German.

     Derrida points out that an infinite number of crucial concepts are in some languages ​​and not in others.

      The Self is a concept of this magnitude. Its importance in the English language is crucial and definitive, as the Spanish language unusually does not have it and that not having it underlines a difference in terms of subjectivity and culture between English culture and, above all, between those of us who have developed and that we have developed our lives, works and careers first in cultural dynamics impregnated with American culture and then directly within it in the United States, and those who have experienced it in another way.

    This essay is centered and focused on making known as much as possible the main aspects of my theory of the self, my own, developed as a result of extensive years of analysis and theoretical writings around the self. Many of the things I will discuss this time, however, will introduce new questions into my own elaborations as I will recall my first theoretical writings on the self dating back to my Venezuela essays, with my writings on the self in the developments I have made. from the United States, as well as I will also present more recent creations.

    Before discussing my theoretical analyzes of this pair, it will be necessary to recapitulate the very problematic of the self as it has been presented in sociology as well as elaborate on its philosophical implications, for which I will begin to discuss the very question of the term self and its nonexistence in Hispanic language.

     There is no word in Spanish whose diameter of semantic meanings encompasses or explains what properly configures the meaning of the self in English and the concept of self itself with its precise delimitation born in the English language. To try to capture the meaning of the self in Spanish you have to use three words, actually two conjunctions of words and one word, none of which capture the meaning of the self, then you have to try to relate those two conjunctions and that word with each other and even relating them trying to approximate with that relationship the territory that contains the sense of self, neither each one nor the relationship between the three manage to enclose the meaning and the territory of the self, taking for granted that the territory of the self is not defined nor exists in Spanish.

    These three conjugations in Spanish are “himself,” “oneself,” and “I.”

   The expression “oneself” must be related to the expression “oneself,” which in Spanish would be the two phrases closest to what the concept of self encompasses, but “oneself” as a concept underlines what is of oneself in a way. determined unity that can be if the individual's assertion that he is the same and that he has something for himself that makes him be the same in his “self”, this gloating however fails to capture the self.

   The self remains, through its semantic meanings, related to the philosophical question of the identical, that is, to the idea of ​​what is coincident with itself or that coincides in itself as an identity at that moment undifferentiated or differentiated only in that which at the same time making it coincide with itself in all its aspects corroborates the assertion that it is in itself or that it is its self, this relationship of the self with the semantic diameter of the question of identity or of the identity, understood here not yet in cultural sense, but only in a philosophical sense it highlights the diameter of the self around an idea of ​​unity that can be the self of a thing, an object, a concept or any phenomenon among which the individual is just one more, the vagueness It is given in the fact that when it is applied to the individual being, that is, to the individual, one has to resort in relation to the self of the same to an abstraction that in its own content is so general that it can be the self. of the very general problematic of what is coincident with itself and which is therefore in itself the self of any thing or phenomenon

    As occurs in the topic of applications through similes to the territory of the individual, in Spanish the self is brought to the territory of the individual from other territories so that it is then, making use of meanings of a concept that refers to what is identical to himself or coincident with himself in the abstract world of the identical corresponding to any phenomena, apply it to his territory as an individual, in English the exact opposite happens, the self, which comes from the territory of the individual and is only delimited in its semantic senses because it corresponds to the individual and, moreover, not to any individual, but specifically to the human individual, it is conversely taken to the territory of the non-human or of phenomena in general to offer those the information that something can be in itself, in fact, the self in Spanish is translated into English it itself, the word self is used whose meaning and etymological and semantic origin is the human individual, to help say that the it, which is that or anything else, any phenomenon, can be in itself or have its self.

    We have not yet talked about the very precise delimitations that limit the exact details of the self in the human individual, we have just recapitulated the fact that the Spanish language does not have this concept for the individual human, and that to approximate it it resorts to abstractions that come from the self. self from what it is in itself by coinciding or being identical without being and without requiring being a self in order to be in itself. Although against this it could be argued, once the self is brought from the generally identical in any phenomenon to the territory of the individual, that ultimately the idea of ​​a self is created by the human being and that therefore it is in itself , it becomes clearly legible that the self as an etymological concept does not contain the sense of the self as what is specific to the human individual delimits the territory of the self and is also delimited once within it compared to other aspects of the human individual that are not your self.

    In fact, in English, all individuals have a self and this self is not something that is brought to the individual from a general idea of ​​what is coincident with itself or identical with itself in any phenomena, this self is, for the human individual, something as delimited for each person as his self is delimited for each individual human being. There is no other delimitation in Spanish that closes on itself in relation to the human individual other than the self. Every human individual in Spanish has a self, which belongs to him and which is his self. But in Spanish each human individual does not have a self.

      Only in English does each human individual have their self in the same way that on the other hand they have their ego, both self and I are equally important in what makes them an individual and both are for the individual and within this distinct and well-defined territories. .

      In the same way, the concept of “oneself,” the second that comes closest in Spanish to the semantic diameter of what the concept of self encompasses, suffers from a similar vagueness that fails to acquire the specificities of the sense of self.

     While the self remains as an application of a general question about the coincidence of anything with itself and of the general theme of the identical to the territory of the individual without being able to specify in the latter the territory that the self occupies, the self emphasizes the monadic vagueness that relates two different things to each other, that is, it emphasizes that one as singular compared to the multiple of many ones is towards oneself and in its difference from others, oneself, but the concept of oneself cannot achieve The very detachment of that cut that sees inside that self by what relates it from the outside with others or with multiple others with respect to which one is then oneself, remains therefore in the vagueness of what differentiates that one is like oneself with respect to others, continues to depend on what one is not to define from the outside what one is oneself, without exploring or approaching the well-defined space that the concept of self forms with respect to the individual and within this.

    Spreading the semantic meaning on the side of the self towards what coincides with itself or identical of any phenomenon with the self and spreading the semantic meaning on the side of the self towards the territory of what relates to what one is in oneself. from the outside in which it is not another in the third word that in Spanish seems to approximate the sense of self, the delimitation of the sense of self, which is the self, is once again left dispersed, disseminated and not contemplated.

      But the difference between the ego and the diametric self exists in English, both with their territories very well delimited and differentiated as we said before.

     Having recapitulated these distinctions between both languages ​​and specified that the self is something in itself in each human individual, each of whom has his or her self, let us then move on to discuss and recapitulate what the self is.

      The concept of self has as its main distinction or as its implicit and self-constituting other of that self in itself the concept of the social, the self and the social are on the one hand opposed or the opposite, at this point or moment the self seems very close, if not almost the same as saying the individual whose pair with the social is also of the same type, a contrast of opposites that are inclusive, however, although the self certainly and only corresponds to the individual, the concept of individual In its relationship with its opposite pair, the social, it lacks a gateway or passage through which one and the other relate.

   The concept of the individual cut back on itself in its most complete form in the notion of the individual, appears as a closed formation on itself which does not require or contain the semantic meanings that offer support to the relations of mutual permeability between that individual and the social.

     We know, especially where, as in Spanish, the concept of self is not available, that ultimately the individual receives from the social and relates to the social, that from the moment he acquires a language and assimilates some customs, habits and acquires a learning is simultaneously individual in the same way in which it is formed as a social being and vice versa, but we know this by putting two concepts in relation in whose semantics the relations are given as extrinsic, that is, as relations between two different things that are external to each other, while for this reason we know nothing, first about how this permeability occurs at a phenomenological level and second about how it comes to form within an individual a singular formation as delimited in its individuality as the me, the self...

    That is to say, we make a collection of things without relations between them, we say that the individual from the moment he acquires a language is in turn implicitly a social individual and vice versa, but we say it like someone who is placing separate words in a list of things in Therefore, we do not know anything like this about how this permeability occurs and how it conforms to the phenomenological scope that is specific to it. The self specializes in this area and corresponding, as much or more than the self, to the individual as something that is his own and that is his, shows how it is shaped in the phenomenological world.

   On the strangeness of this extrinsication or this principle of what is external and the different forms that it has acquired both in subjectivity and in the conceptions of what is social, the relationship between the individual and the social as exogenous, develop my theorizations in my first book, it is enough here to add that what we know about the relationship between the individual and the social, we know it as that aggregate or collection of things located one after the other that we were referring to.

as if there were no explicit relationship between them in their own configuration, that is, we agree that the individual becomes an individual by becoming social without either of the two concepts, individual and social, providing us with phenomenological specificities in their semantic field through which we can figure out precisely how this phenomenon of mutual inclusion and permeability takes shape and occurs, given that we work with concepts closed on themselves and extrinsic to each other, the individual, on the one hand, and the social, on the other, We know very little or almost nothing about how this relationship occurs and takes shape and about its phenomenological specifications.

   Every individual and only the human individual has a self, but the self is not the entire individual but only a part of him, which in a similar way is the self, and that part of him precisely through which this process of mutuality takes phenomenological form. permeability and inclusion of opposite pairs, where the individual and the social are given as extrinsic and extrinsic, as relations between concepts that are external and strange, the self comes to explain how and in what precise ways the relationship between what takes shape takes shape. individual and social,

    Now, it is necessary to say that the self is not a subordinate or subsidiary instance that does only the work of translating, in the manner of an intermediary, two concepts that would be found on both sides, the individual and the social, and between which the self It would be a simple vehicle, a zone or area of ​​passage of which the individual and the social have access as a bridge is available to pass from one side to another or as a strainer is available to allow a liquid to enter a container, rather the self itself forms an entire well-defined area, like the self in another way, a very well-formed formation on the side of the individual and the individual.

   There is of course, neither in epistemological terms, nor in phenomenological terms nor in organic terms, a self on the side of the social or society, the self corresponds to the individual and only an individual has a self, but it happens that the self that Every individual has a part of that individual in which, unlike the simple self, the being of his certainty of himself as an individual and the material of the social that this individual processes and that at the same time permeates him are related. becomes one with itself in its configuration, unlike the self that remains on the side of something identical to itself relatively impermeable that would return on itself in the mode of something that always maintains the same form, the self refers to the process by through which that individual incorporates and internalizes the social world while externalizing to the social world the universe of those internalizations, the process of mutual relationship between something that is processed in the world of an internalization from the outside in and the process by through which what is internalized is then socialized, phenomenologically forms the most primary or general zone or area of ​​the self.

    Every individual throughout his life has learned and incorporated a variety of knowledge, but every individual is again exposed to this continuous processing of internalizations and socializations to the point and level that, per se, what he makes him be a self for himself, his conformation as an individual is made at the same time and is configured by this process of mutual permeability and updating between the interior and the exterior, between what makes him individual and what relates him to the social, The accumulation of this experience as something that is continually resorted to forms within an individual a certain area of ​​both work and identity, that is, it is something that returns to itself for itself all the time around its own certainty of being in itself, but of something that is continually participating again in its phenomenological world as an individual, this process is given in the individual and to the individual from its own interiority through experience and the acerv, experience and acerv make up the territory of the individual self.

   Experience and acervo in the formation of the self are progressively added to the most basic previous levels around which the self is organized and configured, the mutual process of internalizing and externalizing, individuating and socializing. After the work of individuation through which the social world is incorporated and after the work of socialization through which what is social of the individual in the social world is individuated, the most important aspects that shape the self begin and are initiated. The latter make bundles of phenomenological and experiential relationships of meaning with that first, most basic or first zone or area of ​​the self made up of individualization and socializations.

    Given the above we have so far discerned three unique precise levels of the self, which only in the self acquire phenomenological form and organization and which are one with itself with the self, that is, that the individual self resides in them and that only in the self they reside and consist of, we have explained these three levels before and we will elaborate on them

    First, the formation of a cluster or accumulation that makes up the experience and the individual heritage, this level we will see later is of immense phenomenological importance in the self and conversely only through our self do they integrate and acquire ontological form, cohesion. , consistency, they are, in fact, one and the same thing with the self and without the self they would have neither sameness nor ontology. The most general sieve, the form of feedback or the filigree mode, the catwalk or the phenomenological funnel through which at this level the inner and the outer are related, fed back or passed towards each other, is generally given by learning. Although there are other forms and its dimension as a level being one with the self, that is, being like the self itself and with it, individual, it is at the same time a cultural dimension.

    Studies and theorizations about the self at this level are almost nonexistent. At this level, an infinite number of phenomenological specificities are organized for a theory of culture and subjectivity through the theory of the self.

    The second level that corresponds to the self is what we have called the primary or basic level, which in reality would be the first. It has immense importance in the understanding of the self given the fact that it is of the most general levels of the self that are most directly related. to its ontology, that is, to the ontology of the self itself, this refers, as we said, to the process of internalization of the social, that is, of individuation of the social world, on the one hand, and of socialization of these internalizations on the other. Only through his self does each individual individuate and socialize, internalize the social and socialize his individuations. We ask ourselves, in fact, with what part of himself does an individual internalize and individuate the social world that permeates him and with what part of himself does an individual socialize these internalizations? With his self, both internalizations and socializations are the same thing. with his self and only in his self can this process take ontological form.

     Although we could argue that ultimately accumulations are at most or ultimately also dynamics of internalization and socialization, it becomes obvious and explicit that at the ontological level in those we are outside the territory in which as two opposing pairs defined by the internal and the external , the interior and the exterior, the inside and the outside, the individual and the social, the opposite pairs exchange or process mutual permeabilities. In the scope of this primary or basic level that shapes the identity of our individual self, the self is as if in its box, so to speak, it is in its place of realization, that is, in the field in which it most frequently corresponds to its presence as self before ourselves, it is here where the self does the general work of its specificity in our individual.

    Through the relationship between internalizations of the social world and socializations of these internalizations, the self processes the relationship of passage from the inside to the outside and from the outside to the inside while at the same time diminishing with it, only thanks to the self and only to through the self it can be carried out, understanding this processing not only and less in the physical sense in which we represent this process, as when we visualize that something enters an inside from an outside or conversely that something leaves from an inside to an outside, also encompasses the process through which this exchange occurs, which is not, as in physics, a literal entry and exit, but rather, between the self and the social, an individuating and a socializing, the social, in fact. , it does not socialize or individuate, only an individual internalizes and socializes, only an individual individuates and externalizes an internalization, but an individual does not do this with his entire individual, nothing in the individual specifies or defines at a phenomenological level how an individual does this other than the self, given among other things that it is not a process simply subject to will but to more complex processes that we will see later, this work is done by the individual only through his self and only his self can do this work, In fact, when we say that at this most primary or basic level, the self makes presence to the individual, in the same way that the self makes presence to our representations, we say nothing more than that it is here where we objectify our self, we repair in the how of the individual's self.

    The individual, in fact, due to his extrinsic relationship with the social as his opposite, cannot the whole and in all its parts do this work, only a part of him as precise as his ego, is in charge of doing this work and it consists of it. itself in that work, its self, because its self consists itself in this work only in its self and through its self the social is individuated, in fact, the self is the same this individuation once, and the self is the same then socialization individuated as social or in the social.

   We said that at the level of accumulations, experience and wealth, we did not have this more externalized work, if you will, between two extrinsic pairs, the self and the social, --although less extrinsic thanks to the self, than that extrinsication between the individual and the social. social, and we said it because at the cumulative level by resorting to a concept of Hegel in his analyzes on ontology we have an intrinsication of the extrinsication and an extrinsication of its intrinsication, the exterior becomes internal and the internal becomes external and therefore Thus, the most contrasting relationship between the pair that we have at the most basic or primary level disappears.

    In the order of experience and knowledge everything has in fact become one with the self, everything related to the world of culture has become one with the self and therefore in its ontology something individual.

     At that cumulative level, to which we will return later at a more complex level of analysis and theorization, the extrinsic relationships that we observe at the most primary level have been diluted; the extrinsic has become intrinsic and is one with the self at the same time. which, consisting of the self itself, has returned to culture from the dimension of the individual, of the individual person. We will return to this level later in our analyzes of cultural theory and theory of subjectivity.

