1969 - June 9 - Shocking House of Representatives hearings - Did Dr. MacArthur suggest HIV was being researched ?

Full PDF, all 1969 D0D appropriations senate hearings preparing for 1970 - [HG004U][GDrive]

42 page selection with Dr. Donald MacArthur - [HG004X][GDrive]

Department of Defense Appropriations for 1970: Hearings ... Ninety-first Congress, First Session, Volume 6, Part 6

United States. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969

• Mr. MAHON. You may proceed.

HISTORY OF U.S. PQLICY ON CB WARFARE

Dr. MACARTHUR. The first question I want to address is: What is the

U.S. policy on chemical and biological warfare?

In 1943, President Roosevelt stated that we would not be the first to

use chemical warefare but that we would be prepared to retaliate if

such was used against us.

This statement has been espoused by President Truman and Presi

dent Eisenhower.

Members of the last administration also made similar statements,

For example, on February 7, 1967, Mr. Vance, Deputy Secretary of

I)efense, said:

We have consistently continued our de facto limitations on the use of chemical

and biological weapons. We have never used biological weapons. We have not used

lethal gases since World War I and it is against our policy to initiate their use.

We have used riot control agents in Vietnam, agents similar to those used by

police throughout the world.

This policy continues to be that of the present administration. In

fact, President Nixon recently directed a comprehensive study of the

U.S. position with regard to both chemical and biological warfare.

CONTROL OF CB WEAPONS

Another question that comes up very often is: Do we consider riot

control agents as CB warfare as defined by the Geneva protocol? The

answer to that is no. In fact, in December 1966, our representative to

the U.N., Ambassador Nabrit, spoke in support of the Hungarian reso

lution that all nations should abide by the protocol. He stated on that

occasion that riot control agents and herbicides did not constitute

chemical warfare. His statement was not rebutted. The riot control

agents we use are those used by police forces throughout the world.

Are we participating in any action to curb these weapons! Yes;

we supported the Hungarian resolution in December 1966, and indeed

at the present time we are participating with 13 other nations in a

study for the U.S. Secretary General on the effects of CB weapons.

This will be used by the U.N. General Assembly and the 18-Nation

Disarmament Conference Committee in Geneva next month.

Two months ago President Nixon gave the following charge to the

U.S. delegation to the the 18-Nationiš. Committee:

While awaiting the United Nations Secretary General's study on the effects

of chemical and biological warfare, the U.S. delegation should join with other

delegations in exploring any proposal or ideas that could contribute to sound

and effective arms controls relating to these weapons.

EFFECTIVEN ESS OF CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS

I would like for a moment to dwell on the types of chemical and

biological systems we have. On the chemical side, in addition to mus

|

113

*

º

tard, we have lethal chemicals of the same types as the chemical war

fare agents developed by the Germans prior to World War II. These

are more powerful than several of our well-known insecticides, and

about 10 times more potent than the most toxic of World War I gases.

A lethal dose of these agents is about 1 milligram per person.

Mr. FLOOD. Would you touch upon delivery systems’

Dr. MACARTHUR. Yes. There are various ways of delivery. You can

deliver in artillery shells or bombs, rockets, or you can deliver them

from spray tanks.

Mr. MINSHALL. How much of a drop is a milligram :

Dr. MACARTHUR. One-fiftieth of a drop.

I would like to elaborate on that.

There has been a lot of misunderstanding, not so much about tox

icity, but about its effectiveness.

Mr.SIKEs. The story has gone around that there is enough of this

material on hand to kill everybody in the world.

Dr. MACARTHUR. Thirty times over.

Mr. SIKEs. This might be true if you lined them up and injected them

one by one.

Would you get into the practicality of this statement

Dr. MACARTHUR. I would be happy to, sir.

As you indicated, if you simply do the arithmetic you arrive at the

conclusion that that could be accomplished if you line them up and

inject them one by one with the minimum amount of agent.

But that is just like saying we have enough bullets to kill the popu

lation of the world 50 times over, or 100 times over if you equate one

bullet with one individual.

It is totally impossible to get 1 milligram inhaled by every person

in any practical situation.

. Due to atmospheric dilution, absorption by the terrain, and destruc

tion in deployment (when I say destruction I mean part of the agent

}S. urned up as the munition bursts), the quantity required

is much higher. In fact, a typical nerve agent—I am talking right now

about GB-requires 1 ton of agent dispersed in the air to produce 50

percent casualties to unprotected personnel over an area of about 1

Square mile. Now this is more effective than high explosives but cer

tainly not as effective as nuclear weapons and most certainly not as

effective as some self-ordained experts who write and talk about it

Would have us believe.

Does that answer your question ?

Mr. SIREs. I think so.

Dr. MACARTHUR. One ton, 50 percent casualties among unprotected

personnel per square mile.

Mr. MINshALL. What kind of a gas was that?

Dr. MACARTHUR. It is called GB.

Mr. MINSHALL. What is that 2

º MACARTHUR. It is a nerve agent. It is one of the most toxic ones

We have,

Talking about effectiveness. I would like to extrapolate a little

further and say, to attack a complete city of many millions of people—

114

let’s say a densely populated city like New York—it would take 300 to

400 tons efficiently dispersed to immobilize the city.

Mr. MINsu ALL. How would you disperse it?

Dr. MACARTHUR. Effective dispersal is difficult. That is why you re

quire that number of tons. It would have to be dispersed in the air from

aircraft or missiles which would have to fly over the city and deliver

it fairly uniformly over the entire area.

Mr. ADDABBo. We do not have a stockpile that large.

Dr. MACARTHUR. Yes, we do.

I just wanted to bring out that the weapon, though effective, is not

as effective as many people today make it out to be.

From the example I gave, the high logistics burden imposed, makes

chemical warfare weapons clearly tactical rather than strategic.

INCAPACITATING AGENTs

Mr. FLOOD. Wouldn't it be more effective to disable than to kill

troops ? Wouldn't it cause the enemy more trouble to disable him

than to kill him.

EFFECTS OF BZ

Dr. MACARTHUR. BZ brings about complete mental disorientation

as well as sedation which induces sleep.

Mr. SIREs. Explain that in more detail.

Dr. MACARTHUR. First of all the individual is completely confused

as to what he is doing or what he is supposed to do and in addition he

has hallucinations.

Mr. SIKEs. He cannot concentrate on the task in front of him.

Dr. MACARTHUR. He cannot carry out his assigned duties nor can

he remember what his assigned duties were.

Mr. FLOOD. Isn't there a nausea and temporary physical disability!

Dr. MACARTHUR. From Iłż

Mr. FLOOD. Yes.

General STONE. I don't think there is any nausea.

Dr. MACARTHUR. You are correct, General Stone. There is physical

incapacitation but vomiting is not a usual symptom.

Mr. SIREs. Is there complete recovery :

Dr.M.ACARTHUR. Yes, there is.

Mr. SIREs. It is automatic?

Dr. MACARTHUR. Yes. It takes 2 or 3 days. He does not need any

Therapy, if I understand the sense of your question.

|

115

APPLICATION OF BZ

Mr. SIKES. How is this incapacitant administered

Dr. MACARTHUR. It is administered the same way as a lethal chemi

cal agent.

It has to be inhaled.

Mr. SIKES. What is a dose that will incapacitate?

Dr. MACARTHUR. The incapacitating dose is about 2 milligrams by

inhalation.

Mr. FLOOD. Is this a first cousin of LSD?

Dr. MACARTHUR. Chemically, no, and although some of the effects

are similar, the mental effect is as a depressant and not one of excita

tion. There is no relationship from a chemical standpoint.

* Missiºn. It has to be inhaled? You cannot put it in the water

supply

Bºcanner. Yes you can. I should have said earlier it has to

be ingested into the body through inhalation or other means.

Mr. MINSHALL. Suppose you put this into the water supply &

Dr. MACARTHUR. You would need tons and tons of the material be

fore it would have any effect whatsoever because of the dilution effect.

It would take about a ton for a 1-million gallon reservoir.

Mr. MINshi ALL. How soon is it effective :

Dr. MACARTHUR. The onset time of the effects is 1 to 11% hours

after ingestion and the effects last 2 or 3 days.

Mr. ANDREws. And they get it by inhalation?

Dr. MACARTHUR. Yes; in a tactical field situation.

