Work in Progress
Navigating Centralized Admissions: The Role of Parental Preferences in School Segregation in Chile
Navigating Centralized Admissions: The Role of Parental Preferences in School Segregation in Chile
(with M. Kutscher), IDB Working Paper Inter-American Development Bank, Paper
Abstract: In this paper, we aim to understand some of the mechanisms behind the low impact of a Chilean educational reform on socioeconomic integration within the school system. We focus on pre-kindergarden (pre-K) admissions, which account for the highest volume of applications since all students (except those applying to private schools) must seek admission through the centralized system. We employ a discrete choice model to analyze parents school preferences. Our analysis reveals that the school choices of low-SES families are more strongly influenced by a schools non-academic attributes which are often omitted from analyses of parental preferences due to data availability constraints rather than academic quality. For instance, low-SES parents tend to prefer schools with fewer reported violent incidents, schools where students report facing less discrimination and exclusion, and schools where students demonstrate higher levels of self-efficacy. Disadvantaged families also tend to favor schools that have a religious affiliation, offer more ”classical” sports (e.g. soccer), or have a foreign name. These results have significant implications for understanding the preferences of disadvantaged families and the impact of centralized admission systems on reducing segregation. By recognizing the non-academic factors driving school choices, policymakers can better design admission systems that truly foster school diversity and equality.
Abstract: In this paper, we aim to understand some of the mechanisms behind the low impact of a Chilean educational reform on socioeconomic integration within the school system. We focus on pre-kindergarden (pre-K) admissions, which account for the highest volume of applications since all students (except those applying to private schools) must seek admission through the centralized system. We employ a discrete choice model to analyze parents school preferences. Our analysis reveals that the school choices of low-SES families are more strongly influenced by a schools non-academic attributes which are often omitted from analyses of parental preferences due to data availability constraints rather than academic quality. For instance, low-SES parents tend to prefer schools with fewer reported violent incidents, schools where students report facing less discrimination and exclusion, and schools where students demonstrate higher levels of self-efficacy. Disadvantaged families also tend to favor schools that have a religious affiliation, offer more ”classical” sports (e.g. soccer), or have a foreign name. These results have significant implications for understanding the preferences of disadvantaged families and the impact of centralized admission systems on reducing segregation. By recognizing the non-academic factors driving school choices, policymakers can better design admission systems that truly foster school diversity and equality.
Exodus to Public School: Parent Preferences for Public Schools in Peru
Exodus to Public School: Parent Preferences for Public Schools in Peru
(with N. Figueroa, A. Fontaine, J. Margitic & C. Mendez ), IDB Working Paper Inter-American Development Bank, Paper
Abstract: Due to an unprecedented rise in demand, in 2020 the Peruvian Ministry of Education implemented a centralized assignment mechanism that allowed thousands of students at various levels of education to move from the private to the public sector. In this paper, we empirically explore the determinants of accepting a public school assignment and, subsequently, remaining in the public system. Specifically, we exploit the randomness in the assignment of students to new public schools to causally estimate the influence of distance on the decision to accept a public school placement, and we explore its role in the decision to remain there. We also provide insights into various determinants of parental preferences. Our findings reveal that families care about distance from home to the assigned public school as well as the relative academic and peer quality with respect to their school of origin. Parents weigh these factors differently based on their familiarity with them. Consequently, experiencing a new school environment can alter the significance of specific attributes when it comes time to decide whether to stay at the assigned school. These findings offer valuable insights into how governments can strengthen the supply of public schooling.
Abstract: Due to an unprecedented rise in demand, in 2020 the Peruvian Ministry of Education implemented a centralized assignment mechanism that allowed thousands of students at various levels of education to move from the private to the public sector. In this paper, we empirically explore the determinants of accepting a public school assignment and, subsequently, remaining in the public system. Specifically, we exploit the randomness in the assignment of students to new public schools to causally estimate the influence of distance on the decision to accept a public school placement, and we explore its role in the decision to remain there. We also provide insights into various determinants of parental preferences. Our findings reveal that families care about distance from home to the assigned public school as well as the relative academic and peer quality with respect to their school of origin. Parents weigh these factors differently based on their familiarity with them. Consequently, experiencing a new school environment can alter the significance of specific attributes when it comes time to decide whether to stay at the assigned school. These findings offer valuable insights into how governments can strengthen the supply of public schooling.
