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Abdel Hernandez San Juan

The Linguistic Presentational

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Book III

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Author: ©Abdel Hernandez San Juan

The author rights of this book belong to Abdel Hernandez San Juan, its author, conceiver, writer and composer

Title: The Presentational linguistic

Type of Work: Literary of theoretical essays/book

Destination:  Books Libraries and biblioteques

Sides of Covered and Print Publications Sides: 22.5 cm x 15 cm

Number of Pages: 200, Reproduction: from 1 to 5000 exemplars, Covered Conservation and Protection Sides: 21.59 cm x 27.54 cm, Covered Lectures Sides: 21.59 cm x 27.54 cm

contents

The Linguistic Presentation. By Abdel Hernandez San Juan

Theorizing Media Today. By Abdel Hernandez San Juan

The Interstice. By Abdel Hernandez Juan

The Intangible. By Abdel Hernandez San Juan

Confines of the stratum. By Abdel Hernandez Juan

Philosophizing field research. By Abdel Hernandez Juan

The privilege of the present, Gegenwart predomine yet Parmenides poetry, Legein, noein, the present under the form of persistence and permanenships, something nearly, accessible, available, affordable by the gaze Vorhandenheit, a presence presenting, apprehended in legein and noein according to a process to which a temporal structure is a pure presentation, maintenance, reinen: Gegenwarttigens, the one who exist, the existent only shows itself in presentation, explained and comprehended by a present, captured as presence in the present of a pure presentation, as ousia

Jacques Derrida, Ousia and Gramme

The Linguistic Presentational
©By Abdel Hernandez San Juan

This paper discusses the phenomenological relation between presence and present under the relation between presentation and the presented theorized and discussed around modern technology medias such as the internet, television and several forms of presentationality in the city including publicity toward also examples in the arts. The paper focus in linguistically theorizing the tautologies and redundancies of the presentational linguistic discussing its similarities and differences to metalanguages and performatives, while it also explores the theoretical linguistic analysis to a more urban sociological and anthropological approach on presentationality in modern settings of technology and the city

Keywords: Presence, Present, Presentation, medias, technology, stratus, language and reality

    In the world we live in, everything is a presentation. Once referred to precise forms of staging, in the introduction to a work, a book or a person, the presentation, however, with the world of the media, new technologies, design and advertising has been transformed throughout the world. horizon of the relationships between text, image and environments. If you walk through New York, everything around you is a presentation, from the facades of the buildings, to the platforms you walk on, each place offers itself as an image in the form of the presentation, in the text and in the image, in advertising and lighting, dynamic forms, themselves sensual, invitational to the sensory immersion of the body, have overflowed the confines of every idea of ​​landscape, to become the entire horizon of the city; The disposable coffee container that you carry in your car presents itself on its cover, and from the small package in which you eat your sandwich, to the simplest shopping space you enter, bookstores, markets, everything is presented.

In this presentational world, however, if something is scarce, it is precisely our own books on the philosophy of language and theoretical linguistics in which we objectify what in this essay I will define as The Linguistic Presentational. What is a presentation at the language level, what characterizes the presentation and what conditions must be met for us to consider a language as properly presentational. The first thing I will affirm in this essay is that for a language to be presentational it does not necessarily have to literally present as when we say, let me introduce you to this person, this product, this program, this work of art, or as when we say, meet this book by this author, which consists of this and that. Language will thus be presentational not only when it introduces, literally presents or presents itself, but it will also be so even in other linguistic forms that themselves consist of presentations, in presentational forms as we will see on the Internet, on television, in a catalog about art, and even in high art performance, cinema, among other modalities and examples.

It is true that in our most referenced books in the philosophy of language—Carnap, Berthan Russel, Wittgenstein, Jacobson, as in linguistics, Saussure, Benveniste, Hemslev, Sapir, among others, demonstrations of language have been developed around phrases. and type statements in which it always refers to a subject that develops a certain activity or signifies it with respect to and succeeded by some predicate that offers it its context, its referentiality and its relevance. But whether they were in the first person, the second or the third, none of the demonstrative phrases has been properly a linguistic presentational. Austin's performatives, in fact, which denote linguistic-demonstrative phrases such as "open the door", "wait, I'll be right back", "hold my backpack", although they denote phrases in direct relations to performance in everyday life, are not properly presentational. But the philosophical and linguistic status of The Linguistic Presentational that I define is scientifically indisputable. Our languages ​​do not only serve to denote at the referential level the world, the worlds or ourselves, our languages ​​also present, or present something, a phrase in which something or someone is presented, an advertisement that presents a product, a poster or catalog that presents an exhibition, or they themselves form forms of presentation in language, websites and visual spaces on the Internet, television programs, but also stands at fairs, among many other ways in which They display forms presentationally, books, foldings, sample books, labels, etc.
It is precisely in presentationality, because of the way in which the presentational itself is arranged in language and as language, that the theory about presentationality and presentation requires new developments. Could it be that because we live in a world in which everything is presentation, the presentational is too close to us? Is it possible? This essay is dedicated to discussing and demonstrating it. What would precisely be a linguistic presentational and what is the implicit, inclusive, determining relationship of the concept of performativity in the linguistic presentational. Since what is presented is never presented without a presentation, we say that in the presentation itself, as it takes place according to some links of language, some specific forms of linguistic articulation, and therefore, a rhetoric, what is presented is presented in the presentation.

This principle not only takes place, however, as another previous or simultaneous presentation which, similar to the one presentation, would be to that external one, it would therefore literally be another presentation that presents it, because if so this would be nothing more than a presentation developed in the same terms and according to the same rhetorical forms, would be, according to that assumption, another presentation to which in turn we would have to look for the presentation that presents it and it does not necessarily have to be like that, not to be a presentational in the language. The linguistic presentational is nothing other than the moment and principle according to which - regardless of whether the presentation is self-referring or not -, that according to which we obtain in language the reiteration of the form in the form, of the medium in the medium. , from rhetoric into rhetoric, recursive reiteration according to which that language results in the same presentational language.

It is the principle that calls our attention to the fact that what we have before us is, as a form of language, a presentation, the space-time indexicals and deixticals that refer in a text - and to that text as a totality of language - to the exhibition to which it refers and which is presented in it, the forms that the text and the image can offer references to that this set consists of a presentation, due to the way the elements are located, arranged, distributed and placed in it, by the way in which it can be explored and arranged, whether its physical reality, its facticity and faticity, consists of all the sensory ultra-reality of what is presented—the large-scale advertising of a simple product or lotion for the skin unfolding over the sensuality of a female body, the bookcase unfolded so that the passerby can perceive in continuity the covers of the different academic and commercial books for sale or offer in bookstores, the magazine racks in which the covers of hundreds of books are displayed. of magazines, counters and other forms.

However, for it to be a presentational in the language in a rigorous theoretical linguistic sense, it does not necessarily have to occur in these more obvious forms of the presentational referred to above. We will see below in the most minuscule forms of the language, in the linguistics of the phrases that properly conforms to the presentation and what makes an alphabetic language in writing a linguistic presentational, even in those forms in which we do not properly have, neither the presentation of something, nor the ways in which a language would present itself or make references to itself itself, nor those referring to the forms of the display. If the presentation as such, by itself, in its own rhetoric, does not become self-reference, the linguistic presentational is the one that will be responsible for emphasizing that what is presented could never be perceived, even given to perception and reading, but always according to a presentation which is there in its rhetoric and its means although it does not refer to itself, because even where what is presented is simply presented in all the immediacy of its denotation, it can never be perceived without being perceived from the presentation as its way of being in the language that presents it and in which it is presented, therefore, according to the how of that language and its rhetoric.

Some examples in which we can define and theorize this more abstract form of the presentational, we can discuss in the example of the internet. On the one hand, the so-called web that we have before us, the image of the window through which we can navigate, offers itself as a site in which certain texts and images are presented. What is presented in them, however, is not accessible without the relationship to the fact that these texts and images correspond to a presentation, they are presented. What is presented is therefore not only accessible according to a denotative or referential immediacy, but according to the rhetoric that makes it a presentation. The window, the environment, the search lines, the option clicks, and the coding boxes that communicate some sites with others, that lead and transport from some sites to others, result only in linguistic presentations, they themselves are presentational that They activate from themselves a new presentation, they present that presentation, they make it appear, they bring it to the presentation, to the visible form, to the window, to the site.

In a certain way, the environment in which we perceive it is offered the same in its configuration as both things, the setting, the set, the scene itself in which something is brought into presence from the window and the form itself, probably until now the unique existing in terms of a graph, in which that environment, that desk, that desktop-window, offers the same images of its devices defined by the figures of the “bring to” (when the new text and the image are brought to its format), of “going towards” (when a certain set results in its presentational movement, in its rhetoric, replaced by another, more appropriate, precise or specific to the new presentation), of “moving through and between”, “ through”, “between this and that” according to various commands that include “search”, “travel”, “visitor”, “navigate”, etc.

Unlike other media, it is interesting to note that in the Internet mode—the one in which linguistic presentations become more visible in its graphics—the presentation and its rhetoric are related to the known self-references that imply advertising from the same sites. regarding themselves and others within them. The same thing happens on television, when we are watching a program and the channel spends several minutes advertising itself, a presentation in whose form the presentation itself is presented, in its intrinsically recursive, tautological repetitiveness, in its reiteration of the same thing. in the same. On the Internet, in fact, the presentational never appears as an image but always according to that moment in which the tautology of the presentation shows the presentation that it presents recursively.

Another example is when a program presents itself, either as an inclusive part of it, edited as advertisements for the program in the program according to its different parts, or throughout the week in the channel's broad advertisements about its programs on the billboard with schedules and options. Even where the television and entertainment program that is linked around and around the idea of ​​the presenter makes all its display of self-reference, I am referring here to that leading figure who is presenting now this, then that, and between a thing and another, the rhetoric that celebrates for itself and self-referentially – “you are in the program”, “come back”, “in the next few minutes we will present this or that” – image commercials come in –, “watch this program ", "the only one that offers this or that", "here you can enjoy this or that concert", "we will have these or those guests", etc., "don't ask for it", and all this according to rhetoric that embellishes and adorns, which reiterates its own rhetoric, these colors, these images, these or those solutions in special effects, dissolves here, effects there.

The similarity between linguistic presentationals and what we define as metalanguages ​​is that in both the metalanguage—whose reference is always another language—cannot be related to that other language in a way that is not tautological, thus it would be a form of metalanguage about another less tautological language. The concept of tautology has only come to highlight this other form of equidistance according to which a language without going outside another language with respect to which it is a metalanguage, becomes towards the metalinguistic level without going outside that language, and, for the same reason, it seems in its own presence, as if it were another moment of that same language for which it is metalinguistic.

However, the very idea that the metalanguage continues to be another form of that language, refers to something that I have previously stated when I said that the language itself, before we think of it as a metalanguage, is, due to its high level of complexity, diversity and differentiation in itself and from itself, also metalanguage. This statement does not fail to present, however, new questions since visibly the level and or metalinguistic moment of that language would differ substantially from language one due to the fact that its own language does not refer to the world and or worlds that it They are denotable as the content or concepts of that language, but their entire working horizon is only always another language. I said regarding presentation at the beginning of this essay that we not only refer to the world in language but we also present.

Due to its way of moving towards a metalinguistic form that becomes language with respect to language, but doing so without going out to the exteriors and outskirts of that one language, the reiteration and tautological recursivity that the linguistic presentational carries out in its way of presenting the presentation tends for it to remain virtual, if you will, virtually present and impresent, appearing at all times as a recursiveness that in language one reiterates the form in the form, the mode in the mode, the rhetoric in the rhetoric. This recursive movement, this linguistic reiterator, this virtuality inherent to its way of being and giving itself as a meta-level to that language and on that language, but paradoxically in that language, it supposes, in its reiteration of a principle, in its accentuation of a form in the form, a certain tautology.

This tautological moment, however, would turn out to be slightly but significantly different from the concept of tautology when we see it according to those forms of self-reference through which the concept returns to itself. With this precision, it is not a question of saying that what is virtually reiterated, that through which certain principles of rhetoric are reiterated in itself, does not suppose in its recursiveness precisely a certain turning of the concept back on itself. Undoubtedly, the concept also recursively returns to itself in the presentational, but it will do so, not as in the most recurrent tautology, to represent that concept, or to refer to it as a concept from the metalanguage, but only as a reiteration of the rhetorical form that engenders it, specifically as a way of reiterating that presentation, the simple fact that that language is as language a form presented itself, presentationality and its rhetoric.

We would thus say that while in the most recurrent tautology the reiteration of the same thing seems to follow the form - to describe in a certain way the image of a certain return on itself of the concept - a return that returns tautologically insofar as it does so through the concept and through the mediation of this to emphasize or accentuate this or that in that concept, in linguistic presentationals, this concept would not necessarily have to have become representational in language one. In this way, the metatextual moment will not necessarily have to refer to a concept that would be in the conceptuality of language one, referring to its own concept in the direction of which the tautological movement would return as if to accentuate this or that content. It would therefore not be so much a tautology full of content, or carried out according to the thickness of meanings synthetically assumed in a series of conceptual meanings on whose synthesis the tautology would return as accentuating or reiterating an element. We will see then that we have here another form of the reiterative and how this other form of the reiterative, while still being conceptual, is not representational with respect to the concept, that is, we do not have the Re that in the word representation re-presents, presents again, or reiterates as the identity of the representation, to that concept, it will thus be a non-repetitive reiterative and something very important, but most importantly, a non-identical reiterative, in fact, non-identitarian.

Because then its reiteration, which reiterates the linguistic presentational. Unlike the conceptual tautological which of course cannot but obviously be quite similar, the linguistic presentational will be directly related to the medium of that language, to the medium and the medium of its presentation, its reiterative will be and its recursiveness will be related to the medium and the body. of that rhetoric, to what we could understand as the mediaticity and rhetoric of that language, in its abstracted form. This is, in fact, its most significant specificity. Let's see below several examples that refer to performance modalities in our high art, as well as later something about film and cinema. To discuss these examples we will do so in the linguistics of the written sentence, writing sentences about hypothetical types of performances that, by way of exemplification and theoretical illustration, are only supposed types and not performances that have actually been carried out. That is, regardless of whether we assume as an example that these hypothetical performances have been presented as works in gallery spaces and art museums, we will simply take the phrase according to which we describe that performance to analyze it as a linguistically written phrase.

First, let's make references to a real work and artist that serves as a point of reference. Let's start with a classic example in the plastic arts which in itself, by the way, makes up a phrase, which is Magritt's well-known painting “This is not a Pipe”. That painting by Magritt drew attention to the fact that it was not a pipe but precisely a representation of the pipe as opposed to its presentation which would have consisted of saying “This is a Pipe.” However, it is interesting that the resource through which Magritt noted this fictitious reality of representation, was the same, if you want, performative and in a certain way, although his example would be about representation more than about presentation and rhetoric, it did not We can stop saying that the resource he used was performative in itself, saying “This is not a Pipe” to say “This is a Representation of a Pipe”, turned his painting in a certain way into a modality of linguistic presentation whose theme we would say, unlike referring to the performance itself and the recursiveness that makes it effective, there would be but in that work the artifice of representation.

Well, one might wonder if in this showing the artifice of representation Magrit did not in some way show a relationship between artifice and rhetoric. This could at least be assumed, if not explicitly from what his own words were, if from the exemplary nature of his example, he thus illustrated not only the performance or the performativity through which he made the painting, but the concept of representation, that which precisely almost all performances in art or media, they avoid and dodge. Let's continue with other examples of sentences, this time hypothetical. For example, suppose a sentence in the third person singular describes a performance that an artist has exhibited in an art gallery, the sentence says, “The Lord Moves the Honey Pot in Space and then lets it fall.” Pouring it over the Milk Container.”

This phrase, if we did not have the presentationals, the phrase in fact, insofar as it describes it, shows in turn that the activity described can itself be a presentation—it could be understood as any activity of everyday life. However, in the same way that the gallery or art museum functions as the presentational instance that turns the simple activity in which the phrase describes the artist into an art performance, the rhetorical reiteration of the phrase, the fact of describe an activity, presents the presentation that the activity described in the sentence entails. Let's look at it in the first person singular, assuming that the hypothetical artist is speaking, "I at this precise moment move before you this Pot of Honey and pour it in front of you onto this splendid Container of Fresh Milk." We assume, in fact, that in this phrase the artist himself who made the work in the gallery speaks in our hypothetical example, but from the moment we consider it as a phrase for the linguistic analysis of presentationals in language, we perceive that A presentational linguistic phrase always involves the reiteration in the presentational nature of that phrase of an activity which itself supposes a presentation.

