The Emptiness of Gender

Zac Loh

Editor's Note

While this unessay was written for the Topics in Buddhist Philosophy class, it was subsequently submitted to the The Red Stone: An Undergraduate Journal of NUS Philosophy, where it was one of four papers selected for publication that semester. You may view the final version of the paper in Volume 3, Issue 1 (Winter 2023) of The Red Stone. 

Abstract

Feminism, if broadly conceived as the project to achieve women’s liberation from gender-based oppression, faces the Inclusion Problem, which is the problem of defining the gender kind “woman”. In other words, in order to advocate for the liberation of women, feminists must have a suitably inclusive and robust definition of the gender kind “woman” in order for any advocacy to take place. In this paper, I respond to the Inclusion Problem by drawing on the concept of emptiness from the Mahāyāna tradition of Buddhist philosophy to develop an account of gender which I title the relational account, which states that gender kinds do not exist, and are loci of social relations. I then argue that we should accept the relational account over two other accounts of gender mentioned in recent literature, namely the structural and identification account. I conclude by clarifying that the relational account overcomes the Inclusion Problem by deflating its significance, and I argue that we do not need to define gender kinds in order to motivate feminist action. In doing so, I also argue that Gender Nominalism is equally as viable as Gender Realism in responding to the Inclusion Problem.

Introduction

Feminism, if broadly understood as a movement or project to achieve women’s liberation from gender-based oppression, faces the Inclusion Problem. The Inclusion Problem refers to the problem of defining “woman” as a gender kind to make sense of the feminist goal of women’s liberation (Jenkins, 2022). In other words, in order for feminists to know what they should be doing and why they should be doing it, they must first identify the group of people they are doing it for in the first place; they must first establish the gender kind “woman” in order to motivate a social movement aimed at ending oppression for women. Yet, the category of “woman” is too heterogeneous and diverse in that its members experience varying forms of oppression, dependent on their social identities and positions, that intersect in unique ways. For instance, the forms of oppression that a black woman experiences is a particular combination of sexism and racism that cannot be reduced to either, and is also different from the kind of oppression faced by a white or trans woman. This multidimensional nature of oppression is what has been referred to as the concept of Intersectionality originating from black feminist literature,¹ which poses a problem for feminist movements in general: that feminists must identify and establish a “suitably inclusive” definition of the gender kind “woman” lest they fragment and undermine their own movement through the marginalisation and exclusion of women who face multiple axes of oppression (Jenkins, 2016). For example, the second-wave feminist movement in the United States focused primarily on the issues and experiences faced by white women to the exclusion of black women and other women of colour, leaving the modes of oppression faced by the latter largely ignored or unaccounted for within the movement (hooks, 1981). More contemporary feminist movements like the #MeToo movement have also been criticised for facing the same problem of primarily highlighting issues faced by women who possess a white, cisgender, and middle-class perspective (Borah et al., 2023), leading to undesirable consequences such as the failure to address material concerns faced by women of colour (Williams et al., 2022). Hence, there is an imperative for feminists to launch an “ameliorative inquiry” into how they might establish the gender kind “woman”, that is to say, how they might define the concept of “woman” such that they might more efficaciously combat gender-based oppression (Jenkins, 2016). In other words, overcoming the Inclusion Problem entails resolving the metaphysical problem of defining the gender kind “woman” in order to achieve social and political aims, such as justifying the formation of feminism as a social movement, as well as identifying and resolving gender-based issues along different axes of oppression.

One ameliorative solution to the Inclusion Problem is to provide an account of the gender kind “woman”, thereby providing an account of gender itself, that helps to justify the existence of feminism and contribute to the fulfilment of its social and political aims. Two better known examples of accounts of gender include the structural and identification account. In this paper, I draw on the Mahāyāna concept of emptiness in Buddhist philosophy to develop a relational account of gender as a response to the Inclusion Problem and argue that we should accept it over Jenkins’ combination of the structural and identification accounts. I then respond to a potential objection to the relational account: that it does not overcome the Inclusion Problem as it fails to establish gender kinds, by arguing that the relational account overcomes the Inclusion Problem by deflating it. That is to say, the significance of the Inclusion Problem can be reduced due to feminist action not requiring the existence of gender kinds, and that the non-existence of gender kinds characteristic to the relational account can be efficacious to the feminist project by contributing to the long-term reduction of gender-based oppression. In arguing that the relational account overcomes the Inclusion Problem by deflating it, I also argue that Gender Nominalism, as opposed to Gender Realism, is an equally viable approach to overcoming the Inclusion Problem. 