Mr. SIKEs. The distribution is the same as for the nerve gases?

Dr. MACARTHUR. Yes; it would be distributed by the same type of

weapons, but engineered so that the munition or grenade has no frag

mentation or blast effect to injure target personnel.

STOCK OF BZ

Mr. SIKEs. What kind of stocks do we have and what kind of ca

pacity do we have for production 4

Dr. MACARTHUR. As far as BZ is concerned our stock of bulk agent

is less than 10 tons.

Mr. SIREs. Ten tons would be effective against what size military

unit? A regiment or a division 4 A brigade 4

Dr. MAGARTHUR. Ten tons would take care of one battalion.

Mr. SIREs. We do not have very much. -

Dr. MACARTHUR. I would agree.

Mr. SIREs, And very little capacity to manufacture more.

Dr. MACARTHUR. That is right. We have no capacity. We procure

it from industry.

COST OF BZ

Mr. Floop. Is it expensive to manufacture?.

116

Dr. MACARTHUR. Yes.

PRODUCTION OF BZ

Mr. MINshALL. What is the lead time for manufacturing these in

capacitating agents? How long would it take for you to make 10 tons

of BZ2

Dr. MACARTHUR. Six to 9 months.

Mr. MINsiiALL. With the plants that you have going, or the

standby's 7

Dr. MACARTHUR. Our three chemical plants which are in stand-by

are for nerve gases. BZ would be procured from industry; however,

there is no requirement for additional production.

Mr. SIKEs. Can you switch to an .. chemical operation?

Dr. MACARTHUR. Yes, for an incapacitant.

Mr. SIKEs Quicker than you can put your own plants back in

operation?

Dr. MACARTHUR. For incapacitants we would go to industry. For

lethal agents, we could recondition our plants more rapidly than we

could procure from industry.

LETHAL VERSUS INCAPACITATING AGENTS

Mr. Flood. Why do you emphasize and lay so much stress on the

stockpile and speak so highly of the killer rather than the disabling

agent} You have so much of the killer and you are so concerned about

it and so interested in it and you beat your chest about it. Why not

the disabling agent? Why not that first?

º

117

agents is no more than $500,000 per year. We are concentrating on

incapacitants.

r. Flood. If you are talking about a lethal agent, it does not mat

ter how many you have. If you are killed . one it doesn’t matter

what it is called. And it does not matter whether the Germans or

British created it. We have it.

Mr. SIKEs. When you speak of the development of incapacitants,

what do you include? How many different agents?

Dr. MACARTHUR. We are looking at various types on the chemical

side. In addition to chemical incapacitants you can have biological

incapacitants,

On the chemical side we are looking at four classes of compounds.

Mr. SIKES. You say looking at them, what does that mean?

Dr. MACARTHUR. We are synthesizing new compounds and testing

them in animals. I should mention that there is a rule of thumb we

use. Before an agent can be classified as an incapacitant we feel that

the mortality must be very low. Therefore, the ratio of the lethal dose

to the incapacitating dose has to be very high. Now this is a very

difficult technical job. We have had some of the top scientists in the

country working for years on how to get more effective incapacitating

agents. It is not easy.

OPERATIONAL STORAGE LIFE OF AGENTs

Mr. Flood. We have the question of longevity as between a killer

chemical agent, the longevity of a biological lethal agent and the

longevity of any incapacitant. -

ou have four questions. You have a chemical lethal agent. You

have a question of longevity. How long will it live? How long is it

effective? How long will it stockpile and be effective? Six months,

6 years, a century? -

Then you have a biological killer. How long will it be with us?

What is its longevity or effectiveness?

Then you go to the nonlethal category, the disabling agents. You

have the same classification. How long will it be chemically effective

and how long biologically effective?

. Mr. SIKES. Generall }. have the periods at which these materials

in the different classifications enumerated by Mr. Flood can safely be

Stored and will retain their effectiveness.

Dr. MACARTHUR. We maintain our chemical and biological agents

InOW–

Mr. Flood. Not 100 percent effective, but operationally effective.

STORAGE OF CHEMICAL AGENTS

Dr. MACARTHUR. As far as chemicals are concerned, I would say the

lethal capacity can be effective for indefinite periods of time.

118

STORAGE OF BIOLOGICAL AGENTS

Mr. SIREs. What is the case with biologicals?

Dr. MACARTHUR. On the biologicals the lifetime is much, much

less.

The half-life of a few is something on the order of 3 to 4 years.

Most bioligical agents have half-lives of 3 to 6 months, but only if

kept under refrigeration.

Mr. MINsh ALL. Would it be possible to transfer it from one con

tainer to another after a certain period of time without endangering

those doing it?

Dr. MACARTHUR. Safety is always one of the things that is very

difficult to define. Transferring from one container to another definitely

involves a lot of hazard and many safety precautions would have to

be taken. It would be easier to produce more than to salvage the old

material from a safety standpoint.

STORAGE OF INCAPACITATING AGENTS

Mr. Flood. Now how about the disabling agent?

Dr. MACARTHUR. As long as you are talking about chemical in

capacitants, which are solids rather than gases, I would say 5 to 10

Years. y Mr. MIN's HALL. What kind of containers are these stored in that you

are afraid they might deteriorate? What are they made of

Dr. MACARTHUR. The containers are the munitions which are metal,

usually steel, although aluminum is sometimes used. Agents stored in

bulk are in steel cylinders.

DEVELOPMENT OF LETHAL WEAPONS

Mr. SIREs. Let me see if I understand the statement you made a

little bit ago. You say we are not seeking to develop new chemical

killers such as the nerve gases?

Dr. MACARTHUR. That is right.

Mr. SIREs. Are we updating or modernizing the ones we have or

do we think they are adequate 2

Dr. MACARTirt R. We think from a toxicity standpoint that they are

toxic enough. Where we are losing most of the effectiveness is in the

dissemination process. So our R. & D. emphasis is on increasing the

operational utility of the ones we have.

Mr. SIKEs. What are other countries doing, notably Russia, are

they developing new weapons or are they taking to improving their

dissemination process?

Dr. MACARTHUR. The Russians certainly are doing R. & D. in this

a refl.

Mr. SIREs. Are they developing any new chemical weapons in the

Jethal field 2

Dr. MAGARTHUR. Yes, there is information of a new agent which

they have developed.

Mr. SIKES. Which we do not have?

Dr. MACARTHUR. We do not have it in stockpile.

Mr. SIKEs. What are its characteristics?

119

Dr. MACARTHUR. —.

Mr. SIKEs. Does it have advantages we should have in our weapons?

Dr. MACARTHUR. Yes. Then there is another agent the Russians

have—GD. In terms of inhalation toxicity, GD is not any more effec

tive than GB, which we have. However, if we were attacked with GD,

we have no adequate therapy, which we do have for the other nerve

agentS.

º: FLood. They have been bragging about their anthrax for years.

Dr. MACARTHUR. We were talking about chemicals.

Mr. SIKEs. Are we seeking to develop a remedy?

Dr. MACARTHUR. We have had R. & D. programs at the Edgewood

Arsenal working on the GD therapy problem for at least 5 years, now.

Mr.SIKES. Without success?

Dr. MACARTHUR. To date without complete success. And there are

other countries working on the same problem.

Mr. SIKEs. What do the Russians do to provide a remedy for their

own gas if it gets out of hand?

Dr. MACARTHUR. That I do not know, sir, and I cannot answer.

We do know that they have therapy or a remedy for the nerve agents

we have stockpiled.

TRAINING OF RUSSIAN SOLDIERS IN CBW

Mr. FLooD. But it is also true that far beyond our training, almost

without exception—so our intelligence indicates—that every Russian

man in uniform is trained as well as possible depending upon his job,

in offensive and defensive biological and chemical warfare.

Mr. SIKES. Are we seeking to develop new incapacitants or to im

prove the ones that we have?

Possible uses include attack of mixed population of enemy and civilians, capture

of prisoners, and similar actions where the intent is to reduce the scale of vio

120

lence with minimum risk to target personnel. Compounds investigated include

LSD, which was discarded as unsuitable in view of deleterious side effects,

including possible genetic effects. We have one standard agent, known as BZ.

which has the effect of causing confusion, disorientation, and slowing of mental

and physical activity. Research is under way on several classes of compounds of

greater promise.