Humans versus Chatbots: Scaling-up behavioral interventions to reduce teacher shortages
Humans versus Chatbots: Scaling-up behavioral interventions to reduce teacher shortages
(with N. Ajzenman, A. Jaimovich & G. Perez), IDB Working Paper Inter-American Development Bank, Paper
Abstract: Empirical results in economics often stem from success in controlled experimental settings, but often fail when scaled up. This study presents a behavioral intervention and a scalable equivalent aimed at reducing teacher shortages by motivating high school students to pursue an education degree. The intervention was delivered through WhatsApp chats by trained human promoters (humans arm) and rule-based Chatbots programmed to closely replicate the humans program (bots arm). Results show that the humans arm successfully increased high-school students demand for and enrollment in education majors, particularly among high-performing students. The bots arm showed positive but smaller and statistically insignificant effects. These findings indicate that a relatively low-cost intervention can effectively reduce teacher shortages, but scaling up such interventions may have limitations. Therefore, testing scalable solutions during the design stage of experiments is crucial.
Abstract: Empirical results in economics often stem from success in controlled experimental settings, but often fail when scaled up. This study presents a behavioral intervention and a scalable equivalent aimed at reducing teacher shortages by motivating high school students to pursue an education degree. The intervention was delivered through WhatsApp chats by trained human promoters (humans arm) and rule-based Chatbots programmed to closely replicate the humans program (bots arm). Results show that the humans arm successfully increased high-school students demand for and enrollment in education majors, particularly among high-performing students. The bots arm showed positive but smaller and statistically insignificant effects. These findings indicate that a relatively low-cost intervention can effectively reduce teacher shortages, but scaling up such interventions may have limitations. Therefore, testing scalable solutions during the design stage of experiments is crucial.
Report Cards: Parental preferences, information and school choice in Haiti
Report Cards: Parental preferences, information and school choice in Haiti
(with M. Borger, I. Jacas, C. Neilson & S. Olsen), IDB Working Paper Inter-American Development Bank, Paper recent version
Abstract: This paper studies school choice and information in the context of education markets in rural Haiti. Using a market level randomized control trial, we evaluate the aggregate effect of providing test score information on subsequent test scores, prices, and enrollment. After the intervention, we find that private schools have higher test scores, with an average increase of 0.3 standard deviations in treated markets. However, we are unable to detect significant changes to prices and market shares. These findings suggest that providing information in poor education markets can improve market efficiency and benefit children's welfare.
Abstract: This paper studies school choice and information in the context of education markets in rural Haiti. Using a market level randomized control trial, we evaluate the aggregate effect of providing test score information on subsequent test scores, prices, and enrollment. After the intervention, we find that private schools have higher test scores, with an average increase of 0.3 standard deviations in treated markets. However, we are unable to detect significant changes to prices and market shares. These findings suggest that providing information in poor education markets can improve market efficiency and benefit children's welfare.
Can information on school attributes and placement probabilities direct search and choice? Evidence from choice platforms in Ecuador and Peru
Can information on school attributes and placement probabilities direct search and choice? Evidence from choice platforms in Ecuador and Peru
(with F. Arteaga, T. Krussig, C. Méndez & C. Neilson), IDB Working Paper Inter-American Development Bank, Paper
Abstract: This paper evaluates how new information influences families applica- tions and assignment outcomes in elementary school choice settings. Specifi- cally, using a multi-country RCT based in Tacna, Peru and Manta, Ecuador, we examine the effect of providing personalized information on schooling alternatives and placement risk. We find that applicants who received feed- back on placement risk and a suggestion of new schools add more schools to their applications and were more likely to include recommended schools than other alternatives available. Interestingly, the project implemented in Manta, Ecuador had only marginal effects for all outcomes. The main differ- ence across implementations was the inclusion of outreach and information provision through an additional WhatsApp “warning” in Peru, which was not realized in Ecuador. A lower school density seems to have also been a contributing factor to the results observed in the Ecuadorian context.
