Chaim Azriel Weizmann (born 1874)

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1st President of Israel


In office

17 February 1949 – 9 November 1952


Prime Minister

David Ben-Gurion

Preceded by

Himself

(as Chairman of the Provisional State Council)

Succeeded by

Yitzhak Ben-Zvi

2nd Chairman of the Provisional State Council of Israel


In office

16 May 1948 – 17 February 1949


Prime Minister

David Ben-Gurion

Preceded by

David Ben-Gurion

Succeeded by

Himself

(as President)

Personal details


Born

Chaim Azriel Weizmann

27 November 1874

Motal, Russian Empire

(now Belarus)

Died

9 November 1952 (aged 77)

Rehovot, Israel

Citizenship

Russian Empire

United Kingdom

Israel

Political party

General Zionists

Spouse(s)

Vera Weizmann

Relations

Maria Weizmann (sister)

Anna Weizmann (sister)

Minna Weizmann (sister)

Ezer Weizman (nephew)

Children

2

Alma mater

Technical University of Darmstadt

Technical University of Berlin

University of Fribourg

Profession

Biochemist

Known for

Politics: helped establish the State of Israel.

Science: industrial fermentation, acetone–butanol–ethanol fermentation process, critical to the WWI Allied war effort. Founder of the Sieff Research Institute (now Weizmann Institute), helped establish the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

Chaim Azriel Weizmann (Hebrew: חיים עזריאל ויצמן Chayyim Azri'el Vaytsman, Russian: Хаим Евзорович Вейцман, Khaim Evzorovich Veytsman; 27 November 1874 – 9 November 1952) was a Russian-born biochemist, Zionist leader and Israeli statesman who served as president of the Zionist Organization and later as the first president of Israel. He was elected on 16 February 1949, and served until his death in 1952. Weizmann was fundamental in obtaining the Balfour Declaration and later convincing the United States government to recognize the newly formed State of Israel.

As a biochemist, Weizmann is considered to be the 'father' of industrial fermentation. He developed the acetone–butanol–ethanol fermentation process, which produces acetone, n-butanol and ethanol through bacterial fermentation. His acetone production method was of great importance in the manufacture of cordite explosive propellants for the British war industry during World War I. He founded the Sieff Research Institute in Rehovot (later renamed the Weizmann Institute of Science in his honor), and was instrumental in the establishment of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

Biography[edit]

Chaim Weizmann was born in the village of Motal, located in what is now Belarus and at that time was part of the Russian Empire. He was the third of 15 children born to Oizer and Rachel (Czemerinsky) Weizmann.[1] His father was a timber merchant.[2] From ages four to eleven, he attended a traditional cheder, or Jewish religious primary school, where he also studied Hebrew. At the age of 11, he entered high school in Pinsk, where he displayed a talent for science, especially chemistry. While in Pinsk, he became active in the Hovevei Zion movement. He graduated with honors in 1892.[3][4]

In 1892, Weizmann left for Germany to study chemistry at the Polytechnic Institute of Darmstadt. To earn a living, he worked as a Hebrew teacher at an Orthodox Jewish boarding school.[5] In 1894, he moved to Berlin to study at the Technische Hochschule Berlin.

While in Berlin, he joined a circle of Zionist intellectuals.[4] In 1897, he moved to Switzerland to complete his studies at the University of Fribourg. In 1898, he attended the Second Zionist Congress in Basel. That year he became engaged to Sophia Getzowa.[6] Getzowa and Weizmann were together for four years before Weizmann, who became romantically involved with Vera Khatzman in 1900, confessed to Getzowa that he was seeing another woman. He did not tell the family he was leaving Getzowa until 1903.[6] His fellow students held a mock trial and ruled that Weitzman should uphold his commitment and marry Getzowa, even if he later divorced her. Weizmann ignored their advice.[7]

Of Weizmann's fifteen siblings, ten immigrated to Palestine.[3] Two also became chemists; Anna (Anushka) Weizmann worked in his Daniel Sieff Research Institute lab, registering several patents in her name.[8] His brother, Moshe Weizmann, was the head of the Chemistry Faculty at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.[8] Two siblings remained in the Soviet Union following the Russian Revolution: a brother, Shmuel, and a sister, Maria (Masha). Shmuel Weizmann was a dedicated Communist and member of the anti-Zionist Bund movement. During the Stalinist "Great Purge", he was arrested for alleged espionage and Zionist activity, and executed in 1939. His fate became known to his wife and children only in 1955.[8][9] Maria Weizmann was a doctor who was arrested as part of Stalin's fabricated "Doctors' plot" in 1952 and was sentenced to five years' imprisonment in Siberia. She was released following Stalin's death in 1953,[10] and was permitted to emigrate to Israel along with her husband in 1956.[citation needed] During World War I, another sister, Minna Weizmann, was the lover of a German spy (and later Nazi diplomat), Kurt Prüfer, and worked as a spy for Germany in Cairo, Egypt (then a wartime British protectorate) in 1915. Minna was outed as a spy during a trip to Italy, and deported back to Egypt to be sent to a British POW camp. Back in Cairo, she successfully persuaded the consul of the Russian Czar to provide her safe passage out, and en route to Russia, she managed to reconnect with Prüfer via a German consulate. Minna was never formally charged with espionage, survived the war, and would eventually return to Palestine to work for the medical service of the Zionist women's organization, Hadassah.[11]

Chaim Weizmann

Weizmann married Vera Khatzmann,[12] with whom he had two sons. The elder son, Benjamin (Benjie) Weizmann (1907–1980), settled in Ireland and became a dairy farmer. The younger one, Flight Lieutenant Michael Oser Weizmann (1916–1942), fought in the Royal Air Force during World War II. While serving as a pilot in No. 502 Squadron RAF, he was killed when his plane was shot down over the Bay of Biscay in February 1942.[13] His body was never found and he was listed as "missing". His father never fully accepted his death and made a provision in his will, in case he returned.[8] He is one of the British Empire's air force casualties without a known grave commemorated at the Air Forces Memorial at Runnymede in Surrey, England.[14]

His nephew Ezer Weizman, son of his brother Yechiel, a leading Israeli agronomist,[15] became commander of the Israeli Air Force and also served as President of Israel.[16]

Chaim Weizmann is buried beside his wife in the garden of his home at the Weizmann estate, located on the grounds of the Weizmann Institute, named after him.

Academic and scientific career[edit]

In 1899, he was awarded a PhD in organic chemistry.[17] That year, he joined the Organic Chemistry Department at the University of Geneva.[3] In 1901, he was appointed assistant lecturer at the University of Geneva.[18]

In 1904, he moved to the United Kingdom to teach at the Chemistry Department of the University of Manchester as a senior lecturer.[18] He joined Clayton Aniline Company in 1905 where the director Charles Dreyfus introduced him to Arthur Balfour, then Prime Minister.[19]

In 1910, he became a British citizen when Winston Churchill as Home Secretary signed his papers,[20] and held his British nationality until 1948, when he renounced it to assume his position as President of Israel.[21] Chaim Weizmann and his family lived in Manchester for about 30 years (1904–1934), although they temporarily lived at 16 Addison Road in London during World War I.

In Britain, he was known as Charles Weizmann, a name under which he registered about 100 research patents.[8][22] At the end of World War II, it was discovered that the SS had compiled a list in 1940 of over 2,800 people living in Britain, which included Weizmann, who were to have been immediately arrested after an invasion of Britain had the ultimately abandoned Operation Sea Lion been successful.[23]

Discovery of synthetic acetone[edit]

See also: Acetone–butanol–ethanol fermentation

Weizmann with Albert Einstein, 1921

While serving as a lecturer in Manchester he became known for discovering how to use bacterial fermentation to produce large quantities of desired substances. He is considered to be the father of industrial fermentation. He used the bacterium Clostridium acetobutylicum (the Weizmann organism) to produce acetone. Acetone was used in the manufacture of cordite explosive propellants critical to the Allied war effort (see Royal Navy Cordite Factory, Holton Heath). Weizmann transferred the rights to the manufacture of acetone to the Commercial Solvents Corporation in exchange for royalties.[24] Winston Churchill became aware of the possible use of Weizmann's discovery in early 1915, and David Lloyd George, as Minister of Munitions, joined Churchill in encouraging Weizmann's development of the process. Pilot plant development of laboratory procedures was completed in 1915 at the J&W Nicholson & Co gin factory in Bow, London, so industrial scale production of acetone could begin in six British distilleries requisitioned for the purpose in early 1916. The effort produced 30,000 tonnes of acetone during the war, although a national collection of horse-chestnuts was required when supplies of maize were inadequate for the quantity of starch needed for fermentation. The importance of Weizmann's work gave him favour in the eyes of the British Government, this allowed Weizmann to have access to senior Cabinet members and utilise this time to represent Zionist aspirations.

After the Shell Crisis of 1915 during World War I, Weizmann was director of the British Admiralty laboratories from 1916 until 1919. In April 1918 at the head of the Jewish Commission,[25] he returned to Palestine to look for "rare minerals" for the British war effort in the Dead Sea. Weizmann's attraction for British Liberalism enabled Lloyd George's influence at the Ministry of Munitions to do a financial and industrial deal with Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) to seal the future of the Zionist homeland.[26] Tirelessly energetic Weizmann entered London again in later October to speak for a solid hour with the Prime Minister, propped by The Guardian and his Manchester friends. At another conference on 21 February 1919 at Euston Hotel the peace envoy, Lord Bryce was reassured by the pledges against international terrorism, for currency regulation and fiscal controls.[27]

Establishment of scientific research institutes[edit]

Chaim Weizmann in 1926

Concurrently, Weizmann devoted himself to the establishment of a scientific institute for basic research in the vicinity of his estate in the town of Rehovot. Weizmann saw great promise in science as a means to bring peace and prosperity to the area. As stated in his own words "I trust and feel sure in my heart that science will bring to this land both peace and a renewal of its youth, creating here the springs of a new spiritual and material life. [...] I speak of both science for its own sake and science as a means to an end."[28] His efforts led in 1934 to the creation of the Daniel Sieff Research Institute (later renamed the Weizmann Institute of Science), which was financially supported by an endowment by Israel Sieff in memory of his late son.[29] Weizmann actively conducted research in the laboratories of this institute, primarily in the field of organic chemistry. He offered the post of director of the institute to Nobel Prize laureate Fritz Haber, but took over the directorship himself after Haber's death en route to Palestine.[30][31]

During World War II, he was an honorary adviser to the British Ministry of Supply and did research on synthetic rubber and high-octane gasoline.[32]

Zionist activism[edit]

Weizmann was absent from the first Zionist conference, held in 1897 in Basel, Switzerland, because of travel problems, but he attended the Second Zionist Congress in 1898 and each one thereafter. Beginning in 1901, he lobbied for the founding of a Jewish institution of higher learning in Palestine. Together with Martin Buber and Berthold Feiwel, he presented a document to the Fifth Zionist Congress highlighting this need especially in the fields of science and engineering. This idea would later be crystallized in the foundation of the Technion – Israel Institute of Technology in 1912.[33]