Gender as a Social Kind

For the purposes of this paper, I shall be assuming the admittedly simplified view² of the sex-gender distinction; the view that sex and gender are distinct categories.³ From this sex-gender distinction, we can then define gender categories as a social kind, which is defined as a group of things, whose existence is contingent on social practices, that share certain features in virtue of which the grouping can be used in the formulation and explanation of true generalisations (Jenkins, 2022). In simpler terms, gender kinds are social categories that we can pick out and make true or false claims about. However, that is not to say that they exist mind-independently of us like natural kinds, but rather that their existence depends on the existence of social practices, which in this case are the social structures and institutions that underlie gender. For example, the gender kind “woman” depends in part on the existence of social structures such as a patriarchal division of labour in society, while the natural kind “oxygen” does not. With the concept of social kinds in mind, we can then reframe the Inclusion Problem as the need to define the gender kind “woman” in the context of feminist advocacy insofar as it helps to motivate and facilitate feminist action.

Two Accounts of Gender

Although there are numerous accounts of gender that respond to the Inclusion Problem, I shall focus on two prominent accounts. Namely, the structural and identification accounts, which focus respectively on the structural and psychological dimension of gender. 

The Structural Account

The structural account, proposed by Haslanger (2000), states that gender kinds are roles or positions within hierarchical social structures such as patriarchal societies. According to the structural account, the gender kind “woman” refers to those who are perceived to have, and subjugated on the basis of, certain bodily features related to the female role of biological production in a patriarchal social structure (Jenkins, 2022). In simpler terms, the structural account states that members of the gender kind “woman” have in common the experience of being subjugated in some way due to others perceiving them as a woman, or more specifically, perceiving them as having the female role of biological reproduction like that of childbirth. For instance, someone who is confined to performing household duties on account of them having the perceived role of a maternal caretaker, and someone else who is expected to take on certain low-paying jobs on account of their being perceived to be less capable by virtue of their bodily features (linked to the female role in biological production), would both belong to the gender kind “woman” under the structural account. The strongest explanatory strength of this account is that it allows feminists to understand gender-based oppression as a structural, systemic issue, given that the subjugation faced by women are most often consequences of their structural roles in a patriarchal society. For instance, problems such as the gender pay gap or domestic violence are partly explained by the gendered division of labour within a capitalist and patriarchal society, with the role of women being that of providing “unwaged household-based labour” to support and maintain the labour force (Weeks, 2021), which in turn results in problems such as the gender pay gap (from the expectation that women’s labour are worth less) and domestic violence (through the privatisation of the family as a social unit). Ultimately, the gender kind “woman” provided by the structural account contributes to the ameliorative project by directly pointing to the kinds of systemic and structural gender-based oppressions that feminists care about. In addition, the structural account is robust enough to unify members of the gender kind “woman” in spite of the biological diversity of its members due to appealing to their social roles instead of a certain set of bodily features, which makes it a more inclusive account compared to other responses to the Inclusion Problem that define gender kinds based on biological characteristics. Hence, insofar as the feminist project aims at ending the oppression of women by targeting structural issues, the structural account is well-placed to offer a definition of the gender kind “woman” in a way that is amenable to structural and systemic analyses of gender-based oppression. 

The structural account, however, is limited as a classification of gender kinds. For one, it does not include definitions of gender kinds outside of the gender binary (of “man” and “woman”), given that it is unclear what social role nonbinary individuals are perceived to have.⁴ More importantly, however, the structural account does not account for the psychological dimension of gender. Intuitively, there is something it is like to be a certain gender independent of one’s social role, which the structural account fails to explain. For instance, one’s internal experience of being a woman is not identical to how one might be subjugated on the basis of being perceived as one; one might view their own womanhood as empowering while at the same time being subjugated by patriarchal social structures on the basis of their womanhood. Additionally, this also means that trans people would be at some point of time excluded from their own gender kinds, given that they sometimes occupy a social role that doesn’t cohere with their own psychological sense of their own gender (Jenkins, 2022). In this sense, the structural account is incomplete given that it sometimes excludes people who we would think of as women from the gender kind “woman”, and as a result fail to overcome the Inclusion Problem. 

