Introductory Session

Hiroshima after the U. S. dropped an atomic bomb, Aug 1945 Why many Europeans wanted to appease Hitler in September 1938: they knew this was coming if war broke out: Guernica, April 1937

The price of appeasement: the Nazis, having just annexed Austria in March 1938, raid a Jewish Austrian business

Session 1. Introduction to the Course. (I) The Central Problem of the Ethics of War and Peace: When, If Ever, Is War a Better Option than Peace? When, If Ever, Is War Anything Besides Organized Crime? (II) Moral Dilemmas of War and Peace. Two Case Studies: (1) An Argument that the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki Was a Massive War Crime, along with a criticism of pacifism; (2) Arguments for Britain’s Appeasing the Nazis and Declaring War against Them.

Suggested reading 1: Charles Tilly, "Warmaking and Statemaking as Organized Crime," in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol (Cambridge UP, 1985): 169-191. READ PP. 169-183 ONLY

Suggested reading 2: Elizabeth Anscombe, “Mr Truman’s Degree,” Collected Philosophical Papers, Volume III: Ethics, Religion and Politics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), pp. 62-71

Suggested reading 3: Sections I and II of Michael Walzer, “World War II: Why Was this War Different?” Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1971): 3-21 (pp. 3-11)

"There is a catch that lies at the root of affluent liberal democracies' torment in conflict situations. Since wars are abhorred in liberal societies as antithetical to both their interests and values, to their entire way of life and worldview, they are sanctioned only a last resort--after all other options have failed. Yet in practically no situation does it ever become clear that all alternative policies have indeed been exhausted, and that war has really become unavoidable. A feeling that there may be another way, that there must be another way, always lingers on. Errors of omission and commission are ever suspected as being the causes of undesired belligerency. Moreover, it never becomes clear that the democracies come to a conflict with entirely clean hands, morally, because of past or more immediate alleged wrongs; nor indeed can they, given the inevitable gap that always separates ideals from reality.

"The democracies' reaction to the Axis challenge during the 1930s amply [illustrates this catch]. Everything was done to avoid military action, even if this meant allowing Germany to regain its power, grow in confidence owing to the democracies' inaction, and cross the point of no return on its road to expansion. The democracies' feelings of guilt for not having treated Germany in good faith after the First World War contributed to their paralysis. As long as the prospect of peaceful accommodation and containment remained--and it hardly ever faded, not even in 1939--there was no way the democracies would have initiated armed confrontation. To be sure, as critics caution, Hitlers are rare and not every crisis is the 1930s. All the same, the 1930s are a standing reminder that the democracies' strong aversion to war, while immensely beneficial overall, can become a grave problem in serious conflict situations."

--Azar Gat, "The Changing Character of War," The Changing Character of War, ed. Hew Strachan and Sibylle

Scheipers (2011), p. 36.

"The memories of [World War I] were ones of horror [for Europeans in the 1930s], and the prospect of another [they] regarded with dread. But...the conduct of that war had not been completely sterile, not were memories entirely negative. On the western front in particular, there had been operational developments which were to have profound social as well as military consequences. There the deadlock resulting from the ascendancy of firepower over mobility had gradually been broken...by the precise and flexible use of artillery in support of storm troops...To these developments on the ground was gradually being added a further element: air-power...far-sighted strategists [were visualizing] a new kind of war...It would be waged, not by masses of conscripts commanded by chateau-bound generals far behind the lines, but by keen young specialists in violence: tank commanders, airmen, storm troopers. The First World War had produced just such men, particularly in the German army. Their symbol was the grim, purposeful Stahlhelm [steel helmet]. They were classless, efficient...Peace left them [without work]...The image of violence they conveyed was a vital factor in enabling both movements to seize and retain political power. "Hitler used this threat of force to intimidate his adversaries, international as well as domestic. He used the fear of war in itself, especially the fear of air bombardment, combined with the parallel fear of Communism, to persuade European statesmen either to give him the benefit of the doubt in the belief that, once German 'legitimate grievances' had been appeased, the aspirations of the peace movement could at last be fulfilled; or, more realistically, to settle for a German hegemony that now appeared inevitable. When war came in 1939, the brilliant campaigns of 1940 seemed to settle the matter. Although Britain was able to stave off defeat until more powerful allies found themselves compelled to enter the war on its side, Hitler's prophecy of a thousand-year Reich seemed only a hyperbolic exaggeration of what Europe had now to expect. But there was no prospect of this being a peaceful order. In Hitler's programme, the subjugation of Western Europe was only a preliminary to the conquest of the Soviet Union to make possible the creation of a self-sufficient and racially pure Reich capable of holding its own against the rest of the world. Beyond that, Hitler was already making preparations for war with the United States. For him, war was not simply an instrument for creating a new order: it was the new order." --Michael Howard, TheInvention of Peace (2000), pp. 69-71.

So you’d like to know more…

You could watch:

Hiroshima: Why the Bomb Was Dropped, directed by Martin Smith, hosted by Peter Jennings (1995)

You could read:

[1] Osama bin Laden, from Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden, ed. Bruce Lawrence (London: Verso, 2005):

“Declaration of Jihad,” pp. 23-30

“The Winds of Faith,” pp. 103-105

“Terror for Terror,” Messages, pp. 106-129

“The Example of Vietnam,” pp. 139-145

“Nineteen Students,” Messages, pp. 145-158

“To the Americans,” pp. 160-173

“To the Allies of America,” pp. 173-175

“To the Peoples of Europe,” pp. 233-236

“The Towers of Lebanon,” pp. 237-244

[2] Robert C. Batchelder, The Irreversible Decision, 1939-1950 (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1962)

[3] Avishai Margalit, “Two Pictures of Political Compromise,” On Compromise and Rotten Compromises (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), pp. 19-39