Weizmann met Arthur Balfour, the Conservative Prime Minister who was MP for East Manchester, during one of Balfour's electoral campaigns in 1905–1906. Balfour supported the concept of a Jewish homeland, but felt that there would be more support among politicians for the then-current offer in Uganda, called the British Uganda Programme. Following mainstream Zionist rejection of that proposal, Weizmann was credited later with persuading Balfour, by then the Foreign Secretary during the First World War, for British support to establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine, the original Zionist aspiration.[34] The story goes that Weizmann asked Balfour, "Would you give up London to live in Saskatchewan?" When Balfour replied that the British had always lived in London, Weizmann responded, "Yes, and we lived in Jerusalem when London was still a marsh." Nevertheless, this had not prevented naturalization as a British subject in 1910 with the help of haham Moses Gaster, who asked for papers from Herbert Samuel, the minister.[citation needed]

Weizmann revered Britain but relentlessly pursued Jewish freedom.[35] He was head of the Democratic Fraction, a group of Zionist radicals who posed a challenge to Herzlian political Zionism. Israel Sieff described him as "pre-eminently what the Jewish people call folks-mensch...a man of the people, of the masses, not of a elite".[36] His most recent biographers challenge this, describing him as a blatant elitist, disgusted by the masses, coldly aloof from his family, callous with friends if they did not support him, despondently alienated from Palestine, where he lived only with reluctance, and repelled by the Jewish immigrants from eastern Europe there.[37]

Gradually Weizmann set up a separate following from Moses Gaster and L.J. Greenberg in London. Manchester became an important Zionist center in Britain. Weizmann was mentor to Harry Sacher, Israel Sieff and Simon Marks (founders of Marks & Spencer),[citation needed] and formed a friendship with Asher Ginzberg, a writer who pushed for Zionist inclusivity and urged against "repressive cruelty" to the Arabs. He regularly traveled by train to London to discuss spiritual and cultural Zionism with Ginzberg, whose pen name was Ahad Ha'am. He stayed at Ginzberg's home in Hampstead, whence he lobbied Whitehall, beyond his job as Director of the Admiralty for Manchester.[citation needed]

Weizmann's passport photo, ca. 1915

Zionists believed that anti-Semitism led directly to the need for a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Weizmann first visited Jerusalem in 1907, and while there, he helped organize the Palestine Land Development Company as a practical means of pursuing the Zionist dream, and to found the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Although Weizmann was a strong advocate for "those governmental grants which are necessary to the achievement of the Zionist purpose" in Palestine, as stated at Basel, he persuaded many Jews not to wait for future events,

A state cannot be created by decree, but by the forces of a people and in the course of generations. Even if all the governments of the world gave us a country, it would only be a gift of words. But if the Jewish people will go build Palestine, the Jewish State will become a reality—a fact.[38]

During World War I, at around the same time he was appointed Director of the British Admiralty's laboratories, Weizmann, in a conversation with David Lloyd George, suggested the strategy of the British campaign against the Ottoman Empire. From 1914, "a benevolent goodwill toward the Zionist idea" emerged in Britain when intelligence revealed how the Jewish Question could support imperial interests against the Ottomans.[39] Many of Weizmann's contacts revealed the extent of the uncertainty in Palestine. From 1914 to 1918, Weizmann developed his political skills mixing easily in powerful circles. On 7 and 8 November 1914, he had a meeting with Dorothy de Rothschild. Her husband James de Rothschild was serving with the French Army, but she was unable to influence her cousinhood to Weizmann's favour. However, when Weizmanm spoke to Charles, second son of Nathan Mayer Rothschild, he approved the idea. James de Rothschild advised Weizmann seek to influence the British Government. By the time he reached Lord Robert Cecil, Dr Weizmann was enthused with excitement. Cecil's personal foibles were representative of class consciousness, which the Zionists overcame through deeds rather than words. C. P. Scott, the editor of The Manchester Guardian, formed a friendship with Weizmann after the two men encountered each other at a Manchester garden party in 1915.[40] Scott described the diminutive leader as extraordinarily interesting, a rare combination of idealism and the severely practical which are the two essentials of statesmanship a perfectly clear sense conception of Jewish nationalism, an intense and burning sense of the Jew as Jew, just as strong, perhaps more so, as that of the German as German or the Englishman as Englishman, and secondly arising out of that and necessary for its satisfaction and development, his demand for a country, a home land which for him and for anyone during his view of Jewish nationality can be no other that the ancient home of his race.[41]

Scott wrote to the Liberal Party's Lloyd George who set up a meeting for a reluctant Weizmann with Herbert Samuel, President of the Local Government Board, who was now converted to Zionism. On 10 December 1914 at Whitehall, Samuel offered Weizmann a Jewish homeland complete with funded developments. Ecstatic, Weizmann returned to Westminster to arrange a meeting with Balfour, who was also on the War Council. He had first met the Conservatives in 1906, but after being moved to tears at 12 Carlton Gardens, on 12 December 1914, Balfour told Weizmann "it is a great cause and I understand it."[citation needed] Weizmann had another meeting in Paris with Baron Edmond Rothschild before a crucial discussion with Chancellor of the Exchequer Lloyd George, on 15 January 1915.[citation needed] Whilst some of the leading members of Britain's Jewish community regarded Weizmann's program with distaste, The Future of Palestine, also known as the Samuel Memorandum, was a watershed moment in the Great War and annexation of Palestine.[citation needed]

Weizmann consulted several times with Samuel on the homeland policy during 1915, but H. H. Asquith, then Prime Minister, would be dead set against upsetting the balance of power on the Middle East. Attitudes were changing to "dithyrambic"[clarification needed] opposition; but in the Cabinet, to the Samuel Memorandum, it remained implacably opposed with the exception of Lloyd George, an outspoken radical. Edwin Montagu, for example, Samuel's cousin was strenuously opposed. Weizmann did not attend the meeting of Jewry's ruling Conjoint Committee when it met the Zionist leadership on 14 April 1915.[42] Yehiel Tschlenow had travelled from Berlin to speak at the congress. He envisioned a Jewish Community worldwide so that integration was complementary with amelioration[citation needed]. Zionists however had one goal only, the creation of their own state with British help.

In 1915, Weizmann also began working with Sir Mark Sykes, who was looking for a member of the Jewish community for a delicate mission. He met the Armenian lawyer, James Malcolm, who already knew Sykes, and British intelligence, who were tired of the oppositional politics of Moses Gaster. "Dr Weizmann ... asked when he could meet Sir Mark Sykes ... Sir Mark fixed the appointment for the very next day, which was a Sunday."[43] They finally met on 28 January 1917, "Dr Weizmann...should take the leading part in the negotiations", was Sykes response.[44] Weizmann was determined to replace the Chief Rabbi as Jewish leader of Zionism.[45] He had the "matter in hand" when he met Sokolow and Malcolm at Thatched House on Monday 5 February 1917. Moses Gaster was very reluctant to step aside. Weizmann had a considerable following, yet was not involved in the discussions with François Georges-Picot at the French embassy: a British Protectorate, he knew would not require French agreement. Furthermore, James de Rothschild proved a friend and guardian of the nascent state questioning Sykes' motivations as their dealings on Palestine were still secretive. Sokolow, Weizmann's diplomatic representative, cuttingly remarked to Picot underlining the irrelevance of the Triple Entente to French Jewry, but on 7 February 1917, the British government recognized the Zionist leader and agreed to expedite the claim. Weizmann was characteristically wishing to reward his Jewish friends for loyalty and service. News of the February Revolution (also known as the Kerensky Revolution) in Russia shattered the illusion for World Jewry. Unity for British Jewry was achieved by the Manchester Zionists. "Thus not for the first time in history, there is a community alike of interest and of sentiment between the British State and Jewish people."[46] The Manchester Zionists published a pamphlet Palestine on 26 January 1917, which did not reflect British policy, but already Sykes looked to Weizmann's leadership when they met on 20 March 1917.[47]

On 6 February 1917 a meeting was held at Dr Moses Gaster's house with Weizmann to discuss the results of the Picot convention in Paris. Sokolow and Weizmann pressed on with seizing leadership from Gaster; they had official recognition from the British government. At 6 Buckingham Gate on 10 February 1917 another was held, in a series of winter meetings in London. The older generation of Greenberg, Joseph Cowen and Gaster were stepping down or being passed over. "...those friends ... in close cooperation all these years", he suggested should become the EZF Council[48]- Manchester's Sieff, Sacher and Marks, and London's Leon Simon and Samuel Tollowsky. While the war was raging in the outside world, the Zionists prepared for an even bigger fight for the survival of their homeland. Weizmann issued a statement on 11 February 1917, and on the following day, they received news of the Kerensky take over in Petrograd. Tsarist Russia had been very anti-Semitic but incongruously this made the British government even more determined to help the Jews.[49] Nahum Sokolow acted as Weizmann's eyes and ears in Paris on a diplomatic mission; an Entente under the Ottoman Empire was unsettling. The Triple Entente of Arab-Armenian-Zionist was fantastic to Weizmann leaving him cold and unenthusiastic. Nonetheless, the delegation left for Paris on 31 March 1917.[citation needed] One purpose of the Alliance was to strengthen the hand of Zionism in the United States.

Weizmann's relations with Balfour were intellectual and academic. He was genuinely overjoyed to convince the former Prime Minister in April 1917. Just after the U.S. President, Woodrow Wilson, had left, the following morning, Lloyd George invited Weizmann to breakfast at which he promised Jewish support for Britain as the Jews "might be able to render more assistance than the Arabs."[50] They discussed "International Control" the Russian Revolution and US involvement in the future of the Palestine Problem.[51] The complexity of Arab desiderata – "facilities of colonization, communal autonomy, rights of language and establishment of a Jewish chartered company".[52] This was followed by a meeting with Sir Edward Carson and the Conservatives (18 April) and another at Downing Street on 20 April. With the help of Philip Kerr the issue was moved up "the Agenda" to War Cabinet as a matter of urgency.[53]

Vera Weizmann, Chaim Weizmann, Herbert Samuel, Lloyd George, Ethel Snowden, Philip Snowden

On 16 May 1917 the President of the Board of Deputies David Lindo Alexander QC co-signed a statement in the Times attacking Zionism and asserting that the Jewish Community in Britain was opposed to it. At the next meeting of the Board, on 15 June 1917, a motion of censure was proposed against the President, who said he would treat the motion as one of no confidence. When it was passed, he resigned. Although subsequent analysis has shown that the success of the motion possibly had more to do with a feeling on the part of Deputies that Lindo Alexander had failed to consult them than with a massive conversion on their part to the Zionist cause, nevertheless it had great significance outside the community.[54] Within days of the resolution the Foreign Office sent a note to Lord Rothschild and to Weizmann asking them to submit their proposals for a Jewish homeland in Palestine. The way had been opened to the Balfour Declaration issued in the following November.

