Collective Choice
Collective Choice and Political Morality
Syllabus
What is so great about majority rule? Why shouldn’t we let a minority of experts rule? Or a minority of the highly informed? Or a minority of the highly interested? What should we do when a majority thinks we should do something, but doesn’t feel very strongly about it, while a large minority feels very strongly that we should not do it? Is there any reasonable basis for claiming that a society chooses this over that? Should we aim for a democracy in which all citizens actively participate, or are we better off when the people only have a say during periodic elections? Should business firms be run democratically? Given how diverse are the preferences of individuals in any given society, it is difficult or even impossible to create a societal choice procedure which could fairly be said to express society’s choice among options. Moreover, a famous economic theory shows that no social choice procedure can simultaneously satisfy several reasonable standards. This result may imply that democratic voting is meaningless, that the public interest does not exist, that the notion of the will of the people is nonsense, and that democracy is a pipe dream.
This course will survey these problems and the techniques used for solving them by social choice theory (SCT). We ask, first, what are the grounds and limits of majority rule, by looking at the justifications and constraints proposed for it by James Madison’s plan for the US political system. We then consider two robust and ambitious conceptions of democracy: participatory democracy and economic democracy. Next, we consider the implications of the results of SCT for political morality: the part of morality that tells us what we ought to do in politics. We then consider whether and in what sense SCT invalidates certain justifications of constitutions and democracy. We then turn to considering the nature of the preferences involved in social choice: should we count immoral or unjust preferences the same as morally decent preferences? We end by considering whether SCT’s main result means that democracy is meaningless or infeasible. Readings will be drawn from the work of some of the greatest political economists of the 20th century: Kenneth Arrow, James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, and Amartya Sen, as well as distinguished political theorists like Robert Dahl, Carole Pateman, William Riker, and Brian Barry.
The course aims to hone students’ skills in analysis and argument. Much attention will be given to structures of reasoning and the shape of models and theories. The goal is to strengthen skills of reasoning and analysis that will be useful in public life, in the professions, and in graduate school.
Course Requirements. To earn full credit, you must:
(1) Participate in class discussion. I know many people find this daunting. Nevertheless, try. One main aim of the course is to help you improve in argument.
(2) Submit 8 weekly response papers. Each week, you may submit a paper, of not more than 350 words, that examines some thesis that that week’s reading has argued. The paper may criticize the argument by which the reading defends the thesis, mount its own argument to refute the thesis, or mount its own argument to defend the thesis. For full credit, you need only submit 8 such papers.
(3) Submit a paper proposal. You are required to submit, in Week 9, a proposal for your final paper. The proposal should state a question concerning one of the topics covered in the course, say why the question is important, state your answer to the question (i.e., your thesis), give the key reasons by which you will defend the thesis, state two serious objections to your thesis, and state how you will respond to the objections. The proposal should be not more than 800 words long.
(4) Submit a final paper. You are required to submit, on the last day of reading period, a final paper. The paper should state a question concerning one of the topics covered in the course, say why the question is important, state your answer to the question (i.e., your thesis), defend the thesis with argument, state two serious objections to your thesis, and respond to the objections. The paper should be not more than 5,000 words long.
Course Assessment. Course marks will be computed on the following distribution: Class Participation: 20%; Response Papers: 30% (3.75% each); Paper Proposal: 15%; Argumentative Paper: 35%
Course format. The course will be discussion oriented. In weeks where we are discussing formal proofs, I will walk through the steps of the proof, asking questions and inviting comment. In weeks where we discuss natural-language arguments, I will usually begin sessions by presenting a thesis advanced in the week’s reading. I will discuss its implications. I will then ask one or many of you whether you think the thesis true or false, and why. We shall then examine the reasons you offer for your view. We shall then turn to the reasons the text offers in defense of the thesis. I will ask you what you think of those reasons, and so forth. The course in part aims to improve your skill in reasoned argument.
Course Objectives. By the end of the course, students should
(1) Have become familiar with the key concepts of the theories and arguments about democracy and collective choice covered in the course;
(2) Have strengthened their skills in applying these concepts to current debate about the problems of democracy;
(3) Have honed their ability to specify how and why specific values clash when dealing with problems of democratic decision-making;
(4) Have improved their skills in specifying the disagreement over the relevant facts involved in disagreement over problems of democracy.
(5) Have honed their skills in specifying the structures of arguments, breaking them into premises-axioms, middle premises-lemmas, and conclusions-theorems;
(6) Have improved their ability in distinguishing between similar concepts denoted by the same word and spotting equivocations;
(7) Have honed their skills in evaluating and challenging the premises of an argument with rational and well-ordered arguments of their own;
(8) Have improved their ability to evaluate the deductive validity or inductive strength of an argument’s progress from premises to conclusions;
(9) Have worked out for themselves a detailed and developed argument arguing a thesis about one of the questions covered in the course.
E-mail policy. You are welcome to e-mail me with questions about the course. I try to answer e-mails within 48 hours of receipt. Don’t expect an answer before then.
Academic Dishonesty: Don’t do it! Yale College’s policy is to severely punish those who do commit it. So you want to know what is dishonesty and what isn’t. For definitions of things that count as academic dishonesty, see here: http://yalecollege.yale.edu/content/cheating-plagiarism-and-documentation. Further advice on how to avoid inadvertently doing it is here: http://writing.yalecollege.yale.edu/using-sources. I may, at any time, use tools like turnitin.com to detect plagiarism.
REQUIRED TEXTBOOKS
[1] Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, second edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963). $21.00 new.
[2] James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2010). $14.50 new.