The Identification Account

One other account of gender kinds is the identification account (Jenkins, 2018; 2022), which states that gender kinds are one’s own sense of their own location within a social structure. In other words, members of the gender kind “woman” are individuals who think of themselves as occupying the social role of a woman, in that they perceive certain gender norms as relevant to them (Jenkins, 2022). Unlike the structural account where the members of the gender kind “woman” occupy a certain role relative to a social structure, the identification account instead groups them according to their psychological sense of their own social location, which may not be identical to their actual social location (Jenkins, 2022). For instance, the structural role of a trans woman before she socially transitions might be similar to that of a cisgender man, which is different from her own perception of her social role, or in other words her own internal gender identity of a woman. Moreover, Jenkins argues that one’s own internal sense of social location is determined by which gender norms one perceives as being applicable to them, even though they might not necessarily endorse the gender norms. For instance, to identify as a woman just means to perceive certain gender norms as being relevant to oneself, regardless of whether one wishes to follow or transgress these gender norms. Under the identification account, a butch woman and a more feminine-presenting woman would both be members of the gender kind “woman” even if one transgresses and the other follows feminine gender norms respectively, as long as their own internal sense of social location is determined in relation to certain kinds of gender norms. Conversely, someone whose gender identity is not determined in relation to the aforementioned feminine gender norms would not belong to the gender kind “woman” according to the identification account, such as a cisgender man. The main strength of the identification account is that it accounts for the psychological dimension of gender, which is useful in explaining how gender-based oppression operates through it, such as in the case of catcalling, body image issues, and gender dysphoria. For instance, it is not sufficient to analyse unhealthy beauty standards for women solely through the lens of structural factors, as part of how this form of gender-based oppression operates is through warping one’s internal sense of one’s gender identity by unattainable and objectifying gender norms. The definition of the gender kind “woman” offered by the identification account thus facilitates feminist action by not only identifying and accounting for the psychological dimension of gender-based oppression, but also by identifying avenues of resistance to them. For instance, Jenkin argues that the identification account allows feminists to resist the psychological dimension of gender-based oppression by “finding new ways [we can] interpret and inhabit the identities of men, women, genderqueer, agender, and so on” (Jenkins, 2022, p. 245). Moreover, the identification account has the added benefit of not excluding trans people from their own gender kinds, since their sense of self, or their own social location, tracks onto their respective gender identity, which in turn allows feminists to make sense of how trans women might be affected by transmisogyny even if they, at one point of time, do not inhabit the structural role of a woman. In total, the account of gender kinds defined by the identification account helps to justify the formation of the feminist movement by attending to the psychological aspect of gender-based oppression, which in turn allows feminists to identify and resist them.

With that being said, the identification account is likewise limited, as it lacks the tools that the structural account has to explain the structural dimension of gender-based oppression. That is to say, given that structural gender-based oppression partly operates without reference to a subject’s own sense of social location, the identification account thus cannot explain some instances of structural gender-based oppression that one might be subjugated to, even if one’s own internal gender identity is different. For instance, a pre-transition trans man may still be subject to the gender pay gap owing to the structural role he is perceived as having, even though his own sense of social location does not track onto the gender kind “woman”, that is to say, even though he identifies as a man.⁵ Under the identification account, feminists are thus unable to analyse forms of structural gender-based oppression such as the gender pay gap as ones that operate through social structures, and as a result are unable to formulate solutions and avenues of resistance towards them. Hence, the account of gender kinds provided by the identification account is limited in facilitating feminist solutions towards structural forms of gender-based oppression and fails to overcome the Inclusion Problem in this aspect. 