Political career[edit]

On 31 October 1917, Chaim Weizmann became president of the British Zionist Federation; he worked with Arthur Balfour to obtain the Balfour Declaration.[55]

His Majesty's government view would favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, ...to use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country, 2 November 1917.

A founder of so-called Synthetic Zionism, Weizmann supported grass-roots colonization efforts as well as high-level diplomatic activity. He was generally associated with the centrist General Zionists and later sided with neither Labour Zionism on the left nor Revisionist Zionism on the right. In 1917, he expressed his view of Zionism in the following words,

We have [the Jewish people] never based the Zionist movement on Jewish suffering in Russia or in any other land. These suffering have never been the mainspring of Zionism. The foundation of Zionism was, and continues to be to this day, the yearning of the Jewish people for its homeland, for a national centre and a national life.[citation needed]

Weizmann's personality became an issue but Weizmann had an international profile unlike his colleagues or any other British Zionist. He was President of EZF Executive Council. He was also criticized by Harry Cohen. A London delegate raised a censure motion: that Weizmann refused to condemn the regiment. In August 1917, Weizmann quit both EZF and ZPC which he had founded with his friends. Leon Simon asked Weizmann not to "give up the struggle". At the meeting on 4 September 1917, he faced some fanatical opposition. But letters of support "sobering down"[56] opposition, and a letter from his old friend Ginzberg "a great number of people regard you as something of a symbol of Zionism".[57]

Zionists linked Sokolow and Weizmann to Sykes. Sacher tried to get the Foreign Secretary to redraft a statement rejecting Zionism. The irony was not lost accusing the government of anti-semitism. Edwin Montagu opposed it, but Herbert Samuel and David Lloyd George favoured Zionism. Montagu did not regard Palestine as a "fit place for them to live". Montagu believed that it would let down assimilationists and the ideals of British Liberalism. The Memorandum was not supposed to accentuate the prejudice of mentioning 'home of the Jewish people'. Weizmann was a key holder at the Ministry of Supply by late 1917. By 1918 Weizmann was accused of combating the idea of a separate peace with Ottoman Empire. He considered such a peace at odds with Zionist interests. He was even accused of "possibly prolonging the war".[58]

At the War Cabinet meeting of 4 October, chaired by Lloyd George and with Balfour present, Lord Curzon also opposed this "barren and desolate" place as a home for Jews.[citation needed] In a third memo Montagu labelled Weizmann a "religious fanatic".[citation needed] Montagu believed in assimilation and saw his principles being swept from under by the new policy stance. Montagu, a British Jew, had learnt debating skills as India Secretary, and Liberalism from Asquith, who also opposed Zionism.

All the memos from Zionists, non-Zionists, and Curzon were all-in by a third meeting convened on Wednesday, 31 October 1917. The War Cabinet had dealt an "irreparable blow to Jewish Britons", wrote Montagu. Curzon's memo was mainly concerned by the non-Jews in Palestine to secure their civil rights.[59] Worldwide there were 12 million Jews, and about 365,000 in Palestine by 1932. Cabinet ministers were worried about Germany playing the Zionist card. If the Germans were in control, it would hasten support for Ottoman Empire, and collapse of Kerensky's government. Curzon went on towards an advanced Imperial view: that since most Jews had Zionist views, it was as well to support these majority voices. "If we could make a declaration favourable to such an ideal we should be able to carry on extremely useful propaganda."[60] Weizmann "was absolutely loyal to Great Britain".[61] The Zionists had been approached by the Germans, Weizmann told William Ormsby-Gore but the British miscalculated the effects of immigration to Palestine, and over-estimated German control over Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans were in no position to prevent movement. Sykes reported the Declaration to Weizmann with elation all round: he repeated "mazel tov" over and over. The Entente had fulfilled its commitment to both Sharif Husein and Chaim Weizmann.[62]

Weizmann holding a standard of the Jewish Legion, 1918

Sykes stressed the Entente: "We are pledged to Zionism, Armenianism liberation, and Arabian independence".[citation needed] On 2 December, Zionists celebrated the Declaration at the Opera House; the news of the Bolshevik Revolution, and withdrawal of Russian troops from the frontier war with Ottoman Empire, raised the pressure from Constantinople. On 11 December, Turkish armies were swept aside when Edmund Allenby's troops entered Jerusalem. On 9 January 1918, all Turkish troops withdrew from the Hejaz for a bribe of $2 million to help pay Ottoman Empire's debts. Weizmann had seen peace with Ottoman Empire out of the question in July 1917. Lloyd George wanted a separate peace with Ottoman Empire to guarantee relations in the region secure. Weizmann had managed to gain the support of International Jewry in Britain, France and Italy.[63] Schneer postulates that the British government desperate for any wartime advantage were prepared to offer any support among philo-Semites.[64] It was to Weizmann a priority. Weizmann considered that the issuance of the Balfour Declaration was the greatest single achievement of the pre-1948 Zionists. He believed that the Balfour Declaration and the legislation that followed it, such as the (3 June 1922) Churchill White Paper and the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine all represented an astonishing accomplishment for the Zionist movement.[citation needed]

Weizmann (left) with Faisal I of Iraq in Syria, 1918

On 3 January 1919, Weizmann met Hashemite Prince Faisal to sign the Faisal-Weizmann Agreement attempting to establish the legitimate existence of the state of Israel.[65] At the end of the month, the Paris Peace Conference decided that the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire should be wholly separated and the newly conceived mandate-system applied to them.[66] Weizmann stated at the conference that "the Zionist objective was gradually to make Palestine as Jewish as England was English"[67] Shortly thereafter, both men made their statements to the conference.

Weizmann in Jerusalem, 1920 (Herbert Samuel to his right)

After 1920, he assumed leadership in the World Zionist Organization, creating local branches in Berlin[68] serving twice (1920–31, 1935–46) as president of the World Zionist Organization. Unrest amongst Arab antagonism to a Jewish presence in Palestine increased, erupting into riots. Weizmann remained loyal to Britain, tried to shift the blame onto dark forces. The French were commonly blamed for discontent, as scapegoats for Imperial liberalism. Zionists began to believe racism existed within the administration, which remained inadequately policed.[citation needed]

In 1921, Weizmann went along with Albert Einstein for a fund-raiser to establish the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and support the Technion – Israel Institute of Technology. At this time, simmering differences over competing European and American visions of Zionism, and its funding of development versus political activities, caused Weizmann to clash with Louis Brandeis.[69] In 1921 Weizmann played an important role in supporting Pinhas Rutenberg's successful bid to the British for an exclusive electric concession for Palestine, in spite of bitter personal and principled disputes between the two figures.[70]

During the war years, Brandeis headed the precursor of the Zionist Organization of America, leading fund-raising for Jews trapped in Europe and Palestine.[71] In early October 1914, the USS North Carolina arrived in Jaffa harbor with money and supplies provided by Jacob Schiff, the American Jewish Committee, and the Provisional Executive Committee for General Zionist Affairs, then acting for the WZO, which had been rendered impotent by the war. Although Weizmann retained Zionist leadership, the clash led to a departure from Louis Brandeis's movement. By 1929, there were about 18,000 members remaining in the ZOA, a massive decline from the high of 200,000 reached during the peak Brandeis years.[72] In summer 1930, these two factions and visions of Zionism, would come to a compromise largely on Brandeis's terms, with a restructured leadership for the ZOA.[73] An American view is Weizmann persuaded the British cabinet to support Zionism by presenting the benefits of having a presence in Palestine in preference to the French. Imperial interests on the Suez Canal as well as sympathy after the Holocaust were important factors for British support.[74]

Jewish immigration to Palestine[edit]

Chaim Weizmann (sitting, second from left) at a meeting with Arab leaders at the King David Hotel, Jerusalem, 1933. Also pictured are Haim Arlosoroff (sitting, center), Moshe Shertok (Sharett) (standing, right), and Yitzhak Ben-Zvi (standing, to Shertok's right).

Jewish immigration was consciously limited by the British administration. Weizmann agreed with the policy but was afraid of the rise of the Nazis. From 1933, there were year-on-year leaps in mass immigration by 50%. Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald's attempted reassurance on economic grounds in a White Paper did little to stabilize Arab-Israeli relations.[75] In 1936 and early 1937, Weizmann addressed the Peel Commission (set up by the returning Conservative Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin), whose job it was to consider the working of the British Mandate of Palestine.[76] He insisted that the Mandate authorities had not driven home to the Palestinian population that the terms of the Mandate would be implemented, using an analogy from another part of the British Empire:

I think it was in Bombay recently, that there had been trouble and the Moslems had been flogged. I am not advocating flogging, but what is the difference between a Moslem in Palestine and a Moslem in Bombay? There they flog them, and here they save their faces. This, interpreted in terms of Moslem mentality, means: "The British are weak; we shall succeed if we make ourselves sufficiently unpleasant. We shall succeed in throwing the Jews into the Mediterranean.'[77]

On 25 November 1936, testifying before the Peel Commission, Weizmann said that there were in Europe 6,000,000 Jews "for whom the world is divided into places where they cannot live and places where they cannot enter."[78] The Commission published a report that, for the first time, recommended partition, but the proposal was declared unworkable and formally rejected by the government. The two main Jewish leaders, Weizmann and David Ben-Gurion had convinced the Zionist Congress to approve equivocally the Peel recommendations as a basis for more negotiation.[79][80] This was the first official mention and declaration of a Zionist vision opting for a possible State with a majority of Jewish population, alongside a State with an Arab majority. The Arab leaders, headed by Haj Amin al-Husseini, rejected the plan.

Weizmann made very clear in his autobiography that the failure of the international Zionist movement (between the wars) to encourage all Jews to act decisively and efficiently in great enough numbers to migrate to the Jerusalem area was the real cause for the call for a Partition deal. A deal on Partition was first formally mentioned in 1936 but not finally implemented until 1948. Again, Weizmann blamed the Zionist movement for not being adequate during the best years of the British Mandate.[citation needed]

Ironically, in 1936 Ze'ev Jabotinsky prepared the so-called "evacuation plan", which called for the evacuation of 1.5 million Jews from Poland, Baltic States, Nazi Germany, Hungary and Romania to Palestine over the span of next ten years. The plan was first proposed on 8 September 1936 in the conservative Polish newspaper Czas, the day after Jabotinsky organized a conference where more details of the plan were laid out; the emigration would take 10 years and would include 750,000 Jews from Poland, with 75,000 between age of 20–39 leaving the country each year. Jabotinsky stated that his goal was to reduce Jewish population in the countries involved to levels that would make them disinterested in its further reduction.[81]

The same year, he toured Eastern Europe, meeting with the Polish Foreign Minister, Colonel Józef Beck; the Regent of Hungary, Admiral Miklós Horthy; and Prime Minister Gheorghe Tătărescu of Romania to discuss the evacuation plan. The plan gained the approval of all three governments, but caused considerable controversy within the Jewish community of Poland, on the grounds that it played into the hands of anti-Semites. In particular, the fact that the 'evacuation plan' had the approval of the Polish government was taken by many Polish Jews as indicating Jabotinsky had gained the endorsement of what they considered to be the wrong people.

