English

Abdel Hernandez San Juan

The Intramundane Horizon

Phenomenology and hermeneutics of everyday life

Complete works

Book VI

Individual authorial work/Theoretical Writings

Free school for advanced studies in hard sciences

Western thought

Book information

Author: ©Abdel Hernandez San Juan

The author rights of this book belong to Abdel Hernandez San Juan, its author, conceiver, writer and composer

Title: The Intramundane Horizont

Type of Work: Literary of theoretical essays/book

Destination:  Books Libraries and biblioteques

Sides of Covered and Print Publications Sides: 22.5 cm x 15 cm

Number of Pages: 200, Reproduction: from 1 to 5000 exemplars, Covered Conservation and Protection Sides: 21.59 cm x 27.54 cm, Covered Lectures Sides: 21.59 cm x 27.54 cm

Content

The Eclipse of the eye

 The Intramundane Horizon

The Chrysalis of being

Overordination in the life worlds

Facing immanence

Christianity and structure

Beyond interactionism

Bibliography

In fact, precisely in this opposition of both worlds their difference has disappeared, and what would have to be a world in and of itself is the same a phenomenal world and vice versa the Phenomenal world is the same an essential world, the phenomenal world and the world in itself are, therefore, each one in itself the totality of the identical reflection with itself and of the reflection in its other, world in itself and Phenomenal world, one would have to be only reflected, the other only in itself, but each one continues in its other and therefore it is in the same the identity of both moments, what is therefore present is this totality that by itself breaks into two totalities, one is the reflected totality, the other is the immediate, both are above all independent but they are such only as totalities and they are such because each essentially has in it the moment of the other. The different independence of each one, of the determined as immediate and of the determined as reflected, is therefore now placed in such a way that each can be only as an essential relationship with the other and have its independence in this unity of the two 447- 448

Hegel, Science of Logic

The Eclipse of the Eye

©By Abdel Hernandez San Juan

  This paper discusses a retheorization of the eye in current neoliberal and late capitalism specifically in the united states but it applies to any were the world of free market and the transnationalization of the culture of free market publicity, modern technologies as the internet and mass medias stablishes under neoliberal capitalism. Coming from the issue of subject and predicament in ancient thought since Aristoteles to late modern dissolutions of the subject under modern grammatology and computer modern technologies the paper proposes a rediscusion of the eye under free markets after the late eighties discussion on the death of the subject

Keywords: Retheorizing the eye, free markets, the death of the subject, anthropology of the subject

Written, conceived, composed and created in English 

by Abdel Hernandez San Juan

When Aristoteles, a major classical philosopher to us in art since fine arts begins from the very beginning with obligatory ancient Grieg’s, defined to discuss his logical tractactus there was not yet a clear, well defined distinction between subject and predicament as a sentence matter, the subject which was in fact already considered in Aristoteles logics, was still considered as a function of syllogisms, to ancient Grieg’s logic and logical analysis in general, was related with and subordinated to yet a sense of congruency that was not much being comprehended within a formal and structural abstraction of languages, but by common sense derivations from logics of affirmative and negative assertions.

   If A supposes to go all the way to his house, there is a way to his house. A may be then be a person because usually only person goes to a house, but not a dinosaur, because a dinosaur maybe goes away but not to a house and a dinosaur can just broken a house, only a person uses to go all the way to his house, so A may more probably be a person, even when we still don’t know if certainly dinosaurs really existed or if that was just an invention of Hollywood genres or a certain effects of adventures genres in natural sciences imaginations.

  This fun explanation simply explicit in a few words how logics worked to ancients, the subject was not yet recognized as a formal abstraction of the sentence which helps us moderns to extend the syntactical roll of the subject as a general abstraction that helps to relates elements with qualities, the chair is being transported to another room, the chair is the subject, transported to another room the predicament, adjectives to pronoms, the chair is good, the chair supposes not to be a subject out of language but it is a subject to the good as an adjective which qualify how the chair feels.

   In ancient thought, the subject was still a function outside language just as a someone who uses language to something else and logically related with sentences by affirmative and negative common sense implications, only a sense of congruence versus incoherence, sense versus non-sense, maybe linked and seen from today as a modern revisitation, relate modern formalism with ancients. 

   Grammatology, for example, relates in gramatics with such an aspect, if it is grammatical then it is coherent, if it not coherent or makes not sense, then it is not grammatical, there is also an interesting, unexplored and undiscussed relation between ancient logics and contemporary sociology, when we fully read Alfred Shurtz who was the first one who proposed and created a phenomenological sociology, we can see a subject in everyday life who works out of language as a function and to whom language, given to sociology, goes from and through experience, acerbos, backgrounds, repertories, tipifications, significativizations and pertinences, also Junger Habermas in his Theory of Communicative Action I and II understand sentences as enunciations in terms of intersubjective forms.

  The modern syntactical rol of the subject which becomes as abstraction almost diluted within infinity formal relations between qualities and things, adjective and substantives, the email was amazing, the morning light is great today, has being the basis to modernity, civilization and evolution, but beyond just a matter of sintaxis abstraction which still works like early xx century machines, compared to current technologies, the modern dissolution of the subject in abstracted formal logics was a necessary condition to the formal logics creates computers and fractal technologies, it helped makings fasters the velocities of inferences and deductions and as results all the mathematical and cybernetic formalism and informatics creates the acceleration and success efficacy of modern technologies congruency. 

  Modern grammatology in facts worked with the subject already diluted in abstract formal logics inside language as a formalism and beyond sintaxis fasterly given subjects by elements and revisiting classical philosophy from ancients to contemporary in a way which moved philosophy to be with highest precision an exact science as explicit in Jacques Derrida and Junger Habermas, a simple concept, like the chair, the email or a morning light maybe simply the subject. 

  Anyway, this issue basis the eighties debate turn to the nineties about the death of the subject, a complex and exhausted debate since all the Lyotard philosophical theory of discourses regimes and about the differences between languages genres, artists versus lawyers, lawyers versus medics, medics versus informatics ingeniers, informatics ingeniers versus economists or business managers, business managers versus journalists, journalists versus administrators and all them versus politicians, basis in the prevalence of the subject as he clearly demonstrated exploring –something I defined as domains exchanges-- in the confines of the given subjects, the philosopher as artist, the artist as philosopher, the prevalence of the subject, by the way applies and is needed to any exploration of the confines of givens in the given confines toward the ungiven horizonts, from interdisciplinary and transdisciplinaries, to specialities and expertises domains explorations, communications, exchanges, cooperations. 

   Of course any valuation of the needed subject after the eighties debates on the death of the subject, should be completely retheorized as I already did in my book The Subject in Creativity, considering all I has explained before, also.

   Who is the subject in creativity?, it may be me, it may be the computer softweres to navigations, it maybe designs, it maybe be the business one, it may be any of us exploring confines, it is abstract logic and supposes the already discussed when ontology dilutes in epistemology as computers are, but it is alive in another ways and in another sense, nor a subject death, it maybe in the theory of practice, the  curator of exhibits functioning in the structural logic of practices or it may be art exploring social sciences or social sciences exploring art, it maybe literature and literacy, it maybe writing, in fact, its objects as usually object to subject is here being in marketing, it works in and out daily and is current and proper phenomenologically in the three senses of the subject, the ancient one functioned within common sense syllogisms, the one stay outside or inside in another sense to the everyday life world of phenomenological sociology or Habermas intersubjective pragmatism, and the one prevalence abstract formalism diluted at Derrida grammatology and Lyotard as ifs of the philosopher as artist and the artist as philosopher, Duchamp as well. 

  The philosophy of the subject in fact evolves a few more things to be considered, first science as a subject and art as a subject as there is not possibilities even to explorations in the confines of disciplines, professions and specialities without retheorizing the subject as I did at the subject in creativity, evolves also a primary, pivotal prevalence of the subject in the basis of any epistemology as knowledge itself needs a relation between subject and object, nor only as a matter of pregiven object or constructive object to the subject knowledge, but also at any phenomenological processing of the given world of nature and society to the impressions, senses and perceptions including the eye we later will seen.

  The point in question I want to call in this paper is about a research on the point of views in free markets I developed, research and discussed. There is the whole eighties conversations between Junger Habermas and Jean Francois Lyotard mainly accent and effazis theorizing capital versus state, free markets versus state.       

   While the subject evolves the theory of the state as althusser clearly pointed out when he said that the state interpelates ideologies and awareness, conscience, as forms of the subject there is not a fix or constantly defined notion of the subject as one with itself to free markets and capital given that free market and capital evolves a process of continuum exchanges in which the position of elements is being defined by exchanges itself, saling, buying, business commercializing and or marketing.

  Even when this exchanges may evolves also abstractions of space and time maybe defined as diluted subjects like within the formalism of computer formal logics as forms of a syntactical subject just like relations between elements and qualification may be seen as subjects to the accelerated fast inferences and deductions of computational processing, the financial system, for example, or simply the relation between values and credits, the subject in free markets is not already working in the sense of subject and object relations, nor even according to interpelative forms of ideology as form of the subject.

  The object to the subject in free markets is the object of saling and buying, the object is being exchanged nor perceived or received by the passive body memory of the senses, there is, of course, a moment of perception in free market as there is also aesthetics in market, but this moment of contemplation as explicit in publicity is regarded not to a passive object as objects are usually given to the impressions or to the passive objects the subject creates as the object of knowledge constructions. Subject and object are the subject and the object of exchanges. There is not in free market a fix point of view to stablish a fix position to the subject, to the object of the subject and to the subject of the object, the whole idea of points of views is itself being relativized in free market. 

  One cannot define in free markets a fix or a constant position to an eye even to an abstract eye, the position of the eye is being eclipsed itself within free markets, who knows and perceive in free markets?, who defines the privilege eye?, the vendor?, the vendor is sailing something but he may be waiting his whole life a purchaser to his sales, if you don’t have a free market exchanges process of merchants you can’t not figure out a possibility for the vendor to sale it, the vendor becomes the object of the purchaser and both vendors and purchasers are at the same time the objects of merchants. There is not in free markets “an other” to “a self” or “a them” to “an us” or to “a we”, who is “the self”?, the vendor or the purchaser?, the distributor or the merchant?, the exchanges?. 

  The concept of exchange supposed to describe a certain activity to the figuration of spacial and time meetings of sailing and buying, vendors and purchasers but as you all well know exchanges in free markets are not reducible to the point the actors meets, who is “the us” or “the we” in free markets?, the vendors or the purchasers?, who are “the them” to “the us”, or “the us” to “the them”?, the vendors?, the purchasers?, the financists?, the business managers?, the distributors?, the publicists?, the merchants?. Let supposes a position, a cream lotion product to the skin, a beautiful woman is being here as an image a model at a merchant publicity, she appear at the bottle product etiquettes, at magazines, at posters within the city, any were the product is being in sale, is she “a we” to “a them”?, or is she “an other” to “a we”?, who is being “the we” when she is “the other”?, or who is being “the other” when she is being “the we”?, she is not the vendor nor the purchaser for instance, maybe she is a girl friend of the product owner, let imagine that, then she may be “a we” to the owners of the industries of cream lotions bottles to the skin, and vendors and purchaser “the others” to her and the owners. 

 But there is many other industries sailing cream lotion products to the skin with different woman models already in competition in free market so that maybe to another owner she and her boyfriend owner maybe “an other”, who defines the privilege eye?, who embody the privilege eye?, product owners, publicity models, vendors, purchasers, consumers, the banks?, the financial system?, walt street?.

  The eye should be completely retheorized. This retheorization of the eye applied to the eye in general any were the eye appear as paradigmatic.

  Certainly there is a moment in neoliberal capitalism of full free market in which the whole free market progresibly becomes illustrated, I will even define neoliberalism as the turn of free markets advanced capitalism when free markets culture and society commit to illustrates free markets itself, here all the eighties and nineties literacy on business managing, market control of quality, how to successful improve a business, attention to the client, markets nichos, illustration of group dynamics inside an empresarial organization, in which the dialectics of illustration is being fractalized and redistributed inside the logics of free markets as a new culture of free markets qualification services, the born of a new culture of services applies to the general logics of both empresarial organizations, freelance independent professionals, free markets actors such as vendors and purchasers, corporations and companies, but this neoliberal turn of attention of the free market culture on itself resolves not precisely through a privilege point of views in free markets or an eyes solution, in fact, it required already an eclipsed eye and successfully worked through a new mixture of markets pragmatism procedures and illustration dialectics migrated from a sense of a civil citizen and communities educational vocations to the economies of free markets, it was the result of free markets subjectivities learnings on how to improve the success efficacy of free markets culture of services to take amazing advantage or vintage over the state, by self-providing free markets with a metaculture of illustrating free markets, something which, as we well knows also transformed assimilates many things from the nonprofit, volunteers, profitalics and philanthropy logic of the state, to the private sector of initiatives and procedures having definitive consequences in late capitalism, it was then the result of a conversation the nineties heritages from the eighties about the complex relation between theory of free markets, capitals and theories of the state.

 To tell the true my idea, my concept, my initiatives, my desition and my creation to decide to conceive an ethnography of markets is more a mixture relates first with marketing as a market illustration of the market in terms of the fold turn out free market attention to free markets on itself and with the philosophizing of such a subjectivity evolving here all I previously discussed on the impossible point of view of any privilege eye in full free markets is being pivotal, there is then as mainfull subjectivity in my move and subjectivity evolves already nor a subject, but subjectivity and intersubjectivity and the only subject to subjectivity and intersubjectivity is a subject in creativity, by the way how may this ethnography I invented and created work as an unprecedent one, it haves a precedent heritage certainly in all I mentioned before about free markets on free markets and the eighties debates Habermas, Lyotard but moves far away from all that metaphors of the eyes and to the ideologies of us them or we and the other relations.

  There is of course also markets of eyes nor only in prostetic shopping stores which literally sales artificial eyes to blinds or a one eye person, a wrong, or at hospital when organ donations operations helps people without eyes to obtain an eye from another person, and there was also the classical image of surrealism films earlier XX century when Buñuel after placing a she-ass over a piano and an actor similar to Jesus crist moved carefully carry away on the flour to the outside the piano with the she-ass over, he decided, as critical metacomment on the image level of cuts and sequences, juxtaposing or montage, to intercalate several times a clouse up image on an eye in the moment it is being intervened at the hospital operation room. 

  As I clearly stablished in my prospectus writings on my books I am not a socialist nor a communist, I am an anarquist and as I clearly pointed out at my paper The Eclipse of Evocation there is not other even lacanialy nor in outside nor in the unconcient, the ideology of otherness begin at being crisalide as an invention of naming since renascence and Iluminism, here beginning by the christian concept of progimity and the only possible otherness between us is the otherness between nomadic forms of deterritorialized subjectivities, (here me Abdel my life as a Houstonian and texan, before as a Venezuelan and my cuban origin as a nomadic mixture, Surpic Angelini, a Venezuelan married with an italean of armenian phater and Anglo-American mother stablished in Houston), but also all the forms of deterritorialized forms of subjectivities evolves deterritorialized economies, transnationalizations, globalizations, etc, as otherness to territorialized forms of subjectivities defined by countrains of nations and ethnicities, and biseversa. 

  I am fully indeterminist in epistemology and sociology with only Bourdieu at Saussure, Structure and Practices on top to objective structures. There is not in fact any possibility to relations we and the others as otherness in general less in the sense of traditional anthropology or etnography.

Bibliography

Aristoteles, Logical Writings

Derrida Jacques, The Supplement of the Couple: Philosophy in front of linguistic, Margins of philosophy, the university of California press

Habermas Junger, The Problem of Comprehension in Social Sciences, Theory of Communicative Action, Beacon Press, Boston

Habermas Junger, The Problems of Understanding in Social Sciences, Pp, 144-196, Theory of Communicative Action, Volume I, Taurus

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The Subject in Creativity, complete works, tome II, book, 2004

The Intramundane Horizon

©By Abdel Hernandez San Juan

  This paper proposes and discuss a theory of the Intramundane Horizont discussing the ontology of it under phenomenology and hermeneutic. Discussing the graped up phenomenological form of the Intramundane horizont around the monadic nature of the impressions of the body and of the subjectivity feelings of the inside and the outside, while theorizing pertinences as the phenomenological principle addressed to give structure to the common sense world, the paper discuss how the phenomenological start to be an Intramundane horizont when phenomenology and hermeneutic interrelates and fusion. 

   First discussing the epistemological differences between phenomenology and hermeneutic, to next discuss the specific form through which both interrelate and fusion, the paper continue proposing a theory of how hermeneutic texere and makes a phenomenological world Intramundane, from the succession of activities between mornings and nights toward ends the principle of share spectations horizonts stablishes the nexts in the pragmatics of everyday life around interpretative arranges  derives from explicitations in intersubjective communications. The paper is the first one in a serie I started addressed to two distinct as well as complimentary objectives, the complexion of a full theory in phenomenological and hermeneutic research and studies itself, on the one side, and on the other, toward a serie redicussing the horizonts between the sociology of common sense and anthropology research theory experimenting the avenues of a more near relation between Ethnometodology in sociology and anthropology, Retheorizing inscription and rediscussing the relations between everyday life and research methodology. 