[3] William H. Riker, Liberalism against Populism: A Confrontation between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1982). $32.25 new.
[4] Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956). $17.50 new.
RECOMMENDED TEXTBOOKS
[1] Rational Man and Irrational Society? An Introduction and Sourcebook, ed. Brian Barry and Russell Hardin (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982). Available for less than $35 used.
[2] Foundations of Social Choice Theory, ed. Jon Elster and Aanund Hylland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). $37 new.
[3] Wayne C. Booth, Gregory G. Colomb, and Joseph M. Williams, The Craft of Research (University of Chicago Press, 2008). Available online through Yale libraries
[4] Anthony Weston, A Rulebook for Arguments (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2001). $10 new.
RECOMMENDED REFERENCES AND BACKGROUND READING
[1] The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta [plato.stanford.edu]
A free resource which is probably the most comprehensive encyclopedia of philosophy ever compiled. Authoritative articles by scholars.
[2] The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edn (2008) [www.dictionaryofeconomics.com]
A non-free resource accessible online through the Yale Libraries. One of the most comprehensive dictionaries of economics ever. Authoritative articles by scholars.
[3] Richard Wollheim, "Democracy," Journal of the History of Ideas 19 (1958): 225-242 [JSTOR]
[4] Duncan Black, The Theory of Committees and Elections (Cambridge University Press, 2011 [1958])
The first systematic treatment in a single volume of the properties of majority rule, supermajorities, proportional
representation, single transferable vote, and voting cycles. Includes a famous history of social choice theory,
from Condorcet to Nanson.
[5] Gerry Mackie, Democracy Defended (Cambridge University Press, 2003)
SCHEDULE OF READINGS
Week 1. Introduction to the Course.
No readings.
Week 2. Madisonian Democracy and Its Fraught Relationship with Majority Rule; An Argument for Absolute Majority Rule
Dahl, Preface to Democratic Theory, Ch. 1, pp. 4-33
Dahl, Preface to Democratic Theory, Ch. 2, pp. 34-44
Week 3. An Argument for Absolute Majority Rule; The U. S. Hybrid of Minority Rule and Majority Rule
Dahl, Preface to Democratic Theory, Ch. 2, pp. 34-62
Dahl, Preface to Democratic Theory, Ch. 4, pp. 125-151
Week 4. Participatory Democracy and Economic Democracy.
Carole Pateman, "Participatory Democracy Revisited," Perspectives on Politics 10 (2012): 7-19. Available on classesV2.
Robert Dahl, "Democracy and the Economic Order," A Preface to Economic Democracy (University of California Press, 1985), pp. 84-111. Available on classesV2.
Robert Dahl, "The Right to Democracy within Firms," A Preface to Economic Democracy, pp. 111-135.
Available on classesV2.
Week 5. The Problem of Social Choice Posed.
Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, 2nd edition, pp. 1-24
Week 6. Arrow's Reasonable Conditions; The Compensation Principle.
Arrow, Social Choice, pp. 24-45
Week 7. Implications of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem; A Criticism.
Charles R. Plott, "Axiomatic Social Choice Theory: An Overview and Interpretation," in Rational Man and Irrational Society, ed. Brian Barry and Russell Hardin (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982): 229-245.
Available on classesV2.
I. M. D. Little, "Social Choice and Individual Values," Journal of Political Economy 60 (1952): 422-432.
Available through JSTOR.
Week 8. Majority Rule and Responsiveness to Preferences; Arrow’s Way Out.
Brian Barry, "Is Democracy Special?" in Rational Man and Irrational Society, pp. 325-340. Available on classesV2.
Kenneth Arrow, "Current Developments in the Theory of Social Choice," in Rational Man and Irrational Society, pp. 247-263.
Available on classesV2.
Week 9. An Economic Theory of Constitutional Choice.
Buchanan and Tullock, The Calculus of Consent, pp. 3-62
PAPER PROPOSAL DUE.
Week 10. A Supermajority-favoring Theory of Constitutional Choice; The (Alleged) Impossibility of Justifying Any Specific Threshold (60%? 67%?) in Supermajority Decision Rules.
Buchanan and Tullock, The Calculus of Consent, pp. 62-96
Week 11. (1) The Liberal Paradox: Can a Liberal Consistently Accept the Pareto Principle? Arguments for “No,” “Yes,” and “It Depends on What You Mean by ‘Liberty’.” (2) What Should We Do about Bad or Immoral Preferences entering into the Social Choice?
Amartya Sen, "The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal," Journal of Political Economy 78 (1970): 152-157.
Available on classesV2.
Brian Barry, "Lady Chatterley's Lover and Doctor Fischer’s Bomb Party: Liberalism, Pareto Optimality, and the Problem of Objectionable Preferences," Foundations of Social Choice Theory, ed. J. Elster and A. Hylland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986): 11-43, Read pages 11-20. Available on classesV2.
Brian Barry, "Lady Chatterley’s Lover and Doctor Fischer’s Bomb Party," Read pages 20-43
Week 12. An Argument from the Impossibility Theorem for Minimal Electoral Democracy and against Direct Democracy.
Riker, Liberalism against Populism, pp. 1-81
NOVEMBER RECESS.
Week 13. Refutations of Riker’s Arguments; Defenses of Engaged Democracy.
Jules Coleman and John Ferejohn, "Democracy and Social Choice," Ethics 97 (1986): 6-25. Available on classesV2.
Carole Pateman, "Social Choice or Democracy? A Comment on Coleman and Ferejohn," Ethics 97 (1986): 39-46
FINAL PAPER DUE LAST DAY OF READING PERIOD AT NOON