Abstract: This paper evaluates how new information influences families applica- tions and assignment outcomes in elementary school choice settings. Specifi- cally, using a multi-country RCT based in Tacna, Peru and Manta, Ecuador, we examine the effect of providing personalized information on schooling alternatives and placement risk. We find that applicants who received feed- back on placement risk and a suggestion of new schools add more schools to their applications and were more likely to include recommended schools than other alternatives available. Interestingly, the project implemented in Manta, Ecuador had only marginal effects for all outcomes. The main differ- ence across implementations was the inclusion of outreach and information provision through an additional WhatsApp “warning” in Peru, which was not realized in Ecuador. A lower school density seems to have also been a contributing factor to the results observed in the Ecuadorian context.
Teacher transfers and the disruption of teacher staffing in the City of Sao Paulo
Teacher transfers and the disruption of teacher staffing in the City of Sao Paulo
(with L. Rosa), IDB Working Paper Inter-American Development Bank, Paper
Abstract: This paper analyzes preferences for certain school attributes among in-service teachers. We explore a centralized matching process in the city of Sao Paulo that teachers must use when transferring schools. Because teachers have to list and rank their preferences for schools, we can estimate the desirability of school attributes using a rank-ordered logit model. We show that the schools distance from the teachers home, school average test scores, and teacher composition play a central role in teacher preferences. Furthermore, we show that preferences vary according to teacher characteristics, such as gender, race, age, and academic subject.
Abstract: This paper analyzes preferences for certain school attributes among in-service teachers. We explore a centralized matching process in the city of Sao Paulo that teachers must use when transferring schools. Because teachers have to list and rank their preferences for schools, we can estimate the desirability of school attributes using a rank-ordered logit model. We show that the schools distance from the teachers home, school average test scores, and teacher composition play a central role in teacher preferences. Furthermore, we show that preferences vary according to teacher characteristics, such as gender, race, age, and academic subject.
The welfare effects of including household preferences in school assignment systems: Evidence from Ecuador
The welfare effects of including household preferences in school assignment systems: Evidence from Ecuador
(with I. Jacas, T. Krussig, C. Méndez & C. Neilson), IDB Working Paper Inter-American Development Bank, Paper
Abstract: We study the welfare produced by a coordinated school assignment system that is based exclusively on minimizing distance to schools, comparing the matches it produces to a system that includes household preferences using a deferred acceptance algorithm. We leverage administrative data and a mechanism change implemented in the city of Manta, Ecuador in 2021 to estimate household preferences and show that considering applicant preferences produces large welfare gains. Our counterfactual exercises show that differences across alternative assignment mechanisms are small. Survey data on household beliefs and satisfaction support these conclusions. The evidence indicates that coordinated school choice and assignment systems can have large welfare effects in developing country contexts.
Abstract: We study the welfare produced by a coordinated school assignment system that is based exclusively on minimizing distance to schools, comparing the matches it produces to a system that includes household preferences using a deferred acceptance algorithm. We leverage administrative data and a mechanism change implemented in the city of Manta, Ecuador in 2021 to estimate household preferences and show that considering applicant preferences produces large welfare gains. Our counterfactual exercises show that differences across alternative assignment mechanisms are small. Survey data on household beliefs and satisfaction support these conclusions. The evidence indicates that coordinated school choice and assignment systems can have large welfare effects in developing country contexts.
Does an education major matter for teaching?: The relationship between teachers degree and student achievement
Does an education major matter for teaching?: The relationship between teachers degree and student achievement
(with M. Drouet, L. Marotta & L. Rosa), IDB Working Paper Inter-American Development Bank, Paper
Abstract: It is unclear whether teachers with a degree in education are more effective than those who are not trained in an education-related field. To further examine this issue, we analyze the rela- tionship between teachers college major and student achievement by using unique data from Ecuador, which, for a period of time, allowed any graduate, regardless of their major, to apply for a teaching position in the countrys centralized selection process. Results from all specifi- cations indicate a non-significant relationship between degree type and student achievement, suggesting that teachers with and without an education degree are equally effective. We also found that teachers content-related and pedagogical knowledge do not seem to mediate the relationship between having an education degree and student learning. Finally, we observe no heterogeneous effects across different student demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. Examining these claims empirically is crucial for ensuring that greater flexibility in teacher re- cruitment does not have negative effects on the quality of the education workforce.
