Embedded Files
Rumbos
Explorations in Cultural Anthropology
By Abdel Hernandez San Juan
and Alberto Méndez Suarez
May 9, 2023
Book information:
Title: rumbos:
Subtitle: Explorations in cultural anthropology
Authors: Abdel Hernández San Juan and Alberto Méndez Suarez
Suárez
kind of Work: Literary of theoretical essays based in dialogues
DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.15930.30401
Contents
I- The hermeneutic Adecuacy. By Abdel Hernández San Juan
The hermeneutic adecuacy
Anthropology cultural from sociology: Criticism of ethnology
The American Sensibility: new cultural identities in formation
The composition in sociology and anthropology
The Defamiliarization of the morph in the logical genesis of the signifier
Types of field work
The paradigms of scientificity
Which is the signifier?
The word "man"
The attention to the common sense as a relationship between forms of language
sense and significance in methodology
Superfitial unconscious
The world within reach
II- The mirror stadium. by Alberto Méndez Suarez
Audiences and Social groups
The cientific from positivism
Lacan and psychoanalysis
The mirror stadium
The image, the specular and the imaginary
Third part
III- The Pre-interpretative Form: Phenomenological and Hermeneutics: Theoretical meta-empirical analyzes. By Abdel Hernández San Juan
A classic read
Phenomenological and linguistic structurality: exploring research with the interpretant in sociology and cultural anthropology
A phenomenology of the self
The Self and the heritage
Three areas of science education
Culture and language sciences: Criticism ofobservationalism and natural sciences
Relevance and intramundane phenomenological structure
Itpreinterpreted: meaning, meaning, interaction and situation
Elements of social psychology
Semiotic theory, narratives of experience and cultural analysis
IV- Mind and Bodies Dilemas.By Alberto Méndez Suarez
About the Mind Body Problem
Relationship of the self with the world
On relativism and the moral crisis of postmodernity and truth in French poststructuralism
On the problem of structures
Discussing Wittgenstein
About phenomenological structuralism and pre-interpretive, acquis and hermeneutic typifications
Part I
The hermeneutics Adecuacy
by abdel hernandez san juan
The adequacy hermeneutics
By Abdel Hernandez San Juan
Hello Alberto, the point is this, I am thinking about directions, to articulate the handles, the shortcuts, to articulate a possible next project that I am suggesting to you, given that it is not going to be theethic, could be theanthropology cultural because I am passionate about my work at this moment and it is a goodarea what you told me you like, now precisely because it is a goodarea it becomes interesting and necessaryclarify some things
I am going to place a crucial problemepistemological andmethodological regarding theparameters own through which I incorporate theanthropology culture in my authorial books of philosophy and sociology, and for this II will refer to my concept ofadequacy hermeneutics, which I have developed sinceparameters strictlyhermeneutics
I would like to discuss some examples aboutas changes the meaning and meaningsemantic of conceptstheorists in itscore hard when we move from someparameters epistemological towards others, for example,hermeneutics and phenomenology versus positivist or postpositivist analytical philosophy.
Thinking about this, I returned to that unfinished text where you told me that your vision was not substantialist, or metaphysical, I did a kind of research on it about the moments in which you tell me what you do not do, paying attention to when you tell me that It is then what you do in their difference, and when you say what you do you return again to mention the logical pairs that are what epistemologically structure the subject/object relations in analytical philosophy, no matter how much it has changed and varied since the old logical positivism of the beginning of the century to the current situation of the intermediate generations with whom you have been working more, Dummer, Davison, among others that you mention, in addition to Rorty, although Rorty is already a pragmatist, or looking back , that is, carnap, quine and others, notions such as corroboration, verification are recurrent in that tradition as well as the logical pairs of the relationship between language and reality, thought and the thing, etc., the logical proposition of the sentence, etc. , it is always that logical relationship, when you are doing an analysis about my books, for example, about something you read in my book “El correlato de mundo”, or about something I told you in "Counterpoints", you can do as it says derrida on Chomsky, detours, you can go through those reflective detours anywhere but you always leave those logical pairs and return to them, they trace and reinforce the logic of any detour, you leave them and return to them, you take the issues under discussion always to your parameters in positivism.
Now, we know that concepts that come from hermeneutics or phenomenology, when taken to the logical forms of analytical philosophy, acquire meanings and meanings there that are not compatible with what they mean in hermeneutics and phenomenology, for example, the concept of adequacy, a strictly and rigorously hermeneutic concept, taken to the field of analytical philosophy and its logical problems, could serve to qualify that rigid exteriority that usually defines there the relationship between subject and object, thought and thing, language and world, saying adequacy as a way of qualifying, of smoothing out the pitfalls and bottlenecks, the limitations of positivism and post-positivism that we discussed in "counterpoints", so suddenly adequacy acquires a meaning related to corroboration, verification, etc., instead of saying corroboration of language With respect to reality or the world, the thought or the thing, say adaptation of one to the other, in a way of softening or qualifying, but it is important to note that there the concept of adaptation, although it helps to qualify a logical question in that context, has lost Even used like this, completely its meaning and logical sense in hermeneutics, it has already lost the hard core that defines it in hermeneutics, what makes it a hermeneutical concept, it has been deformed with that use, epistemological assumptions of background on the truth that regulate and constrain the meaning that this concept has in hermeneutics, the factual adequacy in hermeneutics does not refer to a representational or denotative parameter, but rather on the one hand it refers, when we talk about exegesis, to how the interpretation and reading adapt to the text read or to what is interpreted if it were not a text, what we adapt to is not a passive instance governed by an observation, a perception or a corroborative representation, but is something full of meaning, something that has meanings, for example when, far from being a text, it is something that is told to us, something that someone or another tells us in an intersubjective communication where to adapt is to make our elucidation and its explanation in statements mutually adapt, not only when there is different points of view but in the mere interpretative sense we have to adapt to each other because the course of the communicative situation unfolds within a thematic whole and pragmatically supports the meaning of the dialogue and if we do not adapt it collapses or is interrupted, that is what what I call interpretive arrangements and shared horizons of expectations, then in hermeneutics we adapt ourselves and in general the problems of adaptation, either in the sense of exegesis, interpretation and reading of texts, or in the sense of hermeneutics/ontology, as I discuss it in my book "the correlation of the world", or in my essay "the intramundane horizon" has a hard core of its own logical and epistemological meanings that does not coincide with those of positivism, although of course the opposite could also be said, by bringing us concepts of the analytical philosophy to a hermeneutic and phenomenological field those completely change their nature and meaning since we are not understanding in the same sense the very concepts of language and thought, and therefore neither those of world or thing.
To levelhermeneutic haveadequacy for example in theelucidation of experience as an interpretive activity between experience as somethingempirical, lived, and our reflexivity about it, we adapt when reconstructing what we lived because theinterpretation What are we going to do in that?recapitulation will be related to what we will do or not do, therefore we adapt,here adapting is aweighing hermeneutics, moderate, make more flexible, find a way tocome together with something regarding which ourrelationship It is interpretive and therefore, we must fix the meaning or meanings that we give it,adequacy of the speakers, such asHe said, in their interpretive activity regarding what the otherit is elucidating or making it clear inrelationship to the greater or lesser margin in which theinterpretation could bepolysemous, open indeterminate and uncontrolled unlike a possibility of understanding given in thatclarify or make explicit, in relationshipsontological in betweenhermeneutics andontology, also relations ofadequacy, where the conceptit is epistemologically essentiallycrossed by aproblematic interpretive notcorroborative or background verification eitherarticulating regarding the world.
Howeverthat happens with thehermeneutics, on the one hand in thehermeneutics language is not in front of the world but released to the world, notit is facing the world as something thatit is on the other side interms representational butit is released to the world whereit is living the process ofinterpretation that is createdaround yours and regardingthe how language in adynamic hermeneutics, on the other hand, andhere tried return to more on whatwe could understand as anegotiation enter herehermeneutics via pragmatism with analytical philosophy,negotiation that Habermas began, regarding which it is essential to make some things clear.
On the one hand, we know that positivist analytical philosophy from its origins to its current forms has at various times coincided with thephilosophy of language, both closely related, some of the main analytical philosophers have also beenphilosophers of language andsemiotics has played an important role as in carnap within the questionslogical that govern this, now once thesemantics has that role within analytical philosophy because it of courseyes it presupposes be componential orsyntactic, in the sense of the deep and superficial structure that I work on in my book and that Echo quotes in Chomsky, being related to sense and meaning coincides in certain aspects with the problemshermeneutics that by always being interpretiveare dice inrelationship otherwisealso with sense and meaning, it is precisely that coincidence that makes Habermas make the effort to begin to connect or trace a possiblenegotiation between the problems of hermeneutics via pragmatism and analytical philosophy understood from the point of view ofsemantics.
Now as he does it, first it is true that in thehermeneutics speechit is in the world, butit is in the world released to the world between subjects in intersubjective relations, it is not properly situated in arelationship pragmatic among speakers, Habermas brings theproblematic of Austin of the statements related to speech acts, that is, in the parole in thepragmatic of speech where that language does notit is understood as in analytical philosophy as something representational or propositional, not even as somethinglogical abstracted in itsrelationship of subject versus object, but as aenunciation surrounded by theintersubjectivity, in apractice ofcommunication where the subjectsare talking
clear in austinalso are analyzed,isolate phrases and they are seen in themselves, as much as in analytical philosophy, however, not as propositions, nor as their internalitylogic or with respect to a world in a representational sense, but despite this there is that coincidence in which phrases are seen, then we have two coincidences, the first, thehermeneutics works with sense and meaningimplicit and budgets as central for theinterpretation, (also thesemantics, which has become important inphilosophy of language in the analytic tradition), the second, moving towards Austin, in nothing related to thehermeneutics, we find that yourtheory of the speech acts thatalso isolated phrases, however, in Austin it was not aboutas the language isconnect to the world representationally or propositionally, but ratheras one is givenrelationship between the phrase and thepractice between subjects whoare talking.
So there is with Austin arelationship between language and the world but neither representational norlogical propositional, butpractice due to the way in which language acts in speech acts.lean in apractice ofcommunication between subjects,understand which is not about austinlogic predicative relative to themlinks between subject and predicate fromaristotle, but to the performatives of language related to what connects an oral phrase to apractice in acommunication, certainly Austin speakers do notare properly discussed asinterpreters are further GOODaccording to you see there are more in onesituation pragmatic, but undoubtedly speaking between subjects is somethingalso interpretive, in this way the idea of the world changes completely, that is, let us remember that the concept of the world in analytical philosophy is heir to the concept of the thing in the strict positivist sense of Comte thatalso and dabadurkheim This governs analytical philosophy from the beginning, but here it is not that object/thing world for language or thought, understood as a thing, but rather it is the world in which languageit is once located in apractice of muteexplanation.
Now, as at the same timeit is Isolated that phrase it builds a bridge, what does there be more?, it brings theanalysis of theperformative of austin differentiating in that, forms of the phrase that modify the course that the speakers' speech takes, what they say, as a first mode of the performatives,there we have onemodification frompractice for the words,is latest affect what is said or left unsaid, this is a sentence/practice connection, which then differentiates it from forms of the sentence that modify the whole of the sentence.conversation not only what was said but the general structure of the discourse, that is a second performative modality ofrelationship ofmodification between the phrase and thepractice, and finally forms of the phrase that presuppose completely changing the action, that is, for example, stopping talking, that is, performatives that modify the experience.practice, third way the phrase connects with thepractice.
Once again we must focus on the fact that these are three different concepts of the world, one, that ofhermeneutics It is a world in which languageit is released between speakers andinterpreters in the communitylinguistics, where the world surrounds language, not remaining on its other side like arepresentation, but between subjects in intersubjective relations, another, that of Austin's speech acts, where the real world is nothing other than thepractice, that is, deciding thatcarry in the world onecommunication oral between people, and third, the idea of the world as a thing or object, representationalist, or propositional that we have in analytical philosophy. We could say that with Austin, language in that way does connect with the world, however, in another way very different,llamémosle practical Opragmatic, but because speakers in Austin enunciate andagainst state in orality,also can be understoodhermeneutically.
ForksSo how one seeks to try to articulate therelationship between language andpractice, reconcile ahermeneutics that supposes meaning, meaning, via pragmatism with thesemantics andSo at the end of being possible with analytical philosophy, but that's where it would come fromnegotiation initiated by habermas, now, both inhermeneutics As in Austin's speech acts, relations with the world do not refer tothey respect to corroborations, verifications or articulations but become problems ofethic, ofrelationship ethic between language and world, and thisI would be thenegotiation Habermasian between the three traditions, if the subjectsare in arelationship interactive the world no longerit is from the other side of the language likerepresentation but located in theinterpretation, Howeverwhich is the price, whichconstrains thehermeneutics to issues related to consensus due, on the one hand, to the fact that in Austin's three performative modes therelationship between phrase andpractice isfurther pragmatic than hermeneutics, speakers must obtain consensus in its three modes, which is still attractive, but it also leads to problems ofethic of speech, that is hisnegotiation
But as I told you in an essay that I sent you, I am not going in that direction exactly, although I use those things and have incorporated them, my position maintains the pure objectives of hermeneutics both in the sense of the place that interpretation has in the phenomenenological sociology of alfred shutz where everything, at least according to my own theoretical elaborations of the problems in question, is interpretation, including the most articulated forms of experience, where the heritage and interpretation make up the very structure of meaning of the life world and ontology same phenomenomology of the world of life and the organization of experience and then in the Gadamerian sense as well as in the exegetical sense, that is to say that I work from what could be understood as a radicalized hermeneutics, I do not deny that I have incorporated some Habermasian aspects – and all this that I have discussed when defining a Habermasian negotiation is already a lot of my reflections and are my own elaborations--but if I have incorporated it it is not to go in the direction in which there will be more, my direction is cultural anthropology Like you, virtuously, in those summaries you made, you summarized very well.
Cultural Anthropology from Sociology: Criticism of Ethnology
Abdel Hernandez San Juan:
In principle Iwanted to catch up on some clearances and someparameters on which I am working and thatare based on the reasons why I am working theanthropology culture regulated by thesociology, let's talkhere well ofadequacy hermeneutics, theanthropology I adapt it culturallyhermeneutically fromparameters disciplinary ofsociology and not to thereverse, and in the wayspecific How does it come into my way of working?sociology, on the one hand, and thecriticism of art, on the other, wherealso ventured theanthropology cultural
There would be aproblematic ethnological whatwould have have to be made explicit, that is, answers that I have given myself to questionsethnological and around which I have been specifying my own perspectives and positions, there are several dilemmasethnological which I consider bottlenecks,pitfalls, unresolved things, problems, when theanthropology culture is intertwined withethnology There are a series of very contradictory diatribes that have made me separate cultural anthropology from ethnology, which I hope does not discourage you since you like Levi Strauss for whom.ethnology is very important in youranthropology but I keep them very separate, it doesn't mean that I don'ttook into account elementsethnological but in a very peculiar way thatI would be interesting you understand.
Let's go to your reference points todo it further familiar to your parameters, you sent me thedialogue by Rorty and Geertz where the problem ofacculturation that is, the problem of ethnocentrism and cultural relativismthere rorty se define a itself asethnocentric from the point of view that he recognizes or says that for his own process, that is, the process of the liberalbourgeois contemporary United States lives asacculturation it distances it in an important way from whatI would be thetransculturation, thisasseveration rorty yoI would want point out, although you will see it because probably not rorty but the perspectiveUnited States of this problem you may have difficulty understanding unless you areAmericans who have traveled to the Caribbean and know it or have gone to Brazil and other countries inSouth America, but let's say the one who has not come or has done little and does not know enough, which in reality is exactly the same process
us
You and I, for example, and thousands of Cubans and others who live in the Caribbean and South America have experienced the same process of what Rorty calls acculturation, that ethnological notion, which is nothing other than drawing attention to a series of structures. of social and cultural reproduction that have arrived from Europe that have been inscribed in the way society functions and that these structures replaced the cultural formations that were native here, which would be the Native Americans and then the Africans, it is a way of See the issue that since it is ethnological it is contradictory, we could say the same thing, we also have and are those processes of acculturation, I read yesterday a professor from the University of Berkeley who said I am white, not Native American, what We ourselves could say, we are white, non-Native Americans, but there it is already racialized and the problem is seen from an ethnological point of view. However, I consider that what is really relevant to understand that difference that in ethnology is reflected between acculturation and transculturation, is to understand it from the sociological point of view, that is, to understand that these societies, regardless of whether they are economically less developed and subordinated five centuries ago from the point of Max Weber and Emile Durkeim in sociology, entered the European process of social differentiation that generated, on the one hand, the process of secularization analyzed by Max Weber, which was the separation between science, art, religion, morality and law that were previously united in the medieval and premedieval world, but had not been differentiated and separated internally.
It is about the process that, from the point of view of an evolutionary sociology, later led to overspecialization, the fact that knowledge is divided into disciplines, the arts into specialties, and we reproduce ourselves culturally through social overspecialization, through that gradual process. of secularization, in the United States and in Europe, the central countries, there is awareness regarding this, there is a poorly completed and poorly informed knowledge about the extent to which these societies structurally reproduced five centuries ago from these two perspectives and I would also mention Durkeim, What would be the perspective that through the concept of social consciousness and collective consciousness highlights that what for Weber is evolutionism, in terms of a synchronic sociology is social division of consciousness and social division of labor, these two notions are structuring, no longer only of the forms of governmentality or democracy, capitalist or socialist, the ideology or the ideological system does not matter, they are societies that believe more or less in the state, in any case the state itself is as an institution a secular institution, it was born and emerged, it is formed as a result of that secularization, and whether the state has greater or lesser preponderance in societies more inclined to social democracy, neoliberal capitalism or socialism, in any case they are all regulated by these two processes explained by Weber and Durkeim, so that the racial problem, the fact that we are black, white or Indian is not important.
In this sense, there is a black woman who cleans houses and at the same time is a specialist in microships, and there is another black woman who is either an electrician or an electrical engineer and there is an Indian woman who is either a nurse or an internet specialist, all the programs you run on the internet require specialists and we live in a secularized world, all those structures of social reproduction that govern these societies are ignored in the central countries, therefore for a person like Rorty to distinguish between acculturation and transculturation, which would be the ethnological way of seeing This, acculturation would be that here there were Indians and then blacks and it was the whites who brought all this that I just analyzed in terms of sociology but that there is an acculturation because the Indians and the blacks are not like that or because the ethnological process of creolization or miscegenation is contradictory with those structural processes that would be the so-called processes derived from colonialism.
I have serious objections to all this that has led to the problem of postcolonialism anddecolonization, I consider that thislast is theideology what he intends, invoking therelationship in ethnology of the races and ethnicities that coexist with whites in these societies asalso In the United States, it is theideology that aims to dismantle the relationships of cultural subjectivity with these structural processes oftraining andreproduction of culture and society, is something that is reflected in issuesalso very interesting.
Let's say, for example, you and I form ourselves, our girlfriends, your mother, mine, our friends, we form an idea of a person who is the person we have been, which is the same person that Piagget discusses in his books, and we We form in an idea of a subsystem where the individual is seen functionally as different from the cultural and the social, in functional terms in Talcon Parson, and we function from the point of view of the self and the social in the same way that George Helbert discusses it. mead, who are sociologists in these last two cases, American states, but for an American state, not for everyone, but for example, for Rorty, his is a vision that would deny that you or I and any person who may have been born in Cuba, the Caribbean or South America could be that person described by Piaget, Mead, or Parson, they believe that this person only exists in the United States and Europe, this is ethnocentrism, what European or American psychologists, philosophers or sociologists discuss. According to Rorty's ethnocentrism, it can only refer to the person and the European or American individual, erroneous, scientifically false, incorrect, we, you and I, who were born in the Caribbean, have been that person since childhood and it has been like this since before our great-great-grandparents. That is to say, it has been like this for centuries, they don't know that we have been that person since childhood, and for centuries.
So there are many pitfalls in this matter on the one hand, the ethnocentrism that isself refers rorty and on the other in this matter of thedecolonization and I see it closely related to neocolonialism, that is, I believe thatdecolonization It is a necessity of relationshipsdomination and subalternityeconomic between the south and the north, that it is a necessity of neocolonialism to decolonize these cultures, so that they are notfrom the colonies that from the colonial heritage innovate thetradition colonial, for example, we, you and I, are talking about all thesetheories What are theyparameters oftheories Anglo-Saxon or European, but notwe could let's never say innovate thattradition because they are European or Anglo-Saxon which is the ethnocentrism that Rorty refers to, notwe can innovate thattradition because somehow weIt would denying the colonial heritage, the heritage in which we have been reproducingfurther of five centuries and in which and from which we think.
TheyI would want point out as jean saysguessed, andsociologist French of the theater, whichtraining of the self that defines the personcontemporary Nor was it a simple process in Europe but a processtraumatic and verydifficult from the Middle Ages to the 19th century, the progressive and very slowtraining of what we understand as the individual in theterms in which we speak since Hegel of the self and consciousness, Iwould say this side.
So, theanthropology cultural when seen from the point of viewethnologic it is full of contradictions, I have an essay titled "The subject, naming and substance in social sciences", a very interesting essay where I analyze whatit is happening today inethnology with the concept ofdiaspora which is a concept that has become very attractive in theethnology and theanthropology, but I observe that it reveals contradictions that theanthropology culturalif you have whenEthnology interms of his inability to grasp the conceptsphenomena cultural thatthese conceptsenclose in a truly objective wayterms of social sciences.
The concept of diaspora is a concept that, viewed from the point of view of what Deleuze calls the nomadization of subjectivity in advanced capitalism related to the problem of the free market, the phenomenon of globalization and multiculturalization of Europe and the United States is has presented for the purposes of the native American culture as, - which I feel mine due to the number of long and extensive years that I have lived there -, as an interesting alternative, that is, the idea of diasporicity in subjectivity , given by those truncated forms of multiculturalism that are inscribed in the contemporaneity of an American city, that is, I am making here an important distinction also with respect to ethnology, multiculturalism in the United States and Europe on the one hand, and processes of mixtures culture in South America and the Caribbean, on the other hand, given that here there are also whites, blacks and Indians in the streets, but they are blacks and Indians who arrived three centuries ago, that is, ethnological processes of cultural mixtures that occurred a long time ago, not They are cultures that have arrived recently, that have become contemporary for Cuba within its own current contemporaneity, let's say that there were Japanese, Pakistanis, Indians, Arabs here, who arrived recently, as there are in the United States who will participate in the contemporaneity of art. and Cuban culture accepted multiculturally as active exponents of that contemporaneity, which is what happens communally in the United States and Europe, a reflection of development, what is happening? that hemulticulturalism has generated aattraction great in native, European andAmericans Anglo-Saxon because there is onerelationship interesting amongnomadization of the subjectivity thatit is living capitalism anddiasporicity as a component of that thing split from the culture of origin of the new cultures that participate in the United States and Europe, and that in some way in the face of the process ofhomogenization which connotes thetechnology, commerce andgentrification, the excessive comfort that has been achieved there, since in some way they are components that are not a native part of the local traditions of the United States but that help thereculturization of a society in whichit is losing cultural identity due to the process ofhomogenization to which modernity leadstechnological and market
All this has no other objective than to point out that the dilemmas are exactly the same although many native American intellectuals do not know it, Rorty himself is a case, the same dilemma that the white American state has is the same one that we have, we do not We are Baracoa Indians, we are not Ciboneyes, we are Spanish or French that our relatives emigrated here, but at the same time Americanity, the Americanity that Rorty feels when he says I am American, you cannot define it without taking into account the native Indians because although Whether they are different ethnological phenomena, they co-participate and coexist in the same contemporary reality and this coexistence entails complex allosemiotic processes through which cultural identities are formed, processes of multi-ethnic coexistence that have an influence on sensitivity and subjectivity and therefore Although they cannot be seen as united, they can be seen as processes of cultural identity formation that are taking place through transculturation, which is a bit what Ortiz was talking about with respect to Cuban processes, that is, while it is acculturation that coincides with the understanding of Weberian and Durkeinian structural reproduction that I explained before or the concepts of person that are in our education, it is transculturation that explains the cultural processes of formation of new identities that have to do with interethnic learning in these coexistence
In that essay I show how the relationship between the name, the substance and the subject becomes contradictory around the accuracy and objectivity of the concepts in anthropology and I give the example of the concept of diaspora, which while it serves for this recently explained phenomenon about the nomadization of subjectivity in advanced capitalism, where there is immigration, emigration, migration, has begun to be used for other phenomena inconsistent with it, such as the way in which the national sees what emerges from it and ends up somewhere else. place, Cuba 'for example, see as diaspora what splits and leaves, for example, you are in the diaspora, those two concepts, the diasporization of subjectivity in a nomadic sense in capitalism and the diaspora seen from the nation as something that is comes from it and ends up somewhere else, they are anthropologically completely different things and they want to be enclosed in the same concept, the same thing happens with African emigration here for centuries they have also enclosed it in the same concept as a diaspora, and when you come Let's see what the Indians experienced in the United States when they resettled, their lands were taken away and they were placed in new lands. All of this is diaspora, the concept says everything and says nothing and that happens with concepts in cultural anthropology that have a basis ethnological, so that personally, although I have some essays in which to define my cultural anthropology I have had to raise these problems, I am really working on it separately from ethnological concepts because I think that through ethnology, cultural anthropology has very few possibilities of being a science, so I am doing it from sociology, and I am very fascinated and dedicated. I have dedicated myself to seeing how cultural anthropology can work from my sociology.