The evacuation of Jewish communities in Poland, Hungary and Romania was to take place over a ten-year period. However, the British government vetoed it, and the World Zionist Organization's chairman, Chaim Weizmann, dismissed it.[82]

Weizmann considered himself, not Ben-Gurion, the political heir to Theodor Herzl. Herzl's only grandchild and descendant was Stephen Norman (born Stephan Theodor Neumann, 1918–1946). Dr. H. Rosenblum, the editor of Haboker, a Tel Aviv daily that later became Yediot Aharonot, noted in late 1945 that Dr. Weizmann deeply resented the sudden intrusion and reception of Norman when he arrived in Britain. Norman spoke to the Zionist conference in London. Haboker reported, "Something similar happened at the Zionist conference in London. The chairman suddenly announced to the meeting that in the hall there was Herzl's grandson who wanted to say a few words. The introduction was made in an absolutely dry and official way. It was felt that the chairman looked for—and found—some stylistic formula which would satisfy the visitor without appearing too cordial to anybody among the audience. In spite of that there was a great thrill in the hall when Norman mounted on the platform of the presidium. At that moment, Dr. Weizmann turned his back on the speaker and remained in this bodily and mental attitude until the guest had finished his speech."[83] The 1945 article went on to note that Norman was snubbed by Weizmann and by some in Israel during his visit because of ego, jealousy, vanity and their own personal ambitions. Brodetsky was Chaim Weizmann's principal ally and supporter in Britain. Weizmann secured for Norman a desirable but minor position with the British Economic and Scientific Mission in Washington, D.C.

Second World War[edit]

On 29 August 1939, Weizmann sent a letter to Neville Chamberlain, stating in part: "I wish to confirm in the most explicit manner the declarations which I and my colleagues have made during the last month and especially in the last week: that the Jews stand by Great Britain and will fight on the side of the democracies."[84] The letter gave rise to a conspiracy theory, promoted in Nazi propaganda, that he had made a "Jewish declaration of war" against Germany.[85][86]

At the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939, Weizmann was appointed as an Honorary adviser to the British Ministry of Supply, using his extensive political expertise in the management of provisioning and supplies throughout the duration of the conflict. He was frequently asked to advise the cabinet and also brief the Prime Minister. Weizmann's efforts to integrate Jews from Palestine in the war against Germany resulted in the creation of the Jewish Brigade of the British Army which fought mainly in the Italian front.[citation needed] After the war, he grew embittered by the rise of violence in Palestine and by the terrorist tendencies amongst followers of the Revisionist fraction. His influence within the Zionist movement decreased, yet he remained overwhelmingly influential outside of Mandate Palestine.[citation needed]

In 1942, Weizmann was invited by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to work on the problem of synthetic rubber. Weizmann proposed to produce butyl alcohol from maize, then convert it to butylene and further to butadiene, which is a basis for rubber. According to his memoirs, these proposals were barred by the oil companies.[87]

The Holocaust[edit]

In 1939, a conference was established at St James's Palace when the government drew up the May 1939 White Paper which severely curtailed any spending in the Jewish Home Land. Yishuv was put back to the lowest priority. At the outbreak of war the Jewish Agency pledged its support for the British war effort against Nazi Germany. They raised the Jewish Brigade into the British Army, which took years to come to fruition. It authenticated the news of the Holocaust reaching the allies.[citation needed]

In May 1942, the Zionists met at Biltmore Hotel in New York, US; a convention at which Weizmann pressed for a policy of unrestricted immigration into Palestine. A Jewish Commonwealth needed to be established, and latterly Churchill revived his backing for this project.[citation needed]

Weizmann met Churchill on 4 November 1944 to urgently discuss the future of Palestine. Churchill agreed that Partition was preferable for Israel over his White Paper. He also agreed that Israel should annex the Negev desert, where no one was living. However, when Lord Moyne, the British Governor of Palestine, had met Churchill a few days earlier, he was surprised that Churchill had changed his views in two years. On 6 November, Moyne was assassinated for his trenchant views on immigration; the immigration question was put on hold.[citation needed]

In February 1943, the British government also rejected a plan to pay $3.5 million and just $50 per head to allow 70,000, mostly Romanian, Jews to be protected and evacuated that Weizmann had suggested to the Americans. In May 1944, the British detained Joel Brand, a Jewish activist from Budapest, who wanted to evacuate 1 million Jews from Hungary on 10,000 trucks, with tea, coffee, cocoa, and soap. In July 1944, Weizmann pleaded on Brand's behalf but to no avail. Rezső Kasztner[88] took over the direct negotiations with Adolf Eichmann to release migrants, but they came to nothing.[89] Weizmann also promoted a plan to bomb the death camps, but the British claimed that this was too risky, dangerous and unfeasible, due to technical difficulties.[90] On 20 September 1945, Weizmann presented the first official documents to the British, USA, France, and Soviets, for the restitution of property, and indemnification. He demanded that all heirless Jewish property should be handed over as part of the reparations for the rehabilitation of Nazi victims.

In his presidential statement at the last Zionist congress that he attended at Basel on 9 December 1946 he said: "Massada, for all its heroism, was a disaster in our history; It is not our purpose or our right to plunge to destruction in order to bequeath a legend of martyrdom to posterity; Zionism was to mark the end of our glorious deaths and the beginning of a new path leading to life."[91]

First president of Israel[edit]

Weizmann addressing soldiers at Tzrifin, 1949

Weizmann (left) with first Turkish ambassador to Israel, Seyfullah Esin (c), and Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett, 1950

Two days after the proclamation of the State of Israel, Weizmann succeeded Ben-Gurion as chairman of the Provisional State Council, a collective presidency that held office until Israel's first parliamentary election, in February 1949.

On 2 July 1948, a new kibbutz was founded facing the Golan Heights (Syrian) overlooking the Jordan River, only 5 miles from Syrian territory. Their forces had already seized Kibbutz Mishmar Ha-Yarden. The new kibbutz was named (President's Village) Kfar Ha-Nasi.[92]

When the first Knesset met in 1949, Weizmann was nominated as Mapai's candidate for president. The Revisionist Party put forward Prof. Joseph Klausner. Weizmann was elected president by the Knesset on 17 February 1949.[93] On 24 February 1949, Weizmann as president entrusted Ben-Gurion with forming a government. A Coalition was made up of 46 Mapai, 2 Arab Democratic List of Nazareth, 16 of United Religious Front, 5 of Progressive Party, 4 of Sephardi List. Mapam was officially a socialist party with Mapai, but was anti-religious and so remained outside the coalition.[94] On 2 November 1949, the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration, the Daniel Sieff Institute, much enlarged and rebuilt, was renamed the Weizmann Institute of Science. The institute was a global success, attracting scientists from all over the Diaspora. In 1949 there were 20 researchers; twenty years later there were 400, and 500 students.[95] Weizmann met with United States President Harry Truman and worked to obtain the support of the United States; they discussed emigration, for the establishment of the State of Israel.

President Weizmann lived at Rehovot, where he regularly received the Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion into his garden. He was denied any actualisation of the political role he had hoped for by the Left,[96] and had to be consoled with the Weizmann Institute's successes.

When Weizmann died on 9 November 1952, he was buried at Rehovot. He was acknowledged as a patriot long before Israel had even begun to exist.[97] "The greatest Jewish emissary to the Gentile world..." was one academic verdict.[98]

  • Weizmann's funeral in 1952


  • Weizmann memorial stamp issued in December 1952

Published works

  • Weizmann, Chaim (1918). What is Zionism. London.

  • Weizmann, Chaim (1949). Trial and Error: The Autobiography of Chaim Weizmann. Jewish Publication Society of America.

  • Weizmann, Chaim (1949). Autobiography: Chaim Weizmann. London: Hamilton Ltd.

  • Weizmann, Chaim (January 1942). "Palestine's role in the solution of the Jewish Problem". Foreign Affairs. 20 (2): 324–338. doi:10.2307/20029153. JSTOR 20029153.

  • Herzog, Chaim (1996). Living History: a Memoir. Plunkett Lake Press. ASIN B013FPVJ42

References

Further reading

  • Berlin, Isaiah (1958). Chaim Weizmann. London: Second Herbert Samuel Lecture.
  • Berlin, J. (1981). Personal Impressions. private info.
  • Crossman, Richard (1960). A Nation Reborn. London.
  • Dugdale, Mrs Edgar (1940). The Balfour Declaration: Origins and Background. London.
  • Gilbert, Martin (1978). Exile and Return: The Emergence of Jewish Statehood. London.
  • Gilbert, Sir Martin (2008) [1998]. History of Israel. Black Swan.
  • Halpern, Ben (1987). A Clash of Heroes: Brandeis, Weizmann, and American Zionism. London and New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0195040627.
  • Leon, Dan (1974). Chaim Weizmann: elder statesman of Jewish Resistance. Jewish Library.
  • Litvinoff, Barnet (1982). The Essential Chaim Weizmann: the man, the statesman, the scientist. Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
  • Litvinoff, Barnet (1968–1984). The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann. Vol. 25 vols. New Brunswick, New Jersey.
  • Reinharz, Jehuda (1992). "His Majesty's Zionist Emissary: Chaim Weizmann's Mission to Gibraltar in 1917". Journal of Contemporary History. 27 (2): 259–277. doi:10.1177/002200949202700203. S2CID 159644752.
  • Rose, Norman (1986). Chaim Weizmann: A Biography. London: Elisabeth Sifton Books. ISBN 0-670-80469-X.
  • Schneer, Jonathan (2014). The Balfour Declaration: The Origins of arab-Israeli Conflict. Macmillan. ISBN 978-1408809709.
  • Stein, Leonard (1961). The Balfour Declaration. London. ISBN 978-1597404754.
  • Stein, Leonard (1964). "Weizmann and England". London: Presidential Address to the Jewish Historical Society delivered in London, 11 November 1964.
  • Verete, M. (January 1970). "The Balfour Declaration and its makers". Middle Eastern Studies. 6: 48–76. doi:10.1080/00263207008700138.
  • Vital, David (1987). Zionism: The Crucial Phase. London.
  • Vital, David (1999). A People Apart: The Jews in Europe 1789–1939. Oxford Modern History.
  • Wilson, Trevor, ed. (1970). The political diaries of CP Scott, 1911–1928.
  • Wolf, Lucien (1934). Cecil Roth (ed.). Essays in Jewish History. London.