Gender Realism and Gender Nominalism

In lieu of the problems faced by the aforementioned two accounts in responding to the Inclusion Problem, one response might be to synthesise the two accounts to cover the structural and psychological dimensions of gender respectively. This is the approach Jenkins adopts, whereby the structural and identification accounts, alongside a social status account,⁶ are unified under a “Constraints and Enablements Framework” (CEF) where each account is deployed to analyse different forms of gender-based oppressions based on scope, breadth, and granularity (Jenkins 2022, p. 247). Under this framework, there is no “single variety of gender kinds that has overriding explanatory value relative to feminists aims,” but rather that each account under the CEF “identifies real, explanatory gender kinds” that can do important explanatory work for feminists under different contexts (Jenkins 2022, p. 249). For instance, feminists may choose to analyse the gender pay gap using the structural account, while analysing instances of gender dysphoria using the identification account. Before I respond to Jenkins’ approach to the Inclusion Problem with my own, I will first need to provide more context by outlining Jenkins’ taxonomy of approaches to the Inclusion Problem. Gender Realism is the view that gender kinds exist; that gender categories sufficiently feature in true generalisations such that they count as real and explanatory kinds (Jenkins 2022, p. 239). Moreover, given that gender kinds exist, we can thus utilise gender concepts, that is to say, we can categorise and conceptualise the world using gender categories. For example, a gender realist would claim that we can utilise gender concepts, such as analysing and pointing out instances of gender-based oppression, because gender kinds exist; that “[gender] concepts reflect real kinds in the world” (Jenkins 2022, p. 240). Conversely, Gender Nominalism is the view that gender kinds do not exist, but we can still utilise gender concepts in spite of their non-existence. In other words, gender kinds are neither real nor explanatory given that there is no set of necessary and sufficient conditions for being of a certain gender kind, but that gender concepts like gender categories are still a useful mode of analysis (Jenkins, 2022). For instance, a gender nominalist would claim that gender kinds do not exist; that there is nothing all women have in common, yet we can still talk about gender-based oppression and the category of “woman” in true and useful ways (Jenkins 2022). Jenkins’ CEF is thus a gender realist approach to the Inclusion Problem. Although the CEF admits of a pluralism of various gender kinds, it still posits that gender kinds exist, and that they feature in true generalisations across varying contexts.⁷ Jenkins argues that a gender realist approach to the Inclusion Problem, rather than a gender nominalist approach, is the more preferable option, because positing the existence of gender kinds is “the most straightforward and robust way” to allow us to articulate and make use of gender concepts that would best motivate and facilitate feminist action, and that feminists should only turn to gender nominalism as a fallback option. That is to say, if they can no longer manage to be gender realists, or if the task of establishing gender kinds proves too difficult (Jenkins, 2022, p. 240). 

The alternative account of gender kinds I am about to offer in response to Jenkins, which I title the relational account, is a gender nominalist approach to the Inclusion Problem. In arguing for the relational account, I do not intend to also argue that the gender nominalist approach to the Inclusion Problem is necessarily superior to the gender realist approach, but rather that the gender nominalist approach is not merely a “fallback option” to the gender realist approach, and that gender nominalism is an equally viable response to the Inclusion Problem. In light of this context, I will proceed to describe what the relational account is and respond to a possible objection from a gender realist. 

The Relational Account

The relational account, which draws on the concept of emptiness from the Heart Sūtra in the Mahāyāna tradition within Buddhist philosophy, is the view that gender kinds are empty, in that they are loci in a field of social relations. That is to say, gender kinds do not have an intrinsic existence, and are instead loci in a field of social relations. Before I elaborate further on how the relational account applies to the context of gender kinds, I will first briefly explain the concept of emptiness as it appears in the Heart Sūtra. For something to be empty is for something to lack an intrinsic existence (Garfield, n.d., p. 3).⁸ In other words, when something is empty, its existence or identity is always such that it bears relations to at least one other thing, with the type of relation being causal, mereological, or more broadly any type of contingent relation (Priest, 2009, p. 469). Conversely, something that is not empty has an existence or identity that bears no relation to any other thing; something that is not empty exists in and of itself. For example, a computer is empty because a computer does not exist in and of itself, but rather its existence is dependent on that of other components, such as a keyboard, GPU, monitor, et cetera. The sensation of pain is also empty because its existence depends on the existence of the cause of the pain (such as a prickly object), as well as the existence of one’s nervous system that generates the sensation of pain. Moreover, it is not just that only some things are empty, but that everything is empty, for according to the Heart Sūtra “Form is empty”, which means that all determinate categories, such as natural and social kinds, are empty (Garfield, n.d., p. 3), that is to say, they have a non-intrinsic, relational existence (Priest, 2009, p. 467-8). For instance, a natural kind like a water molecule is empty, since its existence is dependent on the existence of oxygen and hydrogen atoms. Moreover, a social kind like “refugee” is also empty, since one’s being a refugee is dependent on national borders, the cause of one’s becoming a refugee, and other social determinants. In addition, while there are several ways to interpret the concept of emptiness as it is described in the Heart Sūtra, I shall be mainly utilising Graham Priest’s (2009) interpretation of the concept, which is the view that to be empty is to be loci in a field of relations (p. 468). In other words, for A to be empty is for A to have a relational existence, and A’s having a relational existence means that there is no self-existent entity that bears those relations, but rather that A is merely an individuated locus in a field of relations (Priest, 2009, p. 469). 