    For the moment we specify that the primary or basic level of the self is, so to speak, its space of realization, that is, the area where the self most directly acts and is present. This concept of being present to oneself of one's self is related. a necessary philosophical analysis. Let us return here to the initial question of translation between languages ​​and the lack of the concept of self in the Spanish language. When we tried to show how Spanish does not have a word or concept that defines the precise territory of the self and we said that it is necessary to resort to two conjunctions and one word, we were wandering around without approaching the precise territory of the self, some questions related to making presence of the self before ourselves, that is, how we visualize that we have a self in the same way that we visualize that we have a self.

    We argued that, contrary to Spanish in English, we go to the world of other phenomena, bringing with us the self to define in those when something can be a self and when something can be oneself for oneself. We remembered that in English to say that that is in itself, we say it itself, the return translation here into Spanish translates again “that in itself” or it in “its self” losing the semantic specificities that the self coming from the human individual assigns to the certainty that he is in himself.

   In fact, referring here to the main ontological problems of phenomenology from its origins in ancient and classical thought, at the precise moment in which we distinguish the purely or properly ontological from something that is only in itself for itself in its sameness without exintersections towards This is what we are already paradoxically at the same time making presence before ourselves, it is what Derrida called the first form of the sign, the appearance of ourselves before ourselves in the representation, we say that what is in itself in itself without extrinsication towards it, but by saying without extrinsication we are ignoring that our representation that there can be something that is in itself and only be without extrinsication towards it, is itself already an extrinsication, therefore we omit that we are there as subjects reflecting that that can be in itself and only be without extrinsication, as if it could be in itself because we are extrinsicating it, for this reason ontology and epistemology appear together with each other, one in the other, without representing to us that something is In itself we cannot know that something is if we are therefore already appearing before ourselves.

    As a summary of the presence of the self before ourselves, we say that our self appears before ourselves at this moment in which the peers are contrasting the self and the social because the self is a part of the individual whose strangeness towards the social world. as exterior it remains latent at the moment of the first level, doing, however, with respect to it precisely the work of coming and going, of carrying and bringing. This coming and going, this carrying and bringing, is not, we have seen it a literal bringing and carrying, coming and going, but it takes shape as a relationship between internalization and socialization, only our individual as a whole, his self, does this work. and only as a result of this does every individual have his or her self, however, there is a return in the self that has not been theorized about. A self is not only at the primary or basic level of individuating and socializing, and not only is it at the cumulative level of experience and heritage, a self is also a return upon itself that contains a level of self-representation, and this level of self-representation makes up the third level of the self

     A self is a self of oneself as we argued in reference to Hispanic vagueness, but a self is something more than that, it is at the same time and above all before and at the same time the human individuation of this principle, one is in oneself. and one is oneself but from the moment we say that one is one, what is in itself has first become individuated in the human, it is no longer the self of any one, but the self in the self. the same individuation of the human individual, one is first an individuation of this principle through which what is in itself oneself is in turn individuating and individuating, at the ontological level this principle refers in some aspects to the concept of consciousness, through of consciousness we represent ourselves, that is, we return to ourselves in a self-representation, the self has this movement of the loop that returns to itself, however, the return to itself of the self that differentiates it from the simple self and the simple self, although it is of course formed from certain aspects specific to the reflective activity or subjective representation of the system of representational meanings that refers consciousness more to the phenomenology of the spirit and the subjective than to the phenomenology of the material world or form. and things, the return on itself of the self is not self-representational in the same way that consciousness is.

   Let's go further back, back to the classical problems to discuss the self-representation specificities of the self in the return. We distinguished how the diatribe of being in itself without extrinsication already brought with it ontology and epistemology together from the moment in which, together with the being that is only ontological, the subject in which it is reflected as self-representation appears at once, but until now that subject was only a simple extrinsication, it had not yet represented a concept, which does not come to consciousness except from the moment in which we make sure that being in itself is already a concept. In the logic of the concept, Hegel argued the identity or coincidence with itself of the ontology given in the immanence of substance, on the one hand, and of theological ontos on the other, religion, experiences the division of essence, which supposedly It was essential to that immanence that was only in itself from the moment it is reflected in the subject and represented as a concept, that is, from the moment we notice that the subject in which it is reflected is there, the essence of that immanence has been divided and has begun to run at the same time in two relatively parallel series, on the one hand it has started running in being itself without extrinsication of that supposed immanence or being in itself that only is, but on the other hand it has started running In this other side in which it is reflected, that is, in the subject, and once in the subject when it becomes a concept, being in itself now understood as a concept and its essence is not that of that immanence, in this classic dichotomy, we have a first form of self-representation, it has been necessary for the subject to return to himself.

    Consciousness is the simple form of this self-representation, but consciousness only reflects in the form of a self-movement, that is, of seeing itself as a whole returning to itself in the image, the elements that must be placed In relation they are simple, one is oneself and one is oneself again reflected or represented in the consciousness that self-represents that one is. The self-return movement of our individual self through which we represent that we have a self functions in a richer and more complex way than a simple self-representation, in fact, the self is the same at its third level not exactly a self-representation but to be more precisely a self-representation, the differences are subtle because at most consciousness of course in the mode of the concept also participates in it, but a self-representation is not exactly a self-representation.

   In the representation of what is in itself and only is without extrinsification and the extrinsification in which it was paradoxically reflected through which we have our first most basic representation of the subject, of consciousness and of the concept, we have a first representation of the concept of the concept , we notice that being in itself is a concept and we notice that we have noticed it, that is, that we have a concept of the concept, here we have only two extrinsic elements, first the extrinsic between something that being in itself alone is and the subject in which it is reflected, secondly the extrinsication between the subject in which it is reflected and the representation that this reflection is already a concept and therefore in that representation the essence is divided because that immanence that we assumed to what was only in itself, it ceases to be that immanence in the extrinsication of the subject in which it is reflected, at the same time that it then comes to be divided as an essence in the representation that the subject in which it is reflected is already a concept; between the two extrinsications it then appears. not just the concept but the concept of the concept

   One that is in itself and another that is extrinsic to it, then we have two additional representations of that extrinsication.

   According to similar epistemological principles regarding the relationship between a first essence of what is in itself and a division of the essence in the concept, the way we represent the self occupies a precise and specific place at these levels of ontology. , one that certainly had not been contemplated in that classic representation of the dilemma, is different precisely because the self remains halfway between what is in itself and what is represented, it remains halfway to use a momentary expression between us when We simply are and when we represent ourselves to be, or for greater delimitation, it remains halfway between the intrinsic and the extrinsic, between something that is in itself and something that is extrinsic, the self in fact, consists itself in the translation , the sieve, the passage, the intermediate point between these two moments, consists in fact, in the work of intermediation between both levels, the work of its individuation and its socialization, is precisely to bring to an interiority and the of translating into an exteriority, of internalizing and externalizing, of mediating between what is only in itself for itself and what is extrinsic to it, let's see it more clearly.

   In fact, we are this paradox itself, on the one hand we are and on the other we represent that we are, if when we look at what is in itself we look at something that is not ours or that is not one but is something else, a plant, the physical world, the infinite, an astronautical universe, the externalization between us as subjects and that which is greater, we are not that to which we are external, but if that which is in itself is not something other than us, but that we are ourselves in two different moments, how to put them in relation?, how to process the step between that being in itself and that extrinsication? The self is halfway between these two moments and specializes in putting them in relation, a moment in the one that we are in itself without extrinsication and another in which we represent that we are, between the being in itself and the subject in which it is reflected there is an intermediate space, that intermediate space is also and perhaps more principally who we really are and That intermediate space corresponds to our self, in fact, consciousness arrived in the extrinsication reflected together with the subject and together with the concept in front of a being in itself that was extrinsic in it, but between the extrinsic and the consciousness that remained extrinsic. We find a third level when that extrinsic is a moment of ourselves, that is, we are ourselves, while consciousness makes this extrinsic self-representational movement, the self is at a midpoint between the being that is and the consciousness or representation in which it exists. reflects.

   The above does not mean that the self is confused with pure being, in fact, the self is already in itself a being that has returned to itself in individuation from the moment in which it has formed something in the human individual. individual that occupies the level that goes between its interiority and its exteriority, between its inside and its outsides, its specificity as something that the individual has, its self, consists precisely in processing that relationship and from the moment in which it is a Processing a relationship is therefore part of the individual's representational system, just as in another way the self is part of the representational system. Let us call this its third level, the level of self-representations. Self-representation is different from simple self-representation. because we do not have a plane of extrinsication compared to a plane of immanence, but what is extrinsic compared to immanence, given that it is ourselves, continues to be immanence itself, ours, that of our self, here the concept of immanence is not the most precise, in fact, we should do without it, but it has served us as a way of explaining that the relationship between the intrinsicness of what is in itself and its extrinsication has had to begin to work in another way, a a way that involves, by using an expression, the process or the processing, the translation, the passage, the walkway, between the intrinsic and the extrinsic through which it is no longer just two series that run parallel, each one on its own side. , on the one hand the flow of what is in itself in the direction of what is in itself, on the other hand, the flow of the subject in which it is reflected, and from that in the concept that it is and in the concept of the concept, but from an intermediate space that specializes in the translation between the intrinsic and the extrinsic, the self has the return in this way in the form of self-representations and thus contributes in our living individual a level of self-representations unique to the self and that only In the self we experience, these are self-representations distinct from simple self-representations.

   Some of this could refer us to the Descartian dichotomy of I exist therefore I think and I think therefore I exist, the same, however, is not understood here in the sense of the dichotomy between subjectivism and objectivism, idealism and materialism, since the self It is already the individual and it is already a form of the individuated human individual, it is in itself part of the representational system only that, to the extent that it occupies the space that mediates between what is interior and what is exterior, its phenomenological place corresponds to the processing of that step or catwalk, of that sieve and funnel, of that translation if you will, of that bringing and carrying, of that coming and going that, as we said, is not literal but occurs in the form of internalization and socialization at the level primary or basic, the one in which we represent ourselves as having our self, at the cumulative, acerbic and experiential level, and at the level of the self-representations that we have just discussed. .

   The intermediate relations that the self occupies between ontology and representation are crucial at a phenomenological level for the understanding of our world as individuals; in fact, we will return to the cumulative level to analyze the significant ontological preminence of the self.

  We have defined the third level as a bundle of more complex meaning relations related to the phenomenological specificities of our self-representation of our self or the way in which our self presents itself to ourselves as opposed to our pure being, on the one hand, and on the other hand. difference from our pure awareness of the other. The complexities of the most prominent concepts of the identity universe of the individual in fact bring with them this type of diatribes that are not at all new since the theory of the self itself, that other striking aspect of our phenomenological service as individuals, has never been able to ignore diatribes. Similarly, the pure theory of the self has in fact always been exposed from the classics to the present day to ontological dichotomies.

     The objective and center of this essay, as we suggested, is to demonstrate a theory of culture through the theory of the self, between my early theoretical developments on it, my later developments in the USA and my most recent analyses, we develop a theory of the self. culture through the theory of the self.

   Demonstrating in what way the culture that had been at one level individuated and at another level accumulated, has become within the intramundane plots that make up the experience and the individuated cultural dimensions of the experience given in the self and as what I define Since self-representations are distinguished from simple self-representations although they are related to them, although at a given moment we can use the self-representation to refer to self-representation, it is required and necessary to distinguish that self-representations are specific and different from what is usually we have understood by self-representations.

      The main distinction of this theorization we adduced before, in self-representation as we conventionally understand this concept, consciousness has remained exterior or extrinsic to its objects and has returned to them as if assuming that what is represented and the representation do not correspond to the same thing, or at most there is supposed to maintain the extrinsication towards oneself, in the field of self-representation since the self consists itself as a moment of the human individual in the part of us that does the work of translations between the interior and the exterior, between the ontological and social, the self has been woven together with and has been shaped in its relationship to an accumulation that is the accumulator and the experience which form oneself with the self and are its own identity and from which the extrinsic has been intrisected and individuated, the cultural world has returned in the form of the self and through its own sieve, to the world of individuations and has in turn provided the self-representations, that is, representations of oneself that have mediated between the intrinsic and extrinsic a new plane, level or individuated dimension from which the representations work in a different way than they do in the self-representations of consciousness even when in the end the latter has been required in some of its aspects and even when we have worked with concepts

    The self certainly refers us in the first place to the complete opposite of an underlaborer function, to use a concept from Stephen to Tyler relative to Wittgenstein, the self is not a subsidiary function occupied in relating bundles of relationships that the individual and the social would have themselves as concepts with respect to which the self would only do the work of facilitating, in the first place, neither the individual nor the social each have a bundle of sufficiently phenomenological and semantic relationships of meaning. rich and sufficiently developed so that around them, a third concept comes to only do a substitute job, the individual and the social, are, in fact, limited, narrow, vague and poor concepts at a phenomenological level, they are concepts of the type of the contour concepts whose relationship to their semantic field describes the external circumambulation of something from which something else is supposed to remain or begin.

   Contour concepts, as we know, usually confront the diatribe that when the ontological question is opened about what they are in themselves, they begin to radiate phenomenological insufficiencies in all directions, disseminating, like the signifier in Derrida's analyzes when he argued that explaining a sign leads to turning to another and then to another and then to another, always and increasingly remaining in spaces of indetermination.

    With the above I do not mean that, at least accepting the meanings of common sense, the individual and the social do not represent a relatively discrete field of typifications sufficient to know with certainty what each one refers to, but as soon as we move away from what makes them strange to each other, of what makes them extrinsic with respect to the other and we begin to ask in what precise ways at a phenomenological level the processes acquire shape through which, while being contrary, they are pairs that are simultaneously inclusive and beyond mutually inclusive configurational we enter an area in which nothing that both concepts provide in their semantic field serves us or nourishes us, informs us or supplies us with answers, only by distancing ourselves from them through concept substitutions do we begin to fill through successive additions that space corresponding to the permeabilities that neither of the two concepts requires, and that field of permeabilities is covered and covered in the English language with a single concept thanks to which we can dispense with resorting to a multitude of words to define it, that concept is the self. Now, once in the territory of the self, the phenomenological field of the specificities of that permeability begins, first of all we move away from a simple idea of ​​a passage, walkway or zone of permeability, to advance towards the riches and forms that it acquires.

   The self then initiates and covers, circumscribes and phenomenologically delimits the field that refers to the relationship between the individual and the social, but as I said before, not to mediate between them as a third party, but to define that this field is itself a well-defined area. delimited within the individual and in each individual.

     It is self in short, in the same way that the self as part of the individual is like the self of the individual part of the volitional activity and cannot be entirely separated from the activities of the will. Although a significant percentage of the self falls into an area of ​​continuous phenomenological processing that does not always correspond to voluntary activity as we understand it to be in the sense of actions oriented toward ends such as goals, etc., it is obvious that the self also participates in all this and that, like experience and heritage, the self also continues in various ways in the superordinate activity and in the pragmatics of social acts but it does so nevertheless in a way that remains unique and exclusive to the self in that in In these territories the self continues to perform its specificities in the same way that the ego continues to do so.

    Now, thanks to the same work that the self consists in and with it the culture turns from the extrinsic to the intrinsic, this intrisication of the extrinsic, to use again the Hegelian concept, does not, however, refer as in Hegel to a pure abstraction in the ontos itself but is distributed in the manner of and in accordance with an individuation so that the intrinsic of an immanence is no longer other than that of the individuated intrinsic, the extrinsic of the cultural world is therefore turned to the interiority of the self that has done this work of translation at the same time that it has received in the being of its own ontology, as individuation, all the permeabilities through which the culture expressed in our everyday experiences, in the continuous work of relating what we have accumulated and what we are experiencing, transforms us and continues to participate in our configuration, the self, in fact, is in continuous transformation, unlike the self, and if it occupies a place as unique in our individual which makes it a part of us given in the expression each individual has his self this is found working precisely at the other end of the self, both self and I are parts of the same individual and make up as such his individuated nature, but while the I monopolizes what remains the same, the self monopolizes what remains continually permeating and its work consists precisely of returning again and again to reconfigure our relationships between the internal and the external, between the individual and the social, on the side of accumulations. , acerb and experience, the self is closely intertwined, in fact, the main assertiveness of this essay lies in establishing that the self is the individuated acquis and that the acquis is the self, in short, through the self the entire culture, expressed in the world of its individuation, it appears reflected and the theory of the self is in a position to be, with complete precision, a form of theory of culture through the heritage and acervical relations.