Let's define another hypothetical example among those that are highly typical in the current art world, performances understood as certain actions that an artist develops in the gallery space with certain objects, elements, narratives. Suppose that the performance that we see in the art museum consists of transporting a series of pictorial works that the artists bring to the gallery packaged as they usually come to be transported. The hypothetical performance consists of unpacking these works in front of the spectators. The phrase for linguistic analysis in this example would therefore simply be according to the singular or plural person, for example "They, the artists, move the packed canvases and unpack them in the museum before the spectators", or conversely, suppose a phrase in which the artists themselves speak, “we, the artists, unpack these works in front of the viewers.”
Isn't this phrase in the linguistics of the phrase an example of the linguistic presentational? And the artistic activity it describes, let us ask, could we perceive it as an artistic performance, if it were not for the presentationality that is assumed but in the phrase with that we have described, as in Magritt's pipe, at least if in the omitted phrase that this activity supposes and according to which the artistic activity itself would consist only in the presentationality of a presentation that the phrase makes obvious? And what is it if not performance, both in theoretical linguistics about phrases, in the forms of language, and in art, but precisely a presentation of the presentation? What does performance consist of here, but precisely in the reiterative that makes the description of that action recursive, reiterating its presentational character in its rhetoric. The performance presents the presentation. This previous example, which we can consider typical with respect to types of performances in the plastic arts, could also refer to works of art that were previously painted, or to empty canvases which artists paint in front of viewers, sometimes painting themselves. The fact of showing this action before the spectators does nothing but present the presentation, reiterate the rhetoric that removes it as a scene from the rest of the scenes and arranges it as a presentational form.

Due to its modality, the example recalls those first performances that emerged from Klein's canvases, derived directly from gestural painting when Klein included women who painted their bodies with which they then painted the canvases. But the same theoretical concept is offered as rich in its possibilities of systematization when we refer to a whole series of forms of performance which included this effect of recursive reiteration, of presentation of the presentation itself, in modalities that we know from earth art and the ecological art in natural spaces. The lines, for example, drawn by Walter de Maria to large extensions of land and landscape, or the shapes of Richard Long or the packaging of Chirsto, which are nothing more than phrases like “I am packaging Five Hundred Cubic Meters of Virgin Land”, or “Five Hundred Cubic Meters of Virgin Land are being Packaged”, makes the rhetoric the performance itself. Now, undoubtedly the field that opens the criticism of performance according to this definition that I have developed is vast and splendid if we decide to move these analyzes towards richer and more complex forms of performance, for example, nominal performances in art that include delimitations of areas. pre-given as conceptual designations, adding certain shapes, materials and colors, texts and photographs, or those that consist of descriptions between maps of the city and spaces, or those others that involve the description of a given activity including narratives related to objects, objects related to individual memories, and even in some modalities, relationships between contextualization and decontextualization, decontextualizing cut and reflective continuity. All of these modalities – Gordon Matta Clark, for example – offer more complex and richer forms of this same meaning.

What the performance does in them, as in the phrase of the jar of honey on fresh milk, or the typical performance of the female artist who walks barefoot for forty minutes repeating the same action, combs and ruffles her hair, walks across the floor cold of the art gallery, walks along the sand floor in a delimited area, moving his belongings from one point in the gallery to another, placing them inside something, they are nothing but modalities of linguistic presentational, they can be perceived and enjoyed as performances precisely because they take place in the linguistic presentational and in its rhetoric. The linguistic presentational will then be the one in whose place the language will do this work, whether its how from itself is reiterated in the presentation, whether it refers to itself, it is always the movement of recursiveness of the form in the form, the medium. in the middle and rhetoric for rhetoric's sake.

It carries with it not only the memory that it is precisely a certain language and its rhetoric, but also that some other principle, virtual this same for presence, present by itself in no other way than according to the recursiveness that it reiterates to that media as rhetoric of presentation, and yet, the only one who retains the presentationality of that language as presentation, who knows the rhetoric that it will entail, the device that it makes. Thus, the linguistic presentational not being properly a presentation and, however, occurring only in the presentation itself according to its rhetoric, how can the linguistic presentational be and not be, that is, be as metalanguage – language about language – according to the tautological recursive? that he reiterates, but without another exteriority that would define him before the language of the presentation as another form that would be exterior to him? Given this reiterativeness, to reduce to a minimum the redundancy to which performance tends, we must resort to concepts that I have proposed and discussed in other essays, my concept of a non-reiterative reiteration, or what I have defined as a reiteration without identity, a reiteration non-identitarian, which actually refers to and discusses this issue of the virtuality of the reiterative and what its relationship is, the relationship of this concept with our concept of the virtual, of virtuality, the one according to which linguistic presentationals, without requirements of representation, without themselves appearing represented, reiterate what is necessary in the very rhetoric of representation, thus accentuating, emphasizing, arranging, calling attention, in the medium itself and according to the same rhetoric, without thus resorting to another exteriority.

But the presentational is also related as a rhetorical phenomenon to the configurational aspect of language, the fact that it is an articulated relationship between elements that make up an editable and reversible sequence itself, cut here and paste there, put this with this and that with that other forming a totality always in its rhetorical device. Let's define some examples in this sense. For example, suppose a film begins with a first-person monologue that begins the film in the form of a voice-over according to which we assume the thoughts of a subject who we still do not know who he is, we will know later, immediately, etc. ?, we ask, the one who lived the experience that the film will tell?, the one who will most represent the constant hexotopia that will offer this film its aesthetic totality, its everything, or who will be no more than the occasional, fragmentary thought of a voice that will remain throughout the film as an internal monologue, a voice of conscience, in a time so many years ago? Or suppose the beginning of a film with any fragment taken from what, according to certain logic, would have been the middle or the end of something, a fragment that would not even have corresponded to any idea of ​​a sequence, much less of a beginning, and which nevertheless , once located as a beginning, it will be offered in its logic as the presentational of what will happen to it and its paradigmatic relationships.

The linguistic presentational can also be any of these figures as long as it is situated in relations of linkage and articulation—hence its relationship with language understood as a configurational phenomenon, composing, shaping, editing, configuring certain plots according to to some decisions about what comes before and what follows, the mode of their relations will always involve recursive virtual reiterations within the language itself, that is, performative modes of the reiteration of the form in the form according to its how, of rhetoric. in rhetoric according to its how, the how of that language and, therefore, these will have relevant meanings with respect to the paradigmatic relationships between the elements. That is why in certain forms of artistic performance, especially in poetry at a literary level as in certain forms of writing in the plastic arts, certain phrases in their own rhetoric have been experienced and explored in a way that we could in linguistic theory discuss as modalities. of the linguistic presentational which often also involve performative turns according to which the phrases by themselves in their appearance and in their written freedom develop by experiencing these games that can be philosophical and literary, like this "The Girl Drinks a Jug of Naked Milk in the Room while Combing and Dressing", can form a simple literary phrase, a simple writing on the page without referring to a given activity. It would thus be in the phrase a literary form of experimentation and creative exploration of the linguistic presentational that I have defined and discussed.

That is why what has been said before can reach forms such as "What you are reading, --dear reader--, is a performance and the following are its elements (although these are nothing more than scriptural and literary forms): and it begins, " This Jug of Milk (which can only be the image according to the word, and even include the image on the page in the literary space of that writing), “This Body that is Dressed”, (the pure phrase as writing, we probably don't even know What body dresses, is it perhaps an allusion to the writing itself?), “This Hair that is Combed”, “These Minutes that Pass”, “You Sitting”, “Reading Me”, “Your Furtive Look”, and everything that You want to reiterate it in the presentational of that presentation, even if it is not there, if you bring it to the presentational form of the phrase and its rhetoric, even if it is as a simple literary phenomenon, “This Book”, “His book that does not Show” , “His Unconfessed Notes”, “His Dubious Shyness”, “His Minutes of Silence”.

Elusive in its recursiveness, the relationship of the performance to the reiteration that turns it into a presentation of what is presented in the presentation, in its rhetoric, always keeps all performance and the linguistic presentations themselves in the space of what in recent years has focused theoretical attention in the criticism of not a few among us, especially in the Anglo-Saxon world in the United States, the criticism of and of representation. Performative avoidance thus results, we know, in the face of representation, both ethical and critical.

Bibliography

Derrida Jacques, Ousia and Gramme: Notes on Sein and Zeit, Margins of Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press, USA 

Derrida Jacques, Ousia and Gramme, Pp, 63-102, Margins of Philosophy, Chair, Theorem, Serie Mayor, Madrid, 1989

Theorizing the media today

©By Abdel Hernandez San Juan

This paper discuss a theorization of medias focused on the new world created by the internet as the new media of revitalization in the fractal age 

according to my point of view experience from Texas on its relation with everything in everyday life

Keywords: Medias Theory, The Internet, Everyday Life

   One of the most overwhelming images among those that we relate to what we understand by media, both with respect to its concept and its material carrier, its mediaticity, is that of receptive simultaneity, whether we are talking about media that we consider massive, such as television, or those others that we understand to be related to computing and cybernetics, the internet and cyberspace navigation at home 24 hours a day. Both are averages and are offered for representation due to the fact that they suppose the simultaneity of a shipment defined by a series of more or less dispersed, more or less ordered points, which represent on a plane a multiplicity of receivers who receive and between them, the same image transits and circulates at the same time, that is, relationships between texts and images and a certain idea of ​​a signal, making this transmission codifiable, as well as the apparatus, that is, that apparatus and its paraphernalia, the machine itself that in In English we call a machine, a device through which that receiver, which in its objectified thingness is not us but a material, captures that signal and transmits it.

     That receiver is thus, before the person who receives a transmission, before the viewer or the netizen, the device itself: which is nothing but that device, that machine. This is presented and offered to the signal as a first conceptuality of the receiver to which the Weberian concept of an “ideal type” is included, that is, the abstracted formal logic that establishes the relationship between a sending and a receiving where the receiver It does not have to be another person, a recipient, but rather that other standardized, homogenized, depersonalized thingness, that abstraction made into a device, formally turned into technology and which brings together certain electronic, computational and digital prototypes, effectively ways of making visible relationships between images tangible. and sounds that we had not known in any other way out there become another objectification, a factual thingness, more than as we knew them in our perceptual system. They are, however, emptied of all self-representation from themselves to themselves and of course, they lack self-awareness.

     It is necessary here to emphasize the fact that we know that in the Anglo-Saxon world, when theorizing about the media in English we place emphasis, less usual in other places, on the fact that they are ultimately machines which make up artifacts. objectified in their thingness, something that among other things is due to the preponderance acquired, on the one hand, by the reproduction of the image of that media, seen from the outside as an apparatus, both in advertising with all the hyperreality effect typical of this , as due to its overabundance. On the one hand, as paraphernalia in the markets; year-by-year renewable forms of technology, in which we can see as a visual phenomenon the forms that these devices of the media thing acquire as simple artifacts in stores, but also due to all the junkyard and junkyard that this waste subsequently generates. once again as a phenomenon that is both material and as a visual thing. This emphasis on the objectified thingness of the machine that could, according to advertising seduction, be understood as a subjection to the media, has generated, paradoxically, quite the opposite, the distance of its objectification and therefore a relationship, if you will, that is at the same time more hyperreal. , but also more demystified towards its machine character and its thingness, unlike cultures in which subjectivity remains more imbued by the culture that this media generates.

    So we know and emphasize the fact that in the place of a real receiver, which itself would decode by resorting to a heritage, a culture and a consciousness, this abstracted automaton, in some ways this robotic automaton, offers the recipient real, first as an objectified thing out there, as a machine, a repetition in front of him of images that in any other way than in his own perceptual principle, he had not visualized out there. Something that, this repetition of principles that generate an image, turned into another thing, in that device, in that computer, in that laptop, in that television, etc., and the images they transmit, we call, in fact, and not for taste, mediated images.

   This is the first and most significant reason why we actually call them stockings. In this way, the media do the work that the decoding system of people, languages ​​and cultures would do without the need for mediations. As long as they only present at most their re-presentation cannot be more than that, a re-presentation, that is, the re-presentation of a presentation.

   And this is the reason why the representatives of the media are nothing but re-presentants, that is, they do not represent anything but only the media itself as presenters, they present themselves and present themselves to the media, they present the presentations that the media re-presents. , presents again, but which the media itself cannot represent. That is why in the media we say that everything circulates as in a shipment, as in a place of transition, of passage, and hence its mediation and mediatization.

   Hence also the reason why for some time, absorbed in this mediatizing principle according to which the media does the work for the people, media criticism was focused on the fact that the media lulled people to sleep, that they standardized their perceptions and impoverished their representations, homogenizing them, which made them idiotic, thus ignoring the ability of those same people to choose, to form their own and critical idea.

   Now, the simultaneity of the media has significant consequences to the extent that, on the one hand, it dediachronizes the social space, as a space of images of the social, (the concept of diachrony represents a line of continuous dots that presents an idea of ​​succession linear). The medium itself is the disjunction of every idea of ​​necessary sequence, or more precisely, of necessity in the sequence, it shows not only that this sequence is reversible, you can go back as many times as you want, as in the rewind of a film showing its arbitrariness, you can repeat it as many times as you want, you can change that sequence, you can edit it, cut here and paste there, modify, this goes with this and that goes with that.

   The media is, in fact, the exacerbation of the very principle of what is editable and hence its demystification and media deauratization of the sequence, as well as its close and direct relationship with rhetoric, that is, with language understood as a device, as architect.

   If it is an image that is not only repeatable but also mediated and if it does not have to be in this or that form, and it could be the same in this other as in that other form, it is only because the sequence is not necessary and because its artifice of language knows its forms, its tricks, its rhetoric, its seduction, its effectiveness, if it is an advertising spot or a short advertising film, if it is a spot of promotional images, or a program in a schedule, if it is a film or a documentary , etc. That is why we say that the media, which is organized in the best of cases according to a sociology of tastes, consumption and preferences, schedules and ages, children's programming, adult programming, etc. It is a device in the different senses of this word, both because it is one directly, we actually have some device in the house that physically represents it, the television or the personal computer, the laptop, etc., and because of the device that the form represents. rhetoric that supports it as emptied of all immanence, understood in its exponentiality of seduction, in its enchanting power, and this is the relationship we have with the media between rhetoric and the enchantment of the world that some of us have theorized as a modality of theatricality. of the form, as in the kabuki theater in which we see the doll and the entire way in which the scene is created and even who moves it and offers its voice, a deauratization that works, of course, only if we want to be enchanted.

    In its principle of no necessity in the sequence, of arbitrariness of the sequent, the media supposes the dediachronization of any idea of ​​continuity that was implicit in notions such as habits and customs with respect to traditions, which is why we say that it mediates the culture itself. In the place of those habits he creates the empty habit of watching the media, it makes people idiotic, as his critics said long ago. These are images which the media presents and re-presents as many times as it wants, showing their deauratization, their character as an image emptied of its relationship to a culture, because the media itself is this emptying, a phenomenon that also occurs with any phenomenon of narrativity, both the media and its mediatization of culture, and the media itself as culture, the culture of the media, denarrativizes the social space, demystifies the narratives, shows them in its device, returns them to the simultaneity of the now and here of that image every time repeatable.

    However, this mediated and mediated dediachronization of the images of the social space does not suppose, instead, the idea of ​​a synchronization which would consist of synchronizing different diachronies that would themselves be simultaneous with each other, since in its mediated dediachronization of the images of the social world, the diachronies can no longer correspond, each one according to its own sequence to the others by some order that would be, for example, of homology, derivation or subordination, but rather they offer themselves to the idea of absolute and total heterogeneity, that is, totally and infinitely heterogeneous, since the absolute heterogeneity of simultaneity goes beyond the idea of ​​multiple non-coinciding diachronies that do not themselves correspond to needs in the sequence, and therefore disjunct, the same ones too. They are desynchronized.