DEVELOPMENT OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Mr. SIKEs. Tell us something about the biological weapons, both

lethal and incapacitants. Tell us what we are 'i. and what the

Russians are doing.

Dr. MACARTHUR. I am sure all of you know biologicals are micro

organisms.

e have had a policy that the biological agents that we would try

to develop would be noncontagious; that is, that it could not be passed

on directly from individual to individual.

Mr. FLood. Would they be effective if not contagious?

Dr. MACARTHUR. They could be infectious from the standpoint that

they would be used as a primary aerosol and infect people inhaling it.

After that they could be carried from me to you, say by an insect

vector—a mosquito, for example. -

Mr. FLOOD. Could they be effective and contagious?

Dr. MACARTHUR. No. -

Mr. FLOOD. I doubt that. I doubt that.

Dr. MACARTHUR. A contagious disease would not be effective as a

biological warfare agent, although it might have devastating effects.

It lacks the essential element of control which I alluded to earlier

since there would be no way to predict or control the course of the

epidemic that might result.

Mr. SIREs. Tell us the story of our progress and our capability.

Dr. MACARTHUR. I want to reemphasize that our policy has been not

to develop any contagious agents so that we could control the effects

so that they would not “boomerang” on our own people if ever we

were forced to use them. Typical examples of diseases caused by agents

we have worked on are tularemia, Rocky Mountain spotted fever,

“Q” fever, Venezuelan equine encephalitis. These agents are different

from the chemicals in that they are naturally occurring diseases.

Mr. SIREs. Are all of these lethal 2

Dr. MACARTHUR. No. Some of these are lethal and others are non

lethal.

Mr. Flood. Could any be inherent by transmission? One generation

to another'

I)r. MACARTHUR. If you are talking about genetic effects, no.

I would like to dwell a moment on the limitations of biological

weapons which most people don't fully understand and consequently

lead to a great deal of public misunderstanding. They are just not

as effective as they are made out to be by many people.

LETH.A.L AND IN CAPACITATING AGENTS

Mr. Flood. Break out for the record which are lethal and which

are incapacitants.

(The information follows:)

h

121

BIOLOGICAL AGENTS

The following potential biological agents are among those that

have been studied for offensive and defensive purposes:

Incapacitating: Lethal :

Rickettsia causing Q-fever Yellow fever virus

Rift Valley fever virus Rabbit fever virus

Chikungunya disease virus Anthrax bacteria

Venezuelan equine encephalitis - Psittacosis agent

Virus Rickettsia of Rocky Mountain

spotted fever

Plague

Mr. Flood. Now go ahead with your answer.

LIMITATIONS OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Dr. MACARTHUR. Talking about potential offensive agents, I will

first restate the constraints I mentioned earlier that we have put on

ourselves as a matter of policy to prevent exactly what people have

been saying—that there will be a worldwide scourge, or a black death

type disease that will envelop the world or major geographical areas

if some of these materials were to accidentally escape. That could not

possibly happen with the biological agents that we have. That is a

constraint that we have put on ourselves.

However, to keep the record straight, we have done a small amount

of research on a ** agents that do not satisfy this constraint—the

reason for this is that a potential enemy might use them against us and

we have to be prepared to defend ourselves—so we try to develop vac

cines and rapid identification systems, for example, for defensive

purposes.

Another constraint is shown by analysis of the logistic burden.

To store biological agents, you either have to have constant re

frigeration, or have them freeze-dried and even then you cannot pre

pare these agents for long periods of time before use.

Also, when they are exposed to the atmosphere with its ultraviolet

rays, the organisms are killed.

Light kills them and so to be effective you have to only disseminate

them under cover of darkness. And there are only so many hours of

darkness. Let's assume there are 10 hours of darkness and the normal

average wind speed is 10 to 15 miles an hour. Then your agent cannot

travel and be effective for more than 100–150 miles downwind. So it is

clear º cannot be effective on a continental scale by disseminating

upwind.

Mr. FLood. Isn't this then important? Your primary object in CB

warfare is not to attack a population or a city, it is to attack a limited

objective of troops on the line for a specific period of time for a specific

purpose; isn't it?

Dr. MACARTHUR. The answer is “Yes.” There is no question as far

As chemical agents are concerned, they are tactical agents and anyone

familiar with their characteristics recognizes them as tactical weapons.

Personally I cannot conceive of them as strategic weapons.

The biological agents are considered strategic rather than tactical

Weapons but there are many limitations which I pointed out earlier.

When we talk of strategic applications, we think of large area cover

age, but as I said you can only cover so much because of the germicidal

effects of ultraviolet radiation.

122

Also, for most of these agents there is natural immunity. Some peo

ple will not be affected because of natural immunity. Second, you can

not use the same agent twice against the same population because after

the first attack, the people build up immunity to that agent.

Mr. SIREs. How about chlorine and phosgeneº

USE OF DISSEMINATORS IN VIETNAM

Mr. SIREs. When the use of chemicals was begun in Vietnam it was

found the disseminators we had on hand were generally of World

War II vintage and extremely limited in capability and in number.

Have we overcome that shortcoming?

Dr. MACARTHUR. Well, efficiency of dissemination is a problem that

has been with us for a long time.

Mr. SIREs. My statement was true; was it not?

Dr. MACARTHUR. Your statement was perfectly true. And we are

spending R. & D. on getting more effective methods of dissemination,

to get most of the agent that is in a munition to the target area in

an effective form. And we do have a number of more effective muni

tions for tear gas (CS) than we had a few years ago.

Mr. SIREs. Have we developed new and effective disseminators since

their use began in Vietnam.”

Dr. MAC UR. We have a pyrotechnic CS grenade which has an

efficiency of 50 percent.

Mr. FLOOD. Fifty percent? That is very good; is it not?

Dr. MACARTHUR. It is good compared to what we used to have, but

I believe we can do much better.

Mr. FLoop. Fifty percent for any munition is pretty good,

Dr. MACARTHUR. Yes, but I think we can and should increase the

efficiency.

Mr. SIREs. You are using a number of other disseminators in Viet

nam. Give us for the record a rundown of what you are using and what

improvements have been made.

(The information follows:)

When we went into Vietnam the Army was equipped with the M-7 type

grenades as the only riot control munition. Since that time we have developed

a family of weapons, as follows:

º

ºt

123

Cartridge, 40 millimeter, CS, XM 651–E1.

Rocket launcher, E–8.

Cartridge, 4.2 inch, mortar, CS, XM-630.

Cluster bomb, E–158/E—159.

Fuse and burster for bulk agent XM–925.

Grenade, CS XM-54.

Grenade, hand, riot, CS-1, M-25 series.

Grenade, hand, riot, CS-2, M-7 Series.

Cartridge, 10.5 millimeter tactical, C.S.

Bomb, chemical, BLU 52.

Dispenser and bomb, aircraft, CBU 30.

USE OF CHEMICALS IN WIETNAM

Mr. SIKEs Now tell us about the use of chemicals in Vietnam. What

are you using : What has been their reception by U.S. field com

manders, and their effect against the enemy

Dr. MACARTHUR. Well, there are two types of chemicals that we

are using in Vietnam. The first is riot control agents and the second

is herbicides. One is antipersonnel, one is antivegetation.

I want to make clear that we do not consider riot control agents to

be chemical warfare agents as defined by the Geneva Protocol. The

are tear gases that are used in the United States, and by civil authori

ties all over the world.

Mr. Flood. And if this goes in the record, I repeat for you, when

Ambassador Nabrit, who is the retiring president of Howard Univer

sity and Ambassador to the United Nations, when this presentation was

made, it was not rebutted.

Dr. MACARTHUR. The agent we are using—the tear gas we are using

in Vietnam, is C.S.

Now in terms of effectiveness, the troops who have used them and

the field commanders feel there are many situations where the use of

CS has enhanced our military effectiveness. For example, in situations

where the civilians are mixed in with the military, in situations where

there are bunkers that high explosives just cannot take care of; in

denying the use of tunnels, after our troops leave the area. It is also

useful in flushing the enemy out of tunnels.

In Vietnam it has saved may U.S. and Vietnamese lives.

Mr. FLOOD. Have we used Mace?

Colonel Osick. We have not, no.