   It is obvious that when we talk about knowledge, not everything is relative to the individual knowledge; we certainly also say, for example, the knowledge of our readers, according to which they will interpret in one way or another or understand in one direction or another what we have written in our essays and books, but in the same way that we say that we are one and we are multiple, that each of us is a cutie and that we are all many cuties, each individuation has formed a heritage and as long as the theory of culture works from the theorization of the expressions of the self, whether we do it from the pure individuation of the human individual, or through the theorization of the social individuations that this individual carries out in forms of language and symbols, will largely dispense with a way of understanding the culture that does not understand in its intricacies the plots or plots that relate languages ​​and symbols to experience.

    It is true that one could argue in this at most a very individualistic theory of culture and certainly over the years at least I have decidedly leaned towards individualism and its reconstructions, but per se to the fact that over the years I declare myself more and more more in moral, ethical and civic favor for the moral truth of individualism, a theory of culture through the theory of the self offers kind and responsible ways to address issues that also concern culture in general.

   In fact, although we share with Terry Eagleton the relativization of the intrinsic meanings of symbols in his discussion with Russian formalism when he analyzed that regarding the question what is literary in a context, an apparently non-literary phrase taken from a literary work to an audience not informed about the origin of the phrase could be evaluated as non-literary while being literary and conversely, a non-literary phrase inserted in a literary context could be evaluated as literary without being literary, as well as its application in general. to the void that we can hold something definitive in itself about the intrinsic meaning of symbols other than the oscillations between their infinite polysemy and their situated interpretations, but at the same time and for the same reasons, we also recognize that if symbols seem devoid of Threaded and woven relationships of meanings in such circumstances is precisely because they have been considered from such an extrinsication of the social world with respect to individuation that in such hypothetical or real contexts depending on the case under consideration, symbols have been distributed as on a exteriority in which they appear like lists of things side by side with no relationship between them, from which they have been deprived of that which weaves them together in the field of experience and of the plots that relate our self and the culture through the heritage.

   The theory of culture through the theory of the self returns symbols to plots and intramundane plots through which they cannot be separated from the ontological place they play in the translation relations between the world of the individual and the world. social, through the self, the symbols and images of culture have received the work of the intrinsication of the extrinsic from which culture appears reflected in a web of correlated relationships of meaning and significance.

   The theory of culture developed as part of the theory of the self deals with the relations between the self and the heritage, both with regard to the relations between symbols and experience, on the individual's side, and with regard to It concerns the theory of those languages ​​and symbols from the side in which they become independent of the individual, being in a certain way the social expressions of their individuations.

Bibliography

Eagleton Terry, Phenomenology, hermeneutic and reception theory, Literary Theory: An Introduction, The university of Minnesota press

Habermas Junger, The Self and the Social; Mead, The Change of Paradigm, Pp, The Theory of Communicative Action, Beacon Press 

Habermas Junger, The Self and the Social; Mead, The Change of Paradigms, Theory of Communicative Action, Taurus

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The Intramundane Horizont, Complete Works, 98 Lab Books, USA

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The Presentational Linguistic, Complete Works, 98 Labs Books, USA

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The Intangible, Selected Essays, 98 Lab Books, USA

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, Being and Monad, Complete Works, 98 Lab Books, USA

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The Given and the Ungiven, Complete Works, 98 Lab Books, USA

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, An Analysis of Asymmetries in Sociolinguistics and the markets

Hegel W G, The Science of Logic, Hachete

Exploring narratives in urban settings

©Por Abdel Hernandez San Juan

Entrance: Taco Bell

   It is actually early in the morning, my parents have just woken up, the feeling of being in Mexico and having my parents, mom and dad, is intertwined with my recent and vivid bodily memories of the sound of the bells of the taco carts that roam around. the bottom of the freeway where I go out at mid-morning every day to shop, no less than ten years have passed in my life since the last time I saw them.

The person I am today has become something else and I have no way of going there, but having my parents around me in a few hours is an indescribable emotion. I make a coffee while, submerged in the early morning breeze, I walk around and around a manuscript, I am visiting Mexico after a trip in my car driving from Houston. I must accept that the little bells of the taco vendors and the colors of Mexico overwhelm me in an incredible way.

When I leave Houston towards Kimas or Galveston, I also feel a similar pleasure, but the distance here is diametrical, being in Mexico is reliving a way in which the urban is so alive and rich that I have not experienced since my trips from Caracas to Maracay. or from Caracas to Anzoátegui when you have to spend important hours of the day surrounded by chicha sellers and cachapa makers.

Four hundred brightly colored backpacks hanging on hooks made of improvised wire, all for sale. Tarpaulin roofs mounted on recycled tubes tied together as best they could, ready to be dismantled if the current government decides to remove them, change the area for what they do or simply throw them away.

For a mayor's office, the interprovincial bus terminal must be clear to prioritize a welcoming, calm, clear and comfortable environment for clients who travel from province to province, but for another government with an opposite tendency, the answer to the same question is the opposite. , the interprovincial terminals cannot be deserts or rooms to watch the dead wrapped in air conditioning but rather places through which people who leave and arrive come into contact once and for all with the markets of a city that receives you and says goodbye to you. .

The city's markets need, to prosper and make the city prosper economically, become markets just for that exit and entry that centers and decides its economic life, this cannot be understood in an isolated way, interconnected as it is with the rest of the country.

Five hundred flannels with texts and fluorescent paintings hanging one on top of the other as if they were capable, all for sale. Four hundred stereos playing all at the same time in the same urban space, each with different music and the speakers at full volume, all for sale

Five hundred sellers of homemade inventions all approaching you at the same time, you look at something to your left and try to focus on it, a type of plastic container in which you could package the food you take to work, five hundred women selling sets of plastic bowls, They fall on you, look sir, these are better, look, have these, I'll reduce them to fifty percent.

This is how things are in the interprovincial bus terminals in Venezuela, regarding this I am far from having even mentioned what it is about.

Things here are not so crowded, they are actually more calm and orderly, but a Mexican taco vendor every fifty meters and asking any of them to serve you a taco, evokes it just by looking at how they put the sauce on it, in what way He cooks the meat, and how many people order a taco at the same time.

The truth is that after eating a taco in Monterrey, life takes on an indescribably pleasant flavor, something that in Texas can only be remembered in the fast and modern life with a taco bell. This whole world is underlining to me that something in everything I have become, an extraterrestrial from a technologically encapsulated world, is exceeded, but something in this whole world is also exceeded, a taco vendor every fifty meters and five hundred stereos. all playing at the same time with different music is obviously something exhilarating although it was like that throughout the nineties and probably still is.

             Reflexive Monologue: Free Market Subjectivities

To understand the free market subjectivity of those of us who live most of our lives and will continue to live in capitalist free market societies, one must understand a world devoid of the state. The market is, in its relationship to biological reproduction, civil society, citizenship, the worlds of everyday life, the ways in which society lives itself, the family, social interactions, the opposite of the state.

It is therefore necessary to move from the most basic senses of being individuals, capacities, talents, virtues, etc., towards the simplest immediacies in the social world.

Structured by the relationship between many individuals, to each of whom day and night, daily, happen to us, and for each of whom that social world is a free market, for our free market subjectivity it does not exist in one place. society, and in the other the market as something extrinsic, exogenous or different from society to which society goes as if visiting something that is not part of it.

From the family we have an economic need, we have to survive and prosper economically in a society that is all free market, this is intrinsic to our individual needs, our abilities and virtues are a capital that we possess, something that makes us more or less competitive according to the effort we dedicate in life to develop ourselves, cultivate ourselves, read, know.

If we accumulate knowledge, this is capital that we have available to the market, since it can be converted into a potential that makes us competitive when we offer our services.

The market is not something we go to, from a place in society from which we leave, society itself is presented as a free market.

The relationship between the free market and civil society, that societal sphere in which the spontaneous dynamics of our daily lives take shape, the course of life, the home, the city, the institute, the commercial store, the company, the center of work, is mutually constitutive, there is no civil society, horizontal societal world without the free market and there is no free market without the societal world and civil society, the market is constitutive of the life worlds from within, and the latter cannot be understood without the former.

The market is defined by many in competitive commercial relationships, so there is the possibility of each one achieving their goals, these will be accompanied by economic success, but at the same time, one has nothing to resort to other than their own capabilities, for On the one hand one is redeemed, one can achieve as one strives and what one achieves is one's own and for one, only one's on the same level as the biological body, but on the other hand one is taken to a tiny level as everything What you can achieve will depend on how competitive we are in a free market governed by trade in which others are equally competitive.

In our free market subjectivity we do not know mediations or intervening instances that mediate between our impression of the daily world, phenomenologically, the market and what we achieve in that market, which is society itself, since what we achieve we achieve in a society that It is all, only and only a free market.

Technologies such as the telephone, transportation, industry, and later television gave the impression of intervening or mediating that relationship, but telephone companies became companies competing to be the chosen service, television stations became shopping spaces. and rental of channels where commercial advertising is carried out, the advertisement thus became a profitable commercial relationship for these technologies and conversely, also for investors, they themselves became a free market relationship, the mass media in their dynamics are also governed by the free market.

The same ones who advertise their products, merchandise, corporations, companies in the media, are in that advertising, the economic sponsors who promote sites or websites with their services on the Internet, programs and channels on television, lines and services in digital telephony, are their financiers and sponsors. If a channel advertises a shampoo, that shampoo pays for the channel and its programs. If a show advertises a car, that car pays for the channel and the show.

Nothing in what makes a world social can acquire social form without the free market, this is constitutive of the social world from within, including technologies.

It was not possible then, either with TV and the new fractal technologies, to intervene in that direct relationship between the free market and civil society as an ontological relationship at a social level. Finally, the Internet ended up bringing the free market twenty-four hours into our homes in life. daily, computerized communication.

But like the church that places moral restrictions on the debauchery of the market, restrictions that affect social ethics and therefore on commercial ethics, the state also puts limits on the market and commercial debauchery through annual taxes.

Despite this, neither the church nor the state can do anything to intervene or prevent that relationship between the civil life worlds, each of us as individuals, our worldly course, the free market and free trade being mutually constitutive, They are, therefore, ontologically the same in what makes the world a social world, implicit, intrinsic, one in the other, each one being the other.

Worldviews, beliefs, ideological points of view, morality, all these human things, may be attempts to create social superstructures, but the market and free trade are like language and social transmission, prior as we understand it in free market subjectivity.

We would then have language, free market, commerce and transmission, that is, social reproduction, education, these would be the basic principles of our free market subjectivity.

Free market subjectivity does not require a single point of view regarding the social world, there is no absolute or privileged observer, the market is par excellence the opposite of a single point of observation, it is multiple, heterogeneous, contrary to something omniscient that sums up.

The closest thing in our cultural world to market subjectivity is the carnival.

The free market, the social and city world in which everything is business and free trade, is in our subjectivity like a kind of continuous carnival that never stops all year long, the difference between one and the other is in its relationship with the ceremonial rites.

In the carnival, surplus time is staged, the dynamics of surplus are symbolized, social time is celebrated, in the market, social time is exchanged and with it the time of values.

It is not that there is no ceremonial in the free market, there is ceremonial in the free market, also staging and staging around its basic principles, but while the carnival is a symbolic apogee, the free market is a symbolism of the apogee. .

The carnival celebrates social time in the symbol, the market is an exchange of symbolized social time.

The basic principles of the free market are themselves rituals.

The most basic principle of free market subjectivity is barter, the exchange of something for something, I give you something and you give me something in return.

However, despite this first relationship to barter, in which it always seems the relationship between two, one gives, the other receives in return, first forms of the seller and the buyer, our free market subjectivity lacks a single point of observation, the point of view of the one who gives in the barter is not the same as that of the one who receives in exchange, but neither is it the same as that of the one who observes the barter, that is, he gives and takes in exchange between two, not only because Many exchanges take place at the same time, but because this exchange of time and values ​​establishes many other relationships that are not reducible to the point of purchase and sale, or simple exchange or exchange, such as credit and an infinite number of other relationships that are abstract like the same capital.

The dynamics of our free markets are rituals because in them we exchange values ​​related to social rites, the objects that are exchanged are part of the social spheres of domestic life, the body, habits, customs, customs, needs. and fashions with their dynamics and advertisements.

A free market mise in scene is a mise in scene of ritual exchange of social time expressed in tangible and intangible values ​​by which our society, the United States seen from Texas, New York, Chicago, California, is also symbolized.

As mise in scene, markets have a symbolic importance for our society, they are city, urban and civil visual forms, from the Sunday public squares of yesteryear in which social customs, going to the market, going out were expressed around the markets. from shopping, to the forms of advertising and mass media of the market that in developed neoliberal capitalism arrive through the Internet or knock on our doors offering services for sale.

The natural foundation of the free market is our innate capabilities as individuals, talents, virtues, knowledge, experiences, understood by what relates these to our biological individual, there is therefore a direct relationship between the ethics of the free market and the ethics of the person. natural, between the ethics of the free market and the ethics of the spontaneous community, of the society that came into the world as its individuals came into the world.

The other natural foundation of the free market is the needs of the individual person to prosper economically to improve the individual quality of life and exponentiate individual profits, these would be the basic foundations of the free market in the natural condition, in natural law.

Trading or doing business in our free market subjectivity is not throwing all the cards at a way of thinking, or involving in transactions the most important questions and the most decisive answers about what one wants or thinks about something, but rather doing business, To the extent that the social world is itself a free market, it expresses the smallest mode of social relationship that we know.

Developing the business is not bringing to the table arguments, reasons, points of view or ideologies, nor is achieving an objective like this one brought pre-established by the will, subjecting the business to pre-established goals, it is rather the mode of social relationship that comes to us. predated in that social world, being like this, becomes part of the finer areas of our subjectivity, in the presentiments, in the sense of the other or of the others, in the way of adapting ourselves, ours is therefore an adequate subjectivity , relational, that embraces what the other brings, we trade not only when something is literally made explicit, we trade before, from the very moment in which in each tiny social relationship it is understood that the other and the others bring their own dynamics regulated by the business in the free market and that ours cannot be or acquire form in that social world as social relations without being a business in commerce.

In our capitalist free market subjectivity each individual is brought to an infinitesimality as a point in a world in which millions of other individuals exist in competitive commercially regulated relationships by the very principle according to which we come into the world, the social world must be what possible, as close as possible to the natural world, ours is a subjectivity accustomed to the fact that the same proportion that occurs between entropy, randomness, chance and directionality, in the natural world must be more or less the proportion that they have. these things in the social world.

If in nature randomness, uncertainty, chance, and spontaneity have a certain proportion in relation to structured processes, the social world is supposed to maintain these proportions.

This proportionate relationship between nature and society is expressed for our market subjectivity not only in the tangible world of the free market and commerce as these occur in the life worlds and in the intramundane horizon from within them, it is also expressed in its abstract forms that the market acquires and keeps in them, in those abstract forms, and the more abstract, the more their correspondence, their correlate and their proportion to the natural world.

Capital itself as a concept is an abstraction of the market, of its logic and dynamics, of its relationship with the social and symbolic world and of the values ​​as they are perceived from a phenomenological world established according to the free market and its subjectivity, as It is also, an abstraction, the financial system.

All of this works according to and according to the free market and our free market subjectivity.

In our market subjectivity, each individual is a business man or woman business, a person dedicated to marketing, to business relationships, we are a person, we are a biological individual, we are a profession and specialty, and we are also, by obligation in that social world, a person dedicated to business.

It is not possible to get ahead in the social world of the individual person if we are not, in addition to a specialty and a profession, also, additionally, a person capable of leading our own life as a business, a business that is of one and for one in the two senses together, biological individual and social individuation, a business however in which each minimum of social individuation that we obtain in the public space will once again correspond to being left alone in the competition of the free market.