This point thus brings me back to the relational account. If social kinds such as “refugee” are empty, then it follows that gender kinds such as “woman”, “man”, “bigender”, “genderfluid”, or “nonbinary” are also empty. In other words, it is not that gender kinds have a determinate identity or essence that is stable over time and social context, but rather that gender kinds are picking out a set of relations one has with others and oneself that is dynamic and constantly changing across time and social context. While the structural account defines gender kinds as the structural role one is perceived to have within a hierarchical social structure, and the identification account defines gender kinds as one’s own psychological sense of their position within a social structure, the relational account takes a middle path between these two accounts. That is to say, the relational account captures the meaning of the gender kind “woman” as described by the other two accounts by defining gender kinds as the loci of one’s relationship with others as well as one’s own relationship with oneself, in terms of how one conceptualises one’s gender identity in addition to how one’s gender identity contributes to the nature of relationships one has with others. To spell the relational account out in simpler terms, to be a “woman” is to stand in a particular set of relations with oneself and others, such as being expected to wear makeup, being able to openly express emotions, being the primary caretaker in the family, to identify as a woman, and other similar kinds of relations. In this example, it is not the case that a biological or social essence “woman” underlies these relations, but rather what it is to be a woman simply is to stand in these relations. Moreover, the set of relations which a certain gender kind picks out are not immutable, and are always changing across time and context (such as what it is to be a “man” has changed slightly over time and across societies), or are open to revision (such as in the case of Marginalised Orientations, Gender Alignments, and Intersex, or MOGAI genders).⁹ Hence, according to the relational account, gender kinds are empty in the sense that they pick out loci of social relations that are dynamic and constantly changing across time and context. This in turn makes it a gender nominalist approach to the Inclusion Problem. Given that, under the relational account, gender kinds are nothing but loci of social relations that are not constant over time and context, it thus follows there is not a set of necessary and sufficient conditions to delineate any gender kind, and thus gender kinds do not exist. Under the relational account, what we refer to with the words “woman” or “man” are not real and explanatory kinds, but rather are conceptual categories that sometimes feature in true generalisations. 

Why, then, should we accept the gender nominalist approach to the Inclusion Problem, in the form of the relational account, over the gender realist approach, in terms of Jenkins’ Constraints and Enablements Framework? One reason is that the relational account retains the explanatory benefits of the CEF, more specifically the explanatory benefits of the structural and the identification account. Just like the structural account, the relational account can explain gender-based oppression as a structural, systemic issue by explaining larger sociological trends in terms of broader, more expansive sets of loci of social relations. Issues like the gender pay gap can be analysed under the relational account in terms of a type of relation that broadly and often constitutes the gender kind of “woman”, such as being perceived with less worth, being denied access to certain benefits, and other similar relations which we can identify as structural and systemic barriers to gender wage equality. Moreover, the relational account is also able to explain the psychological dimension of gender like that provided by the identification account. Under the relational account, the social relations which one’s gender is the loci of also include reflexive relations, that is to say, one’s own relationship with oneself, or one’s own self-conception of one’s gender identity.¹⁰ The relational account is thus able to account for one’s gender along structural and psychological dimensions like the CEF, both in terms of one’s relations with others as well as oneself. 