External links

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Louis Dembitz Brandeis and The Cleveland Conference, by Esther Panitz Source: American Jewish Historical Quarterly, Vol. 65, No. 2, ZIONISM IN AMERICA: Magnes, Kallen, and Brandeis (DECEMBER, 1975), pp. 140-162 )

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Louis Dembitz Brandeis and The Cleveland Conference, by Esther Panitz Source: American Jewish Historical Quarterly, Vol. 65, No. 2, ZIONISM IN AMERICA: Magnes, Kallen, and Brandeis (DECEMBER, 1975), pp. 140-162 ) ; Downloaded/purchased PDF : [HP00CV][GDrive]


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References :

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keren_Hayesod

Judge Julian W. Mack of Chicago ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Julian_Mack )

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Louis_Brandeis

Bernard Flexner (born 1865)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nahum_Sokolow

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Menachem_Ussishkin

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfred_Mond,_1st_Baron_Melchett "He is also - along with the Turkish leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk - widely considered to be the inspiration behind Mustapha Mond, one of the ten world controllers in Aldous Huxley's 1932 novel Brave New World.[18]"

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jacob_de_Haas

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ze%27ev_Jabotinsky


  • Louis Dembitz Brandeis and The Cleveland Conference By Esther Panitz
  • The culmination of a prolonged controversy between European and American leaders in Zionism occurred at the Cleveland Confer ence of the Zionist Organization of America [= ZOA], held in June, 1921. Nominally, the conflict centered around Chaim Weizmann and Judge Julian W. Mack of Chicago, then President of the ZOA. In reality, Weizmann's chief opponent was the Honorary President of the ZOA and of the World Zionist Organization, Louis Dembitz Brandeis, who, possibly because of his position on the Supreme Court, felt constrained to keep silent in public. Leaders in the Mack regime sought the Justice's advice on every aspect of Zionist policy and tactic, although the replies of the Justice, except for some iso lated remarks or inferences, are not available in the sources. In the months immediately prior to the Conference and during its deliber ations, it became Judge Mack's lot, as the official representative of his group, to negotiate with Weizmann for a peaceful solution to the conflict, and to bear the brunt of public criticism directed against his regime.1
  • The battle was primarily a contest of wills and personalities, of proper attitudes and techniques to adopt in the achievement of a common goal. The resultant split in Zionist ranks was tragic for several reasons. Nationally, it rent the ZOA apart. Internationally, it occurred at the very moment when a united Zionist effort was indispensable for achieving the crystallization of the Mandate. In a personal sense, it demeaned the stature of two giants on the Jewish scene.
  • The controversy arose from two divergent orientations for achiev ing the goal of the Zionist cause. Brandeis, supported by a small coterie of devoted adherents, saw the reality of Palestine only as state developed through sound economic enterprise, a society man aged by experts, freed, through ample financial resources, to con cern themselves with the physical and industrial development of the land, and with the health, welfare, and education of its inhabitants. Within the Brandeisian arrangement, Palestine was to become a haven, and an economically tidy one at that, for Jews turned Pales tinians.2
  • For Weizmann and his followers, on the other hand, refashioning a people on a land to which it felt itself indissolubly tied through the forces of history and by ethnic obligations, involved a cultural, polit ical, economic, and social renascence. It mattered little if ex pressions of political nationalism merged with a variety of indus trial enterprises; if economic blueprints for the future failed to dis tinguish the specific uses to which funds were to be put; or if, in the development of any financial project, the same instrumentality was to be used both for charitable bequests or for profit sharing pur poses.3
  • In the course of the controversy, the Brandeis-Mack group in veighed against this seeming melange of garbled ends and means, and accordingly reduced its contribution to the World Zionist Or ganization. For their part, the Europeans retorted that the Americans, in their concern for proper directives, had lost sight of the ultimate goal, and therefore questioned their status as Jews.4
  • Such charges and countercharges multiplied on any number of specific issues, which, though clearly definable, were nevertheless interrelated. Implementing the meaning of the San Remo decision, and anticipating the growth of Palestine in terms of the Mandate's potentials, necessitated a clear understanding of the sources of Zionist authority. On this neither the Europeans, speaking for the World Zionist Movement, nor the Americans, loyal to the Brandeis ideals, could agree. Was the World Zionist Executive truly the final arbiter in matters of controversy and was it the spokesman for the movement in deed as well as by word? What guarantees were there that such entities as the World Zionist Executive itself had fashioned, the Keren Hayesod and the Economic Council, might ultimately usurp the powers of the very agency which had brought them into being? Was there, in truth, one decisive voice to define the precise relations of Federations and Fractions in the movement the Zionist Executive? For who was to gainsay that the penchant for economic solutions so dear to the American Zionist Administration, or its denigration of political action into a much-shunned policy "Diaspora Nationalism," was not merely a smokescreen to hide American feelings of superiority over the World Zionist Movement?
  • The premises inherent in such questions were brought into sharper focus when during the London Zionist Conference of July, 1920, Weizmann was charged with having undercut Brandeis' plan to revise the structure and activities of the Zionist Movement. At that time, the Justice, motivated by the belief that the political goal had already been achieved at San Remo, and disturbed at what he deemed was a careless misuse and questionable application of funds by Zionist authorities, really prepared for a radical alteration of the entire Zionist apparatus. He envisaged a three man commmittee, composed of Weizmann, Nahum Sokolow, and Bernard Flexner, an American attorney, in whom would be vested the entire executive authority of the Zionist Organization. Brandeis himself, as Honor ary President of the Organization, would be a member, ex-officio, of this committee. This small group would then be empowered to select a larger seven-man directorate which, in turn would appoint both Zionists and non-Zionists, efficient in management, to head differ ent bureaus in the Palestinian administration. Such departments, buttressed by a series of financial trusts dedicated to both private investment and cooperative enterprise, were to occupy themselves with the economic, industrial, agricultural, and cultural development of the country. Department heads would have direct access to the High Commissioner who alone would be responsible for matters of political policy. Brandeis' plan therefore not only by-passed, but also called for the liquidation of the British approved Zionist Com mission in Palestine, then under the direction of M. M. Ussischkin. This was a quasi-governmental agency, operative since 1918 at the request of the Zionist Organization. The Steering Committee of the London Conference rejected Brandeis' plan on the grounds that it would allow non-Zionists to assume control of Palestinian activities.5
  • It was then alleged that Weizmann, though originally in complete accord with Brandeis, suddenly abandoned the Justice's project. Presumably, unbeknownst to the Justice, and unmindful of the trust reposed in him by Brandeis, Weizmann urged an alternate plan upon Sir Alfred Mond and certain members of the Steering Commit tee. According to this account, all of Brandeis' earlier successful efforts, culminating in a Brandeis-Reading draft, to have Lords Reading, James de Rothschild and Baron Edmund de Rothschild, along with Sir Alfred form a small executive entrusted with large powers, failed. The arrangement between Mond and Weizmann included the formation of a British Economic Council, a select group of industrialists dedicated to the economic upbuilding of Palestine. addition, Weizmann and Sokolow conceived of the formation of the Keren Hayesod, a foundation fund to be used for all purposes, for immigration, colonization, health work and educational services for Jews in Palestine. Monies for this venture, a portion of which were intended for the Jewish National Fund, were to be raised through a tithing system on individual incomes and through returns on eco nomic investments. The American delegation joined in the unani mous confirmation accorded this plan by the representatives at the London Conference.6
  • In an exclusive interview granted later in October, 1920 to Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, Brandeis himself regarded the entire issue of the Brandeis plan as a most unfortunate occurrence. He had never in tended to institute any divisiveness at the London Conference. In fact, the plan had been his only in detail; in reality, it was Weiz mann's as well. Yet at the same time, Brandeis was convinced there was a fundamental difference between his and Weizmann's viewpoint concerning the use of certain means to accomplish ends which they both desired. For this reason Brandeis refused to be held responsible for the activities of the Inner Actions Committee. He had been prepared to assume the Honorary Presidency of the Zionist Organization only on condition that no American become a member of the Zionist Executive. In addition, Brandeis insisted that finan cial considerations alone made it necessary for the American delega tion, after the London Conference, to decide upon a radical reduction in its subvention to the World Zionist Organization. Under no cir cumstances was this action to be considered a secessionist move.7 One result of Weizmann's contacts with Sir Alfred Mond was that he and Lords Reading and de Rothschild, originally intended for the Brandeis inspired executive, became members of the British Eco nomic Council. It was therefore inconceivable that a mere change in structure, rather than a radical alteration of objectives, was suffi cient to initiate so wide a cleavage between the two protagonists. Correspondence from Benjamin V. Cohen, an American then serv ing as financial secretary in the London Office of the Zionist Execu tive, addressed to Justice Brandeis, reveals that the financial and industrial intentions of the Economic Council closely paralleled those encompassed in the original Brandeis plan. Both called for the creation of efficient agencies operating on investment principles, but with allowances made for the emergency nature of the Palestin ian situation to include long term credit facilities, lowered interest rates and the possibilities that quasi-public economic undertakings would yield little or no returns in the immediate future. In truth, both programs proceeded from an idealistic rationale that the suc cessful economic evolution of Palestine was a primary requisite in reformulating a normal society composed primarily of Jews and con taining the appurtenances of government. At the same time, the aspirations common to both ventures were tempered by the view that charity alone was insufficient; it had to be undergirded by sound business practice. During the winter and spring preceding the Cleveland Conference much of the same spirit permeated the many individual economic enterprises in which the American Zionist Ad ministration hoped to engage, and on whose course of progress Mack, de Haas, Flexner, and Bernard Rosenblatt, President of the American Zion Commonwealth, frequently consulted with the Jus tice.8
  • Perhaps to a lesser degree, such hopes for the economic revival of Palestine, shaped by modifications to the demands of business necessities, were likewise applicable to the Keren Hayesod. Despite the objection of the Mack-Brandeis group to the all-encompassing nature of the Fund, with its alleged mingling of donations and investments, the Fund had made provisions to separate economic enterprises and capital investments from charitable bequests. By January, 1921, Weizmann informed Judge Mack that henceforth the Economic Council was to control and dispose of those Keren Hayesod Funds intended for investment purposes. One month later, Alexander Sachs, an assistant secretary to Jacob de Haas, the Executive Secretary of the ZOA, viewed this arrangement as a nefarious scheme. Writing to Justice Brandeis, he contended that Weizmann had effected a close association between the Keren Hayesod and the Economic Council to prevent the formation of separate American economic committee or branch of the Council. Sachs' statement assumed particular relevancy at the time for was then that Lord James de Rothschild, at the invitation of the American Zionist Administration, came to America to fashion a local agency on the pattern of the British Economic Council. So eager were the Americans for their own counterpart to the British economic group that they were not averse to referring to Lord Rothschild's apparent dissatisfaction with Sir Alfred Mond's direc tion of the British Economic Council, and were even prepared to offer de Haas' secretarial services to that institution in London.9