In the same way that nothing intervenes that what we achieve or fail to achieve is governed by the relationship between our capacity, talent, individual competitiveness and the free market, nothing helps us, maintains or subsidizes us in that relationship before, during and after. that we obtain the result and achievements of a given social individuation obtained with our capabilities, competitiveness and own capital.

Free markets are like carnival in culture, the triple present of space and time is celebrated in its transcendental now and here, the vital present, and even more so as through the new technologies of the Internet and other media Free markets become part of our daily lives now, no longer like the chicha seller who knocks on the door or the crier whose voice we hear through the window selling along the streets we occasionally go out, but rather in the face of Our eyes, “accessible to our gaze and within reach of our hand”, to use a phrase from Jacques Derrida, is the free market as a visual environment where we write, read, consult information and decide what to do in the city this week, on our desks, on the computer monitor.

But knowing how our free markets are like carnival in culture and in a certain way a cultural form of carnival in our subjectivities, is not only referable to technologies, but also to its visual expressions in the broader culture.

My analysis of the relationship between the free market and carnival does not suppose that the pragmatics of the worlds of life assumed in the meaning that we give to the concept of pragmatism when we understand it in the Anglo-American sense of the United States cease to be governed by imperatives of highly ordered practical contingency. , as in fact expressed in the same pragmatic culture that is related to business culture, customer service, marketing and the high level of organization that market efficiency entails, it is about one thing and the other, They overlap and occur one within the other.

The forms of carnival addressed here are not, of course, carnivals in the ancient or medievalist sense of this concept, but rather, modern and contemporary forms of carnival which, given their very modern and contemporary character, are closely intertwined with the economic practices of bussines and commerce, I consider these three modalities in general to be quite exemplary in terms of their symbolism.

Exit:

It is an ordinary day, it is dawn in this ordinary hotel in Los Angeles whose name and whose street name I do not remember, perhaps to the same extent that I write I recover those names, there is something of recovery in the writing, not only recovery in the sense of who recovers in a literal way, such as recovering from the ravages of a trip through rest, the ravages of a party, excessive work, recovering economically, but also recovery in a broader sense that encompasses the previous ones. and a few others, recovering names, for example, here those of an ordinary hotel and its meager street, but also recovering relevant life experiences, here a relationship, a couple.

The dawn in question is frankly mundane and ordinary, it bathes the entire horizon visible in the city with the same meager light, the entrance of the hotel and the lobby with its squalid carpet, the Moor parks the truck behind a bunch of taxis, I will return about this truck parker with whom I was later able to talk at length one early morning near the parking lot of the gala cars, since there are several Moors. I am a Houstonian, the people of Houston are noticeable at first glance, you can see that you are from Houston, a beautiful blonde girl told me yesterday, you have something that is noticeable wherever you are, in an airport among people sitting, walking or They arrive with suitcases, you can sense who they are from Houston.

The Angeles They seem to me to be the first city in the United States that, unlike all the others, including Houston, where I have lived for many years, could be a city anywhere in the world. The cement of Los Angeles looks like the same as the Rossia Hotel in Moscow, Sabana Grande boulevard in Caracas or 23rd avenues or line in Havana.

The restaurant where I have breakfast, lunch and dinner at the hotel is tiny, its tables and chairs look like those dining rooms you can find in a factory. The ladies who serve you the food look like aunts, and the food is the same all the time, it's standard. At the back there is a large, comfortably furnished living room in which I try as much as possible to spend a few hours of the day reading Aesthetics and Interpretation by George Gadamer.

Leaving this room on the way to my room, I return every day to the same lobby from which I not only see the Moro parking the vans every morning, but I can also ordinarily have the service of two plastic and volumetric artifacts approximately five feet tall. each one, types of computers from which one can, not without a short queue of customers, connect to the Internet for a while and from where I write emails and read the emails that they write to me.

With words like ordinary and mundane, which I can maintain in general about the usual passage of and in the worlds of life I try to express beautiful things, not at all implausible, perhaps this will help me to know the architectural values ​​of this hotel, perhaps aspects of this cozy little hotel, highlighted by unusual details, not infrequently, in fact, I found myself involved in a conversation that focused on it. At the back, which faces a somewhat busier avenue, there is a night bar that is entered from both sides, from the hotel, being in a way part of it, and from that busier avenue, also being independent.

This relationship of being part of the hotel and at the same time part of the city as something in itself, is perceptible in the people who surround it, some live in the hotel, others are people from the city who frequent it or visit occasionally. The Moor's friends have persuaded me to visit him.

I do not consume alcohol ordinarily in my life and like that hotel, my also mundane life does not usually lead me to visit places like that, unless I am looking to conquer a woman to be my girlfriend. The Moor's friends are truck parkers, mostly, although they also take the luxury cars in and out of the parking lot in the mornings and at night. They have the gala cars parked waiting for the man and the lady of occasion who decide to rent them and choose whether they want a driver or prefer to drive it themselves so that one day some of them will not be there, but I think that despite different than the type of things we dedicate ourselves to, and even though Aesthetics and Interpretation may seem a little strange to you, I have even achieved a sense of mutuality and reciprocity.

My room, in which I spend a large part of the day, is not actually from the other world, rather from this one, its most relevant detail is that its floor is completely green, actually carpeted, upholstered in green, a green that seems to me baroque to explain, that which in the color palette is defined as complementary to red, green in the paintings of Henry Matisse, classic paintings such as the Dance of the Violinists, that which abounds in the treetops. When I look to imagine the plan view of my own room, I see myself in the proportions of a flat geometry, lying on that bed like in a painting by Henry Matisse.

Certainly, Da Vinci's perspective had not yet been discovered in medieval paintings, but for some reason, no less incommensurable than Matisse painting flat, naked figures of violinists dancing on backgrounds that were also flat and without perspective in Europe in 1910. , as in the first casual juxtapositions, ways of placing family photographs, which inspired Tzara and other Dadaists to discover photomontage, things become interesting with the synecdoche between Matisse's backgrounds and a hotel in Los Angeles.

For some curious reason the lady in the next room leaves her shoes outside the door on the carpet of the hotel's communal hallway on that floor, I have asked myself several times, as I walk through the hall towards my door and see all around the room. extension of the hall, just two meters in front of mine, her shoes placed precisely on the outside of her door, how to interpret this phenomenon, was it perhaps an oriental custom, I wondered, assuming she could be a Japanese, a Thai, or one Chinese?.

To tell the truth, the girl's shoes were perfectly Western in their shape, their design, their leather and their style, in black detail, but the custom of leaving them outside in the hallway of a hotel that is considered collective introduced a series of attractive elements. to my hermeneutics, thus resorting to my own heritage, cultural experiences with shoes displayed on carpeted expanses, only in the shoes of my Russian ex-girlfriends had I noticed before as something wrapped in an exorbitant feminine sensuality, the ritual of taking off the shoes was at the same time a climatic necessity, a detail of exquisite and delicate seduction, a custom of social courtesy, and a form of sentimental education, were taken away, however, inside.

Leaving shoes on the outside of a door is something that I have only seen before in Japanese films in which, however, the girl's relationship with the property, here the typical traditional Japanese house that inspired Le Corbusier, is not the same. the same as the relationship that an Anglo-Saxon tenant, perhaps from Texas, perhaps from New York, can maintain with what makes the rooms of a private hotel in Los Angeles collective, I will return to this point later, the relationships between the private and the public , the sense of pertinence or relationship to a social or community whole, here the hotel, and a few other things that I thought about lying on that bed around these shoes.

A sensory world of sensitive and physical impressions integrates and centers here the relationships between observation, the body and the extension of memory, it is not, as in Leiris, a body that is dispersed fragmented in metaphors of organs like the one that Derrida evoked in the manner of ghosts of Africa, his inveterate Algeria in Paris, and then of Marx, his Franco-Algerian grasp of the temporal disjunction experienced between a world in which subjectivity remains imbued in the absolute interior proper to the endogenous relationship between history of religion, pragmatic in the worlds of life and forms of the economy in the end-of-the-century Weberian spirit and that disjunct estrangement of the world that opens time and space with Marx to the formation of value when it, estranging itself from the substance, equidistances the matter by opening subjectivity above the exteriority of the objective and folding objectivity above an axiology in which the subjective extending itself cannot do so without meticulous care, that disjunction typical of an objectified subjectivity, with its fetishes and reifications.

Here is rather the relationship between a capsule body, my Houstonian one, ultra-technologically urged by questions about embodiment, a body in me that is inescapable but theoretically experimental in writing and thought, and a body filled with nature, with organic fruits that arrive from the groove, not so organoponic, of an exorbitantly natural freshness in which the day smiles in a smile.

The first book on autoethnography, as I define and understand it, was written by a French theorist, Jacques Derrida. It begins with self-positioning or self-location, using a crucial concept of Clifford Geertz when he compared the rituals of death in rural Greece. of Lorin as a Heideggerian modality of thinking in Greece the coral descriptions of a disciple of Malinowski, but the self-location here was not that of the ethnographer who leaves an encapsulated culture which is his culture and goes to another that is different, it was rather, the Algerian intellectual, that is, a North African, who, immersed in life as a theorist in France, and recognizing himself as an emigrant, begins a treatise on thought from classical antiquity that is his but in a different way than in that he did not live it as Algerian emigrant, that is, positioning himself as a critique of philosophy from a two-column ethnographic writing with a French ethnographic writer who did field work in Africa, thus situating a simultaneous work of double field work in writing about himself deconstructing the philosophical tradition of which it is a part while rewriting and at the same time rewriting it from the African perspective in France, we must therefore read the margins of philosophy as the first autoethnography, which in no way means that in this book the possibilities of it, but just in the making

In the hotel lobby I found a poster of Chaplin, perhaps casual but not at all insignificant to my hermeneutics. It shows the classic image in Footlights when Chaplin, while eating his hot boots, performs a dance with the cutlery, just a dance.

 Bibliography

Derrida Jacques, Margins of philosophy, The University of Chicago Press

Ricoeur Pierre, Time & Narrative, books 1, 2 and 3) University of Chicago Press; 1 edition (September 15, 1990)

Between acervos and backgrounds

©Por Abdel Hernandez San Juan

This paper discuss some of the main things define the phenomenological and ethnometodological turn in sociology after a general overview on the main tendencies of sociology in XX Century affording some of the main systematic issues characterize Alfred Shutz turn and its relation with Max Weber concept of Ideal types in comprehensive and axiological sociology, to late theorize and discuss a theory of the relation between everyday life and the discourse of science as it work in my own fieldwork and methodology of research, 

  The paper discuss how things called to experience and everyday life from the discourse of science and theory and biserversa, things called out to the discourse of reason and science from experience and everyday life pertinently and mutually enriches, compliments and benefit as well as pertinently distance according to the rationality of the ends inclusive to the pragmatism of the types of activities. The paper offers and theorize a general overview on how I has assimilated and incorporated issues from Habermas and Shurtz in my own scientific discourses as well as created my own systematic theory in response to and on the background of it in the ways to research, do sociology and fieldwork in sociocultural settings.

Keywords: XX Century Sociology, Phenomenology and the ethnometodological turn, Alfred Shurt, Junger Habermas and Weber Ideal Types, the theory of Acerbos, Everyday life intramundane horizont and discourses of science, Sociological research and fieldwork in sociocultural settings

   It is June 2014, exactly ten years ago in 2004 I began and concluded my book The Subject in Creativity, this book is for a wide variety of reasons, recommended here complete but specifically includes two in which I propose and develop my own theories on, on the one hand, the rhetoric of the papers, on the other, issues of ethnomethodology in contemporary sociology. I included and developed my first analyzes on ethnomethodology in an early work, from my twenties, more precisely begun when I was 22 and concluded when I was 24, although it resumes, inserts and includes intellectual material from previous essays dating from the period from when I was 18. At the age of 20, Edges and Overflows of Art: Possibility of Transart, a predominantly phenomenological book that I have recently returned to and reviewed in the light of experience, with the intention of publishing.

    The predominantly phenomenological character of that book focused on several aspects that I cannot stop considering today, first the relationship between the inside and the outside, a crucial relationship for art, which moves between what we consider individual and what we consider social. , between what we consider the self, the oneself, the side here that corresponds to the individual, inside, and the side there, which we consider social, outside, this way of accentuating and attending to the correlation between the one and the multiple, The self and the social, as a relationship between an inside and an outside, has in that work the objective of treating the matter in a phenomenological way appropriate to how it is presented, not so much as an objectifying theory, although also later in that book, but firstly to the author, what I defined in it as Multiaspectuality: Prisms of Visibility, the reason?, to find out how this matter is presented to artistic praxis, that is, the distinction between an inside and an outside that is correlative and implicit to the subjective experience that goes from authorial works to society, analyzing the axiological process of value formation.

    To this analysis of the relationship between subjectivity and the process of formation of values ​​I dedicate extensive and detailed developments in that book that are also objectifying, a meaning that has meaning first for the author in relation to his work, then in the processes of social insertion of the works for all the axiological dynamics that are assumed in the social formation of that value and its modes of social reproduction, as well as for its different literalities, not only our well-known theme as avant-garde in art, that of the autonomy of art , central since the early 20th century in Europe, but the inside of a disciplinary domain and its relationship with that which is an outside, when a specialized technicality from within, for example, communicates with other different technicalities that are a outside, or when it tries to make its special forms inclusive, aspects of another specialty, generating mixtures, which we call mixed techniques, or beyond, when a disciplinary domain goes out towards communication with other disciplinary domains, the assimilation of social sciences in the procedures of art, for example, or the inside and the outside understood as a relationship between locations or exhibition sites specific to the art institution and exterior locations, nature, city, architecture, community, determined in a precise place, the town or the village, or simply, not to go too far, due to the way in which this inside/outside relationship is presented to the participation of art itself in interdisciplinary experiences of collaboration or cooperation that include people from the field of art and people from the field of social sciences working together. .

    I do not intend here to make a review or synopsis of that work since no comment could exhaust the reading that the reader would have to make of it, but what I want to bring to the foreground when opening these lines to you in reference to that early book, is that in He dedicated extensive pages to analyzing issues of ethnomethodology in contemporary sociology and related, for the first time, from a phenomenological development as a whole, classical philosophy, questions about modernity, the relationship between being, technologies and the mass media, Benjamin, Heidegger, philosophical and symbolic anthropology of the contemporary world, Boudrillard, Bourdieu, issues of ethnomethodology in contemporary sociology, and if in that book already in relation to certain phenomena my first inclusion of Clifford Geertz, the most symbolist aspects in his theory of the symbolic in that abstracted book, the interpretation of cultures.

   Like psychoanalysis in which it is not the same and in reality it is quite different to be a psychoanalyst in the sense of Freud, than in that of Lacan or Kristeva, it is not the same to be ethnomethodologists in the sense of Alfred Shurtz than in that of Mead , Garfinkel, or more recently in that of Michael de Certaud or Goffman, some now also want to include Lefebre, which would complicate things quite a bit. What defines ethnomethodology in contemporary sociology, in response to what questions and initiating what questions in contemporary classical sociology did ethnomethodology emerge, what is my position in it and what could we say that it gives generality to the different trends of ethnomethodology in contemporary sociology? , regardless of what separates the different exponents?

    The generality of the ethnomethodological turn in contemporary sociology describes in relation to the tradition of classical sociology two main lines, the first, moving sociology from the macro social to the micro social, the other, effecting this mobility from the macro to the micro. only with respect to the object but also with respect to the subject, that is, not only as a matter of what sociology is about, dealing with micro social and non-macrosocial issues, but also doing it in the order of the methods of sociology beginning by the sociologist himself, to unburden sociology from its relationship to collective programs in which the sociologist remains at the service of the intentions and purposes of certain institutions and collective programs towards society as a whole.