Moreover, the relational account is at least an equally plausible account, if not a stronger account, of the heterogeneity of the gender category “woman” that Jenkins’ CEF accepts. Recall that the purpose of the CEF is to unify three disparate accounts of gender kinds owing to the diversity among members of the gender kind “woman” and the varying types of gender-based oppression they face (Jenkins, 2022, p. 246). In other words, given the difficulty of establishing a determinate gender kind “woman” due to the diversity of women in addition to the types of gender-based oppression they face, an overarching framework like the CEF is thus needed to relate the different accounts of gender kinds together to have a more cohesive metaphysical picture of gender kinds that would be more conducive to the feminist aims. However, an overarching framework like the CEF is only needed due to Jenkins’ gender realist views, that is, her view that gender kinds exist. In contrast, the relational account offers a more parsimonious account of the heterogeneity of the gender category “woman” by forgoing any attempt at establishing a gender kind “woman” precisely due to the difficulty in doing so. In other words, the diversity of the gender category “woman” and the types of gender-based oppression they face seems to lend more support to the view that gender kinds do not exist, than it does to the view that gender kinds exist. Hence, it is not the case that gender realism is the “most straightforward and robust way” to talk about gender concepts or that gender nominalism is a “fallback option”, but rather that a gender nominalist view like the relational account is an equally plausible response to the Inclusion Problem in that it is more explanatorily advantaged in its account of the heterogeneity of the gender category “woman” compared to Jenkins’ gender realist CEF. 

It is at this point that one might question if the relational account is secretly just another version of the CEF. After all, the relations one has with others and the relations one has with oneself seem to come apart cleanly as the structural and psychological dimension of one’s gender respectively, and an analysis of the two types of relations under the relational account is similar to how one might deploy different accounts of gender kinds under the CEF. In response to this suspicion, I argue that the relational account is distinct from the CEF in that it does not draw a clear distinction between relations with others and relations with oneself. In other words, the relational account states that gender kinds are the loci of social relations, and that there is nothing essential or substantive that underlie these relations. To assert, then, a difference between one’s relations with others and one’s relations with oneself would be to claim that there are existent gender kinds by which the two types of social relations constitute, which is a claim the relational account rejects. Rather, under the relational account, it is the case that relations with others and relations with oneself do not come apart cleanly, as they are simply just relations. In simpler terms, our own self-conception of gender influences, and is influenced by, our social relations with others. For instance, a trans woman whose self-conception of gender does not match her perceived appearance (as a cis man, for example) may still hold different social relations with others compared to a cis man, in terms of refusing to engage in stereotypically masculine activities or being viewed as a source of (conventionally feminised) emotional support. Sophia Burns (2018), a trans woman, talks about her own childhood experiences when she had not yet physically and socially transitioned, where, even though her outward appearance was that of a boy, she was still somehow expected to perform feminised forms of emotional labour in her relationships with others due to her own self-conception of her gender identity influencing the nature of her relations with others and vice versa. The example of Burns does not necessarily support the claim that there is an essential gender identity, but rather that there is no clear separation between one’s self-conception of gender and one’s social relations with others; they mutually influence each other. In turn, this supports a reading of gender kinds as empty, because there are not different existent gender kinds that underlies one’s social relations as the CEF claims, but rather that there simply is a locus of social relations that together holistically constitute one’s gender experiences. Hence, the relational account can explain the psychological dimension of gender as well; under the relational account, there is no clear distinction between the structural and psychological dimension of gender because they mutually influence and determine each other. From this deflating of the distinction between the social and psychological, or the external and the internal experience of gender, the relational account is different from the CEF, and is robust enough to account for both structural gender-based oppression and the ways in which our psychological sense of gender shapes the relations we form with others and ourselves. 

Problems with the Relational Account

A gender realist opponent to the relational account, however, might still object that it ultimately fails to overcome the Inclusion Problem due to its inability to establish the gender kind “woman”. In other words, while the relational account might be broad enough to overcome the explanatory difficulties of the structural and identification account, it might be too broad to the extent that it fails to establish a determinate gender kind “woman”, and thus fails to overcome the Inclusion Problem. The objection might work like this: according to the relational account, gender kinds do not exist and are loci of mutable social relations, however, given that resolving the Inclusion Problem requires a suitably efficacious definition of the gender kind “woman”, the relational account is unable to do that, and thus fails to overcome the Inclusion Problem. In other words, this objection states that the gender nominalist approach to the Inclusion Problem, in the form of the relational account, fails, as the existence of gender kinds is ultimately needed in order to justify the feminist movement and to facilitate feminist action and projects. In short, to talk about gender concepts such as gender categories and instances of gender-based oppression that feminists are concerned about, we need the existence of gender kinds. For instance, in order to discuss the gender pay gap, we need the existence of the gender kinds “woman” and “man” or else we render the problem of the gender pay gap incoherent or obfuscated. The relational account, by claiming that gender kinds are empty and do not exist, thus fails to contribute to the ameliorative feminist project by being unable to do the important explanatory work that gender realist accounts can do. 