Mr. SIREs. General, what can you tell us about the attitude of U.S.

field ºmmanders and the effectiveness of these weapons against the

enemy

. General STONE, CS is very well accepted. It has been 3 or 4 years

Since we first introduced this over there. We have had several com

manders and they have learned how to use these materials more ef

fectively. I think Dr. MacArthur has stated all the specific types of

tactical usages to which it can be applied. It is the degree to which

they are being applied. The requirement in terms of numbers of muni

tions and tonnages of material has indicated an acceptance.

Mr. Flood. How about the troops? -

General Stone. They like it very much. It flushes out Charlie, gets

him out of the bushes, and they are able to see who they are fighting.

Mr. SIREs. The demand has been great from field commanders be

cause of the effectiveness of the weapon; is that right?

124

--

General STONE. Yes, sir.

PROCUREMENT OF RIOT-CONTROL AGENT Cs (ALL SERVICES)

|In thousands of pounds]

Fiscal year CS in weapons Bulk CS-l Bulk CŞ-2

233 142 ...... . . . . . . . . . .

MACE

Mr. MINSPIALL. I would like to know a little bit more about Mace.

Are you qualified to tell us about that? We have read so much in the

apers about it, whether it is harmful or whether it is not harmful.

ne report said it was harmful and another said it is not harmful.

What are the facts?

Dr. EMERSON. We ran some experiments with Mace as it is com:

mercially available, at Edgewood Arsenal,

Mr. FLOOD. Many police departments will use it and many are

against it.

Dr. EMERSON. On rabbits, which was the only test animal we used

it on, we found that in some cases there was some damage, very slight

damage to the eye.

Mr. MINshALL. Permanent damage to the eye?

Dr. EMERSON. No.

Mr. Flood. There are reports to the contrary.

Dr. EMERSON. I know it.

|

125

Mr. MINsh ALL. What do you mean damage to the eye 2 How tem

porary was it? Describe that damage a little more.

D.A.NGER TO USER OF MACF.

Mr. Flood. On the delivery there is also a problem. There is a very

strong opinion that the man who delivers it is in great danger as

well as the man who is supposed to receive it.

Dr. MACARTHUR. Usually in greater danger.

Mr. MINshALL. Why do you say that? - -

Dr. MACARTHUR. I am not now talking about Vietnam but talking

about—

Mr. MINshALL. The commercial applications in this country with

the police department. - - -

Dr. MACARTHUR. I am sorry, I was thinking, you can go out and

get Mace as an ordinary John Smith citizen and carry it and use it

for self-protection. -

Mr. MINsh ALL. Mr. Flood implied it was more dangerous to the

man using it against the potential foe. - -

Dr. MACARTHUR. What I thought Mr. Flood was implying was

that it was more dangerous to the person who was going to use it

because the act of reaching for the item might provoke a more violent

response on the part of a potential attacker. , . - Mr. Floop. Many police departments advise against the female

carrying a small gun in her handbag for exactly the same reason.

126

POSSIBILITY OF PERMANENT EYE DAMAGE

Mr. MINsh ALL. Would you recommend to a police department

based on the experiments that you have conducted, that Mace is safe,

or is it unsafe to use, as far as permanent eye damage!

-

Dr. MacARTHUR. Based on my personal knowledge of experiments

conducted at Edgewood, I think no definitive conclusions can be

drawn. I do not believe I am in a position to say whether it would be

safe or unsafe. The indications from the experiment were that it might

be unsafe. However, we have to look carefully at how the experiment

was conducted in terms of whether it represents a true simulation of

a practical situation before we come out with a definitive answer say:

ing it is safe or unsafe... .

- I myself as an individual, couldn't in all good conscience say

whether it was safe or unsafe.

Mr. SIKEs. Now would you get into herbicides as used in Vietnam!

CS NOT HARMIFUL

Dr. MACARTHUR. May I make one more comment on tear gas!

USE OF CN RATHER THAN CS

Mr. MIN's HALL. Why would people go from CS to CN ? What is the

advantage of one over the other?

Dr. MACARTHUR. Are you talking about the police departments?

Mr. MINsh ALL. Yes.

Dr. MACARTHUR, I think the manufacturer decided that he was

going to manufacture a product with CN, because it was better known,

and that is what was available and so he selected CN over CS. I

think it was a pure and simple thing like that.

General STONE, I think the military has really had the national cº |. to F.". CS tied up for military use and the civilian users

ave not been able to get hold of CS. They have been able to get

hold of CN.

Dr. HARRIs. There is the historical fact that CN has been an article

of commerce for a long time. CS was developed under our aegis only

about 10 years ago and it is only now becoming accepted and being

produced for commercial use.

Mr. MINsh ALL. Do you mean the ordinary tear gas 2

Dr. HARRIs. No; CS. There are a number of tear gases and to di.

tinguish, CN is an older one. It was in World War I for example. It

has been in commercial supply for many years. CS was more recently

developed by the military. It now is becoming known by the general

public and becoming available.

Mr. MIN's HALL. But CS is not Mace?

127

Dr. HARRIs. No. Mace contains CN. We are now conducting some

experiments in our research and development program to see if one

can make a Mace-type weapon using CS.

Dr. MACARTHUR. We are not using Mace.

Mr. MINSPIALL. What are these little guns that used to be advertised

like a fountain pen that you could put tear gas in

Dr. MACARTHUR. They contain CN, as does Mace. They were not

advocated by the Defense Department.

HERBICIDEs

USE IN VIETNAM

Mr. SIREs. Herbicides in Vietnam, now, please.

Dr. MACARTHUR. Herbicides are plant control chemicals and they

are used in many countries throughout the world by millions of pounds

a year. Domestic use is 50 to 70 million pounds per year in the United

States. People continually say, “You are not using herbicides, you are

using defoliants.” Defoliants and herbicides are one and the same. We

call them defoliants because we use them to defoliate the jungles. We

use them to defoliate the jungle along the sides of roads to reduce

ambush and save lives, and along enemy trails to reveal enemy traffic

and camps, and for very limited anticrop use along infiltration routes

on rice plots used by the enemy.

In fact, when we started using it, the ambush rate on roads—main

roads leading out of Saigon—was reduced by 90 percent while the

ambush rate in other areas of the country remained the same. So that

is an indicator that its use was successful.

. Secondly, when we use it, the vertical visibility through the jungle is

increased by 80 percent and the horizontal visibility through the

jº is increased by 40 to 60 percent.

Mr.SIKEs. Does that mean you can also take pictures if necessary of

what is under the jungle cover when you could not while the leaves

were on the trees?

Dr. MACARTHUR. That is exactly the reason we use it to detect the

enemy, in addition to ambush prevention.

Mr. Flood. This can only be delivered by air?

Dr. MACARTHUR. No. If you want to put your herbicides on a rice

plot that is known to have been planted along the trail by VC for later

use you just take a little sprayer. But the most effective way for large

area coverage is aerial delivery.

NO KNOWN PERMAN ENT DAMAGE

Mr. SIREs. What about permanent damage to the area insofar as

the production and reproduction of vegetation is concerned?

35–262–69–pt. 6—9

128

and we have experts who have gone there who are not members of the

Department of Defense—and based on a study done for us by Mid

west Research Institute of Kansas City where they reviewed 1,500

reports and interviewed 140 experts, they concluded that no startling

adverse results were likely to occur.

In addition, recently, the U.S. Embassy in Saigon jointly with

MACV looked into this matter again with the aid of Dr. Fred

Tschirley of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and came to the

same conclusion. However, he did recommend—Dr. Tschirley—that

an in-depth study be done after cessation of hostilities to see if

there was any long-term permanent effect that hadn't been shown

up by all the previous studies.

Mr. SIKEs. You can find out the same information by driving along

any highway or right-of-way where defoliants are used by power line

companies, by telephone companies, by others who want to prevent

the growth of underbrush and they have to use it over again every

year to keep the underbrush down.

Dr. EMERSON. The Department of Agriculture has plots in Belts.

ville that are over 10 years old that they have yearly reports on, with

no permanent damage.

STOCKPILING

Mr. SIKES. Let's get into the field of stockpiling and then shipments,

Tell us about stockpiling, first.

CHEMICAL AGENTS

Dr. MACARTHUR. First of all, taking the chemicals, our stockpile

for chemicals is approximately half mustard and half nerve

agents. About one-quarter of this is in weapons—the rest is in bulk.