Abstract: It is unclear whether teachers with a degree in education are more effective than those who are not trained in an education-related field. To further examine this issue, we analyze the rela- tionship between teachers college major and student achievement by using unique data from Ecuador, which, for a period of time, allowed any graduate, regardless of their major, to apply for a teaching position in the countrys centralized selection process. Results from all specifi- cations indicate a non-significant relationship between degree type and student achievement, suggesting that teachers with and without an education degree are equally effective. We also found that teachers content-related and pedagogical knowledge do not seem to mediate the relationship between having an education degree and student learning. Finally, we observe no heterogeneous effects across different student demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. Examining these claims empirically is crucial for ensuring that greater flexibility in teacher re- cruitment does not have negative effects on the quality of the education workforce.
The potential of smart matching platforms in teacher assignment: The case of Ecuador
The potential of smart matching platforms in teacher assignment: The case of Ecuador
(with L. Gomez, T. Krussig, L. Marotta, C. Mendez & C. Neilson), IDB Working Paper Inter-American Development Bank, Paper
Abstract: This paper studies the potential of personalized "smart" information interventions to improve teacher assignment results in the context of a centralized choice and assignment system (CCAS) in Ecuador. Specifically, we focus on the impact that a personalized non-assignment risk warning, coupled with a list of "achievable" teaching position recommendations, had on teacher applications in the “I Want to Become a Teacher” selection process. We study the causal effect of the intervention on teachers school choices, assessing its impact on the equilibrium probability of being assigned and on the overall results of the selection process, both in terms of the percentage of filled vacancies and the selection scores of as- signed teachers. We find that treated teachers, in equilibrium, are much more likely to modify their application and obtain an assignment. This result highlights the potential of similar information interventions in other contexts. We furthermore present evidence that the intervention led to increased overall assignment rates and selection scores
Abstract: This paper studies the potential of personalized "smart" information interventions to improve teacher assignment results in the context of a centralized choice and assignment system (CCAS) in Ecuador. Specifically, we focus on the impact that a personalized non-assignment risk warning, coupled with a list of "achievable" teaching position recommendations, had on teacher applications in the “I Want to Become a Teacher” selection process. We study the causal effect of the intervention on teachers school choices, assessing its impact on the equilibrium probability of being assigned and on the overall results of the selection process, both in terms of the percentage of filled vacancies and the selection scores of as- signed teachers. We find that treated teachers, in equilibrium, are much more likely to modify their application and obtain an assignment. This result highlights the potential of similar information interventions in other contexts. We furthermore present evidence that the intervention led to increased overall assignment rates and selection scores
Order effects and employment decisions: Experimental evidence from a nationwide program
Order effects and employment decisions: Experimental evidence from a nationwide program
(with N. Ajzenman, L. Marotta, & S. Olsen), IDB Working Paper Inter-American Development Bank, Paper
Abstract: Qualified teachers are a fundamental input for any education system. This paper presents the results of a large-scale intervention to attract high performing high-school students into the teaching profession in Chile. The intervention was a three-arm email campaign which made salient three types of motivations: intrinsic/altruistic, extrinsic, and prestige-related. The “intrinsic” and “prestige” arms reduced applications to teaching majors among high performers, while the “extrinsic” arm increased applications among low performers. A plausible interpretation could be that the “intrinsic” and “prestige” messages made more salient an issue that could otherwise be overlooked by high performing students (typically from more advantaged households), negatively impacting their program choice: that the social value of the teaching still lags behind other professions that are valued more by their families and social circles. In turn, the “extrinsic” arm made salient the recent improvements in the economic conditions of the teaching profession in Chile, thus appealing to low performing students who in general come from disadvantaged families and for whom monetary incentives are potentially more relevant. These results show that making salient certain types of motivations to the wrong target group could lead to undesired results.
Abstract: Qualified teachers are a fundamental input for any education system. This paper presents the results of a large-scale intervention to attract high performing high-school students into the teaching profession in Chile. The intervention was a three-arm email campaign which made salient three types of motivations: intrinsic/altruistic, extrinsic, and prestige-related. The “intrinsic” and “prestige” arms reduced applications to teaching majors among high performers, while the “extrinsic” arm increased applications among low performers. A plausible interpretation could be that the “intrinsic” and “prestige” messages made more salient an issue that could otherwise be overlooked by high performing students (typically from more advantaged households), negatively impacting their program choice: that the social value of the teaching still lags behind other professions that are valued more by their families and social circles. In turn, the “extrinsic” arm made salient the recent improvements in the economic conditions of the teaching profession in Chile, thus appealing to low performing students who in general come from disadvantaged families and for whom monetary incentives are potentially more relevant. These results show that making salient certain types of motivations to the wrong target group could lead to undesired results.