In response to this objection, I argue a gender nominalist approach, specifically the relational account, can still overcome the Inclusion Problem and do important explanatory work that gender realist accounts provide. This is because the relational account is not meant to respond to the Inclusion Problem by solving it. Rather, the relational account deflates the Inclusion Problem by reducing its significance. In other words, I concede that it is difficult, or perhaps impossible, to completely resolve the Inclusion Problem due to the aforementioned diversity amongst women, in addition to gendered norms and standards varying across time and social context. However, the presence of the Inclusion Problem does not mean that feminist projects cannot be justified or motivated at all without appealing to the existence of gender kinds, and that it is still possible for a gender nominalist view like the relational account to do important explanatory work that justifies and motivates the feminist movement. In what follows, I respond to the objection to the relational account by arguing that we can still make sense of feminism’s goals without the existence of clearly defined gender kinds, and that the non-existence of gender kinds can help feminist goals by being an effective pedagogical tool to understand and resist certain types of gender-based oppression. 

Firstly, I argue that we do not need the existence of gender kinds to motivate and facilitate feminist action. How, then, can we motivate the feminist project if we do not posit the existence of the gender kind “woman”? I argue that the thought of ending gender-based oppression for everyone is one possible reason. Mari Mikkola (2016) advocates for a similar position by arguing that gender-based oppression affects not just women, but people of all genders (albeit in different ways), and thus insofar as we want to end gender-based oppression for everyone, we should be feminists. Likewise, we can also argue for this position from a Buddhist perspective. Ultimately, the Buddhist project is broadly to reduce suffering for everyone. Hence, the thought that everyone, in some way or another, is suffering under patriarchal social structures is enough to motivate the feminist project regardless of one’s own gender. With that being said, I will clarify that the claim that everyone is affected by gender-based oppression is not also the claim that everyone is equally affected by gender-based oppression. In other words, I am not denying that certain marginalised groups of people disproportionately face a greater amount of gender-based oppression compared to more privileged groups. However, the thought that everyone is affected by gender-based oppression is at least a good starting point to motivate and justify any feminist action at all. We can accept that everyone experiences some form of gender-based oppression under patriarchy and that this fact justifies feminist action, while also accepting that cisgender and heterosexual men experience disproportionately less material and social harms compared to gender minorities such as transwomen and women of colour and calibrate our analyses of feminist issues and actions accordingly. The relational account is furthermore well-equipped to handle such diagnoses of intersections of oppression, by analysing them in terms of clusters and patterns of violent social relations that, by themselves, can justify feminist action and solutions without having to depend on the existence of a welldefined social or gender kind. For instance, instead of requiring the existence of a gender kind “woman” to justify feminist action, the larger systemic trend of a certain type of violent social relation, such as being perceived as not deserving of bodily autonomy, is already sufficient to motivate feminist intervention and solutions. In other words, as long as we can describe social relations in a way that “carves social reality in a way that is significant in explaining our causal interactions with the world,” then the risk of fragmenting the feminist movement posed by the relational account, or gender nominalism in general, is minimised (Stoljar, 2011, p. 44). Hence, we can still justify feminist action without having to appeal to the existence of gender kinds by appealing instead to the notion of ending gender-based oppression for everyone, as well as appealing to the existence of violent social relations in need of being resolved. In short, we can still work with gender concepts without the existence of gender kinds. 