The American Sensibility: new cultural identities intraining
Abdel Hernandez San Juan:
Paradoxically, the cross-cultural processes that Rorty refusesthere when he talks aboutacculturation Front oftransculturation, they are true, I havenewly analyzed, what are the reasons and reasonssociological to talk no more aboutacculturation, but of a process that must be understoodfurther sociologically that in a wayethnological?, the ethnological understanding of the problem is very weak in my opinion, it is not so important that we have acculturated as that sociologically we have secularized ourselves and we have overspecialized and that work has been socially divided and we have differentiated ourselves and we are the same person as Piaget , and the same person of Parson and the same person of the self that Duvinaut speaks of, who was formed in Europe in Hegel and Kant, and the same person of Helbert Mead, which is what very few intellectuals and people in the United States understand regarding South America. and the Caribbean, but at the same time it is also true that the process of transculturation is of extreme importance because although it refers to dynamics through which intercultural and interethnic coexistence, multiethnic learning not only between different racialities but between cultural resonances of the cultures that coexist, for example African culture is very strong, as you know, in music, in rituals, in values, in material culture, in visual culture, the same thing happens with the Andean culture in South America, a beautiful material culture that produces all that Amerindian culture. from the south that undoubtedly participates in a transcultural way, not only committing, as decolonization intends, to getting rid of the structures of social reproduction that came with colonialism, but rather participating in the formation of something new resulting from multiethnic learning related to coexistence, especially at an alosemiotic level, related to the fact that several cultural resources coexist within the same affirmation of contemporaneity and there is what I call processes of formation of new cultural identities.
But the processes oftransculturation in contrast to theacculturation they are not important only oronly inMexico, the Caribbean orSouth America, they arealso in the United States to the United States itself.
I have an essay called "Aanalysis of cross-cultural redundancies" that analyzes thefreak fromtraining of new intercultural identities andmultiethnic in betweenMexico and the united states both towards the texas and united states side and towards theMexico, where I analyze two processes oftransculturation what each culturelived byherself and the one whoit is Living therelationship between the two cultures, you would have to read that essay to understandthat relevance have the processes oftransculturation which Rorty refuses, are not processes that involve or aim to decolonize ordecolonize thestructures ofreproduction social levelsociological but they have to do with sensitivity,training of cultural identities resulting from theinteraction intercultural and learningmultiethnic
On the other hand, I wanted to tell you that the same dilemma that makes identical the problem that Rorty has when he defines himself as an acculturated bourgeois liberal with respect to the native American Indian or the black African when when defining himself as an American he has to resort, he has to come into contact With the idea of Americanity, it has to take into account how the Native American Indian participates in the contemporary cultural sensitivities of the American cultural identity in American formation. It happens in Cuba too, although in Cuba the Ciboneyes Indians were razed, for example, but You see it in South America in Venezuela, for example, where you have a number of groups coexisting there, the Baris, the Yuxpas, the Arawako Wayues, a number of indigenous groups that coexist with the contemporaneity of the Venezuelan, as I analyze in my essay "semantic elucidation" where I discuss As Venezuelan Spanish is completely filled with phonologies and semantic processes permeated by Amerindian ways of speaking, when in itself it is a non-Amerindian culture, Canarian Venezuelan is that of the city, and I analyze how these identity formations participate in the material culture and in visual culture in the markets where you see the imbrication of the Amerindian markets with the contemporary capitalist market, that is, the processes of transculturation are important without a doubt, but not to the point or in any sense related to a problem that has implications for what What would be decolonization?
On the other hand youwanted to say again oncefurther from a perspective that moves away from your taste for Levis Strauss in whom not only ethnology and cultural anthropology work together but the way in whichhe related to diffusionism and evolutionism in itsanthropology is different from thetight, due to the way I work fromsociology disciplinary I am not referring to the use ofsociology byanthropology, in the perspective of Levi Strauss as well as evolutionism in general, there was this whole inheritance ofanthropology colonial where they compare theneolithic and thepaleolithic or the venus de milo in the process from the caveman to how it was from thecondition primitive towards barbarism andcivilization analyzed by lewis henrry morgan
andstill in levis strauss although he undoubtedly provides an interesting perspective,still it is that idea of going to look forpaleolithic who lives with us to go look for theneolithic that lives with us, to the primitive that lives with us separately,it is that idea of cutting out a book about it as something separate as if brasilia, sao paulo did not exist, as if a culture did not existBrazilian modern andcontemporary with which those culturesamerindias are ininteraction and to study them inyes let's say that thehopis Americansthey would have to be studied asneolithic who live with us in the United States
This evolutionary perspective is contradictory to theperspective ancentralist that seeks in those cultures from the ritual point of view a kind of descendants as cultures of the native American, and I say native Americans because we are native Americans because we were bornhere inAmerica We are not our grandparents or great-grandparents who were born inSpain We were born here in America and in that we agree with the Amerindians where they are active. We agree that we were born inAmerica and as such there isover there in the processes oftraining of sensitivity and identityvia material and visual culturecontradiction between thetheories that are implicated in these communities ascontemporary coexisting with evolutionists who see them asneolithic late wanted to tell you that I separate myself from all this becausesociologically it looks differentyou would have than read my booksempirical where many of these things are discussed.
Thecomposition in sociology and anthropology
Abdel Hernandez San Juan:
The essays that I sent you by gmail in their contentare related to sounds two and three where I clarify issues involved in insoluble diatribes andaporias that confronts theanthropology cultural toentangle with theethnology that seriously hinder the possibility ofanthropology culture of being a science,signing up So instead in thesociology disciplinary andautonomous, that is, it is not what makes Levi Strauss a use of elements ofdurkheim what is asociologist within the disciplinary nature of thesociology from aanthropology It is the opposite, working disciplinaryly from thesociology autonomous, incorporating problems ofanthropology cultural within authorial and compositional objectives of the wholelogical of each book governed by thesociology in the two senses pointed out by weber anddurkheim
Of coursewe could say that both are the ABCfurther basic, since there are many other meanings thatcould be discussedhere interms theorists ofsociology, but those two I said are crucial in response to the perspectiveethnological rorty callacculturation the process that differentiates it from that of a Native American orwill keep away from the idea oftransculturation to in turn affirm itself in the idea of ethnocentrism that it affirms in itsdiscussion with geertz
So try to adapt thediscussion to your references in geertz and rorty, welltoward necessary to distinguish that whathe calls acculturation I would be exactly the same as us, children and grandchildren of emigrantsSpanish people, canaries,Majorcans, Andalusian, French
The concept of person, the individual that we are, is exactly the same asit is in thetheory of thelearning ofpiaget and of thetraining of the person, is exactly the same concept of person thatit is and Georgeherbert mead and is exactly the same concept of person asit is in thesociology of the subsystemstalcott parson. AsHe said, the point of view fromsociology evolutionist seen from thesociology structural synchronous competes invia durkheim to thetraining of social consciousness as a differentiated social consciousness and thedivision social work in thesociology synchronous no I would be other than what in societyhere and now it is expressed as regulations, as social norms in structurality, in its regulations.
What weber from asociology understanding anddiachronic explains tothrough of theanalysis sociological of the process ofsecularization, as separate instances that explain the process of subjectivity that comes from Protestantism thathe discusses in itanalysis fromtraining of the professions, with luther and others, even in hissociology of religions when analyzingas isare on the basis of the forms ofeconomy that generated capitalism and studies the advent of societyabout specialized in which we have been formed and in which we live, which is what structurally regulates the modes oftransmission cultural andreproduction social and cultural in all the societies of the Caribbean andSouth America sin exclusion in one in the same way as in the United States
So the problems that for Rorty are exclusive problems of the liberalbourgeois United States They are not just problems ofbourgeois liberal United States I havevivid further of twentyyears of my life in that liberal and neoliberal capitalism and I consider myself part of that experience and of that individual to whom Rorty refers, in a very important part of me I feel reflected in whathe says butalso As an emigrant I have the experience fromchildhood and I know that as individuals we areSo since we were born and that the societies in which we were born wereSo several centuries ago.
Starting from thatcomprehension my booksare all structured in thedecisions compositional authors as works of social sciences based on the fact that they regulate thecomprehension of thisstructures, they are notsingle interms ofsociology Taking into accountthere, there are many othersdecisions sociological one is not the samesociology phenomenological what a structuralistsymbolic, they are books ofsociology phenomenological in thetradition fromethnometodologia and interactionismsymbolic and especially in thetradition fromphenomenology social thatstart alfred shutz although as you know I have innovated in thattradition also importantly, andthere would be other problems ofsociology to discuss, but taking yourparameters With respect to Rorty and Geertz, the main problems of thesociology who are vertebral when it comes to takingdecisions authors
Now this does not mean that as books in whichincorporated theanthropology cultural there are no proper discussions in themanthropology cultural if there is any and quite
In theelucidation semantics: theory semantics, sociolinguistics andsemantics of culture" and I sent you the tables of contents of these booksmine, the first "The twodialectics del town: analysis cultural in urban readings" that is the one with the analyzes I did on the relationships betweenhomogenization resulting from thetechnology, commerce and comfort, and learning processesmultiethnic and multiculturalism in thecountries highly developedeconomically, specifically there it is analyzed based on houston, I discuss thesociology fromtelevision and tastes since the eighties, theadaptation community to the new media in houston, andthere I do some analysis ofdialectics very interesting among the Anglo-Saxon regional local culture processes in thetradition Texan andas they interact these processes with both the fears forlosses of identity butalso with their local traditions against thehomogenization and the processes ofacculturation that enables or promotes itcoexistence multiethnic of the multiculturalism of recent arrival that is expressed in the contemporaneity of that city,
This is not the case, it should be pointed out that the Argentine who arrives in Cuba, the Argentine enters and the Argentine leaves, studies his studies in Cuba and is never incorporated into any dynamics of literature, cinema, art, or Cuban culture. because it is always considered another ethnic group, Argentinian, in the United States it is not like that, in Miami it is not so strong but in the rest of the United States in Chicago, in California, in Texas, in New York it is notable, there is an exhibition the week that It comes from a Pakistani artist who has been living in Houston for ten years and the community sees it as part of its contemporaneity and gives it as much importance as it gives to an exhibition by a local artist. I analyze the axiological implications of all this. I open the book. with that essay but then he has an essay where I do a study of bilingualism, that is, of the relations of asymmetry between structural governing languages of cultural reproduction (cultural transmission in the language) such as English in the United States (structural0 and in its respect Spanish (asymmetrical), or the Amerindian languages in the United States with respect to English (asymmetrical), or the Canarian Spanish in Venezuela (structural) and the languages that coexist in Venezuela (asymmetrical), and that have an incredible ancestry, the Arawak Wayu, the yuxpa or bari, in the ideolects and dialects of Venezuelan Hispanicity, when you hear Venezuelan Spanish spoken, the number of words that are impregnated with phonologies and semantic elements of Amerindian languages is impressive, it is a cultural semiological and anthropological analysis based sociology in the interaction of languages and how this is reflected in the formation of cultural processes.
Then that book has an essay that is a criticism of the little relevance that semiotics has had in anthropology generally used by homology to study non-linguistic phenomena but not to study linguistic and semiological phenomena and makes a theoretical development of how a sociology can work. of semiological culture that incorporates semiology in cultural analysis, that same book continues with an essay on the distinctions between material culture and symbolic production that contrasts empirical analyzes of popular urban markets in their spatial forms in capitalism in Venezuela and the modes of material culture, the spatialization of markets, artifacts and bricollage in popular inventiveness in the way of distributing things in contrast to previous studies in anthropology on the artifact in crafts, which is what has governed the most in anthropology, crafts African, Mayan, etc., this is how tribal elements come into play, instead of how Levi Strauss cuts out an entire book under the traditional evolutionary presupposition that indigenous communities must be studied separately from the modern conglomerates with which they interact. I incorporate the problems of tribal culture into works that are works of sociology about our own Western culture.
There I talk about thehey which is atraining Andean culture that lives between Colombia and Venezuela, or see my next two essays, one aboutstratification social andreligious in itanalysis of African languages in theSpanish Cuban and how thereligion a through of words from the point of view of asociology of the sensecommon to levelsemantic in the use of African languages that are already related toreligion but understood even in a secular and profane way without religious meaning, that is, it is aanalysis semantic of the meaning that certain African notions and words have in the Cuban Spanish language from those that are not strictly religious to those that are but still understoodout fromreligion, and then the last one is an essay on semiotics and semantics.sociology fromreligion discussing at levelempirical thereligion Yoruba, the rule of ocha
See in that book as a whole composed how I work on mydecisions compositional theanthropology cultural from thesociology
The other example would be my book "Rethinking intertextuality: research method in sociology of culture", I also give you details of its chapters one by one so that you have an idea of how I compose, what are the compositional problems of sociology and anthropology that I proposed, this includes in its second chapter "An analysis of cross-cultural redundancies", and in this I also disagree and distance myself from Rorty's perspective, that is, from the sociological point of view that we are Westerners, even assuming it as a ethnological problem between whites and non-whites is also questionable, the Berkeley professor who said I am white, not Native American, but you were born in the United States, then if you are Native American, if we are Native Americans and we share with the Indians the fact of being natives of the Americas then you cannot exclude from the formation of sensitivity and the senses of cultural identity the presence of cultural groups that coexist within the same social reality, that second essay is dedicated to transculturation in understanding about what are the dynamics that are taking shape between the southern United States and northern Mexico, but you can't see that alone, that essay comes after an essay that opens the book where I am discussing a retheorization of the concept of intertextuality, taking it out of the context of literary criticism and moving it towards the possibility that the concept offers in the work with the exegesis of the texts of culture in field work, "Rethinking intertextuality", in this case exegesis when we are reading the direct texts of the culture, also villages, cities, spatialized symbolic interactions, an essay with modern cultural groups, the images that punks and rockers or artisans make of themselves on the boulevards of Berkeley and compares them with the same groups in Cuba, it is an essay that analyzes settings or scenes ofinteraction in urban spaces and markets in the United States and demonstratesas It is essential to work with intertextuality, to put intorelationship textual forms, in that same book there is an essaytheoretical on "The Observed Observer"
There enters a problem of participant observation that borders between sociology and ethnography, this is preceded by an essay called "The indeterministic truth" very important and crucial at a methodological level, the problem that arises there are the problems that we have to consider to try to understand how a can collector who lives in the city collecting waste cans sees the world and what it means, and how we cannot exclude in approaching him the way in which he has pre-meanings for us, and for all those who approach him. to buy cans from him and how we can move from his presignifications to the distinction that we are not going to buy cans from him but to do a sociology, that is, to explain to him that we want to know how he gives meaning to his world and what it means, not to buy cans from him, of way that there the observer is observed by himself and by a third party, this book has an essay entitled "form, identity and difference", which discusses the crucial logical and phenomenological issues to consider between these concepts, and follows with an essay entitled " postmodernism and dualism" where I talk about the ambivalences, complexities and contradictions between the idea of being Western and not being Western involved in the ethnologization and racialization of the discussion about the contemporaneity of these cultures including the United States without taking into account the structures of reproduction and cultural transmission there I analyze how postmodernism as a cultural logic has generated a tendency towards dualism (Western/non-Western as dualism) both towards the United States and Europe and towards the Caribbean and South America.
And that book ends with two important essays, one where I examine the relationships between the restoration of colonial heritage in its interaction with tourism and the habitation of a city, I discuss it in towns in Texas and Mexico but I focus especially on Old Havana, "Performativity in research" is paradigmatic because of everything I discuss in the research methodology, it is the one in which I told you, it is very clear how I am carrying at the same time the methodological alternatives and the topic under discussion, also because the issues of tourism that are transnational in economic terms have an importance today in cultural anthropology and I approach and discuss the matter there in a very peculiar way, that is, I do not discuss tourism merely or in any way but I choose to discuss it specifically from the perspective of the restoration of colonial heritage, and how the urban habitation of families that live between both processes is related to both things, I put it many times as an example in "counterpoints" to explain how I develop the methodological possibilities of the Peircian interpretant in sociology and anthropology, that is, here tourism is seen according to restoration as its interpretant with everything that this presupposes in a way of discussing it, but also vice versa, the discussion of the restoration of colonial heritage according to tourism, with everything What this means for memory and staging, then there are three elements in a triadic relationship, not two, the habitation of families taking place between one thing and the other would be the third interpretant.
And this book ends with an essay on therelationship between thought, being and writing entitled "Theinscription and the couple", is the essay in which youHe said I develop my owntheorization no wayfurther there but it contemplates in certain aspects therelationship Derrida/husserl, and it is an important essay because in the sametheorized my own perspective and my ownelaboration Hegel/Shutz/Hurssel/Derrida, a conference thatimparted in the Hispanic American cultural center, see in this book another example of how I incorporate theanthropology culture within thesociology of cultureSo asknow inthat way I compose the authorial whole, each book as a wholelogical in social sciences.
It is obvious that in all this there is atheorization background of theanthropology philosophical, a return totheorize theanthropology philosophical since beforedetaches fromphilosophy (I do it in my book thinking science) and a return to it in a new way which then results in a different arrival that, from thesociology disciplinary, brings in theanthropology cultural in a new way.
In theElucidation semantics"It's the same thing but with respect to the relationship between disciplinary sociologyautonomous, semiotic and semantic theory of culture where you see a resultnovel also verymine in betweensociology phenomenological and of the sensecommon (shutz) retrograde and reconsidered sincesociology of culture, semiotics, semantics of culture andsociolinguistics, that is to say,anthropological linguistic/cultural.
The other book you should read is "Rethinking urban anthropology", this is a book that starts with three essays on popular urban markets approached from the point of view of what it was like in colonialism, that is, in the colonial tradition until the postmodernization of the markets in capitalism popular Venezuelan urban markets, but in that same book you have the discussion of the anthropology of Quetzil Eugenio Castaneda, which is an anthropology in Yucatan related to Mayan communities, there is a lecture of mine at the University of Houston about a video of him , it is a discussion of the interaction between tourism, the Mayan communities, the vendors and artisans who make a living from this tourism around the events of the Mayan culture related to the museum and the question of the pyramids, another about the markets. of the Mayan culture around an exhibition of quetzil at the university of Houston, and two more about an exhibition that we did together at lake forest college when I was invited by the faculty of anthropology and sociology, an exhibition on the anthropology of quetzil and crafts mayans that we museograph and present in durant gallery, they are two essays about it where you will see a tremendous interplay between contemporary problems in the United States and Mexico and issues of traditionality and tribality involved in culture, here you have how I solve these problems,
The essay ondiaspora it is then in another book "The Couples of theepistemology: practicingsociology/composinganthropology", a book whereare the essays on the problems of realism in field work that youthere was mentioned.
There is no way to movelogically among all these problems that we have analyzed that I have told you andyou will read in these booksmine Without doing field work there is no way to be able to takedecisions compositional when making asociology that theorizes culture and studies it whenempirical It puts you in front of such a high number of problems without doing field work, so as not to do field workthere would be that we can fix the point of view in only one way, but the point of view on these things can never be fixed; it has to be oscillating all the time.moving in an investigation, in ainvestigation that each book proposes as a proposal for reading culture.
Thedefamiliarization from the morph togenesis of the signifier
Abdel Hernandez San Juan:
There are many things in everything that Isaid, it is very varied, very complex, with many sides, there are things I want to tell you about it, some I have already told you.
The first thing you talk aboutrelationship between mind and body as given in Lacan, what you say aboutrelationship between the signifier and thedrive, The modeas You relate to this the logical question in analytical philosophy ofrelationship between the word and the thing, thought and thing, language and reality, butvia libido, I already talked to you about it and when I did, you left in theaddress that the way Lacan refers to the problem is not literal, I don't agree with you on that.
Actuallythat What happens? On the one hand, the signifier itself as a concept, and before moving on to that, I want to return to the distinction that the concept of the signifier is one of the sides of the sign in Saussure's theory, but the sign in Saussure is conceived within the frameworks and the contained perimeter of the alphabetic language, that is, writing and orality, in the alphabet that is where the concept was born, it does not have a cognitive or epistemological source in theories of the sign that are logically conceived outside the alphabetic language, therefore the concept of sign in Peirce, which is a concept that has an origin in inference and a very high percentage of its applications to the visual field, including what he called rhematic, the very examples that he put forward and mine refer to perceptions of things seen in reality like the gayito on the eaves, or things that are observed, or thought, are two very different matrices to think about the theory of the sign, the topic itself I have developed extensively and I master it a lot, I have a lot elaborated in that direction I could give a theoretical development but I am going to prioritize what I want to tell you about what you have said about the signifier with respect to Lacan's drive, the importance of what I told you in "counterpoints" about it I want to recall it, I told you that in linguistics the signifier itself as a concept, referring exclusively to the alphabetic field, that the signifier in a sign, taking as its beginning a vowel, a consonant and a word as a minimum unit, is nothing other than a defamilization that we do in that sign, which originates the signifier in terms of logical abstraction is to defamiliarize what that sign means, the sign means is what semantics proposes but beyond semantics, it is what common sense logic proposes, the analysis of what the sign really serves, the sign does means, means something, the table means table, the conjugated expression that communicates a meaning communicates a meaning, which is what makes you have arelationship pragmatic with that meaning, that you understand it, that you elucidate it, for example, what I am telling you right now, if you understand it, the level of meaningit is functioning inpragmatic because I am doingexplicit and you areelucidating what I tell you,there there is no signifier,there the signifierit is retired to the background, whenare understanding the content of what was said the signifierit is in the background, when does the signifier come to the foreground? When youyou defamiliarize of what I have said, of what I am telling you and pay attention when I say it, how I say it to you, when youyou defamiliarize of what was said and pay attention to what is said, of what that word coordinates interms from hissemantics, from its field of meaning and lends insteadattention in its own way.