   This absolute heterogeneity, paradoxically, turns out to be more peaceful, convivial, balanced and harmonious than its diachronic (linear), synchronic (paced simultaneous) and achronic (chronic achronic according to the synchronic cut) ancestors. In it, the era of total heterogeneity, everything is mediated and mediated, the diachronies, the synchronies and the achronies have themselves also been mediated in the device of that mediated and mediated mediation. The world has been transformed into a telecommunication, the recipients of the languages ​​have themselves been transformed into transmission devices which by themselves not only mediate representations about the world of things, but also insofar as they transmit microrepresentations infinitesimally as tiny narratives, but rather presentations as it mediates the very principle of what is present in the presentation, thus mediating the way in which the images are presented, offering a presentation that the device made by itself according to that thing out there, that device.

    However, it was not television or radio itself that could do this work of peaceful harmonization of heterogenization, because for this new current peaceful harmony to be possible, the principle of fractality that this heterogeneity supposed transformed itself was necessary. , that fractal, in a new media, in a new technology of that fractality, giving people back the possibility of participating in that communication. On television, the viewer was a passive entity not only insofar as he received standardized, homogenized and mediated material, but insofar as he received a massively coded discourse, because in his dediachronization and desynchronization, although they had consequences on the notions of continuity and sequence, they did not Neither television nor radio could open themselves as media, technologically speaking, to the fractality and dediachronizing mediatization that they supposed in the social space, to the new reality, the new spaces of life and heterogeneity in the communication that took place. with these reconfigurations.

    And it is for this reason that in the place of the old continuities and their immanentisms of what is necessary, as they themselves could not, television and radio as technologies, open technologically to the heterogeneity and fractality that they supposed, both were transformed into a another culture of the media, of metanarratives, another form of representations of totality, media, according to what we understand as collective representations, that is, emptied of course, in the artifice and device of their rhetoric, were transformed into new metanarratives and tried to create an entire mediated metaculture of the media with respect to that same culture that was mediated in its images.

   All its paraphernalia ended up being one around those who are the owners or proprietors of such television stations, channels or stations, of those production machines of mediated simulations of totality.

    Thus the Internet at home 24 hours a day is the new peaceful and participatory media of the fractal era, of fragment and metonymy, in which the heterogeneous disjunction is reharmonized in the natural principle and in the spiritual principle, in the place of the receivers. Once passive, these new ones are transformed into interactive and creative performers, in the place of and instead of representations of totality, the Internet reestablishes and restores the fractalization of simultaneity in heterogeneity, returning to each person their most humble position before the world. at the same time making it more creative and participatory. This supposes the new speeds and the new ultra-celerations of the rhythms of communication and information that as a new media it brings implicitly, especially the new forms of textual and informational nomadism, to that same extent it reestablishes the living relationship of the media with life, of technology with life and ecological ecosystems and to the same extent with living traditions in a certain way recycling and offering themselves as a new alternative.

   The Internet thus offers itself as the medium of revitalization, it does not propose synchronizations or empty totalities, but rather fractalized reharmonizations restoring participating simultaneity, playful and closely related to entertainment. An entertainment, however, infinitely more enlightened and rich in its possibilities and potential, both for the type of affectivity that it implies in the modes of relationship, the playful and interactive connectivity, and for the simultaneously intellectual and visual richness that it offers. to its users. It is in fact the user who defines for himself, among the infinitesimally miniaturized infinity of options, what his itineraries and trips are, visual and written material that he goes through, reads, enjoys, processes or selects.

   It thus supposes a whole new ecological culture of the city and the urban habitat in large highly developed countries, according to my own individual experience living in Houston from 1997 to 2002 with the internet at home 24 hours a day, as well as it also supposes a whole new panopticon and a redistribution according to other cartographies of our representations of knowledge. The bookstores and libraries themselves, to be optimal and effective for customers, as well as for the reproduction and circulation of that knowledge, reorganize their databases computer-wise and cybernetically for the computer according to websites that turn them into libraries and bookstores that can be visited and traversed from The Internet thus becomes libraries accessible according to websites and clicks, and to the same extent the images of knowledge implicit in these new inventories, to these new ways of classifying typical of the speeds of communications, offer other cartographies of knowledge and knowing. how approachable, traversable, accessible to anyone, thus relating it to living culture, as knowledge that has to become part and not as watertight universes.

    The Internet thus has positive consequences on our representations not only of textual nomadisms that positively affect our own essays, academic papers, email communications and texts, but also of our representations of what memory is and even our concepts of archive.

    So that the simultaneous points and their lines on the plane, once referred to the effects of television viewing, with the Internet are now all creative points, each of these points that on the plane were recipients of receptions previously mediated as mass decoders, They were transformed with the Internet into new creative performers, each one generating playful and interactive creativity.

    Thus, in the place where television and radio left a sedentary culture, the Internet reestablishes a productive culture, everyone has the Internet in their home, the same as an essayist, writer and theorist, as does an urban being. anyone who lives in the middle of the city, and even representatives of living traditions. It reached, in fact, every corner, in the same way that television and radio once did. In addition to the way in which it reestablishes direct relationships between people, it also creates new modes of communication with everything, shopping, the calendar of the week at work, places to go in the city, school activities. our children, going to the market, consumption, the provision of books, intellectual material, essays, colloquiums, materials on the topics you work on, etc. all running with high efficiency and at high speeds. Each person, according to the literature that fascinates or interests them, whether for intellectual or entertainment reasons, visits and obtains the material they require, and the world becomes an available and playful universe. It puts an end to leisure and transforms everyone into productivity by establishing an ecological culture of recycling as a creative way of life, thereby exponentiating talent and transforming the infinitesimality of the point into telecommunicated creativity here and now at the same time and at high speeds, wholes cannot be but only evoked.

    In this new world the media is no longer that which mediates and mediatizes our images but rather that which is remedied by us in a kind of new globalized therapeutics.

The Interstice

©By Abdel Hernandez Juan

This paper discuss the interstitial and Intersticiality as a concept in which epistemology and ontology meet and fusion diluting one into the other, the paper theorize Intersticiality around a variety of empirical research examples from to natural and physical phenomena’s to immaterial, conceptual and spiritual one and discuss the specific epistemological place correspond to Intersticiality regarding both mobility and relationality under causal and generative parameter to analyses and objectify how the intersticials work 

Keywords: epistemology and ontology, intersticiality

  In its way of presenting itself, the interstice suggests in principle another way of giving, another way of what, in the line that offers a certain route, that describes a certain interval, from this to that other, in its where, it seems to describe the another movement that could carry out, dissimilar to movement one, its wandering, its prowling, the sinuosity that that line describes. The route of the line does not seem, however, to be suggested by what, according to a relationship of scope or correspondence between this point and that other, would be defined here according to the relationship between the possible and the probable, between what we know about how the line circles, knowledge that is offered according to the image of the whole that the plane provides, and the probabilities that we anticipate and intuit as its options. If it is an interstice, it describes another wandering, another way in which it passes. In the interstice we say that it has taken another place, that interstitial, however, always seems to define itself with respect to the precepts that we could suppose.

   We say, it is interstitial, because as we anticipate the prowls that would describe its movements, any points, concepts in philosophy, forms in aesthetics, words in the sentence, objects in space, take on another sinuosity. If we suppose a way in which, with respect to a theme, its variables should be resolved, the interstice will offer forms that will take another place, but it will do so, unlike a total and absolute novelty, interstitially, not against the background of nothing.

    In its relationship to something that is given to it, an interstitial relationship between elements will also be novel, but as a form of the interstice, in a dissimilar way. How is it, then, if it is done with given elements, that the interstice in general is possible, that it offers it the constant nutrient that allows it to give itself and give itself again and again in an inexhaustible way, if its interstitiality is a another form of wandering, another wandering, another sinuosity, in a conversation between speakers, or when we see a work of art and say its aesthetic is interstitial, or in the literal taking of space, when we go to the river and say, according to certain irregularities of the forms, we take an interstitial path, another path that was not drawn and that in its own interstitiality is new, that at the same time breaks away, but above all that gives itself. If it does so between this and that point, this and that element, this and that concept, how is it possible that infinite nutrient that again and again in an inexhaustible way supplies a new form of the interstice and interstitial itself?

    A first way of giving language, grasping this matter, begins in the unpredictability of what has not been outlined. Interstitiality is thus presented as the opposite of the stroke. Once the line has been drawn, it will always be not only the drawing of a shape on a plane but it will remain the same phenomenally as the line of that shape, that is, the line will always be subordinated to that form of which and with respect to which it is a stroke, his stroke. Failing that, interstitiality will never correspond to that form or element that would be corresponding to it, it will never be the phenomenal expression of that. It will be interstitial, in fact, precisely because it will be and will respect itself from itself in the same way that it ceases to be to respectivities to which it will only maintain a relationship always itself, as the word says. , interstitial.

    The interstice thus anticipates in its giving, in its way of going through, of moving between and around, the idea of ​​something that it respects, but always from itself, in its own way of providing itself with the elements to continue being and respecting, leaving always being or corresponding to those respectivetivities in a way other than through them, as an always interstitial form over and over again around their respectiveivities even.

    To the extent that it ceases to be them and is given to them in forms that are once and again interstitial, the interstice itself generates and displays its field, one that is between, a way of being between, however, peculiar, unique, interstitial. the same. The word interstitial includes in an inclusive way its etymology, something that we usually understand as a suffix, the inter. Could it be that the effect of interstitiality would correspond to a form of inter? Undoubtedly, an interstitiality always presents itself and makes itself present precisely when between the three forms of the senses, physical, regarding bodies in the plane and spaces, sensorial, regarding the translations of the bodily senses, and signifier, regarding the ways in which meaning participates and contributes movement to meanings; they interrelate. This interrelation, however, cannot itself remain confined to any of the three points as if it began and was exhausted in any of them. In a certain way, if it is interstitial, it is precisely because it always remains in the space of that interrelation.

     That interrelation, of course, could not be defined per se according to an external concept of relationship or one devoid of specificity, since interstitiality itself, always corresponding to some element that we define as interstitial, a form, a plane, a line, an image, an atmosphere, visual, environmental, musical, would itself offer a unique, if you will, sugeneris way of moving between those three moments. Thus, it is a field, in the plastic arts, the arts, language at a broader level, which itself occurs as long as the interstice itself presents it, that is, it comes with it, it occurs in it and with itself, which unfolds as the interstitial in itself in all its extension.

     When we have before us an empty plane, whatever it may be, the very idea of ​​creating in it for the first time a series of shapes, lines, elements, be it two-dimensional, or let's talk about a space in which we must arrange elements, or simply When in the production and creation of meanings we begin to speak to an interlocutor, in writing or speaking, in extracting a new piece from a musical instrument, etc., the idea of ​​a potential space is presented as a field in which very movement of realization that is assumed in the form that emerges. In its antipode, the concept of a stroke, whether with respect to what has been drawn, previously given, or with respect to the giving of the stroke, what is about to be drawn, supposes another form with respect to which the stroke would be its stroke, the stroke with respect to and of that way. If it is drawn, in its most splendid freedom, in what we even call the free, improvised line, once drawn the form that it describes supposes the fixation of a given delimitation, even where in its own spontaneity the line is the same suggestive. , his suggestion will have been nothing more than having fixed, that is, the line of that drawn form, which would thus correspond to the subject of that line, the one who draws, will only always be able to refer, once drawn, to that form of the which and with respect to which is a stroke.

    In the interstice, however, the anticipated field in the form that is given and the potential for suggestion, suggested by that interstitial form, will always turn out to be interstitial with respect to itself, insinuated. On the one hand, if it is interstitial, it is in relation to what it concerns, what concerns in the two modes of the respective, that to which it is respective, like the line to the form, the interstice to the meaning, although this It were only in the case of the forms, the sense of the forms, and relative to their respectivity, that with respect to which they relate, their respect to. The interstice can thus work itself from and with the forms, but it will never correspond to these, that is, that interstitial will not have been in itself an immanence of the form, in that plastic work or that language, but rather related to the meaning that we perceive in that form, that plane, that color, that material, that language.

   The interstice is not the same an immanence of the form, or a mode of manifestation of the form, it works with the forms and can, as its potential field of suggestions, anticipated in its potential, or suggested in its realization, offer, dispose and even offering itself as the space in which these forms will take or have achieved an interstitial mode, a certain interstitiality, but the interstice itself will never correspond to the identity of the forms. If it is interstitial, it is experienced in anticipation, the prowling that it describes in its existence as a line always implies the anticipation of a suggested potential plane, if you will, it would be better to say insinuated in the very interstitiality that that line is describing.

   If interstitiality emphasizes in that which is interstitial a relationship of meaning, as I said before, we have that the very concept of the interstitial, of immense potential for the genesis of concepts in philosophy, as in a broad way for any form of philosophy of forms, field theory, art and aesthetics, it does so by taking with it in its own nomenclature, in its potential for new and relational meanings, the three forms that we know of meaning and the relationship between these three forms.

    On the one hand, everything that concerns the relationship of meaning with directional movement, that is, the direction taken by bodies and elements; whether we are talking about two-dimensional elements on a plane, or these in space. Although we have to say that this first meaning of the interstice in its relationship to meaning is not the one that one most usually uses in theoretical philosophizing, since philosophical metaphysics supposes precisely a meta level that detaches itself from physics, meta /physics, we work with these images of meaning that suggest physical meanings in metaphorical, analogical ways, using one of their possibilities of suggestion for theoretical concepts, something that we could understand as the ways in which images of the physical world can offer fields of suggestion to the philosophical categories of the philosophical field.

    In fact, in its reference to the physical world, the conceptuality of the interstice finds rich and broad possibilities of meaning as images for philosophizing. If it is interstitial in the plane or it is interstitial in space, whether we are talking about an image, a geometric figure, a line or whether we are referring to a route, the question in what way is it interstitial? What does that interstitiality offer? offers a rich field of experimentation for the philosophy of forms, field theory and aesthetics. On the other hand, the other two meanings of the concept of meaning are as productive or more productive with regard to their relationship with the interstice; these are, on the one hand, the relations of meaning related to the sensory world, that is, to the immediate world. of the senses, the five senses, sight, touch, hearing, smell and palate.

    On the one hand, we know that all our concepts and images, whether theoretical or aesthetic, are in themselves elaborations that come from the world of the senses; Concepts are nothing but synthetic elaborations of perceptions and abstractions coming from the senses and their relationships. Every abstract intellectual elaboration is nothing more than a form abstracted from the universe of the senses. The fascinating thing here, in fact, is that the concept of interstice is the only one among all the others that exists that is related, limited, restricted, and limited in its field to these three meanings of meaning. Any form that appears interstitial before us will be so precisely because of the way in which the relationships of meaning are developed. An interstitiality is nothing more than a form that the universe of the senses acquires in an image, a painting, a two-dimensional or three-dimensional form, whether it is interstitial with respect to the directional sense of the bodies in the plane, or with respect to how The senses coming from the five senses are related in this way. Its relationship as an image to a perceptual impression of tactility, whether it is ductile or lax, whether it is smooth or flexible, whether it is textured and bumpy or thick and consistent, whether it is porous or creamy, in as many possible images, it can also be so in the form or the interstitial image with respect to sight, whether it is intense or diffuse, contoured or blurred, cut out on a background or merged into it, striking or lateral, colorful or dull, as well as with respect to sounds and their articulations, timbre, harmony, melody, rhythm.

    Finally, the third form of the concept of meaning is also of immediate relevance for the field that is assumed in what we define as interstitial, I am referring here to our immediate translation from the physical and sensory world of the senses to the world of the relationship between the senses and meanings where the former begin to participate in the form and direction of the latter. Hence when we ask if this or that expression makes sense and what sense it makes, what are the meanings it provides or implies, suggests or generates.

    When we say it is interstitial we are saying that we have seen in that image, that form or that concept its immediate relationship to the three forms of the senses discussed above. It is properly interstitial, in fact, and nothing else, when what gives it its peculiarity, what gives it its character and mode has been precisely the fact that that form, that image or that concept are themselves made of relations between these three forms of meaning; their interrelationships. No other existing concept, neither etymologically since ancient Greece or Greco-Latin etymologies, refers more precisely and in a clearer way to the interrelationships between the three forms of meaning than the concept of interstitiality. No other concept than that of interstice will be the same as an expression of the interweaving of these three modes of meaning. However, it draws our attention to the fact that interstitiality, in a canvas, a drawing on paper, an essay, in a conversation between speakers, a form of aesthetics, in the beauty of an environment or the relationship between a series of forms, it seems a way in which those physical, sensory and significant relations of meaning would find another way of interstitial relating to the same.