The market design approach to teacher assignment: Evidence from Ecuador
The market design approach to teacher assignment: Evidence from Ecuador
(with S. Olsen & S. Velez-Ferro), IDB Working Paper Inter-American Development Bank, (2021). Paper
Abstract: We study the advantages, trade-offs, and challenges of employing a centralized rule to determine the allocation of teachers to schools. Data come from the centralized teacher assignment program in Ecuador, “Quiero ser Maestro,” conducted by the Ministry of Education. Notably, in 2019 the program transitioned from a priority based algorithm to a strategy proof mechanism, similar to the change introduced in Boston in 2005 to assign students to schools. Using the reported preferences, we conduct a counterfactual analysis and find substantive evidence that the adjustment in algorithm resulted in greater efficiency for the school system. However, in contrast to the Boston case, we find the benefits stem from increasing the competition for positions among teachers, rather than by the introduction of a strategy-proof mechanism.
Abstract: We study the advantages, trade-offs, and challenges of employing a centralized rule to determine the allocation of teachers to schools. Data come from the centralized teacher assignment program in Ecuador, “Quiero ser Maestro,” conducted by the Ministry of Education. Notably, in 2019 the program transitioned from a priority based algorithm to a strategy proof mechanism, similar to the change introduced in Boston in 2005 to assign students to schools. Using the reported preferences, we conduct a counterfactual analysis and find substantive evidence that the adjustment in algorithm resulted in greater efficiency for the school system. However, in contrast to the Boston case, we find the benefits stem from increasing the competition for positions among teachers, rather than by the introduction of a strategy-proof mechanism.
Does technical education improve academic outcomes?: Evidence from Brazil
Does technical education improve academic outcomes?: Evidence from Brazil
(with P. Navarro-Palau, M.F. Prada & S. Soares), IDB Working Paper, 2019. Paper
Abstract: Despite the renewed interest in technical education, only a handful of studies analyze its effect on academic outcomes. In this paper we apply a regression discontinuity design to oversubscribed technical high school tracks in Pernambuco, Brazil, to identify the impact of technical education during high school on student academic outcomes. We find that students above the technical high school admission exam score cutoff drop out less from high school and have Math and Portuguese standardized test scores over 0.1 standard deviations higher than students below the cutoff. We also find that students above the cutoff were more likely to attend schools offering a longer school day and better school, teacher, and peer characteristics. Comparing technical high schools with academic schools with similar characteristics, we find no differences in terms of achievement but significantly lower dropout rates. This evidence suggests that the estimated effect of having the opportunity to enroll in technical high schools on student achievement may be driven by the school characteristics while the nature of the instructional content seems to be effective in reducing dropout rates during high school.
Abstract: Despite the renewed interest in technical education, only a handful of studies analyze its effect on academic outcomes. In this paper we apply a regression discontinuity design to oversubscribed technical high school tracks in Pernambuco, Brazil, to identify the impact of technical education during high school on student academic outcomes. We find that students above the technical high school admission exam score cutoff drop out less from high school and have Math and Portuguese standardized test scores over 0.1 standard deviations higher than students below the cutoff. We also find that students above the cutoff were more likely to attend schools offering a longer school day and better school, teacher, and peer characteristics. Comparing technical high schools with academic schools with similar characteristics, we find no differences in terms of achievement but significantly lower dropout rates. This evidence suggests that the estimated effect of having the opportunity to enroll in technical high schools on student achievement may be driven by the school characteristics while the nature of the instructional content seems to be effective in reducing dropout rates during high school.