The concept of defamiliarization has a tradition in linguistics, it comes from Russian formalism and was very important to understand the operations through which it was understood what poetic language and aesthetic language is and what it is like, it is a concept that is defined by In contrast to familiarity, what is familiar to you is what is relevant, what you have already told yourself about things, what they mean to you, the way you have to teach it to a child, the way you have to teach it to a child. transmit to other people, we could use the Bretchian concept of estrangement to explain it although it is a very different concept, but there is defamiliarization in estrangement, the latter is taking distance from a thing to see its different sides, that is, you separate yourself from what it is. to see it from other different angles you are not seeing how it works, for example, in the theater, within a dramaturgy the sequence of what happens in the plot, when you miss it you distance yourself from it, you stop it, you see it outside its flow in that dramaturgy where it is working to begin to see different points of view on what happens there.
To defamiliarize in language is to statize, stop, separate, abstract the fact that the signit is meaning as something within acommunication in which it functions by meaning, to notice instead that it has a form, there is arelationship intrinsic between the signifier and the form, between the signifier and theaesthetics, in fact whatHe said Saussure is that the signifier is the imageacoustics of the word, that is, that image that the word forms in ouraudition when we hear it spoken, and that the signifier is the imageprint shop visual in the written sign, imageacoustics when it is sound,print shop when it is written, that is, its form, its materiality.
Derridaalso He emphasizes this in another way when he says that the signifier is the body and the signified is the soul, it is that body/soul dualism that was in the monad inleibnizYes, indeed, butthere in derrida there is already onemetaphor whathe knows, no it is bringing the linguistics to the passionate sensory body, on the contrary,it is bringing themetaphor from the body to the field of languagealphabetical, saying: the signifier is the body of the sign but not saying; The body, our literal body, is a signifier, it is not bringing the signifier which is anotion which refers to one side of the signalphabetical towards our sensory bodyphysicist like ametaphor linguistics to say our body is a signifier but on the contrary, it is to bring themetaphor from the body to thelinguistics to say, in the signalphabetical the signifier is his body, what you say is the opposite instead of bringing to language ametaphor of the body is to bring ametaphor from language to body.
According to Saussure the sign has two faces or sides, you say conversely that the face or side of the signifier in Lacan is the body or thedrive, with this they lacquerit is using a conceptlinguistic content to the alphabet towards the territory of the literal body, of our passionate body
But let's analyze it, the signifier is the same in thetheory linguistics from saussure to suontology over there in the languagealphabetical, in the signalphabetical, something that is born from adefamiliarization, disconnect that the wayit is related to a meaning and see it inherself, defamiliarize of the meaning, nowalso we can do this outsidelanguage alphabetical, there are forms of thedefamiliarization from the point of viewlogical inaesthetic in general every time we look at the wayof getting familiar therelationship from form to meaning, whenyou analyze in hegel form and content once they areinseparable whatare intricate, imbricated one in the other cannot be separated and yet, we can repair in the formabstracting the perceiving only herprovide to the content
And we can do it because we can defamiliarize ourselves with the fact that this form is linked to a content and look only at it. Certainly, there is a moment in which the appearance is actually present as such, that is, in which the phenomenality of what is presented to us sensorially. As a form we perceive it as long as it is present to us and as such we have to separate the pure presence as something that has a form before us from its total understanding, that is, from the arrival at all its planes because with presence alone we do not know. everything as I have told you other times about the phenomenological procedure, that is to say that separating the form is required by sensitive and practical experience, this defamiliarization has a cognitive and logical basis even in the Kantian a prioris when it separates the aesthetic judgment from pure reasoning and of practical logic, there is indeed a moment of defamiliarization that abstracts the form, and it is that moment that generates and engenders the signifier, without defamiliarization, more precisely without separating the form and seeing it in itself, defamiliarizing us from the fact that it is related to a content, the signifier would not exist, I notice this because it is important to know that while Lacan is trying to authorize a symbolism that moves and moves towards the body, that is, between language and libido, authorizing the scientificity of his discourse with scientificity. that supposedly the concept of signifier has its linguistic basis in linguistic theory, which is how you know the parameter of scientificity that authorizes scientificity due to its application to the phenomenon of language as the science that has proven to be most exact within the exact human sciences. and social, in reality what Lacan does is a tautology, a redundancy that is to say that it was already like that, because the signifier itself was already that defamiliarization but when you realize that the signifier was that defamiliarization then the death of the sign begins under theparameter Saussurian which is one of the things that Derrida discusses, that is, once we realize that the signifier is generated by adefamiliarization if we can effectively move the territory of the signifier to the territory of anything thatpresupposes pay attention to the form itself because the signifier as a way of analyzing one of the faces of the sign is nothe another defamiliarize thing that the sign means, thereforealso we canmove towards eros as a way of repairing, of enjoying the pleasure ofas you have therelationship and that eros is nothing other than a narcissism of form.
Indeed thetheory of Lacan leads towards therelationship between language anddrive, between language and libido, but not necessarily as arelationship between language and reality, or between language and non-language in the sense that there is a signifier in the signalphabetical whatIt would over there located in the sign as something that belongs to the ontos of the sign that then travels tothrough of an authoritylinguistics to observe what there isaesthetics in what is notalphabetical That is to say that there is a signifier in the libido, that there is a signifier in thedrive, so with this I am already telling you that the path towards which Lacan is going is theoretically, rigorously debatable, that is, he is already going for what?
I'm not saying there isn't oneoperation that can make sense in thataddressFor example, I can give you some examples in which I consider that this way of proceeding can even be operationallyempirically work, in the case ofanalysis of art many times I have even observed, speaking precisely of the body, forms of works of art in which you do not properly have arepresentation of the body in the manner of expressionism where the gestures of the body were represented by painting as in expressionismGerman, but what you have is a gesture as happens in Klee or inkandinsky, or in Jackson Pollock a gesture initself as a sign disconnected from where that gesture comes from, notknow a face that makes a gesture but simplyknow a stain that she is onYes one kinesis, a gesture and when we are faced with shapesof gestures in art we wonderwhich is therelationship of the gesture with the body?, with the temporality of the process and the ritual?, and indeed there are many ways to analyzesemiotically the non-verbal language where the gestural participates that refers us to what Stephen A Tyler calls "thepass"which is the passionate memory of the body, sensory memory and Barthesapplied heanalysis semiotic of thelanguage non-verbal to issues ofdrive and libido.
There are some forms of contemporary art that, even further distancing ourselves from the basis in bodily representations that an isolated gesture of representationality can still have, that even explore the possibility of alluding, of making comments on social issues through notions of the body that are not the literal body of the person's body as an image, I think of artists who put volumes floating in space, what I call "embodiments", bodies that are not literal of the person's body but are, I am thinking in artists who put volumes floating in space made with materials that from the semiotic point of view of the code refer to the domestic, to ways of decorating armchairs, to tablecloths, to things that are placed in the house, to things that They refer to the world of children like inflatables and create floating bodies in space, bodies that float in the gallery that move in an abstract way but that, being made with those textures that refer to the domestic, evoke an idea of corporality that does not It is no longer literal to the human body but to the mere pop sensoriality of a body that is already a television viewer body, that is already an industry body, that is already a textile print body, that is already a mass iconography body without literalizing.
and if there are many ways in which it can be readsemiotically thedrive and libido establishing thoseof familiarizations that separate form from meaning, as youHe said in "counterpoints" and if there are orcould there were moves, Barthes did it but what I see is a little weak, a littleweak anddifficult to sustain, is thatoperation of converting two signifiers into relationships between subjects, I saw it in kristeva whereyes shows function well at a certain level or limited plane andconstrained in kristeva alanalysis of a literary work, because it incorporates thatquestion Lacanian to histheory of text productivity,would have what to explainhere Now what Kristeva does and how she incorporates someelements Lacanians whichI would be very long, but in summary it is aboutanalysis fromrelationship between the author of the work and the reader of the work as arelationship between two subjectsthrough of the signifier, it is therefore aproblematic which has possible applications of a certain type sometimes in some cases like these that I mention, Barthes and Kristeva, but I consider that the scope of this is limited and doubtful.
On the one hand, if it is seen as mererelationship between two signifiers between subjects in the framework in which Kristeva work has scope while contriving towards theanalysis of literary works in their languages, but if it is related to thatrelationship messy and imprecise between language anddrive can give rise to ways of confusing therelationship between literature and its readers, with culture in general, from which I distance myself.
But why do I say that it is doubtful? I am thinking today aboutday in the speeches ofgender (ofgender sexual), whichare moving thegenders of language, which are what differentiate the novel from the story, from thereview, from the report,genders that come pre-inscribed to us as we cannot write outside of them as Todorov analyzes, to move those notions ofgenders in discourse or language that are notions ofgender non-sexual neutrals, to all literature thatit is trying to pass thediscussion of whatgenders of the language unsexed neutralstaking them to the area of sexual genders.
But forthat has served asit is doing for example judith butler, thistheory policy United States, It's something thatit is that one being used quite a bitquestion Lacanian way of moving between the forms of discourse anddrive, the problem of desire that you saidquestion spinoziana indeed espinozaHe said that man was desire, since I observe in all of this a lot ofquestion foucaultiana of the discourse strategies of whichHe said I distance myself and walk away.
Once we know that the signifier itself intheory of the signalphabetical is nothing other than adefamiliarization that needs thelinguistics to abstract form from content,say also syntax ofgrammar, paradigm phrase, connotationand denotation, morpheme of lexeme, meaning of signifier, once we realize that it is done alone andonly for a reasonmethodological, the signifier in fact is nothing other than the form in the sign, the sidemorpho, we then notice that what is universal is not the signifier but thedefamiliarization itself, the fact that we can do thatalso with no signsalphabetical, that we can do it with the body and with what you called the vital impulse. But bring us the signifier to name that other thing in whichalso you can do thedefamiliarization Shape,defamiliarization What can she do herself as a beginning?logical without requiring thetheory linguistics, nothing is done other than authorizing aoperation of the discourse, because it is no longer the signifier, when theabstraction the way it is in thatillusion, that is another form of thedefamiliarization in the way that is universal to thelogicWhy is it done from the signifier? Why is it not done from the signifier?phenomenal or from other forms of the morphe?
Derrida himself hasanalysis of the morphe that do not treat it from the signifier, the morphe can beabstracted inherself, the form can be seen in itselfturning off of sense and meanings, in morphological theory, inlogic formal, the form can be treated inherself without seeing it as onequestion linguistics that comes from the languagealphabetical, it is done from thelinguistics because thelinguistics isparameter of scientificity to authorize a mode of discourse that wants to move towardsdrive and towards the libido, and what operatesthere?, what operatesthere it is whatfoucault called the strategies of discourse, I have my moral objections to that type of game, that is, it is not that it is not possible, it has possibilities, but they distance themselves from relationships with truth and morality, they already distance themselves from the functioning of language that they may be verified --let's see yourproblematic positivist-- what interests me is not thecheck o tocorroboration what interests me isvia hermeneutics that they are relationships that function for subjects in congruent forms of culture, in forms that are constructive morally adequate, that operability between the concept of signifiermoving towards the body anddrive it can be done barthes did it but it is subject to discourse strategies that can respond to anyparameter that you want
there what I knowit is It is authorizing the discourse on libido with the discourse on language and there is no control over it because libido is desire and to that extent it can go in any direction.address without control, I consider that there must be a moral limit, a limitpragmatic, a preservehermeneutic, not censorship, not surveillance as they sayfoucault, nor a punishment, it is not about containing plurality, or what Barthes called "plural listening", the plurality ofstrategies of discourse but in that same Nietzschean sense of liberating thediscursivity fromreason It no longer matters what is used as an authority, the important thing is that it is an authority for anything.
and it is important to know that all those discourses about homosexuality, authorizing sexual genres with language genres, what they want is to redeem homosexuality, redeem forms of opposition between man and woman by turning them into rivals, things that lead to moral deformations that become excessive, as I told you, French thought is excessive and I tell you this from a pluralist position, that is, I am a democrat, I am open, it does not matter that it is excessive, but it is important to know that it is excessive and to take a position against it as a theorist, so I I take care of myself against that, I work on certain things when it seems to me that it is constructive to do so but I do not make political use of it, the only thing that justifies it is a political reason, I take care of myself against that operation
Ok now I want to talk to you about the problemderridiano that I also speak to you in "counterpoints" of thegenesis of the sign and the death of the sign, we have just seen an example of the death of the signthrough Of the samedefamiliarization which defines the signifier as something that is only possible because adefamiliarization methodological requires it but has no ontos in the experiencelinguistics The ontos itself is none other than the same ontos of morphe, so therefore Derrida has a base in Saussure and hisvision is based on whatalphabetical and you can examine thegenesis and death, buthere peirce enters to tell us clearly there are othersorigins etymological of the sign, the sign is not onlyalphabetical, there are signs wherever there is inference, thelogic It works with signs and we cannot simply consider the sign dead.
me would care a lot of movingproblematic lacanian towards peirce the will keep separated.
Regarding the problem ofadequacy At the beginning you gave me an example of atheoretical that became important from analytical philosophy with a use of the concept ofadequacyI don't doubt it, as youHe said, the concepts exist in the vocabulary therefore they admit that flexibilitysemantics, that is, if there issome use of the concept ofadequacy in analytical philosophy without having been imbibed by thehermeneutics Well, nothing is about severalorigins in the use of the concept, since nothing existsit is well a coincidence, what I was interested in highlighting is that this concept inhermeneutics It refers neither to correspondence nor totruthfulness it is not inhermeneutics a way to qualify the way positivismlogical wonders about therelationship between language and reality, thought and thing.
NowI would want tell you that all theexplanation What have you given me about who in thequestion of the untranslatability that you have explained to me many times suddenly acquires a very simple answer in thedistinction semantics between connotation and denotation, since the first is already arelationship holistic, in that sense with whatconnotes, in theconnotation there is nodenotation The way in which language is connected with that in whose place language is is not because of thevia of onecorrespondence that understandsvia mimesis, reflection orcheck that thislanguage reallyit is or does he have a way of holding that thing?linguistics, that reality or thing for thought or reality for language.
Insemiotics itit is resolved withconnotation, there would be what to see untilthat point the concept ofconnotation would crash with thecriticism whatquinn makes the meaning but the concept ofconnotation its alotfurther richer than the concept of meaning,further GOODwould lead to a Shutzian perspective interms ofsociology, to oneconsideration of a corpussemantic that has a matrix that cannot be sought anywhere else than in the collection, which is nothing other than what allows us to decode, we encode not because the language has something that connects with the referentvia denotation but we decode because we have a heritage, therefore the languageit is connoting in denoting,there would be a way to summarize everything you told me about who by saying that itit is explained, answered and solved with the concept ofconnotation insemiotics.
Thequestion that youHe said not that onesubjection where is theproblematic of speech from the point of viewepistemological andethical, morality of discourse when we realize thatover there thelinguistics it is being usedonly to authorize a speech about what is notlinguistic but that it does not have a true one, that there is no signifier or a truerelationship between language and libido but rather it is a use of anotion linguistics that can be transported because it brings with it a logicality that is whatyes it brings Morfe is therefore a word just like what we are doing with the wordadequacy, we move it fromhermeneutics analytical philosophy and it has two completely different meanings but it is the same word
We are talking using the word significantbringing us from thelinguistics de saussure to connect it with thedrive and libido in the Lacanian sense butthere is no longer the signifierlinguistic, there the word simply continues to be used as remains oflinguistics but what makes it prevailthere is theuniversality of the logicality of the morphe not that it is a signifier in language, again as youHe said, Derrida goes through there as well as through what I told you in "counterpoints", topic that I worked on in my book thinking sciences, thedisappearance of the sign.
I want to note here the fact that this non-subjection of the Foucoultian question of the relationship between discourse and strategy is the opposite of the Habermasian vision of discourse ethics. I don't know if you have read "constructive and reconstructive sciences" and "moral conscience and communicative action" of Habermas, that is, Habermas has an important moral project that you must take into consideration, the entire Habermasian discussion is a moral and ethical discussion, he is putting limits on that uncontrolled relationship with linguistic problems, limits that do not He has put them in the same terms in which I am explaining here now because in fact he is defending Judith Butler, he is putting limits but not exactly what I am putting because he has not discussed the problem analytically through the theoretical analysis that I I am doing here now, he has come to the problem in other ways like the ones I explained to you the other day among other ways that he has followed but although he does not make this analysis that I did in "counterpoint" that I have now reminded you of, it is I who is doing a analysis different from another type, my own analysis, I agree with Habermas that it is certainly a problem of speech ethics, he is right about that.
Yes because how do youHe said When I was talking to you about Foucault, man and woman must live inharmony, not as enemies, not as rivals,there There is something wrong with thereproduction cultural, and with the normality of culture, and since it is outside ofsubjection Well, you go outside of morality and to the devil, Nietzsche, to authorize anything, in any way, because simply thedrive justifies it.
On the other hand, the problem ofpsychopathology I return to my point again, I mentioned Eric to you.fromm not to tell you that he sees it towards the collective unlike freud and lacan whothey saw further individual to individual, and if not it was meemphasis, weemphasis was the level of truth assigned to thetheory psychoanalytic of the forms of thepsychology Freudian based, untilthat point has arrivedacceptance almost meaninglesscommon that there are indeed inclinationspathological even in the normal non-ill person, that a person can have ainclination schizophrenia, psychotic, paranoid orneurotic being a healthy and not sick person, to what extent has theacceptance ofthis theory Freudian that even atheoretical whatit is speaking of collectivities he makes use of it to address collective issues, paranoid tendencies in society, tendenciesneurotic of the society. but how do youHe said I consider that there is also a moral limit in this, there is something eschatological in psychopathologizing the entire society, and since I already think that there is somethingdismal and even terrorist in what Foucault does by going to search in the archives of the 18th and 17th centuries for the reasons why the mentally ill were classified as mentally ill to make a kind ofgenealogy of the unsaid andSo unveil the sourcestax policies that werebehind of theparameters about what was rational and what was irrational in certain periods of theevolution of human society
because I see in that operation of Foucault an instinct of hatred towards the destructive common sense of seeking foundations for irrationality in the face of rationality, for denigrating common sense, for humiliating common sense to an excessive point obviously there are things in culture produced by commonplaces that it is good to have an awareness that this is not always the case, that these limits are also imposed but we must have a morality in the face of all this, the operation of even getting into the archives of the 18th century seems to me macabre, malevolent based in a very deep hatred and distrust towards man and common sense culture, has a destructive motive towards culture and is exceeded and in the same way wanting to redeem in this way the irrationality which is the same that one wants to obtain through of the redemption of the libido in that moral and ethical non-subjection of the relationship between discourse and sexuality, in that uncontrolled discourse strategy that can sometimes work, for example in Barthes, in a scientific way at a given moment but already in these discursive practices. It doesn't even matter that I'm a scientist, what matters is being authorized to sneak in a speech, a strategy that redeems a gendered generic problem in a political sense, that's where I make careful observations.
I consider thatpsychopathologize society is not healthy for society and I have reservations against it, distances, if I have to take sides thetook for the holism of Miguel Posani when he spoke to you about my distance fromrelationship between natural and social sciences, andHe said that I have never done theconcession to bring them into the social and cultural sciences, but I have worked with colleagues who do unite them, Miguel is an example, if conferences ofantipsychiatry like those whoothers Miguel, suspicious of thepsychiatry because it is an interventionism in the human body of things that havesolution byvia of the positive constructions that morality can make to help people who have difficulty adapting or whoare depressed or need help, there are many solutions out there.via frompsychology that do not require entering thepsychiatry, in that we have an important difference withrelationship to the problem of uniting natural sciences and social sciences, I am a cultural relativist and I have never doneconcessions On it
And by the way, you're talking to me about Levis Strauss, which is an important point of reference.relationship between both levis strauss is atheoretical based on thedenial of uniting the natural sciences with the humanities and social sciences, I am not one of them, I have never made concessions to that, in fact alfred shutz one of the main things that define it in an important way, afeature yours is thatrefuted in several important congresses to pareto and otherstheorists from hisera at large conferences demonstrating that the social sciences and humanities must be regulated bybeginning own, what he did was demonstrate what are the laws and principles that organize the scientific nature of the humanities and social sciences without resorting to the natural sciences.
I separate them and I have not made concessions and I am not going to make them, and if Popper does it then I distance myself from Popper too, I do not unite them and that is one thing that does not make me not share affinities, in fact with Miguel PosaniI worked sevenyears of collaborations in the same centerinvestigation and theyes the unites, and it was a very good experience, a great friendship andwe left ofparameters different as we do, you and I did it in "counterpoint" a beauty and we continue to do it, it can be an enriching element the fact that we have that difference but it is important to know that theseparated, and this case ofpsychiatry is a good example, that is, it has arelationship with whatorganic.
That I, the same distance that I take towards substance in Bourdieu's sense,took towards organicism and towardsorganic, that is, I do not give way to whatorganic in itanalysis of culture and language.
Types of field work: spatialities versussociocultural ages
Abdel Hernandez San Juan:
I wanted to tell you something that just happened very coincidentally but I want to ask you the question, I have this colleague who is doing his doctorate right now at Cunny University, Alex Werner, he was here in Cuba for more or less a year doing his field work which It caught my attention because it coincides that I also consider the question of field work not only in the traditional sense in which I have ventured into various field work projects, let's say in terms of going to a town, a village, a place. where usually one does not live to live in the conditions of another social group, which is, let's say, the classic paradigm of field work, as in those years when I was working with ninety-eight settlements in the mountains in the south of the Sierra Maestro in Manzanillo Pilon. and on the coast, where I had to do that type of field work, or later what I did in the urban markets of Venezuela, although it had other characteristics, it also had that character of cutting something back in time for a period of two years, immersing oneself in something topographically demarcable from the material and visual cultural point of view and also demarcable from the urban point of view, but also in some phenomena related to art criticism and a more sociocultural thing than a territorial thing and where the criticism of Art occurs in urban spaces in the cities where one is living but that also involves displacement, that is, the fact that one writes about art in Houston, but then one moves to northern Mexico and writes about art there, or moves to other cities in the United States but there is also what one writes about art in Venezuela that supposes mobility of discourse and field work issues involved in decisions of cultural translation and axiological evaluation about the relationships between text and context that affect writing from the point from field work view
Finally, due to the fact thathe is doing work on artcontemporary but like his field work,he me contact and he came to do an interview with me, of course, about the fact that you master all those incursions very well.further empirical field work "do"sociological, and althoughhe comes with a different approach to the topic of Cuban art, it is not as separate as you who have itfurther clearly defined as a thing inIf that he took out goalstheorists and social sciences, but sees itfurther from the perspective of a researcher who cannot avoid workingalso about Cuban art, but despite thishe is quite clear that it is something different, but comparatively to other people who have come to interview me, not long ago, for example about two years agoyears They came from Saint Martins University in London to interview me.