I will, however, add a caveat that the existence of some gender and social kinds are still needed by the feminist movement in general.¹¹ Aside from being normative grounds for feminist action, some social kinds also act as useful prerequisites for important gender concepts that allow us to identify, and subsequently act against, intersectional forms of gender-based oppression. For instance, social kinds that refer to intersecting marginalised identities track onto groups of people that face modes of gender-based oppression that are unique to them, such as transmisogyny and misogynoir to trans women and black women respectively. It is thus difficult to identify feminist solutions to the aforementioned modes of intersectional gender-based oppression without a clear idea of the social and gender kinds they pertain to. For instance, it is difficult to talk about transmisogyny without referencing the gender kind “trans woman”. One can thus object to the relational account on the basis that feminist action still requires the existence of some social and gender kinds. This is a strong objection against the relational account, and I concede that the relational account, as a response to the Inclusion Problem, needs to consider the role of social and gender kinds like the aforementioned ones in the context of justifying feminist action. Even then, I do not think this objection severely undermines the relational account, because even in contexts where these social kinds are necessary to facilitate feminist action, the relational account is still relevant in that it can provide the narrow and specific analyses of intersectional modes of oppression required for feminist action. For example, while the social kind “trans woman” as opposed to “trans person” or “woman” is useful in indicating transmisogyny as a particular type of gender-based oppression, the relational account is still wellpositioned to build off this initial diagnosis of the issue by analysing transmisogyny in terms of the specific violent social relations it involves. That is to say, under the relational account, transmisogyny consists of certain types of violent social relations, such as simultaneously being perceived as male and being sexually fetishised by other heterosexual men.¹¹ Julia Serano (2022a) moreover points out how recent analyses of transmisogyny in online spaces have trended away from identity-based ways of describing the phenomenon to more relational ways, that is to say, from “trans woman” and “non trans woman” to “transmisogyny affected” (TMA) and “transmisogyny exempted” (TME), which is another instance of how the relational account might provide an analysis of intersectional modes of oppression without appealing to gender kinds.¹² This specification of how intersecting modes of gender-based oppression are instantiated better facilitates feminist action in that it can more incisively point out the recipients of said violent relations and how these relations operate without being bogged down by issues of categorisation and identity, which ultimately allows for more targeted and efficacious solutions. Hence, while these social kinds are useful to the feminist movement in terms of pointing to intersectional forms of gender-based oppression, analyses of these forms of gender-based oppressions in terms of social relations like that provided by the relational account are still equally as viable as gender realist approaches in facilitating feminist action and intervention. 

Secondly, the non-existence of gender kinds can also aid the feminist project by being a useful pedagogical tool to resist gender-based oppression by deconstructing the concept of gender. That is to say, by teaching us that gender is empty, the relational account helps to disabuse us of the idea that gender is a substantial and relevant social kind that can form the basis of judgements and generalisations, and in the long term reduce forms of interpersonal gender-based oppression like casual sexism.¹³ For example, forms of interpersonal gender based oppression like unhealthy beauty standards or sexist beliefs require the idea that there is a substantive gender kind by which we can form judgements about ourselves and others. However, if we no longer believed that gender kinds exist in and of themselves, then we would no longer reproduce these interpersonal forms of gender-based oppression.¹⁴ In the words of the Heart Sutra, once we realise that everything is empty, “there is no suffering, no origin of suffering, no cessation and no path.” (Garfield, n.d., p. 4) Likewise, when we realise that gender kinds are empty, we will no longer cave to, and impose, gendered norms and expectations. With that being said, I will caveat that much of gender-based oppression is based on structural and systemic problems independent of what we might think or how we might behave on an interpersonal level. However, the non-existence of gender kinds proposed by the relational account would still be a good pedagogical tool in some contexts to help us understand the metaphysical emptiness of gender, which in turn may motivate solutions to structural and material forms of gender-based oppression. 

Conclusion

In conclusion, I have argued that we can overcome the Inclusion Problem through a gender nominalist approach in the form of a relational account of gender, which states that gender kinds are loci of the social relations one has with oneself and others. However, unlike Jenkins’ CEF, the relational account overcomes the Inclusion Problem by deflating its importance. In short, we do not need the existence of gender kinds in order to motivate feminist action in most contexts. Although my paper is by no means a wholly comprehensive account of gender identity and gender experience, I hope to have shown how we might begin to think of gender in a way that allows for useful frameworks of analysis in addition to being sensitive to the lived experiences of individuals, in particular gender minorities.¹⁷