  • Under the circumstances, both the arguments of the Weizmann faction that the Brandeis plan would have entrusted the interest of the Zionist movement to the care of a non-Zionist executive, or the American countercharge that external agencies such as the Economic Council and the Keren Hayesod would usurp the powers of the World Zionist Executive, appeared tendentious. Judging by Weizmann's letter, the Europeans were perfectly content to impose responsibility upon the Economic Council, composed of Zionists and non-Zionists, for developing industrial and financial projects originating from the Keren Hayesod, a fund under Zionist control. The Americans, for their part, jealous of the economic potential of the British Council, hid their sensitivities by accusing the Zionist Executive and Weizmann in particular for subjugating the Zionist Movement to outside forces, the Keren Hayesod, ultimately in league with the Economic Council.10
  • The differences, then, between the Weizmann and Brandeis forces were not to be seen in the economic nature of, but rather in the competition for, business ventures in Palestine, which the British Economic Council, the Keren Hayesod, and an American investment program were seeking. To be sure, the public aspects of the controversy were to be found, as has been indicated, in the divergencies between the Brandeis opinion that economic efficiency was the prime desideratum, and the Weizmann view that financial solvency went hand in hand with political agitation, a cultural revival and Jewish national idealism. Privately, however, such differences were the by-products of tensions over Weizmann's choice of personnel both for the Keren Hayesod directorate and the World Zionist Executive.
  • On October 22, 1920, Chaim Weizmann, having composed his differences with Vladimir Jabotinsky, concluded an agreement where in Jabotinsky, together with Isaac Naiditch, Hillel Slatopolsky, and Berthold Feiwel were to become directors of the Keren Hayesod, while Julius Simon, a European, but the American choice for the World Zionist Executive, would be its representative to the Board of the Keren Hayesod, with a controlling vote of 51%. By the coming February, Jabotinsky would be added to the World Zionist Executive.11
  • Benjamin V. Cohen first confirmed the news of this arrangement for de Haas, and bluntly warned Mack that such a plan would threaten the well-being of the economic agencies involved in the substructure of successful Zionist activity. Cohen was worried lest affluent Jews, who might normally invest in the Jewish Colonial Trust, the Anglo-Palestine Bank, Land Banks, the Palestine Land Development Company, the American Zion Commonwealth and similar institutions, would no longer care to be involved in the agricultural and industrial expansion of Palestine, were such ventures linked with an outright Zionist fund like the Keren Hayesod. Cohen informed Mack that for this reason, Simon himself had been eager to confine the Keren Hayesod to a donation fund. But other members of the Zionist Executive, fearing the ineffectiveness of a system of outright gifts, decided to add an investment program under the aegis the Keren Hayesod. While it was true that Simon had been given controlling vote, Cohen was fearful that in practice, Jabotinsky and his colleagues, who had flouted the authority of the Zionist Executive in the past, would now control the Keren Hayesod, and achieve co-equality with the Executive.12
  • On the basis of such information Cohen instructed Mack to limit the Keren Hayesod in America to a donation fund. Cohen also out lined the possibility of having two separate boards, an American and a European, for the Keren Hayesod. Both were to be responsible to the Zionist Executive. Cohen conceded however that such an arrangement might not only prove wasteful, but also ineffective, since Jabotinsky would still retain a seat on the Zionist Executive.13
  • Shortly before Cohen had alerted Mack to the dangers of a powerful Keren Hayesod and altered Zionist Executive, Professor Felix Frankfurter, a close associate of Justice Brandeis, begged Weizmann not to enlarge the executive. Weizmann warmly promised to honor Frankfurter's request. But the promise appeared almost simultaneously with the news release of the Weizmann-Jabotinsky agreement. Towards the end of January, it became known that Jabotinsky, having earlier in October made his services available upon several conditions, now specifically demanded that the prior understanding whereby Simon retained 51% of the votes in the Keren Hayesod directorate be revoked. Weizmann, forced by an American failure to contribute adequate funds and by the Brandeis decision refusing American participation on the World Zionist Executive, felt obliged to comply with Jabotinsky's demands. Later, at the Cleveland Conference, Frankfurter regarded Weizmann's capitulation as a flagrant breach of trust, particularly in view of a decision taken at the London Conference to bar Jabotinsky's entry to the Zionist Executive. Echoing parts of Cohen's letter to Judge Mack, Frankfurter implied that Cohen's warning had been justified: once Jabotinsky became a member of the Keren Hayesod director ate, he would use his position to make that institution all powerful, and contemn the authority of the Zionist Executive.14
  • Yet seen in retrospect, Jabotinsky's conditional acceptance of service may not have been merely a capricious bid for raw power, but rather an attempt to secure both his and Weizmann's view of the future of Zionism. Precisely at the time that the Weizmann Jabotinsky understanding was first formulated in October 1920, the World Zionist Executive had dispatched Julius Simon together with Nehemiah de Lieme, the Americans' second nominee for the World Zionist Executive, and Robert Szold, an American attorney, to in vestigate Zionist activities in Palestine. All three were loyal to the Brandeis ideology, while Simon allegedly still retained 51% of the votes as representative of the World Zionist Executive to the Board of the Keren Hayesod. They remained in Palestine through November and December of 1920. When their highly critical report of conditions in Palestine appeared, its central theme called for the liquidation of the Zionist Commission in addition to other provisos which not only reproduced many aspects of the Brandeis plan, but, on occasion, went beyond it. Once again suggestions were made that the Zionist Commission be replaced by a small executive secretariat, speaking for the World Zionist Organization. Directly in control of all matters non-political, responsible only to the High Commis sioner, and fortified by precisely the same economic substructure as that envisaged by Brandeis, such a secretariat was to measure all work in Palestine by the yardstick of productivity. Whereas the Justice had made allowances for such quasi-investments of a public nature which would bring little or no returns, and was prepared to engage in projects whose consequent value may not have been im mediate, the directorate encompassed by the Reorganization Com mission of Simon, de Lieme and Szold was to be geared to the achievement of quick results. In terms of methods, this meant strict accounting, careful budgeting, and pruning vital needs to the con fines of limited funds. For example, expansion^ of the country through scattered colonization was to be sacrificed for the more lucrative rewards of contiguous settlement. Intensive land cultiva tion became preferable to afforestation since the latter appeared neglectful of more tangible achievements. Similarly, any immigra tion beyond the immediately absorptive capacity of the country would be detrimental to the Zionist cause. Nor did Palestine's edu cational system escape the American vision of self-sufficiency. Szold, de Lieme and Simon were determined that the Zionist Or ganization progressively reduce its customary allotment of one third of its budget for education in Palestine. While the Yishuv was somehow to assume complete responsibility for this venture, the Reorganization Commission also suggested the creation of a world-wide Jewish society devoted to the financial maintenance institutions of learning in Palestine.15
  • To Ussischkin, the director of the Zionist Commission in Pales tine, the American criteria for instituting such changes on the bases of distinctions between productive and non-productive work ap peared wholly irrelevant. In his opinion, every post held by Jews in Palestine had political or geographical significance, and were not to be abandoned for the sake of any prevailing economic policy. Jewish interests, he was convinced, had to be maintained at all costs, even if they involved a faulty bookkeeping system or the commingling of funds because of emergency expenditures. Ussischkin was con cerned lest an Arab majority with an Arab-oriented administration would undo the work of the Yishuv. For that reason, he felt, it had been necessary for the Zionist Commission to assume the many functions of government, economic, political, and cultural, which it did. To Ussischkin, the demands of the three investigators to elimi nate the work of the Zionist Commission, or, at the very least, to reduce it to a bare minimum, appeared completely destructive.16
  • For Weizmann, as well, the recommended changes of the Reor ganization Commission would have wrecked the multi-faceted Keren Hayesod program for Palestine and the Diaspora, which had recently been placed in the hands of Jabotinsky and his colleagues. Bluntly stated, the Brandeis-directed concepts which the Reorgani zation Commission bespoke, with its distrust of political agitation and an emphasis on a rigorous stewardship of funds, would have denied the Keren Hayesod the two very reasons for its existence. It would be unable to serve as a collection agency, disbursing funds in agreement with the Zionist Executive for a variety of purposes, while its propaganda work on behalf of the Zionist cause both in Palestine and beyond would go by the boards. Had Simon been able to retain his 51% control on the Keren Hayesod directorate, his primary allegiance to the Reorganization Commission would have prevented him from assenting to the political activity of the Keren Hayesod, while his preference for relegating its operation to a dona tion fund would have destroyed its intended multiple purpose.
  • The Weizmann-Jabotinsky rapprochement, however, thoroughly negated all of de Lieme's, Szold's and Simon's efforts as members of the Reorganization Commission. It has been suggested that the World Zionist Executive dispatched the three men in an attempt to minimize its differences with the Americans and their sympathiz ers. If this were indeed the motive, its execution had the very oppo site effect. As a condition for his joining the Commission, Szold had demanded and received assurances from Weizmann and the Zionist Executive that the Reorganization Commission would have full ple nary powers to initiate changes in Zionist activities in Palestine. Yet when he and his colleagues embarked on their journey, de Haas and Mack were distraught to learn from Benjamin V. Cohen that the Jabotinsky-Weizmann agreement also entailed limiting the Reorganization Commission members to an inspection trip. They were to have no authority to effect alterations. Cohen, however, cautioned de Haas and Mack, then presiding at the Buffalo Conven tion of the ZOA, against broadcasting this information. It was also withheld from Szold, who proceeded on his trip as scheduled. Having later learned the truth, Szold then issued a private memorandum to the World Zionist Executive, subject to Haas' approval. In his letter, Szold included the contentions later referred to in the printed ver sion of the Report of the Reorganization Commission, and more spe cifically, gave a detailed summary of M. M. Ussischkin's seeming inability to supervise the work of the Zionist Commission, particu larly in view of the control he wielded over the disposition of Zionist funds. For this reason Szold disagreed with his colleagues, Simon and de Lieme, in allowing Ussischkin to retain political control. Szold would have dismissed him.18
  • Just one month after Szold penned this note, Julius Simon and Nehemiah de Lieme resigned from the World Zionist Executive. They charged Weizmann with weakening that central agency when he added men of divergent temperament to it and fashioned an agreement flouting its authority and moral position. More pointed ly, Simon and de Lieme emphasized that the Keren Hayesod had opposed the Reorganization Commission at every opportunity, limit ing its power and undermining its cardinal beliefs. Like their American counterparts, the two were incensed that other institu tions, such as the Keren Hayesod and the Economic Council, had pre-empted the work of the Zionist Organization, confining that body to the pursuit of political propaganda or "gegenswarts arbeit."19
  • Sadly enough, all of the participants in the battle were both the culprits and victims of such charges of bad faith. From the American standpoint, Weizmann reneged on an agreement with Brandeis, made promises to Frankfurter, Szold, Simon and de Lieme which he did not fulfill, and ordered a commission whose work he then dis carded. To the Weizmannites and Ussischkin in particular, the per sistence with which the Americans intended to apply a plan already rejected at London was further proof that Brandeis and his followers were intent not only on destroying much of the political and na tional machinery of government hitherto fashioned by Jews in Palestine, but were also scheming to secede from the World Zionist Movement. To confirm their suspicions, members of the Weizmann camp felt they had only to look back to a whole confluence of events in America, beginning at the end of September, 1920 and continuing on through the winter and spring of 1921.