   Conducting population surveys at the service of implementations of other types in that population that use sociology for another purpose, institutional pollster at the service of implementations to be applied in those institutions for purposes that are not those of sociology itself, and bring it into the order of the individual sociologist as a generator of knowledge, as a creator of a sociological work in which a way of understanding society is offered, a point of view, a way of understanding it and of conversing it as a matter of the sociologist as author and of his work. This shift of attention from the macro to the micro, both in the object and in the subject, had to be carried out in sociology on the background of, or in relation to, decanting from, evolving in relation to, differentiating from, assimilating from the previous heritage. of sociology while getting rid of three previous trends, situationalist sociology, Popper, functionalist sociology, Parson and institutionalist sociology, Merton, which in turn were the achievement of three previous trends, the strongest even today, founders of sociology, Emile Durkeim, Max Weber and August Comte.

    Let us specify here between the close of the 19th century and the departure of the 20th century those three basic sociologies in a rigorous sense with respect to whose tradition this turn is carried out, the sociology of Emile Durkeim, the first great synchronic sociology, the social whole understood here and now through the stability of its structures, its emphasis then towards the phenomena related to structural stability, institutions and phenomena related to social reproduction, here come those related to the social rules of generality and those of transmission, that is, , language, education, sociology itself, The Rules of the Sociological Method, rules that Bourdieu later extended to art in The Rules of Art, (the rules of art not only for itself, but for the rest of society as art begins in human expression from childhood), and finally, the elemental forms of religion.

   Max Weber, the sociology that begins in the evolutionary character of society in specific and to the foreground, the process of social secularization that goes from the evolution of the forms of social generality that structure the secular spheres of our societies that include secular separations undertaken between science, art, morality and religion with their respective institutions, professionalization, specialization and social overspecialization, the field of techniques, the evolution of forms of subjectivity related to the separations of these areas and generating of them and their social conditions of possibility and, finally, the relationship between society and the economy understood as a mutually constitutive relationship, the comprehensive sociology of Max Weber considered by many to be the main predecessor in the disciplinary past of the first forms of what many Decades later, the ethnomethodological turn in contemporary sociology began.

   Finally, positivism in sociology thanks to which sociology was able to free its own undertaking of autonomy towards the rest of social modernity, the entire process that was required to develop around which gave specificity and own delimitation both in its methods and in its object to the sociology as a social and human science different from the rest. I will try not to have to expand unnecessarily on Comnte, it is only in broad strokes the beginning of a literature on sociology itself and its methodological issues which is still decisively important not only in the delimitation of those specificities autonomous to it, but then, for all those who, less positivists than contemporary sociologists, undertook the forms of sociology that were most concerned with giving continuity to the invariances of the classics in renewed and current forms.

    Bourdieu, for example, who with The Craft of a Sociologist consolidates and modernizes Weber while synthesizing Comte, and moves beyond them, who with The Rules of Art consolidates and modernizes Durkeim while moving beyond him, which with The Artistic and Literary Field, The Distinction and The Field of Cultural Production, consolidates and takes contemporary sociology towards renewed paths and updated the relationship between economy and society, and without neglecting the secularized and specialized Weberian field, at the same time it establishes a new synthesis of modern sociology and symbolic anthropology with an attention and development of the crucial issues of Marxism, regarding which I have not referred here, for the moment, intentionally.

  Certainly, in Weber's sociological comprehensiveness, similar modalities or even at that time not very developed but already close, of axiology in sociology, are explored for the first time. Bourdieu works on value in capitalized structural relations of exchange, but as highly symbolized phenomena regulating their equivalence analysis, axiology, however, at the center in my books and essays, is not sufficiently developed in any previous trend, including Bourdieu and also the ethnomethodological turn, why? We will leave the answer to this question for later for the moment alone. I will advance that as a matter of social sciences, axiology must work as a theory of the processes of value formation, the reproduction of value and everything that concerns valuation, not specifically its capitalized exchange, although it does not exclude these.

    Now, once this broad outline has been presented, it is essential to refresh it in light of what I am going to develop below, let us return to ethnomethodology. The immediate previous developments are important to understand the ethnomethodological turn but with a view to not going too far into ramblings on the evolution of sciences, I will try to specify these relationships to their precedents in the analysis of the ethnomethodological turn itself.

   Three very different figures epitomize the turn, Alfred Shurtz, Mead and Harold Garfinkel. The first, Alfred Shurtz, phenomenology in contemporary sociology, here I am, the object of knowledge here is knowledge itself as it is formed, established, given and developed in the daily and social life of a typical individual, this individual type can be Alfred Shurtz, but it can be any individual, this is not specified, the important thing is that this hypothetical individual, supposed, is provided with everything necessary so that what surrounds him, his daily life and his course mundane we are going to say, it could be what we would say about any individual in mundane and ordinary conditions in the course of his days in everyday life, we could say, it could be Shurtz himself, it could be the reader or it could be oneself.

   The object of this sociology will not be that individual who otherwise is not specified, neither in name, nor in origin, nor in culture, nor in society, nor in country, nor even in what his characteristics may be, is an individual. without personality and without character, without temperament and without psychology, without personal stories or relationships with specific people around him, he is generally a solitary individual, he sleeps, wakes up, does activities between day and night, visits people, he is visited, he goes to places, he travels through them, he is in precise human and social situations, there are no names, not even his own, neither as a name in reality, nor as a name in a fiction, nor does the question arise, as in the phrase for linguistic analysis, the one running on the sidewalk could be anyone, he is simply a typical individual, anyone, the reader fills in the rest with his imagination, although treated as in the linguistic phrase, this individual, however, is not placed in the phrase, is placed in another sequence, this sequence is as structured as the phrase for linguistic demonstration is, but its structure is sociological, this sequence includes, first, day and night, second, the passage of ordinary and mundane life Third, a dense web of intricately interrelated relationships that are formed around concepts such as significances, typicalities, acerbs, experience, relevance, the rest is in your daily world, the analysis of how concepts are presented, arise, occur, are formed. knowledge that this individual develops in his ordinary and mundane life.

    Finally, and closing this rough manner with until now barely synoptic pretensions, the phenomenological sociology of Alfred Shurtz, we must say that on top of this intricate sequence of horizontal relations of mutual inclusivism between correlated typicalities, significances and experiences does not require any additional concept, the The relationship of these concepts to each other forms a self-sufficient system which functions and works as sociology without the need for any additional element, it is enough that they are integrated into the worlds of everyday life and as a sociology of knowledge in those worlds.

   However, despite their immense differences, given certain characteristics that define the ethnomethodological turn, affinities of its three main figures, it is possible, it would be necessary to search more precisely in the texts of his main disciple who, in addition to his wife, consecrated himself to compile and publish Shurtz's work, if these sections that I mention below were Shurtzian responses, that is, from Shurtz himself, but elaborated as responses rather than as elements needed by his system from within, to the rest of the exponents of the turn a posteriori or if they were previous elaborations by Shurtz that he later assimilated and that influenced this, I am referring to certain sections separated from the rest and treated as something distinct in themselves, which Shurtz consecrates to personal pronouns, that is, to the relationships I , you, him, she, we, them.

   Although again, it does not devote priority attention to these notions, as it does to the concepts seen above, which are incomparably more important, if it devotes theoretical developments to relationships.

Yo/yo

I/you

I the

Me she

I we

I they

or without the self

to relationships

he/the

He she

The you

you/him

He they

We They

   And all other possible interrelationships, pronouns occupy in Shurtz's phenomenological sociology the place that Self/Social relations occupy in Mead, but they work in a different way, since in Mead the relationship always goes from self to socialization or from the social towards the Self, while in Shurtz the pronoun establishes a relationship that presupposes and requires the concepts of its interwoven structure of the world of everyday life, that is, meaningful relationships, relationships around typicalities and relationships in conditions of relevance.

    Pronouns, however, are not filled in his books as literalized relations but only as pure abstract pronouns, any I, any he, any you, any she, any we, any they, any he/they relation, any we/we relation. them, any he/she relationship, any I/you relationship, I/him, your/him and so on. It is true that the immense influence of Shurtz, decisive in the ethnomethodological turn, does not need these sections on personal pronouns, his sociology can completely dispense with them, they could be understood, however, as Shutzian responses to characteristics of the other two figures of the Mead turn and Garfinkel.

    Because we infer from these pronouns a Shutzian response to the other exponents, because, although in terms of potential relationalities, Shurtz's system, less dedicated or focused on this objective, supposes a relationality different from that of the other two and does not require the type of that of those to be sufficient relationally, it is true that Mead prioritizes the relational aspect more than Shurtz because it is a theory that focuses, as he said, on the relationship between the self and the social, a relationship which of course if it supposes more active processes in terms of the dynamics that move either through the socialization of experiences, or vice versa, through the internalization or introspection of the social world, to the flow that goes from the self to the social and vice versa. .

   It is important to specify the latter, that in the sociology of Alfred Shurtz, again, this axis of interrelated concepts worked with the same imbrication of the examples in the phrase for linguistic demonstration is structured with a single objective, no other objective is the purpose for this sociology, turning the object of sociology into knowledge itself as it is formed and developed for any typical individual in the worlds of everyday life. This would then be my first observation as far as ethnomethodology in contemporary sociology is concerned, concluding as a frank explanation that my individual position in ethnomethodology is definitely Shutian and Habermasian, from Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action I and II. The complete Reading and Thorough Study of these two entire volumes in their first edition of 1979, is mandatory and conditional for any debate of scientific rigor with me.

   Here enters the inevitable relationship to what Derrida calls Positions, the irremissible contingency of taking positions that I did not take from one day to the next, which took me decades to decant, which expresses, synthesizes, ponders and moderates, an extensive process of decanting my own experiences, after long years of tireless dedication to extensive reading and not infrequently meticulous and dedicated rereading of hundreds of thousands of books.

  Nor am I the first to relate Habermas to ethnomethodology, although Habermas comes from the Frankfort school and is at the same time an independent figure, he is not an ethnomethodologist nor is he related to what was the turn, I began some conversations with the disciple of Shurtz that are mandatory. I am about to read these conversations in full in the coming months. In turn, Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action I and II has become an essential and obligatory reference for any compendium of contemporary sociology that covers the relationship that goes from Weber to ethnomethodology, passing through its intermediates, I mean countless published compendiums are mandatory in any faculty of contemporary sociology, while Bourdieu is mandatory in contemporary sociology for any compendium that starts with Durkeim, structuralism and neostructuralism in sociology.

  I must accept that certainly in my books I always remain as if from a window, a window from which I work on the correlate and the referential horizon when at most the epistemological matrix and the surface phenomenology can suppose the development of a proposal, accept that in This prevails something of a pristine sense, it is true that from my book Bordes y Desbordes I explain my affinities but also my distances towards post-structuralism in terms of feminism as made explicit in my essay hermeneutics and axiology, it is true that I am a feminist but very heterosexual and for the same reason I am not pleased with Heterophobia.

   It is not necessarily or not precisely about filling these worlds with life as they occur if pristine in the course of life, with professional or work activities. In no way do I mean to say that in the same sense in which the discourse of reasoning can enter and become diluted towards the goal of improving the quality of life and daily communication with ourselves and our affections, the areas of life cannot and experience being called to speech and writing. Understanding these life worlds as pristine, that is, as not intervened by activities from the career, professional or academic field.

   In the same way that reasoning can be called, brought, incorporated and then diluted to the simple intention of enriching the pure experience or pristine communication, its contemplation or its happiness, we can conversely bring to that discourse, call from it, incorporate into it, make it the object of their attention and self-sufficient deliberations, exposing these here to the purposes of the speech, the essay, the paper, the squesh, the sketch or the draft of the lecture or the class, or simply the textual and visual elements that They participate in a career setting, which includes them and others in an ordered relationship, pragmatically mutually explained by the relevance of a career domain, areas coming from experiences revisited or experiences reconsidered, nor is it excluded that the repetition that takes place through synesthesia, or the memory of an experience recalled in the discourse, can produce interesting results for that form of discourse and its scope, a discourse thus nourished, enriched and structured around and from the career, the specialized field and professional rigor.

    Whether or not these things can become objects of mutual inclusion, the reasoning brought and included in pristine life diluted in and by it, and conversely, the experiences coming from pristine life to discourse, and then reconsidered by another superordinated discourse which proposes to give attention not only to what attention attends for the first time but to attend to attention, first, and then, to make the ways in which one is attentive to attention, expectation, observation, verification, reasons for the rigors of a highly superordinated discourse which, in itself, also seeks to be superadded or superordinated like a discourse about or around fieldwork, seems fine to me.

  But my considerations about a mutual distancing between the orders of specialized, career, professional and academic discourse, and pristine orders of daily life that extend and contemplate each one as different things in the ordering of space and time, including not only their ecstasy, its oases and its paradises, but also its pragmatics and its contingencies, its mutual distances as well as its mutual inclusions, suppose a more considered, weighed and careful way.

   That knowledge and reasoning can enrich from within those worlds of life and experience without yet being, not becoming or not needing to relate or bring to that area of ​​mundane life an experience that is linked to professional time, to the dedication that one gives to their works, to their career or to their work, teaching or academic responsibilities, that is how it should be, but the validation of these areas by the way in which they participate, integrated into the life requirements of experiences, are subordinated to the pragmatics of the worlds. of life to arrangements of mutual explanation and rapport between people who share life worlds, of the passage of life that may include contemplation or happiness, vacations, leisure activities, pure entertainment, rest or simply the contemplation of experiences emotional relationships with people who have emotional meanings in life, children, partners, friends, are areas that have their own autonomy to which one dedicates great care in the ways of giving and receiving affection, caring for self-esteem and fulfilling the people you love and who love you, or bringing your sense of reciprocity, for example.

   It is not a question, I insist, returning to the same point again this time with more precision, that I close myself to their relationships, it is that I understand the inclusion of one from within the other according to requirements of relevance that each order requires. For the other, this relevance, which from one order we demand for the other when we are decided for some reason or reason to be included, is not closed to me to the richness or the weighted possibilities that according to the requirements of relevance of an order of things. , could promote the inclusion of orders corresponding to the other, in any case, assimilate to the requirements of relevance of orders of daily life, questions and orders of things coming from modes of reasoning and discourse that the career, specialty and exercise entail. professional, offers the latter ways of adaptation of relevance through which they are called, incorporated, assimilated, taken back and ways of relevance to which these orders must be welcomed and assimilated, which on the other hand also They offer those orders correlates that they had never received from themselves as orders according to their own relevance.

  By receiving in one way another subject to another pragmatic way, to some other relations between means and ends, between illusions and expectations, between horizons and hunches, between intuitions and questions, these forms of rationality and discursivity cannot, at least for the considered inclusion , remaining not even in that being called, according to what they are in themselves, or as they have been anticipated, this subjects for the same reason, the occasional inclusions to the requirements of relevance that these orders demand, then returning from them back to their own specialized orders, career, professional, academic, dedication to works, with elaborations that have received a form that they could not have received otherwise, we are therefore in the presence of a relationship in which two or more different orders of relevance of typicality, of significance, of acerbity, of communication and even also of pragmatics, the worlds of one's own life, the passage of life, and that of discourse, give of themselves, receive from each other, feed each other.

   Every individual has an experience thanks to which he has an acerb, we can therefore leave, for example, from the acerb and return to the acerb every time we go to this individual to whom we appear in a variety of mundane and ordinary situations in all the situations that we require. anticipate or imagine as those in which any typical individual will be in a position to resort to his knowledge as a way of resorting to his previous knowledge given in his knowledge, to adapt to the knowledge that a situation demands of him, to relate the knowledge of his knowledge prior with the knowledge that is assumed in that mundane and ordinary circumstance and conversely, understand from the knowledge of its acerbs, the knowledge requirements that these mundane situations suppose, which in any case can be of very varied types.

   We leave the knowledge by theorizing it, conceptualizing it, abstracting it, literalizing it, going through it, filling it with a dense plot of rich developments and we obtain results with respect to the examples, we leave the knowledge and go to the situation, we analyze all the probabilities that the situation offers to the knowledge that the individual brings, we infer from the situation everything that it tells us regarding the situations of knowledge that are posed to the knowledge of that typical individual in that supposed circumstance and conversely, we fill the situation with a rich variety of elements that we bring to it. From that acerb that the typical individual assumes for us, we return to the acerb to theorize it, then we return to the situation, if in theorizing the relationship between the acerb that the individual brings and the one that the situation assumes, we find, arriving from the previously enriched examples, rich, renewed elements that expand our knowledge, we are deepening in conceptualizing new aspects of our theory of the acerb.