Keywords: Intramundane Horizont, the ontological form of the world of life, phenomenology and hermeneutic, pertinences, structure of the common sense world, the hermeneutic form of the Intramundane, pragmatics of everyday life, share spectations horizonts, interpretative arranges, explicitations

 Alive present is the ultimate, universal and absolute form of the transcendental experience in general

Jacques Derrida

Form and Wishes to Say, Notes on the Phenomenology of language

  Because not simply accept the worlds of life in their tacit passage as they pass and are presented to the ordinary course among the set of activities that I develop as an individual or anyone develops within the pragmatics of daily life with the orders that it contemplates between day and the night?. Infinite reasons that are internal to our course of life, turn our attention towards the worlds of life without even our question about them being directed to specifying them as a question of knowledge or research, these ways of turning attention to them are implicit to phenomena that are given in their own internal rationality and in needs that the life worlds bring and entail.

  In the life worlds our lifestyle takes place, in them we develop and enjoy life alone and accompanied, while in them we develop activities aimed at our practical purposes and goals in the areas that involve both our affective and intersubjective relationships, as well as our economic, professional and labor activities, therefore paying attention to them is inherent to the very fact of directing the development of these activities and areas in them.

  But life worlds involve a few more things than those in which we ordinarily notice, and the need to go further in this understanding is aimed, on the one hand, at enriching our knowledge so that the paying attention to them, which is implicit in that direction, in them their different areas are enriched and on the other hand, once better known, understand how they provide new and different cuts for the epistemology in which the production of knowledge works in a differentiated and unique way, covering all the questions inherent to knowledge itself, the way concepts work and relate to each other.

  Below I will specify a series of concepts that I have developed regarding my own consideration of them.

  The first concept that we must attend to and know is my concept of “enveloped world” which is required to understand life worlds. If we make an effort to pay attention to our life worlds and distance ourselves from them by trying to define them immediately, we will observe that our habitual tendency is to place on the horizon of our gaze, of our visual attention, a set of physical spaces, locations, sites and places in which we live and among which our things happen.

 These places, sites, locations, sites and living spaces, contemplate the home or house where one lives and the places that one visits daily such as the work center during the week, and the places of leisure, recreation, market and communication that They involve weekly and monthly activities that we develop around our pleasures, our needs and our communications, going to the market, cooking, reading, writing, communicating with people, taking care of family and friends, going for a walk.

 However, as soon as we display this succession of locations, sites, sites, activities and exchanges with people in front of us in the visual imagination, we realize that the display we have made out there, as in the models, does not coincide with the way in which We live and experience, how those same places and people make sense to us in the life worlds. A kind of immobile model or scenery of more or less ordered, more or less dispersed places, a living room, a market, a portal, an office, a place of recreation, in which, as in the plans in which models are preliminary projected, Cardboard figurines, paper stools and polyfoam figurines are placed on a scale that suggests a silent cinema that in no way coincides with how we live, experience and make sense of those same spaces, places and people in the life worlds.

 Simply describing places, sites, locations and placing people in them is nothing like what life worlds consist of. If our propensity to notice them when the question arises about what life worlds are, how they are defined, what they consist of, how to understand them, is to look at a visual display of places in which we distribute people, including ourselves. , and we try to imagine what these people are doing with each other, talking, walking, thinking alone about something, we immediately realize that our propensity externalizes places in the visual imagination or describes them, acquiring a different form than that relating to how we live and experience those same places and relationships with people and the worlds in which our lives take place.

  On the contrary, the worlds of life are enveloped, things are not distributed in them like figures are arranged in a background. The involved nature of lifeworlds involves profound questions of phenomenology and hermeneutics. The enveloped character of the life worlds from the phenomenological point of view entails a whole development because without an involved phenomenological world it would not be possible to understand what the life worlds imply for experience, for worldly flow, for living, the way in which They are experienced and lived, in what they take place and what they consist of for one in the world and for one in one's relationship to others.

 Both points of view, phenomenological and hermeneutical, can be understood in relatively independent ways since they imply relatively autonomous understandings, but ultimately and in reality, they are intertwined and closely related to each other.

  The most exterior concept and yet also interior to the wrapped character of the worlds of life is relevance, we could say that the relevances order in the wrapped character of the worlds of life the warp of common sense, they organize and provide the worlds of life its unspoken plot, the worlds of life are relevant.

  I have resorted to this concept of exteriority phenomenologically so as not to give the impression with what was said above, my criticism of the distribution of little paper people on cardboard benches on models of places without relations between themselves, of people and situations as if they were mannequins. , that the enveloped nature of life worlds denies or supposes an interiorism so subjective or subject to the experience of individual living that it would be a way of returning to a subjectivist interiorism.

  Although the involved nature of the life worlds implies subjectivism and interiority for the experience, they are organized around the experience, the living present and therefore insofar as they make sense to the person in their intersubjective relationships and communications, therefore For the same reason, the world of life is in its mundane passage articulated according to and according to relationships and communications towards oneself and others that the pragmatics of everyday life entail.

  As a closure on the fold of this first exteriority, instead of places, sites, locations and scale figures, the exteriority of life worlds can be defined by relevance, relevances organize the world of common sense, they distribute and they arrange, order and make possible the adequate exteriority in an enveloped world, that is, the way in which an enveloped world that makes sense and in which our life takes place can be phenomenologically turned towards its exterior.

  It is not that our life in the worlds of life does not take place in its living present between places in solitude or between people, it is that the way of going to these places or of being in them in the enveloped worlds of life , and these relationships towards oneself and others do not appear or acquire form and meaning in that which makes them life worlds, in any way. Relevance structures common sense, without relevance, there would be no common sense, it is in the structural genesis of common sense at a phenomenological level and continuously guarantees the wrapped character of the life worlds, the structures.

  The relevances, however, being the appropriate mode of exteriority that corresponds to the involved character of the worlds of life, although they underline the fold of this first exteriority or proximal exteriority, contiguous and at the same time interior to the meaning with regard to how we experience and experience the life worlds, they do not go beyond, for the purposes of the interiority of meaning in the life worlds, becoming inclusive as anticipated horizons in the relations between explicit and pragmatic statements of the life worlds, although they remain all the time providing that character of a tacit world in respect to the fact that they suppose the relationship of our statements, our communications and activities with a structural stability of common sense that is appropriate to the character of the world involved, to the adequate relationship in them of experience and experience, they By themselves they do not explain an infinite number of other issues that are presupposed in the involved character of life worlds.

  I will return to them later because they also occur, although related to the same common sense structure whose tacit character they provide, in intersubjective communication and intercorporeal relationships.

  Life worlds are worlds enveloped by many other phenomenological and hermeneutic motifs that suppose, on the one hand, the monadic character of experience and phenomenological experience, first, the interior and the exterior, second, the one and the multiple, the one self and the distinct, the self of oneself and the self of any one that presents itself to the one of oneself as the rest or the multiple of many ones, of the relationship between the monad, the singular one, with its interiority, from whose chapel, the body and its impressions, the external world is simultaneously processed in subjectivity, and lived in its objectivity, the experience of the world always lived from the phenomenological interior of the body, its impressions and its relationship with its outskirts, the infinitely unique as it happens to each monad and the validation that other monads experience it in a similar although heterogeneous way.

  On the other hand, experience highlights the most interior order of the experience and the sense of how things occur and are given to us in the ordinary course of time. Finally, we have the pragmatics of everyday life that involves communications, relationships and activities.

  The monadic character of experience and phenomenological experience is at the center of the involved character of the life worlds because they are experienced by each monad and by all the monads between the one of each and the multiple of many. The monad emphasizes the processing and the unique experience of the world by a singular monad to which the life worlds pass, and at the same time that which is monadic for many monads and in which they all confirm being related to a world.

  Without monad there would be no world, she underlines and confirms, as she herself is the fold of the interior and the exterior, the first in the last, and the second in the first, precisely in the appropriate way in which it is experienced and experienced by the one person, as for all people, that what validates a world in subjectivity, impressions and sensations, would not be a world without the monad, it could be anything else, perhaps reality, but not a world.

  In the world the subjective and the objective come together, without subjectivity objectivity could not be reproduced, that is, have continuity, permanence, stability and repetition, without objectivity, subjectivity could not be reproduced, have continuity, permanence, stability and repetition. At the same time, the monad confirms, as we have just seen with the pertinences, the modes of exteriority that are adequate to living and experience as presented to the monadic character of its processing and, conversely, the modes of interiority that are adequate to forms of the exteriority, we have just seen it in our initial contrast regarding appropriate ways of going to places, locations and locations, according to how the monad knows how these exteriorities are processed in that which makes them world and here, worlds of life.

  Since the monad emphasizes the relationship between the one and the multiple, between what is one of oneself and in oneself, as well as the self of any one, in the multiple or multiplicity, she does the work of adapt the relationship between the interior and the exterior not only with regard to direct experience, the confirmation of the immediate senses, the “immediate senses”, but also in the analysis of concepts, it organizes the sieve and the filigree to through which the subjective and the objective, the interior and the exterior are related.

  It is decisive for the understanding of the involved character of the worlds of life at a phenomenological level and although it is less so at the hermeneutic level, it is still present also in hermeneutics because although the latter is less monadic, the monad continues there supplying understandings. necessary. We could say that the monad is decisive and central at the phenomenological level with respect to the involved character of the worlds of life, as supplementary in the hermeneutic while reiterating, central here, that the very concept of the world, of any world, the The very idea of ​​world is, at a phenomenological level, entirely monadic, without monad, the sensation, meaning and validation of a world, of any world, and here, of life worlds, would not be possible.

  Experience is the main concept of life worlds because from it everything leaves and everything returns to it, in it everything develops and unfolds and in it everything is collected, but life worlds involve activities, courses, events and communications related to the pure experience, the pure passing of ordinary and mundane activities, and above all, the pragmatics of daily life that cannot be exhausted either in experience, nor in the monada nor in the pertinences.

 I will expand on the experience later because it is the best known to everyone and I will try as much as possible to expand, propose and develop here on what has been less worked on and therefore less known with respect to the life worlds that I will define as "the intramundane horizon”, with this concept of intramundane horizon the phenomenological and hermeneutical aspects of the life worlds begin to relate, communicative activities of various types, individual expressive or intersubjective are intertwined with and in the life worlds and their pragmatic development and plotting. the intramundane character of life worlds.

  Life worlds in a purely phenomenological sense, although they are involved worlds, are not yet intramundane, the intramundane character of life worlds is a consequence of various ways through which the hermeneutics of life worlds becomes part of the phenomenology of life worlds. Let us be precise here regarding hermeneutics, this requires some precisions and clarifications in the phenomenology of life worlds, also precise regarding the differences between phenomenology and hermeneutics in order to then understand how they relate and overlap in the involved character of the worlds of life.

 Phenomenology can go from the very abstract to the empirical and concrete, from an elaboration on the phenomenal nature of the spirit or intuition, where phenomenal appearances are not given in the form of a form in which they are empirically explicit, but to which The phenomenological elaboration proceeds in recurrence to intuition or experience, a good example, so as not to go too abstract, could be the efforts to achieve the phenomenology of the authorial motivations in a work of art according to the appearances that it provides, without even knowing what those authorial intentions have been, resorting to knowledge about any consciousness, for example, or about how relationships between plots, statements and ways of arranging situations in worlds, whether fictional or experiential, would in any case be ordered by something. As well as an authorial consciousness, from this to the opposite, phenomenology can explain the phenomenology of an empirically verifiable phenomenon such as technology, environments, the city, fashion, a work of art or communication between people.

  In Kant, for example, the experience of abstracting a prioris is phenomenal because in no way do we know the a prioris other than in the intuition of them in sensory experience, what is phenomenologized here is the relationship between an intuition and of a conceptual abstraction.

  Something that has no empirical correlate, that has not been experienced in the form of a corroborable or externally verifiable empiricity, is nevertheless known intuitively by experience, although it has not realized it.

 When through conceptual abstraction the analysis makes it explicit, distinguishing as well as specifying the aprioris of pure rationing, the aprioris of practical reasoning and the aprioris of aesthetic reasoning, experience confirms that there are indeed aprioris for each one that separates them and the It makes each one different in their purity, a purity that is later made explicit and corroborated in the way in which they need to be separated in order to be specific with respect to their understanding and practice.

 The phenomenology that makes the analysis here does not adhere to an external empirical object in which it confirms something, but rather turns a distinction that only experience knows into conceptual abstraction. The abstraction of a spirit or a form is not phenomenologized here either, however, as soon as the aprioris are abstracted as conceptual forms, turned into forms of analytical explanation, experience confirms them in the intuition of their three lived forms, the pure rational. , the pure practical and the pure aesthetic.

 We know that in Kant we do not yet have phenomenology as it developed later, but only its budding modes, but what I want to emphasize is that it refers to the relationship of a conceptual abstraction with an intricacy of the senses known by intuition. , or refers to making the abstraction of a verifiable empiricity phenomenal, phenomenology always operates by relating the phenomenal, appearance expression of any phenomenon, that is, related to its form that we assume is relatively exterior because it is confirmed in appearance, and its supposed essence or that which defines it in its substrates or strata, thus phenomenologizing in the abstraction of a concept something that only intuition knows in experience, but that is not verifiable outside in the world of empirical data, in this example the aprioris, or conversely, can abstract and provide phenomenology that corresponds to something entirely empirical, verifiable by observation and description.

  Hermeneutics proceeds differently, in this we do not abstract the appearance of something to relate its phenomenal expression with its essence or its supposed essence, but rather we proceed to interpret and give meaning to a form, we do not want to relate a form as appearance with the deep expression of its essence trying to find out its ontology or its substrate, we do not proceed to find the unmanifest through the latent, we take a form for granted, we accept it as it is because of what makes sense to us in it and we proceed to interpret it , to read it and give it meaning.

  Having specified these differences, we understand that the enveloped character of the life worlds at a phenomenological level makes explicit our relation of the impressions, sensations and riddles of the mundane passing with the forms that corroborate in our phenomenal experience the enveloped character of the monadic life worlds. regarding the body, the habitat, the environments and the relationships between what is interior and what is exterior both in space, habitat, architecture, surroundings, and in terms of subjectivity, while the hermeneutical level of the life worlds is It refers not to relationships of forms with riddles, impressions and sensations with corroborations, but to relationships of meaning and interpretations.

  Now, returning to the point I announced before, some concise clarifications about hermeneutics in life worlds are required. We said that thanks to the ways in which hermeneutics and phenomenology are intertwined in life worlds, the enveloped character of life worlds takes the form of intramundane horizons; without hermeneutics, there would be no intramundane horizons, we would have phenomenological, monadic enveloped worlds. , but we would not have the intramundanity of the worlds.

  The involved character of life worlds concerns in the first and last instance our mundane passage because hermeneutics, that is, the meaning-giving forms, weave the life worlds into forms of meaning, explanation and communication that participate in the definition of the same course of the practice of life in which what we do is related, whether in pure life or in work between ends and goals, or between experiences and references to them, with what we develop from it in its inner sense by continuing it or returning to it, on the one hand in its pragmatics, on the other, the intersubjective communication and the practice that it entails.

  It is necessary to advance here that in life worlds hermeneutics does not refer here to the relationship between an interpretive form and a textual form, but rather to a pragmatics of the life worlds in which our activities take place, those same ones. that we develop in the passing of our days, our daily and mundane life, and where then everything that becomes susceptible to our impressions, to our gaze, to the experience of our environments and spaces is presented to the experience and experience as a world. involved, also including the pragmatics of our intersubjective communications.

  Undoubtedly, the intramundane character of life worlds is composed of intersubjective communication activities between people and speakers who exchange statements, but not only of them, also in life worlds the mere relation of activities between day and night becomes intramundane. night, the ways in which in our soliloquies of life we ​​think about giving shape, meaning, order and flow to what we do, we give meaning to what we have experienced, we return to what we have experienced and offer diaricity to what follows as we give meaning to our own experiences, to our experiences, as well as according to the pragmatics of life worlds defined by activities of different types and orders, we make sense, things make sense to us and we give them meaning.

  In short, here hermeneutics becomes an activity interior to practice, the very practice of everyday life supposes, in the succession of activities, the ways in which hermeneutics weaves, discerns and plots the intramundane horizon of life worlds, which We are doing now, what we will do in a few minutes, that will relate one activity with another or moments of an activity with each other, towards where we will direct something that we develop, all of this is woven together and discerned in hermeneutic relationships, giving meaning or elucidating the meaning that the The same things make us and it is for the same reason, together with the phenomenology it entails, a hermeneutical activity.

  Despite this, communications understood as intersubjective relationships have great importance with regard to the intramundane character of life worlds since, immersed in the depth and intricateness of life worlds, their mere and mundane course, our daily Passing is not only made up of solitary activities, but also of these, but it involves the relationship of our activities with other people in intersubjective relationships that are part of the pragmatics of life worlds.

  First, let us specify that life worlds, to the extent that they imply the pragmatics of everyday life, consist of activities that we carry out in life, firstly life itself as an activity, the living present, and secondly the pragmatics of those activities that involve various orders, communications and relationships, purposes and goals, arts of life, the art of living, these orders can be related to each other more or less, as we move from activities that correspond to free time, lifestyle, enjoyment, pleasure, leisure, entertainment, recreation, towards work time, writing, reading or performing our professions in the career and work environment.