But I'm happy with him because he's a guy who I was able to talk to about Stephen, Geertz, about writing culture, about various references. He's not very focused on theory, but he's very sensitive, and accurate, and he's doing interesting work, so He finished his stay here and went to New York, but now he is recently in Miami doing a specific investigation and he is just about to finish the investigation in Miami, and we write to each other with some frequency. We keep in touch. We have a good relationship. It is a beautiful person and now we had a contact this month by a person that he wanted to contact and he remembered that I had told him that there are people in Miami that he could contact and since he is finishing he just asked me if there is any person that I would suggest to him It could be interesting for him and I'm thinking that it could be of great quality and good fortune for him to have contact with you, see each other for a while, have a coffee, talk a little, stay in touch, not so much in relation to what you may have written, but something related to this whole matter of "doing" with which you were also much closer than I assumed not only because of everything you have shown me that you understand and know but also because literally all the experience you had had a certain relationship with "doing" through a part of the "doing" team that had certain logical characteristics to how all of this took shape in what you did, everything that you have told me about the Lacanian school, in short, you are a person with a broad vision of things I think it would be very useful to be able to have a meeting with you, so I feel confident that you would see him I don't know I can't imagine how it could be, I know you have your health problems, you have your mother's problem and dad, but you shouldn't take it so personally, he is a simple person, a good person, a nice person, you can have a pleasant exchange, a first contact, talk a little, get to know each other, you don't have to make it a demand, but if he demands a lot from you, don't Please feel sorry to tell me no, I would look for a way to contact someone else, Carlos Michel Fuentes, although it is very different, but I am going to think a little more and if it is okay for youlet me know and if you don't tell me too, let's seeas I appreciate what I said, well, thank you very much.
Abdel Hernandez San Juan:
I'm happy with the first onerecording for having found out about something that I didn't know, it makes it more interesting for me personally to know that you did that workincursion of field work with the rockers regardless of whether you have done it with the precarious means specific to Cuba because somehowalso it was my own circumstance
Theyhad a project thathard six months that present in theinstitution with the aim of giving me certain support precisely in material infrastructure, resources that I did notwe had as getcameras, rolls, have aphotographer working with usSo it was likegot at two o'clockpsychologists whatafter were related to the Lacanian movement with which you worked and it was a project thatinstitution me helped to locate the participants because they were art students who were finishing thatyear your studies and set aside a large part of your time to take this workshop with me
It was a workshop thathad two settings let's say two main scenes in the week of meetingsmine with these students a group thatwould I don't think they reached fifteen, one was a meeting in a classroom where I was teaching a class.theoretical, the first classes were about the concept of culture and if they were verylinguistics and classes oftheory cultural, sociology and anthropology classes, verytheoretical since then, of course not as much as today because I was very youngstill but for that age it was already enoughtheoretical me, a two hour class,after that I spoke for an hour or an hour and so much and wewe saw on thursdays,we had a kind of conversation wherethey did questions andwe had an exchange, this classhard six months, once a week, as the class evolved, that class transformed, not only in the first part where I theorized but also in thedialogues After my conference they becamedialogues about the results thatwe were going obtaining in the other part of the project
because this project does notIt consists Only in those six months of my theoretical classes, we had two more ways of working, one was that each onehad They had to choose a cultural social group of their choice in the city at the urban level and once they chose ithave what to consider interms ofmethodology frominvestigation field workThey had to consider a way to enter thedynamic of that group interms ofmethodology and make ainvestigation about that social group as a cultural group,They had what to gothere It isdives in that group and then whenthey came back See me on Thursdaywe passed that everyoneto talk to about whatthere was occurred in the week andthere we had adiscussion further applied to the problems that everyone was having in theirimmersion, so that to the extent that each person advanced in their work with the social group, they advancedalso on that Thursdaydialogue about what theywere going doing over time
We started in September, my class started on Thursday and so four Thursdays to the fourth Thursday everyone was already choosing cultural groups and by the fifth they were already immersed and as they spent two months seeing me on Thursdays, we began to have theoretical discussions in the classroom and criticisms on questions of methodology of that immersion that everyone was having, then the other attractive element is that it was not only immersion like questions of methodology of sociology but there had to be a result that could be written a paper an essay but it could be also with visual media and resources, that is, installation, photography, video, a conjunction of sociology and anthropology with visual languages of the arts, parallel to this we had a meeting on Tuesdays in a neighborhood in El Vedado and this had a different characteristic Here the idea was not that they would take a theoretical class from me and go out to immerse themselves in a cultural group, but that they would once and for all meet me in a space where there was a neighborhood and where my own family lived, and they had to To consider a refunctionalization of an architectural space, they had to study that space of habitation, of neighborhood coexistence, and propose a refunctionalizing intervention of the spaces according to the studies they had done, here they applied the semiotic contents of my classes, so that the "do" workshop gave two types of results, the results that they were obtaining from the immersion in the cultural groups that were presentations in visual media, exhibitions, installations, videos and photographic essays and on the other hand interventions that they made in this neighborhood transformations What they made of these spaces where there is a series of documentary photographs where you can see the neighborhood reacting, that was essentially the "do" workshop, within the do workshop I should not be a split professor teachingtheory, so thatI decided workalso I started a project and worked with the social group of rockers and punks and Iimmersion in that social group for a couple of months and I did worksociological anthropological and thenalso from visual results tothrough fromPhotography and the painting
And after this summary that I gave you so that you could get a spatial idea of what the project was, I want to tell you that I am extremely interested that you have done a projectspecifically this one you tell me aboutfrankenstein regardless That you tell me that for reasons of precariousness and that the tools were only those of Levis Strauss, this admits thehypothesis abductiva you can reflect on fieldwork problemsalso you can learn from what you don'tyou could carry asyou wanted and I think that what you are going to do with this boy is notyou should stop mentioning that you had that experience connecting it with doing
In fact, the interview he did with me was about this project that I just described to you in two parts and then he and I were motivated by the problems thathere arose aboutsociology, anthropology
I didn't tell you that it was notheoretical, I was able to talk tohe things theoretical, just noit is passionately articulated withtheory, but yes, as you say, when doing field workare budgets and I have put theemphasis that myinterest in his thesis rests on the possibility that he can write about the problemsmethodological that's myinterest.
I was able throughout our meetings anddialogues let you see the order a little andlogic of theanthropology of art as I see it and work which is almost a miracle, there are very few people working theanthropology Of artcontemporary but yes of course you can theorize
I could feel good talking tohe and he enjoyed talk to me and it has to be inclusive, noit would be too much tell him about that experienceempirical and mention theConnection with asking, and the questions you asked yourself and forhe goes to be valuable and for me it is interesting that you have done thatincursion
I told you all these things in "counterpoints", now I want to talk to you about the things that interest me in what you have said, that is, once all these reservations and distinctions have been established.
This time you followed a peculiar route, but you managed to articulate it well and tried to follow alogic because you have been giving them an order andwanted to tell you that many of the problems we are discussing have to do with the problem oforganization, the problem of order.
Stephen Tyler put a lot of effort intoemphasis in the problem of order in science, and it is something that interests me a lot about Stephen, the importance he gave to order because there are orders and orders, there is a level oforganization of your parameters that you arrived atafter whatyou read my book "the correlation of the world" and much of what I talked about in "counterpoints" and you were understanding throughout my explanations because we based a lot on my book because you were translating the things that I was theorizing into the field of yourparameters, lacan , philosophy positivist
There are some moments that you reachedadapting a the theorizations and translating them into yourparameters in which you reached interesting conclusions now you reached another order, you have gonegiving trueorganization logic to your themes and that makes me happy thatyou are arriving atorders, further ordered that at the beginning
I would like to see that thoseorders passalso to a plane that movefurther there, I would like to see a time when you can get in touchfunction of a jobmaybe for you bedifficult Well, you will always go towards analytical philosophy, you never move like me, I work.also itempirical, field work,analysis of concrete forms of cultural reality, you don't bring thoseanalysis to analysis of concrete forms of culture.
I think it would be a good time to explore possibilities of putting into practicerelationship thoseorders to those who have been reaching the issues that we are going to discuss because theanthropology culture puts us in a territory ofanalysis of cultural issues where we work with thingstheoretical but othersempirical, you said that you are going to need my guide to give you guidelines
If you can listen and watch the last of my recent video/lectures, one that is abouthermeneutics There you will see everything I discuss about field work in myconception and my own experience, although very little and summarized, I discuss several crucial things there.
But I am notover there still bringing issues logical of analytical philosophy and realism since they are issues that are closely related to field work issues.further theoretical and a lotfurther dives In field work I also have a certainas I tell you "the uses of diversity" by Geertz, I don't like it very much.
I like geertz but not in a wayhomogeneous I like theinterpretation of cultures", "local knowledge" andafter of the facts" but there are other books of his that I like less, for example Geertz who begins to analyze power and the new states and who begins to talk about agrarian problems in Indonesia, which puts himself in aposition From aparameter that gives them to cultures as already formed with stories and with powers and withpolicies and with state to me that geertz does not call meattention, I like the geertz thatit is Making anarration in first person of what was experienced as it happens in "after of the facts "thatit is further about what I experienced
Or in theinterpretation of cultures", whichit is over there in front of thewinks facing the fightgallos He has moments when I'm interestedfurther than in others.
Thequestion to see the culturesemantically Levis Strauss had also raised it in "theanthropology structural" was the first who did it and Stephen A Tyler who isfurther a follower of levis strauss since he is a structuralist in his firstanthropology he took thequestion semantics a lotfurther there of levis strauss and a lotfurther there by geertz but even stephen doesn'tenough when in fact levis strauss never did it, when you read levis strauss the questions oflinguistics are always used byvia biological to analyze issues notlinguistics, and when this occurs theanalysis they stop beinglinguistic andsemiotics, then if the cultureit is consideredsemantically but it is not truly analyzedsemiotics, and even though in Geertz there is a littlefurther of onecomprehension semiotics that in levis strauss since knowledge is notideological but if he proposes that what he is going to do asanthropologist is to interpret in any way when it interprets notdives truly in asemiotics of culture not enough and not truly
I recognize the importance of geertz in havingbrought interpretivism toanthropology butalso I recognize the differences between me and Geertz among many othersit is inspecific that unlike you, I am doinganalysis, research and studies trulysemiotics of culture
and 'the uses of diversity' is an example of a geertz that is not the one that interests me, first thethere is against the idea of informants, I am an abolitionist regarding it, I consider that the idea of informants should be abolished from theethnography, I do not work with the idea of factual informant insociology of the sensecommon I don't use weber to make oneethnographyI practice a lotfurther weberianism when I worksociology in field work and I do much moresociology of the sensecommon really in the way I do field work, by which I mean that I don'tarrive to no community or meimmersion in nonemicrointegracion social without beingover there imbued by arelationship of meaningcommon and since it isSo The idea of the informant disappears as well as the idea of the spy and the intruding eye, all thoseparameters traditional of theethnography of the intruding eye or what geertzcalls "thedescription participant" which is like a kind of descriptivism of astrange I am an abolitionist against all that
Obviously not all forms of access are equally first-hand and there are always intermediaries, there are always degrees, the one who takes you is not the same as the one you talk to, but calling a collaborator an informant is a person from the community who participates with one in a field work experience, it doesn't seem to me, I don't agree with that, I don't think so.called So to the person who participates with you, this speaks of that detective side of theethnography which seems detestable to me, one mustbe impressed in cultures in a muchfurther authentic a lotfurther determined to change in that culture, and in a way that remainsethnographic which is stillanthropology that continues to pose all the same problems of thesociology
and thenalso doesanalysis fromtraining I distance myself from all that from the new states. That doesn't interest me.
I agree with his defense of cultural relativism because I am also a cultural relativist, but the way Geertz defendsthere herelativism cultural it is too much standing in thequestion from the point of view, from theanarchy from the point of view, on the side of saying let's sayIf that withobjects to cultural relativism that relativizesparameters morals, that everyone can have a point of view, so it is used against anti-relativism with that way of seeing relativism. I don't work on it that way, I work on it in another way, which you can read in my essay "The multicultural model."United States", over there I discuss how I see cultural relativism and work fromparameters a lotfurther of universality, I question less the universality of cultural relativism and I put in a place muchfurther higher the importance of cultural relativism than the place that Geertz gives it.
He is likedefending As a way of saying, it is true that cultural relativism relativizesparameters but at the same timeanti-antirelativism, is that this is already an inadequate way of looking at cultural relativism, cultural relativism has other universal reasons regardingrelationship between cultures, in the way Geertz treats it, the difference between cultures is overemphasized, I consider that cultures are muchfurther similar to what Geertz believes and have manyfurther points of universality that relate them than geert believes
and therefore I am muchfurther optimistic with the cultural relativism of whathe is, althoughhe is also a relativistcultural and in it I feel a great affinitywith the, butit isfurther in a disillusioned way to accept that cultural relativism is adenial from a point of viewon of the other that is not whatfurther important point of cultural relativism that is too vulgar a way of reducing cultural relativism to aquestion point of view there are other ways to defend themobiles, the reasonsphilosophical of cultural relativism in culture that makes it defended in a veryfurther optimistic, I tell you this because I consider that what I told you in the recordings that I made of you in those two recordings ofanthropology cultural from sociology, criticism of ethnology, does not require or need Geertz,it is justified byitself everything thatover there I even told youover there I made important distinctions that establish contradictions between diffusionism and evolutionism inanthropology against structuralism and the supposed componentdurkheimiana further synchronous a levis strauss
I see onecontradiction important in levis strauss, on the one hand he says thathe distinguishes from evolutionism and diffusionism to justify a structural, that is, timeless, study of a culture, synchronizedbetrayed at the present but innone moment abandons the idea that those cultural groups thathe is analyzing are someneolithic and treats them as primitiveslate I am not saying that they are not primitive forms of life, but I am saying that they are communities that coexist with modern, Western societies,contemporary with whichare ininteraction
You cannot analyze the Yanomami without analyzing Brazil, you have to analyze the Yanomami in aanthropology whatalso I talked about Brazil, you can't separate it, if you separate it it's acontradiction scientific think you can understand themseparating them
When, as I demonstrate in 'la elucidacon semantica', the Wayue Arawak language and other Amerindian communities in Venezuela, the Wayues, who are a cultural group that has their own communities that live between Colombia and Venezuela, participate in such a decisive way in Canary Islands Spanish. Venezuelan to the point that a lot of words that are thousands do not exist in Spanish but only in Wayu and other Venezuelan Amerindian languages of communities that live in tribal states and that nevertheless have an ancestry in material and immaterial culture through music , the basketry, the weaving, the suitcases that participate in the imaginary of a society of secular and contemporary modernity in a decisive way, this cannot be separated from the way the Wayues see themselves, when the Wayu people talk about themselves they resort to the way the dilemma they live on the border is seen and the way the non-Wayu culture sees the Wayu culture is part of the way the Wayu culture sees itself cannot be studied. Without studying the way in which they interact, it is not possible to understand the Wayu culture, no matter how tribal it may be, through the diffusionist and evolutionary idea of precolonial contact, that is, going back to the first contact of the whites with the Indians, going via races and ethnology to that first contact that the white colonizers had with the Indians, the Wayu problem is a transcultural problem that in itself has to be analyzed from an anthropology that is a sociology and there I have serious disagreements with Levi Strauss and also with Canclini It has points of contact but you will realize that my perspective has many differences from that of Canclini.
That is to say, I am not saying that they are not tribal forms of culture, they are, but either they are Native American ancestors or they areneolithic andpaleolithic wild that coexist with thecivilization or one thing or the other but not both because it is not coherent because it is irrational for it to be both things, that is, if they participate in the cultural identity of Americanity, they cannot be seen aspaleolithic andneolithic wild, we must see them as forms of tribal culture, of course they do not function in the way modernity works, but we must see themthrough fromrelationship between modernity andtradition and seeing it as atradition of modernity you have to see themthrough of onerelationship between the urban and the rural, and can no longer be seen aswild neolithic but tothrough of onerelationship between the modern and the tribal thatI would be whichit works here in an appropriate wayaxiologically,
On the other hand, there is a question also related to the way in which postcolonial discourse wants to situate an apparent redemption of the excluded colonized, abstracting from the secular structures of Western reproduction that arrived with colonialism but through which economically subordinate societies are reproduced. from the south but in the process of development as if colonialisms say how by denying us the inheritance that we can innovate the tradition of Levi Strauss or that of Habermas, we could not innovate it because Habermas is a German in the ethnocentric sense and German problems are only innovated by Germans Non-Cubans, then from the postcolonial point of view we could never expand the tradition started by Habermas and bring it to an original development, I disagree with that, either we inherit colonialism or we don't inherit it and as if we inherited it and we cannot renounce that inheritance. The discussion is between forms of colonialism and the discourse of decolonization is actually a neocolonial discourse, in which I have recently felt very happy when I realized that James Clifford, an anthropologist whom I admire and in fact the first to place this problem of the modern and the tribal even in a theory of art and culture collecting, in a conference I recently heard he recognizes that the question of postcolonialism and decolonization is a logical pair of neocolonialism
Butas is that they do not realize that thedecolonization It is precisely what neocolonialism needs to become possible, it is necessary to brainwash all the cultures that inherited colonialism torecolonize them, then I seriously disagree with postcolonialism anddecolonization, which does not mean again likealso with you regardingfusion of natural and social sciences that I cannot work with postcolonialists, Quetzil, for example, a person with whom I have had forays as successful colleagues is a postcolonialist, that is, we are working from principles of rationality and we understand each other and, as Stephen says, we are cooperatinghere there is the fact that we havedifferences in the positions that we have assumed astheorists Each one of us as an author and writer does not limit us to advance in joint efforts where we can obtain results when we make products together as "counterpoints" between you and me.
It is necessary to combine,through of thedialogue asHe said Stephen, Stephen is still forme the main reference.
thanks for the development you did, I liked it, I'm interestedvery much the way youare carrying yourparameters what you receive and process from your reading of my books, and not just for a reason of legacy and influence
Also note that this is part of development, one of the reasons why Latin American intellectuals do not progress andalso Cubans in the academy is because of the noncomprehension of the importance of legacy, in the United States the academy progresses because people recognize the legacy, so it develops a lot around atheoretical, there's atheoretical and they come alot around it, to carry out something that can never be done by one alone with true civilized sentiment, that we must work as a team, that is, we are authors, we aretheorists individuals, this must be respected in each person's works, the integrity of the author's work, as you meyou said once, but in other things and efforts we team up and cooperate infunction of products that dialogue infunction of our coincidences not of our differences.
ANDadded I have onediscussion hermeneutics sophisticated that objects to the way they have beendemonized tribal cultures for all that evolutionist and diffusionist discourseneolithic whatcontradictorily does not disappear in levis strauss, that is to say or aretradition for modernity as it happens with culturejapanese and its beautiful traditions even if they are tribal traditions or areneolithic wild, and I disagree, for example, with the whole idea that they eateach other
Geertz, for example, stops a lot at that point, and says well, how are you going to tell me thatit is GOODeat All this seems very weak to me, the Yanomami do not eat each otherYes all thedays, those are onedeformation it's not true that's adeformation of the colonial discourse of theanthropology the way the colonial culture positioned itself vis-à-vis the Yanomami, and I'm not saying the Yanomami, any tribal culture, thehopis in the United States, the Navajos in the United States, thebars, thecome on, thehey invenezuela they don't eat alldays among them that is a sensationalism that took an isolated thing probably onceoccurred that they ate acorpse or a head.
once upon a timeoccurred and then itconverted in a wholegeneralization, he became moutrified and demonized in an exacerbated way, this has to do withwhich renderattention the observer, and it is even something thatalso culture exaggerates because it is sostrange for a Yanomami as it is for Geertz, and as such if it ever occurs, it becomes ascandal also among the Yanomami or any other tribal culture, so what Geertz thinks is not very different from what someone from that culture might think about it, nor is it very different if it were something that happened in our Western culture, imagine that insome intricate town of europe someone was once eaten, enough and it is enough for all the nearby towns to believe the myth that in that neighboring town they eat people when suddenly it is something thatoccurred just oneturn in a hundredyears, or even something that neveroccurred just as it is told
In this frazer remains the great master, thefables of Italian folklore, those offolklore English and thefables Yorubas respond to the same principles and explainfurther or less the samelogical
It's notfurther dangerous to move among Yanomami or amongsurprised so there may be different in your tribal way of life for someone who comes from the city where people don'tit is barefoot what forms tothrough of which interactions can occur in our modern culture in which people can be exposed to dangerous situations. There wasmagnification in all of this.
As there isalso in the way myths and legends have been put together, it is generally aabsolutization of something that isI'm listening once and nowabsolutize as if it were the legend of the Yanomami, I consider that it is notSo I consider that from the moment in which aanthropologist collect a legend about the cultural group the cultural group begins to give importancefurther to that legend than to his other legends due to the fact that theanthropologist I collect them.
So that you understand where I am coming from, for me there is an importance in cultural interactionism, ininteraction between cultures, the observer is not something not meant by the tribal culture is muchfurther meaning of what the observer assumes and the way in which tribal culture is performed throughherself for theanthropology its alotfurther decisive of what theanthropology and theanthropology colonial supposed, and the legends collected about myths are not always or necessarily all the legends or the legends that explain thetradition of that culture, they are rather fragments.
and on the other hand they occur once in threeyears in fiveyears in unusual circumstances in the culture that suddenly becameabsolutize because of how different they are
But very strange things and verymonstrous andwild can be observedalso in our Western culture such as the war between Ukraine and Russiafalling down to bombsdestroying buildings and generatingcorpses, and I consider that there are many contradictions in all of this
Yes, I am clear as Quetzil says, humanizing the communities.natives, in a very muchfurther Christian and muchfurther universal, muchfurther cultural relativist.
The word "man"
Abdel Hernandez San Juan:
Gooddays, I am going to try to deal with the first problem that I told you about at the beginning, the problemtheoretical Well, if you don't understand it very wellprecision You can hardly connect it with the problem of the signifier and the libido, such asproblematic logic whatthere I have cleared, so thatafter you can seeas is that it connects with thecriticism what am I doingdeconstructiva a lacan
In thetheory de saussure that is based on language, languagealphabetical, which refers to speech and writing, the sign supposedly has two faces or sides, the signified and the signifier, butas They are locatedontologically in what we understand as a concrete sign those two sides or faces?, ifwe carry to a material fact andphysicistFor example, a door, we see that it has two sides, one inside and one outside but both are the same, it is wood,it is carved, it has the same vaned color, nothing distinguishes signifier and meaning in it.
Let's imagine the word "man" written two meters high by three meters long in three dimensions that can be seen like the door from one side and the other, we see it from both sides and the same thing happens to us as the door, nothing happens to us. It allows us to distinguish that one is the signifier and the other is the signified.
As you can see whereare situated and localized meaning andsignificant?, each one in the same concrete sign?, for example in the word "man"So writing?
Let's imagine that we have aJapanese standing in front of the word "man" in those three dimensions, length, width and height, he does not speak Spanish and does not know that that thing thatalive with some curves and some little lines means being human,he is in front of something that haslines, curves, shapes but thathe does not understands its meaning, at that moment we are faced with whatwe could call the purity of the signifier, he only sees forms, he only sees morphe, he only sees matter, this is what Jakobsoncalls thefunction factual and conative of the sign, that is, it has a material sidefactual connective that can be separated from its meaning, the Japanese onlyit is in contact with the signifier.
Now, this is notstill The flesh of the signifier is its purity, but not its flesh, why? Because by not having a connection with meanings that the signifieronly can receive meanings, by not having ground with a meaning, it is pure matter, it is pure form, the signifier is what theJapanese, without a doubt, but if I could somehow connect withsome aspect of the meaning even if it was tangentially of the word whichI would be impossible because you don't understand, because you don't have the ground.