BIOLOGICAL AGENTS

Mr. SIREs. What do you know about the comparative stockpile of

Russian biological agents?

º

º

129

agents that we have ever considered. So, we have to believe they are

probably working in the same areas.

SYNTHETIC BIOLOGICAL AGENTS

There are two things about the biological agent field I would like

to mention. One is the possibility of technological surprise. Molecular

biology is a field that is advancing very rapidly, and eminent biologists

believe that within a period of 5 to 10 years it would be possible to

produce a synthetic biological agent, an agent that does not naturall

exist and for which no natural immunity could have been acquired.

Mr. SIKES. Are we doing any work in that field?

Dr. MACARTHUR. We are not.

Mr. SIKEs. Why not? Lack of money or lack of interest?

Dr. MACARTHUR. Certainly not lack of interest.

Mr. SIKES. Would you provide for our records information on what

would be required, what the advantages of such a program would be,

the time and the cost involved?

Dr. MACARTHUR. We will be very happy to.

(The information follows:)

The dramatic progress being made in the field of molecular biology led us to

investigate the relevance of this field of science to biological warfare. A small

group of experts considered this matter and provided the following observa

tions:

1. All biological agents up to the present time are representatives of naturally

occurring disease, and are thus known by scientists throughout the world. They

are easily available to qualified scientists for research, either for offensive or

defensive purposes.

2. Within the next 5 to 10 years, it would probably be possible to make a new

infective microorganism which could differ in certain important aspects from

any known disease-causing organisms. Most important of these is that it might

be refractory to the immunological and therapeutic processes upon which we

depend to maintain our relative freedom from infectious disease.

3. A research program to explore the feasibility of this could be completed

in approximately 5 years at a total cost of $10 million.

4. It would be very difficult to establish such a program. Molecular biology

is a relatively new science. There are not many highly competent scientists in the

field, almost all are in university laboratories, and they are generally adequately

supported from sources other than DOD. However, it was considered possible

to initiate an adequate program through the National Academy of Sciences

National Research Council (NAS–NRC).

The matter was discussed with the NAS–NRC, and tentative plans were made

to initiate the program. However, decreasing funds in CB, growing criticism

of the CB program, and our reluctance to involve the NAS–NRC in such a con

troversial endeavor have led us to postpone it for the past 2 years.

It is a highly controversial issue, and there are many who believe such

research should not be undertaken lest it lead to yet another method of massive

killing of large populations. On the other hand, without the sure scientific

knowledge that such a weapon is possible, and an understanding of the ways it

could be done, there is little that can be done to devise defensive measures.

Should an enemy develop it there is little doubt that this is an important area

of potential military technological inferiority in which there is no adequate

research program.

Cross-CouxTRY SHIPMENT OF LETHAL AGENTs

Mr. SIKEs. Now, let's talk about shipments. There has been a great

deal of discussion—most of it hostile—about the proposal to ship cer

tain stocks of nerve gas across country for transporting to a deep

130

ocean area and disposal. Tell us something about the reasons, and the

alternatives, and why you propose to follow this procedure and what

the alternatives would be.

Dr. MACARTHUR. I would like Colonel Osick, who is here, who is the

action officer in this program, to address himself to that question.

OBSOLETE CHEMICAL AGENTS

Colonel Osick. Sir, we have roughly 27,000 tons of obsolete or

unserviceable munitions.

Mr. SIKEs. What do you mean by that? They have been stored too

long 2

&ional OSICK. Some of them stored too long. In the case of the Air

Force bombs, they have become obsolete because of the calendar time,

They were all manufactured in 1953 and 1954 and with an expected

life span of 5 to 10 years, but, more importantly, for an aircraft that

is no longer in the inventory.

In addition to that, in the normal surveillance performed year by

year and in analyzing the results, we find that they are passing the

point in time where they are now beginning to leak. The Air Force

recently declared them obsolete and has no requirement for them.

Since we are the custodians of them we are now obligated to carry

out some type of disposal.

In addition to the Air Force bombs, we have a number of Army

rockets. This rocket is an item about 6 feet long, about 115 millimeters

in girth, holds about 10% pounds of nerve agents in the head and has

a motor and booster that goes with it. This is a thin-skinned rocket

made of aluminum. It was a first step in this area and we are finding

now that, having been in storage for some time, there is an electrolytic

process that sets up and we are getting leakers. We don't really know

what is happening in all cases. As a result of our surveillance, we have

identified those leakers and they have been put aside and encased in

concrete and are part of the disposal action that you hear of.

Recently it has been determined by DOD that we had sufficient

quantity of mustard and could dispose of a large part of it. This, too.

then was added to the disposal action.

In addition to that, we have some contaminated containers. We

don't know really what contaminated them, whether it was an arsell

ical or phosgene or what, and we are not sure we can decontami.

nate it satisfactorily and we have declared them excess and are dis.

posing of those. . . .

The last item in this group is some CS. This CS was manufactured

and put up with a pyrotechnic mix designed to go into an artillery

shell, but the CS itself was rejected as not being able to meet the

specifications. Rather than burn this in the atmosphere, this rather

large quantity of 3 tons we decided to encase it in concrete to provide

the negative buoyancy and include this in the shipment.

NEED FOR SHIPMENT

Now, what does this shipment involve? We have most of the ship.

ment at Rocky Mountain Arsenal in Denver. Let me go back about

131

a year and a half ago. We undertook, in the DOD and the DA, a

look at our stockpile, where the items were located, and the need to

provide proper security or to reorganize our stocks and relocate them.

As part of this look, we faced the gut decision of what was to become

of Rocky Mountain Arsenal. When the arsenal was constructed in the

early part of World War II, Denver was a long ways away, as the

say out West, and today we find it right snug up against the bac

door. The municipal airport there has expanded. Twice we have given

up 650-acre plots and the FAA and the city and county of Denver

are asking for additional ground.

There have been three previous CHASE operations involving chemical

munitions:

Date of operation Material involved

June 15, 1967______Concrete coffins of M-55 rockets, 1-ton containers of mustard

June 19, 1968------Concrete coffins of MI-55 rockets, 1-ton containers of mustard

Aug. 7, 1968----------------------Contaminated 1-ton containers (water filled)

DISPOSAL LOCATION

Mr. FLOOD. Where?

Colonel OSICK. At the same site we planned to do this one. The fig

ure 250 miles east of Atlantic City has been used, but I will not use that.

It turned out to be incorrect.

Mr. FLOOD. What is peculiar about that site? With all the seacoast

we have, why pick on the same site three times?

Colonel Osick. That particular site is one of two on the east coast

that is identified on maritime maps as a disposal area.

Mr. Flood. That doesn't answer my question.

Colonel Osick. I will get to it, sir.

...The geography of it, the depth at which we will drop this, the marine

life and what we know about what is on the bottom there is ideal for

this type of dump. It is in 1,200 fathoms of water, roughly 7,200 feet.

..We have dumped other munitions there before and therefore ship

ping stays away from it. It is off the Continental Shelf not near the

132

normal Russian jfleets that come into the area, and impinging

on this is also the length of time we want to have this tow in hand. Cer.

tainly there are deeper parts in the ocean and more remote. The tow

from New Jersey to the site is about 20 hours.

Mr. SIREs. Why not the Pacific coast? Denver is much closer to the

Pacific coast. You have a munitions loading area out there that pre

sumably you could use for this.

Colonel Osick. In looking for a port in which we would carry this

operation out, we looked at č. in California. We looked at Ban.

gor in Washington. We looked at Charleston, S.C.; Yorktown, Va.,

and Earle, N.J. We ruled out Bangor—we didn’t; the Navy did. They

are the ones that had to recommend the ports. They ruled out the one

in Bangor, Wash., because it was heavily committed to Southeast Asia

and it services a large part of the Polaris fleet.

They felt they could not undertake this operation and fulfill their

mission.

Concord was ruled out largely for the same reason.

Charleston does have three piers. One is under repair at this time

and not available—

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Sikes asked you about the west coast and not

Charleston.

Colonel Osick. I have essentially finished the west coast.

Mr. FLOOD. Only two spots on the west coast?

Colonel Osick. Only two were looked at. The Navy felt the facilities

to carry this out were only available in these two locations.