  Communication here encompasses individual communication and intersubjective communications, these two forms of communication extend and interweave in the life worlds, becoming part of the warp of the life worlds. When the pragmatics of individual communication and intersubjective communication are presented as a decisive activity in the life worlds, the intramundane horizon emerges.

  The mundanity of a world, in the first place at the level of its immediacy, is its diaricity, its being mundane in a stable and continuous way, the immediacy of the world is therefore correlative to its mundanity, something that is implicit in its diaricity, its repetitiveness and rituality become ordinary, a world is mundane when extended in the meaning-giving activities that plot the hermeneutics of the daily, it is mundanely known and experienced in its immediacy, here it does not refer to a world its being as for the first time to which phenomenology without hermeneutics can Referring worlds to their forms, highlighting, for example, as I have done, the way in which pertinences order and generate the structures of common sense, is a very important phenomenological assertion, but one that says nothing even about the hermeneutics around these pertinences according to These are embedded in the meaning-giving activity.

  In hermeneutics as a meaning-giving activity, the involved character of life worlds ceases to have that only phenomenological effect of a world referred to its conformation, to that which forms it as a world to impressions, experience and experience, since Hermeneutics also supposes, and in addition, in the different orders and levels of the life worlds, the meaning-giving activities that weave together what relates in terms of senses and meanings the relationship between what we did before and what we will do immediately, between what We have said and continue to say, between what we have interpreted, the meaning it makes to us and our following expressions, only with hermeneutics does the phenomenological world then also become a mundane and intramundane world, a world that has made meanings, that makes meanings. and in which activities whose practical order is filled with meanings that are internal to the practice are elucidated, this form of giving meanings to the world is henceforth intertwined with phenomenology and the character of the world involved is presented as intramundane.

  The life worlds become intrinsic and intrinsically intramundane, everything in them refers to themselves, the activities of the soliloquy are related and intra-imbricated in the pragmatics of the life world, with intersubjective communications, and the latter with the former, the intramundanity of the worlds. of life is a form of hermeneutic and phenomenological imbrication because certain orders of experience, meaning and typicality cannot do without each other or, in any case, if they could do so, at least in their mundane life they would not tend to do so.

  In life worlds, however, pragmatics related to intramundanity are usually related above all to intersubjective communication. I will therefore move to analyze here the intramundane horizon within the involved character of life worlds as a form of intersubjective communications within the pragmatics of life worlds. The first concept that appears here that is decisive at the intramundane level is the concept of “shared horizons of expectations.” What are shared horizons of expectations?

  To understand the shared horizons of expectations, it is necessary to refer to communication in the involved worlds of everyday life, understood as an activity in which the meaning-giving hermeneutics is intertwined with the pragmatic dimension of communication; it is necessary to understand that the statements of This communication cannot be isolated as forms of discourse or separated from those pragmatic forms of the message, the text or the medium of discourse. This is not about language understood as the emission of a statement that takes a form in the phrase or the written or oral sentence, not even teletransmitted, with respect to which the exchangers of statements would be senders and receivers, unlike this semiotic understanding of communication, which subordinates the pragmatics of communication to the pragmatics of information, and above all, of the emitted text to be considered by itself in its structure, in the pragmatics of life worlds, the statements in forms of intersubjective communication are modes of explicitation and intelligibility.

  Relevance as the structuring of common sense in the involved character of the life worlds, is responsible here for discarding and selecting which forms of the statements appropriately correspond to the involved character of the life worlds and belong to them, establishing the separation corresponding to the worlds involved. of life, where my ordinary course takes place and in that other order, which does not correspond to the worlds of life in which phenomenologically and hermeneutically the intersubjective relations arrange their shared horizons of expectations, that is, that which gives continuity or establishes a relationship that worlds of life from their pragmatics welcome their logic and project onto the horizon of their nexts.

 The nexts in the life worlds are like the life worlds themselves forms of “immediacy”, the relationship between pragmatism and contingency is known to all, the pragmatics of the life worlds supposes immediacies that are contingent in and for life in their life worlds.

  As an example, we could refer to countless other mundane examples. Let us consider a teletransmitted message. This can at a given moment be copied and pasted into a file and analyzed as a phrase due to its discursive autonomy, but this analysis will not go beyond being impertinent to the that an email is in terms of the life worlds for exchanging statements in intramundane conditions in the course of everyday life.

  The same thing happens with a telephone call, although we could distance ourselves and notice it by the phrases that are said, observing them as forms of discourse, such a distance towards a telephone conversation in the worlds of life is strange and no longer belongs to the meaning that They cover telephone utterances in everyday life when they are involved in the phenomenological and hermeneutical relationships of the life world and its experiential, experiential and practical contingencies.

  Treating a statement in the worlds of life, as if it were a discourse or a form separate from the text, is not grasping its meaning and is therefore distorted. Let us note here that the relationship to meaning is not interpretive in the sense of relating a interpretation and a text, but it is hermeneutics in the sense of elucidating, a relationship of meaning is elucidated because the hermeneutics and phenomenology of the involved world refers the enunciative form to an intelligible explanation contingent for the pragmatics of the nexts in the life world .

  The above does not mean that the elucidations of meaning do not imply a greater or lesser margin of assertiveness, but if a form of the statement is not explicit in the life worlds, by not making sense, it does not become part of the shared horizons of expectations. which are those that relate enunciative explanations in the hermeneutic successiveness of life worlds and their pragmatics.

  Only where the hermeneutic arrangements arising from intelligible explanations project shared horizons of expectations, the practical relationship between statements of explanation and worlds of life establishes the nexts that define the “immediacies”, which will become successive and continue to be part in the worlds of life and that not.

  Obviously in life worlds not everything becomes successive; enunciative modes that are not explicit are discarded by the same relationship between meaning and pragmatics in life worlds. The meanings of the statements in the pragmatics of intersubjective communication in life worlds have to be intelligible explanations; if they do not respond to principles of mutual explanation, they cease to be functional statements for the pragmatics of life worlds, and if they do not create Shared horizons of expectations resulting from hermeneutical arrangements are excluded, with great ease in the worlds of everyday life. A form of enunciation that does not respond to the practical immediacy of the statements is immediately discarded, either because it requires a way of relating to the statement that does not It adapts to the ways in which the pragmatics of life worlds suppose the order of spatial and temporal relations, or because by responding to autotelism in a form in itself separated from the statement understood as discourse, its dimension is inadequate to the practical nature of communication in the worlds of life where the modes of statements within the forms of intersubjective and intramundane communication must be modes of mutual explanation around which the shared horizons of expectations are generated, which are those that, both in intersubjective communication , as in the individual soliloquy, give continuity to those relationships, activities and communications that will take place in the life worlds, which will have continuity and stability in them, as well as in what they ultimately consist of.

  A life world is a continuous, discrete, measurable and immediately present present in which our life as individuals, two or more individuals or many individuals who form relationships in those life worlds is assumed and involved. It is a world. current and present in the living present that involves communications involved in intersubjective relationships that are in turn subject to pragmatic and practical intramundane imperatives.

  In the involved character of the worlds of life, statements and phrases are always modes of explanation, statements are oriented from the moment they are formed to mutual explanation, mutuality is here constitutive of the order of enunciative modes, a statement is oriented to be made explicit and the intersubjective result of mutual explanation is the intramundane conformation of shared horizons of expectations.

  The shared horizons of expectations are open forms of understanding that have been established around mutual explanations and have woven with these intramundane expectations of continuity, that is, intersubjective arrangements that life worlds welcome and project in the pragmatic orders of their nexts.

  Only when mutually explicit statements have established shared horizons of expectations in intersubjective relationships, are they welcomed by the life worlds and projected by them within their character of an enveloped world as intramundane possibilities of continuity.

 We say that the shared horizons of expectations are open forms of understanding, because the statements oriented toward explanation have made explicit relationships of meaning through which the exchangers of statements have managed to understand each other what is necessary for the worlds of life to accommodate that mode. of communication, communicative rationality is therefore contingent for the pragmatics of life worlds independently of and without the need to resort to consensus, interpretive arrangements here are modes of adaptation, interpretation that does not adapt to the relations of mutual explanation that can generate shared horizons of expectations with their intersubjective arrangements as open forms of understanding are excluded from the nexts in the pragmatics of life worlds, this exclusion, of course, is made by the monad, which is what ultimately validates a world for Yes, and for its relations with others, it validates any world and here the worlds of life between the singular and the heterogeneous in which the worlds are confirmed in their ordinary course with their common sense relevance as a mode of exteriority for many monads.

  The shared horizons of expectations replace consensus here, consensus around something is not so much necessary as the hermeneutical arrangements that result from mutual explanation put into perspective horizons of expectations around which the explanations establish meaning for the modes. givers of meaning that in the intramundane horizon of communication, are welcomed into the worlds of life. As I have said elsewhere, it is not about the consensus between forms of the statement because of what the sentences say, but rather the consensus in what is the rationality of the communication, the mode of relationship.

  Even beyond this, in the phenomenological and hermeneutic involved character of the life worlds, the explanations in the intramundane horizon establish relationships with the practical order of the life worlds that are not always, and in reality, rarely, discerned around them. to the content of the statements but rather to what relates them to the practice of everyday life.

  The open dimension of understanding here establishes intramundane hermeneutical relationships that are part of the life worlds, welcomed in them and projected from them in their character as an enveloped world, as part of their processes. The motivations of the participants, the exchangers and the speakers, are intertwined with the open dimension of understanding resulting from the character of mutual explanation of the enunciative modes, the relationship between motivations and adaptations, replaces the relationship between interpretations and texts, the giving hermeneutics. of senses puts horizons of expectations into perspective, these horizons of expectations are themselves hermeneutical and are closely related to the worlds of life in their two forms, phenomenological and hermeneutical.

Notes

   1- Regarding my essay The Intramundane Horizon, I want to insist again and specify that the concept of life worlds supposes the pragmatics of daily life, that is, the world lived according to the activities and communications that we develop so that although An accentuated interiorism and subjectivism have a place and are part of it, an exacerbated existentialism could not be contemplated in it. As I said on another occasion, it is not about denying existence, we exist, but against constructivist introspectivism exposed to pragmatism and developed in the latter, existentialism entails tears with which and around which, everything is torn, the person and the world. The life worlds go on a different path.

  The precision here regarding hermeneutics in the enveloped character of life worlds moves beyond the parameter of hermeneutics as interpretation of a text to be read, in short, hermeneutics in the enveloped character of life worlds, It excludes even my three concepts of reading as I have developed them before with respect to the work of art, neither the reading of the text, nor the archaeological nor the free one are considered here, these forms of hermeneutics refer to the interpretation of the work of art or other textual modes.

  This does not mean that within the life worlds and surrounded by them in their courses, we do not read texts and that within these life worlds in reading texts we cannot also practice my three forms of reading developed for reading texts, but the scope of the life worlds are broader than the reading of texts, the latter are nothing more than one more activity among thousands of others that occur in the life worlds and the latter, broader and more involving, are phenomenological. and hermeneutically areas of life in themselves, the concepts of phenomenology and hermeneutics here are broader and as forms of the life world, they involve others, phenomenology and hermeneutics interweave and relate to create the life world and to shape it in its phenomenal and in its intramundane mundanity per se and without the need to resort to reading the text.

 The reading of texts can develop within the life worlds as the sphere in which at most they occur, but the life worlds suppose their own discernments that are broader than the course of life and the pragmatics of life as the course of activities included the art of living.

  Undoubtedly, we also read texts, pre-texts and works of art within lifeworlds, but these are subsidiary activities in regards to the hermeneutics we were talking about here, here we refer to how hermeneutics plots and organizes the life worlds themselves in intramundane horizons, we refer to hermeneutics in the involved dimension of the life world where the meaning-giving activity is subordinated to the pragmatics of daily activities and the pragmatics of intersubjective communications.

 Undoubtedly, within the life worlds we can make interpretations about any things, interpret what certain people have said, interpret why a certain person has behaved with us in a certain way, interpret a work of art, but hermeneutics here rather here is the meaning-giving activity that itself organizes the intramundane horizon of the activities of daily life.

  This concept of communication does not refer either to pragmatics as we understand it in semiotics or to pragmatics as we understand it in Bakhtinian dialogicism.

  Although in my own essays I have resorted recurrently to those two modes, especially where the autonomy of a certain textual form such as the work of art or some modality of staging is involved or assumed, it is necessary to understand that within the character wrapped in the worlds of life where the diatribes of the practice of the arts of living take place and where intersubjective communications are embedded in the worlds of life, the statement does not become a form of the message, the emission or the structure of the sentence. .

  2-The concept of life worlds that I work on in this essay, implicit in general in all my books and essays, is an assimilation and incorporation as well as my own original, innovative and renewing reworking but permeated by its previous development in Alfred Shurtz and only in Alfred Shurtz, specifically my reading and study of a book by Shurtz Knowledge in the worlds of Everyday Life. The specific way in which I bring my concept of lifeworlds once reworked permeated by Shurtz's developments, some aspects of Habermas's developments on understanding-oriented statements can be expanded in my notes to my essay Between Acerbos and Backgrounds.

Bibliography

Habermas Junger, The Theory of Communicative Action 1 and 2, First Manuscript Version, The Library of the University of Visual Art Armando Reveron, Caracas

Habermas Junger, The Problem of Comprehension in Social Sciences, Volume 1-Reason and the Rationalization of Society, Boston, Beacon Press. 

Habermas Junger, The Problems of Understanding in Social Sciences, Pp, 144-196, Theory of Communicative Action I and II, Taurus

Sagittarius Alfred, The Knowledge in the Worlds of Everyday Life, edited by Schutz's wife Ilse Heim with Thomas Luckmann

Overordination in the life worlds

©By Abdel Hernandez San Juan

   This paper offers and develop a theorization and discussion of five transcendental concepts experience, pertinences, acerbos, tipifications and significativization constellated around the two main concepts of phenomenological sociology: Common Sense and World of Life while at the same time discuss sobreordinations in the world of everyday life such as reflexion, inscription, documentation, memory, representation and narration as forms of sobreordinations on the inmediacy discussing a variety of examples and finish with examples through which the inmediacy of the Intramundane horizont and sobreordinations decurse together one over the other and how experience, acerbos, pertinence, tipification and significativity continues working at the sobreordinated level, 

  The paper is a part and the second one in a serie I started addressed to two distinct as well as complimentary and related objectives, the complexion of a full theory in phenomenological and hermeneutic research and studies itself, on the one side, and on the other, toward a serie redicussing the horizonts between the sociology of common sense and anthropology research theory experimenting the avenues through a more near relation between ethnometodology in sociology and anthropology, retheorizing inscription and rediscussing the relations between everyday life and research methodology. 

Keywords: experience, pertinence, acerbos, tipifications and significativization, common sense and world of life, sobreordinations, phenomenological sociology, ethnometodology

  Is there overordination in the life worlds? This question itself is enough to start the topic. Undoubtedly, the worlds of life, due to the immediacy of their tacit and mundane passage, seem to be themselves the opposite of overordination; one could even come to think that it is precisely the opposite and even agree that entering the territory of overordination It is ipso facto a way of getting out of the worlds of life and undoubtedly there is an extrapolated relationship in the first instance between both concepts, a world of life both at a phenomenological and hermeneutical level and the imbrication of both should be as little superordinated as possible and effectively the pragmatics. of daily life, the arts of living and daily activities, both free time and work time, lead to a contingency between pragmatism and course that seems to dispense with and get rid of or ignore over-ordinations as much as possible.

  The less superordinate forms of lifeworlds and more immediately pragmatic forms of mundane discourse and the practice of everyday life, I will discuss in my ongoing essay Anglo-Saxon Pragmatism, but on this occasion I have made it necessary to discuss the issue of the relationship between worlds of life and overordination, and of the latter in those because undoubtedly although they are extrapolated concepts, there is overordination in the worlds of life and it is also important in them.

  Briefly, before going on to analyze superordination in life worlds, I consider it necessary to make a recapitulation of the main concepts that establish the life world in phenomenological sociology. This recapitulation is not required here in the sense that the analysis of the overordination requires these main concepts because, as we will see below, these main concepts do not themselves refer to any overordination, rather they specify the main areas around which the world of life is structured and formed in an eminently phenomenological and transcendental sense. However, as we will see, superordination in life worlds necessarily moves around them and between them.

  One of my objectives with this essay, in addition to elaborating on overordination in life worlds, will be to analyze in what ways overordination is related and intersects with these transcendental phenomenological concepts. The main concepts of phenomenological sociology establish an axis of relationships made up of a main pair and a constellation of related concepts that together make up a phenomenological and hermeneutic imbrication, the main pair of this transcendental axis lies in:

COMMON SENSE AND WORLD OF LIFE

The concepts that constellate this main pair and are intra-imbricated between them are

EXPERIENCE

ACERBO

TYPIFICATION

RELEVANCE

SIGNIFICANCE

  The experience is known to everyone. There are practically no areas of life that do not require it and are not from one end to the other enveloped and defined by it. When we abstract the whole of the vital experience and summarize the whole of its experience, there is almost no conceivable domain that escapes it, we abstract language, for example, and we try to discern language phenomena around which we refer to analyze certain phenomena, communications that we have read, observed or received from others, things that have been said to us and we are interpreting or have read, works that we have written or done in some other media, and we are analyzing, languages ​​of others that we have seen in the city, on the computer, on the Internet, in museums that we have just visited or in cinemas that we have just seen, as the day passes around the next dawn, no matter how much we abstract from any of them in their language aspect, separating this itself as something with its own structure to be versed, analyzed, treated, memorized, reconstructed, there is practically no aspect of that language even separated and seen in its most possible autonomy that for the purposes of the global process that relates us to it in its memorization, in its reconstruction, in its return to it or in its having it before us, that it is not absorbed by the field and domain of experience.