To explain this ligature, let us imagine a Portuguese, an Italian, or aFrench, languages that have the sameroot latinaSpanish where words are spelled alike and sound alike, although they are spelled a little differently and sound a little different, likeit is written and has a form, Portuguese, Italian or French are in contact with whatmorpho and with their materiality, that is, they see the samelines and shapes, curves and matter that Japan sees, but at the same time likeroot is the same they can identify some of its meaning, not completely but something, they can see above all the formal differences betweenas written or sounded in Spanish, to be able to deduce what it means to be human, there we would be more in contact withas the signifier is linked to the senses, for them asit is written differentlyare in contact withmorpho, with the material and formal of the word, with itsspelling, or its sound, but at the same timeare in contact with something of your senses
The signifier is thefunction conative andfactual but since it doesn'tit is So separated into a sign by understanding a sign as it actually works whenit is meaning integrally, what we have done with these examples is adefamiliarization, we had to resort toJapanese to see in the same word what you didn't beforewe saw when do notwe had the image ofJapanese no we distinguish its signifier, we had to resort to aJapanese, that placelogical that playshere heJapanese to make us notice the puremorpho, in pure formal and material terms, is adefamiliarization, because we arefamiliarizing a through of another language that does not understand that language of what that sign means to begin to see inhe his facticity his sidemorpho, its materiality
SaussureHe said that when the sign is sound the signifier is the imageacoustics of the word, how it sounds, its sonority, in the case of writing the signifier is its visual graphics, asit is written, but perceiving it is adefamiliarization of meaning, that is, we have todefamiliarization that this sign means, to abstract into its signifier, but when the wordit is meaning as an integral sign in front of which we are understanding each other, right now I am using signs/words if you are understanding me you only grasp the meaning in what I tell you, the signifierit is in retreat, noit is in the foreground.
When the sign signifies, the signifier disappears. For the signifier to be in the foreground, the signified must be removed, and how is the signified withdrawn?, paying attention to the form of the sign, paying attention to itsaesthetics, in its materiality, but by removing the meaningit is ceasing to be a signit is functioning as an integral sign that has a meaning but ratherit is being seen alonethrough fromdefamiliarization who sees it in his morphe.
I hope with this I have beenfurther sharp
Howeverthat What happens? This principle of separating its form from its meaning into something perceptible, its morphe, worksSo regarding everything and it islogically universal, it is not necessary to resort to languagealphabetical to find the samelogic, with respect to everything regarding thefreak and appearance, everything that makes us present we canalso separate it and seeonly arephenomenal and its form, not its essence, pay attention to its appearance not its substrate, therefore it is a universal principle ofabstraction logic, theabstraction of morphe, of form.
When the significant word thatarise in thelinguistics is transferred from the languagealphabetical to anything else, libido ordrive, what we are bringing to ourselves by no longer being languagealphabetical to anotherdimension, what we are bringing to ourselves, from that momentit is ceasing to be significant,single what we have left is that thingempty what is the beginninglogical, over there is no longer a signifier, the principlelogical since thenit is ceasing to be significant,single what we have left is the beginninglogical same ofabstract morphe, when we see it this way we see that calling something significant that no longer refers to signslinguistic, but to things related to libido ordrive, we are working formetaphor and byanalogy.
There is no longer a ligaturescientific between the problemlinguistic that explains the signifier in the signlinguistic and histranslation to the libido or the body, to thedrive, when doing thattransition it is failing to respond to a truthscientific, we are working formetaphor, byanalogy.
What is Derrida doing? Derrida brings themetaphor fromrelationship body/soul to the signlinguistic alphabetical but not the other way around, he says analyzing the signlinguistic alphabetical the signifierI would be his body but he does not say the body, the literal body, the body libido is a signifier, he does the opposite, he brings themetaphor of the body to distinguishSo as I did just now to distinguish between matter and meaning with theJapanese and the examples that I put in theanalysis of whatlinguistic
that is what makes the signifierover there in the sign?, it says it is the body, instead of saying it is the matter, it is the morphe, it is the form, it says it is the body in the sign but in the signlinguistic It is not the same as saying that the body is the signifier or that the libido is the signifier.
Now, the beginningthrough from which we come into contact with the libido now outside of languagealphabetical and with thedrive, the eros tothrough of other ways through which we come into contact with the libido, that principle initself contains the oneabstraction of morphe without recourse to languagealphabetical and without recurrence to the signifier, that is, to come into contact with the libido one must abstract the morphe because the very principle that operates in coming into contact with the libido presupposes the narcissism of the form.
why name that significantdefamiliarization that engenders libido in theperception narcissistic of the form?, only to authorize a discourse that wants to operate in a field notlinguistic with the authority of a conceptlinguistic but nowtranslation has lost theConnection with the scientificity of the concept of signifier within thelinguistics, so, theit is doing Lacan is operating a fieldmetaphorical in which the scientificity has been lostConnectionWhat then justifies that game? A discourse strategy, aconnection enter hererhetoric and the truth, betweenreason to speakSo and the fundamentalsscientists to speakSo, that is, it is spokenSo because ofrhetoric you can talkSo obviously, without a doubt you can do thatoperation what Lacan does without a doubt and it can becarry the signifier to anything but thatoperation it is alreadyrhetoric, and beingrhetoric loseConnection with the problemsscientists that connect language and truth, language andcognition, language and world.
Now, once this is clear, it is then understood what youHe said there is nosubjection morality for thatoperation with the speech, there is nosubjection ethic, by releasing the signifier in this way using it only by authoritylinguistics It can be applied to anything in any way, authorizing any strategy of discourse regarding the body, libido anddrive
I hope with this I have concluded a better, more graphic explanation even of what I told you yesterday when I told you that a situation has been created with the strategies of discourse where it is the homosexual who goes to the signifier to authorize a sexualized discourse, which transposes the inscribed genres of discourse neutral to the genres of sexuality, you see it clearly there, that is, the problem of drive and libido now sexualized that you said is not sexualized in Lacan, but how the discourse there has lost relationship with scientificity since anything can operate and in fact what is operating in many discourses is a politics of the strategy of discourses that is being authorized with linguistics for a discourse that the only thing that justifies it is a rhetorical politics not a scientific contact with the significant in linguistic theory
But on the other hand it is important to distinguish, already interms linguistic, that Saussure's concept of signifier and the concept of interpretant infirst place no are in contact bynone aside, there are two conceptslogically incompatible.
The concept of signifier, as we have just seen, is aabstraction factual, conative of thedimension purely material and formal of that whichit is over there, the pictureacoustics in oral speech and its imageprint shop in the case of writing, in languagealphabetical, the signifier neverreplace to the object, that is, to the object with respect to which the sign means, it is precisely that which in the sign does notreplace to the object, since it is pure matter, it is morpheus
That moment in which the Japanese see the sign as something purely formal, without understandingthat meansI would be the signifiereducated, completely disconnected from the signified, the signifier would thus logically be like the value zero inmathematics or nothinglogic In Hegel, the signifier has a moment when it resembles zero,only operates by differentiality, beingabstracted asconatividad and being disconnected from the meaning, its true value is differential, that is, it is what makes one sign and another different by mere matter, that is, because they are two different words. If they were not different, the words could not designate two different objects either.there the signifier operates aConnection with the meaning tothrough of differentiality for nothing fordenial for zero valuelogical, it's pure morphe
there is no contact in the signifier at the levellogical with the object that the sign replaces because the signifier is what does not replace the sign, it is what the ground does not do, it is what does not allow theConnection what does ground do with the object athrough of the meaning
Peirce's interpretant is exactly the opposite, it is the meaning that replaces the object, becauseonly the meaning once you and I are meaning a thing to which we are referring we can dispense with what we are referring to andreplace it by the language about it, therefore it is the meanings that allow thesubstitution of the world forlanguage not the signifiers
In thetheory of peirce it is the meaning thatreplace to the object but it does notit is thought in the same way as the meaning ofsaussure because this isalphabetical Not Peirce's, Saussure's is what that means.
The signifierit is in theposition to signify but it still does not mean, it is pure matter but necessary because if the sign has no form it is not a sign either.
Then the interpretant is the same as the meaning, the interpretant is nothing other than the one who creates the meaning.significance only that it has a different nature, it is already an interpretant thatit is in the place of the object, why? because thelogic from peirce part to levelphilosophical fromrelationship in betweenobservation and reference, does not start from the tonguealphabetical, starts from the problems ofseparation between substance andperception, in betweenquality anddistinction logic of the world, that is, from the problemslogical Hegelians whoalso are in positivismlogical onrelationship between language and reality
There is no possibility of operating thelogic Lacanian that what is precisely brought is a signifier that is pure morphe that does notit is in the place of the object at arelationship with the libido with the interpretants of Peirce because theseare on the territory of what the sign means noare splits detached towards the narcissism of morphe in a way that allows arelationship with the libido, well I hope with this I have beenfurther clear aboutwhich is mycriticism to thequestion lacaniana, a hug
The paradigms of scientificity
Gooddays, thanks for the audios
everything you just told me now seems to me that inlast instancecould justifyhave moved towards the whole problem oflogic in the analytical philosophy of language from the moment in whichparameter from which II worked my development waslinguistics de saussure, because it was the theme
Obviously you are going towardsthere because I have said thatlinguistics de saussure has been the paradigm of scientificity for the social sciences, and I would like to make some points since it is not in any way that it has been considered a paradigm of scientificity but in very precise ways that establish important differences with the problems of scientificity as they are considered. in the way thatare behind of the paradigms of analytical philosophy on what is considered more or lessscientific
First of all thislast connects with theproblematic fromlogic which is nothing other than the ancient form inherited from theclassics pre-modern and already modern of the 18th and 19th centuries, which was the ancient form of whatafter was thephilosophy of science,logic of Hegel's science is an ancient form as is the organon ofaristotle of whatafter was thephilosophy of science because it is notexisted before hegel,
and thesingle way we have had it in the past isthrough Of the samephilosophy classic Thatdivide inontology, logic, dialectics, phenomenology, philosophy of nature, they then occupied the place of whatafter was thephilosophy of science when it was not defined as such.
So the problems oflogic to those whoyou you mean they go inaddress to thephilosophy of the sciences which implies that it is a general problem for all the sciences and not a science problemspecific.
That is, when I say sciencespecific, I am referring to the disciplines when they are already established within thesecularization specialized and over/specialized, thedivision social development of work that, with the 20th century, makes new sciences emerge that had not been possible before.existed as thesociology, the samelinguistics whatstill was not exactly alinguistics in thephilology traditional and in the school of port royal and that becomes a science with all the rules and requirements of a science in the 20th century
We are talking about scienceyouths that are born as disciplines which distinguishes them in an important way from thephilosophy of science, thislast it's aspeech general that concerns all forms of science
When IHe said paradigm of scientificityreferred The paradigm of accuracy, the natural sciencesalso are separated as disciplines,physical separates from thebiology, fromchemical, fromzoology, and the social sciences had to become disciplines to show their scientificity, and that scientificity is not only resolved byvia of the problemslogical that communicate to a sciencespecific and disciplinary with thephilosophy general of science, but has to be discerned once it is established as a disciplinarity from its own borders fromparameters that are typical of that science thatphilosophy general of science is unaware and does not enter there
when I say thatlinguistics It is the paradigm of scientificity, I say that it is within thestructuring science disciplinaryspecific the first science that proves to bescientific not within theparameter fromphilosophy of the science that concerns all, but within theparameter of a sciencespecific regarding what you study, in this case language
there is no science of human or social nature includinglogic and thephilosophy of the science,further scientific thatlinguistics Regarding the results that it produces in the study of something specific that is its object of study, the studiesphonological, ofmorphology of language, about morpheme and lexeme, aboutdistribution helmet lever, martinet, chomsky, are studies that have shown to be applied in a very accurate way to the exact study of language and have demonstrated asoaring level of scientificityfurther high known to date in a human and social science,further higher even than the samephilosophy of science or that itlogic becauseit is based on the study of something concrete.
This is a complex issue sincewould involve distinguish differences between sciences,after fromlinguistics the second science that isfurther scientific is thesociology, precisely because he has been ablediscern Despite variations between schools and trends, thesociology count positivist, lasociology evolutionary andunderstanding of weber andsynchronous structural ofdurkheim and of the differences between those three mother or father schools, of the birth of thesociology
Thesociology has demonstrated with parson and his functionalism,shutz with thephenomenology insociology, in interactionismsymbolic andethnometodologia has demonstrated asoaring level of scientificity indefinition ofwhat it's the social
It doesn't matterhow Different has been the way in which each school has given an answer to that question, all althoughdiscrepan in betweenyes in what to prioritizemethodologically have proven to study the social in certain aspects of the social that become laws that become indisputable
Theanthropology On the other hand, it has been less able to demonstrate its scientificity because it has not been able to verify in the object whatkant called the object as a thing in the case ofsociology thedefinition ofthat It is the social, in the case oflinguistics which is language has not been able to demonstrate its object with the same level ofprecision but italso makes attractiveanthropology
because the human sciences, not exactly the social ones, such ascriticism literature have always required those inaccuracies thatanthropology has respect to the object and with all the rotation that thesemiotics to thepost structurality theanthropology has come to gain interesting territory from those inaccuracies on the side ofconsider it a humanity and not properly a social science
on the side ofconsider it further linked to thecriticism literature and the humanities, but I consider that theanthropology also It is interesting as a social science but I consider that it is in a nascent state, that it has not matured enough, I recognize important steps towardsconformation fromanthropology as science, for example in Levi Strauss and Stephen A Tyler, butlean a lotfurther late In Myselfconsideration regarding the possibilities of demonstrating its scientificity, however, this does not mean that it is no longerextremely attractive precisely because of those inaccuracies that it has always had in contrast to thelinguistics and thesociology, Now I have a diagram aboutas I see the scientificity, in my book "the couples of theepistemology: practicingsociology/composinganthropology"
It is something that not everyonetheorists They look the same and I think that it is impossible to establish a diagram that is the one that everyone applies, it always happens as happens, for example, with the tables of thesemantics, in the paintingslogical that give scientificity to thesemantics that the different tables and organization chartsvary by author and this will never be able to stop beingSo, neverscientific will be able to be collected in a single modellogical alwaysthere will be many and one has to move among them and position oneself
there In that diagram I say what thehierarchy of the sciences, I give it alocation in a tableas they must communicateeach other, receive material from thephilosophy of science, and vice versa, but it is aquestion that to mewould lead If I have to answer what I havefurther said, to a whole development in whichwould have thousands of things to say, butmove away completely of the theme
Abdel Hernandez San Juan:
Which is the signifier?
I have just listened to the following two sounds and the third seems to me to merit intermediate comments, this is much better, all this development that you have done now is much closer to my working logic, indeed that is what structuralism generates but There are some things missing there that I think are important to clarify, in the argument that you have made there has been a propensity to extend the concept of defamiliarization to the general operation that in itself creates the sign in its entirety, that is, calling defamiliarization to the sign itself, that is interesting to me and in a certain way I agree, but that was not exactly where my analysis came from, that is, although I agree that the sign itself is a defamiliarization and that what Saussure was doing was inherently if a defamiliarization, that what the theory of the sign engenders in itself is a defamiliarizing activity, in fact, the static itself is what nationalizes language, what takes it out of temporality, what gives it that structurality and what timeless the perception of language as something that has a structure that remains and puts us in contact with the invariability of language, its grammar as something timeless that always remains the same, with its morpheme, its lexeme, with its syntax and all the components of the language that linguistic structuralism objectifies and brings to the foreground, is a defamiliarization, it is true that the theory of the sign itself and that the very idea of the sign is a defamiliarization
The concept ofdefamiliarization It's a conceptideological and operational,methodological, in fact thatdefamiliarization was required for a reasonmethodological, now I wasn't using the concept ofdefamiliarization to focus on the fact that whathe took a saussure a ver So the sign was an activitydefamiliarized, there I'm reintegrating the sign not in the sense of returning it to that vital activity between subjects signifying in a familiar way but in the sense of seeing it as an unseparated unit within its signifier and meaning, now even separated from that vital experience in whichit is meaning for the sensecommon and its familiarity, even taken fromover there, the mere fact of seeing the sign of treating it as a unit although certainlyalso is adefamiliarization no it is doing thedefamiliarization that the signifier is with respect to the signified in thedefinition of the sign as somethingunivocal, dyadic, composed of two faces, the signifier and the signified
obviously I'm not mentioninghere the reference because wewould take to a space that is the third side of the signalso in saussure that actually in saussure is the object because wecould confuse, leading us towards analytical philosophy, the relationship between language and the world, which is not what should be focused on in Saussure because of what precisely you have realized: biunity, that biunity (meaning/signifier), is nothing other than what makes possible thetiming of the language and itscomprehension structured separated from temporality, that is, that the statism that Ithere was discussed in "counterpoints"it is here again in the foreground called now to see how statism itself has been generated by adefamiliarization, but theargumentation that I was developing beforeothers in thataddress and more in the direction of understanding what the signifier is? with high precision, it is an argument that was taking for granted already situated in the interiority of the Saussurian sign, establishing the separation between signified and signifier as two things distinct from each other because what Lacan is talking about is the signifier, not the meaning regardless of whether you say that the way in which the signifier is working presupposes refamiliarizing the sign that language in relation to an individual subject, the concept of the signifier in Saussurian linguistics as a concept separated from the signified is engendered by a defamiliarization and there is a difference here Importantly, we cannot argue that the meaning contains the defamiliarization as the signifier does, regardless of the fact that by seeing the sign as a unit, that is, reuniting meaning and signifier where we are no longer paying attention to that separation, it can be argued that separating the sign as a whole It is a defamiliarization with respect to the functioning of the sign in the flow of familiar everyday communication. In any case, what would make it a defamiliarization is that in that unit is the signifier, the meaning, seeing it again on both sides, is not a defamiliarization. By itself, in any case, we would have to say that the meaning would be in the sign that keeps it connected with its familiar side. The meaning can be explained through the semantics of the familiarity of the language. The very fact of separating them is a defamiliarization, but it is the signifier is the one that is generated by a defamiliarization because he is nothing he is nothing he is zero, effectively the problem of the relationship between form and content at a logical level, he is Hegel's nothingness zero in formal logic, and when We realize that a word cannot be analyzed in its pure form because a word is not matter in the same way that a door or a bit of coal or a cooking recipe is. A word is a thing linked to what it means. otherwiseit is Dead ceases to be what she is, so what is the signifier? something dead something that has no life now clear when we return the sign to the unity the signifier,here Prague is important, we are beginning to seeas is that it is relateddimension significant with the meaning butthere it is becoming nuanced with the logic of meaning in the Deleuzian sense because it has the meaning withhe does does not have it, we cannot separate meaning from meaning because they come from the meaning and therefore he does not have it himself, the example ofJapanese, we need toJapanese who does not understand the word to come into contact with the purity of the signifier,over there where it means nothingover there is the pure signifier therefore what is it? It is only differentiality, it is only thedenial of what is affirmed, what makes the difference between one sign and another, that a sign is what it is because it is not another, it islogic formal differential, once we understand that the sameontologically It is nothing, we ask ourselves what use can be made of the concept of the signifier to rediscover it with the vital, but it is not with any form of the vital because the way they lacquerincorporates the signifier to the flow of experience, it is not an experience concocted by meaningcommon It is not by narratives of experiences, by a world imbued with apragmatic of relationshipsintersubjective but with the libido with the desire you speak of thorny, with theenergy generator that is desire, with thedrive
then it is not with any vital thing butprecisely that related to desire and therefore inaccessible to activityconscious of the subject and precisely because it is aget familiar to something likedrive no it is completelyrefamiliarized to the world of meaningcommon but to an experience that is itselfdefamiliarizing of morpheus because as you figure out what it does to libido anddrive?, how do you explain libido inherself but it is through anarcissism from the form without separating the form from the meaning you do not get the libido, if there is meaning there is no libido or the libidoit is off, withdrawn into the background, so that the libidothis To the foreground you have to separate the form from the meaning, from the meaning of the content and enjoy it inherself As in all desire, the desire itselfit is related to the form not the content, then if in the languagealphabetical A signifier is the separate form of the signified and in theenergy vital libido and desire are the separate form of meaning, but we know that we can only separate forms of meaningof getting familiar which is therelationship between the signifier and the libido? There is literally none, the first isalphabetical, the second is something corporal, the signifierbrought to libido from language is no longerover there the signifier but the signifier arises from a principle ofseparation between form and content which is the same principle that we have in libido therefore, we cannot say that libido, desire and the body are a signifier because they are not, but we can say that a universal principle applies and is given equally on both sides, abstract the morphe, withoutabstract no we will receive the signifier in languagealphabetical, sin abstract no we would give with libido in the body, that's whyHe said that what really passes from one level to the other is the universal principle itself of abstracting the form, there the connection is none other than the universality itself of thedefamiliarization of morphe, if there is aabjection, whyare connecting something that does not haveontology, something that isempty that she herself is anarcissism of the form you are connecting it with something that in life experience is narcissism of the form
by acquiring in lacan that place that gives him greaterhierarchy is requiredstill withfurther reasons definethat It is the signifier that was in Saussure and that remains the signifier. When Lacan speaks of the signifier, I am examining the signifier initself precisely because it acquires that relevance,
againhere The problem arises that what relates two signifiers is nothing other than pure difference, a negative component operates in it, nothingness for being, zero for one, absence for presence,relationship It is arbitrary if asHe said Saussure and as everyone has saidsemiotics, levis strauss and bourdieu, but at the same time it is only difference that makes one sign distinguishable from another, whichit is coming to the foreground in Lacan is the zero, it is the difference, it is the negative thought, the identity of what is according to what is not, Hegel, there is above because there is below, you remove the below and the above is not above thenthat defines the identity of the above? the bottom and what is the bottom for the top? hisdenial its opposite, but it is the time from which it receives its identity, how zero operates for one, nothingness for zero, how absence operates for presence, the null for what makes sense then when the null comes to the foreground. the difference comes to the foreground, it is not any form of nothingness or zero because in the sign it is nothing other than morpheus, it isseparation of the form of the meaning, we speak of the signifier because we have separated the form from the meaning
we have the pure form but it is aabstraction whyit is inrelationship with a content we begin to call theattention about the form and we are removing the content and vice versa, but what is it?per se/ but what is morfe?per se?, ismorphology, that's whyrelationship with thesyntax because this is themorphology in the language,
then on the other hand the concepts from which thepsychoanalysis By putting libido in the foreground, they do not refer to anything other than desire and inrelationship with the form, because what abstracts the libido is nothing other than thenarcissism in the way yourseparation of the content, because the form is freed from that which binds it, there is libido anddrive because there is enjoyment of the form
Abdel Hernandez San Juan:
Theattention to the sensecommon like arelationship between forms of language
On the other hand I want to call theattention about the fact that the concept ofdefamiliarization has abase epistemological andcriticism no negligible arose in Russian formalism in discussions about whatcould make a language differentpoetic of ordinary and meaningful languagecommon, the languagepoetic It is a rarefied language, which makesspecific to languagepoetic?, unlike other forms of language, which is a type of language that isdefamiliarize of the language of meaningcommon
On the other hand, it has been important in part of the criticism about the relationship between special languages and common sense language for the distinction between scientific language and common sense language, and there is a whole discussion here that sociology makes that is important for you to know. There is a very crucial reading that the autonomous disciplinary theoretical tradition of sociology makes regarding the Comtian problem, one of the three fathers of sociology and who was a logical positivist, which is to bring the discussion of positivism to the discussion about what distinguishes a scientific language. of a common sense language, there is a whole discussion in sociology around this problem that reversed in an important way through the criticism of positivism the parameters of what makes a special language scientific with respect to the language of common sense and that Paying attention to the relationship between two forms of language, one scientific and the other common sense, is at the basis of the way in which interest and attention to common sense begins, especially in the ethnomethodological tradition, specifically in Alfred Shutz, from which Shutz extracted, as Did it occur to you how Shutzs arrived at the understanding that the main distinction that should define sociology would have to be that between the sociologist and common sense?, to the point that sociology could not properly be a science if it were not makes common sense its main object of attention and study?, that sensecommon and its study must be the source from whichsociology obtains its knowledge, its truths and its scientificity, this does not come from another place than from that firstrelationship between forms of special languages and languages of meaningcommon, I have discussed this in my essay sense and significance,also in I think science, and I plan to dedicate manyfurther own developmentsonwards, also it is the interesting coincidence thatalso graspingarrive to theconclusion of onesociology of the sensecommon from thesemantics structural,could tell you that as much as mytheories propias about the possibilities of the interpreter inmethodology of sociological and anthropological investigation, or as I dotheory of the gateways between language and non-language, inside and outside, I am very focused and prioritize my own developments in thisaddress
That is to say, we did not arrive at the idea that sociology would deal with common sense through a mere discussion of the object of study, as a mere topic that was searched for by mere occurrence, we arrived at common sense as a basis for sociology because there was a previous tradition that had been asking about what differentiated a spatial language from another of common sense, which made a language scientific for which the antinomy, the opposite, the opposite, the inverse point of reference was language. of common sense, that relationship between science and common sense began with questions about forms of language and is in its origin closely related to the dialectical place that common sense, ordinary languages, meant to define the identity of what is scientific in fact of new, Hegelian logic, there is no left without right, you take away the right and the left ceases to be left, therefore it is at the same time its opposite, its negation, but it is at the same time what gives it its identity, it is left because there is right, In the same way, a language is scientific because it is not a common sense language, so what is common sense language for scientific language? its opposite, its negation, its contrary, but if you remove the language of common sense in the same way that when you remove the right there is no longer any left, if you remove the language of ordinary common sense then scientific language is no longer scientific language because it is not It has its other, its negation, from which it obtains its identity, there at the same time as the problem of defamiliarization that analyzed what made a language poetic as a rarefaction with respect to the language of common sense, or scientific language compared to the language of era sense. defamiliarize common sense language
When sociology with shutz begins to understand that it must achieve and obtain its main reason for being from the study of common sense (it is discussed very clearly by maurice natanson about shutz but it is very notable in several essays by shutz and in knowledge in the worlds of daily life, edited by ilse and luckman), is doing nothing other than noticing the importance for scientificity of its relationship with its opposite with respect to which on the one hand it is defined but from which on the other hand it receives its identity, dialectical problem crucial that I dare to say without hesitation, certainly in that I am the first to objectify and analyze it without there being the possibility of doubting the scientificity and certainty of what I am saying, my essay meaning and significance as I told you in my book what is given and what is not given discusses this problem and proposes its analysis for the first time. When I say that it is a tradition in sociology, I am not saying that it was clarified as I am doing. Here I am the first to do so, but I believe I have demonstrated a minute ago that it is not The reason why sociology has taken this path is another. There are plenty of examples of how it was from a comparison between forms of language that attention began to be paid to common sense in the sciences for the first time. It is from there that attention to common sense began.