Mr. SIKEs. Do you have to outload from a defense installation?

Colonel Osick. It would certainly be desirable.

Mr. SIREs. Is that what you are trying to get at?

Colonel OSICK. Because of the nature of the items there is security

involved with them. The safety procedures and the handling equip

ment normally wouldn't be available at a civilian facility. I would say

categorically, yes.

Mr. SIREs. How about San Diego?

Colonel Osick. As far as I know, the Navy did not even consider

San Diego. The Navy has only two west coast ports qualified to handle

this type of operation. San Diego is not one of them.

METHOD OF SHIPMENT

Mr. MINSHALL. To move this gas and the bombs and all, how many

freight cars and/or trains would be required to do it?

Colonel Osick. We have estimated the number of cars to be 809. We

estimate the trains would be between 60 and 70 cars, so we are talking

about 12 or 13 trains.

Mr. MINshALL. These things are all encased in cement?

Colonel Osick. No, the bombs themselves—if I can describe the

bomb for you, the package and then I will describe its course across

country. The bomb is a thousand-pound bomb composed of 76 sub

munitions or bomblets. The bomb, when it is completely manufac.

turned, weighs about 1,300 pounds. The bomblet inside is about 10

inches long and contains about 2.5 pounds of nerve agent. It has 3

half-pound of tetryl and a fuse. The bomblets are arranged such

that four bundles of 19 are placed in this container. Each bomb is

133

pressing on the other, holding down a delay bar. The delay bar, when

released, activates a parachute delay to allow the bomblets to swing

clear, and have the parachute pop out the back. The sudden change

in velocity inertially arms the fuse, allowing the bomblet to hit the

ground and explode.

Unless the explosion takes place, we don’t have any nerve agent

vaporized in the form of a gas. It is a liquid much like water. Now,

this bomb, as it is going to be º for shipment to come East or

wherever we go, if we go any place, could contain four of these 1,300

pound bombs to a skid, hº and strapped together and placed in

a steel boxcar. Those items that are in concrete are the rockets. They

are about 6 feet long and about 4 inches in diameter. They have been

placed 30 to a coffin to provide necessarily a tº. and give it

the negative buoyancy required to keep it at the bottom. These coffins

weigh about 13,000 pounds. The block of cement is wrapped with a

ºurer inch steel plate, double-welded to provide a hermetic

We feel the safety involved in this package is so great that it is

hard to even calculate.

POSSIBILITY OF ACCIDENT DURING SHIPMENT

Mr. MINsh ALL. There has been much publicity about one of these

trains going from Denver to whatever port this might be, and if you

had a train wreck, what is the situation then?

134

to 18 hours and look for just these things happening. If a bomb should

leak, detect it, find it, isolate it, fix it or remove it.

I can't say this is so safe nothing would happen. If this car blew up

by somebody's planting a large pile of TNT or dynamite under it, cer

tainly it would rip the car open.

If this car were to go through an open drawbridge, for example,

let's assume it ripped open. We would find some of these containers

being crushed. We don't believe that any of the agent would get loose

or get into the water.

Last week at the Naval Ship Research and Development Center, we

asked them to take one of our bombs as configured for shipment and

sumerge it and expose it to some external hydrostatic pressures to

see what would happen to it as it goes down through the levels of

water that we would plan to sink it through.

We found at slightly below 265 p.s.l. we got buckling in the outside

of the casing, although no leakage. We found the item would get to

7,200 feet, it would be intact and that the bomblets inside the container

again would buckle but there would be no leakage.

We took the bomblet down to 8,000 p.s. i. external pressure, equiva

lent to a depth of about 16,000 feet. Again we found the very pro

nounced buckle about three-quarters of the length of the bomb and

about a quarter of the girth but again no rupture. Admittedly, it was

a limited test. We did one empty casing, one complete bomb and 10

small bomblets. In no case were we able to rupture the bomblets.

I would conclude then, while it would be thrown asunder in the wa

ter and conceivably could be crushed, it would only be from running

into a spike or something physical down there. If that happened, we

would have some contaminated water from what spilled out. Hydro

lyzing in fresh water is a lot different than in salt water, and I am not

technically qualified to say what it would be, but it would be a differ

ent problem. There would be some contamination.

General STONE. In all of our munitions, the standard test is a 30

foot drop test. These clusters have been tested. There is a free drop of

30 feet on all corners tried from a number of attitudes onto a hard

cement pad. This simulates a crash at some speed, I am not sure what.

POSSIBILITY OF DISPOSING OR STORING GAS IN DESERT

Mr. MINsh ALL. Would it be feasible to take this stuff from your

I)enver arsenal and rather than ship it to one coast or the other, take it

out into some wasteland in Nevada or a desert area and store it?

135

Mr. SIKEs. I would think there would be less objection from the

sources you were discussing if it were out of Concord, which has no

other principal function.

port.

COST OF LAND VERSUS SEA DISPOSAL

Mr. MINshALL. To revert back to my question about disposing of it

or storing it in some desert area: is that feasible?

Colonel Osick. I guess everything is feasible. Yes, sir. We have

gone through it. In the land burial we estimated that to prepare the

ground, fill the pit with concrete, move the items there, make sure

the ground is blocked off or fenced so that animals or human beings

would not traverse the top of it, and insure there would be no percola

tion up: about $11 million and about 39 months to do it.

Mr. SIREs. Compared with what cost for disposal by sea?

Colonel Osick. About $3.9 million and 3 months.

Mr. MINSHALL. How much area would be required to dispose of this

and to bury it? How many acres, square miles or whatever it might be?

Colonel Osick. I would have to provide that.

Mr. SIREs. Provide the details for the comparison for the record.

(The information follows:)

It is estimated that approximately 25 acres of land would be required to bury

on land the items in Project Chase. -

COST OF DROP TESTING BOMBS

Mr. SIKES. Did you have this testing done at the model basin on a

reimbursable basis? -- - - -

Colonel OsiCK. The Navy provides the facilities and we provide the

transportation to get it there. It was a joint project.

Mr. SIREs. Would you be able to find out how much it cost jointly,

Army and Navy'

Colonel Osick. I am sure we can.

(The information follows:)

Cost of crush test of M34 bombs

U.S. Army:

Preparation for shipment--- -- -------------- $2,028

Transportation -- –––– 4, 690

Technical escort team------- -- - ––– 1, 375

U.S. Navy: Test ---- --- -- 2, 200

Total -------------------------------------------------------$10,293

PURPOSE OF DROP TESTING BOMBS

Mr. SIKEs. Now, is this a new test or is this a duplication of some

thing that was done 6 or 8 years ago?... . -

d Colonel Osick. So far as I know, it is the first time it has ever been

One.

Mr. SIKEs. What was the purpose in having it done at this point?

Is this simply to answer some newspaper headlines?

136

Colonel Osick. No, a committee of the National Academy of Sci

ences is meeting to consider the subject, and it was felt by some of the

scientists that this was the type of information they would need to

have.

TRANSPORTATION OF CB WEAPONS DURING WARTIME

Mr. SIREs. For the record, provide these answers: How would we

be able to utilize our stockpile of chemical biological weapons if they

were required in war? Would we have serious problems in transport.

ing them safely to the combat area?

TRANSPORTATION IN WARTIME

All weapons, including the M34 chemical bomb, are designed and constructed

to be safely shipped by normal freight (rail or truck) in their final configura

tion. They meet all specifications and regulations of the Department of Trans

portation and its regulatory offices, and all other applicable regulations. In

wartime the weapons would be safely shipped to active theaters by normal

transportation (rail, truck, and ship). All shipments of toxic agents are accom:

panied by trained technical escort teams, equipped to handle any incident, and

provided with decontaminating materials for use in the unlikely event of a spill.

In this regard, it is well to realize that no present chemical or biological agents

are gases under pressure. All are liquids or solids, so that any rupture of a con:

tainer would contaminate only a small localized area, easily decontaminated.

The time required woud be that for normal transportation by the carriers

mentioned.

CB TRAINING RECEIVED BY RUSSIAN SOLDIERS

Mr. SIKEs. I would like to have provided for the record a compari.

son of the Russian training given to the Russian soldiers in this field,

both offensive and defensive training, versus that of the United States.

(The information follows:)

RUSSIAN TRAINING

ORGANIZATION

(a) The chemical branch of the Soviet Army is a separate troop directorate

under the Ministry of Defense. It is considered to be a combat arms branch.