  Everything we can abstract to try to grasp its autonomy and see it as something in itself, is obliged to occur in the experience, to be nourished by it and to return to it.

  Experience as a domain is the most important and complete transcendental concept in the history of science. On the one hand, it covers practically the entire spectrum of the world and reality, since, soon, something that we have just experienced begins to form a immediate past and is no longer there, like a living present, what remains in its respect is completed by experience, at the moment of living it perhaps the phenomenon was full of surprises and novelties, let us suppose that this is so, and that for this reason , we try to apprehend it as something perse and independent of the idea of ​​experience, but by distancing ourselves from what we experienced, what happened, what happened, we cannot do anything other than refer to the experience we have lived, in fact we tend to call that sequence of experiences an experience. experience and reality from the moment we have experienced it.

  The concept of experience emphasizes that what we have experienced has not been so much or more so as observers, but that the order of the world or reality itself is supposed to be something experienced to us and therefore something that has happened to us.

  It is a concept contrary to the distinction between an observation world and an observed world of which one is not a part or of which we can do without in a non-participatory way and take a cold distance towards it that offers us an impartiality that excludes us as affected, In turn, it emphasizes that we are not passive observers of a world that occurs outside, but that we experience that world from the moment we live it and its experimentation represents in itself an experimental phenomenon for oneself and for the world, this concept of experimentation is the same transcendental at a phenomenological level since what has happened to us in the world has probably been for one and for the world, and establishes a relationship between the experienced world and the world shaped by experience once the experienced world has been an experiment for that world. and for one, becoming decisive for what has impacted us and transformed our own lives that for everything that we could assume or imagine an innocuous distance, experiencing it has made us part of the experimentation itself.

  We even tend to say that experience I had, emphasizing that it refers to an experience that had a certain autonomy with respect to which for a moment we can say but you could also have it if you do what you would have to do to make it an experience for you too. .

  We can also say the experience was amazing, while on the other hand we say, that's not my experience, my experience consists of this or that, or we can say we recognize that you have great experience in it, or be recognized for having a great experience. in something, moments in which one notices not the relationship between experience and events, experience and world, experience and reality, experience and experience, but between experience and experience, experience and accumulation of things experienced that make up learned knowledge, knowledge. .

 Experience can also and frequently refer to the entire order of the person's life and even define the person as a whole including their knowledge, their knowledge and the latter two as smaller than the broader and more complete knowledge in which Reason, knowledge and knowing become aspects of the more general knowledge that constitutes the intelligence of experience, one's experience as a person encompasses the entire scope of what we have accumulated.

  We understand the sole experience of life by this, having lived through your twenties is an experience for those who are in their thirties, having lived through their thirties is an experience for those who are in their forties, which is why some say you have more. experience in reference to it, you lived your thirties I am just living my twenties, or conversely, you are living your twenties I am in my forties.

  The experience of individuals of course differs greatly according to what each person has lived, experienced, experienced, gone through, read, known, and this distinguishes and separates general references to experience from references to experience for reasons of the uniqueness of each. life, but the important thing to emphasize with the experience is that both space and time in it maintain their main transcendental principles.

  We have experience for the now here of the present continuous in the life world where we say experience not in reference to an accumulation, but in terms of the ways in which drawing on our experiences establishes the way in which we understand the new thing we see and know, the new thing that we are told or read, it participates in the ways in which we interpret and make sense of the world here and now in the mundane flow of person to person we meet, book to book we read, conversation to conversation we have, films to film we We see, day by day, that we organize in our organizational charts what to do each week in our free and professional time.

  The experience is interwoven with all aspects of reflective activity, it participates in the ways of memorizing, reconstructing, analyzing and reflecting, and it is also intertwined with the ways of interpreting others and expressing ourselves towards others.

  It is in turn intertwined with the practical mastery of the pragmatics of everyday life in the arts of living and working because it participates decisively in what we decide to do and the order we decide to give to our activities and performances, what we did. a while ago and we will do in a few hours, what we did today and will do tomorrow, what we will do on the weekend and plan to do next week.

 Experience is both the experience of the world and the world of experience, it highlights an experienced world and the world that is then shaped by experience, we turn to it for everything, from it everything comes out and to it everything returns, In it everything is corroborated and everything is collected.

  Experience also has a certain and preventive dimension, a specific aspect that Shurtz insists on most, since we not only resort to it actively or internally as a passive accumulated memory, in the way we interpret what others tell us, what we read or see, but once the experience has become accumulated knowledge ipso facto, that accumulation is transformed into a continuous and everyday mode of knowledge in the worlds of life, by which we mean that practically everything we know in the everyday life, we know it with experience, the assertoric and preventive nature of the experience is given in the fact that if the experience you have tells you that you should take this path and not that other one faced with options, you must follow it because only it validates knowledge, despite this, at this point a question arises around experience relative to how experience works in the face of what is new and must be learned, undoubtedly once known it becomes part of it, but when it is not It is the terrain of experience that distends and the other transcendental concepts of phenomenological sociology then come to the foreground.

 If a course of activities is novel for the apprehension, for example, a trip to a previously unknown place, where the learning system must be and is forced to be, through the novelty of sensations, open to the new , a new book whose topic is new to us, a film, new people we meet, whatever the example, then relevance and significance come to the fore.

  When something is new to the experience, the relevance is what continues in the next. Through dissertation of relevance, the apprehendant guarantees relating what he knows with the new thing that he should know. If the new thing that he should know is not relevant, the apprehendant realizes in assertoric and preventive terms, that the knowledge that his experience validates, assures him that he should not go in that direction, if the new thing is relevant, even if it is completely full of new things to learn, the apprehendant, relevance by relevance, processes them and in That same measure opens up to the new field that novelty entails, which progressively enters the experience, thus forming a new experience and expanding the previous one.

  When the terrain in which the apprehendant operates is completely new but relevant, the area of ​​significance also comes into play.

  We have placed here an extreme example according to which, as in the example of a trip to a new place, everything is new and unknown due to previous experience, but what was explained above also occurs when working on areas that do not necessarily have to be completely new, It is enough to simply situate in the course of the worlds of life the fact that oneself is always full of new things every day, as is everyone we know, and that our life and communication relationships continually bring with them novelties and surprises that occur. in what we say and are told, in what we see or create, in work or in pure life, in this sense the previously extreme, occurs as an interweaving of transcendental concepts when one or the other passes to the first flat and alternate according to the situations and according to them, without the need to resort to a complete novelty.

  When the novelty is extreme, the scope of the typification is reduced almost to zero, since the apprehending cannot resort to what was previously typified to grasp the novelty. Let us mean by novelty here something not so extreme, but let us simply call novelty the fact that we are talking about with someone we know well but we don't know what their next sentence will be in a conversation we are having, this could be considered an unexpected dimension, where we don't know how each cutie will behave with us, in the conversation, when we don't know what the next sentence, in the car when we don't know where to turn, on the bus, as pedestrians on the sidewalk, in a park, on the beach, in a sudden conversation, with the salesman on the corner, with the taxi driver or with someone suddenly that the word addresses to us, the level of surprise and novelty that is unpredictable brings relevance to the absolute foreground, everything in the world of life begins to be governed and regulated by it.

  Let us remember that in phenomenological sociology the main pair is formed by two interrelated and inseparable concepts:

WORLD OF LIFE and COMMON SENSE

  Let us also remember that our main attention in this sociology is how we know, how knowledge develops in life worlds.

  When we think of experience as an accumulation and knowledge, we tend to relate it to the knowledge because it is certainly that accumulated experience that defines and makes it possible to have a knowledge, the concept of knowledge, in fact, is initially closely related to that of experience and in in a certain way it comes from that, however, as we will see, the acerb itself forms a separate and autonomous domain.

  We could ask ourselves to what extent the acerb is not just an acerb as a form of experience and although we can undoubtedly say that the acerb is formed with experience and that there is practically nothing in the acerb that in the end is not part of the experience, but Paradoxically, perhaps for this very reason, the experience is on the one hand more general and less specific than theimmature, the recurrence to experience is not enough to understand the entire domain that makes up the ways in which accumulated experience, learned knowledge and lived experiences, turned into a collection, participate and are intertwined in the interpretive, hermeneutic, elucidative and relative activity. our understanding of the world, reality, art, other people, society and culture.

  We could say that the concept of acerb specializes in this phenomenological and transcendental field, offering possibilities that the concept of experience alone does not require.

  It is in interpretive activities and hermeneutics where this is most clearly and widely corroborated, that is, when we move towards phenomena related to understanding, as soon as we care about the world not only what we have accumulated in its experience and what experience we have formed for this purpose, and we ask ourselves about understanding, the acerb comes to the foreground as an aspect of the experience that becomes independent and specialized.

  We have not yet specified why we are talking about significance and not meanings. The concept of significance is of extreme importance in phenomenological sociology and its distinction and difference with the concept of meaning is even more so. The concept of significance underlines the meaning that something makes to us in an activity that makes sense to us and is therefore significant to us.

  It emphasizes that it is situated between the world of life and common sense, in the passage between day and night, how the things we experience, the things they tell us, the things we see or read, the conversations we have, make sense to us. and therefore they become intrinsically significant, we say that they become significant since they make sense to us.

  On the other hand, this concept highlights not only what makes sense to us that becomes significant to us but also the way in which we make meaning, that is, how we ourselves give meaning to them. We designate with significance, a meaning-elucidating or meaning-giving activity immediately related to the world of life and its pragmatics of the course of experience, the concept of meaning, on the contrary, fixes the meaning as the content of a form which is understood, treated and seen by its discursive autonomy or by its textual autonomy.

  When Saussure divides the sign as a minimal unit, the word, for example, the iconographic sign, an image, for example, or the acoustic sign, a sound, into signifier and signified, he tries to show that per se ha and independently of the meaning we can Attributing to a word or sign that it has a carrier or material form, this carrier or material form is literally its graphic, iconographic or sound form.

  By separating the signifier from the signified, Saussure specifies that we can move through the plane of signifiers without the need for signifieds, that is, from form to form, and that only in this way, separating the signifier from the meaning, form by form, without signified content, we can abstract the syntax, the lexicon, the phoneme, the lexeme, the semantheme and the grammar.

  If we do not abstract from the signifier, we cannot then understand why there is a grammar, because there is a syntax, but Saussure's separation, originally aimed at structurally abstracting language, its formally abstract structure in correlation with the structural sociological relationship between the synchronic stability of language, and the diachronic variability of speech, also makes it clear and establishes that the terrain of the concept of meaning belongs to the content of the form, that is, it makes it clear that the concept of meaning is both depositary and attributive, its main character is to be or be fixed given as a depository to the form, its content, given as an attribution to the form, its fixation with respect to it.

  The concept of meaningfulness is the opposite and the opposite of the fixation or attribution of meaning as the content of a form of which it is its content deposit or its fixed attribute corresponding to that form as we structurally separate it in its signic and discursive autonomy, a text, a sign, visual or sound, an image.

  Habermas refers here to two main concepts, first, to the theory of speech acts according to which phrases are immediately related by illocution, locution or perlocution, with a practical activity and second, to the relationship between comprehension and semantics according to which the meaning is freed from the forms and ceases to be the content meaning of these, to become a continuous relationship between enunciative forms oriented to understanding formed as intelligible explanations through which language phrases as speech acts make meaningful the practice.

  This concept of course refers back to pragmatics, but to a pragmatics that has already abandoned the triad of Pierce, Morris and Searly, and therefore has moved away from semiotics and information theory, to situate the acts of communication in the field of comprehensive activity and once in the life worlds, contemporary sociology.

  We speak of significance as the opposite of meanings; in the worlds of everyday life, meanings have been disseminated and dispersed not only in the signifying sphere, forms devoid of depositary meanings, but they have been eliminated and replaced by the Meaningfulness, which relates a phrase as a speech act to an activity, replaces the relationship of the phrase with the activity, as a pragmatic relationship, with the relationship between an interpretant of the phrase and its meanings, things do not carry a meaning or meaning. They are repositories of meanings, for common sense in the worlds of everyday life it is about relating, significance replaces meanings.

  Things make sense to us or they do not make sense to us, we give them meaning or we do not give them meaning, they are intelligible explanations oriented to understanding in that which relates them to the course of life or they are not explanations and cease to be part of the worlds of life and of common sense, here meaningfulness is an activity in the life world that intelligifies, elucidates and gives meaning. We have seen it explained and discussed before in another way in my essay The Intramundane Horizon when analyzing the phenomenological and hermeneutic interweaving that shapes the life world. and in this of the intramundane horizons.

  The concepts of phenomenological sociology are transcendental, in them the transcendental is the world of life itself, the present and the vital passage. We could ask ourselves then what is the place of typification. Typification is a concept of great stability for the life world, a typified world is an accepted world. A typified world is a world known for its repetitions; it, together with relevance, which gives structure to the world of common sense, participates in the stability and continuity of the latter. For this reason, its relationship to the continuous repetition that establishes what is typical in the everyday world of life, it serves to characterize the everyday world by offering experience relatively standardized guidelines that often become patterns, for example, it is typical that The man who brings the newspaper does it in the morning on a bicycle and leaves quickly, it is not typical for him to hawk the newspaper in Houston, Texas, San Francisco or New York, it is typical for him to leave it in the mailbox and Well, but it is typical for him to announce it in Monterrey or Caracas, therefore, if he announces it in San Francisco, it is a surprise and if he knocks on the door asking for coffee, it is a complete novelty so then relevance replaces typification.

  It is not pertinent that they knock on my door and when there is a knock I find a harlequin performing marumacas, nor is it pertinent that it is a mime who when I open the door begins to communicate by making body expressions without using his voice as in the language of the deaf and mute. , if they knock on my door in all probability or it is a neighbor who comes to talk to me about something related to the condominium, the evangelists who come to proselytize the Bible, or some unexpected friendship, but if the harlequin immediately tells me, we are collecting support for a cultural activity that we will do at the carnivals, or we are the actors of the circus that is a hundred meters away, maybe I will offer you coffee.

Overordination in the Life Worlds

  A first form of overordination in the worlds of life comes in the telling of experiences, in the narrative activity through which we tell others what we have experienced. This form of overordination that, taken to expressions of art, can lead to extensive narrative developments. around experience, whether these are truthful with respect to experience in the way of writing, composition and editing in writing or film, or whether they are treated in fictional worlds, it has mundane expressions that occur in life worlds. and they become part of these, it is not necessary to resort to a very elaborate form of recurrence or reference to what was experienced, for this overordination to appear, it is only enough that one person has experienced something from which another person was absent, and the first person resorts to telling the other in the mundane what he experienced during the week, what he experienced for long years or what he experienced on a trip.

  Overordination can also appear in the form of the anticipation of a future experience, such as when we plan what we are going to do in the week and establish a work plan or a strategy of how we will behave with respect to our communication with other people or with respect to something. work reason. Overordination can appear in the life worlds also in the way in which a person needs to resort to what has been experienced and what has been lived to reflect or draw conclusions from what has been experienced and their performance within it, analyzing for themselves what they experienced alone or by analyzing it. with another person who is affected by the same reason of experience with whom you can maintain a relationship, friendship or work relationship.

 Telling what we have experienced as a way of over-ordination entails, of course, a whole development, and there are countless mundane situations in the ordinary worlds of tacit and daily life in which we resort to it. In the activity of narrating, of course, transcendental phenomenological concepts continue to be present since everything that we can tell about what we experienced will continue to resort to experience, acerbity, typification, significance and relevance, but in the scope of telling what we experienced it would seem acquire form a mode of repetition that in a certain way is superadded to the first, tacit order given in the immediacy of what is experienced, which is that which in the telling becomes a reference of the narrative.

  If we are telling another about a lived experience in a certain way we are producing an added order of language according to which what we refer to is no longer being lived in that first immediate sense in what it was, but is being in a certain way for the one who tells it, relived or relived, but this time in the world of a narrative that refers to it and tells it.

 In a certain way, the activity of telling an experience to others is also in this sense a form of its intermediation, that is, what was experienced once it is told is intermediated for a third party. The narrative activity that tells it is a repetition that generates an added order that transmits it from a sphere of life to a sphere of communication in which what is experienced is not present in that first way in which it is experienced.

  Here two modes of relationship are established in which transcendental phenomenological concepts, expressive relationships and communicative relationships, are once again present.

  If the third party to whom the experience is told lived that experience, the superadded form becomes an expressive form, that is, for the purposes of the person to whom the experience is told, they receive a superadded language that results in an expressive mode specific to the one who It is told by someone who has experienced it in a way different from their own, taking as meaning that here this third person could counterstate the same experience by adding content, points of view or reflections that may accentuate other aspects or be different in their content.

  This superordinate communication would establish the superordinate plane through the acerb, that is, resorting to the same acerb, a general concept of experience, communicates to two people about a world of life that is familiar, known and confirmed, but around which each one has offered a different expressive superordinate response.