    The physical moment always offers to that form, element or image, the specific mode of its occurrence or, to be more precise, the mode of its relationship to an idea of ​​nature, of a nature that in the interstice would always occur to it even if it is The event does not come to it in any other form than in the presentation of interstitiality itself in that form or element. This moment will always refer again and again to that part, aspect or moment that in that interstitial form would evoke its relationship to a natural world of bodies and environments, figures and backgrounds, lines and planes, bodies and movements, physicality that would be related to the ways in which images of the spatial world can participate in our relations of meaning at the moment of grasping intertitiality in that way.

   The physical moment, however, could never present itself alone or isolated by itself, but would always be, according to the interstitial form, referred from and interstitially impregnated in relationships of meaning that will suppose from the beginning a relationship that is both complex and rich of the other two moments of meaning, the sensory and the significant, for example. Interstitiality would thus always have to be a specific form that in itself would imply an elaborate relationship between the five senses and their translations.

    The interstitial in fact only presupposes in itself the existence of a highly rich relationship of meaning. In its movement between, in its mode of inter, the interstice seems to want to elude, however, any respectivities by maintaining a relationship, as the word itself says, interstitial, that is, it is related to that respectivity, but always as long as it leaves to be or correspond entirely to it to suggest another way, to initiate in the movement assumed to that respectiveness, the possibility of an interstitial, that is, the other movement according to which it will cease to be to be in the interrelation itself, and to to go and respect, to those respectiveivities, an interrelationship which, moreover, is itself an interstitiality and, therefore, transcends the idea of ​​interrelation as simply a relationship between, although it supposes it.

   And this concept according to which interstitiality would suppose the form of a going away respecting itself in the movement of ceasing to correspond to the idea of ​​a respectivity, that is, in the way of its own going away being and respecting itself, ceasing to be and respect it. The idea of ​​a respective corresponding is nothing other than that through which we can both relate and differentiate the concepts of gap and novelty.

    Undoubtedly also in novelty we have expressions of this other form according to which the novel seems to elude all the given aspects of their respective and corresponding ones. As I said at the beginning of this essay, interstitiality, like novelty, depending on the forms and elements in which it is presented, can itself be novel and usually is, novel, innovative, only it will be so in another way.

©Abdel Hernandez San Juan

Conceived, written, composed and created By Abdel Hernandez San Juan in English and Spanish

The Intangible

©By Abdel Hernández San Juan

This paper challenge the traditional ways to understand and discuss the relation between aesthetic and economy. Starting by discussing the intangible the paper objectify how through intangibility aesthetics and spirituality values meet and fusion while paradoxically as any major classic pair, the intangible is intrinsically related with its supposed to be opposite the tangible, through theorizing this pair, the paper completely renew and discuss the relation between the intangible and the tangible developing a phenomenology of both moments in between the spirit and aesthetics through empirical analysis on several forms including free market economy and publicity to unfold out how the intangible continues working in all the moments of the relation between aesthetics, values and economy to get out how current avant-garde distinguishes itself around the intangible in the process of values formation even through the relation between aesthetics and economy 

Keywords: Phenomenology of the Intangible, spirituality and aesthetic, aesthetic and economy, values formations, axiology

    The intangible is the aesthetic, this is the assertion that I am going to propose in this essay. What other form than aesthetics could we assign to intangibility? The idea of ​​a spiritual value? And wouldn't this be precisely, in its moment of intangibility, a form of aesthetics? It is true that aesthetics can at any given moment result in something tangible. The beauty of a tree, a work of art or a woman, this is how it raises it, however, would it be anything other than the expression of an intangible of the tangible, as when we say it is something that has no price? How can something intangible be equivalent to so much tangible? What will this intangibility correspond to?

   In fact, a first way to understand the relationship between aesthetics and the intangible is that which we define when we say it is intangible because its value is not tangible, this has a value, but its value is not tangible. In a daily activity between people, as in front of a work of art, there can be aesthetics, time to contemplate what they tell you and how they tell it, to perceive the form and contemplate it.

    That time of contemplation can be towards the images that you see in front of you, when you take the time to visually contemplate the way in which they tell you, their formal beauty, it can be towards what they tell you, not just the visual image, but the content. of what is said, but if there is aesthetics towards it, it is because you perceive time in what is being said to you, that is, you perceive not only what is said, but also the saying, and it may be aesthetic for you, contemplating its own beauty, which may be either aesthetics or ethics. Thus, for ethics to be aesthetic, it must become part of that time in which the intangibility of aesthetics allows the contemplation of the beauty of how. Or it can result from the simple contemplation of themselves and the activity they carry out as they perceive the passage of time in it, they see themselves before the passage of time. If I refer to an everyday activity, it is only to object to the idea that the relationship between aesthetics and time refers to the fact, common to certain ideologies about art, that, of course, aesthetics occurs in art where They always have time, because they spend their time wasting time on intangible things.

    Thus, to object and at the same time show that in the simplest daily activity, in the love of a couple, in the relationship with children, in work activity, if there is aesthetics it is because there is time to contemplate the how, to contemplate the saying. in what has been said, to be present, in addition. But the same thing happens with a work of art, a classical music that we listen to, a concert, a work of painting that we see placed on the wall, a very beautiful woman, if it is aesthetic it is because it is intangible again, even if it was so in reality. a given moment, although it is in itself as a tangible phenomenon. That is why the concept of the intangible does not fail to also refer to the relationship with the economic. Undoubtedly, only aesthetics seems to be understood from economics as a form referred to a certain intangibility, to another type of market, for the same reason, which we understand as a sumptuary and symbolic market. Not only is there aesthetics in the economy and the relations of supply and demand, but even the economy itself is an activity that involves the economy of the tangible and the intangible.

    The concept of economy has, in one of its antipodal meanings, a relationship with economizing, and this relationship with what is economized is usually seen related as the opposite of the time we require for aesthetic perception and contemplation. But economics cannot avoid aesthetics, even in the economy of language and text, in the most economical economy, it must be again and again related to a surplus, and that surplus is again and again. once aesthetic and intangible.

      Without aesthetics there would be no economy. Let's see them if you will in advertising where it becomes more noticeable. An advertising advertisement, whether it is developed on the body of the product itself, its packaging, its coating, its label, or it is developed in the form of standardized advertisements focused on that purpose, the printed form reproduced and located in different spaces in the city, The commercial on television or the billboard only accentuates the sensuality of that body, emphasizing in it, as an image, the image of its product and the product itself as an image, if it is directly for the body, a lotion, a cream, if it is for pleasure and enjoyment, a juicy food, for recreation or for recreation, for entertainment or for creation, will always insist on the beauty of its how, of its forms.

   Thus, while paradoxically in the literal market we want that same product to be sold as soon as possible and at the greatest speed, it is exponentially exchanged for other products or its equivalent in price, rushed to exchange without the time that we usually require for contemplation. aesthetic, advertising will want to offer an anticipated image of it according to which it can be perceived and contemplated with all the time required for aesthetic contemplation. Given that ultimately, when it is not a product of symbolic exclusivity such as a work of art, what it is about is selling it, in this way in which advertising anticipates in the image the time of aesthetic contemplation of a product that they want to put it into circulation within consumption at the highest speed, we see it related to the exponentiality of seduction.

    However, to refuse this seduction would be to refuse the very rhetoric according to which the market itself could not function in the competitiveness of products, before consumers and clients, without aesthetics, not only because in order to be consumed these same products must also participate in the image market, which is no longer just that other supposedly original market, devoid of images and supposedly aesthetics, but because, as has been recently stated, it is the activity of consumption that establishes a criterion on the demand for new products and, therefore, about the forms that this aesthetic market of images should take.

  Therefore, in its relationship to aesthetics and rhetoric, we can say that advertising not only seduces, the idea of ​​seduction supposed on the one hand a product and on the other a strategy of seduction, which was for him as If it were something else, exogenous, extrinsic, but above all, it enchants, in fact it raises a world of sensorialities and sensualities which in itself wants to provide the most comfortable image possible regarding how users should feel in the world of the picture.

    In the anticipations of advertising we thus clearly find that the effectiveness of the market, of the economy, is closely related to aesthetics, but even beyond, to the idea itself also sensual that in consumption we should also have time for aesthetic contemplation. If you contemplate how the sauce falls on the spaghetti, or the cream on the female skin, if it is more greasy and creamy, if it slides smoothly as if to taste, etc., it is the perception of its how that results in both things, its quality. and its exclusivity. However, the advertising image, although it comes for its exponential seduction to the time we require for the aesthetic contemplation of something that, paradoxically, we want to detach it from, does not appear in the same way as the aesthetics of our exclusive and sumptuary artifacts of the high culture, related to intangibility.

   The price of its products may decrease or increase, but it will always do so in accordance with a market which, unusually, will continue to be related to the relationships of supply and demand. That is why we say that in advertising aesthetic contemplation can remain mired in the purely rhetorical aspect of that seduction. Although the time of aesthetic contemplation is invoked to notice the beauty and sensuality of its products, these are still governed by an economy of their usefulness. Thus, only the sumptuary market of our high art and cultures provided by exclusive symbolic objects to the which ones one wants, rather than detaching them, accumulating, collecting, collecting, seems to be directly related to intangibility. Which would then be, according to this delimitation, intangibility. This will refer directly to the aesthetic according to a series of surpluses which, on the one hand, can never be exhausted in the object itself, in the product, even if it represents it in its fetish moment.

    Hence the paradoxical ambivalence, it is collected as a way of feeling that one possesses it, that one possesses it, in possessing it itself, all that intangible that, however, not only is not in it, but can never be be sent only to him. On the other hand, it will refer to the aesthetic in everything that differentiates it from the utilitarian and what corresponds to an immediate function mediated by necessity. Having said this, we can affirm that the aesthetic is the intangible since in its sumptuary nature, the spiritual values, related to time, memory or culture, the beauty and exclusivity of that product, do refer to aesthetics of times that They are in extinction, increasing their exclusivity, if it does so to elements of the urban or spiritual sensitivity of a certain custom or a certain era, it cannot be exhausted or referred to a utility and a need.

    Because utility and necessity, we must emphasize, consume the time of the product and, therefore, reduce its intangibility. If it is useful, it is tangible and will therefore cease to be intangible again as many times as it is considered again. So we would say that intangibility would be for aesthetics, what would directly refer aesthetics to sensibility, it would be the concept through which aesthetics and sensibility would come to not only relate but even become inclusive of each other, both, However, to be inclusive, the aesthetic and the sensitive need to be translated into intangibility and even into a certain economy of the intangible. This economy of the intangible, paradoxically, while on the one hand it explains the direct relationship of aesthetics to an always revitalized surplus, in its becoming always intangible, the intangibility of so much tangible, nevertheless represents a certain difference before and after to those forms that consume the aesthetic in the rhetoric regarding what we usually understand as a market of utility. That is why we must affirm that the fiduciary economy of this intangibility refers our values ​​and aesthetic universes to another economy.

   And although we don't have to go far to find this other economy among us, isn't the very economy of academic papers and essays like this one, provided with so many intangible values, an expression of it? Or that of works of art? . But it is true that intangibility not only refers to what is expensive and exclusive, but can also refer to what is altruistic and philanthropic, since intangibility precisely relates everything that cannot have a price and that, for the same reason, could be pray free, pray valued for its spiritual meanings.

   Thus, paradoxically, it connects the two poles of aesthetics, on the one hand its relationship to a surplus of time that is transformed into the phenomena we call aesthetic, into time to contemplate beauty, in its meaning in natural principle as regards nature to the very disposition of that time for perception, on the other hand, its relationship to intangibility that directly translates it into a phenomenon of value, of intangible values ​​in this case, that is, incommensurable themselves as irreducible to any tangibility. , including here, of course, that tangible that would correspond to the idea of ​​the fetish object, which we understand as a reified object.

   In this regard, I would like to offer some considerations regarding reification. When aesthetics does not refer itself to an open relationship related to the time of contemplation, but is instead referred to the forms of its reification, the same thing happens to it as in its relation to the rhetoric of consumable goods, it becomes social forms. of taste, that is, in fashionable aesthetics and, therefore, in cultural forms of appearance, that is, in ideologies of appearance which in turn can become given precepts according to which the accepted appearances are like that. In the reified aesthetic forms then a whole form of accepted culture must also be assumed.

   The above is closely related to the way in which aesthetics functions in the conservative and orthodox side of society, which in itself can also include the ways in which conservatism and orthodoxy tend to mystify the aesthetics of the former avant-garde. Innovation that does not involve, now and here in the current time, truly critical deconstructions, even if these are positive criticisms aimed at improvement and good, precisely towards the reifying, ossifying and fetishistic mechanisms of official culture, that is, towards the forms of their codification and canonization, they cannot themselves be expressions of the avant-garde, even if they were once so.

    Intangibility, in all its incommensurability, thus itself comes to transform itself not only into that image around and around which the intangibles of aesthetics find themselves again and again the possibility of becoming intangible again according to successive processes. of intangibleization of forms, but in a certain way also, in the space around which all these forms themselves aspire to never be closed according to the value processes that would want to reduce them, to remain thus as living and dynamic processes.

Bibliography

Adorno, Theodor W. Aesthetic Theory London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984. Ed. Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann. Trans. Christian Lenhardt, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997. Ed. Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann. Trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor, London, New York: Continuum, 2004. Ed. Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann. Trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor

Theodore Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, Orbis

Gadamer George, Aesthetics and hermeneutics, Tecnos, metropolis collection

Confines of the stratum

©By Abdel Hernandez San Juan

This paper theorizes the phenomenological concept of stratus from an hermeneutical perspective. Placing out stratus as a phenomenological concept defined in between presence and substrats, the paper discuss how writing bring the stratus to the presence of the surface of writing as a progressive arrival from the moment hermeneutically something without a previous language start to become to have  a language, relating the hermeneutical process of reading with reading jeroglifis and petroglyphs in archaeology when the meaning of an image in presence is unknown yet,  the proposes and theorize an hermeneutical analysis of the Derridean concept of the stratus defined as a texere in between experience and language, the non-discursive and the discursive, to discuss the phenomenology of stratus in the critique of languages as a form of an anthropological and ethnographical philosophizing   

Keywords:  Jacques Derrida, critique of language, phenomenology and hermeneutic of the stratuss, anthropological and ethnographic philosophizing

   The Interweaving of language, of what in language is purely language, and of the other threads of experience, constitutes a fabric. The word Verwebung leads to this metaphorical zone: the strata are woven, their imbrication is such that the weft of the warp cannot be discerned. If the stratum of logos were simply laid on top, it could be lifted and allowed to appear beneath the underlying stratum of non-expressive acts and contents. But since this superstructure acts, on the other hand, in an essential and decisive manner, on the unterchichts, we are obliged, from the beginning of the description, to associate with the geological metaphor a properly textual metaphor, since fabric I mean text, Verweben here means say texere. The discursive is related to the non-discursive, the linguistic stratum is intertwined with the pre-linguistic stratum according to the regulated system of a type of text.

Jacques Derrida

Form and Wishes to Say, Notes on the Phenomenology of Language

   The present essay will be the one in whose body of writing and in its clarifications it develops, at the same time as its own horizon, its theme, and as a mode of reference, the ways in which in both senses—hermeneutically clear—scientific and aesthetic-literary, — I have developed those horizons and they have worked, which in the very concept that I define as the limits of the stratum, supposes that which is presented not at once and in a single form to the presence, to the surface, but gradually and according to a relationship of correspondence between clarifications, concepts, terms, creations that throughout his writing, the writing that in this book has been for me a fascinating composition and creation at the same time, the reader will be able to enjoy in his own way. I also know that the communication of this originality and innovations forms a certainty within what we call hard high theory today, my contemporaries, Derrida, Habermas, James Faubiam, Stephen A Tyler. In our field, for the sake of our love of knowledge, we recognize the scientific works that make up essential insights with simplicity without the egoisms inherent to art. The stratum – cleared as the form of this hermeneutic graduality – will thus be the scientific figure to whose confines I will leave this certainty open.