T}}

th

NT

iſ

ls:

Rail

*

137

fare. They also provide training in offensive chemical operations and supervise

CB detection, reconnaissance, and decontamination training in peacetime. This

organization provides an excellent chemical defense posture spread out through

all echelons of command. It also has the advantage of being able to mass chemi

cal defense organizations where the need exists.

TRAINING

(a) The Soviet training program is characteristic of any well-planned train

ing program. The Military Academy of Chemical Defense located in Moscow and

the Higher Officers Chemical School located on the testing grounds of Shikhany

provide schooling for senior chemical officers. The Chemical Officers School at

Yaraslavl gives instruction in offensive and defensive procedures that could be

compared to our basic officers' course, and the School for Chemical Troops at

Saratov provides specialist training for the chemical enlisted men assigned to

the various chemical units.

Mr. SIKES. I would like to have for the record information on the

time required to achieve a war footing if it should be necessary to

resort to these weapons in time of war and what steps would be taken.

How would industry be brought into the picture?

(The information follows:)

CONVERSION TO WAR FOOTING

On competent authority to begin mobilization, existing industrial mobiliza

tion plans would be implemented. One of the first steps would be the assignment

Of priorities in an environment that would already be strained by the pressure

of production requirements in many other areas. These priorities must be suffi

ciently high to permit adequate acquisition of materials, both for chemical in

gredients and hardware for munitions components.

RUSSIAN MILITARY DOCTRINE

Mr. SIREs. I believe it has been testified by you, Dr. MacArthur,

º: *Russian capability in chemicals is substantially 10 times that

Of OurS

138

Dr. MACARTHUR. Their military doctrine is for tactical use, on a

massive scale.

Mr. MINsh ALL. It wouldn't be used against mass populations in

this country’

Dr. MACARTHUR. Not chemicals, but for the biological, their doc

trine calls for its use in combination with a nuclear attack—to follow a

nuclear attack with a biological attack. The nuclear attack will take

care of our defenses and installations and the biological weapon will

take care of people.

Mr. MINshALL. Do the Russians have that capability to follow up!

Dr. MACARTHUR. If that is part of their doctrine we must infer that

they feel they have the capability.

Mr. MINsh ALL. What protection do we have in this country?

Dr. MACARTHUR. As far as the population is concerned?

Mr. MINSHALL. Yes.

Dr. MACARTHUR. The Office of Civil Defense has developed a mask

that could be mass-produced, but we haven't done this because it is

felt that the possibility of use of biological weapons against the

United States at the present time is not high. Should the situation

demand it, we could mass-produce the masks in sufficient quantity to

protect a population in a relatively short time.

FIVE-YEAR BUDGET FOR CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Mr. SIREs. For the record, please provide for 5 fiscal years up to

and including fiscal year 1970, a breakdown of the budget which will

show a comparison by major fields. For instance, R. & D., munitions

manufacture, plant facilities, et cetera.

CB FUNDING, FISCAL YEARS 1966–70

139

ABOLITION OF CHEMICAL CORPS

Mr. SIKEs. I would like to know what the effect is from the stand

point of chemical officers as of today on the abolition some years ago

of the Chemical Corps, which I thought was a serious mistake in view

of the highly specialized nature of the Corps and its activities.

General STONE. Well, sir, as I believe you know, the school system

we had in the days of the old Chemical Corps has been maintained

and all Chemical Corps officers do receive the regular training. We

still have staff positions, not as key chemical officers, but inserted

within the operations directorates where we do in general have chem

ical officers with this background located in the operations sections in

major tactical units.

I personally think we have done quite well in holding together a

corps of technical talent.

Mr. SIREs. Is it more difficult under the present procedure than it

was under the Chemical Corps?

General STONE. Sir, I don't believe so. I thought it would be at the

time technical services were dissolved. I believe it has worked out quite

well. At last from my own personal observation it has.

Mr. SIKEs. Are you a chemical officerº

Colonel Osick. Yes, sir, I am.

Mr. SIREs. What is your feeling on the matter?

Colonel Osick. I think generally, as General Stone says, there cer

tainly has been some evidence that perhaps if we had the old corps

together it might be working a little bit smoother, but generally speak

ing, overall, I think we have fitted into the structure and have adapted.

r. SIREs. From the standpoint of the scientist, do you wish to

add anything to these comments?

º MACARTHUR. No. I would personally agree with what has been

Sal (i.

General Stone. I might add one fact. Since we no longer exist as a

*g corps, it has enabled us to be accepted by the line groups.

f ºsks. Do you have an opportunity to express those views

reely

General Ston E. Yes, sir; more so, I would say.

TIME LIMIT ON DISPOSING OF OBSOLETE CHEMICALS

Mr. ADDABBo. On the question of transportation, the chemicals

which are outdated, must those chemicals |. disposed of within a

given period of time?

140

Mr. SIKES. I read somewhere in the paper that they were loaded on

cars and had to be taken off.

Colonel Osick. They were loaded on cars. Because of the high

demurrage cost we did unload those nondefense cars. Those cars that

belonged to the Government still remain loaded.

Mr. SIREs. The cars were at the arsenal?

Colonel Osick. They were at the arsenal loaded and ready to move,

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COSTS

Mr. SIKEs. On the question of research, could you supply for the

record the extent of research performed by private industry, by uni

versities and the Government?

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CoSTS BY PERFORMER

The relative participation of Government, industry and universities in the

CB R. & D. program can best be illustrated by analysis of the fiscal year 1969

program :

Walue Percent

Total-------------------------------------------------------------------- $92 100

Every effort is made to assure that the university contracts are in areas of

basic research appropriate to academic missions and purposes. The development

of munitions, for example, is not considered appropriate, and such work is done

exclusively in Government laboratories or in industry.

FUNDS FOR AREA DECONTAMINATION

Mr. SIKEs. Of the amount requested, how much is for decontamina

tion of areas?

(The information follows:)

There has been no contamination of areas or decontamination of such areas

except in small laboratory studies, and any cost associated with such de

contamination is very small. Area decontamination in combat situations is not

envisioned; the logistic expenditure would be prohibitive. Doctrine requires

that personnel decontaminate themselves and their equipment when subjected

to toxic attack.

Dr. EMERSON. The figures that Colonel Osick gave you on the ton

nages are the total packages, including the containers. If you take

the agents, it comes out to something less than 7,000 tons.

l,

141

FEASIBILITY OF RENDERING WEAPONS NONTOXIC

Mr. Evans. With regard to the disposal problem, in that case no

mention has been made about the practicality of changing the

chemical qualities of the items, whether chemical or biological, so as

to render them harmless. Has this been considered?

DANGER IN EVENT OF AIRPLANE CRASH

Mr. Eva Ns. We are talking about things stored in my State but

not in my district.

POSSIBILITY OF MOVING ROCKY MOUNTAIN ARSENAL

Mr. SIKEs. Has consideration been given to moving this arsenal to

a more remote location in view of thei. pointed out by the dis

ºished gentleman from Colorado and, if so, what would be the

COst .

Colonel Osick. Our technology, Mr. Sikes, as it is moving here now,

envisions us not manufacturing any more G.B. We think in the next

5 years certainly we can see our going to a binary-type of munition

where we have two nontoxic elements that would only become toxic

ºn route to the target or over the target. If this does come to pass, we

feel that for Rocky Mountain Arsenal, as a producer of nerve agent as

we have known it, the requirement does not exist. So, to answer your

question specifically, while there have been some studies, I don't know

of any that have been addressed to moving the entire arsenal as a

package somewhere else.

, Dr. MACARTHUR. In terms of the materials stored there, it is our

intent to move it all. In terms of the point Colonel Osick brought

142

out about binary munitions, I would like to say that just to produce

what the Russians have now would take us years. However, if we

go to this binary munition concept, which we are working on in R.

& D., we can use the industrial base of this country and at that time

we really don't need an arsenal because we are producing two non

toxic items and can have a large stockpile in a short period of time.

BINARY CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Mr. SIKEs. How do you spell the term “binary 2”

BINARY LETHAL CHEMICAL WEAPONs SYSTEM

Within the past few years it has been found technologically feasible to devise

a shell or bomb in which two nontoxic chemicals are filled in separate com

partments. During final trajectory of the munition to target the chemicals are

mixed ; they then react to form any selected one of several nerve agents, and

are disseminated when the munition arrives on target. This is called a binary

chemical munition.

