The role of un and foreign states

The history this genocide is also the history of the indifference of the West in the face of events perceived as distant from its interests. The UN's attitude was emblematic and it was completely disinterested in the timely requests for intervention sent to it by the Canadian Major General Roméo Dallaire.

The New York-based Department of Peace Missions did not send a request to speak to the General Secretariat or the Security Council. On April 20, 1994, the Secretary General of the United Nations presented to the Security Council a special report in which, describing the situation of the ethnic clashes, he underlined the impossibility for the force of UNAMIR, composed of 1705 men after the withdrawal, the Belgian contingent and non-essential personnel, to pursue the objectives of his (peace) mandate.

The report therefore contained three intervention alternatives:

1) Immediate and substantial reinforcement of UNAMIR forces and modification of the mandate in order to impose a ceasefire on the fighting forces, restore order, stop the massacres and allow humanitarian assistance throughout the country;

2) Reduction of the UNAMIR contingent to a small group led by the military commander and his staff, with the task of intermediation between the fighting forces to reach the ceasefire. To ensure the safety of the team, around 270 men were expected to attend;

3) Complete withdrawal of UNAMIR forces.

On April 21, 1994, the United Nations Security Council unanimously voted on Resolution, which adopted the second of the three alternatives presented by the Secretary General. Despite several reports submitted to the UN Human Rights Commission, the Security Council, due to the veto of the United States of America, did not recognize the genocide in Rwanda.

In addition, several western countries sent quotas for the sole purpose of saving their citizens. Among these, Belgium and France stand out; the latter not only did not want to stop the massacres (in previous years had armed and trained the FAR), but rather flanked the Hutu militias in retreat after the arrival of the RPF (Tutsi).

The US spoke of "acts of genocide" on June 10, 1994, after 2 months: this wait-and-see attitude is to be related to the still alive memory of American soldiers massacred in the Battle of Mogadishu just five months earlier (October 3, 1993). Not to be overlooked, and which is often overlooked, is the position of Mitterrand and France, who first supported the Tutsi and then pushed the Hutus to revolt (the most violent command of the Tutsi genocide, the Interahamwe, wanted by the Habyarimana clan, was trained by the Rwandan army and also by French soldiers).