Tradition crucial, vertebral and main source, matrix and main fluvial, defining and foundational of my sociology, heir to the legacy ofprotection, shutz was the first to say social science must be based entirely on studying the meaningcommon and receive all your sense materialcommon, and it is I who am saying not as a mere topic or a mere turn of theattention, not as a mere definition of aobject of study that he went looking for or foundhe for merely define an object of study but we have arrived at it as a result of questions that were initially questions aboutas forms of language are related, onescientific another meaningcommon, and second, not to study it as somethingstrange or alien or contrary, but as somethingdialectically involved in the very identity of thesociology, situate ourselves in our own sensecommon.
This dialectical problem that I am placing here is crucial because without common sense such as the left compared to the right or the above compared to the below, scientificity does not obtain its own identity from its negation or its opposite, turning attention to common sense only acquires its justification and explanation dialectically and therefore its main source for sociology must be specified as philosophical, it is in the common sense that science itself receives its identity, it is I who am saying this and I would like to highlight it here, making it clear to what extent the epistemological root of the issue of defamiliarization between forms of language initiated by Russian formalism is important to understand why we have turned in sociology towards common sense, we do not come to consider common sense as the mere result of searching for an object of study, we come to consider common sense as an object of study because we pay attention to it, defining the very identity of science in terms of language, because by asking ourselves what made a language scientific with respect to other forms of language, we concluded that common sense language was its antinomy , its negation, its opposite, its versus, but at the same time dialectically that which by negation defined the very identity of scientific languages, common sense is thus at the source, in the very genesis of science and noticing it is no other something that is the very ground of scientific knowledge, we have therefore, as I say in my book, thinking science of seeing common sense not as a mere object of study but as the very foundation of scientific knowledge.
And again I reiterate I have not been talking about thedefamiliarization of the sign as a whole as something structurallyeducated with respect to the sign functioning in the sensecommon, but to argue that what makes the signifier in its ontos is thedefamiliarization itself, that the meaning is not defamiliarized but is what connects it with its familiarity with the meaningcommon, when we stopdefamiliarization the signifier ceases to exist, so what links one signifier with another? It is nothing other than thedistinction between forms, the problem that we distinguish presence by difference and identity bydenial, there is nothere another principlelogical operating
Now once we are looking at the morphe, in any system of signs orcommunication in any systemfurther there of the signs in the perceptual problems of the presencea phenomenon We understand that it is a universal principle oflogic, we distinguish presence because the appearance, because the form is what, due to the difference between appearances and forms, distinguishes the presence, in the same way the signifier distinguishesthrough from forms to signseach other, is what allows us to distinguish that in their form two signs are different
obviously the shapeit is integrated into the sense and there is no needget acquainted both to the point ofgo back until the sensecommon stop incamera levelhour returning little by little and perceiving step by stepas is that she connects with the senses and leavesSo progressively from being pure form
If we see a Pollock painting we see drippings we see loose stainswe could call them signifiers from the moment that nothing connects them with a concrete meaning, they are pure abstract gestures, but to the extent that they are in relation to a format in which they have a color, to the extent that we begin to relate all that warp to relations of meaning, the fact that we know that a subject has done it, the fact that we wonder about its expressive reasons, about itsintentionality, the fact that we ask ourselves inthat conditions a subjectcould freeing the pure gestural in this way, we move away from the pure signifier to the extent that we begin to reestablish it inrelationship with the states ofcheer up of the subject we return those forms or marches to relations of meaning, relations ofsense that we are obtaining from the meanings.
I am pointing out thatoperation that brings to the foreground the signifier in Lacan notit is reconciling anything with libido anddrive because these are themselves, both libido anddrive, narcissism Shape
thereforecarry the signifier as a journey that goes fromlogic of the languagealphabetical to thelogic of desire is to work with the narcissism of the form since the signifier is not the same other than the pure form and thenarcissism thatdefamiliarize, over there in the signlinguistic, while libido anddrive over there in desire, in the literal body, they are nothing other thanalso narcissism of form
there is thenabjection without a doubt, because there is arbitrariness, not only is therenarcissism also there is sadomasochism from the point of viewpsychopathological because it is a way to enter theexperience of the subject from the point of view of what connects him with the narcissistic side of hisrelationship with pleasure with desire and at once it is a negative input to the subject, differential
It is good that we agree, it is good that you are not interested in those speeches and that we agree on that, however we do not see it the same in terms of responsibility, in the case of Foucault if he had not written the history of sexuality, the history of madness and the microphysics of power, I would agree with you, but what he does in those books I do not consider to be defensible, if he had only written the words and the things and the archeology of knowledge, his interpretation of the meninas, he would have to see what could be saved and say well up to this point Foucault is fine, but that up to this point is not all of Foucault and he wrote too much in the other sense so much so that I do consider him responsible not for the specific manipulations that are being done but for his system and its work brings the deformations required for these monstrosities to be generated, and I also believe it with respect to Marxism, I consider that the vulgarizations and the concrete forms of society and dogmatisms, not only of concrete societies but of concrete theories of Marxism, if I consider That Marx's theory contains the deformations in which the origin of all this can be found, does not mean that there are no aspects of Marxism that can be saved, the theory of value, the theory of fetishism, the very fact of distancing oneself from the Capital is attractive, but again just like Foucault, and in the case of Marx it is thanks to the later Marxists because in Marx's direct sources what there is is very little in my opinion that can be salvaged, but let's say that there are original things that Through post-Marx Marxism they can be rescued but unfortunately Marxist theory does contain all the deformations that led to those forms of society. In Derrida's case I think it would be more of a saved case, although he also went too far, but less than the others. and it is clear what you say about a manipulation to which a theoretical system is susceptible to what that theory supposes, in Derrida I see itfurther Of course
would point out the fact that the libido itself and the drive itself on an ontological level, what are they? How do you explain them? Both are related to desire, both to eros, they have a sexual origin but they emphasize in the sexual what separates sex from the sublime plenitude of the plenitude that integrates the sexual act into the integrality of the experience of man and woman
Both concepts imply a reading of sexuality that focuses on eros,are related to desire and from that moment onConnection sexuality isthrough Shape
It would be necessary to see to what extent, ontologically, for the vital experience the very fact that the form exists that we have a formal contact with things that we have a morphology and things are presented to us in a way that requires the form, it would be necessary to see until point, the morphological experience itself no longer brings this, the libido itself is already a way of seeing desire that disintegrates desire to morality, to love, to the passions to the things that make the person's activity constructive, does this not mean Denying that there is libido and desire in the experience of every human being means dimensioning a dimension of the experience that is being dimensioned by its connection to eros, which is what makes it vital energy, primordial force, nothing other than its relationship with form, narcissism of the form separating the form from the meaning I consider that ontologically the concepts of libido and drive themselves are already a narcissism of the form and that there is a coincidence between the defamiliarization that a signifier is like a morphic phenomenon disconnected from the meaning and the relationship What is there in the libido and the drive regarding the subject's experience with desire?
Abdel Hernandez San Juan:
Structuralism inanthropology
I like Levi Strauss, I always liked it, I have read it lots of times, not even six months ago I read the complete structural anthropology again and in these years I have read it about three times again, and I also like Stephen and Tyler. I am referring to the structuralist Stephen Tyler who has a lot of connection with Levis Strauss, his studies on Koya on Indian languages and on Indian culture that transpose issues of structural linguistics to the study of culture, in the case of Levis Strauss from the point From a phonological point of view, Stephen in a semantic way, but in both cases I am interested in what happens, and I respect it very much and I like it, when I make distinctions against it I am not failing to recognize the legacy and importance of what they did what I am It is proposing what is necessary to innovate, not innovating for the sake of innovating, but I am examining the blind spots, the things where they are limited, it is a generational thought where repeating what they did does not make any sense, why do what they did again if it is already done and I consider that just as he has achievements, many of which have not been sufficiently discussed, many of the things that Levi Strauss did when bringing Saussurean parameters to anthropology had an important consequence for anthropology, not so much in the terms in which he said to himself. themselves because it was important, they were important not so much because of what they told themselves was important, I do not consider the analyzes that Levi Strauss did of the Bororo villages using parameters of phonology to be so important so that these analyzes can really produce as a result in the study of the Boboro village and for the way in which they produced a textual result in the anthropological reflexivity of structuralities that offer possibilities for comparativism in cultural anthropology and for ways in which relationships are established between the data collected in the field work andproduction of textanthropological In both Levis Strauss and Stephen I see alot of interesting results with their differences because stephen introduced many thingsnovel Regarding Levis Strauss, I see important consequences in aspects that are not what they noticed.
Stephen, for example, through all that structurality, can arrive at a study of a market in India that if he had not started from those parameters in structural linguistics, he would not have gotten there to do the levels of analysis that he develops on the men in the market. in India, but it is not there where the linguistic parameter applies, he applies the latter in the analysis of the relationship between the modes of social organization of India such as castes and the way in which they are forbidden and the ancient Indian texts organize them in their compendiums of worldviews and religious compendiums such as the Koran in the Arab world or the Bible in the Israeli world. The Indians have several important treatises that are both philosophical and cosmological on the origin of the cosmos of genesis that are on the one hand religious but on the other hand. The other has a very peculiar structurality and compositionality typical of the cosmological system of India and Stephen has very interesting studies that establish very illuminating homology relationships between what a caste is and how caste organizes the relationship between order and chaos and The way in which the relationships between order and chaos occur in the Vedic texts, makes very original moves. I am referring to that first Stephen writing about the koya about kinship in India, that first more traditional Stephen who later became postmodern and became A very sophisticated theorist on a more philosophical level moved towards a more philosophical anthropology that was already postmodernized. I would even tell you that in Stephen I see things solved that in Levi Strauss are contradictions.
stephen takes thequestion a lotfurther there and a lotfurther interesting, but if I consider that levis strauss is interesting and I like his work, thereviews What I do to Levi Strauss does not mean that II admit not I disparage the legacy of Levis Strauss in my ownanthropology cultural, I am not aanthropologist that has books that can be considered one hundred percent ofanthropology cultural my books aresociology butyes the I have been incorporating one way at a timefurther relevant to the point that there are some forms of theanthropology culture that they consider my books books ofanthropology cultural, that is, but this presupposes adiscussion inside ofanthropology cultural, there are some booksmine which are disciplinary books ofsociology that within certain discussions and trends in theanthropology cultural are books ofanthropology cultural
But for me Levi Strauss has been important interms of how I conceiveanthropology cultural andfurther still Stephen A Tyler, none anthropologist has beenfurther revealing and illuminatingmy what Stephen, is my main influence onanthropology.
In your recent developments, you reached moments of articulations that are among the best things of yours that I have heard, I do greatly appreciate that you have done that field work experience on the one hand due to the lack of materials in that direction but on the other hand In the academy in the United States I learned something that I did not bring from Cuba or even from Venezuela, which was a great teaching, something with which I grew a lot as a theorist and as a writer in my field, the way in which that sense is preserved that a single The author cannot develop everything alone, you have a figure like Stephen who is a theorist with a vast work that radiates around him, but Stephen Tyler's work is not enough on its own, he has needed students who have taken certain things from Stephen but not others and they have made variations that are not in Stephen and that later inspired Stephen, my relationship with Stephen is not a teacher-student relationship, as mine is not with you, but also in the field of department colleagues, of faculty, from research centers this type of relationship radiates, you take a parameter of things that I developed but you are developing things that I did not develop, and that is important to consolidate schools and you have to have a greater sense of cooperation than the one that We have in Cuba where, due to the same material precariousness of the economic difficulties that the faculties do not have money, the people do not have the comfort and are in need of solving their problems, and despite all the cooperative ideology of socialism, paradoxically it generates a chaos that It completely breaks everything that is started that prevents theoretical systems from having the type of vitality that they need for systems of thought to develop where each author has their own developments, as you told me at the beginning of "contrapoints" that can come to shape each one in a school as happens to quetzil and me where each one is a different and original school but where what we have achieved does notthere would be been possible withoutcooperation that at a given moment we develop in our livesacademic As colleagues, I do consider that it is important to giveattention because it is a trigger for developments that would not otherwisewould possible is not anything you have done field work
Even I would tell you that Pilon had a lot of thatalso wasfurther important because of the experience lived than because of what we were really able to do, much islost and it could not be done, however theten monthsover there in the communitymaking us questions aboutas study the culture were left with visits to religious temples, the formsthrough of which community members took me to thebohíosIn my case I nevercould give up that field work, because although I later developed field work in Venezuela where I was able to work with manyfurther resources that was an experience in 98 settlements in themountain aimmersion In rural towns this has relevance when I will have an experience like this again, perhaps never again, many times I havethought whatought go again to studyfurther these temples in depthspiritualists to complete knowledgefurther deep of the religions of the East, if you have had an experience that has had relevance you should not give it up
Abdel Hernandez San Juan:
you tell me thatknow but one thingmethodological that properlyempirical In me, it is true, the whole experienceempirical I work with hermethodology directly, even from the point of viewrhetorical the way I write when my books areempirical the way I write the essaysituates the reader facing the dilemmamethodological in which I myself am faced with an empiricity
there is a testmine illustrative ofas I work therelationship betweenmethodological and theempirical, "performativity ininvestigation", which is this one that is about therelationship enter hererestoration of the colonial heritage, thehabitat that is generated in the same place where that heritageit is being restored, and the tourism that is inserted in that spatiality, where I analyze therelationship between these three elements both in small towns between Texas andMexico like in old havana which is wherefurther time spent onIt is rehearsal,also In my essay on can collectorsit is arguingas access a can collector andas studying it is an essay in which both things are done at the same time and discussedmethodologically a problemmethodological but at the same timeit is arguing with somethingempirical concrete
I am taking the reader to the alternativesmethodological that the specific problem poses to me and I move forward with examples asanalysis of whatempirical I do that in many essays, but those essays are not like Alfred Shutz with ideal types, in the sense of Max Weber who works on something as a prototype of what it would be like because in that case they are examples that have not occurred in reality.
In my case, they are lived things and when I do field work I go to do what I am empirically describing is not an ideal example of what it would be like but is based on a study that I did of a real empirical reality, that is I really did those studies of the artisans on Berkeley Boulevard, I actually did those interactions with the punks in the parks of Berkeley, I really spent two years in the Venezuelan urban popular markets, I immersed myself in them and had interactions with them. sellers, and I did a whole development, in addition to doing newspaper archive work, I made a survey of the images of the market since the 15th century, from the Dutch and English visitors who drew the Sunday square as something exotic to the perspective of the local Laplante costumbristas, about the same market, I reviewed collections and reviewed the visual tradition of the markets in collections and I did real field work, I went to the markets and immersed myself in them, which is a whole two-year story that has lots of interactions and photographic surveys, Although in the case of markets I also have empirical essays where I directly say what the markets are like and I take the reader to immerse myself with me in what they are like, but in the literary way the way I continually write methodological questions never ceases to exist, I am very interested. This is of great interest to me.
sense and significance inMethodology
Abdel Hernandez San Juan:
Yes it is indeed the way I work
here you have to make onedistinction which is adistinction in which Geertz emphasizes a lot that it is thedistinction between fieldwork and writing the fact of positioning those two elements that maintain arelationship proximity, mutualseduction of issues related to temporality, that is, if you write before or write at the same time whileare doing field work or writingafter of the facts and I have very original and unique solutions to all of this.mine
thequestion whether or not you considerinscription within the spatiality of field work
The concept of field work at this timeit is passing through adiscussion inanthropology cultural and especially inethnography which has its fruitful and interesting moments butalso its dispersions, its uncertainties and its quagmires
I would like to follow a very pathmethodological, because in the circumstancescontemporary field work occurs in several dimensions that cannot be avoided
On the one hand, we must distinguish the cut from the traditional idea of immersion in a social cultural whole that has its spatiality, which can be, for example, the parameter of the village, the town, or the city in which one is immersed, the idea village is the traditional paradigm of field work, I say little town because I think it is different from the village, I have immersed myself in communities that are much more rural than the idea of a village where there is not yet the idea of a village where there is no village or small town but just a group of bohios, I have done field work in circumstances of bohios but not in the bohio of the agrarian peasant who is tilling the land, it is not the flat bohio that has a central street with a sidewalk and a certain layout of the houses, otherwise it is the mountain hut where you are walking along paths and you see a hut a kilometer away, you see some donkeys and some horses passing by, and a guajiro that goes up and down. It is the hut where there is a single Englishwoman, a single warehouse of feed, a single meeting place for the community where everything is reduced to a minimum and where religious practices are carried out either within the huts or removed towards the mountains in rustic temples that are created for families to meet, but I have also worked in the village, in this you insert yourself into a social and cultural space that has a name, a tradition where you have to adapt to the lifestyle of those people, insert yourself and make it make sense that you are there in front of the paradigm of intrusive observer who has no connection with cultural reality, compared to the foreigner who does not have to be a Frenchman in the Amazon but rather a Havana native in a rural community, a foreigner who may only be the contrast between the metropolitan and the rural peasant, but contrast which can become quite high even if you speak the same language, as you not only get to know a totality in which you insert yourself and for the first time you are going to collect material about it and delve into itthat way you come to know that reality within theparameter of the object of study that you are the subject ofanalysis the observer and the culture that you are going to study your object of study, but ratherfurther there and outside of thatparameter It is the idea of how you insert yourself into a culture thatit is meaning to you, if you saw the video dies of myvideoconferences There you will see how I talk about understanding the social world as a pre/interpreted world, which puts us in front of the fact that the observerit is already meaning in thesituation in which you enter and participate and that you cannot imagine yourself as something neutral but that the culture has youpre meaning regarding other classifications that she has made regarding situations similar to what you mean to her
This is something that in another sense Pierre Bourdieu has seen with respect to the interview when he said that the interviewer always presupposes that he brings a neutral interview, presents it to the interviewee and that the interview contains enough neutrality for that interviewee to answer what relates him with that question as a relationship with the truth and answer authentically, and Bourdieu said no, the interview enters a space of cultural dispositions in which the first thing the interviewee does is make a relationship with what the interview means to him. The way it comes to him and how he responds to that interviewer, editing himself in relation to what the interviewer means to him in his circumstances, is not the same as having the priest of the church of the town where he lives come to interview him and having him come to interview him. someone from the state who is doing an inspection or someone who has no connection with their community, someone who gives them legitimation an opportunity for something in their career, work or economic life, it depends and then I add the way the questions are prepared establish contact with classifications that the interviewee has about the types of questions that are asked in certain circumstances and when he answers he does not respond between a pure way between what the question asks and a going to his own situation that summons in his situation the ultimate truth for the answer to the question, but in facing the question it brings in all the preinterpretations it has about the question
He doesn'the took like me to the fieldsociology phenomenological and of thereinterpretation of culture as I am doing in thetradition ofprotection butcarrying it a lotfurther there carrying it to thecomprehension of culture and field work, you insert yourself into a circumstance that can be amicro interaction in a social space, community or village and you have to consider that you are beingreframed pre interpreted for the culture
thatknow In me something related to descriptivism is true, especially in rethinking theanthropology urban I resort to thedescription at various times you havereason and I have nothing specifically against thedescription butthere would be To make some distinctions, I resort to thedescription when I talk about popular markets because I'm trying toimpress to the reader with me in those markets I am trying to earn him from being in mysituation that you can put yourself in my place that you canimagine what it isdives in these markets
and to do this I have to give it as a kind of approach to the world in which I am immersed in that experience, give it elements about what the markets are like and at that moment I resort to description but even when I resort to description I never stop thinking about how you have I realized that I would be dealing with the methodological problems at the same time because if I only described I would make a description of what I am seeing and I would simply resort to writing that gives the reader information that is a mix between a description of what was seen and observed and information about what that is. So that you can understand what it is about, I don't do that, I start to describe and to the same extent that I am describing I am putting the reader in front of the dilemma that describing that reality is already placing us in the fact that there is questions that are phenomenological specific to what makes the world of that spatialized world of intercorporeal and intergestural interactions and I am making the reader participate in the fact that even my own description cannot be sufficient in giving him the idea of what that world is if leaving the parameter of merely describing we do not understand that there is a phenomenology there, for example in the popular urban markets you have been in markets because you go shopping, when it is not a mole but you are in front of shacks that are improvised on a boulevard in the United States it happens a lot. The agricultural markets and craft markets in Los Angeles happen a lot, the farmers come down to the city and the weekends are filled with improvised markets where the same seller is the one who makes the construction system with a tarp to establish themselves there with an authorization that They have and settle thousands in a square kilometer to sell
In those markets you have a flow of passersby who are browsing merchandise that is not just anything but is an important component of the material culture of that culture. There is not only an agricultural market but also crafts, artifacts, decorations, icons and images of religion. , then there is an ideosyncracy and a folklore expressed there but you have a displacement where what governs is barter, there is also a whole theatricality of the seller and that generates ways in which the seller addresses the people and there is a sound there that does not It is even that other sound, which is very interesting, the vendors who move, who move, who sell tender corn, things that you can snack on. It is not only the sound of the street market that hawks but that of the vendors and you have the customer there are many people moving at the same time people greet each other with short expressions, with winks, a family a couple come talking they don't interrupt you the seller listens to them talking and dialogues are generated I say that one of the main characteristics of the market is that the People are in a situation of seeing, of seeing, but also of being seen, you turn but you are seen and this regulates the market with its exchanges but regulates it in a way that comes to annulment, I say that it is where a camera is least noticeable, an example only of the type of journey I say I have to bring the reader closer to the semiotic specificities and I include elements of semiotics, proxemics and kinesics, I analyze how the saleswoman is sitting who suddenly has the merchandise around her and acts as a kind of ceremony or staging of a rag doll shop surrounds herself with rag doll shops and woven backpacks to the point that this creates a platform that is above her body and she is as if below the merchandise while on the other hand everything hangs, What hangs? How do you hang it? and where does he sit?