   If there were one or more boundaries for the stratum, this brief essay – in itself and in what it relates to this little book,

     The Linguistic Presentational--, in what he himself suggests regarding the movement that the remaining essays offer from themselves to this little book in its entirety--, would be dedicated to writing those confines, to defining the language where in the death rattles of those confines the stratum would allow itself not only to be written—if perhaps the stratum itself as a figure were something writable—perhaps it would rather be considered more precise not only the idea of ​​a writing on and of the stratum in its confines but rather the very possibility of giving language regarding to what we can understand as a stratum. Beyond the stratigraphic illusion according to which the images of the stratum are presented as spaces of depth, we will understand the stratum as what in itself is not presented at once and in a single form to the surface, but is found, by To put it in some way, stratified, that is, it supposes a series of meanings which will be presented, arriving at the presence, and the language, stratified, that is, by successive levels of explanation, capable of moving from some planes of explanation. which would be found on the surface, towards others less explicit, and which would correspond to the presence, phenomenally, gradually.

  This graduality of the stratum, of what is stratified, and of what would therefore be progressively presented according to language, would not, however, be that of a movement which according to some immanence that was itself consubstantial to the stratum in itself, it would itself appear, but rather it is a process of putting into form and language which by itself—related to the essay and writing, to the very work of prowling and coming and going of the exegesis—would, if one wants, finding different moments, aspects, levels, we would say finally, different capable of that stratified presence, of that latency, if we could put it that way, that would allow itself to be written and which would be expressed in a certain way on those different levels, but that the language will present only little by little.

    The essay would thus be the same one in whose writing with respect to the entirety of this book as a work, both things would take place, on the one hand, the putting into the language of that image of the stratum with respect to which it will deal as an essay, its theme, its horizon, theorizing the stratum, while also offering itself, in its own experimental conceptuality, as the demonstration, at the same time philosophical and formal, scriptural and phenomenal, of that way of developing the stratum that hermeneutically makes explicit the ways of developing the stratum. thickness and richness, both in its conceptual and philosophical as well as its literary, scriptural and stylistic flow, that graduality that I have defined as what is not presented at once and in a single form, but in dissimilar, versatile ways.

    So it would happen that while he would write about the stratum, very much against himself, two things would happen in the body of the essay: on the one hand, he would write the stratum, he would turn it into writing, although this writing itself was nothing more than one about the eventuality of that sugeneris form. of what is presented not in one form or at once, but stratified, while on the other hand, it would happen that in the very philosophizing about it, the philosophy of that ontology, that philosophical ontology of the stratum would itself have to stratify itself, thus reaching the stratum. to philosophy, presenting itself to it in its own language, taking place through it, that is, presenting itself to the essay, this essay, in its conceptual development as well as in its rhetoric.

   When we say that something does not have language, in fact, that we have not given it language, what are we doing but omitting the reality that there has never existed any form that it has not had or to which we have not given some language? And this will be the decisive issue that I define for a philosophy and a critique that, with respect to senses and meanings, contemplates the understanding of the stratum, its stratified character and its critical consciousness; a philosophy that must itself be anthropological and ethnographic in this sense that I have defined as philosophy and criticism of language. Due to the effect of an omission that we do but define for writing, for that giving language in writing, those areas, if you will, murky, which in a certain way we could specify as diffuse, opaque, in which we know that some language has existed, a certain grammar, some taxonomy, a certain roughness, a certain ordering, but what do we know are in themselves inexhaustible?

    And certainly, whether we are talking about an aesthetic, literary, artistic phenomenon, material and symbolic culture, or whether we are talking about intersubjective relationships, when we talk to a person about their processes, whether they are creative or intellectual, a friendship or a couple with which we seek rapport on topics that may concern the interior or intimate life of that person, or the relationship, do these require language? That is why when one develops a hermeneusis, a critique of language, if this is like my own critique not only philosophical but also of language and of language as performance, it can put into language, give language, bring to language, eliciting assent in those readers, that's the way it is, that's how I feel, corroborates my riddle. It is not so much about a language which was later erased where what is erased also comes to participate as another form of writing.

    As in the hieroglyphs, where it has been the physical time of centuries and millennia that has subtracted presence from that image and writing that we see, it is something that we cannot reach except by dusting it off, finding out what it would have been like, we infer from the fragments that We see what it would have been like in that suggested way without being able to reconstruct it in its original ways. We know that we never find what it was, perhaps every form of writing in this giving of language - as in the reading of the hieroglyph - was not just another way of inferring how it would have happened from certain fragments? the utopian effect of a hypothesis always induced in what is found? And so we can write according to what would have been, how it would have been where we never find anything other than the very principle of the invention and production of the subject and of cultures, of civilizations even, of languages.

    So we say that something does not have language as a way of referring to the fact that it has not had it, but to simply say that in its regard criticism can be abundant and even inexhaustible, that it can always require more language, one that never existed before. exhaust or close it.

  Bringing language into writing is thus not a fluctuating activity such as surplus or surplus value in the economy, not so much an activity exposed to a certain homeostasis but variable, such as the stock market whose fluctuation is provided with a certain chance as in thermodynamics, calculable according to probabilities, it does not correspond to the principles of the game and the bet in whose journeys the drifts are expected intervals with an estimated margin of variation, but rather a critical activity, criticism itself in writing as an activity, in which we assume certain themes, topics, issues, variables which must be resolved.

   When through criticism, writing and language are presented, it is not enough to name things because we know well that nothing may happen in naming them, such as when a person does not know how to explain himself or cannot find the words and says, I have no words and We say let's talk, let's give language to that. When we say language in this sense in which I understand and practice criticism, we do not say that this language that we are going to bring or that we are going to create is the only possible one, and this is important, we simply say that although it is just one more among the alternatives, Even if ours turn out to be just one more, if there has been language in the criticism it will not have happened in vain. The critic who writes grows, the readers all grow, as the speakers grow when a topic is deepened or as the couple grows when a subject is deepened.

    Criticism must thus be a remover of the stratum and the strata, it must move them from where they were and give them another order, it must be introspective, making the same journey towards communication that introspection makes, taking a matter to a certain language and then bringing it towards that introspection to see how that language works and in what other ways it can illuminate and move in useful, productive and clarifying senses towards new articulating confines, also showing, in the movement of those strata, the way in which certain languages ​​move things in one way, while others move them in others, and knowing how to recognize that it is not in vain that some languages ​​make it easier to work by moving and clarifying matters in given directions, for which other modes of language do not offer alternatives, while those others can offer them to clarify different issues.

     Because language offers itself as a form of consciousness and self-awareness even if its arrival at those certain topics is only provisional, hypothetical, experimental, creative, that other journey towards introspection is what offers each language its thickness, its richness, its grain, and it is what makes it easier for readers to find that something has been deepened. Criticism must thus deepen a form, although this depth does not occur except on the surface, thus leaving both the writer and the readers with new languages ​​with which they can do something, towards themselves or towards their communication with others, it must offer a form. in which things are seen or can be seen in a new way, from that perspective, must, of course, move the light and the stratum, the strata, which means that in that putting in language we clear variables. It may be one more but if it has been a criticism of language it will never have been in vain, once it took place, certain issues that were diffuse took on some language even if it was provisional, hypothetical, experimental, resituated, moved variables, precise certainties, provided reasons, suggested ways, restored alternatives, deconstructed prejudices or assumptions, showed alternatives that work. I thus establish in my philosophical essays as well as in my critics a direct relationship to how it would have been—that is, the experimental character of that criticism—and the production in both senses, the production of writing and that of meanings.

    For me it is not so much about asking how it is, because we know how it is and how it has been, we are in fact stuffed with how it is and has been, but rather about how it would have been, or could have been, in this way we have more than say in our humble condition as writers. The would have been thus refers not to what was and could have been, it is therefore not the would have been to what we wanted and could not have been. It is not the would have been of something not obtained or obtained in another way, but the would have been of an equidistance, that which we require in order to say something in language regarding a thing that is itself, so to speak, between what has been presented. In a certain way and what must be cleared up, is the would-be of the inexhaustibility of hermeneusis, of the production of meanings.

    In this way, the first, if you will, superficial form of the stratum is that according to which we must relate a given body of provisional, hypothetical meanings, which must be related to some collection of experiences or experiences, which may be those of the reader, when it is an essay like this, a philosophical, literary work of exegesis, a scriptural hermeneutics that generates senses and meanings like this, or it can also refer to a certain body of riddles, wanderings, interpretations and enunciations. To refer to it more precisely and in direct allusion to experiences that I have had the opportunity to live. The question of stratum does not arise in the same way when an essay I have written is published and read by an unknown reader as it does for one we know. The resulting two types of readers, however, are necessary and fascinating. This variability in which the stratum is presented develops depending on the type of readers and auditoriums to which they are directed. As I have recently stated, it is not the same to exhibit a set of cinema images on a wall in a fine arts museum where multimedia is usually exhibited than in a video festival and it is not the same because the different auditoriums suppose the prior institutionalization of modes of reception that are not the same, or that are institutionalized with their own inscribed institutionality, assumptions about the image, prejudices about interpretation, assumptions about technique that are dissimilarly secularized in the different arts.

   If it is a material that has the same significance for dissimilar auditoriums, we direct some books and publications to some readers and others to others, considering in fact in the very definition of literary works, in their summaries and synopses, tables of contents and sample chapters, in its target even as objectification of readers in the reader market, in the academic book fairs of Presses Universities, in promotional and commercial presses and publishers. I am referring to author's works to be published which must consider the definition of these aspects in defining their own literary totalities, of what they must innovate and contribute, in what they must offer as their originality, to the clearances that with each literary work we offer, thus developing in each book according to the confines in which we develop the stratum, its readings and its scope, a fact that diversifies not only individual books by each author, but also defines them according to their contextualized auditoriums and the specific way promotion for each book.

    And all of these are questions that compete and are directly related to our concept of the stratum. Between one thing and another, the question regarding the heuristic, exploratory and experimental relevance that certain materials - this book, for example, with its wide field of scope that is simultaneously scriptural, philosophical-theoretical and literary, stylistic, bring together-- , or others directly related to creative processes, experiences, either for their experimental and exploratory value, or for their relevance and meaning as abstract theoretical material, clear new horizons of expectations towards empirical efforts or for a certain critique of representation. .

    Where, above the rest of the forms of hermeneusis, those that deal, as a given cluster of interpretations, with a form that has been exposed to public meanings predominate—a work of art, for example, or a given artifact, any form of material or symbolic culture--, we will estimate in its writing, a given provisional and hypothetical accumulation of meanings--whether these are deployed in the form of interpretive coming and going, as loitering around a form or as exploratory-related form is to an experience, an image, a series of life passages, certain elements, objects or words which have participated in some way, either in the collection of experiences of given and assumed interlocutors, or in a measurable range of riddles that certain interlocutors feel, experience, experience or recognize related to their own hunches, intuitions or riddles, make up, in the literary anticipation of those who will be the readers of the books, the first and most superficial way in which it is presented the stratum to hermeuneusis and in which it is presented to writing itself.

  In fact, these may be stratified meanings that correspond to the motivational horizon of these clusters of provisional meanings. Where, independently of the socially typified meanings that we may have assigned to certain experiences or practices, the supposed interlocutors in question find a position in which a certain body of experiences is correlatively relevant to them when they read the book and since, ultimately, As Jünger Habermas reasons in his writings on the statement of consensus in the pragmatics of communicative reason, every statement hermeneutically arranged between subjects rationally imbued with a practice in which the meanings are from the beginning oriented to mutual rational understanding, the stratum comes to be the accumulation of provisional meanings that take shape on the surface of language.

   Those in which and according to which these subjects understand themselves, correlative here is, of course, not only the relevance—as Alfred Shurtz referred to him—but also the specificity according to which these interlocutors are literary supposed as readers. in writing according to considerations of communicative rationality, whatever they may be, as long as they contemplate their own consensual modes of mutual understanding and the norms of rationality that are assumed for these consensual forms of explanation.

©Abdel Hernandez San Juan

Conceived, written, composed and created By Abdel Hernandez San Juan in english and spanish

Bibliography

Jacques Derrida, Form and Wishes to say, Note son the phenomenology of language, Margins of Philosophy, The University of Chicago press

Jacques Derrida, Form and Wanting to Say, Notes on the Phenomenology of Language, Margins of Philosophy, Chair

Philosophizing field research

©By Abdel Hernandez San Juan

This paper discusses the challenges of ontology to modern thought in the XX Century defined by how modernization and technology affected the traditional presuppositions on ontology. Focusing around the question on how to assure or guaranty the invariance, continuation and or universality of ancient thinkers such as for example Aristoteles, Leibniz, Kant. Hegel between others, in front of the modern technologies challenges to old parameters of ontology, the paper discuss specifically regarding this issue of the challenges of ontology, how Jacques Derrida  paths on the issue rediscussing Aristoteles, Hegel and Heiddenger, can be theorized as mainly a phenomenological theory of retribution between grammatology and ontology, a retribution under a  phenomenological economy of the text, how on this specific regard of ontology Habermas paths, on the background of Frankford school absent of a theory of language, mainly consisted about building a way between positivism, pragmatism and hermeneutics from Frankford logics,  turning the attention to social sciences and how Michael Foucault even if from my point of view only in one of his book, his earlier words and things, developed a revisitation of the relation between language and nature on this regard of ontology challenges.  

Keywords: Ontology, Ancient Thought, Modernity, Derrida, Habermas and Foucault

Closing Communication to my Respective Correspondents

   The question about where philosophy should receive – go out to meet – from itself, the forms that offer movement to its concepts – has been related to and has been moved by clarifications and variables that in philosophy itself we have should ask and answer. Notions that from the ancient and classical worlds—in which philosophy found with Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Heidegger and other metaphysicians—its idea of ​​continuity, be it this—through the mediation of the philosophical spirit—supposed in its abstractions—logic— , (the correlate of validity for all times, the timelessness of the aprioris, and reason, with its invariants for all beings whatever their becomings and worlds of life have been, or else there is the telos, with its assumptions in an idea of ​​human nature—the one with his humanity—and the philosophical spirit—through whose mediation the very idea of ​​continuity of the spirit makes permanence possible; they have also been related, paradoxically, to ruptures with tradition assumed in the modern world .

    However, in philosophy in the 20th century we have had to carry out the work of offering metaphysical continuity to these invariances of logic, of the aprioris of reason and of the telos—with their correspondences for the spirit—thus updating these to the new ones. ontological imperatives. Since it was not conceivable to imagine a continuity that would reach him as if by extraterrestrial ships from the absolute philosophical spirit of Aristotle to the becomings that were presented to that spirit in modern times, the mere fact of abstracting and abstracting in the spirit - in concepts and notions--, it supposed not only a from there, that is, its from there implicit in the cryptic movement of the form of the concept—antiquity—towards a here, its correlate—but, conversely, also a from the same recent, towards its corroboration in invariance, thus abstracting sameness, and philosophizing it. Thus, the received concepts, once reabstracted from the new ontos, and returned to the movement of the philosophical spirit, created many more questions than could have been assumed. Ontology, which had to philosophize the in itself of the self, of the thing, or of being, and of its immanence in order to philosophize the ontos, communicate it in abstracted concepts with the invariance of logic and spirit, could not do its job. alone. On the one hand, between the spirit plus everything that corresponds to it in invariance, and matter, and between one and the other, being, ontology, as the Philosophy of the self, cannot communicate the metaphysics of the sameness of the spirit, being and thingness without having to modify itself.

    When philosophy perceives this, not only as something that it must philosophize from logic, but that it must itself discern for itself, several movements occur in philosophy that diversify and pluralize it. The movements of ontology thus result, on the one hand, in phenomenology, the way in which ontology, once a moment of philosophy, becomes philosophy itself, thus being, since its emergence—Husserl, Hume and Bergson—the way in which that ontology discerns both things, the sameness of thingness – of the presentation of matter – and the sameness of the presentation of spirit, in its phenomenal nature. The relationship between the Philosophy of Spirit and phenomenology had been discerned by Hegel in his logic and aesthetics, but Hegel's phenomenology had not delved into ontology.