  When the third person has not lived the experience, then this added relationship, supposed to communicate in language the narration, reference or repetition of a lived experience, establishes its parameters based on adequacy and compatibility, on the one hand, The level of intermediation is higher because something is communicated that is new to the person who receives it, who has not experienced it or who requires resorting to their own knowledge, typifications and experiences, in order to receive, in ways relevant to their own parameters, on the one hand. what is new to him in what is told to him at the same time as adapting his knowledge to the new parameters that over-ordination requires of his reading or listening.

  As I said, there is over-ordination in the life worlds and the latter enters into the life worlds continuously and frequently, but the fact that the former involves a super-addition that moves away from immediacy, suggests that over-ordination establishes an order that, although it is once again part of the worlds of life, tends to move on a plane that is not the same plane of immediacy that makes up the pragmatics of everyday life.

  Now, the point that I am interested in discussing here is as if the transcendental phenomenological concepts of the life world are part of the immediacy and it is even thanks to them that we can talk about the immediacy and establish, accept as given the immediacy of the world. of life in its mundane passage, of that which is tacit and immediate in the mundane passage of life, how it is possible that they can continue present in the superordinate realm.

  If the experience in the transcendental phenomenological field corresponds to an ordinary, immediate and mundane sphere of life of tacit passage of life, if the typifications occur precisely in the worlds of life as the way to which we resort to typify the world and order phenomenologically and hermeneutically our ways of giving meaning and understanding, if the acerb is present in the world of life as the repertoire that nourishes and informs all the forms of our daily thoughts, if the pertinences structure the common sense that is itself shaping the worlds of life, in what way transcendental concepts can continue to be present when we are moving on a superordinate plane which is supposed to be an order that is no longer that of the immediate lived but rather that of the reference or narration of the experience.

  I am interested here in discussing both things, because the superordinate plane establishes a different order that is autonomous and differentiated with respect to the transcendental phenomenological plane of the world of life and once it is different and differentiated, what happens with this plane? If we inevitably have superordination in the worlds of life per being and independently of what is superordinated that which distances itself and is extrapolated with respect to the plane of experience and the world of life in its mundane course, what is its mode of realization in relation to, how relates the superordinate plane to the transcendental plane.

  The relationship is undoubtedly one of super-addition, but as we are analyzing, once we move on the plane of super-addition we once again find in it the transcendental phenomenological concepts, that is, that the experience, the acerb, the typification, the relevance and the significance They continue working on the superadded plane. Why do transcendental phenomenological concepts continue on the superadded plane?

  In the examples that I have discussed before in The Intramundane Horizon, the exchangers of statements were not referring to lived experiences that are told or narrated, but rather they were exchanging statements in which they simply arranged to say things to each other aimed at mutual understanding that from each one formed statements. of explanation and that for the counter-enunciator of that explanation, it implied elucidation, ways of making sense and giving meaning to that explanation in the conversation they were having.

  Not including references to the fact that the exchangers of statements, the conversationalists, could do so, converse, for example, about the conversation itself, which would already be an added plane of repetition and therefore superordinated, was required and necessary to situate the most ordinary plane of the world of life and common sense according to which phenomenology and hermeneutics are shaping the immediacy, of the immediate given and tacit, of the pragmatics of everyday life, but we are centering here what we had necessarily left aside, to analyze now how also in the life world and in the intramundane horizon both hermeneutic and phenomenological planes can be superordinated.

  The conversation that deals with the conversation is a good example which, by the way, maintains the attraction of repeating as an addition something that does not abandon the same space and the same time that makes up the immediacy of the occurrence of that as it flows and flows, when talking about the conversation, the latter seems to stop consisting of something other than itself about which it is conversed in order to converse about itself, in doing so it superordinates itself, it repeats itself on a new level, the more this new level maintains the self-reference or the loop that returns to itself in reference to the space and the present time in which, running on the conversation itself, it in turn acquires place and flows, the superordination becomes more tautological, it not only repeats in the sense of self-referring and denoting, but it repeats At the same time it runs, therefore, it establishes two planes that run together.

  When we have conversation we have movement and sequence, here we do not yet have a disjunction between the time and space of repetition and that of what is repeated, the conversation runs and flows on its own plane of events with its successions, only instead to discourse on any topic or matter foreign to it, in our example here it begins to do so on itself, its content then begins to form part of its form, and another plane is superimposed on the plane of its discourse as what it is. which she simultaneously is, but this time talking about herself.

  We have resorted to this example to discuss the simplest and simplest, although at the same time less usual, form of superordination and superadded relationship, but when, as in a film, the reference we make to the shot or sequence that has just elapsed and we visualize has stopped being in front of us because the sequence has moved to a new plane and the previous one is no longer there, we can only remember it or reconstruct it.

  As soon as the conversation, far from being about herself, is about a film that is being watched, she turns her present towards her future but about something that is ceasing to be, that is, that it no longer exists, the previous plane is no longer there, From this moment, without even counting or narrating, we have a superordination that repeats through synesthesia a plane to which it is not added in the sense that that plane is no longer there, it has passed, but from the point of view of what relates to that superordinate plane that talks about the sequence that passed, in its relationship to the world of life that now passes below it as the tacit course, if it is superordinated to that plane.

  With these two examples we have gone back for a moment to very simple forms of overordination to at the same time explain that the latter does not only occur in telling and narrating, although we could see others in which telling and narrating are attached to the world of life in its most immediate passing.

  We could say that there is a certain superadded character in any form of repetition that involves a reflection, a reflection or in some way some mode of representation. In the painting of a body, a still life, a city or landscape, as well as in his photography or his film, or in writing that deals with a city experience, a phenomenological world, a living environment, we have repetition, all Whenever our languages, in writing or any other medium, make references in some way to a world of life, technological environments, for example, technologies as living environments, or to not go so abstract, the simple reference to the The design and composition of a home, city or work environment involves over-addition and over-ordination.

  But this form of over-ordination, although it does not suppose a narration or story of what has been experienced, does suppose synesthesia because what is repeated or reconstructed, if I write about a technological environment that is part of my daily life environment and for the same reason of my everyday life world, the overordination is minimal in the sense that its reflection with respect to immediacy is the life world itself.

  When writing about the places where I live or work, or about the people I live with, the superadded repetition, in its relationship to the plane of immediacy in the tacit lifeworld, reflects and reflects the lifeworld itself and therefore the superordination is minor.

  We are facing examples in which over-ordination or over-addition does not move away from immediacy, examples closer to those of my essay The Intramundane Horizon.

  Here the levels of super-addition belong in a certain way to the same order of the tacit world of life in its immediacy of experience, since they recreate the world of life itself and refer to it and its environments.

  Photography and film that remain in the simple capture of spontaneous situations in the world of life, the way in which the camera enters when, for example, in a family situation, or among friends, you only want to have a memory of what you experienced. , could be a good example here.

  Overordination remains here on the same plane of immediacy or the world of life. The motive of its repetition, like the conversation that deals with the conversation, repeats the world of life, despite this, from the moment it becomes the motive of writing, language or film, it inevitably becomes a superordinate plane. or super addition.

  That we have superordination in the life worlds is undoubtedly, that the transcendental phenomenological concepts that shape the tacit world in its immediacy continue to be present in that superadded plane as well, but that most of the life world that shapes the pragmatics of the flow of mundane life dispenses with it. completely of both over-ordination and over-addition, at a much higher percent, is also true as I discussed in the hermeneutics and phenomenology of the lifeworld in The Intramundane Horizon.

  In this sense, phenomenology and the hermeneutics of the life world must establish these two different and specialized domains: the world of immediacy as the passage of life in the relationship between life worlds and common sense, the tacit world, which includes the greatest number of only of our activities but also of our communications and intersubjective relationships and the universe of superordinations and superordinations which ranges from forms of superordination that remain in the immediacy to superordinations that move away from it.

  Not without ignoring that overordination, with the exception of where it consists of recreating the world of life itself as a universe, environment, world or reality, tends to extrapolate with respect to immediacy and therefore, in many of its forms, to move away from world of life.

Grades

 1-Between this pair of main concepts and the relationship of five intra-imbricated concepts but at the same time each one autonomous in its infinity, a bundle of relational principles is added which, subsidiary to phenomenological sociology, did not arise as an internal need of it and therefore Therefore, they are not part of it although they were developed from it in response to the objections: Relationships HE-THEM, SHE-THEM, US-THEM, US-HE, US-HER, YOU-THE, ME-YOU, ME-THEM , I-WE, I-SHE, YOUR-SHE, I-HE, and all possible relationships between these personal pronouns, etc.

  Phenomenological sociology can do without them but they were finally included in it as a response of phenomenological sociology to the objection of symbolic interactionism which goes like this: And how does phenomenological sociology respond with these concepts to the imperative of interaction understood by the How the relationship between bodies in space is externalized from a third position that sees those bodies interacting with each other?

 These additional concepts also arose in response to a main and more widespread second objection from other strands of sociology to phenomenological sociology, which goes like this:

 And how can phenomenological sociology avoid limiting itself to being and succumbing to transforming itself solely into a sociology of knowledge.

 The third objection is answered with the main concepts of phenomenological sociology without the need to resort to additional concepts, this lies in asking: If phenomenological sociology establishes the transcendental phenomenological field of common sense and the world of life, how does it resolve the fact that The one who writes that knowledge, which to write it must be located in his own world of life and common sense, has questions about the world of life that most of the people who live it do not have and therefore how he resolves the fact that located in the transcendental field of the life world, it not only lives it but wants to generate a theory and knowledge about that life world and that common sense, how it manages to resolve the relationship between sociological knowledge and worldly knowledge, the People live the life world and develop their knowledge in the life world, but their objective is not usually to generate a theory about that life world, nor to distance themselves from how knowledge is formed in it, but simply to live their lives in the best way. possible, how this sociology manages to resolve the diatribe between an intention of knowledge and an intention of life, between professional knowledge and lay knowledge.

2- We have resorted at one point in our explanation to the analysis that Habermas makes about Austin in his essay Interlude First, and we must specify what that analysis is which, we consider, is up to the present the most satisfactory and complete available, the fact The fact that the phrases have a relationship with practice is not understood here in a sense that establishes the concept of the practical in a meaning that refers it to the theoretical-practical contrast or to the idea of ​​practice as forms of practice that are not the simple life, the mundane passage of ordinary and everyday life, we are not talking about practice in the sense in which this word can refer to some form of practice that goes beyond the mundane and ordinary passage of daily life. Habermas uses the example of some workers in a construction, where when they take a break, the oldest and most experienced person tells the youngest to go get the snack, here we have an example of a phrase within the world of everyday life.

  When we say that a phrase maintains a relationship with practice, what we mean is that that phrase in its own structure of meanings as a phrase is as a speech act intersubjectively related to an activity, that is, given that a phrase since it is pronounced presupposes someone to whom it is addressed, a conversationalist or person with whom phrases are exchanged, we have three forms of relationship between the phrases understood as speech acts and the activity assumed in its own phrase structure, the locutionary phrase, the illocutionary and perlocutionary.

  In the locutionary phrase the relationship between the meaning and the activity does not modify the latter except for the fact that in terms of its own meaning it offers to the same communication the guidelines on the basis of which it is continuous, the conversational activity in which The phrase takes shape and is exchanged, it does not modify the activity of which it is a part, it only offers the pattern of meaning that at an intersubjective level participates in the next phrases that will be said and in the continuity of that communication.

  In illocutionary phrases, the set of activity that establishes intersubjective communication in which the exchange of phrases occurs is not modified either, but the illusory phrase does introduce as a speech act relations of meaning that introduce variations in the activity, the example The constructor that Habermas puts could be a good example of an illocutionary phrase, something in the phrase offers variations to the activity, thus relating performatively as a speech act to variations of the activity. In the perlocutionary phrase as a speech act, the activity can be completely modified, for example, I am currently writing, but I can receive a phone call, in which they tell me that there is a party at night and they invite me, that phrase, if I decide to go, completely changes my activity.

  The world of life is full of the three forms of sentences as speech acts, the first remains in the order of intersubjective communication as an activity and only modifies in the sense of what the exchangers are saying to each other, that is, in the order of saying in the communication itself without modifying the activity, the second introduces variations in the activity, the third modifies it entirely.

Bibliography

Habermas Junger, The Theory of Communicative Action 1 and 2, First Manuscript Version, The Library of the University of Visual Art Armando Reveron, Caracas

Habermas Junger, The Problem of Comprehension in Social Sciences, The Theory of Communicative action, Boston, Beacon Press. 

Habermas Junger, The Problems of Understanding in Social Sciences, Pp, 144-196, Theory of Communicative Action I and II, Taurus

Shutz Alfred, The Knowledge in the Worlds of Everyday Life, edited by Schutz's wife Ilse Heim with Thomas Luckmann

The Chrysalis of being

©By Abdel Hernandez San Juan

This paper discusses the Hegel logic of being defined by him as an objective logic in the science of logic. Placing out the distinction between being itself –the ontological one which simply is in coincident with itself without yet extrinsecación to it and the subject in which, simultaneously, such a being itself is being already reflected in the form of self-representation as a first one distinction between epistemology and ontology, as well as pointing out the fact that to Hegel paradoxically knowledge and science can’t be excluded from the movement and logic of being and becoming, the paper discuss under Hegel theory of sameness and negations between major pairs such as being and becoming, the relation between being itself the one which simply is without yet extrinsecación to it, and the inmediacy of the world of life. 

  While Hegel theory of being seems to be not as focused in the idea of a present of the present in time needed to get out such an inmediacy, an idea of time he usually assigned in his theory of being moments to the being to itself, the one goes to its own, --the I, the subject, and the monad--, and while Derrida certainly restablished the right now of time mixing Aristoteles physics, Heidegger and Hegel logic, under the nun toward the gramme and the ousia of language, all the Hegel theory of being as a theory of moments developed under the relation of samennes and negations between major pairs, such as being and becoming or between being itself and putted beings, supposes in all cases the ontological moment of being to solution the pairs samennes over its negations, something supposes a continued inmediacy, to be it have to become and to become it have to be,

   toward including monads, my Intramundane horizont, the paper, however, not without assuming and recognizing as major in my theory of the inmediacy Hegel earlier distinctions between world itself and the phenomenological worlds as two different sides which are at the same time samennes, the same, and paradoxically negations, world itself and the reflected phenomenological world, focus out that Hegel theory transform the inmediacy in a world of constant mediations. While he recognized what he defined as a suprasensible world, the calmed and or quiet universe of reality out there, his theory of pairs as moments transform the inmediacy in an university of continuum mediations given by facts such as for example that reflexion itself should be seen as an extrinseque form of putted being under being itself and that being itself and putter being mutually mediate in between each one to the other, 

   while the paper is not focused in discussing my theory of the Intramundane horizonts and its inmediacy, about which Derrida recognize a more well defined idea of the alive present world to Hurseel more than to Hegel, the interest in Hegel complexization of the inmediacy with mediations, his inmediations, stay attractive to the discussion of things exits and or works far to or out of the inmediacy of the Intramundane horizont, probably toward my concept of sobreordinations as well as several theoretical issues not focused yet in this paper

Keywords: epistemology and ontology, being and science, being and becoming, samennes and extrinsecación, being itself and the inmediacy of the world of life, world itself and the phenomenological world

Written, conceived, composed and created in English 

by Abdel Hernandez San Juan

   When Hegel committed to define and discuss his science of logic, he started it by asking about if science should have a beginning and how can be defined such a beginning, and when he response himself to stablish it the objective logic of being appeared as it. 

  The reason to stablish being as the beginning of science was related with how in being coincidence something that seems to be by itself a samennes ontology or Inmanence which simply occur in coincidence with itself without yet an exteriorization of it while paradoxically that impression can only be feel and recognized by a subject.

  Being itself consist precisely in the impression of it by a subject who feeling to be inside himself or outside, creates in awareness, reflected feelings, the appearing of being. By this reason, the beginning of science in being revolves around the crucial point of epistemology and ontology. 

  But according to Hegel, concepts and knowledge can’t not be excluded from being, it is a part of it and precisely because being supposes the paradoxes of something ontologically “being itself” since a sense of it appear in the subject while it is only also since to be it have to goes inside being and as a part of it. 

  The incredible genius of Hegel, in my opinion, consisted about how this dilemma and paradoxes far to make him to feel insecure, all the contrary, inspired and stimuled him to demonstrate his capability to abstract a logic of being. 

  I would like to short recapitulate his thesis given that I will need it to my discussion of this paper.

  There is in Hegel several moments to a being, a moment of “being itself”, this moment, the ontological one receive a long and extensive attention in Hegel logic while paradoxically it finally end as just a moment of being, when late it can’t be understand in the itself of it without “the becoming” meaning that at the same time, this “being itself” without a “becoming” maybe simply “nothing” and by this reason a discussion about the relation between “being” and “nothing” appear as a negation of itself, a discussion I am excluding, while to me, since form is there, it is regarded to the phenomenology of appearance.

  But according to Hegel, like a relation between “to be” and “not to be”, there is a “traspaso”, (this word have an interesting mean, it is translated as transfer, but also evolves to pass, to go by), meaning “traspaso” of being in its opposite “a non being” which like the impression of “nothing” explain to him how “being” can “pass” in “the becoming” and how “becoming” which to him contents itself   “a non being”, a being negated with “nothing”, can late also pass in that “being itself” again.