andanalyzed theproduction of material cultureephemeral that is generated in the markets as they are surrounded by objects, and thenalso There are different types of markets, thisalso I analyze it, the highway market where you arrive and get off is not the same as the market where you park and the marketit is in the portals that the boulevard market, then this leads to ainterconnection between describing and developing aphenomenology that feeds onsemiotics in the sense offilm-maker --interbody interactions andinter gestural--and of theproxemics of thedynamic of spatiality and is combinedalso as you say to onereflection methodological continues that I always bring indiscussion in each essay around thesituation in which I am faced with those interactions
That is to say, I, as a person who is moving there, who at one point in my life moved only to go shopping and it is part of my life, but from the moment I began to do a field work project I began to see the same thing in a new way and I do an analysis of how I revisit my previous experience there and begin to modify my questions and how I solve that problem of being there now to know how those people make sense of their world and their reality, and Here there is a problem that has to do with phenomenological sociology, which is no longer simply a matter of studying, in this case, the markets in the case of a village or a town or in the case of a temple, a certain form of religion as a simple object of study but is also raised in what I am doing the idea that the way of immersing yourself presupposes that what worries you about the subject is not so much studying him from a deterministic perspective that he is looking for in that journey with his eyes and in that process you begin to understand the reality through which you move, those things that you are unaware of or that condition you, such as the authorizations you have from the government to be able to be there in those spaces, the economic situation you have if you need to live. there or not because they are poor people or people with a low economic level, which would be the deterministic ways of studying a culture through those things that are out of their reach because they are things that contribute to their world, it is not studying that culture in the way of searching you data as if they were objects of study, no I work from a different parameter that goes even beyond what interpretivism has been in anthropology, for example, of Geertz.
is asociology no wayfurther there that's what mattersalso and in the first place, what one is going to study is not that subject but rather putting theinterpretation that one knowsit is doing with theinterpretation that these subjects have from what they have experienced, this completely changes and alters the idea of the object of study
I'm interested in trying to understand how he already has a way in whichhe means whichit is living,here the importance comes inepistemological that acquires in me what I call theproblematic pre-interpretive I care that he already has onesignificance of what he has experienced, that he already has onetypification From what you have experienced, I am interested in getting in touch with howhe means their world and gives it meaning, because I assign relevance to their interpretations to the point that I consider that what they think about their own experiences are already interpretations and that these interpretations are of high value for the study that one is going to carry out. What one is going to do is put inrelationship what one is interpreting with what they already bring from what they have experienced, which is at most what one is going to arrive at, and on the other hand, thehermeneutics that one is going to develop what you are going to do is put intorelationship those textual forms
that is, what you finally agreed to,methodologically one puts it inrelationship with how they mean and give meaning to howthey pre-interpret their world without excluding the way you are being signified by that culture, you cannot exclude it, you cannot exclude yourself, you cannot exclude one another.itself of the hermeneusis of culture, nor separate it from the way they make sense of their world nor from theinterpretation What will you do next and here I talk about intertextuality in fieldwork
Stephen speak from the end of thedescription and from the beginning of intertextuality, I have ainterest in the way stephen studied the markets of india, look at the achievement of bringing the problems you know from levis strauss, the bororo village, something similar to studyalso hekinship Now I am especially interested in his essay "a point of order" wherehe studies the varnas and thechhatris thisI would be the equivalent of the clan or the family, here it would be the caste,He analyzes as it is formed the caste and connects his studies of traditional Indian texts the way in whichit is over there given a certainrelationship between order and chaos in an idea of the universe with the structures of caste and from this he draws conclusions that are extremely beautiful for theanalysis traditional culture of india ancient culture
Abdel Hernandez San Juan:
But what I like most is the way that concern that he brings is structured with the relationships of homologies between orders between imaginary things such as a cosmovisibo system and things from the objective material world such as the way a caste is organized or the Cultivation of the land, or the ways of working and the professions, is the way in which when he enters markets similar to those that I studied, of course in an ancient traditional India, it is not the same, but it is the way in which he manages to situate the symbolic analysis. of the market from the point of view of a civic, he says if the market has a moment that may be contrary to ethics if compared to our current concept of business, Western trade contrary to the ethical regulation of giving and receiving, but He makes an effort to study all the civics of the market, all the morals of the market, that impressed me a lot, he analyzes that the market is a civic, moral thing in which there is a structure related to work with energy production. constructions of society and culture and this has a lot to do with the fact that he comes to the market with that structured way of seeing order in chaos, although this differentiates him from me, because I put more emphasis not on chaos. But if in polyphony for me the market is the cancellation of the point of view, it places you in front of the polyphonic
Now the reason why I started talking to you about all this is because I wanted to tell you that on the one hand I have no prejudices towards descriptivism, although I agree with Stephen that there is a moment in which intertextual work comes to replace description, I believe that Not entirely, Quetzil has been giving importance to description lately, in recent texts and I trust a lot in Quetzil's point of view because I agree with Quetzil when he says that the ethnography of the future is going to be an interdisciplinary cultural anthropology. , and it is true that from that point of view it is not possible to completely renounce the description, it is something that he wrote after I wrote these texts of mine and I have a lot of confidence in the way Quetzil discusses these problems, I have a lot of affinity with him although Let us have differences, the affinities are much greater than the differences, so that Stephen's essay where he says that the end of description and its replacement by intertextuality is perhaps a little extreme, perhaps it will not disappear completely but as I say, I am more I agree with Stephen and I agree with what he says, intertextuality is more important, but Stephen does have an essay where he clarifies that there is a speaking through in describing that there is like a dewriting and that it is described to the extent that it is described and speaks for the culture, we could call this another text by Stephen to compensate but on the other hand I also agree that intertextuality is more effective than description in many examples if you go and visit my video 10 you will see how I discuss this I analyze this in relation to the craftsmen of Berkeley and in general to my studies of rockers and punks, but I told you this regarding Geertz because Geertz gave importance to what he called dense description
but you have to make onedistinction because it is not the samedescription dense thandescription participant islast It is a concept ofgeertz but whathe defined regarding malinowski discussing what happens in malinowski, that is, you are making adescription to the extent that you are participating is an interesting concept, but when one reads as I haveread in depth and really study the complete Malinowski one realizes that in reality thatstake It is relative, he never stopped being an observerexogenous, although whenHe describes the process of making the canoe he was there nearby he did not go there with the Trobrianders to participate in theconstruction of the canoehe always he remained as an observer, it is true that he was there watching it but it is astake relative, that is why the concept ofdescription participant, contains much of the observer thisforeigner the intruding eye that is not understooditself inside ofhermeneutics of culture
On the other hand, it is true that indescription dense of Geertz if it means understanding that describing is already interpreting, in which I do agree with Geertz
In fact my essayhermeneutics and culture the first in my book "the correlate of the world" although discussing aproblematic very different from Geertz where I amdistinguishing in betweenhermeneutics andontology on one side and betweenexegesis and texts of the other, and where I put examples aroundsemiotics of objects andparables by eagleton aboutwhen consider a literary language whenbrought anddialogue from a bar to some poets andthey were saying that they were literary andHe said that not thattook by onedialogue in a bar, or vice versa, as a way of relativizingIf that It is the literary, I combine thecriticism That thedescription Nowinterpretation this is a littlegeertziano
However, it is differentvision regarding the meredescription dense and I will explain to you why, he goes so far as to say that describing is interpreting but he never considers the fact that he himselfit is woven in the interpretive field that the observerit is located in a space thatpreinterpret and that cannot exclude thatpreinterpretation of the hermeneusis of culture, it does not include that component of understanding the social world as a worldpretyped andpreinterpreted nor that we are going to arrive at ainterpretation that culture already hasherself, he says who is going to interpret it because he says to describe it is to interpret and that makes his text literary, he calls theattention about the fact that this text is writing andinscription, what issymbolic What is already interpretive is that to describe is to order a text in an interpretive way, where do you start, what do you first describe what is close to you or what is far away? He says that his concept of culture issemiotic which alreadythere was said levis strauss andalso Stephen, but why?it is being interpreted but not because theit is seeing interms peirceanos as a system of coded signs
When I work on the theory of the text myself, I say that what defines the text is its interpretation, every time we read what we read is a text, and that allows us to read how a door closes and opens, it can be a text but it closes and opens a door. door is not a text so there we are textualizing by reading the door as a text, there is the difference, one thing is textualizing that the act of interpreting is treating it as a text and another thing is understanding that what you are interpreting is something that is semiotically encoded and that you are going to read it as a sign, Geertz comes to understand that by interpreting you are treating culture as a text, and that semiotizes it, but he does not read it as a semiotic plot, which is really semiotically a framework. that it must be worked in a way that incorporates semiotics as a science into sociology in a much more decisive way. When I criticized Levi Strauss, it does not mean that I do not see an interest in the use of linguistics for a homologous study. that studies the structures of consanguinity or a Bororo village, no, that application was interesting, as it is also in Stephen, I am simply highlighting the fact that linguistics is being used to study non-linguistic phenomena, but that there is also the need to incorporate a semiotics not to study non-semiotic phenomena in it but to really study it as a semiotic problem that does not simply say it is semiotics and I study it as a text but without doing semiotics, I am not saying that we must bring semiotics as a science incorporated there to do semiotic studies of culture.
Now notice that none of this gets into the problem of analytical philosophy through which IHe said thatquestion of field work if it raises problems that border on the problems of realism that matter to you
Andunconscious superficial
You insisted on your interest in the mind/body relationship and I tried to respond to it according to my experience to illustrate how I see a possibility on the side of art criticism that I have done, that is, I have stumbled On the side of the language of works of art with some of those relationships and I see some possibilities, the criticism that I make of the Lacanian question does not intend to close the possibilities but rather I see limited possibilities, you talk about a thickness, I understand it , but I would rather point out the inverse rather what I see with Lacan is what I define as an idea of a superficial unconscious, and that idea of a superficial unconscious is not something that Lacan has worked on or spoken or said, it is a logical and theoretical deduction of mine based on my analyses, this idea of mine of a superficial unconscious does seem attractive to me, although perhaps it is not about the notion of unconscious as at the same time psychoanalysis today I see possibilities for a superficial unconscious that could encountering it through syntax and through that relationship with the forms that I have emphasized, that relationship with the skin, with the forms, I see in it a possibility where the idea of the unconscious loses depth, loses inaccessibility, and it is better understood as an unconscious in symbols and language than properly within the subjectivity of the individual, but this reading of the problem completely distances itself from the clinical intentions of psychoanalysis and the idea of psychoanalytic interpretation and is It is situated more in the field of a semiotic criticism of visual discourses where in the analysis of signs some possibilities of that superficial unconscious can be explored, so that I do not see the matter completely closed, the criticism that I make does not stop at a point at which the developments you make are not attractive, it seems good to me that you maintain that relationship with Lacan and defend it, but it is important to know inthat point we are each standing and I maintain that distance not by pleasure but by positions that I haveepistemological and ofinvestigationI find you attractiveinterest in therelationship mind body but not from the same point of view as youknow,
Abdel Hernandez San Juan:
What you have told me has for me abranch in two very different things, one from the other, the problem of the sign I have worked on a lot and with greatdedication in "the correlate of the world" there are extensivechapters on this topic and I also sent you the new essay on "the enigmas of the ground", in thechapter 1, 2 and 3 of "the correlate of the world", in thechapter 3 of "thinking science" and I'mworking with muchdedication in my new book, thenalso It is a topic that I have worked on a lot in classes and publications,could ignore everything you talked about and concentrate on this topic, whichalso I told you about it in "counterpoints" several times where I made very peculiar developments around which I made rich developments and several times
these things that I tell you about the signare focused on you being able to understand every timefurther theanalysis necessary to trace thelines suitable for locating the problems ofontology of the signifier with respect to the aspects that become relevant in Lacan, which by the way I must tell you is notonly are relevant in Lacan
Lacan is not the only one who was interested in the signifier itself, one of them is Barthes, Derrida has also worked on it and I personally have just made several developments on the matter although I generally do not work on the signifier alone, more so in the criticism of I have to confront art above all many times because it happens that with contemporary languages where metonymy rules, where the morphological elements of gestural forms are in the foreground, the components of those ligatures that occur between the material and morphic purity of the signifier as zero degree of significance and its relationship in the ontology of the form with the elements of sense and meaning acquires specific forms in which it is important that the signifier is at the forefront because the senses are related through morphological signs where that component The abstract and non-referential meaning of the signifier is in the foreground, but again, as I told you, it is the no or nothingness in itself and as such the relations between signifiers are never more than differential relations, the significant dimension I work above all in semiotics in the analysis of languages, not in psychoanalysis because I do not practice psychoanalysis and therefore I never work on it in relation to a subject understood as a patient, nor on the piscoanalytic couch, much less psychiatric couch, but rather in front of languages, in front of forms of language and of a language that presupposes a relationship of communication, that is, from a semiotic point of view, but in my sociological and anthropological theory, in my ethnomethodological work, the relationship with the signifier is less relevant to the point that many things do not have a path through it with except for a few, such as all the work that I do with Derrida, which has given some relevance to the signifier in a way peculiar to Derrida, different from Lacan, but with the exception of Derrida, all my work with Peirce leads completely in another direction.address, the sign in Peirce is completely different from the sign in Saussure in which Iemphasized and then I'm doing a lot of workfurther deep and muchfurther theoretical about everything we've talked about untilhere, with this matter a work that involves very conclusionselaborate metatheoretical of problems ofdialectics, problems oflogic and problems ofsemiotics imbued and intertwined with very serious problemstheorists ofsociology phenomenologicalIf I go on that oneaddress no would respond to none of the other things you talk to me about and I see myself in adilemma or I do one thing or the other, because the other issuecarry to a themepolitical, it is a topic that involves anotherarea different from thought, then as you have alreadyread some parts of "the correlation of the world", "counterpoints" and these sounds we will have time to delve intofurther in which you understand mytheory of the sign
We have talked little about the other topic.I will search a way to connect although I confess that I don't see it as easymaybe cantake us timecould be a time factor, leavecoupling in time but in principle I will tell you some things so that you understand where to go reading since we are starting fromparameters very different that have to do with life experiences, I will try to give you coordinates to put a possible approach on the horizon or accept the differences or adapt to use the word now in a sensehermeneutic nowhere yes with a meaninghermeneutic with a little bit of Habermasian pragmatism.
Abdel Hernandez San Juan:
For many reasons we have differences withrelationship a that it seems to you that I amdrastic with foucault and otherstheorists French it's a very long story
On the side of defending those books in themselves from a theoretical point of view, I don't think there is any possibility of us moving in that direction, not in vain the way in which you defend them, leaving aside the fact that you exonerate them from having because In another era, they were responsible for these forms that you have mentioned that are being used in a perverse way. In any case, when you try to defend what for you had its reason for being, you appeal to political issues because they are nothing other than books. politicians there is no way to defend the history of madness or sexuality that through a political means even if you place them in their historical context the moment in which they occurred even if you consider that they were necessary in some sense obviously always what is given in the Thought has something that causes it, some reason for being, something that makes it contingent, but when you search deeply for the true motive, it is none other than a political motive, in fact, because there is a Foucaul moment when it liberates the relationship with discourse, it does not liberate because The word liberates there would be inadequate, when it breaks the subjection of the discourse with the genres.
That is, the forms of speech, both oral and written in thetradition cultural as Todorov analyzes in thegenders of discourse are preinscribed modes that have been inscribed as ways of articulating the voice and as ways of articulating the relationships between thestructuring of the voice and the audience presupposed by that voice as a result of accumulations
These are themes that take us out of structural linguistics focused on the sign to issues related not to rhetoric understood from the point of view of the artifice that constructs an oratorical discourse or a mode of discourse in its rhetoric, but with the conditions of possibility of articulation of the voice that are inscribed in genres, genres inscribed in tradition that are neutral, non-sexual, or political, there is no way to write outside the genres of discourse, that is, you either write an essay with what the genre comes pre-registered as a way of relating the relationship between the authorial voice and the argumentative modes, introduction, problem statement, development paths, closure, or you resort to other genres such as the review, the report, the comment, the article, or In the genres of fiction, the novel, the story, the poem, the verse, the rhyme, to move outside the genres you have to work with the existing ones, you cannot invent a new genre without working with the preexisting ones and this subjection of the discourse to the genres that Todorov works with great depth because he not only demonstrates that genres exist and that discourses belong to them, but also that almost all forms of spoken and written communication and rhetoric exist even where they are not considered strictly high literature, in the oral tradition because also in folklore the genres are pre-inscribed, the reso, the prayer, there are infinities, there are so many genres of ways of organizing the voice in popular culture around an audience, and here I am alone analyzing the oral and written, not the art, where we have the landscape, the portrait, the still life, in music jazz establishes some generic parameters where you have a theme that has to be redundant that governs the rhythm and where the central structure that is referred can be released by improvising, and so on to give you examples in music
All the shapes of theproduction of the speechare registered ingenders which means not separating the discourse from thetradition cultural.
Separate the speech from thetradition cultural in whichgenders are pre-registeredpresupposes asubversion very dangerous because while on the one hand it is a way of denying atradition what I knowit is denying is a meaningcommon a repetitive structure that has become ritual but that is what establishes that it hassubjection to a moral structure
You have leaned a lot towards a very saturated, very remanent, very mannerist Habermas, which is a Habermas that is already at a fifth or fourth level of rediscussion of his previous books that are in my opinion the central ones in his work, which include from his work on the public sphere, and his discussion of modernity, to his capital work the theory of communicative action, which, since you are so careful about dates, it would be interesting to study it if there is more, you have to study it, it is a very influential one of the most influential in the second half of the 20th century, moral conscience and communicative action and constructive and reconstructive sciences, that habermas which is a habermas that has not yet entered into discussion with Rorty, Putnam, who are already in the habermas of truth and justification that in reality are like self-defense, based on counter-responses and counter-arguments and that are also very influenced by the consequences of his debate at the end of the eighties with Lyotard and also the theory of communicative action, if you study it and If you get into it deeply, you will understand a percent of the parameters according to which I have been moving away from Foucault, more and more and in a more decisive way. I do not have that relationship that you have with the body of knowledge where you are almost interested. everything, where many things are equally interesting to you, with this I am not telling you that I am radicalized against what I do not choose but that I really am decanting and getting rid of things to the extent that I write and write my work every time it interests me more what is related to what I am writing and less and less what is going to waste my time
But I would tell you that reading this more moralistic Haber is going to give you several elements to understand me, the Habermas/lyotartd debate is going to help you to understand me, a discussion that had as its central axis the discussion on the relationship between capital and the state as a of the main characteristic things the central axis of the characteristics debate in contemporary advanced capitalism, whether we see it as late capitalism or as advanced neoliberal capitalism, that Habermas/lyotard debate was representative of the crucial points that focused the transition after the whole question of Post-industrialism from Bell to the eighties because Frankford is further back, there the entire theoretical problem takes a very important turn that with Bell and the Habermas/Lyotard debate completely rearticulates the discussion and especially with Habermas after the Habermas/Lyotard discussion and of course the previous habermas, which is the habermas of the theory of modernity, the habermas of the theory of communicative action and the moralist habermas, that habermas and that discussion with lyotard is important to situate one of the sides of my position on All that literature that you refer to me is not that it is drastic, just that there are more, it is that I truly consider it to be an excess, an excessive excess, and I do not consider that it is drastic to choose some works in an author and not others, why does everything have to interest me? , the question is why not conclude that not all the works of an author are equally important, authors make mistakes and get confused, they get confusedalso in the arts, I definitely don't see ithomogeneous all that, in my early youth I had a certainattraction to himfoucault of the strategies of the discourse and a little very little of themicrophysics of power, but thendiscard also, so that only the Foucault of words and things survives in me, thearcheology of knowledge, episteme andaesthetics survives for me, but notdrastic but in a determined way positioned there is no way throughthere.
Abdel Hernandez San Juan:
There is a concept in semiotics that strongly emphasizes that ontological side of the signifier, which is the merely formal one, which is that nothingness captured in its mere form detached from sense and meaning. I am referring to the concept of substance of expression, an important semiotic concept, because Indeed, you have tried and I believe that this is related to the way in which the thinking of the analytical philosophy that you call positivist and post-positivist Anglo-Saxon analytical philosophy has accustomed you to always establishing logical relationships with respect to the real, the relationship between language/reality, you have I have tried to look for a connection in that way between the signifier in Lacan and the real through libido and drive and I want to make you notice that it is a construction that you are doing there, not forced but rushed because the elements that are in relationship bring dystopias. epistmological ones are not structured under principles that agree, it is possible but it is a path that gets stuck that does not offer many possibilities because since that signifier is even understood not as a single signifier but as a relationship between signifiers, that relationship is merely differential when I put the example of the thought of identity for what it is not, that is, the signifier is something for the sign because it is what makes that sign different from the other, the sign has a written or spoken form, the sign has a form, And I emphasize in this, the sign has a form, it undoubtedly has a form otherwise we would not even see it, and what makes it different from that sign from another sign other than precisely that it has a form? I am saying that the signifier is the one that establishes therelationship differential in form, that's whyrelationship between signifiers without resorting tomeaning is nothing other than arelationship between differences what operates there is that the signifier is the one that establishes thedistinction of presence is the form that makes one sign have a different shape from another
thisbesides it's a problemlogical So The pure form works the same, when we analyze the appearance in itsrelationship with the presence and with respect to the essence or the substrate the work that appearance does is precisely to distinguish the presence, then it is important both for thevia linguistics as for thevia logic understand that zero degree of the signifier
Now it is true - and here now I want to bring the substance of expression - that the signifier, being the form, although it does not contain the sense or the meaning itself, that is to say, when it comes to the foreground, when the form comes to the foreground without referentiality. Obviously the relationships that this form establishes are the substance of the expression, it happens with forms, writing is not only thinking about what is meant by what is written but it is also something formal and the same in other media, painting requires staining and at that moment it is pure signifier but That's where the concept of the substance of the expression comes in to name it, to underline that side so that that moment is not designated with the significant word but with the concept of the substance of the expression because when you see a loose stain in Klee, Kandinsky, Pollock, rotcho, what you see are completely formal material elements, in tapies it is mere textuality, a relationship of materials that are woven into each other. Everything there is material form and of course there is meaning but this is given by metonymic indexical elements, but What happens in semiotics when the form begins to be filled with meaning is the substance of the expression, it would be the moment in which the significant instance is being filled with meaning, that is why I say that it leads to the Barthesian semiotic discussion and that Lacan is not the only one but at the same time that there is no relationship to the real and the world on the side not only of denotation and referentiality but also on the side of an idea of the world understood as drive or libido because this would mean that there is a significant connection between language alphabetic and those instances or moments that would be the libido or the drive, how do you establish that relationship/?, in a psychiatric way?, in what way do you take the signifier into the interior of the mind or neuronal to then connect it with the libido or the drive/, where do you establish that relationship?
if it is a conceptlinguistic How do you take it inside your mind orneuronal and then connect it with thedrive?