   Two people talk, one has one thing, the other has another thing, have they known each other before? Are they new to each other? If they live in the same city for a long time they share that thing, if they live in different cities they don't share it. same knowledge regarding the city, what aspects of one's knowledge are shared by the other's knowledge and vice versa, what does one say, and how the other relates through his or her knowledge what the other has said, how the known elements function of the knowledge that the situation activates or demands, given what the other has said, and how the novel elements of the situation are integrated into that wealth, expanding or enriching it, the situation can be a person, but it can be a book, a film, the media, technologies, the internet, television, someone you meet on a trip, someone new who arrives in a situation in which they meet others, something they meet for the first time, something they already knew and about which they return in a new way, etc., etc., etc.

   As the heritage, each concept is an infinite universe, the heritage opens some avenues, the significances open other avenues, the experiences others. We thus emerge from the knowledge, we are analyzing a concrete situation based on the knowledge, but suddenly we perceive that a certain deduction, inference, relationship of assimilation, response, familiarization, adequacy or understanding, has required resorting to a principle, for example of significance or experience. , without which the path towards the acerb activated around the situation could have been different, and conversely, a situation appears significant, but elements related to the experience or the acerb, introduce novel elements that expand, enrich or modify the way how knowledge is given around that significance.

   This relationship, however, was worked in a much more moderate and weighted way with regard to the distances of one order with respect to the other, as well as in a much more ductile way with regard to the plasticities that some orders can receive from the others. that is, in the permeation of those by the way in which, in adaptation to the relevance of each order, the receiving order, received, welcomed, incorporated, or accepted, returns re-enriched to the orders that correspond to its pragmatics of overordination, superaddition, the discourse of the discourse, the attention of attention, the analysis of observation, verification, data and the theory of field work itself.

   What is the issue here, as long as I call and bring from one order to the others, or I go according to the relevance of an order and from its own interior, not without this order, of course, having received from the other, but above all, in its adaptation, has generated generative discourse according to figures that it would not have received or found in its own order, to the other, visiting it, revisiting it, I never do it in a way in which the logics of one order invade the other, saturate it, They stress it, they alter it, they ingest it, they intervene in it, they collapse it, about this less intervening relationship one could argue a certain denial in me of the concept of interaction or a way in which, in my considered moderation of this relationship, it opened in me a denial of take the other order, whose inside, defined by the relevance of its pragmatic if pristine, also pristine for the unintervened order of discourse, would be an externalized objective reality in which precise bodies are found in spatialized relations of interaction.

   It is not about that, if there is interaction in me, only that the interaction in me is governed and regulated by the acerb, this means that the others of my experience, or my own life experience in course taken as a world horizon for questions or developments, are not subjects or objects of my agendas in a sense that excludes the fact that those others relate to me acerbic relations in which relations of rationality in communication governed by, in Shurtz's sense, are in the foreground. corroborations, mutual adaptations and acerbic verifications governed by principles of relevance that adapt to the order that these areas and worlds of life bring with them, that is, here Shurtz's concept of significations, the way in which, in a nutshell, people signify their meanings. own experiences and secondly, in the Habermasian sense, it is not only a question of acerbic relations, although in the first place here now in both senses of field work, the acerbic in the foreground, but also that these acerbic compatibilizations must be undertaken at through relations of explanation regulated by understanding.

   This means something that limits the creative and experimental possibilities, in no way, it does mean that one order is not going to superimpose the other not even in its modes of superordination, but rather that one order is going to adapt to the other and will give and to receive from that and with respect to that, but in no way does the experimental possibilities decrease. How do I then resolve the issue of overordination that is contingent and inevitable for a discourse that requires objectification and objectification of objectification, first, and that requires, then, attention to attention, analysis of data and experience, abstractions ultimately? instance or theorizations.

   Well, first of all, I keep this topic subordinate to the relationship that goes from the world given to the senses in their immediacies to the elaborate world of superordinations and supradiscursive superadditions that recall, take up, bring, transport or require ready mades to experiences. , experiences, communications, contacts and analysis of the theoretical problems assumed in them, these superordinate discourses can call aspects of the experiences or experiences in orders of relevance subject to pragmatics of communication, mutual explanation and acerbic correlations whether these refer to carry out everyday and mundane life, simple life, experiences, trips, communications, mutual explanations, or they do it to orders that involve socioculturalities, that is, areas in those worlds of daily life, also separated in their pragmatics as areas of career with respect to those of life.

  However, precisely through typicality, the worlds of common sense that no longer correspond to tacit, intramundane and pristine areas of daily life, but to areas of socioculturality, are highly saturated. The acerb in any of its modes admits and even offers a rich possibility for a discourse that not only theorizes it but also makes it explicit in all its richness, thus avoiding, and also compensating, additionally and for the better, this saturation of the areas of socioculturality with and around which, because of my type, I have to work all the time.

  In me, calling back to Habermas, field work is made explicit, that is, it becomes intelligible through written and oral statements of explanation in communicative conditions governed by understanding, and calling back to Alfred Shurtz, field work is established in relationships of intramundane relevance and in my terms governed by interactions that occur between the inside and inside of two or more acerbic realities between people involved in a situation of communication and mutual explanation in which around the material reported by the acerb, oral conversations, reading of texts, visualization of materials, similarities and dissimilarities are made explicit between the correlative acerbs and the acerbic dissimilarities which resort to the expansion of their correlations of backgrounds to the typicalities or typifications and, of course, to the explicitation of significances, and yes, also to the meaning-giving ways of the world and of that world for research in pristine conditions.

     Whatever the pragmatics of communication, writer/reader, interviewer/interviewee, work colleagues, teacher/student, fieldwork is undertaken under conditions governed by the establishment of shared horizons of expectations, on the one hand, and horizons of mutual adaptation by the other, according to the characteristics of that pragmatics, if they are meetings around research, if they are about art, or around events and according to the relevance of those pragmatics, if they are in simple daily life, the evangelist who knocks on my door, the woman who talks to me on the bus, the woman who is my stable partner or the one who is circumstantial, the surrounding and environment of the apartment where I live in the town and the city, the friend who lives in the same twon that we share that bond with respect to our same city, the street corner vendor, in which the mutual learning around that which makes us equal in our bonds comes to the foreground as that which communicates us, and makes us establish shared horizons of mutual explanation, insofar as that which makes us dissimilar, also made explicit, that is, brought to mutual explanation, establishes a relationship between dissimilar backgrounds that must be coupled for mutual learning, thus stimulating mutual enrichment, mutual sharing and establishing learning relationships, here listening to each other.

  Participant observation is made explicit, communicated and brought explicitly to criticism in the same conditions of participation and observation in which it is developed, that is, the people who share conditions of participant observation, including researchers, not only make this condition explicit but also bring it to light. at the forefront of the critical discussion that makes this relationship a relationship of participation and observation. Observation is not a bouller, an intruding eye or a watcher, observation is an intramundane condition of participation in conditions of everyday life included in this research and as such it must be discussed and become the object of criticism and texts on its nature.

    I practice continuous and unlimited sociological and sociocultural field work, urban, rather than ethnographic.

    Now, it is important to understand, whether it is due to the lack of my early distinction between the inside and the outside, how we could analyze it if we see how in mead, for example, the interiority of the self, regulates the flow that occurs and the passage of a one side to the other according to clear distinctions between the private and the public, the individual and the social, or else due to the lack of that wrapped and protected world that we obtain in the sequence of experiences of an individual in the worlds of everyday life whose relationships are given through his own knowledge and the relationship between his knowledge, the knowledge in general and the knowledge of others, as I have developed, or as in Shurtz, anyone, the writer, the reader, but always an individual in the passage of time. In everyday life, the greatest Ganfinkelian interactionism refers to an outside that is not the outside of an inside, but the outside of other outsides to which no inside refers.

    This relationship comes directly from Parson's theory of the social, this, as we know, is not relational, it is rather derivational from a relationship, the social in Parson is raised, it begins after the relationship took place, it is not important that it has been in place. relationship and because in the direction of what, or how the elements of a relationship relate to each other, but after a relationship something has arisen as a consequence, the relationship in Parson is not social, this is what he called the act- unity, an act unity is a minimum of something that is social per se because it stopped corresponding to that which gave rise to it and began to form a social function, this is what we usually refer to when we say accept the social function, the social functioning, the relationship. functionalistly social about it, it is therefore about what is social because it works socially and if it works socially then it is social perse no matter what its inside is or the experience from which it comes or to which it returns.

    This is then my consideration of risk with respect to Garfinkelian interactionism, as there is not, as in Shurtz, an acerb from which everything comes out and to which everything returns, in which everything is corroborated and from which everything can be read or explained, compared or understood, correlated or permeated, made explicit or communicated, typified or meaningful, the symbolism of interaction cannot be integrated into a theory of communication in which we prioritize, on the one hand, understood in the sense of communication adequate to understanding, mutual explicitness, the rapport and understanding between people, and on the other, understood from the point of view of the theorization of society and culture, the relationships of intricate adaptations according to acerbs, typicalities, significances and experiences, including here the horizon of experimental possibilities of these concepts.

  The great potential and scope of Shutz is, without a doubt, the anti-authoritarianism of his system. Given that the interaction in that sense understood has no background, it does not have Fieldback and therefore does not have anywhere to go, adaptation, incorporation, introspection, internalization, intelligibility, understanding, where it can be corroborated or in relation to which it can be adapted or in which can be adduced, inferred, deduced, induced, this can run the risk of, being the result of the interaction between two things that maintain an extrinsic relationship with each other, an interaction of which the interactants rarely know why and why they interact with respect to themselves as well as with respect to others, devolve into a pre-Lacanian, pre-Ausurian, pre-todorovian, pre-Kristevian, pre-Geertian symbolism, a symbolism that regresses symbolic interactions as symbolized interactions to a lack of relationship of each one with himself and with each other. of the symbolizers in that which relates them to the symbols of their symbolizations.

Grades

  1-Why is my essay philosophizing the field at the end of my book The Linguistic Presentation? For art it is difficult to accept that there is a field where art supposes, on the other side of the gaze, a landscape, a still life or a model , that is, a relationship of mimesis to the social world or the natural world, this is then the relationship that has immersed a part of art in the mimetic principle governed by the ideologies of representation, but there is a field, it is an inescapable reality, In the presence of secularization and specialization, guilds are created around techniques related to these specializations, it is an inescapable reality, as is the fact that ideologies are generated around these techniques, which give rise to dynamics between tendencies towards conservation and tendencies towards innovation, It is an inescapable reality, he who preserves wants to preserve what was made as it was and not according to something else that changes or renews it, he who renews it wants to break as it was and for this reason he tends to go contrary to conservation, there is field also in values, in tangible values ​​with their maximum expression in money, economics, finance, and in intangibles, ethical, spiritual, symbolic values, which occur in exchange relationships that take place according to objective dynamics. that are not expressed in the same way for the author as for the one who promotes the author's work, the publisher, the bookstore, the museum, the gallery, the critic, the editor, the curator, etc.

   There is also scope for countless other reasons, because intellectual practices, writing and promotion, take place in dynamics that involve displacements, cities, urban locations, institutions that are places in architecture and in urban space, because they take place including trips that involve displacements from one sociocultural dynamic to another that are different from each other, there is scope because there is a variety of languages ​​and languages, and because these relationships are not perceived or mapped in the same way seen from one place or the other, or in the transposition or the transfer from one place to another, in the same author, myself, whose career, whose simplest resumes involve things done in distant places, these questions are expressed, there is scope because there are acerbs that have a heterogeneous impact on the dynamics of reading and interpretation .

   There is scope because there is ready-made, transposition of things from some contexts to others, or recontextualizations of those, because the acerbs influence that some experiences can be shared with others, generating rapprochements or familiarities and not communicating with others, generating distances or lack of communications, there is scope because There are auditoriums, let's say that you write about emigrants, among whom do you disseminate your writings?, among an auditorium of non-emigrants that studies emigrants, or among an auditorium of emigrants who study themselves by studying other emigrants?, critical books about Are artists for readers of criticism? Or are they read by the same artists they talk about? All of this affects ethics, it is also expressed in anthropology, as Geertz said, for whom books about the Japanese are for Japologists. or for the Japanese themselves, when you write this it is expressed, either you write a book for Argentinians or you write it for Argentinians, or both, and how do you resolve it.

  But the notion of field also brings around it a series of ideologies that needed to be discussed and relocated. First, it is a notion that is very dominated in ideologies by physics, of a field that is supposed to be a field of magnetic forces where everything is It is discerned by the relationship between mass and inertia in movement, while in the social sciences things are not so simple, human societies involve institutions, the first of which is language itself, which is required for its stability and invariability. then for its transmission and its performance, the very exercise of those languages ​​in communication and in social praxis, objectives, goals, undertakings, daily life, communications wherever and in any of the ways in which they take place.

  Human societies, in addition, suppose correlates about a variety of issues that involve, through consciousness, human questions about the human, the being, memory, the soul, technology, the 20th century, with the advent of industrial reproduction, and of the serial image that is repeated, brought up a series of new problems for these questions which otherwise were once questions about the human condition in its generality, society, experience, civilization, development, but they are also, for everything that is heterogeneous to that experience, different languages, different acerbs, different cities, urban cities or rural communities, capitals or provinces.

   All this affects the theory of the field insofar as it was necessary to remove it, between art, literature and science, from a series of ideological assumptions according to which it could not be developed, with the field being objectively indisputable, not only the one that some We go for a long time to some contexts, cities, communities, languages, and then we go to others, but because if the ideology of the field remains attached to the substance, little can be done with it, if for some series of reasons it is decisive and imperative. in the social field, of aesthetic, literary, artistic, knowledge and symbolic practices as we saw before, it is because in some sense the theory of the field requires a whole series of cuts that separate the specific event that corresponds to the given field, from any other events to which you want to relate them or to which you want to dilute or go unrecognized.

   It was necessary to discuss this as a matter of field theory, especially because, as I explained before, artistic creation generally corresponds, and this is implicit in its ideologies, to an immediate relationship of perception, gaze and point of view. view that discerns, either about the social and natural world understood according to mimesis, its representation, or understood according to the denial of that mimesis and in its place abstraction and other modes of artistic poetics, but even, in the latter, where from Dadaism we have the denial of mimesis, we then have in its place, the affirmation of a meaning of life or of the relationship between art and life, which implies for the assumptions about the relationship between the event of being and the event of happening, of becoming, of the world or of the time, a type of immediatism that leaves little room for dynamics of the field that are inescapably objective and that we cannot ignore.

  In that essay I discuss how the relationship is discerned between what is invariant for the human condition as ultimate questions since ancient times, concepts, notions, assumptions, and the way in which these ultimate questions about the being in themselves of things are modified with technological changes and new modernizing circumstances, I discuss and contrast some of the main trends in the knowledge that deals with these issues, according to this point of view, that is, by the way in which it was presented in the 20th century and those questions as These have been expressed in the philosophy that is where and from where it has been appropriate to attend to and ventilate them, focusing attention on them was contingent in the field.

  When you go after the gap by asking all the questions and all the answers according to the concept, you come across that, for example, if you look for a correlation instead of understanding it as a pure abstraction, you realize that it can involve completely immaterial phenomena as well as completely material phenomena. and things, it can refer to the body as much as it can refer to things that do not require or suppose bodies, it is a concept that supposes what I discuss and propose in my analysis of the dissolution of ontology in epistemology.

  How do these ideologies affect the theory of the field? In the social sciences we need a field through a cut, let's put three cuts that explain how the cut explains the objective inescapability of the field, they could be infinite.