  • At the onset of that period, the Brandeis-Mack group, at the direc tion of the Justice, carefully laid plans for radically restructuring the ZOA itself on a miniature Brandeis system. Its component parts were to include a Palestine Department, concentrating on indi vidualized, economic investments for Palestine, together with a wholly subsidiary Organization Department, either supervising the work of the Zionist districts, or devoting itself to mass appeals for funds and to floating loans for Palestine, and an Executive Council composed both of Zionists and non-Zionists. Suggestions for a com plete overhaul of the American Zionist Organization machinery along economic lines had first come from Bernard Rosenblatt, who later, apparently, had a change of heart and ultimately joined forces with those Americans who were opposed to Brandeis' policies. More immediately, in November, 1920, Alexander Sachs embellished the details of the Brandeis reorganization program for the Justice's ben efit and outlined the tactics Mack was to pursue at the forthcoming Buffalo Convention in order to ensure a unanimous endorsement of the Brandeisian revision.20
  • Despite promises made by the Mack Administration that the ZOA would not sever its connections with its parent body, Sachs' suggestions, as had Cohen's earlier proposal to Mack, already encompassed the possibility of forming a separate entity from the World Zionist Organization. After January, 1921, Sachs returned to this idea, to which de Haas had likewise assented in correspondence with Bran deis. Such views only strengthened the European conviction that divorce from the World Zionist Movement was not quite that alien to American thinking.21
  • This reshaping of the ZOA led to several other tragic conse quences, not the least of which was the formation of an effective American opposition to the Brandeis program. De Haas carelessly informed the Justice that circumstances had been set in motion to force the resignation of those staff members who could not agree with them. Since eliminating the Education Department as it was then constituted and reducing the work of the Organization division in the interests of economy were cornerstones of the new reorganiza tion plan, there was no room for men such as Louis Lipsky or Emanuel Neumann and like-minded individuals concerned with Zionist indoctrination, organization, and political propaganda. In disassociating themselves from the leading members of the Mack Administration, these men soon spearheaded a movement which ultimately witnessed the defeat of Mack, Brandeis and their follow ers.22
  • Momentous as the results of such inner divisiveness were for the future of the Zionist movement in America, the Brandeis-Mack leadership at first devoted less attention to this problem than to establishing their version of a Keren Hayesod in America. A letter from Weizmann, entrusting Mack with forming a local branch of that institution, and further assurances from Benjamin V. Cohen that Weizmann would agree to any program once the Americans had settled their inner differences, convinced Mack and his col leagues that they had carte blanche to proceed as they wished. Mack thereupon took Cohen's prior instructions to heart: in America the Keren Hayesod was to be confined to charitable gifts, so as not to endanger the future of any economic institutions. After having sured the more skeptical on its National Executive that a Keren Hayesod was at best a temporary arrangement, subject to the final approval of the next World Zionist Congress, it only remained the Mack Administration to have a vote recorded in its favor.23
  • This was achieved at the Buffalo Convention, where the Keren Hayesod Donation Plan with its strictures against the commingling of donations and investment funds and the formation of investment corporations as part of an ultimate reorganization plan carried the day. On instructions from the Justice, the details of that reorganiza tion were to be left to a select committee, chosen from the Adminis tration's executive. Brandeis did not attend the convention, though Mack and de Haas urged him to come in person. After considerable soul-searching amongst his followers as to the choice and wording of a message to be read for the Justice at the gathering, it was decided that selected portions from his London Conference speech on the Brandeis plan be presented. According to de Haas and Frankfurter, this address exerted a profound influence upon the delegates, who then whole-heartedly accepted the Brandeis philosophy.24
  • It fell to Alexander Sachs to convince Weizmann of the enthusiasm engendered at Buffalo for the Brandeis program. Sachs prepared a letter detailing the achievements of the convention; due note was taken of the defeat sustained by the European originators of a Keren Hayesod resolution in accordance with the London Conference, and of the universal acclaim accorded the American donation plan. Fred Lubin of Chicago, Weizmann's brother-in-law, and newly elected member of the National Executive, signed the note and mailed it to his kin. According to de Haas, Jabotinsky was duly impressed with the information contained in the message and thought that the Buffalo Keren Hayesod resolutions were not too different in intent from those promulgated at London. But Chaim Weizmann remained unconvinced that the singleness of purpose displayed at Buffalo was proof of a positive policy.25
  • In no uncertain terms, Weizmann informed Mack that the Ameri can investment corporations' program and the Keren Hayesod resolutions of the Buffalo Convention threatened the unity of the Zionist movement. Weizmann saw ample evidence of this trend in the deci sion of the American Zionist leadership to sever essential economic activities from the domain of the World Zionist Executive. He was fearful that such American-inspired differences would merely feed the fires of anti-Zionism. Weizmann reminded Mack that references in Parliament to the split in Zionist authority had already cast doubt on the sole, representative role assigned the World Zionist Organization by the Mandate. Therefore, the only two alternatives out of this impasse were either for the Americans to assume world leadership of the Zionist movement, or for them to cooperate with the World Zionist Executive. With this in mind, Weizmann invited Mack and his colleagues to attend an Actions Committee meeting scheduled in London for the 13th of February, 1921.26
  • This time Sachs drafted the position paper for the American Zionist Administration. He informed the Justice that Weizmann's invitation was proof that the "eastern element" had captured the international organization for questionable purposes. These purposes, as Sachs saw them, consisted in the European rejection of the report of the Reorganization Commission and in the disapproval of the American investment program and the Buffalo resolutions on the Keren Hayesod. Sachs also viewed the intended Actions Com mittee session as an occasion for Weizmann to fulfill his earlier commitments to the Keren Hayesod group. The Americans would therefore have had to witness the appointments of Jabotinsky, Slatopolsky, and possibly even Naiditch to the Inner Actions Committee. If, under such circumstances, the Americans came to Lon don, they would be overshadowed by the Europeans; yet if they remained at home, they would be rebuked for their failure to par ticipate. Sachs then decided it would be far wiser to ask for a post ponement of the meeting, and proceeded to give the Justice a variety of seemingly plausible and equally innocent reasons for requesting a delay. The Justice was convinced as to the cogency of Sachs' argu ment and made a notation confirming his views.27
  • By concurring with Sachs' analysis of European Zionist motives, the Justice widened the breach between the two camps, although the gulf had already assumed alarming proportions. At the end of January, Weizmann had been obliged to fulfill the second part of his agreement with Jabotinsky and allowed him to join the Executive. Since this followed shortly after the resignation of Simon Lieme, Weizmann now formed a new provisional Executive, completely at variance with American interests than ever, and which the directors of the Keren Hayesod showed a preponderant influence. By the last week of March, 1921, these directors incorporated the Keren Hayesod as an agency with wide powers engage in industrial, commercial, technical, agricultural, and riety of other enterprises anywhere in the world in the interests Jewish National Home in Palestine. Rules covering returns vestments and accounting systems for this projected institution mained purposefully vague, but there were specific residential ifications limiting board members to the British Isles.28
  • The incorporation of the Keren Hayesod occurred on the Weizmann's long awaited trip to the United States, a trip which the result of an invitation extended to him during the Buffalo vention. But when he arrived at the beginning of April, conditions had changed radically. The composition of the World Zionist tive had been altered; a system to effect the Brandeis plan tine had been rejected and its proponents rebuffed, while an to adapt the Brandeis philosophy to the American environment produced a growing rift amongst the members of the American Zionist Administration.
  • Both de Haas and Sachs, who set day-to-day policy in the Brandeis-Mack camp, were convinced that Zionism needed no propagandists, but only capable business men. Sachs went even further and saw the future success of Zionism dependent upon "efficient sales managers" of corporations. It could be that Sachs justified this view through a misapplication of a comment by Justice Brandeis that the real directors of a corporation were its "[salaried] officials and select paid management committee." Yet de Haas and Sachs and many of Mack's followers were fearful of what they deemed to be the largest corporation of all, the Keren Hayesod. They viewed it as a monolithic institution, subject to no laws of sound economics or legal ethics and destructive of the rights of the World Zionist Executive and the Zionist Organization as a whole. Such concern for the authority of that central body and its executive contrasted with an earlier expression of resentment against the World Zionist move ment. Benjamin V. Cohen was the first to broach the notion of creat ing a separate Palestinian Movement, one which, in de Haas' words, would "eclipse" the World Zionist Organization. During the early months of 1921 this idea gathered momentum; by then Sachs and Mack along with de Haas were quite prepared to accept it.29
  • Other leaders in the American Zionist Administration, who neither toyed with the idea of creating a separate Zionist entity nor feared the far-ranging activities of the Keren Hayesod, grew in creasingly disenchanted with the course the Brandeis-Mack group was pursuing. Besides Lipsky and Neumann, Morris Rothenberg, Abraham Tulin, and Peter Schweitzer, the Treasurer of the ZOA, joined the disaffected. As the controversy intensified, they charged the Brandeis-Mack forces with separatist leanings and with obfus catory doctrines bent on destroying nationalism amongst Diaspora Jewry, so that Brandeisian Zionism at best would become some kind of privately supported, expansive charity with overtones of commer cial investments. More immediately, the opponents to the Brandeis-Mack group were outvoted in their decision to postpone acceptance of a memorandum prepared by Mack's administration with which to confront Weizmann and his followers.30
  • Weizmann had embarked for America to establish a Keren Hayesod which the Europeans had but recently endowed with paralleled powers, and which the Americans, some four months lier, had limited to a donation fund. The negotiations between Weizmann and Mack groups were, on the surface, to center on form the Keren Hayesod collection would take, but Brandeis and Mack and their colleagues knew full well that more than mere gaining as to methods of fundraising or the proper stewardship public monies was at stake. They therefore outlined a position paper, comprising matters beyond the immediate issue of the Keren Hayesod. Proposals aimed at circumscribing the powers of the Keren Hayesod and the Economic Council were so worded as to grant the Zionist Organization the sole right to serve as the Jewish Agency for Palestine. The Agency was to be dedicated to upbuilding the country, but was not to encroach either on the functions of the Palestinian government or of its citizenry. Other dicta included the economic expansion of Palestine under the control of corporate or cooperative institutions, and a de-emphasis on any cultural influ ences the Jewish National Home might exert in the Diaspora. A logical extension of this last idea led to a repetition of that view first enunciated in the Report of the Reorganization Commission: the ultimate liquidation of any financial support in the Diaspora for the school system of the Yishuv. Only the Hebrew University and the Technion were to be free from the effects of such a decree. The proponents of this memorandum also wanted to abolish such control of the World Zionist Organization as was exercised by different Zionist groups or Fractions which had made no financial contribu tions. This last was directed against the representatives from East European countries where the effects of war and revolution had destroyed local Zionist groups. But for itself and like-minded Feder ations, the ZOA reserved the right to withhold donations geared to "Gegenswartsarbeit" which the Americans equated with "Diaspora Nationalism." This emphasis on local determination on the nature or amount of funds to be presented to the World Zionist Organiza tion was part of a larger concept of Federalism. To members of the Mack Administration, and to Frankfurter in particular, Federalism implied a maximal amount of control by individual Zionist bodies. No apparent contradiction was noticed between the latitudes per mitted different Federations by this definition, and the determina tion to deny Fractions, making no financial contribution, any say in the movement. In fairness to Brandeis, it should be noted that he personally disavowed any participation either in the debate on Federalism or on the issue of "Gegenswartsarbeit." Both however were favorite topics with de Haas, Mack and Frankfurter, all of whom boosted Federalism while they denigrated "Diaspora Nationalism" as the political folly of certain European Zionists. In formulating the memorandum the Mack Administration officially bestowed disparate judgments on the matters at hand; Federalism was to be pursued, but "Diaspora Nationalism" avoided at all costs.31