   Phenomenology is thus, independent, and itself a philosophical form, that through which ontology becomes a philosophy, thus becoming, on the one hand, a type of – as properly a form of abstract philosophizing – empiricism. , which, however, is not properly empirical. With this essay I am, in fact, defining, proposing and offering, experimentally, the innovative alternatives according to which we can philosophize and develop these wanderings—what I define as the coming and going of the philosophical form—and of the spirit in the concept—in a way that can discern another philosophical ontology, on the one hand, in the sameness of spirit, progress, development, modernization, on the other, in form, technology, reproduction, communication, and on the other, in being. , the worlds of science, art, daily life and, ultimately, secularization, that which is given to modernity through the institutions of reproduction, religion, and, finally, in the very same thingness—the diversification of matter and its sameness, ontology; which includes materiality, image and genres.

   These phenomena directly affected the diversification of ontology. For example, logical positivism is the form of Philosophy that at the dawn of the 20th century resisted ontology, going so far as to deny it. The new Scientific Philosophy of today cannot be an ontology, this is the point at which logic stops when it says, logic does not go there. Scientific philosophy is Philosophy without ontology. One of the most significant and influential philosophers since ancient times, Wittgenstein, emerges from this clearing. Moving any question about ontology towards the theory of knowledge, language and performance, ontology disappears in knowledge, dissolving into an epistemology. Unlike phenomenology, this is not an empirical Philosophy. We know that the main clearing in Wittgenstein is that between scientific and ordinary knowledge, not to deny one for the other, but to specify that they are different and between one and the other to put Philosophy to work as a form between systemic philosophizing and that other practical one.

   Nor to object to one another, but to open in their relationships the form that the new Philosophy will acquire. Thus, its issue is not then the in itself or the self of the absolute spirit, or the invariance of the spirit and its continuity abstracted in the concept, the sameness of the thing and its immanence, much less its phenomenology, if scientific knowledge and The ordinary feeds back into the same writer, in research, scientific knowledge must be a philosophy of the field and performance. Wittgenstein is thus, from my position as a philosopher, thinker and theorist, the first theorist of the field and performance. Hence Wittgenstein's philosophical investigations and the very idea of ​​presenting Philosophy as an investigation; a form of research. Instead of a matter on the other side of the spirit, what there is here is an exchange that includes the exchange of matter, --matter is an object of the exchange--, the exchange of matter, and the exchange of both representations of the matter and material forms of the representations. For the same reason, in Wittgenstein we assume a desubstantialization of Philosophy. If ontology was the moment when Philosophy dealt with immanence, non-ontological Philosophy must itself be a Philosophy that desubstantiates immanence.

    Matter without substance, therefore, is entire dematerialization, which is not the same as immaterialization. Matter is only an object of the exchange that begins in language; Language itself is nothing but the first form of exchange of matter; symbolic exchange, in addition. The second great denial of ontology in the 20th century is the emptying initiated by the structural linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure, which desubstantializes the signifier by differentiating language and language, language and speech, acoustic form and graph. Thus, the invariance of the spirit is here language itself in all its forms since antiquity, and nothing else, its modes of realization are the signifier and the signified. But Saussure's theory, which initiates linguistics and semiotics, is not a Philosophy in itself, but rather a linguistic one, a correlate of scientificity for the rest of the humanities throughout the 20th century. While Wittgenstein does not go there, language becomes and presents itself in various other forms for ontology. However, ontology can also become philosophy if, with respect to language, it receives from the philosophy of nature (nature-language relationship) and from the Philosophy on the nature of language, the elements for its philosophizing of immanence. This work, however, cannot be done without the Saussurean emptying that supposes a return of desubstantialization to the natural principle of dematerialization, or what is the same, a reestablishment—emptying the relationship of immanence between substance, language and meanings—between the forms of the spirit, the forms of nature and the forms of language.

   Two philosophers are going to do this work in the 20th century, one is going to communicate Hegel – Philosophy of Spirit – and Heidegger, Philosophy of Being, according to the relationship between nature and language, which is Derrida. The work that Derrida does, --his philosophical works--, for Philosophy as a whole since antiquity--is not so much--in my position and consideration, that of a deconstruction--, related in Derrida to a critical Philosophy, I will refer to this in another chapter, but rather that of communicating and putting the philosophy of the spirit into practice in current conditions. In its grammatology—and its relationship with writing, in its colossal and brilliant communication, it thus communicates the spirit and the being, and offers the philosophy that can speak that other relationship between a desubstantialized ontos—refound in the relationship between language and nature. , and grammatology. The resulting effects are retributive.

   In order for the Philosophy of spirit, of being and ontology to be able to philosophize together, logic and ontology must reward each other, and this remuneration is possible in grammatology. The Philosophy of Jacques Derrida in what its abundance is concerned, what Philosophy itself moves in is in the development and imagination of these other forms of retribution. The other modern philosopher who comes this far is Habermas, who shows philosophically that this work is a work of communication. Abounding with everything necessary to philosophize the statement, the speakers, the understanding, the explanation, the legibility, intra and interscientific and the rationality, scientific, communicative, intersubjective, Habermas develops the ways in which, being a work of communication, the philosophical spirit and all of Philosophy continues to relate the other forms, although these are themselves secularized.

    Habermas thus offers the philosophical development of this communication in the spirit and reason also for the Philosophy of art. From the Philosophy of sciences and the forms of rationality, its most original clarification is that of a Philosophy of vital praxis. By including the possibilities of Philosophy to communicate in the Philosophy of vital praxis, it develops the ways in which the philosophical spirit can move without dichotomies between ontology and Philosophy of vital praxis, which logical positivism once contrasted between a logic of practice versus an epithemology; contradiction from which the Philosophy of the Spirit could not work. In the Philosophy of Art and Vital Praxis, Habermas offers the forms of rationality in which ontology can work as a philosophy of vital praxis, reestablishing that language as a communication. However, while the principle of the relationship between nature and language in Derrida offers in his grammatology the relationship between logic and ontology as one of retribution, Habermas communicates logical positivism and the Philosophy of language, with hermeneutics, becoming the reestablishment of a philosophizing that is vital versus transparent-non-transparent. Although opposed to the history of art and therefore to the social history of art, Frankfort was the dialectical, post-Hegelian and post-Marxist school - Adorno, Hoikemer, Walter Benjamin, Lucash, Herbert Marcuse, who offered an aesthetics in Philosophy, did so , however, as critical Philosophy and, therefore, as a romantic and social form of Philosophy.

    Faced with this, Derrida communicates Hegel's phenomenology of spirit with linguistics and semiology, distancing himself from language. The Frankfurt School, on the other hand, is steeped in society. On the other hand, the Frankfort school assumes an idea of ​​Philosophy of being and metaphysics in which, so that being can speak some language, so that Philosophy can speak the language of art and spirit, it omits that language is over there. As if the language were not there, it is undisputed in Frankfurt, even in Benjamin, which brings with it, and in those omissions, all the maelstrom that surrounds that language that is there. Without phenomenology, ontology cannot work scientifically, nor work with a hermeneutical distance that is both proliferative and participatory, but scientific. For there in modern times Philosophy does not go in any way, it is what is implicit in Derrida who instead proposes reestablishing the first, previous Critical Philosophy. Habermas comes from Frankfurt without being considered by many of the Frankfurt school. The Habermasian concept that makes this communication is that of vital praxis. Marxist objections to Frankfurt's Hegelian post-Marxism abound, especially from post-Marxist structuralism.

    However, paradoxically, --Habermas is the only one who offers a communication--, despite the perceived distance from Frankfurt's Hegelian Marxism, which remains the only critical school with a theory for aesthetic phenomena, where Dialectics, criticism of fetishism and merchandise are communicated in Philosophy as Marxist elements. Now, if the relationship between the invariance of the spirit in the concept abstracted as a received concept and the concept returned from having abstracted an ontology, one cannot philosophize in the ontology if this, in the relationship between language and nature that communicates it in the invariance , does not become grammatology, as Derrida shows, so the Philosophy of grammatology must do this work around the natural fact per se, in itself.

   And this work has been done in Philosophy in a single book. No other philosophical work since the antiquity of Philosophy, even no other work by that same author, does that job and this book is The Words and Things of Michel Foucault. The philosophy of the spirit, which in Derrida continues to philosophize the invariance of the spirit and the return to it of the ontology abstracted in the concept, prevents this direct communication. Since the spirit is there abstracted in the invariance of the concept and communicates directly in ontology, the philosophy of grammatology cannot itself philosophize the natural principle of the relationship between language and nature.

    If it is not in the philosophy of the spirit and in the philosophy of the spirit in phenomenology where this philosophy of the relationship between grammatology and nature can be fully carried out without the non-transparency between writing and orality prone in Derrida, even less will it be possible in naming, in which place, following the forms of the separation between language and speech, signifier and Saussurian meaning, Levi Strauss had wanted to return the relationship between language and nature to anthropology and culture. If in the philosophy of spirit it was possible to maintain the philosophy of the new ontology with respect to the invariance of the concept through Derrida's grammatology, at least in Derrida the philosophy of spirit and grammatology maintain phenomenology in relation to the Philosophy of nature, although without transparency, and for the same reason, in the philosophy of language.

    In naming this communication will be even less transparent. And this movement, which moves outside the assumptions of naming, will shape the colossal importance of Michel Foucault's book Words and Things. It had been Benjamin who, in naming, had developed the communication of this relationship for Philosophy, but Benjamin's Philosophy on the relationship between language and nature in naming could not but develop as a philosophy of mimesis and alterity in which completely disappears the possibility of a direct relationship with nature. Language in Benjamin is a mnemonic phenomenon, whose only possibility of relationship to the natural world is as an imitation of nature. It is Foucault who does this work of finding the nature that gives its configuration to language and for the same reason that clears it away from a simple mnemonic mimesis in the face of direct natural phenomenon. Foucault perceives Benjamin's audacity around the mimetic principle, but he removes mimesis from that superadded relationship; instead archeology shows the other phenomenology, it does not matter so much if the word names, it matters to make the journey again towards the word and This journey that must be made again toward the word is one from nature itself, as language is nature itself.

    But the departure of grammatology towards nature can no longer be one towards which one goes, but one in which one comes. Thus it is not a question of a relationship between a representation and its reflection, a representation and its referent, or its represented object - as if language itself were only an imitation of the world and even an imitation of nature from which it could only be to nature—but it is in the language itself that we must philosophize this natural principle. Foucault is the first to achieve this definitive and radical environmentalism with words and things.

   What Foucault does in his book is to make the journey towards the word again, he tells the word in his book that it would not have an order, it would not be given a link, not even an articulating possibility, it could not even have something. before and something after, it could not be preceded by something, nor correspond to something. To reach all nature in language in this Philosophy, Philosophy itself has to become entirely natural and, for this reason, in this radical ecology, it will find difficulties regarding the invariance of the spirit, that is, it can maintain the invariance of all other aspects regarding ancient Philosophy, except one, that of the spirit. Derrida is thus the only one who in logic says, something with which I also agree, when logic in Foucault radicalized in grammatology towards nature, grammatologized, ecologized logic, cannot maintain the invariance of the spirit since antiquity. Derrida says no, the spirit is still there.

©Abdel Hernandez San Juan, Conceived, Composed, written and created by Abdel Hernandez San Juan In English and Spanish

Bibliography

Derrida Jacques, Form and Wishes to Say, Notes on the Phenomenology of Language, Margins of Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press, USA

Derrida Jacques, Form and Wanting to Say, Notes on the Phenomenology of Language, Pp, 193-212, Margins of Philosophy, Chair, Series Mayor, Madrid, 1989

Derrida, Jacques The Supplement of the Couple: Philosophy in front of Linguistic, Margin of Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press, USA

Derrida Jacques, The Copula Supplement: Philosophy versus Linguistics, Margins of Philosophy, Pp 215-245, The University of Chicago Press, USA

Derrida Jacques, The Semiology of Hegel, Margins of Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press, USA

Jacques Derrida, The Semiology of Hegel, Margins of Philosophy, Chair, Theorem, Major Series, Madrid, 1989

Derrida, Jacques The Ginebra Linguistic circle, Margin of Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press, USA

Derrida Jacques, The Ligústic Circle of Geneva, Margins of Philosophy, Chair, Mayor Series, Madrid, 1989

Derrida Jacques, Ousia and Gramme: Notes on Sein and Zeit, Margins of Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press, USA 

Derrida Jacques, Ousia and Gramme, Pp, 63-102, Margins of Philosophy, Chair, Theorem, Series Mayor, Madrid, 1989

Habermas, Junger The Problem of Comprehension in Social Sciences, Volume 1-Reason and the Rationalization of Society, Boston, Beacon Press. 

Habermas Junger, The Problems of Understanding in Social Sciences, Pp, 144-196, Theory of Communicative Action I and II, Taurus

Habermas Junger, The Theory of Communicative Action, Beacon Press, USA

Habermas Junger, Communicative Action Theory I and II, Taurus

Habermas Junger, From Lukacs to Adorno: Rationalization as Reification, Pp- 433-509, Theory of Communicative Action, Volume I, Taurus

Habermas Junger, Theory of Communicative Action, IUESAPAR LIBRARY, Caracas

Habermas Junger, First Interlude, Social Action, Teleological Activity and Communication, Pp 350-441, Theory of Communicative Action, Volume I, Taurus

Habermas, Junger The Self and the Social; Mead, Pp, The Change of Paradigm, Pp, The Theory of Communicative Action, Beacon Press and Taurus

Habermas Junger, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, Peninsula Editions, 2000

Foucault, Michael Words and Things

Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1953 Philosophical Investigations.  New York: MacMillan.

Conclusions

     . Philosophize presentational and presentation as the ideal way to simultaneously develop a philosophy of media in the developed world and specifically in the Anglo world of high technologies in the USA, the internet, advertising and free markets in capitalism, It was due to a philosophical, scientific and literary decision. In fact, as I maintain, the philosophy of presentation does not find in the abstract forms of language a more precise way to its linguistic specificities, than how it can be philosophized in the high technologies of cybernetics and information, the Internet and advertising. while it is precisely these forms of technology that present most clearly the recursive and reiterative characteristics inherent to the tautological modes of all presentation, of all forms of presentationality in language, as well as of the intrinsic relationship that in this book I develop about the media and specifically about the relationship between media and technology.

The above, however, does not mean that the linguistic presentational and the forms of language that take place in presentationality as a linguistic mode have to only be discussed with respect to how these are given in media such as websites, Internet sites, the cyber, beauty products on the market, advertising, television programs, the design of front and back covers of academic and commercial books, bookshelves as presentational ways of arranging books, catalogs in galleries or museums of exhibitions in which we will discuss At the same time that we have our texts about exhibitions, fashion, stands, merchandise in the presentational form, but also the presentational in language encompasses all those forms of staging that, like the art exhibitions themselves, are not but they themselves are also presentations, regardless of whether or not we present them from another presentation, in which we reiterate their presentationality.

Films, plays, all of these are also forms of presentation that can only take place in language according to how I develop in this book the philosophy of what I define as the linguistic presentational.

  Now, only in technological development has presentation been able to fully arrive in a comfortable and broad, abundant and fluid way to those modes in which presentationality itself as a mode of language acquires another thingness, its own, tangible in its materiality, in its mediaticity, not only in the form of highly sophisticated software in which the programs present themselves, present themselves and develop in presentational mode all the forms of their tour and visit you at great speeds, but also in the ease with which presentation develops in these technologies, both cyber and any other modality of hypertextual multimedia text-image, and even today quite in its technological fractality and much broader creative and visual possibilities.

    Without considering these technological environments, the linguistic specificities of presentationality - although when it comes to forms that we know only find a place in language as modalities of presentation - are highly imprecise not only because of their difficulties in acquiring media thingness in clear forms at both the linguistic and graphic levels in which they could be perceived as presentationalities, but for many other reasons. The philosophy of linguistic presentationalism that I define and develop for the same reason in this book is itself an ideal and optimal metatextual philosophy as a philosophy of presentationality in technology and the media, a philosophy about those forms of linguistic recursives and reiteratives. virtual -linguistically objectifiable in the terms developed in this book-, which are typical of all presentationality--, thus supposes the objectification of their processes and languages.

    Thus, although an art exhibition itself consists of a presentation, it will be so in a way in which, when we ask about the language in which it is available in the presentation, it will not offer the elements so that we can discuss that presentationality of according to its thingness, its mediaticity, its mean, while the very language of what is exposed would move everything towards other questions. The immediacy of what is presented, the fact that it is in front of you without another form of media and technological thingness that objectifies it in its presentationality, makes it in language a much more imprecise form for linguistic demonstration. It is not for nothing that the exhibitions are then re-presented by the artists in their multimedia CD rooms in ways in which the visitor can perceive in a more graphic and visual way, – through the ways of going through, going to, moving around, clicking on this image, or that text, traverse this or that space according to this or that map----the incommensurable fact that, although it is not perceived in this way in the immediacy of its presentation, these also consist of forms of the presentation.