  Wherever we cut out social reality for knowledge or perception there is a field, whatever we cut out, if I cut out society through language, for example, I make a cut and define a field, however, To make any cut we have had to separate the event of social being from the event that corresponds to the world of substance, event that continues to govern in art, in painting, color, support, in engraving, impression, in sculpture, volume, matter, which Furthermore, this event of substance, through techniques, does not cease to have its mark on the ideologies of the social sciences, well, let's say that ultimately even in the syntax, which corresponds to the scope of discourse, there is substance, let's see how the ideologies of substance are expressed in this matter.

  As I explained before, as philosophy in the 20th century is faced with the dilemma that the meaning of our questions and answers to these ultimate or main questions about the human condition, being, consciousness, memory, technology, etc. changes. , has had to rethink the discussion about the being in themselves of things, while at the same time continuing to be invariant with respect to antiquity and changing according to how current conditions modify our questions and our answers to these questions, especially the background of a series of assumptions and ideologies around what a field, the field or the fields are. If you believe one thing or another about the being in themselves of things, if you believe, for example, that the being of being is the same as the being of substance, this impacts your sense or ability to understand in one way or another. that inescapable field that I have just explained to you as an unobjectionable objective reality, if the awareness that the reproduction of an image in photography through the mastery of an artifice can question your sense that the being of things is a being for itself unique and undifferentiated, insofar as if it is reproduced it is not so identical to itself, you could come to think that the being of your being is not the same as the being of the substance and therefore to accept that your sense of what is an event in physics, it does not have to be the same as your sense of what an event is for being, say, in this case, for the field.

  The being that lives the world in its spiritual, symbolic, language, social and cultural relationship in the city can accept a sense of the field in which the dynamics of what happens, language, communication, experience, can have interactive autonomy. with its own events or its own becomings independent of and from the events that happen to the world of substance or inanimate matter, while, on the contrary, you believe that it cannot be separated, that the event of the substance is the same as the event of being in its uniqueness, then you would not be willing to accept that a field could be so in some way that did not contemplate the substance, the Greeks saw the technec, the technique linked to these things, but the techniques changed a lot with the first development industrial and then postindustrial, cybernetics, computing and more our current world of technologies.

  Let's say you answer the question, do you think the substance is? What would you answer? You will probably answer me yes, of course it is, something happens or happens in it, it changes color, it changes, its temperature changes, but it is that IS of the substance something that corresponds to the IS of the BEING, let's say that you affirm, well the substance IS, but it is not a BEING, you are separating the IS from the BEING, according to your response something may correspond to an IS and not a BEING. , what IS may not be a BEING, but immediately the question comes and if it is not a BEING, what IS? You are asking about the IN ITSELF of the thing, on the other hand, if you answer that the IS of the substance and the IS of BEING is the same event, without realizing it you are involved in the field of theology, if you affirm that because it IS then it is the IS of BEING, you affirm that God exists, because if the inanimate world IS like what it is, it IS in BEING. , then to that IS corresponds a BEING, and that being would be GOD according to theological conjecture. The ES of the substance can correspond to the world of becoming or the world of happening which supposes an event, but not necessarily or not precisely the event of BEING, good answer, we then separate BEING from ES, Being IS, but its ES is not as EVENT the same EVENT of Es of inanimate matter, as long as you affirm that it is the same event and the same IS, we return to the question of the identity with itself of the BEING, if the being is undifferentiated, for everything that IS, then there is a part of BEING that falls outside our sense of BEING.

   2- A full and complete discussion of an author is not conceivable without being read in full so, as always, Knowledge in the Worlds of Everyday Life, his main book, is irreplaceable by any explanation that I can give here, it is This is a book that has to be read in its entirety. The examples are all mine, getting into Shurtz's examples when what I intend is only a synthesis of generality, would make referentiality too cumbersome, my synoptic deliberations of generality, well balanced, weighted and fair with respect to Shurtz, are de rigueur for anyone who I really want to read Shurtz at the same time that once I read Shurtz, it becomes obvious how and in what ways I move beyond him and in other directions and senses, however maintaining the rigor of the meanings that the concepts have in his sociology.

  The relationship, however, inseparable between pristine life and career activities, is not an obligation for most people, not everyone in life decides to relate in such a way, a much larger number of people maintain them. separated and they take care that the way in which the aspects of some domains enter the domains of the others do not become excessive in one sense and in the other, a life that is superimposed by a sense of field work arrived in secularized terms of the career , of the trade, the exercise of the rigor of specialized technique, can be a stressed, obstructed, impoverished and deteriorated life. Bringing bureaucracy into life in no sense seems appropriate to healthy living.

   On the other hand, I am not motivated to intervene with my books on reality or reality, much less change it. I am interested in the way in which, between my analyzes and theorizations, I work on the relationship between philosophical abstractions and the correlation by resorting to experiences. of my readers, sometimes claiming in them their visual acerbs, other times their corporal acerbs, other times their intellectual acerbs, they are books that corroborate themselves if, as works of knowledge in the knowledge of my readers, Knowledge and Ethics, as Deleuze says in Empiricism and Subjectivity.

  Although I am not interested in myself, I am not however closed to certain forms of intervention, I have students motivated towards a certain level of intervention in the real in the sense in which we refer here, and I keep my distance from maintaining my position in the phenomenology of surfaces while advising them on their purposes, Michael de Certaud, for example, in The Practice of Everyday Life proposes and develops interesting modalities of a certain intervention towards the real in his essay, for example Readings as encacerations.

Removing intentions to change the reality that I do not share, I am of the idea that life and reality as they are superior to us, I do agree with a retheorization of field work

Notes

In 1998, after Stephen A Tyler, in response to my essay The Eclipse of Evocation, responded to me with his essay Evocation: The Unwriteable inviting me to be at the restart of our dialogue, I opened the next dialogue by proposing Ethnomethodology in modern and contemporary sociology.

Bibliography

Bourdieu Pierre, Durhkeim, Things Said, Gedisa

Bourdieu Pierre, August Comte, Said Things, Gedisa

Habermas Junger, The Problem of Comprehension in Social Sciences, Volume 1-Reason and the Rationalization of Society, Boston, Beacon Press. 

Habermas Junger, The Problems of Understanding in Social Sciences, Pp, 144-196, Theory of Communicative Action I and II, Taurus

Habermas Junger, The Self and the Social; Mead, The Change of Paradigm, The Theory of Communicative Action, Beacon Press

Habermas Junger, The Self and the social, Mead, Pp, Theory of communicative action, Taurus

Habermas Junger, The Theory of Rationalization in Max Weber, Pp, 197-250, Theory of Communicative Action, Taurus

Habermas Junger, Parson, Theory of Communicative Action, Taurus

Habermas Junger, Popper, Theory of Communicative Action, Taurus

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, Philosophizing Field Research, The Presentational Linguistic, 98 Lab Books, USA

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, Borders and Overflows of Art: The Reconfiguration of Culture, Art and Identity in Complex societies, Art Death and Possibility of the Transart, Book

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The subject in Creativity, Book

Muguenza Javier, Salvador Guiner and Jose Maria Maraval, Contemporary Sociological Theory, Technos

Shutz Alfred, Knowledge in the Worlds of Everyday Life

Tyler Stephen A, Evocation, The Unwriteable, A Response to Abdel Hernandez San Juan, Sept 9, Rice University, Houston, Texas, USA, 1997

The Cognitive turn

©By Abdel Hernandez San Juan

Written and composed in English 
by Abdel Hernandez San Juan

  Given to his peculiar, unique attention to what Derrida defined as the “wishes to said”, (El Querer Decir), the relation between expression and form as a Thinker Stephen A Tyler seems to be near to expressionism in philosophy, as explicit in his themes and issues The Unspeakable, (Lo Inablable o Inexpresable), The Said and the Unsaid, (Lo Dicho y lo no Dicho) or in his beautiful, commotional essay in response to me, Evocation: the Unwriteable, A Response to Abdel Hernandez San Juan, on evocation to language, trope, writing, silence, memory and everyday life sublime, to both special and common sense languages, something that can also suggest Stephen affinities to philosophical anthropology, except by his attention to more complex theoretical issues evolving abstract imagination as explicit in his rich essay Alternatives Linguistics: Remediation’s, and his accents to rhetoric’s. 

  I consider Stephen A Tyler a major classical thinker, founder of cognitive anthropology in USA since the sixties and one of the abstracts and deepest, profound theoreticians of his generation in USA and around the world, he has being inspirational to a new generation of united states young thinkers in USA as myself Abdel Hernandez San Juan, Quetzil Eugenio, Between others. 

   As explicit in his presenter Display edited by Lyotard and the impact of his work in Germany and Europe, Stephen work is being progresibly each time more philosophical than linguistic or anthropological, (his volumes with Ivo Sketcher from Germany). 

   As Geertz anticipated claiming and invoquing Stephen, while questioning the difficulties of anthropology to be an intellectual force in contemporary thought, Stephen A Tyler (his works, essays, writings), as Bourdieu or Boudrillard from Europe, but from a unique point of view, develop a rich entrance of anthropology in contemporary thought, as deepest as the first Chomsky, (transformational grammatic, syntactic theory), but lees motivated, exceptic to politics. 

Evacuation of the substance

©Por Abdel Hernandez San Juan

This paper discusses the presupposition of extrinsecation between language and reality in logical positivism, language, on the one side, and reality on the other, as a nominalist, dexitical, indexical and conceptual exteriorization, on how the major move of logical positivism seen from the tradition of classical thought from Leibniz to Hegel, consisted about the evacuation of the substance in the positive moment when with the apparition of concept the essence started to be divided. While Hegel following Leibniz and spinosa sustained that the concept should be seen in its origin as the union between being and essence and by the way as the final true of the substance, he also pointed that with the apparition of concept the essence started to be divided and that from such a moment a concept of the concept appear, the paper discuss how from such a moment the substance is finally superated since concepts are themselves Inmaterials, spirituals and ideals they are the opposite of substance as their otherness. 

      The paper discuss how logical positivism should be theorized and discussed from this comprehension of the concepts affirmations over substance the reason to understand why under positivism both substances and techniques start to be subordinated to cognitivism and conceptualism as an optionals. 

  The paper stablish how one of the must usual uses of the word empirism merged from this dominance of positivism over empiricism subordinating the last one to the meaning of being an application, while more ancient meanings of empiricism such as those claimed by empiricism as a positioning itself is based seen from the same tradition of classical thought exactly from the opposite when everything continues to be substances and techniques when concepts and cognition stay subordinated to its vehicles. Pointing such a dichotomy as the main one between positivism and empirism, the paper discuss the main reasons explain why the relation between language and object, language and reality, subject and object stablish in positivism as the basis to get knowledge and objective thought while at the same time such an exteriorization is needed also in social science to differentiate social facts and social events --even the relation between being and becoming seen as a social or cultural phenomena-- from the chemical and physical events of substance and techniques and how the actor in sociology is theoretically abstracted to distinguish when a world or a universe start to be social or cultural and nothing more, as Popper did, to which the literal actor need to be like substances also evacuated  far to acting or behaviors. The paper clarify how psychology far to be yet a science can’t entrance and or be accepted in the philosophy of science less when psychology is being seen from its empirical side, the paper advertises on the traumatic consequences created by those who don’t know the epistemological differences between positivism and empiricism, needed to both, to maintain it separated as well as to know how to relate and or mix it scientifically as I am doing from phenomenology, to late discuss some aspects of some of my recent years books on medias and technology while also pointing out things distinguish lacan theory from previous Freudian psychoanalysis    

Keywords: Logical positivism, extrinsecation between language and reality, positivism, phenomenology, cognition, conceptualism, empirism

  To the extent that one develops one's own theoretical thinking, the references that tend to be many in one's early youth are reduced as one becomes more and more selective. There are authors from many of whom I distanced myself for reasons of interest, knowledge and interest, as Junger Habermas says.

  There are, however, authors who continue to be of interest to me today. And I'll come back to it at the end. Precisely because I have always considered and put interdisciplinarity at the center, becoming at some point interested in transdisciplinarity, I have had to develop meticulous rigor regarding how and in what way they are possible, this has led me to create very precise maps. and well structured with a strong basis in disciplinary knowledge and to avoid mixing or putting together what should not be mixed or put together.

Disciplinary Autonomies

  The map of the hard sciences does not pass through any place in any way, the disciplines are separated, sociology has an autonomy that goes from one sociologist to another with autonomous coherence to what is sociology, comprehensive-evolutionary sociology, Weber, synchronic- structural, Durkeim, positivist, Comnte, functionalist, Parson, institutionalist, Melton, situationalist, Popper, ethnomethodological, Shurtz, Mead, Garfinkel, structuralist and symbolic, Bourdieu, linguistics has its disciplinary autonomy linguist to linguist, structuralist, Saussure, distributionalist, Hemslev, of the statement and the discourse, Benveniste, functionalist, Jacobson, generativist, Chomsky, and so on with each discipline, it also occurs in the philosophy of sciences, science of sciences

The Evacuation of Substance: The Positivism-Empiricism Dichotomy

  I didn't know that something like logical empiricism existed, what existed was logical positivism, those who seem to attribute to empiricism what positivism did, positivism and empiricism are different things. The logical positivist discussion about language and reality in its side of discussion about the object, which is only one of its sides and which returns in logical positivism to the discussion about objectivity, neutrality and scientificity, is not itself empirical.

  The fact that logical positivist developments on language and reality, language and object can have, in terms of philosophy of science, a prospective methodological scope for possible applications beyond the pure abstract-theoretical, society if it is sociology, the language, if it is linguistic, does not in itself enable us to go from a use of the word that wants through one meaning or the other, now here that of empiricism itself, to sneak into the logical positivist question a meaning of empiricity coming from psychology and in this of behaviorism and behaviorism, together because it is the empirical aspect of psychology in general that has no entry into the philosophy of sciences, the science of sciences.

  The reason why it is not disciplinary appropriate is explained below.

  The logical positivist development on language and reality has dispensed with a substance or the substance, there is no mimesis for that language on its other side, that of the real, with a substance in which it comes, which moves it as if from an immanence, in which it slides, blends in or lands, because it is, per se to its greater or lesser correlate with the real, too immediate or transported in its own vehicle of language, logical positivism has emptied both language and substance of substance. to reality and has therefore reestablished that relationship as a purely nominal, deictic and indexical relationship, in which there is only conceptualism and cognition, the empirical as a dimension is evicted.

  Empiricism, on the other hand, comes and arises from the opposite, it is born from phenomenology, not conceptualism, and precisely because in it there is a difference between the world in itself or the thing in itself and the Phenomenal world, between essence and appearance. , between the substrate and the phenomenon.

  Empiricism arises as a way of working not between language and reality as a nominal relationship, but as a relationship between two moments of something that is the same because it brings with it a substance in its immediacy and it is required to separate and understand, as a The same thing is once a world in itself and once a Phenomenal World, if it is both things in one but it is also both in turn in what expresses them as different moments, then we want to know how these two moments of the same are relate, to one corresponds the in itself of what is, to the other corresponds what appears and what is present as long as it does not do so in the form as it is in itself, but always in the Phenomenal in which it is presented, appears, appearance. , expresses or manifests, for this reason, the empirical emerges as a dimension of the reflective that can no longer work as an intellectual form or of reason, without doing so with the empirical dimension in which from the substance itself it is dragged or transported and of which empiricism itself is a reflection of that empirical reflective form, it is not in vain that Deleuze deduces an intrinsic relationship between empiricism and subjectivity.

  Logical Positivism is the analysis of the concept in the nominal relationship between language and reality, the real and language are thought of as extrinsic, the substance has been evacuated, removed from the environment, empiricism arises from the opposite, everything including the essence and appearance They are nothing but manifestations of the substance. Confusing logical positivism with empiricism could lead to technical disorders if we start from the fact that for the ancients, a third instance intervenes between language and the world, which is technique, technec, which you would have to disrupt to pass off empiricism as positivism, positivism. logical, as conceptualism, puts you above and distant from the technique, you have cognitive access to it as an optionalism, but you are not dragged, conveyed, or transported in it.