There are a number of advantages of the binary system which are enumerated

below :

1. Binary munitions are very much more safe than previous chemical muni

tions. They can be designed so that one of the two chemical components is in

serted, along with fuze and burster, just before firing. During storage and

transportation, the two components could be completely separated so that even

if serious accident occurred there would be no possibility of formation, much

less release, of toxic material.

2. There would be no need to construct and operate Government-owned toxic

production facilities. The components, being relatively nontoxic, could easily

be manufactured by the U.S. chemical industry and procured by DoD on com

petitive contract purchase.

3. Recause of the tremendous capacity of the chemical industry it will be

unnecessary to maintain large stocks of chemical munitions. This will restilt

in reduction of storage depots and other economies. More importantly, it will

in large measure negate the importance of stockpile discrepancies with regard

to potential adversaries since our own limitation would be the rate at which

munitions could be fabricated, not the amount of nerve agent on hand and in

production.

Mr. SIREs. We have not .all of the items that are before

us. For instance, there is the problem of the sheep kill.

Let me suggest, doctor, that you provide a paper for the record

in which you will spell out in detail any items that we have not dis

cussed that were to have been covered.

Dr. MACARTHUR. We will be happy to do that.

(The information follows:)

ESCAPED NERVE AGENTS FROM TESTING AREA AT DUGWAY PROVING GROUND,

UTAH

On March 13, 1968, a spray mission using a high performance aircraft was

conducted at Dugway Proving Ground using liquid persistent nerve agent VX.

One spray tank malfunctioned, so that the agent continued to trail out of the

-

143

tank as the plane rose to a higher altitude (about 1,500 feet) enroute to the

area in which the tank was jettisoned. The meterological conditions at the time

of test were such that all agent would have been deposited within the test area,

miles from the Proving Ground border. Subsequent to the test the meteorology

changed abruptly and in an unpredicted and anomalous manner. Subsequent

analysis reveals that less than 20 pounds of agent remained airborne.

On March 14 range sheep began sickening and some died later. This was not

reported to the Army until March 17 at which time investigations were started.

These ultimately involved the Utah State Departments of Health and Agricul

ture, the U.S. Public Health Service, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture as

well as many elements of the U.S. Army Materiel Command. Extensive investi

gations finally revealed that the sheep probably ingested very low dosages of

the agent WX. In later experiments on sheep, the symptoms exhibited by the

range sheep were reproduced at much higher dosages, leading to the conclusion

that the range sheep were more susceptible for some reason or reasons, as yet

unknown. There might have been such factors as physical condition due to over

wintering, and the presence on the range of various toxic plants. In view of the

fact that the agent VX was apparently involved, the Army has agreed to the

compensation of the owners of the sheep in accordance with established claims

procedures.

In July of 1968 Secretary of the Army Stanley Resor established an advisory

panel of experts from the groups mentioned above and others, and chaired by Dr.

William Stewart, Surgeon General of the U.S. Public Health Service. This panel

recommended certain additional restrictions on open-air testing at Dugway

Proving Ground which were immediately ordered by the Secretary of the Army

and are now in effect. A permanent chemical safety advisory committee has now

been established to oversee testing in the future. This committee is composed of

representatives of U.S. Public Health Service, Departments of Interior, Com

merce and Agriculture, Utah State Department of Health, and two members

representing the public at large, one of whom is the chairman,

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL R. D. T. & E. PROGRAM

The current R. D. T. & E. program in chemical and biological warfare has

been divided into three priority groups, which are described in the following

paragraphs.

First Priority

1. New and improved items for individual and collective CB protection.—This

refers to improved overgarments and protective clothing with less physiological

stress than those currently available; to an improved mask with less bulk and

improved visibility and communication capability; to helmets with CB protec

tion for aircraft pilots; and to protective filters and shelters for missile vans,

Communication centers, command posts, etc.

2. Rapid detection and warming devices for chemical and biological agents.

There has recently been developed a rapid automatic alarm for lethal chemical

agents for Army use. Alarms for incapacitating chemical agents and for biolog

ical agents are not available but are necessary for complete defense. Specialized

alarms for Navy and for Air Force use are also needed.

3. New and improved materials and methods for prevention and treatment of

CB casualties.—Atropine and oximes provide effective treatment for some nerve

agents, but other agents are refractory to therapy. There is no prophylaxis for

Chemical agents. A few biological agents can be treated with antibiotics, but

there is no therapy for most known agents. A substantial effort is devoted to

development of vaccines for both prophylactic and possible therapeutic use.

4. Improved nonlethal and riot control chemical agents.--The concept of

reducing battlefield deaths and permanent disability by using incapacitating

chemical weapons instead of bullets and explosives is relatively new. No com.

pletely acceptable agent of this type has been developed as yet; however, an

extensive program to do so is under way.

5. Binary chemical weapons.—It is possible to make nerve agent weapons

which are nontoxic in storage and shipment. This is done by allowing two non

toxic components to react chemically during the time a shell or bomb is in its

35–262 0–69—pt. 6—10

144

final trajectory to target. The safety advantages of such a system are obvious,

and a substantial program to develop such weapons has been started.

6. New and improved methods for personnel marking and detection.—There

has been modest success in detecting ambushes with a personnel “sniffer,” and

its improvement as well as development of other methods of detecting or marking

people in some reliable but harmless manner is being investigated.

Second priority

1. Universal decontamination system.—This is an attempt to develop one ma

terial which will decontaminate all CB agents and be harmless to personnel,

equipment, and structures.

2. Advanced collective protective equipment, especially field shelters.-The

field shelter is intended to provide opportunity for troops to remove their indi

vidual protective clothing and masks and be in a safe environment while they

eat, rest, and accomplish personal hygiene. Other improvements sought are de

crease in weight and increased mobility.

3. Automatic biological agent 8ampling system.—Automatic biological warning

devices do not provide agent identification, as is the case with chemical alarms,

It is desired to have a sampling system which will be activated by the biological

alarm. Laboratory analysis of the sample can then provide identification for medi

cal planning and other purposes.

4. Advanced field laboratory.—A field laboratory to analyze biological samples

(see above) and to investigate new or unusual chemical agents would contribute

significantly to overall CB protective capability.

5. Improved defoliant dispensers for acrial dissemination.—The present C-123

aircraft and helicopter dispensers would be unusable against an enemy with more

effective antiaircraft weapons. Dispensers for high performance aircraft

possessing standoff capability are needed. -

6. Research in biological agent and munition systems.--The nature and extent

of the threat to our national Security from enemy use of biological weapons has

not been completely defined. Questions such as efficiency of dissemination, whether

viruses and bacteria can be mutated to new forms resistant to vaccines, the

longevity of microbes in aerosols, and others must be quantitated so that we can

accurately assess our vulnerability and develop effective defense.

Third priority

1. Prevention of technological surprise in CB.-A broad continuing research

program is required to provide some attention to areas of potential technological

advances not covered by the specific R. & D. efforts enumerated above. This is

particularly necessary in view of the very rapid strides being made worldwide

in molecular biology, pharmacology, and related sciences.

2. Vehicle, structure, and medical CB decontamination systems.-Pending de

velopment of a universal decontaminant, specialized decontaminating materials

are needed for medical use, on vehicles and for structures, especially those con

taining communication equipment.

3. Large area incapacitating weapon systems.--A modest effort is being de

voted to exploration of munitions which would be effective over relatively large

areas (greater than 500 km3 per aircraft, for example).

In addition, there are a number of areas which represent either continuing

research efforts, or special problems of short duration not easily categorized in

any of the priority areas above. For example, continuing safety research and

inspection is carried on at all in-house CB installations. Analyses and special

investigations for intelligence purposes are done as material may become avail.

able. A search for realistic but harmless training agents is carried out to improve

troop training, and vulnerability studies of critical installations and facilities

are done (e.g., missile silos).

Dr. MACARTHUR. With regard to funding, since 1964 in absolute

dollars in the R. & D, for CB warfare, it dropped 30 percent, and if

you add inflation to that, we are only doing 46 percent of the R. & D.

in this area we were doing in 1964.