    From the philosophy of language and linguistics, however, it is more fruitful due to the linguistic and visual delimitations to philosophize this issue in the language of technology since technology itself does not consist of anything other than a highly developed form of linguistic recursives. , supposes itself to be its thingness and mediaticity highly evolved levels of linguistic recursivities in which precisely these modes of what is in a language that is the language in which it takes place occur, and of what in the media of that language can be according to the ways in which it is in that language; virtuality that only technology makes itself a reified and visualized phenomenon. As I said at the beginning, presentation is defined by the fact that in language we not only refer or denote worlds but also in language we simply present worlds in more immediate and direct relationships of pure presentationality. With this essay and in this book I remain exclusively philosophizing language when it occurs at its most complete and purely level of entire presentationality, thus remaining outside of my purposes and objectives in it, outside of its delimitations and terrains. of the philosophy of linguistic presentational that I define, any of those other ways in which questions about language move towards denotative, referential, connotative or any other type of relationship that supposes a relationship between language and reality, whether at the levels cognitive or nominal levels.

Specifically developed towards technology in its relationship with the media, mediaticity and the media form of that media, towards the technologies of the media and that media, as well as specifically developed in the form of a philosophy of linguistic presentation and the figures that can unfold around their phenomenology that I develop in Theorizing the Media Today, The Interstice, Intangibility, the Stratum and the Field, with this book I move only around and on those forms of language that remain in the relationships between the presentation and Presentationality like these is objectified in the metatextuality of the philosophy of linguistic presentationalism and the forms of its technological recursives. So, whether the questions move towards the concept of performance in English, which supposes all human activity understood as human performance, - everyday life itself as performance - or, on the contrary, they move towards the relationships between language and designation, nominality, denotation, referentiality or connotation, completely exceed the delimitations of this book.

Not in vain in the last parts of this essay I made the effort to take the reader to a series of examples in the linguistics of the phrase analyzing the presentational in what in the plastic arts we have defined as performance, what I precisely analyzed when I said that a performance consists of nothing more than a reiteration of the same thing, a form of presentation of what in itself makes up a presentation. As in the type of examples analyzed when I have a book on my desk and I say to the person next to me, echoing the reality that the book is on the table, “This thing that you have in front of you on the table is a book.” ”, or when I show it to him and tell him, “what I am showing you is a book”, this phrase is, like those discussed in the essay, rigorously, a presentation, a presentational, in it a book is presented that is about the table, so if the book is on the table intentionally the same as a work of art or object that has been arranged itself as a presentation, the linguistic phrase does nothing but reiterate that “the book is on the table” in the form of , “dear viewer in a gallery or museum, this thing that is on the table is a book”, or “this thing that I am showing you on the table, I am showing it to you on the table”, “and it is a book that I am showing you on the table”, the phrase means that this book is a presentation, reiterates the scene in which the book is illuminated in an environment on that table.

The above does not mean that we cannot offer certain fruitful visits from the philosophy of presentationality and the phenomenology of its media and technologies towards certain modalities in which relations between maps and territories are present, or designative or nominal relations of some kind, such as In fact, I did so in my analyzes on ecological art and earth art, among others, these visitations, however, can only be so as long as in them the presentation acquires a relevant presence and are therefore subject to the imperatives of a linguistics of presentationality, thus leaving the rest of its riches completely outside the delimitations of a philosophy of linguistic presentationality and a philosophizing of presentation, for example, the relationships that in these modalities can occur from those forms to their processes, although they may be interesting. , exceed the delimitations of this book, or any forms moved towards their referential, denotative, connotative and nominal levels, remain outside the delimitations of a philosophizing the presentation as a language requiring those other types of efforts and for the same reason, other types of books in which the questions will have to be asked from other places in epistemology.

(2)- The Stratum is here the plane on which the forms of that legibilization extend and open, move and relate. Say, for example, in the very reason why I included this essay in this book, because the layer on my own terms. I begin the book with The Linguistic Presentational because I consider that from the position of the body, of this my body, with which I write, as in the position of the body of any person who, like me, is related to Internet technology or with any form In markets, advertising and consumption, presentation will always be a privileged and prioritized place. If we do not present, if we do not have something in the presentation, then we cannot enjoy it, nor use it, nor benefit from it. Always, at a relevant level, the presentation will have a significant place for the body. Those who design the sites, the websites, the portals, those who arrange the books in the bookstores, the advertisements for the goods in the city, etc.

However, it is true that, when we simply enjoy the services of that technology, that internet, those websites, those counters, those markets, those advertisements, those presentations, it does not matter if they are presentations or not, they mattered when to be where they are they had to be taken to the presentational form, but they stopped mattering when we are with the remote control changing channels, or when we surf the Internet, or when we simply sensually feel in the city the sensoriality of that unfolded world. In this sense, we could very well suppose that we could relate to the matter simply from my essay Theorizing the Media Today, while here the body is in the position simply of experiencing the continuity of those services as they are given and as they are given to the sensation, the netizen who surfs the Internet.

In the relationship between these two ways of relating to the same phenomenon, we have a stratum issue, as we have when we return to relate to the same issue again from the Intangible, or when we return to the issue again at a purely level. abstract and philosophy of forms in The Interstice or when once we have seen it from the presentation, then from the media, the interstice and the intangible, four forms that suppose four different positions of body, sensation, phenomenal, enjoyment, benefit , perception, regarding the same, we return later this time from the more abstract and scientific epistemology of this book on the same now as a matter of philosophy of science in Philosophizing the Field.

The designer who creates a presentation, the netizen, the television viewer, the passerby who reads the city, the book reader, the consumer who consumes on the Internet or in the markets in the city, the buyer of merchandise, the viewer of art exhibitions , etc. So, without the need to refer the stratum to the expression or the subjacency of the expression, we have the stratum in the simple relationship between different modes with respect to the same phenomenon, as also occurs between forms of literature. In short and with regard to my own definition of a stratum, a stratum will always be the way in which we objectify the planes in a given sedimentation, what makes the stratum, in fact, properly speaking, is the sedimentary process. We are here as if we are clearing or raising, if you will, the different planes of the same phenomenon, its different levels, we could say, the different ways in which we can objectify it; we are, in fact, making its sedimentary form legible.

The main theoretical reference to this paper is the phenomenological issue Derrida discuss on the relation between presence and presentation, not precisely the relation between presentation and re-presentation, while there is a moment when my concept of the redundancy and recursivity of the presentational linguistic in technology evoques to a certain point a certain re-of the presentation, and while the relation I discuss between the presented and the presentational suppose such a redundancy it stay yet through the phenomenological issue of presence and present when presentation and the presentation of presentation dilute to a certain point the moment of re-presentation

The theoretician relation between presentation, representation, re-presentation is an issue in analytical philosophy and is an issue I payed attention and bridged to first plane since earlier nineties even before but without yet writing a paper on it, my first attention to the issue revolves initially around the issue of tautology in conceptualism seen conceptualism from the analytical philosophy of science while not forgetting its correlate also in general conceptualism, the issue of the white cube paradigmatic of earlier conceptualism in usa and England exemplify the same principle when the presenter, the white cube, present nothing, but the presenter, during 1998 living in Cambridge court in Houston I dedicated a month to read and study a paper by Stephen A Tyler a half of which theorize the relation between presentation, representation and re-presentation, while the paper included nothing referential to medias nothing about technologies or empirical research and was completely from a very high theoretical deepeners dedicated to pure linguistic matter, I was both attracted and surprised by it, I liked the paper, and I did a reading of the paper to discuss it with my colleague and friend Quetzil Eugenio and my ex-wife mother of my son marcel Hernandez at Cambridge somewhen in 1998, we read the paper turning the reader in speech act to leasing and late we discussed it. 

 The paper have a whole half dedicated to a concepts I am not mentioning in the paper not in this books, which is the relation between the concepts of mediation and remediation’s, while I am not making reference in the paper not in the book to such an issue I am concient on the fact since I dedicated to do a books on this issue in technology that ever the relation presentation-representation evolves matters of mediations and probably to what Stephen called remediation, however, I tried to maintain myself in a more empirical research addressed to theorize a reality out there a reality which if we analyze it certainly we are certainly mediated and remediated by this technologies including science, my purposiveness with this paper was limited to only objectify it, but not yet at least in the paper out of my concept of a window, another part of Stephen paper goes so far to my interest, I am focused in writings books all the time, all the contrary to be interested about his discussion on the end of the book, by that reason, not without mentioning it at notes, I choiced to include in the bibliography of this paper first my main reference in the paper, Derrida phenomenological theory on presence, and second Stephen paper Presenter (dis) play instead of such longer and deeper paper Alternative Linguist Remediation’s, published in a folleto in Texas, which supposed to have a version prolegomenon to a next linguistic according to current online if not the same paper about which the reader will see at the end general bibliography of this book a Pp, from page to page, to the specific issues of my interest.  

As notes, I would like to include my individual thanks to Vasco Zinetar, a keen Venezuelan photographer and vice president of the Museum, and to Tahia Rivero, extraordinary curator and president of the museum, for having dedicated me between 1994 and 1996 to developing research on the topic of the market, focusing on the relationship between the museum of high art and the markets summarized in this brief. Thanks to both of them I was able to review collections and catalogs of plastic arts in various museums in Caracas around the visuality of the markets in painting from the 15th century to the present as I proposed, as well as have as a curator in the museum with the possibility of visit the markets with the support of the same as well as, regarding my stay as a research associate in the department of anthropology at Rice University, expand my motivation towards the topic of the markets towards the writing and composition of two authorial literary works in which I extend the subject from the theory of markets to high technologies and the media in the era of the internet and advertising in the world of Anglo-Saxon society in the USA in daily life The Presentational Linguistic and The Intangible, both literary works by authorial philosophical essays.

Bibliography

Adorno, Theodor W. Aesthetic Theory London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984. Ed. Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann. Trans. Christian Lenhardt, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997. Ed. Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann. Trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor, London, New York: Continuum, 2004. Ed. Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann. Trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor

Theodore Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, Orbis

De Certaud Michael, The Practice of Every Day Life, The University of California Press, USA

Derrida Jacques, Form and Wishes to Say, Notes on the Phenomenology of Language, Margins of Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press, USA

Derrida Jacques, Form and Wanting to Say, Notes on the Phenomenology of Language, Pp, 193-212, Margins of Philosophy, Chair, Series Mayor, Madrid, 1989

Derrida, Jacques The Supplement of the Couple: Philosophy in front of Linguistic, Margin of Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press, USA

Derrida Jacques, The Copula Supplement: Philosophy versus Linguistics, Margins of Philosophy, Pp 215-245, The University of Chicago Press, USA

Derrida Jacques, The Semiology of Hegel, Margins of Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press, USA

Jacques Derrida, The Semiology of Hegel, Margins of Philosophy, Chair, Theorem, Major Series, Madrid, 1989

Derrida, Jacques The Ginebra Linguistic circle, Margin of Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press, USA

Derrida Jacques, The Ligústic Circle of Geneva, Margins of Philosophy, Chair, Mayor Series, Madrid, 1989

Derrida Jacques, Ousia and Gramme: Notes on Sein and Zeit, Margins of Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press, USA 

Derrida Jacques, Ousia and Gramme, Pp, 63-102, Margins of Philosophy, Chair, Theorem, Serie Mayor, Madrid, 1989

Foucault, Michael Words and Things

Eugenio Quetzil, letter to Abdel Hernandez San Juan (sended to transart foundation as artistic director), Lake Forest College, Faculty of Sociology and anthropology, Lake Forest College, Illinois, USA, 1999

Eugenio Quetzil The Ethnographic turn in Archaeology, Research Positioning and reflexivity in Etnographic archaeology

Gadamer George, Aesthetics and hermeneutics, Tecnos, metropolis collection

Habermas, Junger The Problem of Comprehension in Social Sciences, Boston, Beacon Press. 

Habermas Junger, The Problems of Understanding in Social Sciences, Pp, 144-196, Theory of Communicative Action I and II, Taurus

Habermas Junger, The Theory of Communicative Action, Beacon Press, USA

Habermas Junger, Communicative Action Theory I and II, Taurus

Habermas Junger, From Lukacs to Adorno: Rationalization as Reification, Pp- 433-509, Theory of Communicative Action, Volume I, Taurus

Habermas Junger, First Interlude, Social Action, Teleological Activity and Communication, Pp 350-441, Theory of Communicative Action, Volume I, Taurus

Habermas, Junger The Self and the Social; Mead, Pp, The Change of Paradigm, Pp, The Theory of Communicative Action, Beacon Press and Taurus

Habermas Junger, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, Peninsula Editions, 2000

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The Intramundane Horizont, The School of advance hard science university press, united states, 1998

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, Self and Acerbo: The Self and the social between writing, research and culture, 98 lab books, united states, 1998

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, Being and Monad, Complete Works, 98 lab books, united states, 1998

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The Intangible, Selected Essays, 98 lab books, united states, 1998

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The Presentational Linguistic, Complete Works, 98 lab books, united states, 1998

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The Given and the Ungiven, 98 lab books, united states, 1998

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, Rethinking Urban Anthropology, 98 lab books, united states, 1998

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, Anthropology of archaeology, 98 lab books, united states, 1998

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The World Correlate: Interpretant and structure in posmodern cultural theory, 98 lab books, united states, 1998

Hernandez san Juan abdel, The thresholds of the couple: Self Ethnography, 98 labs books, united states, 1998

Hernandez san Juan abdel, The Indeterminist true, 98 labs books, united states, 1998

Hernandez san Juan abdel, The Constellations of commons Sense, 98 labs books, united states, 1998

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, Thinking Science: New Horizonts of Phenomenological sociology, book

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The Sensible Throught: Epistemology, performativity Theory and cultural research, book

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, Essays in the analytical philosophy of science, book

Hernandez San Juan abdel, Rethinking Symbolism, Book

Hernandez san Juan abdel, Phenomenological Anthropology, 98 labs books, united states

Salvador Bueno and Javier Muguenza, Introduction to Contemporary Sociology, Tecnos

Sagittarius Alfred, The Knowledge in the Worlds of Everyday Life, edited by Schutz's wife Ilse Heim with Thomas Luckmann

Tyler, Stephen A, Presenter (Dis) Play, published at The Creative Spirit 31.1 (1991): 122-130

Tyler Stephen A, Prolegomena to the next linguistic, Alternative Linguistics. Descriptive and Theoretical modes, edited by Philip W. David, John Benjamin’s publishing company, Rice University, Houston, Texas. 1995

Tyler Stephen A, Evocation, The Unwriteable: A Response to Abdel Hernandez San Juan, Sept 9, Rice University, Houston, Texas, USA, 1997

Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1953 Philosophical Investigations.  New York: MacMillan.