  If we pay attention to how a “being itself” to just be and to just be the ontological one supposes to evolve inside itself and as a part its own nature, “the becoming”, given that if it supposes to be, to be in itself it have to become (be-come, the becoming of the beenlless being of being) and to become it have to be, there is then not a need to point out or to imagine a “non being” or “a nothing” to the nature of being and to the nature of becoming.

  But according to Hegel we can’t negate “becoming itself” perse a being and that “becoming itself” supposes to him a “non being” or “a nothing”, the pass, transfer or go by appear at this point to imagine how each one considered as distinct, pass (tras-pass) in or through the other considered as its opposite, as a moment of negations of itself.

  In usual terms Hegel efforts to explain both moments, the one of mutual necessity and the one of mutual negation. But such a “being itself” is also negated in another form probably important than the previous one, it is a being negated as a “being itself” by another moment of being, that one when a “being to himself” appear. 

  This “being to himself” and or “to itself” turn being to its own (also stablishing a “self” and an “I”) and start to be from its own out of the first ontology when such a “being itself” appeared, like in the verbal formal time conjunction of “is” and “are” as simply the samennes of being and becoming mutual dissolutions late discussed by Derrida as a concept of being evolving time resolved only in grammatology recalling together at Ousia and Gramme, Aristoteles, Hegel and Heidegger. 

  When the moment of a “being to himself” turn to its own we get “the monad”, “the self”, “the I” and “the subject”, but according to Hegel this moment of “being to himself” to which he also dedicated extensive discussion have also an end appearing like “being itself” also as just a moment of being, since turning to “its own” its opposites appears as its own negation discussing then the “being to another” and “being another”.

  This “being to another” is explained by the mutual inclusivism of pairs, for example, “one” to “multiples one” and biseversa, “being” to “becoming” and biseversa, “finity” to “infinity” and biseversa, something Hegel discuss as moments of mutual samennes or dissolution and as moments of mutual negation considered as opposites pairs. 

  While “being another” appears as being one between the multiples as soon as we are back again in a “being itself” or in a “being to itself” it also have an end. 

  For example, “being another” looks to negate “being itself” from the moment we question how can it “be another” and be at the same time “being itself”?. 

  Leibniz Monad appear here to solution the opposite, how?.

   On the one side we have The “one” of my “one” or of “your one”, this one may be considered as the “single one”, and on the other side we have the “one” of anyone, but this one of any one may appear also at the single one when we say “when one think” or “when one experience” or “when one feel” using the single of the plural or the plural of the single. What we are in front here is about the “to Be” of the verb time, expressed as the “is” and the “are” of any conjunction, in fact, in language verb time we already have this Leibniz monadic solution (and dissolution or sameness) between being it-self and being another as well as of being and is (the to be of conjunctions). 

  The Turn in fact happens at the same time, as soon as being another appear as a moment of being, “being itself” turn to “being to himself” or “to itself” simultaneously, to “its own”.   

  In fact the only ways for the pairs to be inclusives or even sameness, to dilute each one into the other solutioning its opposites a “being itself”, the ontological one, the one which simply “is”, should be reestablished.

  Only in a “being itself” a “becoming”, which to him evolved “to be” the opposite of a being, a “non being” or a “nothing”, can become inclusive to a being, a negation of the negation should appear to solution the rejection of a “one” against “multiples ones” and biseversa, between “finity” and “infinity” as well. 

  A “being itself” should appear and also a “being to itself” should turn to “its own”. 

  There is in Hegel logic of being also a distinction between a “being itself”, the ontological or immanent one and a “putted one being”.

  In the first side there is “being itself” and a considerable part of a “being to itself” that turns to “its own” and in a second side there is a “putted being” as the opposites. 

  This “putted being” appear continuously in his theory to make distinctions between something that “is itself” and an “extrinseque relation”. 

  This extrinseque relation is almost present continually in all Hegel theory of being, for example, reflexion itself start to be first an “extrinseque being” in its relation to a “being itself” ontology, he defined it with an interesting concept I would like to discuss late, the concept of “inmediation”. 

  While I am working in my books with the concept of immediacy my immediacy maybe certainly defined as a pristine one, a pure one, things as simply given to our sensations and impressions, Hegel assign to the immediacy a certain level of mediation defined as inmediation. 

  For example, reflexion maybe considered originally as an extrinseque “putted being”, but this “putted being” negates “itself” in “it own” extrinseque nature and is being late absorbed by “being itself”. In a few words, a reflection start to be first a “putted being” but it late appears again as a part of “being itself”, this maybe defined as the inmediation level of the immediacy, in-mediation (the mediation potential of the immediacy) and is defined as when “being itself” mediate reflection transforming its original putted, extrinsique nature in a part of a “being itself”, (it happen in Hegel nor only with reflexion but with all the forms of “putted beings”).

  And the opposite, also a “being itself” which seems to correspond only to an undiferienced, samennes ontological being without extrinseque relations to it, appears also working in several forms of “putted beings” in Hegel discussion.   

  However, the final resolution of the logic of being is far to be resolved with a theory of moments since there is not an escape to “monad” something stablish the pair of “one” and “multiple” as the more objective one. 

  This pair concept of “one” and “multiple” which grow up and born from the concept of “monad” that Leibniz previously discussed, occupy a significant place in Hegel science of logic and I agree with it even when Hegel dedicate almost the half of his logic of being starting from “one” and “multiple” to discuss the relation between “finite” and “infinity”, “quality” and “quantity”, numbers, quantum’s, geometry and mathematics. In fact, more than a half of Hegel logic of being is dominated by this pair of “one” and “multiple” which is the pair of the Leibniz “Monad”, with a half of it on quality and a second half on quantity. 

  Finally, there is certainly in Hegel as I has discussed in some other papers a general regard of being to Inmanence which generally stay to be an abstract theory of being that can be equally applied to the Inmaterials as to the material. 

  In fact, “being itself” can still be in Hegel just a necessity to stay discussing a unity or a term, a something or a concept, at the end a “monad” again.

  The “being it-self” can be, for example, “the infinity” as there is a moment of the infinity that is being the infinity “in itself”, but there is a moment of infinity that “turn to itself” or to “its own” and then is not already the being of it “in-itself” but the turn to “its own”, if we don’t have such a “turn to its own”, we can’t discuss “concepts by it owns” or any “unity’s by its owns”. 

  With the exception of a few examples, there is not along the whole science of logic first book dedicated to the logic of being, a regard of any of this concepts to the inmaterial or to the material.

  A “being to another”, can be simply a necessity to define how the “finite” is being to the “infinity” and the “infinity” to the “finity”, how the “one” is being to the “multiple” and biseversa, while a “being to itself” may turn to “its own” in the form of a term or a concept “turns to its own”, easing to stay discussing it to “its own”, “the one to its own”, “the infinity to its own”, “the becoming to its own”, “being itself to its own” perse a becoming, as concepts, as monads, as units. 

  “Being itself” at the same time can be the “being itself” of anything, of “something”, of “a thing”, of “finity”, of “infinity”, of “the one”, of “multiple”, of a “quantum”, of a “number”, while “being another to other” can be, like the pair of “one” and “multiple”, exteriority in general, the exteriority of numbers, for example, to plus 3 plus 9 we need each one to be “another to the other” since numbers itself are exteriors, externality maybe here the reason to define a moment of being defined as a “being to another” or being “another to another”. 

  There is not in Hegel in general a literal definition of this concepts regarding distinctions between the material and the Inmaterials in his logic of being, not between the wordless world of life and the universe of geometry, mathematics of chemistries while he assigns existence to everything including the infinity. 

  Remembering that he considers that knowledge’s and concepts are both a part of being his logic of being stay to be apply to everything as possible, it may be applied to literal wordless life, but maybe applied to concepts and knowledge being, maybe applied to mathematics, quantum’s, chemistry and substances, in fact, yes he dedicated also extensive pages to discuss Kant antinomies revolves precisely around this dilemma of the relation between parts and wholes, elements and conjunctions and mainly the antinomies, the one the paradoxes of the composition of substance and matter.

  In fact, Kant antinomies both, the one around substance and matter and the one about space and time are both discussed in the first book dedicated to the logic of being which maintains all the time, as previously explained, the ambiguity or neutral one position of letting it open in a form to be apply to anything without defining if it should be considered as material or Inmaterials, letting it open.

  I am not saying that Hegel never discuss the issue of matter and forms, but he regarded it to his book on essence and excluded it from the logic of being. 

  Why, we will see and discuss it late. 

  To this point I would like to resume toward the whole of this paper, two things, first, the Hegel moment of “being itself”, the ontological one moment, to which all the rest of the moments of being needs to be back to solution, through negation of negation, the opposites and to be mutual or a samennes, need to include and discuss a relation between “being” and “time” that stablishes it as the immediacy, as “the present of time”, considering the immediacy itself as a pristine and pure immediacy without considering yet a Hegelian attribution of mediation to that immediacy, his in-mediation.

  This “being itself”, the ontological one, the one which simply is, should be defined as my immediacy considering it as “the present of the present” and evolve time in a form that also suppose to discuss how time entrance in a being and biverseversa, how a being entrance in time to which we will clearly need to discuss the questions of “the sense of being” at the relation between “sense” and “time” needed nor only to stand the immediacy of space and time “present of the present” but also being and time inside language, (of any language, textual or visual).

  Derrida discussed this “present of the present” at his Ousia and Gramme re-calling Aristotle’s Physis and discussing together Aristotle, Hegel and Heidegger to establish “the nun”, “the right now of time”.

  Second, to this point we have in Hegel to the moment only two concepts of mediation, a first one level of mediation assigned to the immediacy and defined as “in-mediation” thanks to which all the forms of being included the putted ones being are mediated by the immediacy (his inmediation) and transformed in a “being itself” and a second one level of mediation defined by how each pair mediate in itself its opposite.

  We should remember that Hegel discussed the pair of “being” and “nothingness” as a pair itself before assigning late “nothingness” and “non being” to the nature of becoming. But as examples of this second level of mediation we may see somes examples.

  For example, when we figure out a “being itself” as an ontological undiferienced samennes without extrinsecación to it, it looks to be infinity but that sensation or impression of infinity can be feel only in sensibility and not demonstrated yet, to be demonstrated, infinity should be considered itself, but as soon as we are considering infinity by itself turning to its own, infinity itself appear as a “non being” or as a “nothing” by itself meaning something opposite to a being, the question is then, how can “being itself”, which supposed to be the more ontological level of being, be feel as infinity in sensibility if infinity considered itself is a “non being”.

  Well, according to Hegel, becoming, which evolve to be to being an opposite “non being” mediate being and only in this form a sense of infinity corresponding to the feeling of becoming, can be assigned to “being itself”, so that a being is already mediated by the “non being” of becoming. 

  According to me a distinction as such is needed to explain the differences between “being” and “is”, but it is also needed for sensibility to feel the infinity of being, according to Hegel. However, at the same time, it is also impossible to figure out both “becoming” and “infinity” without a feeling of being, because only provided by a sense of the “beinless time of being” something as “becoming” and something as a sense of “infinity” can be reflected by sensibility, to this point “being itself” -mediate at the same time “becoming” and “infinity” because without such a mediation of “becoming” and “infinity” by being, “becoming” and “infinity” can’t just be nothing itself. 

  The opposites mediated themselves while to mediate in between the pairs negates in between and the eliminations of each one of the pair by the other one is needed to each one be the itself of it, the being of it by the way is being defined by “what it is not”, the pass by, and the “non being of It” is being participating in defining the “being of it” and the opposite, the “being of it” participating in defining the “non being of it”. There is some other concepts of mediation working in Hegel but I will discuss it late. 

  Certainly, there is not as clear a well stablished “right now of time” in Hegel, nor a “present of the present” strongly stablished, in fact, the way I has previously discussed becoming, helps to see becoming in a form that distance a letlee the very specific sense this concept have in Hegel as we may say that there is an inclusive sense of time in Hegel concept of becoming defined as a concept ready to exit the present toward the future defined as telos, teleology and overall an idea of progression and progress, becoming is in Hegel affected by both the idea of infinity progress and by the idea of infinity itself, so that the time of such a becoming, when he imagine the trasspass or go by of being and becoming mutually, being and non-being, lost a letlee “a sense of the present of present” toward the future defined in this sense.  

  We may say that the “right now of time” appears in Hegel near to my concept of the immediacy, but we should also point that my immediacy is affected in Hegel by his “in-mediation” in a form that start to be far from that pristine nature of my immediacy of the “here and now”. 

  To Hegel a continued process of mediation between “being in itself” by “putted beings” and biseversa, “putted beings” by “being in itself”, transform the immediacy in an space of constant mediations that difference between the “world in itself” as “it is” and the “phenomenological world” start to be a “reflected world” in both levels of reflections mediated by the immediacy of “being itself” and of reflections stablished as a “phenomenological world” under “world in itself”, he define this complex issue as “two sides” that at the same time coincidence in a unity but also negates itself being defined each one by its opposite, “world in itself” and the “phenomenological world”.

  We may be clear on the fact that this point start to exit his logic of being to entrance his logic of essence evolve a discussion on essence, identity, diference, form and essence, form and matter, phenomena, appearance, things etc., to which we will go late. 

  In fact, in front of the question of the “right now” of time Hegel recognize it in term of the logic of being to the moment of the “being to himself” or “to itself” which is the moment of the “being to its own”, I am pointing here a pivotal theoretical issue not previously discussed nor only not about Hegel but I would say in general, given that first it is not clearly focused by Hegel himself, but as I has really read it with exhaustive attention several times certainly, in the precise moment of asking about the “right now of time”, Hegel recognize and assign that time to the moment of the “being to himself” or “being to itself” the one that turn to “its own” not to “being itself”.

  This is a complex issue because a pristine, pure immediacy accepted as the “right now of time and space” supposed to be also the space of a “being itself” as I discussed before, but certainly a “being to itself” or to “its own”, the born of “the I”, “the Self” and “the Monad”, the “one” versus the “multiple”, is needed for the immediacy of the “right now” of time be fully stablished ending then to win Leibniz again regarding ancients and classics discussions.

  We should be also clear at this point on the fact that Deleuze beautiful recalls of Leibniz at “The Fould: Leibniz and the baroque”, move exclusibly to the soul and exclude this turn of “being to himself”, “to itself”, to “its own ” forgetting both “being” and the “worldness world of life” both of “the world” and of “the present” which I has proposed and developed in my books to which only Shurt and Habermas coincident with me, while at the same time Derrida visionary recall of Aristoteles physic together with Heidegger and with Hegel, stablish the “nun” of time. 

  This “nun” in Derrida is exactly the “right now of time”. 

  Going in a form also discussing dots, lines and surfaces –space and time—, Derrida strongly establish “the present of the present” as the more transcendental time, his definition of the “alive present”, but it is instead then regarded by Derrida to the ousia of gramme, meaning to the entity of the substance of presence in phenomenology and language. 

  Definitely, Derrida turn from being to the “nun”, in his way only to the ousia of gramme was extremely important, I am not negating it, it was a necessity to stablish how all we are is about a phenomena of presence, present and presentation including the fact that awareness itself evolve being in the presence of itself as it appear to itself in conscience and by the way “the nun” of it, the “right now of time” of gramme and language from which he define “the sign” as this first apparition of us in front of us assigning it as a Hegel semiology. 

  But the right now of time is not excluded from Hegel logic of being it is assigned to the moment of the “being to itself” which is in the basis of my discussion of the time and space basis of monad and of my proposal and developments of my concept of the world of life, my whole issue on how to develop a new phenomenological sociology, my Intramundane Horizont thanks to shurt but going beyond innovating it. 

Abdel Hernandez San Juan

Seminars on Hegel, Various Seminars are upcoming by Abdel Hernandez San Juan

Visit the previous one In Front of Inmanence: Hegel, Frankford and Habermas

Notes

  1-The right now of time appears in Hegel Logic of being mainly in his discussion of Kant Antinomies discussing space on ancient’s surfaces and spacialities such as euclides and when answering the question about if the world have a beginning he establish that certainly there is an absolute beginning in time defined by the relation between dots, lines and surfaces as the now. 

   2- Derrida defined this concept of a sign exactly as previously explained as the first form to define a sign, a form to call the phenomenology of the appearance of presence of ourself to ourself in conscience as a sign. Obviously inclusive as certainly evolved as one of the main peculiarities of Hegel way to theorize, Derrida generously attribute it as a Hegel semiology when certainly it is more a Derridean interpretation of Hegel or a way through which Derrida recognize or declare the Hegelian basis in his theory of language, not excluding Saussure, but getting it together. I am not sure if there is a semiology in Hegel as Derrida assigned, I am yes sure about that Derrida way to develop his semiology needed Hegel theory, but I am open to late consider from sociology autonomy and axiology if there is an anthropology when Derrida discussed such a Hegel semiology as a form of anthropology.

   3- Derrida recognize this “alive present” to Hurssel not to Hegel as certainly there is not a clear “liveness of the present” as an “alive present” in Hegel, since Hegel complejization of the immediacy with constant mediations far to it, (his “in-mediation”), however, paradoxically, at the same time, Hegel assign a relevant place to “livennes thought”,  but that thought is in Hegel completely out of a world as also a world in Hegel transform in a complex process of mediations between “world itself” and the “phenomenological world”, while Hurssel discussed a transcendental abstract concept of world coincident with the “alive present”, but this world againt is still an abstract one needed but far yet to my “Intramundane Horizont” world of quotidian life, as to Shurt “worlds of everyday life” and to Habermas “World of Life” too. 