  • This document was presented with unseemly haste to the National Executive Committee, composed both of Brandeis' admirers and detractors. As noted, despite the pleas of the opposition to delay a decision on the memorandum, a majority of the Committee accepted it. A summary, detailing the allegedly illegal incorporation of the Keren Hayesod and the usurpation of world Zionist authority by its leaders, was also adopted. Brandeis was consulted regarding the editing and re-drafting of the memorandum, which was primarily the work of Alexander Sachs.32
  • When, in the first round of negotiations, Weizmann was con fronted with this memorandum, he was furious, and refused to con sider any issues other than the Keren Hayesod. He accused de Haas' of having instigated all the difficulties. Sachs and de Haas had in deed formulated the proposals with the tacit approval, if not the openly avowed acknowledgment, of Brandeis. Yet Weizmann was prepared to admit the possibility of limiting the Keren Hayesod to a donation fund, provided the Americans recognized the authority of the World Zionist Executive. But Mack's colleagues insisted upon adding other restrictions to any intended Keren Hayesod campaign for funds in America. Subject to Brandeis scrutiny, and approved by Frankfurter, these restrictions, which were Benjamin V. Cohen's formulations, included a whole series of safeguards in the amassing of funds. All such collections were to remain in banks in the United States, with several exceptions. The American Zionist Medical Unit, already having had its $50,000 debt paid by the Joint Distribution Committee, was to be a first charge upon the fund, and the contribu tion to the fixed Palestine budget, the terms having been agreed upon by Weizmann and Mack, were to be expended through the World Zionist Executive. Non-Zionists together with Religious and Labor Zionists were also to be represented on the board of the American Keren Hayesod Donation Fund.33
  • According to Mack, Weizmann first accepted these proposals, then abruptly terminated the discussions and issued a manifesto pro claiming the European version of the Keren Hayesod in America. Writing to Brandeis, Frankfurter explained that the more decisive members of Weizmann's entourage, Lipsky, Neumann, Ussischkin, and Schmaryahu Levin forced Weizmann, on pain of disgrace in their respective groups, to sign the manifesto. Frankfurter saw no analogy between the more strident followers in the Weizmann camp presumably badgering their spokesman, and Benjamin V. Cohen, de Haas, Sachs, and Benjamin Flexner, who regarded Mack's pacifism as a threat to the success of their position. In fact, Frankfurter exerted tremendous pressure on Mack not to yield. Specifically, Frankfurter was fearful that Mack, in a desire to settle the differ ences, would agree to two of Weizmann's demands, endowing World Zionist Congress with a greater control in the disposition funds than had been envisaged in the memorandum. Marshalling all his legal acumen, Frankfurter cautioned Mack that he would not be justified in divesting himself of his trust responsibility for the current collection of funds in accordance with the American propos als. Frankfurter was determined to retain American control over the solicitation and expenditure of funds until the next Zionist Con gress would convene. Convinced that Weizmann merely resorted to the "talk of negotiation" to obscure his demands for complete capitu lation, Frankfurter urged Brandeis to impress Mack "with the necessity for dropping his concessions." The response indicates that the Justice had complied with Frankfurter's request, and Mack's attitude stiffened considerably. Frankfurter and de Haas appeared elated at the change, while Weizmann, having heard that the Mack forces refused to relinquish any control over their methods of gathering funds, then signed the Keren Hayesod manifesto. The sensationalism of this impasse and its seemingly insuperable obsta cles were grist to the mill for the Yiddish press, which, in the main, sided with the Weizmann group, but made certain that all the sal vos, fired on or off target in either direction, were always heard by the public.34
  • Towards the end of April, there were indications that Walter Lippmann had succeeded in convincing Weizmann that a talk with the Justice, with Lippmann present, might clear the air. Though Frankfurter himself felt this would be a mistake, he tentatively broached the idea, lest he be judged "too stern against possible mediation with Chaim Weizmann." The reply from the Justice was in the negative; there were to be no attempts to work with Weiz mann.
  • This decision was followed by a later attempt at a rapprochement in May which failed miserably. Once again both sides went same ground. Mack made much of the allegedly all-embracing of the European Keren Hayesod, to be curbed only through safeguards in fundraising. Weizmann insisted that had funds been voted for the World Zionist Organization and to begin with, there would have been no justification whatsoever consult with the American Administration on methods of fundrais ing. Apparently this was too much for Frankfurter to bear. Taking the offensive, he resorted to the principle of Federalism to prove that Americans had not subverted the authority of the Zionist Executive, and that he for one was not prepared to submit to Weizmann's de crees.35
  • The month of May was also a period of preparation by the Brandeis-Mack group for the final confrontation. During this time, de Haas informed the Justice of the need to call a convention, and repeated an earlier plan to have the delegates decide the virtues of an economic program as against the political foolishness of "Gegenswartsarbeit." De Haas' words now had a prophetic ring; negotiations were failing so that a conference was one of the logical alternatives. To this end, the Brandeis-Mack group published all the relevant resolutions on the Keren Hayesod, while Mack broadcast an exchange of communications between him and Weizmann on the April failures. A committee of fifty Mack stalwarts now combined their examination of the charter of incorporation of the Keren Hayesod with other charges against the Europeans. Sam Rosensohn and Frankfurter engaged Bernard Rosenblatt in an open letter on the illegalities supposedly inherent in the formation of that institu tion, while de Haas kept Brandeis informed of their fluctuating chances for success at the convention. De Haas was perturbed that their struggle appeared to be in a "chaotic state." On the one hand, membership applications were being recorded at the rate of 1000 per day, but the views of the Administration seemed to have made no mass impact among individual Zionists. Each district had no clear majority of either pro- or anti-Administration followers, except that the pro-Weizmann tendencies of the New York bloc were considered detrimental to such sympathies as the Administration would be able to evoke from its English reading audience.
  • Adding to de Haas' concern was his estimate of the strength of the opposition. He was convinced they had the advantage both in men and in funds, and in the length of time they were battling. He was also aware that the opposition possessed a "fanatic zeal," lacking in the ranks of the Administration. This zeal, de Haas contended, evidenced itself in the thoroughness with which the Mack regime was castigated for rejections of Jewish nationality, and in the ear nestness with which Levin and Ussischkin were sponsoring a Keren Hayesod campaign against the wishes of Mack and his colleagues.36
  • Earlier, in March, Mack and Frankfurter had hoped that the tice might take the lead in the battle, in which case success would have been theirs at the convention. Now, in May, de Haas returned to the idea of victory at Cleveland. Seconded by the noted educator, Dr. Samson Benderly, and certain Orthodox elements, de Haas suggested that Justice Brandeis resign from the Supreme Court become the unchallenged spokesman for American Zionists. But this idea was discarded and de Haas then agreed with Rabbi Stephen S. Wise that Brandeis was not to be sacrificed by bribing the Cleveland delegates to vote for the Administration. When it became apparent that the Justice would retain his position on the Bench, the theme of joint resignation, first enunciated by Robert Szold, took hold. In the end it was Wise who sweetened the prospects for the future by reassuring Brandeis that should they fail at Cleve land, there would be time enough later to take the leadership again. Frankfurter suggested to Brandeis not only that he remain away from the Actions Committee meeting scheduled for the end of June, but that he also absent himself from the Cleveland Conference and go abroad.37
  • Though his subordinates apparently wanted to spare the Justice the pain of defeat, they did not succeed. One last attempt at peace by Samuel Untermeyer, immediately prior to the Cleveland Confer ence, collapsed as had the earlier ones. The intractability of the positions held by each group together with the verbal understanding put forth by the Weizmannites, though not necessarily by Weizmann himself, that de Haas lose his position, except that he may be elected to the Zionist Executive, and Frankfurter and Cohen be eliminated from service altogether, doomed the Untermeyer proj ect.38
  • There was nothing left then at the Convention to do but to have the delegates choose the side which would be victorious. Again and again the old contentions were repeated, until they assumed a kaleidoscopic quality, depending from which point of view they were retold, or who was hearing them. The rejection of the Brandeis plan and the Reorganization Commission Report; American hostility at Weizmann's choice for the World Zionist Executive and over the presumed power of the Keren Hayesod directorate; European rebuke at American notions of safeguards, penny-pinching, and "Diaspora Nationalism"; these were the topics to which the delegates to the Cleveland Conference were subjected. In the finalvanalysis, such notables as Abraham Goldberg, Morris Rothenberg,vLouis Lipsky and Felix Frankfurter presented their contentions logically and coherently; no extraneous matters appeared to divert thevdelegates' attention. Yet as all great issues are often decided onvseeming technicalities, so now too, once Wise had moved the adopvtion of the President's Report, Emanuel Neumann was able to offer a substitute resolution condemning the course of action pursued by the Brandeis-Mack leadership, which "breached the discipline" of the Organization and threatened its "integrity . . . contrary to the highest interests of the Zionist Movement. . . ."
  • Followed by Abraham Goldberg's brilliant address, replete with appeals to Jewish sentiment, and strengthened by Lipsky's insistence that the American Zionist Administration be repudiated at the Convention itself, Neumann's resolution won the day. It even overcame the hurdle of Frankfurter's last, spirited, tightly-woven, dialectical defense of the Administration. There was nothing left to do but for Mack and Brandeis to resign. They were accompanied by a host of distinguished American Jews.39
  • The new Administration offered its allegiance to the World Zionist Organization. Though the effects of the controversy continued to agitate the Zionist Movement, in time it did adopt some of the Brandeisian economic policies. The Brandeis group itself, after the resignation, proceeded with unabated fervor to implement its investment program in Palestine.
  • A curious epilogue to the whole Brandeis-Weizmann affair was an admission by Sir Alfred Mond, shortly after the Cleveland Conference, that he had never been aware of a Brandeis plan as such. While Sir Alfred Mond conceded that Brandeis had some general notions as to how to proceed, he had not detailed any specific plan. Moreover, Mond was convinced that neither he nor Lord Reading had ever consented to join any executive contemplated by the Justice, and Brandeis was aware of this. How doubly tragic then that a whole year should have been wasted in frustrations, misapprehensions, and miscalculations between two groups of well-intentioned men who may have taken their cue from a program whose precise nature was cast into doubt.40