Index

The Presentational Linguistic. By Abdel Hernandez San Juan

Worlds

USA Anglo Media Culture

USA Anglo High Media Technology

USA Anglo New Media Technology Culture

media world

New York

Presentational world

Bookstores

Libraries

Philosophy of language

Theoretical linguistics

The Linguistic Presentational

Linguistic forms

Carnap

Berthan Russel

Wittgenstein

Jacobson

Saussure

Benveniste

Hemslev

Sapir

Language demonstrations

Phrases and typical statements

Linguistic-demonstrative phrases

Language linkages

Linguistic articulation

Presentation one

Forms of rhetoric

Presentational in language

Reiteration of form

Lowercase forms of language

Linguistics of sentences

Immediacy of its denotation

Self-reference

The presenter

Metalanguage

Tautology

Metalinguistic moment

language one

Linguistic recursiveness

recursive move

Linguistic reiterator

Tautological moment

Conceptuality of language one

Thickness of synthetically assumed meanings

Series of conceptual meanings

Repetitive form

Iterative non-repetitive

Non-identifying repetitive

Conceptual tautological

Linguistics of the written sentence

Rhetorical reiteration of the sentence

singular person

Forms of Presentation

Introduction to a work

Introduction to a book

Introduction to a person

The presentation

Posted

Catalog presenting an exhibition

Websites

Visual spaces on the internet

Design

Advertising

Advertising that presents a product

TV shows

Stands at fairs

Books

Foldable

Samples

unfolded bookcase

Academic and business book covers

Sale and offer in bookstores

Magazine racks

Customers

Dials

Exhibitions

Samples

Half and Half of that Language

New technologies

Relationships between text, image and environments

Sensory body immersion

Internet

Web 

Cyber ​​Navigation

Window

The environment

Search lines

Options clicks

Coding boxes

Configurationality

El Setting 

That atmosphere

That desk

That desktop-window

Brought to your format

Will bring

Go to

Move around and between

Across

Look for

To resort

Visit

Internet mode

Cyber ​​advertising

Half of that language

Medium of your presentation

Middle and body of that rhetoric

Mediaticity and rhetoric of that language

That text as a totality of language

Sep

Sensory ultrareality of what is presented

Large-scale advertising

Skin product or lotion

Sensuality of a female body

Shopping and sales spaces

Facticity

Fatecity

Indexicals and deixticals

Television

Markets

until

theoretical illustration

plastic arts

Forms of writing in the plastic arts

Scriptural freedom

A simple literary phrase

A simple writing on the page

literary form of experimentation

Creative exploration

Art Gallery

Art Museum

artistic activity

Ives Klein 

gestural painting

earth art

Ecological art

Natural spaces

Walter de Maria

Richard Long

Christo 

Gordon Matta Clark

Rene Magritte

Artifice of representation

Configurational aspect of language

Rhetorical artilugio

Editable and reversible sequence

composing

shaping

editing

configuring

Virtuality

Any fragment

Film 

Cinema

Performative turns

Performativity

Criticism of the performance

Supposed types

Other Poetry

Delimitations of pre-given areas as conceptual designations

Descriptions between city maps and spaces

What you are reading, --dear reader-

And starts

This Milk Jug (only the image according to the word, and even include the image on the page in the literary space of that writing)

This Body that Dresses (the pure phrase as writing)

This Hair that is Combed

These Minutes That Pass

You Sitting

reading me

His Furtive Look

This book

His book that does not show

His Unconfessed Notes

His Dubious Shyness

Your Minutes of Silence

Illustrations

Dynamic Lighting Effects in San Francisco

Fair Stands in New York

Sales Catalogs, Oakland, Berkeley or San Francisco

Imagen Web Press, Oakland, Berkeley or San Francisco, USA

Catalog of an Art Exhibition, New York, USA

Advertising for Television Programs within Television Programs, New York, USA

Rene Magritt, This is not a Pipe, Painting on Canvas

Walter de Maria, Drawing on Earth, Photography

Christo, Building Packaging

Richard Long, Ecological Work

Robert Smithson, Ecological Work

Sol Le Wit, Ecological work

Theorizing Media Today

By Abdel Hernandez San Juan

Concepts and Notions

Abstracted formal logic

objectified thingness

Standardized thingness

Homogenized seam

visual thingness

objectified thingness of the machine

Devices of media thingness

Factual thingness

Material carrier

Abstraction made device

Abstraction formally turned technology

Media deauratization of the sequence

Emptying of immanence

Exponentiality of seduction

Language as a gadget

Language as artifice

Principle of no need in the sequence

Arbitrariness of what follows

Dediachronization

Diachronic (linear) ancestors

Synchronous Ancestors (timed simultaneous)

Achronic Ancestors (acronic chronicles according to the synchronic cut).

Media dediachronization

Simultaneity of now and here

Refigurations

Fragment and metonymy

Fractalization of simultaneity in heterogeneity

Sociology of tastes

Sociology of consumption

Sociology of preferences

Sociology of schedules

Sociology of the ages

Half and Stockings of that Language

Media

Mediaticity

Media

Internet

Computing

Cybernetics

New stockings

massive stockings

Television

That device

That device

Your paraphernalia

More hyperreal relationship

machine character

That computer

It's a laptop

that television

That personal computer

Worlds

Anglo Media World

Anglo World of High Technology in the USA

Anglo-Saxon world

Internet world

Sensory World

Sensory Immersion World

overwhelming images

Cyberspace navigation at home 24 hours a day

The netizen

Hyperreality effect

Renewable forms of technology

Advertising seduction

Chats

High efficiency

Great speeds

Available and playful universe

Ecological recycling culture

Culture that this media generates

creative way of life

Communications by emails and texts

Productive culture

Go shopping

Week calendar

Places to go in the city

Activities of our children's schools

Go to the market

Visitors

Navigators

Users

Services

Customers

New speeds

Rhythms of communication and information

Telecommunicated creativity

The viewer

Advertising

Consumption

living traditions

Illustrated Entertainment

Children's programming

Adult programming

Advertising wedge

short of advertising

Promotional images

Ecological ecosystems

New ecological culture of the city

Urban habitation

Large highly developed countries

Houston 1997-2002 

New globalized therapeutics

Visual phenomenon

that fractal

That new media

That new technology of that fractality

visual phenomenon

Simultaneity of a shipment

Responsive concurrency

Multiplicity of receptors

Sending/receiving relationship

Text/image relationships

Perceptual system

Actual recipient

Receiver Conceptuality

Weberian concept of an ideal type

Imbued subjectivity

Empty habit of watching the media

Image emptied of relationship to a culture

Mediatization of culture

The media itself as culture

The culture of the media

Mediated Images

transition place

place of passage

Your mediation

Its mediatization

Mediatizing principle

Media criticism

Heterogeneous disjunction

until

Cut here and paste there

This goes with this and that with that

Exacerbation of the principle of the editable

Rhetoric that supports him

enchanting power

enchantment of the world

Theatricality of the form

Kabuki theater

be enchanted

Computer Art

Digital art

A program

A movie

Illustrations

Sale and Demos of Computer Machines

Large Retail Stores, New York, USA

Technological Equipment, New York, USA

Computers and Televisions New York, USA

Monitors and Screens, New York, USA

Website Services, New York, USA

Home Internet 24 Hours, New York, USA

Internet in Cafes 24 Hours, New York, USA

New Internet Habits at Home 24 Hours, New York, USA

Un Cibernauta 24 Horas, New York, USA

A Viewer, New York, USA

A Radio Listener, New York, USA

Differences between a Cybernaut, a Viewer and a Radio Listener, lifestyles, New York, USA

Work Time and Free Time, New York, USA

The Interstitials

By Abdel Hernandez San Juan

Concepts and Notions

Concepts in philosophy

Forms in aesthetics

Words in the sentence

The language

Theoretical philosophizing

Philosophical metaphysics

Theoretical concepts

Philosophy of forms

Field theory

Philosophical categories of the philosophical field

Conceptuality of the gap

Synthetic elaborations of perceptions

Abstractions coming from the senses

Abstract intellectual elaboration

Abstracted form

ancient greece

Greco-Latin etymologies

Media

An essay

Writing

He speaks

The plastic arts

A work of art

Bidimension

Form

A plan

A fabric

A drawing on paper

A line

An image

A visual atmosphere

An ambient atmosphere

A musical atmosphere

That way

That plan

That color

That material

that language

Ductility

Laxidad

Flexibility

Texturality

Thickness

Consistency

Porosity

Creaminess

Intensity

blurring

Timbre

Harmony

Melody

Rhythm

Worlds

Sensory world

Immediate world of the senses

Universe of the senses

Perceptual impression of tactility

Physical and sensory world of the senses

World of relationship between senses and meanings

Natural world

Bodies and environments

Figures and backgrounds

Lines and planes

Another way of giving

Given elements

Constant nutrient

Inexhaustibility

Another form of prowling

Interstitial aesthetics

Infinite nourishing

Respectivity and Correspondence

Creation of meanings

Interstitial form

Nomenclature

Images of the physical world

Dissimilarity to movement one

Sinuosity that that line describes

Scope and correspondence relationship

Image of the whole provided by the plan

Interstitial relationship

Robert Wilson, Painting on Canvas, Houston, Texas, USA

Robert Wilson, Painting on Canvas, Houston, Texas, USA

Robert Wilson, Theater Works, Houston, Texas, USA

Robert Wilson, Theater Works, Houston, Texas, USA

James Turrell, Ambiente, Houston, Texas, USA

James Turrell, Ambiente, Houston, Texas, USA

James Turrell, Ambiente, Houston, Texas, USA

James Turrell, Ambiente, Houston, Texas, USA

The Intangible

By Abdel Hernandez San Juan

Concepts and Notions

aesthetic contemplation

Symbolic exclusivity

Exponentiality of seduction

Aesthetics of economics

Economy of academic papers and essays

Economy of the intangible

Trust economics

Economy of language and text

Economy of the tangible and the intangible

Critical deconstructions

Expressions of the avant-garde

Value processes

Living and dynamic processes

Aesthetics and sensitivity

Economic exchange

symbolic exchange

Value phenomenon

The aesthetics

Ethics

Forms of reification

Rhetoric of consumables

Cultural forms of appearance

Social forms of taste

Fashionable aesthetics

Reified object

fetish object

Malinowski 

Socks

Work of art

Painting work

Classical music

Commercial

Product body

Sauce on spaghetti

Cream on female skin

Standardized advertisements

Reproduced print

commercial on television

Go advertising

The image of your product

Lotion

Cream

Pleasure and enjoyment

A juicy food

Supply and demand relationships

Embace

Covering

Worlds

A work of art

Love couple

Relationship with children

work activity

Advertising

The markets

Product competitiveness

Consumers and clients

Image market

Supposedly originating market

Aesthetic image market

World of sensorialities and sensualities

Comfortable image

Users in the world of images

Advertising anticipations

Market efficiency

Sensuality of the products

Exclusive symbolic objects

Beauty Products, Advertising, New York, USA

Body Products, Advertising, New York, USA

Food Products, Advertising, New York, USA

Libre Mercado, Grandes Moles, New York, USA

Free Consumption in Large Moles, New York, USA

Authenticity Market, New York, USA

Houston Alreves, Downtown, Houston, EUA

Sales of works of high art, New York, USA

Fashion Clothing, New York, USA

Art Collections in Museums, New York, USA

Cristy and Sotevish, New York, USA

Shopping Mall Circuits, New York, USA

Antiquaries of Images and Objects in Extinction, New York, USA

Stratus Confines

By Abdel Hernandez San Juan

Concepts and notions

Philosophy

Literature

Scientific work

Philosophical and Scientific Insights

Science from its Origin

Greek and Greco-Latin Antiquity

scriptural body

Essential clearances

Hermeneutical Clearances

Scientific and aesthetic-literary insights

Scriptural Hermeneutics

Confines of the Stratum

Stratigraphic illusion

images of the stratum

Depth spaces

Graduality of the layer

Fitness and language

Loitering and coming and going of exegesis

Capable of that stratified presence

Conceptualidad experimental

Philosophical and formal demonstration

Scriptural and phenomenal demonstration

Caudal Conceptual

Philosophical Flow

Literary flow

Scriptural Flow

Stylistic Flow

Anthropological and Ethnographic Philosophy

Philosophy and Language Criticism

Hermeneutically Arranged Statements

Rationally Imbued Subjects

Pragmatics of communicative reason

Communicative Rationality

Consensual Modes of Mutual Understanding

Theorizing Ethnographically

Correlative Meanings of Relevance

Clusters of Provisional Meanings

Criticism of Representation

Empirical Efforts

Hard High Theory

Abdel Hernandez

George Marcus

Clifford Geertz

Jacques Derrida

Hunger Habermas

James Faubiam

Stephen Tyler 

Alfred Shurtz

Socks

Reading the hieroglyph

Hieroglyph

Fragments

Rhetoric of that language

Thickness, richness, grain

Helpful senses

Physical Time of Centuries and Millennia

New Articulating Confines

Heuristic Relevance

Exploratory and Experimental Relevance

creative processes

Experimental and Exploratory Value

Worlds

Our days

Intersubjective relationships

Creative and intellectual processes

Collection of experiences or experiences

Types of readers and auditoriums

Intellectual material in scenes and settings

Living processes

modern ethnography

New urban ethnography

Ethnography as field writing

Faculty of Anthropology at Rice University

Today's ethnographic multitextuality

Reader Objectification

Reader market

Academic book fairs

Presses Universities

Promotional publishers

Commercial Publishers

Hieroglyph, Museum of Archaeology, Berkeley, California, USA

Horizontal and Vertical Display Cases in Museum of Anthropology, Berkeley, California, USA

Excavations in Archeology Areas, Berkeley, California, USA

Geological Images of Different Color Levels on Earth, Berkeley, California, USA

Terrain Archeology in Nature according to the space in which Royal Excavations are carried out, Berkeley, California, USA

Restorations of Large Mural Plans in Architecture, Berkeley, California, USA

Restoration of Vessels, Architecture, Pieces, Berkeley, California, USA

Variety of Alphabetic and Non-Alphabetic Writing Forms, Berkeley, California, USA

Oral Reading of a Text, Berkeley, California, USA

Person Transcribing a Text from Sound, Berkeley, California, USA

Written and Oral Translation from English to Another Language, Berkeley, California, USA

Photograph of a Work of Art on a Museum Wall, Berkeley, California, USA

Museum Wall Looking at the Works

Seat in the Cinema and Theater

Box at the Opera, Berkeley, California, USA

Vinnette of New York City in the 15th Century

Current High Definition Digital Photography, Berkeley, California, USA

Classic Image of the Ethnographer at Field Work in His Writing Chambers or Around Photography, Marcel Mauss, Pierre Bourdieu, Geertz, Bateson, USA

Philosophizing the field

By Abdel Hernandez San Juan

Concepts and notions

Aristotle

Kant

Hegel

Heidegger

Philosophy in the 20th century

The logic

Correlate of validity for all times

Timelessness of the aprioris

philosophical spirit

The reason

Invariants for all beings

The telos

Continuity of spirit

Recent sameness

Corroboration in invariance

Concepts received

Concepts reabstracted from the new ontos

Aprioris of reason and telos

New ontological imperatives

Metaphysical continuity

Invariances of logic

The ontology

The matter

Philosophy of the self

Metaphysics of the sameness of the spirit

Being and thingness

The phenomenology

Hurseel

Hume

Bergson

Sameness of thingness

Presentation of the matter

Sameness of the spirit's presentation

Philosophy of the spirit

abstract philosophizing

Empiricism

The coming and going of the philosophical form

The spirit in the concept

Sameness of thingness

Diversification of matter and its sameness

Ontology diversification

logical positivism

The philosophy that at the dawn of the 20th century

Today's new scientific philosophy

Scientific philosophy

Wittgenstein

Theory of knowledge

Epistemology

Scientific knowledge

Systemic philosophizing

Philosophy of the field

Philosophy as research

Structural linguistics

Ferdinand de Saussure

Correlate of scientificity

Philosophy of nature

Nature-language relationship

The nature of language

Of construction

Critical philosophy

Grammatology

Philosophy of being

Philosophy of art

Philosophy of science and the forms of rationality

Philosophy of vital praxis

Young Habermas

Philosophical development

Philosophy of language

Hermeneutics

Adorno

Hoikemer

Walter Benjamin

Lucash

Helbert Marcuse

romantic form of philosophy

Linguistics

semiology

Frankfurt School

Proliferative and participatory hermeneutic distance

Frankfort Hegelian Post-Marxism

Post-Marxist structuralism.

Frankfort Hegelian Marxism

Theory for aesthetic phenomena

Dialectics

Criticism of fetishism

Philosophy of grammatology

The words and the things

Michel Foucault

Levi Strauss

Philosophy of art and vital praxis

Socks

Materiality

thingness

Ontos

Matter exchange

Representations of matter

Material forms of representations

Desubstantialization of philosophy

symbolic exchange

Language and language

Language and speech

The signifier

The meaning

Relationship between logic and ontology

Natural principle of dematerialization

Forms of the spirit

shapes of nature

Forms of language.

Nature and language

Forms of remuneration.

Communication work

The statement

The speakers

The understanding

The explanation

The direct natural phenomenon

Environmentalism

Communication in spirit and reason

Assumptions in an idea of ​​human nature

The one who with his humanity

Extraterrestrial ships

Logic of practice

Worlds

Ancient and classical worlds

Modern world

worlds of life

Modern times

Progress

The development

The modernization

The technology

The reproduction

The communication

The worlds of science

The worlds of art

The worlds of everyday life

secularization

The modernity

The Institutions of reproduction

Breaks with tradition