References

Derrida Jacques, Ousia and Gramme: Notes on Being and Time, Margins of Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press and Cathedra

Derrida Jacques, Genesis and Structure and Phenomenology, Anthropos

Derrida Jacques, The well and the Pyramid: Introduction to Hegel Semiology, Margins of Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press and Cathedra

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel  Science of Logic London: George Allen & Unwin, 1929, translated by W. H. Johnston and L. G. Struthers, translated by Henry S. Macran (Hegel's Logic of World and Idea) (Bk III Pts II, III only). Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1929  translated by A. V. Miller; Foreword by J. N. Findlay. London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1969, Prometheus; Later Printing edition (December 1, 1991), Humanity books, translated by George di Giovanni, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010

Hegel G.W.F, Science of Logic, Tome I, Doctrine of Being, Solar, Hachete 

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, Being and Monad, paper chapter. Being and monad, book

Facing immanence

©By Abdel Hernandez San Juan

This paper discusses Junger Habermas as the first turn to language theory in the tradition of the Frankford school. The paper offers a general overview on the simultaneous counterposition between positivism and neohegelianism since the earlier XX Century. While the epistemological basis to positivism in classical philosophy can be also discussed in some of the Hegel writings, mainly the moment when substance and essence are superated by the positive affirmation of concepts and concepts of concepts, the influence on Hegel of Spinoza and Leibniz still echoes an indistintion between the well delimited area of concepts and cognition and issue of inmanence considered both as the Inmanence of substances and or as the Inmanence of the ontology of god and religion. This paper theorize and discuss the earlier XX Century neohegelianism continuation in new forms of such an indistintion between the world of concepts and the world of substance and matter influence the absent in all Frankford tradition of a theory of language and how Habermas effort mainly consisted about developing out such a theory of language to the poshegelian logic but critizing previous neohegelian inmanentism recalling several issues from pragmatism, positivism and hermeneutics  

Keywords: Junger Habermas, Theory of language, pragmatism, hermeneutic, positivism and neohegelianism

   Philosophy in Europe was seen as separated between logical positivism with its development of the philosophy of language as a form of positive philosophy, with all that this implies for its empirical correlate, but positive versus negative, and the Frankfort school that seemed more Well, from a mainly Hegelian or neo-Hegelian perspective, it developed as a form of negative philosophy that was very abstract and classical in principle, but negative in the sense of self-criticism, as psychoanalysis and Marxism could have been in another sense, although in a different way. different because Frankfort brings from Hegel, a way in which in the most abstract philosophizing in the abstraction of concepts, whether the developments on being, essence or the concepts themselves, a disdifferentiation between the world of language and the world of thingness, between the animated world of vital processes, subjective or in relation to being, assumed in the relationship of being with the world, and the inanimate world or of matter.

  In Hegel there is no matter in language, there is no coseic of language, to be more precise, it is not known if there is or not, in short, his most abstract developments can be the same about a social experience as about a cell or the chemical property of a substance, the one and the many, for example, one of its richest conceptual relationships, can be the self of oneself as a singularity, the one that I feel to be in front of the many, or the one same of any one in which the multiple becomes one, but it can also be the one of a substance or chemical property, the one of the cell, for example, compared to the multiple of the cytoplasm, it is not that Hegel descends to these literalizations and Say what it refers to, the little literalizes, its developments are, like mathematics, one hundred percent abstract, but when you look for an empirical correlate to those abstractions, it becomes obvious that it maintains the neutrality that one thing can be the same as the other. Another and above all, the point I want to make is that these indifferentiations take place right there where a philosophy of being is developing.

   The logic of being, which defines as an objective logic, precisely in philosophizing being in its philosophy the world of immanence, of ontos, of being in itself of what is, works the same for all forms of what IS, They can be spiritual, they can be merely conceptual or they can be entirely material respecting the immanence or ontos of the inanimate world, their abstractions apply equally to each other, therefore, indirectly in Hegel the implicit immanence, the ontological assumption In the background, it presupposes, if we look towards immanence as substance, the fact that with regard to BEING and IS, the substance IS in the same movement in which BEING IS, this would not be separated, if BEING IS, the substance would be with him because in the immanence of ontos with respect to WHAT IS and BEING if the one and the multiple can be my one with respect to you who are multiple to me, but it can be the one of a chemical conglomerate before the multiple of its chemical ecosystem, the philosophy of being and the philosophy of ES would be the same thing.

   If what we suppose fills the place of this non-literalized undifferentiation is the substance of the ontos in Hegel, immanence, without yet putting language there, would be the same substance, but let us suppose that what would be in that ontos would not be substance, but rather it would be immateriality, if it is immateriality then immanence in Hegel could be spirit and it could be ontotheology, that is, religion, we know that he developed the philosophy of spirit and aesthetics, but the underlying ontology assumed in his philosophy on being and essence, that philosophy in which he treats BEING and immanence equally, he would then receive the Es of Being not from the movement of the substance, but from a Being of the ES that corresponding to the inanimate world, would be ontotheological, that is, it would lead to the theological question of God.

   However, this way in which the philosophy of being, existence and the philosophy of being of what is in any of its forms works equally in Hegel could be interesting for many other reasons today, what I want to emphasize is only with respect to the language that My topic here, that is, in the direction of Habermas, language in Hegel, we could say that it is a clear example, although it is also a clear example in Heidegger, of what I have defined as an omission of language at the center of the classical philosophy of being, that is, philosophical language ignores being a language and ignores language because it wants to be the language of being and the language of being is supposed to be so that being can be in it, it would have to at least be omitted as language, just like that. the Being could be in HIM. If it is emphasized that it is a language, then Being could not be and language would simply have to subordinate itself to Being and go where it wants to take it, this leads us to the issue of expression.

   The point is that although it is omitted, there is a language there, there is one in the way Hegel wrote and in the implicit assumptions about language given in his ways of philosophizing, and that language is one in which language seems to have no material. own. That is to say, its matter of language and its form of language would seem, like the same undifferentiation that I have referred to, of the same matter of the ontos of any substance, in short, it is as if the matter and form of language with the IS and the Becoming that we suppose to be immanence, were, if we fill the undifferentiated with substance, of the same matter of the ontic substance, that is, of any other substance in the world of matter, not that of language.

  And this is what Frankfort brings from Hegel. When you read Benjamin, Adorno or any other Frankfort author you immediately become aware of this Hegelian imperative. In Frankfurt, language is undisputed and certainly seems, as in Hegel, to belong to the same matter of a different substance that would not be the matter or the proper form of language, or it would seem to correspond to the complete dematerialization of the spirit, but on one side or on the other, that of the relationship of language with matter, of language as matter and the matter of language, on the one hand, and that of the relationship of language with being, spirit and thought, language if it is there and it is in precise ways and once it is there a relationship is established between the matter of that language and the forms that being acquires, forms that require philosophizing that being according to that matter.

   In writing, pencil, pen, nib, keyboard, glass, virtual page, paper, parchment, letter, but beyond, in its own subject, syntax, grammar, semantics that are not the same if it is a written word, spoken word or if it is music. or painting because it is not the same to make a sentence grammatical when painting than when composing music or writing, the demands that these subjects place on the compositional act are not the same, the way in which they ask and demand of the compositional act according to their logic and in which for the same reason It gives a dialogue between the being without matter and the matter in which as language it wants to express itself and once in it it is plotted, woven and transformed into something else that only by following that language can philosophize even where that philosophizing wants to continue being so about the being of that language in that form.

  In sculpture wood, stone, metal, and the ways of giving shape to these materials to turn them into languages ​​and expression, in painting pigments, creaminess, plasticity, thinners, supports, fabric, in writing syntax, and right where it has been omitted that language and its subject matter is there, it becomes more interesting to analyze what have been no longer or not only the implicit assumptions about language that have worked in that form of language, on the one hand, but beyond assumptions, what have been the relationships that have been established in that language, because in that language there is matter of language, with both things, the matter of language and the ways in which, according to the matter of that language, it has worked in the communication or the expression of the immateriality of thought and spirit.

   Let's focus for a moment on the subject and on the form that this language has as its own, distinct and differentiated in all aspects starting with its levels of complexity and overordination, grammar, syntacsis, phonetics, semantics, lexicon, glosseme, indexical, different with respect to any other form of substance, of matter or of the inanimate, on the one hand, also with regard to the being of that language, the being that in that language wants to be, and the very relationship between being and language, which does have, which does receive, which does develop in relation to and from, according to the matter and form of that language, which for that very reason even represents a way of philosophizing the being that the relationship entails. phenomenological between language and being, on the one hand, between being and thought, on the other, between language, being and thought, and the relationship between Being and what IS according to language, as language is and how being is in and according to that language, that is, specific to another ontology that, being that of language, is distinguished and separated in the ontos of any substance, and that also has, in the senses, semantics. and the meanings, as the form of relationship to the immaterial that in that language from its matter and its form is immaterialized and therefore it does suppose ways specific to that language of relating to the immaterial and the spirit.

   Placing ourselves for a moment at this point, where language extends and visualizes before us with its visualizable matter and its own form on the horizon of our impressions, what we previously saw as a disdifferentiation between the matter of language and the substance of any immanence (in Hegel and the continuation of it in Frankfort), on the side in which we fill that undifferentiation with an ontic substance whatever is not that of that language, then a relation of mimesis appears according to which the matter of that language that is There, even if it is omitted, since it is assumed not to be there, it would remain as if impregnated by mimesis of the matter of another ontic substance.

  We assume a language to which we have not given matter or more precisely we have not filled it with a substance (according to Hegel and Frankfort in whom language is as a dematerialized language, so to speak, together as if it were the pure language of being and spirit. , the matter of that language that if it is there before our eyes, visible, would be impregnated by mimesis with the matter of other ontic substances. This is, in fact, what happens to our impressions about the material and immaterial of art or any Another phenomenon when we read Hegel and Frankfort, we have the impression of the given that we know that if there is matter in what is spoken about, that its own matter is impregnated by mimesis with the matter of another ontic substance.

But if we fill this indifference regarding immanence, not with substance, but with immateriality, which could lead us to the question of spirit, soul and ontotheology, then that relationship between the material of language and the immaterial proper to the forms in which From its material, language makes possible immateriality, meaning, semantics, let us look here at meaning in all its meanings, also of sensations, that relationship would again be a form of mimesis, but this time no longer mimesis between two materials, that of language and that of another ontic substance, but between two immaterializations.

Matter 1: That of that omitted and omitted language (due to dematerialized or immaterialized) that if it is there even if it is omitted, when it is assumed not to be there, it remains impregnated by mimesis of the matter of another ontic substance

  Mimesis again, in the second, now between the immateriality that language makes possible, meaning, semantics, and the immateriality that is assumed to the ontos of a spirit or to the immanence of a spirit another that would be assumed, such as that of the substance or the inanimate world, provided with a being in itself perse and independently of language.

Matter 2: The most dematerialized or immaterialized matter that, by tending to dematerialize in the relationship with the matter of that language by omission of the latter (defamiliarization of the fact that it is there), would want to be or find in itself another form of matter that it was no longer just that material thing or that it would be less so or that it also wanted to be something else in its spiritual correlate.

  One could be, the first, in ignoring the referential and denotative horizon, mimesis understood either as a phenomenon of impregnation, it mimics because it receives something from another matter that impregnates its own, or as a phenomenon of mimicry. , and in the second, mimesis of one immateriality with respect to another, mimicking God, for example, or with the spirit of Aristotle or with the soul of Kant.

  Since language is there, the previously undifferentiated comes to the surface, the manifest becomes latent, and where we had not yet filled the undifferentiated space that corresponded to immanence, forms of relationship appear, conative, mimetic, connective relationships, among many. others.

   There is some romanticism in all this, of course, it is what I like most about Frankfort, which is not only a neo-Hegelian school developing in the 20th century, a school in which romanticism persists and continues, and in which esthetic.

  But well, since language is undisputed in Frankfort, as soon as Benjamin works on it in an essay that explains his anthropomorphism, lacking a theory of language, this, before Habermas, could only be discerned in Frankfort or as a matter of mimesis, as a dramaturgical, of drama, or subordinated to a logic that is supposed to be above and outside language for the same reason it ignores it, subordinates it or does not develop it.

  On the other hand, in its character of negative philosophy, Frankfort is soaked in society, there is that relationship of thought that is at once philosophical and art and social critic, Benjamin, discusses all the art of his time, Baudelaire, poets, writers, artists, Adorno, after several very abstract books, moves to discuss mass society, both the industrial age and other aspects of social reality, the latter becomes decisive in Frankfort, but without language or with undifferentiated language where in abstraction the ontos or immanence of both the inanimate world of substance and the immaterial world of spirit is assumed.

   In Habermas, all these questions are located in worlds of communicative relations between speakers and enunciators of communicative forms located in pragmatic horizons of communication, in relations for the same reason, at the same time of communicative rationality and hermeneutics, in relations around which one discerns the proper functioning of the society of speakers, enunciators and subjects involved in worlds of communication.

  Habermas completely rediscusses pragmatism and logical positivism in which, I consider, completely and forever renews classical philosophy, rethinking its coordinates and perspectives, while establishing a new and fruitful relationship with pragmatism.

   It is perhaps because of this constructivist and positive, rather than negative, aspect that some perceived him to have distanced himself from Frankfort, but in reality, he was doing nothing other than situating a world of language in a way that before Habermas had not acquired form in thought. , with a solid and strong basis in linguistic and enunciation theory, this development is also, although it establishes something that renews Frankfort, faithful to Frankfort, in fact receiving the Adorno prize.

  Because although in his approach to Hegel immanence and being are undifferentiated in Frankfort as in that one, via substance or via immateriality, or spirit, without the matter of language and without everything that linguistics requires and develops in the 20th century, phenomenology and semiotics, Habermas does not respond to this lack by questioning it, opposing it according to its shortcomings, but rather by philosophically abstracting what that philosophy of language would be that corresponds to Frankfort's logic, a Habermasian philosophy of language focused on communicative rationality, in which Language is situated between subjects who exchange statements in relationships of mutual explanation and hermeneutics, that is, it replaces the indifferentiation between the immanence of the IS and the Being, with a language situated in the pragmatics of communicative rationality between speakers and enunciators, for the same reason. , moves to pragmatism, and develops a very rich and abstract science of communicative reason, in the theory of the statement, but developing a philosophy of language for pragmatism, for positive logic and for Frankfort alike.

  In addition to the fact that, as we know, he continues to develop the aesthetics and philosophy of art on his own terms, he also becomes decisive, much more than the previous authors of Frankfort, in terms of pragmatism since he establishes the bridge that communicates and will open the perspectives for relate classical post-Hegelian philosophy with pragmatism and hermeneutics.

  In fact, for all these reasons, and others that will not be the time to elaborate here, it is immediately assimilated, above all and first of all, in the hard sciences that come from the side of contemporary sociology, it becomes essential in modern theoretical sociology. Post-Weberian, phenomenological and ethnomethodological based, almost all the compendiums and developments of contemporary scientific sociology of the last five decades, place him in the foreground, he is the theoretical philosopher with a scientific basis in terms of exact sciences, who provides the scientific bases of Bottom line, for countless new phenomena in sociology, in fact produces very positive results, and perspectives in the relationship between sociology, media and communities, among other topics, such as those related to understanding and coexistence.

  Two philosophers in my consideration in the 20th century are, as Hegel was in his time, not only classical thinkers, but also exact scientists, Junger Habermas and Jacques Derrida. Recognizing exact scientificity in linguistics is simpler, countless linguists are exact, whether distributionalists, functionalists, structuralists, phenomenological or semiotics, in philosophy, which we assume is where it is appropriate to develop the sciences of sciences, epistemology, the philosophy of sciences Paradoxically, only a few provide philosophy as an exact science, Habermas and Derrida are, in the 20th century, the exact scientists of philosophy.

Grades

  1-I have been considering Habermas inclusive since my first book in 1992, Edges and Overflows of Art, Possibility of Transart, as in all my subsequent books, while I have been discussing it in conferences and texts.

Note on the subject of language

If you are composing a paragraph about anything, something you experienced and want to tell, or simply an essay in which you want to express an idea, as soon as you start writing the first paragraph, the decision that your lines will have will come from a continuous communication between the what you want to say, and what the formal, grammatical and syntactic rules and principles of writing are asking of you, you could not deduce what it is asking of you if you do not first set the tone for what you want to express in your composition, but from the moment in which you begin to write it, the punctuation, the more or less subordinate character of the sentences, the relationship between each sentence as a phrase and the whole that they form between the punctuation marks, the number of articles you use, the way in which the gerunds, the way of treating verbal tense, all of this, in formal logic abstracted from the rules of grammaticality, if you know them, and know how to compose, it establishes options that are not predetermined, you have to find them, but according to those rules, from that moment what you compose will inevitably be a communication between what you are proposing and the resistance offered by the formal demands of language, the same happens with stone, metal or wood in sculpture, if you want to use it in a direction, according to the desire for expression and composition, you have to do it according to the material that offers resistance and tells you how and where what you want is possible, it happens with the pigments, with the supports in the paint, with the thinner , with drawing, with all the techniques and materials, to be in them and according to them they have to converse with the rules of that matter or language and to be in them and according to them, that according to them, once the work is composed , supposes another different syntax for the theorization and understanding of being in that language that can no longer be a theory of being without matter and without language.