  If you come on the path of a technicality you go where the technique goes and according to the technique, you surrender to its vehicle and arrange everything as that technique requires it and takes you, we could call it an empirical dimension, but logical positivism disposes you On the contrary, at a cognitive distance towards the technique that has it according to the concept, if you have the technique according to the concept then you no longer go according to its vehicle and its transport, here you have right in front of logic the contrast between logical positivism and empiricism, if you want a debate between the two, it will be precisely the one that, according to empiricism, would try to show how the concept succumbs to the vehicle and according to positivism, how the vehicle succumbs to the concept.

  With regard to the social world, this contrast between positivism and empiricism is evident because right where the world is social, logical positivism's evacuation of substance is required to find forms of being and events that are social. in its various forms depending on the type of fact, reality or social materiality, is the well-known criticism that Pierre Bourdieu makes from sociology to the relationship between substantialism and psychologism. Here we have an issue of moral and ethical philosophy within the philosophy of science to which Habermas has paid exhaustive attention, which has its beginning in logical positivism and which only defends the latter.

  The philosophy of the object that is born from logical positivism is developed to achieve knowledge, that object is not a subject that becomes an object, it is an object that the subject of knowledge needs to shape his knowledge, which is why the philosophy of the object returns to the objectivity, scientificity and the very constitution of what that knowledge is in itself, yes in the passage from pure analytical philosophy, and from the philosophy of science, to sciences such as linguistics and sociology, the object becomes in some way a subject that is no longer, or that requires separating the subject of knowledge and the subject-object of that knowledge, this step occurs because the subject that becomes an object stops being a subject in the terms in which a subject is a subject. empirical in psychology.

  With this, Quine's criticism of Carnap is dismantled and deconstructed.

  Returning in a note on the meanings of empiricism, it is necessary to distinguish that the meaning 1 referred to above, the one that refers only to "applicable beyond the purely abstract", is certainly one that has been possible precisely thanks to the fact that logical positivism has evacuated the substance with the concept, without this evacuation of the substance that logical positivism does, that meaning of “empirical” would not have been possible, it is the use of the word empirical to mean like abstract and theoretical knowledge cut into its own positivity, we can then develop an application, this meaning would not have arisen without the dominance of positivism over empiricism, the first, as the concept that has the vehicle and the technique, subordinates the empirical to the positivity of the concept.

  If we go back to Hegel, we will find the dilemma clearly in his logic of the concept of fact, after extensively discussing substance in his logic of essence, Hegel argues that the concept is the same as the union of being and essence, for me. Part I disagree with these immanentist meanings of the essence and its substantialism, but respecting Hegel's meanings, he maintains that the substance is in the genesis of the concept but at the same time he then explains that in it the essence is divided and the substance is surpassed. , this overcoming that initially refers it to the relationship between being and reflection, occurs in the concept of the concept that supposes an object, certainly, a consciousness of itself that returns to the concept as its own identity, its objectivity and its truth, and here in its positivity it is no longer substance, in the previous discussion on positivity and negativity exposed in the logic of essence the diatribe that positions positivism is contained, this is affirmed in the positivity of the concept, it thus echoes in classical philosophy of science: the concept is the truth of the substance, but the truth of the concept is not the substance, this is the crucial point, the truth of the concept surpasses the substance and becomes the same immaterial, spiritual, heterogeneous, abstract, it is because the other or the other of the substance.

  Well, and here the distinction between these two different meanings of empiricism is essential, the one, synonymous with the application of the abstract, logical positivism has taken control of empiricism and has made it subordinate to itself through the positivity of the concept, in the other , which is what corresponds to empiricism as a form positioned in itself, empiricism remains as a form of phenomenology.

The table in summary would be like this:

1-Master Logical Positivism

Logical Positivism-Application-Empiricism

Logical Positivism: Concept-Vehicle

2-Forms of Empiricism

Empiricism 1: Substance

Empiricism 2: Application

3-Master Empiricism

Empiricism: Essence-Phenomenon-Substance-Vehicle-Concept

  It is therefore the same distinction that we make between Saussure's structural linguistics, which has made an emptying of the substance, the Saussurean sign with the semiotics that derive from it, cut synchronically between the structural stability of the language and its use in speech and biserver , and the very different type of theory of the sign that comes from Pierce which precisely derives from trying to work in unison with substance.

What makes a World Social: Abstraction of the Social and Evacuation of the Actor

  Popper and behaviorism-behaviorism are situated in opposite places in the philosophy of law and moral philosophy within the philosophy of science.

  Popper's situation comes from the objectification of an act that has been abstracted by that which makes up the social world of that act, the situation has been abstracted not as a literal situation of real actors who act, but as the form of relationship in which engenders the social world with the aim of returning to the latter, distanced from it, to objectify it as a social world through what makes it society, the situation has served here, as in linguistics it has served to define the sign and the signifier, to specify what makes that “social” world and not something else, to find where and at what moment a world begins to be society and not something else.

  If you go to Popper you find a distinction between worlds that allows you to understand when a world is society and not something else, the situation appears here as a minimal abstracted unit, it can be the situation between points and lines, the actors are abstracted and omitted as literal actors who act for what in the act, separated and abstracted from the performance and the actor, supposes a situation in what makes a social world, it is the relationship of knowledge involved in what a world is and then what makes it a world. social, the actor who acts, like the substance before, has also been evacuated, there is no actor who acts neither externalized, nor understood in his subjectivity.

  While Mead sees the origin of what makes a world social in the relationship between the formation of the self and the social as one of incorporation, socialization and conformation, in what makes up society, it is not a situation of a acting actor whose acting has conduct, not in the terms in which for the empirical part of psychology an actor acts, the actor in sociology does not have conduct, so that the empirical dimension of psychology not only has no entry into philosophy of the sciences but does not have it in sociology.

  Quiner and Popper are two diametrically different things.

  You come to Popper from Weber, Durkheim, Comte, Shurtz, a tradition of disciplinary autonomy in which behaviorism and behaviorism are never discussed or mentioned in a single book, it would be like talking about zoology in a mathematics class. Comnte also wrote about what is scientific and what science is, and in the same way as Comnte, Popper is included in sociology, not in the philosophy of science, and if there is anything he is further away from, it is psychology.

  Semantics is meaning from the ontology itself, if you have a debt with semantics you not only let yourself be trapped by the meaning, but from the ontology itself nothing is more than meaning, letting yourself be trapped is a redundancy, you were already in the meaning, semantics It begins, is born and exists thanks to meaning.

  I am stimulated to go to the beach as I am to take a trip and read a book, but my stimulus has not been provoked in me, it comes from my motivations, and understood in this way the stimulus, you can replace the word if you want with meaning , I am stimulated because it makes sense to me, no one from the outside has conditioned my choice, it depends only on me, I have not received an external stimulus, we could say the opposite that without sense there is no stimulus. Meaning is not thought of as a possibility, meaning was before the possible and if you want to make a distinction between the meaning that was before and new meanings that you want to create or that things are about to become, the relationship between meaning and the possible is governed then by the production of new meanings, you do not create meanings with the possible, you create the possible with meanings. I consider that it is not disciplinary appropriate to go to semantics, theory of meaning, with a presupposition of stimulus-response using the word stimulus as coming from behaviorist and behaviorist terms and go to the logical positivist theory about language and reality, language and object, from meanings about the empirical from behaviorism and behaviorism. In fact, they are meanings that I consider should remain separate.

  Behaviorism is psychology and although psychology proposes an empirical dimension, it is precisely the characteristics of what is empirical in psychology that are precisely what do not usually allow psychologists and psychological trends to enter the sciences of sciences. To expect psychology to be accepted in the philosophy of science through the empirical dimension is to choose the side of psychology that has the least possibilities. Replacing positivism in analytical philosophy with conceptions of empiricism from psychology limits this possibility to the maximum. Use Carnap, who is an analytical philosopher in the philosophy of language, to use the topic of empiricism to criticize Carnap, who tries to sneak psychology into the sciences of science by confusing empiricism in psychology with the logical positivist question of the relationship. between language and reality, between language and object, it is a path for which I see very few possibilities, in fact I see it impossible.

  Furthermore, in analytical philosophy and language there is no mind, the mind is dead. Not even when empiricism in the philosophy of science becomes atomistic, as happens with Gilles Deleuze's Empiricism and Subjectivity, is the transition from behaviorism to the philosophy of science accepted. Of all the psychologists of the 20th century, only Jean Piaget has been accepted and with great reluctance because he is a psychologist, he is being given a very slow and progressive entry, at once I anticipate that not even with the help of atomism in empiricism that is Hume through Gilles Deleuze and Gilles Deleuze, one can enter the philosophy of science with behaviorism via empirical atomization. Mead, an ethnomethodological sociologist, his theory includes some elements of psychology but it is clearly not psychology, it is sociology.

  He who wants to be a theorist in the philosophy of science, if the latter is what he wants, must abandon behaviorism and behaviorism because with both he will never reach his goal.

  If you want to be a psychologist you could stick with your choice but then you would have to move away from the philosophy of science and concentrate on psychology to see how it copes within it as a discipline so that it can be a science. Something that to this day has not been achieved, and the behaviorism within it even less so. You cannot, with a psychologist, become an evangelist in the philosophy of science.

  I could clearly do both, a thesis in epistemology, without psychology, excluding behaviorism and behaviourism, and do another thesis in psychology, but separately, I would then have to justify in the latter what, by the way, I see as impossible to achieve within psychology. As a discipline, explain why and how you relate Lacan, which is a theory in psychoanalysis, with behaviorism and behaviorism.

  If your chosen topic is the mind-body relationship because you choose a debate regarding those in whom the mind has died, then if it is based on Quiner's criticism of Carnap, you continue to depend on Carnap to validate Quiner.

After Lacan

  So let's now return to psychology, you are now within psychology as a discipline and we have to discuss Lacan on one side and Behaviorism on the other.

  In post-Lacanian theoretical terms, what it is about is knowing that the unconscious has not been lodged in a place of consciousness as if it had a space which, as Freud supposed, has become unmanifest and can only be found in its latent expressions. through an interpretation whose meanings lead to that unmanifest place, far from being deposited or housed as a reservoir of undiscovered meanings but accumulated like compressed documents in unaccessed places, an assumption that led psychoanalysis to focus on finding the unmanifest meanings of the symbols for the subject, it is about establishing that meanings cannot be fixed around the symbols themselves, spoken or visual, as something that corresponds to them and around which they can be retained once and for all.

  The interpretive activity, in turn or on the contrary, should not move from latent expressions to unmanifest meanings that, assigned to symbols, would lead to discovering an inaccessible unconscious but lodged, located, ready in some place in search of which it must go, but rather It establishes itself as an interpretive activity as the scene of psychoanalysis, the construction of interpretations is not an investigation of the unconscious meaning of symbols, but the establishment of a relationship between what we have given language to and what we have not. we have given language.

  Far from being found behind or on its dark and inaccessible background, what was once called the unconscious is disseminated and dispersed, not on one side of consciousness like the subconscious or unknown space, but rather having been divided and distributed among the language itself and non-language, between what has become language and what has not yet, what is unconscious is not unconscious for one or for others, but is established among many, the interpretive activity consists not in discovering meanings of symbols, but in finding languages ​​that correspond better and are more clearly established between subjects around that regarding which languages ​​had not been agreed upon or established.

  It is the sign in Lacan that transforms itself into a hieroglyph, far from the lost ark or the holy grail of the unconscious, to whose inveterate and unknown lands we have to undertake unknown journeys of whose dark inaccessibility the symbols are revelations of unknown meanings, the unconscious It is attached, if you will, to the signs, it is in them, in language there are at the same time the spells of its illuminating potential and the revelations of that which has not yet achieved a language, language itself must find what it can. Through it, giving a language to express what had not existed before, the unconscious is not deep, on the contrary, it is extremely superficial. How would you relate this to behaviorism? Why would you find a way to relate Lacan and behaviorism? If you find one, I will be your first reader.

  The books The Linguistic Presentational, The Given and the Not Given and the Intangible, which are three among my books, authorial literary works of theoretical thought that correspond to my life and work as an intellectual in the United States which began in 1997, especially to Starting in 1998, I took up permanent residence in Texas, which I have continued consecutively to the present. My books to date are six, the most recent The Intramundane Horizon and the Indeterministic Truth, the previous ones in Alreves order, from last to first, the previous one The Given and the not Given, before The Being and the Monad, before that The Linguistic Presentational and before that The Subject in Creativity, those books follow my first book Edges and Overflows of Art: Advent of Transart, these are therefore the complete works, any other book is selected essays.

  These three are from and about the United States written from a Texan perspective, a point of view from Texas, specifically Houston, that is, about the United States, which is my country as an immigrant since I resided in 1998.

  I read Chomsky's syntactic theory and also generative grammar and essays by other authors on both as well but it has been a long time, I have not taken it up again and I did not take it up again to write these books, I do not remember recursives in Chomsky, but if they are contemplated, I will return to generative grammar and syntax to see if Chomsky contemplated recursives if that were the case, I will write something about Chomsky, I read in Houston his book The Minimalist Program, quite computational, yes, but I found it very variegated, not in the sense of complex, deep or hermetic, but in the sense of being too involved in computer science issues, the theoretical text here became an algorithm of formulas and meta-comments of computer and engineering reference formulas and, as is obvious, my philosophical, sociological and hermeneutic perspective is completely different.

  However, I have referred to it, paradoxically, not in my books on new media, but in my essay The Minimalist Sense not included in these books, which is about art.

  I also read in Houston his book Language and Responsibility, both published in New Press, but I do not consider that these books of mine, due to their nature and theoretical and writing characteristics, have to refer to Chomsky within them, if I mention him, however, outside, as a sociocultural reference at an intellectual level in the United States, since obviously it is language, in this sense I am open to a debate outside the book but developed in and from the United States around my book, the linguistic presentation that contemplates that my book and the essay of Jacques Derrida on present, presentation and presence in phenomenology and if this were of interest, why not?, although my own individual perspective is Derridarian in this, phenomenological, also open to discussing it with Chomsky's Language and Responsibility, specifically his chapters on semantics and even Presenter (dis) play an essay by Stephen A Tyler published in Spiritu Creator Magazine edited by Lyotard.

  This essay is not focused on the question of metalanguage, but in just two or three paragraphs I compare certain aspects of linguistic presentation in high technologies with the former metalanguage, and what I discuss after that moves beyond metalanguage, This is clear not only in that essay but in the book as a whole, the comparison with metalanguage in two or three paragraphs is to establish how the linguistic presentational moves away from it and in what new ways we can say that some remnant survives or remains. in a new way, something that remembers that old or ancient ancestor, the new way in which it occurs is discussed not only in the essay but theorized as a whole with all the chapters of the book and their relationships with each other, in fact, I I move far beyond both metalanguage and hypertext, which remain as great-great-grandfathers, not only in this book, but also in The Given and Not Given.

  The question of metalanguage has obviously been worked on, Barthes also works on it, and I do not consider myself, of course, to be the inventor of the concept of metalanguage, but it is obvious that my book The Linguistic Presentation is that my perspective is completely original and innovative, it is not a book about metalanguage, is clearly a book about new technologies in the United States as we experience them in everyday life, as services that are also part of the living environment, as are The Given and the Not Given and the essays chosen in The Intangible.

Its chapters are those of The Linguistic Presentational

The Linguistic Presentational

Theorizing Media Today

The Interstice

Lo Intangible

Layer boundaries

Philosophizing field research

   I began in Caracas to write sociology and urban anthropology, and in 1997 I finally came to declare experimental ethnography, a work that I did together with my guest set designer Fernando Calzadilla, and to write essays on theoretical anthropology.

  As for Geertz, in Caracas I read The Interpretation of Cultures, After the Facts: An Anthropologist and Three Cities, Local Knowledge and yes, I also read The Anthropologist as an Author.

  Of these books, the one that I liked as a book was After the Facts: An Anthropologist and Three Cities more related to my experience in anthropology, and I liked The Interpretation of Culture for the theory of the symbolic that Geert abstracts and theorizes in the book. the same thing that the book is ultimately intended for, its reason for being. I liked the other two less.

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