The effects of accountability on the allocation of school resources: Regression discontinuity evidence from Chile
The effects of accountability on the allocation of school resources: Regression discontinuity evidence from Chile
(with A. Jaimovich & A. Román), IDB Working Paper, 2019. Paper
Abstract: This research examines the effect of accountability threats for low performing schools on resource allocation decisions and provides evidence that schools act with strategic behavior only when the accountability pressure is high. We used a generalization of a traditional regression discontinuity design, taking advantage of the sharp discontinuity in the Chilean accountability system’s ranking of schools based on performance measures, and of a unique school level expenditure data set, to make causal estimates of the effect of being ranked as “low-performing” on school spending decisions. The results indicate that, while first time low-performing schools do not change their resource allocation strategy, chronically underperforming schools are more likely to hire external technical pedagogical support and invest in teacher training that may help them boost achievement in the short and medium-term and avoid sanctions.
Abstract: This research examines the effect of accountability threats for low performing schools on resource allocation decisions and provides evidence that schools act with strategic behavior only when the accountability pressure is high. We used a generalization of a traditional regression discontinuity design, taking advantage of the sharp discontinuity in the Chilean accountability system’s ranking of schools based on performance measures, and of a unique school level expenditure data set, to make causal estimates of the effect of being ranked as “low-performing” on school spending decisions. The results indicate that, while first time low-performing schools do not change their resource allocation strategy, chronically underperforming schools are more likely to hire external technical pedagogical support and invest in teacher training that may help them boost achievement in the short and medium-term and avoid sanctions.
Teacher policies, incentives, and labor markets in Chile, Colombia, and Peru: Implications for equality
Teacher policies, incentives, and labor markets in Chile, Colombia, and Peru: Implications for equality
(with E. Bertoni, A. Jaimovich, J. Rodriguez & H. Santos), IDB Working Paper, 2018. Paper
Abstract: This paper contributes to the teacher sorting literature by analyzing equity in the distribution of teachers in three educational systems in Latin America, with different equalization policies, teacher assignment rules, and incentives to work in disadvantaged schools: Chile, Colombia, and Peru. We use unique micro-data at the teacher and school level to describe the distribution of teachers across the three systems. Two main conclusions emerge from our results. First, we find that differences in the sources of funding and teacher salaries legislation can affect the equity in teacher allocation between administrative units. Second, we find substantial teacher sorting across schools (vertical inequities) in the three systems. Overall, the comparison of the three countries confirms that, after controlling for confounding variables, disadvantaged students, particularly those in rural areas, are more likely to attend schools with teachers who are less qualified (temporary and inexperienced) and paid less. One of the most consistent findings in this analysis are the vertical inequities across the three measures in Colombia. In contrast, in Chile, the three measures have an inconsistent and weak relationship with mother’s level of schooling and a moderate relationship with the geographic location of the school (rural). While our analyses are descriptive and do not attempt to identify the underlying causes of these patterns, we suggest that these differences are related to the salary structure and hiring policies in the three countries. We discuss some policy alternatives to increase equity, including the introduction of monetary and non-monetary incentives to attract teachers to hard-to-staff schools, improving the working conditions and modifications in the teacher hiring and assignment process.
Abstract: This paper contributes to the teacher sorting literature by analyzing equity in the distribution of teachers in three educational systems in Latin America, with different equalization policies, teacher assignment rules, and incentives to work in disadvantaged schools: Chile, Colombia, and Peru. We use unique micro-data at the teacher and school level to describe the distribution of teachers across the three systems. Two main conclusions emerge from our results. First, we find that differences in the sources of funding and teacher salaries legislation can affect the equity in teacher allocation between administrative units. Second, we find substantial teacher sorting across schools (vertical inequities) in the three systems. Overall, the comparison of the three countries confirms that, after controlling for confounding variables, disadvantaged students, particularly those in rural areas, are more likely to attend schools with teachers who are less qualified (temporary and inexperienced) and paid less. One of the most consistent findings in this analysis are the vertical inequities across the three measures in Colombia. In contrast, in Chile, the three measures have an inconsistent and weak relationship with mother’s level of schooling and a moderate relationship with the geographic location of the school (rural). While our analyses are descriptive and do not attempt to identify the underlying causes of these patterns, we suggest that these differences are related to the salary structure and hiring policies in the three countries. We discuss some policy alternatives to increase equity, including the introduction of monetary and non-monetary incentives to attract teachers to hard-to-staff schools, improving the working conditions and modifications in the teacher hiring and assignment process.