Bibliography

Habermas Junger, The Theory of Communicative Action 1 and 2, First Manuscript Version, The Library of the University of Visual Art Armando Reveron, Caracas

Habermas Junger, From Lukacs to Adorno: Rationalization as Reification, Pp- 433-509, Theory of Communicative Action, Volume I, Taurus

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel  Science of Logic London: George Allen & Unwin, 1929, translated by W. H. Johnston and L. G. Struthers, translated by Henry S. Macran (Hegel's Logic of World and Idea) (Bk III Pts II, III only). Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1929  translated by A. V. Miller; Foreword by J. N. Findlay. London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1969, Prometheus; Later Printing edition (December 1, 1991), Humanity books, translated by George di Giovanni, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010

Hegel GWF, Objective Logic, The Doctrine of Being, Science of Logic, Ediciones Solar S:A and Librería Hachete S.A

Christianity and Structure

©By Abdel Hernandez San Juan

   Christianity continues to be structural in modernity, what is there about Christianity in the structure and what about the structure in Christianity?, beyond the Christian religion understood as a worldview of the world that explains its causes and the meaning of its existence on purpose. of a certain theology, there is a current, current and living relationship between structural Christianity and social reproduction, not as something discursive or ideological, but as something implicit to the social structures of reproduction.

  It is Christianity as an objective social structure that prevails and endures in a stable manner for social formations and groups throughout centuries, continuously encompassing the structural principles that determine the order of morality and ethics as these are expressed in the organization. of the family and social reproduction, including the reproduction of knowledge, its transmission and durability in education, values ​​such as these occur in exchange, the economy and the exercise of family and social responsibilities, childhood, adulthood, the old and the institutions.

   Christianity is the objective form of current culture and reproduction, objective not so much or regarding that which out there in the world of reality is verified in the same way in which it is verified that dogs cross the street, that the mosquito exists or that the oyin generates dust no matter how many times you clean, nor is it about objectivity understood only in the sense of rules of a game which are not known or not visible to an external observer who reaches the circumstances of those who play and observe them, They must be known in all their objectivity of rules accepted by each of the players so that the game has the development it has within a range of probabilities anticipated by its guidelines exactly as this is both experienced by its players and visually observed by the one who, knowing its rules or not, sees it unfold before him.

   The objectivity of Christianity as an objective form of culture is structural, and includes rules that, without being made explicit in the tangible form or vision, show their objectivity in the knowledge that recognizes and follows them, not explicit, but implicitly agreed upon, Some of them are more visible than the objectivity of the rules in the game, and many of them are less explicit but in most cases much more stable, lasting and determining in the way things happen, than the rules of a game. game. The difference between the mode of these objectivities that organize the social world according to relationships between Christianity and structure, and the rules of a game is that the latter, at least the players know, while the former are constitutive as objectivities relative to the world in which they take place. our things are, like the rules of syntax in language, phonetics, glossematics, grammar and other structural principles of language usually unknown to its users since they are structures that, like these notions in language, only They can be known and understood as objective realities being studied.

   In the same way that a language can be learned and even fully performed by a speaker or writer, without necessarily knowing the syntactic or grammatical rules that organize that language, the relationships between Christianity and structure are constitutive of the objective social world. in the form of, like language, stable and objective structures of social reproduction, that is, objective structures of stability and reproduction that are constitutive of the objective modes of a culture.

  Like the observer who comes to the game without knowing it and sees the passage of objective things subject to rules that have not been explained to him, in the social world such as syntax in language, the objective relations between Christianity and structure that establish rules, orders, Stable cultural patterns and norms have to be made explicit, brought into language, and objectified by the scholar both to the external observer and, to a large extent, to those social actors who, as in the acquisition and performance of a language or language, perform perfectly. within their reproductive bases and their learning, without necessarily having objectified them or being able to speak about them in the objectivity that defines them.

  The above does not mean that these structures are unconscious, the concept of unconscious, as Lacan began to demonstrate to a large extent, surpassing Freud, although it is not entirely a fully developed issue in Lacan either, tends to fill for common sense everything that due to lack of time, lack of studies or lack of motivation towards the topic, whatever the reason, it is not known or explicit to the social actors.

   Rather, it is, like syntax or grammar in language, or like the rules of the game that the external observer does not know, something that is once made explicit and communicated to social actors who develop according to their objectivity in the context. world of their social passage, are immediately admitted by those actors, that is, recognized as certainly objective. As I said, the notion of the unconscious was actually the way in which common sense filled in what, because it was not made explicit, objectified or studied, was considered not known, but as soon as such structures, such as the rules of the game or grammar, are explained to the actor, he not only recognizes them in their objectivity, but also confirms knowing them and being in control of them through other modes of knowledge such as experience, knowledge, habits, customs and the development of the person in the social world.

  Languages ​​and languages ​​are heterogeneous among themselves, but grammars all respond to the same homogeneous principles, homogeneity and heterogeneity, this pair relationship so decisive in the USA and its mixtures, is the first and last relationship that can be understood and contemplated in this sense of humanity in general, to be human for everyone and contemplate the human in all its ways and cultures, modernity has to be very general and homogeneous, it has to be that which contemplates the heterogeneous, for the generality of the homogeneous in which it is generalized. the human for all forms of the human, what is not homogeneous must then in its generality be heterogeneous to the homogeneous, to be human for everything heterogeneous it must first be homogeneous, then heterogeneous to the homogeneous, heterogeneity is Thus, the first way in which it is presented as an inclusive aspect and that acquires its condition of possibility in relation to the homogeneous, everything that is specific, complex, dissimilar, different and particular.

  We live in the new age, the new era, regarding this there seem to be fewer and fewer doubts, the new communication and information technologies have forever modified our urban, citizen and social ecosystems in a positive sense, as well as our senses and responses to which are space, time, distances, communications and memory, the economic and social development achieved as a result of the new paradigms of marketing culture, neoliberal or whatever we want to call it, customer service, control of quality, the service society and the free market, optimized and exponentiated human and social values ​​and capabilities that under previous obsolete forms tended to disappear close to extinction.

  Creativity and sensitivity acquired an unprecedented place in the world of daily and social life in our large cities and metropolises, ceasing to be what they once were attributes or qualities of a few, they became both ruling modes of subjectivity and modes of human interaction, this time for contingency reasons, if you are not creative and sensitive in the modern world of high technologies and the development of inventiveness in marketing, neither will your ventures prosper, nor do you adapt to the requirements of capacity and plasticity , knowledge and relationality, that the world of new technologies requires of the individual and the citizen, this has meant an explicit humanization of the social world, contingency is humanity.

Beyond interactionism

©By Abdel Hernandez San Juan

If I am communicating with you in everyday life on a conversational occasion sharing the same space and I state according to what you told me, and you counterstate according to what I told you from the moment in which we are talking saying has an interiority of meaning that requires elucidation and intelligibility, the next thing you tell me makes what I previously told you internal to its relations of meaning.

For me, who is a cutie with my own interiority, from the moment your expressions make sense to me and begin to form part of a communication, your phrases become part of the phrases I say to you and, conversely, my relationship with you. , like yours with me, is a relationship exposed to the subjectivity of my hermeneutical processing of your expressions and the subjectivity of yours with respect to mine.

Our relationship and communication is intersubjective because the relationships of meaning that weave together what we are saying to each other begin to establish relationships between language and practice, and between the practice of language and communication that is phenomenological and hermeneutic for me and for you. , is a communication of mutual explanation and statements aimed at understanding each other, therefore it ceases to consist of an interaction.

Our phrases, sentences and statements become internally inclusive of what each one enunciates, what I enunciate becomes constitutive of what you counter-enunciate and vice versa.

This, which can occur in conversational relationships of enunciation and counter-enunciation in the same physical space, applies to any form through which a continuous conversation takes place, it can be in person, it can be by telephone, through the exchange of weekly or monthly emails. and annually or through letters sent by post-mail.

If I sent you an email and you respond to me, what you tell me in your email will have come from you as much as from what I told you in mine, if you send me a letter and I respond to you, what I tell you in my letter, it will have emerged as much from me as from what you told me in yours, if you talk to me on the phone what you tell me makes what I tell you inclusive of your sentences.

The intersubjective relationship that we have establishes shared horizons of expectations that are what make our communication explicit and intelligible for both, to the extent that the communication carries a meaning and is explained in its understanding by its intramundane meanings, it moves away from that externalization. that placed the bodies from a third position and observed them interacting.

That we interact ultimately becomes irrelevant to the communication we carry out, the interactive component becomes epidermal and distant from what we are experiencing, living and meaning.

Even before considering the interaction that an external observer who sees what we are talking about from the outside as exogenous, impertinent and foreign to our internal communication, there are several concepts that are less external and less intrusive to our communication, which are also exogenous, such as those of reception. and decoding, if we only decode ourselves and are one receiver of the other, we become machines alien to the explanation and intelligibility of the meaning that makes us what we say to ourselves and that carries within our communication and to what relates our sentences with the reason of being of the shared horizons that those same communications establish, without which it could not be a continuous communication, that is, which is followed up and which has a course and a development that forms an intersubjective communication and a relationship.

What defines our relationship and communication has to be understood and understood by you and me, first, and then by anyone else who wants to participate in that relationship or understand it.

From that moment, what weaves together the communication we have inside establishes a relationship, the relationship is first a relationship of communication and then a relationship in the most complete sense of that intersubjective word, from that moment the relationship we have ceases to be defined. by interaction, drawing attention to the latter fails to find justification in the face of the fact that an infinite number of other concepts far from that of interaction, such as those of intersubjectivity, explanation, elucidation, understanding, undertakings, shared horizons of expectations, become more relevant and the interactive component takes a backseat in terms of relevance.

The concept of interaction, in reality, to refer to Habermas's analysis of the origin of Mead's theory on animal behavior, involves the externalization of two organisms or bodies which are defined as interaction because they are being observed from a third perspective. position that is not that of either of the two bodies, a third position that sees those two bodies in space and visualizes them having an interaction, who is that who observes and sees them?

It is a concept in its behaviorist and behaviorist origins with a strong dependence on determinism in epistemology, observed by a third observer who speaks of the interaction because he observes it and tries to determine it from the outside, that is, to intervene and condition it.

As soon as we analyze a communication situation in the two antipodes that move away from its animal visualization, as they are, towards the interior of the relationships of meaning and meanings that order inside what the contenders are saying to each other and what the hermeneutics weaves together of what relates them through which they communicate, and towards the outside of those relationships, when the communication that the contenders carry out is exposed to objective relationships that take place in a field, whether sociocultural, art or science, or whether it is defined by guild dynamics, habitus, customs, acerbs, value systems and traditions, the supposed third position that in the initial animal example only observed the interaction from the outside as Pavlov observed the mouse's reactions to food stimuli, It stops being an observer who analyzes the mouse's reactions and becomes a position that occupies an objective place in that field in relations of force capitalized and objectively mediated by interest, ideologies, preferences, tastes, tendencies, conveniences and objectives.

It goes without saying that one can also sustain, of course, a successful animal communication in the non-interactionist sense in which I am discussing here the eminently intersubjective character of the exchange of statements between speakers and writers, by which I mean that the relationship of Interactionism the animal does not make it better because it is more animal, but is given in that it supposes, as in Pavlov's mouse, the exposition of the animal reaction according to a third observer who outside the situation observes the interaction, there would not even be a sense of the interaction, without observation from the outside of what is happening, the interaction is, therefore, alien and exogenous to the situation and communication.

For this reason, the contenders who supposedly interact no longer do so as they believe they are doing so in the terms in which the dog naively interacts with the cat, the mouse responds to Pavlov's experiment, or the naive interactants believe they are interacting without deterministic positions being decided. to condition their interaction. The concept of interaction has a strong basis in determinism and is contrary to the freedom of the organism to function according to its freedom and the free will of its natural rights to the indeterminacy of the autonomy of its management, its communication, its performance and its system of values ​​and symbolization.

We can use the word interaction as we have it in the dictionary and try to modify its meanings to refer to things that do not properly refer to interaction as we have analyzed before. It had its form in behaviorism, behaviorism and social sciences such as interactionism. symbolic that are controlled by epistemological determinism.

Talk about interaction in conditions, for example, of free will where there are high levels of recreational freedom, such as children's games or interactions in cyberspace and the Internet, to refer to certain processes in which interaction is present, but in those uses with respect to which, given their different meaning, it would be better to use another word that does not have a deterministic tradition like this one, so that although I myself have used it with that different meaning, it is not actually an advisable word for those of us who are indeterminists because its Tradition in the social sciences as well as in the physical sciences was deterministic from the beginning and is even more so today.

Where we talk about interactionism, we talk about relationships that are exposed to deterministic conditioning that observes the interaction from a third position that aims to influence that interaction, manipulate it and use it for objectives and purposes that are not those that the subjects and contenders who communicate.

So we are talking about the Communication that was before in the Life worlds.

Bibliography

Adorno, Theodor W. Aesthetic Theory London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984. Ed. Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann. Trans. Christian Lenhardt, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997. Ed. Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann. Trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor, London, New York: Continuum, 2004. Ed. Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann. Trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor

Adorno Theodore, Aesthetic Theory, Orbis

Aristoteles, Logical Writings

Benoist, Jean Identidad/Identity: Seminario Interdisciplinario, Julia Kristeva, Michael Serres and Mathematicians philosophers, Meeting with Claude Levis Strauss, Petrel, Spanish

Bourdieu Pierre, Saussure, Structure and Practice, Outline of a Theory of Practice, Trans, Richard Nice, Cambridge University Press 

Derrida Jacques, Ousia and Gramme: Notes on Being and Time, Margins of Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press and Cathedra

Derrida Jacques, Genesis and Structure and Phenomenology, Anthropos

Derrida Jacques, The well and the Pyramid: Introduction to Hegel Semiology, Margins of Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press and Cathedra

De Certaud Michael, The Practice of Every Day Life, The University of California Press

Habermas Junger, The Theory of Communicative Action 1 and 2, First Manuscript Version, The Library of the University of Visual Art Armando Reveron, Caracas

Habermas Junger, The Problem of Comprehension in Social Sciences, Theory of Communicative Action, Beacon Press, Boston

Habermas Junger, The Problems of Understanding in Social Sciences, Pp, 144-196, Theory of Communicative Action, Volume I, Taurus

Habermas Junger, From Lukacs to Adorno: Rationalization as Reification, Pp- 433-509, Theory of Communicative Action, Volume I, Taurus

Habermas Junger and Jean Francois Lyotard, The Eighties Conversation

Habermas Junger, The Self and the Social; Mead, The Change of Paradigm, Pp, The Theory of Communicative Action, Beacon Press and Taurus

Habermas Junger, Constructive and Reconstructive Sciences: Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action

Habermas Junger, First Interlude, Social Action, Teleological Activity and Communication, Pp 350-441, Theory of Communicative Action, Volume I, Taurus

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, Self and Acerbo: The Self and the social between writing, research and culture, 98 lab books, united states, 1998

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, Being and Monad, Complete Works, 98 lab books, united states, 1998

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The Intangible, Selected Essays, 98 lab books, united states, 1998

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The Presentational Linguistic, Complete Works, 98 lab books, united states, 1998

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The Given and the Ungiven, 98 lab books, united states, 1998

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, Rethinking Urban Anthropology, 98 lab books, united states, 1998

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, Anthropology of archaeology, 98 lab books, united states, 1998

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The World Correlate: Interpretant and structure in posmodern cultural theory, 98 lab books, united states, 1998

Hernandez san Juan abdel, The thresholds of the couple: Self Ethnography, 98 labs books, united states, 1998

Hernandez san Juan abdel, The Indeterminist true, 98 labs books, united states, 1998

Hernandez san Juan abdel, The Constellations of commons Sense, 98 labs books, united states, 1998

Hernandez san Juan abdel, Phenomenological Anthropology, 98 labs books, united states, 1998

Hegel Georg Wilhelm Friedrich  Science of Logic London: George Allen & Unwin, 1929, translated by W. H. Johnston and L. G. Struthers, translated by Henry S. Macran (Hegel's Logic of World and Idea) (Bk III Pts II, III only). Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1929  translated by A. V. Miller; Foreword by J. N. Findlay. London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1969, Prometheus; Later Printing edition (December 1, 1991), Humanity books, translated by George di Giovanni, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010

Hegel G.W.F, Science of Logic, The Doctrine of Being, The Doctrine of Essence, the Doctrine of the Concept, Solar, Axe

protector Alfred, The Knowledge in the Worlds of Everyday Life, edited by Schutz's wife Ilse Heim with Thomas Luckmann

Weber Max, Sociology of Religion

Tyler Stephen A, Evocation, The Unwriteable: A Response to Abdel Hernandez San Juan, Sept 9, Rice University, Houston, Texas, USA, 1997

Tyler A Stephen, emails to Abdel Hernandez San Juan, 2013-2014

Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1953 Philosophical Investigations.  New York: MacMillan.