Where do you establish the ontological connection between the morphe of the signifier in the alphabetic language and the narcissism of the form in libido and drive? There is no way, the only way is expressed in signs, instead of referring to the drive in the body in its vital space expressed by referring to a sign that would be the only indication of a relationship that the subjectivity of that language that is pure form would have with its drive and its desire, that is, reading the desire or drive in the gesture, in a mode of the stain or the abstract line, there one could try to read the drive through the reading of the abstractness of the gesture but it is not much, this way is limited since it does not provide sufficient elements that refer to the emotional or psychological states due Because it is abstract, I see a limited field, but I am emphasizing that there is no way to connect the signifier there because, as Barthes says, what is obtuse is what is opaque in the sign. What is non-transparent is what prevents the passage towards reference or towards denotation. He is the pure presence of the matter of the sign of that sign that is in the place of the object according to Peirce, so the signifier is not the way for the connection with the real unless you are working with an idea of the real that is abstract but so abstract that could not be referring to the literal body except through the sign via substance of the expression, then also, I think that what you are telling me about language and the world is the problem of reference, denotation and connotation in the Semiotics, there is a clear point of relationship and in that discussion there is nothing to do with Saussure; there the discussion would be with Peirce.
I give some againtraits generals about the sign in Peirce so that you can see the points of contact between Peirce and the problemslogical of analytical philosophy, the sign in Peirce has very precise elements that make up and compose it, on the one hand it has arepresentantement he In his first manuscripts he separated therepresentantement fromrepresentation, you look a piece of furniture that you have in front of you, once you look at itthe how object without noticing thatare looking at that momentknow as an object you integrateperception of object thatknow you don't notice that youperception is different from what is perceived
If you repair you begin to separate it and when you do so you begin to understand that there is a reflection of the object in the retina that reflection is the first form of therepresentation he I explained it like I haven't yetreplica it saw as a way ofrepetition whatcontained still important elements of the quality of the object, for Peirce it was important to distinguishwhen A sign resembles the object and this type of signcalled iconic, it works foranalogy or reflection and itsrelationship with the object defined as arepresentantement whichI would be therepresentation so?,I would be thereplica Yes, that image that you have on your retinawe could take it out to see it outside of us for whichPhotography it doesexplicit you saw it with the eye of thecamera thatI would be therepresentation butafter united the two thingsit seemed that thatdistinction between a moment that contains qualities of the object and one that is itsreplica It was not necessary, but Peirce's sign does not have onlyrepresentatement, also contains ground and correlate, the ground if you read the essaymine on that topic is what connects the sign with the object is what makes the sign connect with the object through thevia to complete in both directions theConnection from the object to the sign and vice versa, the first are elements qualities of the object that in the sign become species offoreshortening of the object are not the entire object but aspects of it and from the point of view of the movement from the sign to the object they are the denotative and referential,
But in my essay the enigmas of ground I explain this verywell, concede of theanalysis what I dothere that sign and object have the same ground at the level of firstity, the same origin.
As in the firstity, sign and object have the same ground, the same origin, they exchange each other, the object becomes a sign and conversely they exchange, the identity is arelationship dialectics, and in the sense ofgenesis phenomenological of the sign
there are the examples you likedbathroom, the steam and the jug, and then I will explain how the groundit is at all three levels andas It becomes more complex towards semiosis, always with the referent in the foreground, the ground is a very rich concept while on the other hand it has suffered confusion.
The interpretant is the moment of the sign thatit is in the place of the object, in therepresentatement and on the ground the meaning is not yet acquired that the signreplace to object, solo from interpretanteregardless of the reference and the object, but as I explained to you, it is and does that job ofreplacement while he is the meaning buthere you must understand that it is not equal to the meaning of saussure not only because it is notalphabetical His examples are visual and everyday, not art, in Saussure it isfurther contentist and repository how to say the content of that or what that means Peirce's interpretant does not have thatcharacter este es un interpretante es una instance detranslation and interpretation It's something thatit is in the place of something else, it can be another sign that helps translate the previous one, and what it does is translate meaningreplace to the object because it means it and is released towardsitself fully establishes arelationship in betweeninterpreting
the one who is active in saussure is the instancemorphic is the one that links thedistinction of presence, thedistinction differential of signs
Conversely, what is active in Peirce is the meaning, which is why I say in my book that the chainlogic of Peirce's semiosis leads to culture and Derrida'slead a la texere to the fabric of the text, of coursehere one has toadd The way the signifier works in Derrida is different from Lacan, the interpretant has such a rich nature that it can even be thevia for intertextuality
In the metal cock that tells us theaddress of the windfunction interpreting is clear not speculativefurther sharp even that the ground and thatherepresentatement because the confusion ofrepresentatement is that due to its basis in theperception and the reflection and in the analogical want to be the ontology of any sign and it cannot be, only some signs arerepresentatements and others are not and that makes it a bit ambivalent
thetrichotomies There are different ways of presenting the sign fromfurther simple tofurther complex, they become more complex,trichotomies They are not the distinctions between firstity, secondness, thirdness, or the immediate, the mediate, the mediated and the remediated, nature, culture, metaculture, but rather they are the ways of presenting the sign.
the first is fromyes the whatit is further close to the components of the sign thatnewly we have just seen but she cannot explain herself, the second is requiredtrichotomy which presents the sign again now as an indication, icon andsymbol, the third, row,sinsigno, legisigno
So that thererepresentation there must beanalogy some type of reflection of the object in the sign and that is why only the signiconic it's arepresentatement On the other hand, the ground and the correlate seem to have an undisputed universality and the interpretant is not onlyessential sino que itself interpreting from sign nowould mean si este no tuviera interpretingI would be a mererepresentation but notwould mean nothing, without this it is not a sign it is a reflection
but you can't understanddimension interpretant without the correlate, which is what separates the sign from the object, is what makes the sign what separates itself from the object, is what makes the sign an instance with respect to the object that becomes a correlate for the sign until that the sign dismisses him andreplace once he is an interpreter he does thepresidency complete
he was amathematical with atraining inarithmetic and all of this was important in the wayhe elaborated the science ofsemiotics, it should not be taken literally when one understands how it works, I am veryfurther there in many developments but of course with the base in Peirce
I explained to you in "counterpoint" the immense possibilities thatlogic of the interpretant for the workmethodological intheory cultural we could call him there tooanthropology cultural, several examples we discussed such as that of the tourist and the restaurateur, illustrative and clarifying examples in the fieldtheoretical abstract to implement it in ways to solve problems ofimbrication between sociology and cultural anthropology is one of the things with whichfurther passionate right now both in whattheoretical as inempirical
How youHe said There is a debate today in theanthropology rich, complex, very varied cultural culture and in that debate there is a tendency thatwould see my books as booksanthropology cultural but itit is related to paradigms thatare changing, with problems thatare indiscussion and do not have the disciplinary bases sufficiently established, there areconfusion in that debate
So I have not done theconcession to recognize them as books ofanthropology cultural because it is in thesociology where I have the bases of disciplinary rigor andscientific to defend what I do and I have also conceived them as books ofsociology do not giveanthropology, but since I have included so many elements oftheory cultural because there are ways to see them as books ofanthropology cultural andproblematic del interpretingpeirceano it is acquiring every timefurther relevance within my explorationsmethodological.
They were published in Venezuela in the years of neoliberal capitalism in which I lived there at the Simon Bolivar University, a very beautiful university that is in the mountains. It had a magazine exclusively dedicated to logical positivism and it was fat, it was like saying zone in terms of thickness or like October. I am referring to the grossor, a magazine, the seven years that I lived in Venezuela I read that magazine continuously, but my way of reading the logical positivity was very permeated by essays about the authors and less by direct reading of the authors, that is, scholars of the authors more than them directly, so there are some like whom I don't know much, but it was useful to me because I studied a lot the work of Comnte, who was a logical positivist in sociology and, as I said, I have a reading at the same time. that I have given it great importance in my theoretical training related to the debate that from sociology, disciplinary, scientific sociology, which is competitive in scientificity with linguistics and with logical positivism, sociology in the 20th century is very scientific, And I had a great fascination and I want to continue exploring it with a discussion in sociology that was important in the Shutz tradition and I would even tell you that it had tremendous importance in sociology with Shutz turning towards common sense. You tell me how it was that Did Shutz come up with a sociology of common sense? Have you asked yourself that question? Why is this not in Weber or Hurssel, the interest in common sense, where did Shurtz's interest in common sense come from? , which is one of the most original aspects of his sociology, that comes from this debate that I am telling you is a very exclusive debate because it connects with discussions that were crucial about the types of language that include the question about what is literary and What is not literary, what is poetic and what is not, and is the discussion about what makes a language scientific and not, understood not yet as a sociology of common sense that is already a study of common sense in culture, but understood even only as the opposite of that is, as the point of reference, that is, a poetic language is a rarefied language defamiliarized in that which distinguishes it from a language of common sense, here common sense is that which functions as versus as that against which it is distinguished, which is what makes a language, a form of language, a scientific language defined by its distinction as a language that is defamiliarized from the language of common sense, at that time as a question On the types of language, in these distinctions the concept of common sense appears as that against which a special language, whether scientific, literary or poetic, is defined by defamiliarization. An interest developed in a comparative discussion between scientific language and language. of common sense and it was from there that the interest in common sense began and it is from there that the retrospection that sociology makes after Parson towards common sense comes, notice that it has a very attractive origin, very interesting on an epistemological level, the turn towards common sense in sociology in which, by the way, logical positivism had its importance because it served as a reference on a type of form of language, I wanted to highlight this because it seems to me that it is something that you should understand in me that I don't know if you know Well, but it has tremendous importance in sociology and can give you elements of where I come from, this has nothing to do with Popper's demarcation criteria, it is not the discussion about what is science and what is pseudo-science, it is a discussion about the types of languages, what makes a language a scientific language, that is, as a form of language and language, which distinguishes one type of language form from another, is a discussion about the types of language that began first with the discussion about what is literary in a language, what makes it literary versus non-literary and then advanced in the same sense to the distinction between scientific language versus common sense language, it has more to do with and is more related to the problem than in Postmodern anthropology has turned towards the idea of rhetoric but in this case understood as a problem related to how one writes, insofar as how one writes is not only a rhetorical problem by mere form but a theoretical and cultural problem, the discussion of Anthropology is different from the one I told you about, from which I come, but it has points of contact, here is the issue of realism in anthropology, it is seeing the way of writing anthropology in a stylistic sense, which, not for nothing, links important matrixes for the discussion. with the problems of analytical philosophy that have interested you.
There is aquestion Over thegenders that I was recording you, I developed something there that made mewould like that you would listen, I made an effort toexplain the Connection thattheory of thegenders has in thetradition cultural in theanalysis of the forms of discourse, that is, it refers to the fact that thegenders in which we can write comepre-registered in thetradition cultural.
I made an effort to explain to you the connection that the theory of genres has with cultural tradition, this is a topic of extreme importance, it refers to the fact that the genres in which we can write are pre-inscribed in the cultural tradition, we We cannot articulate our voice in writing, we cannot write and compose only in genres that are pre-inscribed, there is no way to write and compose without adhering to generic forms that come to us as much as the language itself comes to us, as much as to To speak Spanish we have to learn the words and grammar and teach the child in the same way to write we have to follow rules of certain genres that are not properly languages, that are that way regardless of the language, that are also the same universally regardless of the language, that is, the essay, the review, the report, in the case of fiction the novel, the story, the poem, this apparently simple topic acquires immense richness in the studies of Stvetan Todorov, this Bulgarian semiologist who made an immense effort to make a very deep detail of the generic forms, taking the study of genres not only to the literary tradition, not only to the encrypted tradition of the elites but also to study genres in popular culture, he strove to show how Almost all forms of discourse, even in common sense, in popular culture, praying, professing and lots of ways in which discourse is articulated in everyday life to which we do not pay attention, are generically structured.
The problem of generic studies, generic not of sex but of gender neutral, gender in the structure of discourse, the problem of the connection between gender theory, cultural tradition and discourse subjects the discourse, subjects the discursive forms to the cultural tradition and This is a debate that has value connotations, value systems and that has moral connotations.
Thewanted to make it clear that the way Foucault wants to separate discourse fromrelationship with thegenders transforming the discourse into a thing that can be manipulated by the subject withoutsubjection to therelationship of speech withgenders andtradition cultural establishes thehandling of the speech that therhetoric of power, therhetoric frompolicy
This is something that Lyotard studies in "the difference", his most important book where he analyzes discursive regimes, the rules of the game in discursive modes, in the ways of studying and analyzing what separates the discursive mode from lawyers. From the discursive mode of doctors to the discursive mode of artists, he makes a study of how the modes of discussive articulation are structured in separate islands, which differ from each other and how political discourse is articulated as a discourse devoid of gender, which It lacks its own genre, like all the discourses of the different secularized areas are inscribed in genres that separate them as specialized discourses from one another, what are called the specialized technical elements and the discursive modes, the gestures, the discursive styles, and explained As political discourse is the discourse that wants not to be subject to genres and that wants to be the discourse of discourses in that deprivation of genres, Lyotard did this many years later, it is a work much later than "the strategies of discourse" of Foucault, and it is a work that explains and makes obvious the move that Foucault had to remove the theory of discourse from its relationship with the inscribed genres and with the cultural tradition, because what is not discussed in that book by Foucault is that The operation that he was carrying out with respect to discourse was already political itself, it already presupposed the way in which political power made use of discourse and although in that book he did not discuss it, it is not in vain that later comes 'the miscroficing of power', There is a political unconscious in Foucault, there is a part of his work that is unconscious, unconscious for himself as an author, he did not realize this, he could not have objectification towards this, he could not see to what extent his theory of discourse It was being developed in that way because an appropriation of the discourse by political power was already weighing on it. This is revealed with Lyotard's study but it finds its main pointcritical in thegenders from the speech oftzvetan todorov showing theintrinsic relationship between forms of speech andgenders in thetradition cultural
That is, there is aseparation what are you doingfoucault of the discourse regarding morality anddiscussion aboutethic and Habermas speechit is essentially aimed at answering that whole problem, remember that this is an inheritance from the Habermas/ debatelyotard, that is, there are moreit is finishing onediscussion with lyotard although not anymorethis arguing withhe is one thing after debate with lyotard, andhere lyotard did a littleintermediation With respect to Foucault, that is, he explained more all theproblematic that foucault himself does not knowthere was said or explained toitself, and there will be moreit is contesting all this with hisdiscussion fromethic discursive but not even in having moreit is the best studied problem that intzvetan Todorov who completely distances himself from the possibility of seeing this in apolicy and truly studies it in a waylinguistics which is what I like about Todorov, a disciplinary way, rigorous interms oftheory of language andtheory of symbolismalso Well, we should not disconnect his genres from the discourse of his theory of the symbol and his magnum opus, symbolism andinterpretation.
All this gives you a little direction about where I come from.relationship to all thisdiscussion, both around thetheory of the sign as already by the wayI take advantage and I told you about mycare and distances fromfoucault and to lyotard who alreadythere was announced, then agree that the worksimportant of Foucault are those listed before the words and things, thearcheology of knowledge, his textsaesthetics, the episteme and the meninas, and that there is nothing to do with Foucault's other works.
I want to discuss how I am articulating all of this towards theanthropology cultural.
For example, the issue ofrelationship mind/body I have not worked on it
Inrelationship To this I can tell you that I was interested in how youHe said in art, working artistsvolumes in space as ways of evoking an idea of a body that is not the literal body but I understand that you come from the other side, I have not worked on it much thatrelationship any lessstill inside of the mind, only in modesemiotic in itanalysis Of artcontemporary, in my book about science I make important developments, a very very very booktheoretical, I dealt with a lot of internal problems in that book butthere what is inside is notit is thought as mind, but as what Derrida calls the ground of interiorityit is thoughtphilosophically not from the point of view ofpsychology, which is nothing other than the idea of the inner world,there nicediscussion of the senses touch sight but in a waysemiotic.
The world within reach
In principle Iwould like start at the end around thequestion of evolutionism because I think thatthere We have very well illustrated the points ofConnection and the distance between the two, in fact I don't carereferred to evolutionism in any form butspecifically related to what at another timealso With respect topsychoanalysis I told you and it is the problem of what we have access to and what we do not have access to, this is an important problem at the levelmethodological, to clear and define a positioningscientific, that is, if one works with respect to something to which one does not have access
The parameter of archeology is quite explicit here, of archeology at least in its most well-known and traditional form, the fact that you work with signs with signals, which you see as fragments split into petroglyphs, hieroglyphs, ceramics, in excavations that are done in fragments of areas, where what you find are residues, remnants, dispersed pieces, excised fragments, and through these signs you are trying to reconstruct something that is not codified in the culture in which you are moving. which you are part of, when you see a sign and that sign is part of a cultural heritage of which you participate, you can decode that sign even where that sign has not been codified for you to decode, such as the examples that I gave. In my first chapter of "the enigmas of the ground" about the humid toaya and the vapor it was not done as coded signs but you decode it because you have a heritage and you have a relationship of relevance that you establish understandings of the situation from which you You resort to your typifications from previous situations and that makes you reconstruct the assumptions and be able to decode those signs, why can you decode them? Because both the sign and what you are going to reconstruct around it are within your access, that is, you have access to all the elements that are going to elucidate that sign because they are part of your own contemporary nature of the culture in which you are immersed, when you are analyzing a fragment separated from a thing that refers you to a temporality that is not the temporality of the one in which you participate and in which you have a heritage, you are trying to reconstruct something to which you do not have access, you are trying to go back centuries through split signs, everything you are going to build is about what you do not have access to. and to build an image of what you do not have access to, I am referring to evolutionism that works like this without access to what is going to be reconstructed, which is evolutionism that tries to position itself in the way it was in a historical or historiographic temporality or geological, or evolutionary phases to which we do not have access, it is the same thing that happens with the unconscious, it is the same caution that I have with psychoanalysis in the sense of a science that wants to be based precisely on that to which we do not have access what is the unconscious
I am referring to that evolutionism, not Piaget's, because Piaget's evolutionismit is based on what we have access to, we have access to learning fromchild in theteaching of our children, we have access to learningchild in the learning that we ourselves had when we werechildren, we have access in schools andcircles children in the culture in which we live, thereforeit is doing an evolution inrelationship to a cut that issynchronous now andhere In the contemporary times of our culture, we are going to make ahypothesis evolutionary about a learning process but the time period is shortit is to our access
In relation to language, some developments of this type can be made of short data of short temporality where by analyzing phenomena of verbal language and non-verbal language, some antinomies can be answered in the Kantian sense, clarifying that the non-verbal or the verbal comes first, We could come to certain problems and analysis about originism, answer antinomies, find out what originates what and how, what comes first, if it is something we have access to, we are facing people who express themselves gesturally and not only alphabetically before us right here opening The window of my house I look at the street I see a girl saying goodbye to her husband who is leaving and does not use verbal words, she is doing it with her hand or she is saying no with her head, because we can read the culture that surrounds us through extraverbal communication and therefore based on the observation of something that is within our reach, make inferences, connections that allow us certain conclusions about what comes first and what comes after, and from there develop certain perspectives that combine structurality with a certain sense of the evolutionary but that evolution that is going to be reconstructed is within our reach. We are not going to make an inference about what was first in the origin of the species since life arose to which we have no access or way to have access, it is that evolutionism to which I refer.
I talked to you about the problem of accessibility, resorting to the relationships between structurality and evolution on the basis of which we have access in culture, and I mentioned that there are some forms of methodological diachronicism that take a little more risk in a type of evolutionism in In the case of Max Weber, what he works with is invariances. He does not go to that temporality in the past to say how it was, but starting from his own culture, a culture in which the secular process has already occurred in which the rationality has shown to be organized based on the separation of science, morality, law, art and religion and based on the experience already known in its own culture that it was this secularization that generated overspecialization, generated the current form of the professions and that this is how the process of social rationalization that governs modernity is structured, from which, with Weber, it is deduced that an analysis of the mode of our cultural reproduction is not possible without understanding that a certain way of preparing the culture has been necessary. subjectivity, for that society to be reproducing itself in that way, it is not there making conjectures about how it was in the 15th century, it is doing evolutionaryism, but it is an evolutionism with invariance a bit in the same way that Piagget does it with learning without There is no doubt that it is an evolutionary diachronism, but note that when Durkeim refers to the social division of labor and consciousness with respect to the society to which he had access, he is explaining in a synchronic way the realization that what is not something inaccessible is something to which he had access. max weber was referring not only because without a doubt secularity in overspecialization is something that in his own culture weber was having access to that allowed him these conclusions about the evolution of rationality, but because the data that durkeim adds demonstrates even more to what extent max weber's foundations were based on an experience to whichhad access to conclude what theevolution of rationality
Notice that it is an evolutionism that does not go to the 15th century to say it was like that, and then it wasSo and now we are going to see what it was like in medieval man because thistheory Evolutionary evidence shows that it was this way and not another and now we are going to corroborate what it was like based on thishypothesis but there is noneaffirmation about what there is no access to, what there is is reconstructive worktheoretical with invariance that never falls into historicism that never falls intoillusion archaeological, in theillusion geological, in theillusion evolutionary of how it was, now first this and then that
Derrida has in "themargins fromphilosophy"an essay dedicated tocircle linguistic of gin to thereflection in betweenrousseau and condillac on the origin of languages, and even in that essay where the two authors whohe discusses are asking for the origin of the languages ofas it was thatoccurred for the first time a language in the culture even there there is nospeculation about how it was, but analysis of how it is now in what we have access to and ofthere someanalysis about answersprovisional possible to what is first or how language and nature are related, but without going to the phases ofevolution to say that it was first and thatafter, to say man descends from the monkey because there is avertebra or a shape in the column that demonstrates it, andhere I believe that theanalysis of deleuze are important both histheory of meaning as well as his developments on series and serializations
He has a very important thesis about serializations that leads if one studies Deleuze in depth as I have studied it, I haveread all of his work and I have studied it at various times in my life, which leads one to theconclusion of the serialized parallelism of parallel series, that things do not have to be deduced from each other, that there can be parallel series, that man and the monkey can always have been two very similar parallel series
It is not possible to conjecture that this was the case because a certain piece of information in the evolution of the spinal column says so, the maximum that can be reached is to say that Darwin's theory is an interesting fabrication, one cannot go further, and We must continue working on theories that continue producing discourses about the origin that show interesting alternatives without trying to supplant the others because what cannot be said is how it really was and it is in that sense that I tell you that the theories about the origin of life are as wrong as it is wrong to think that the truth is in the religious compendiums, in the Koran, the Vedas, the Popol Vu, the Bible, undoubtedly these mythological systems are forgetfulness of the culture but forgetfulness that are forgetting things that happened in culture and as such in the hermeneutic sense of culture have as much anthropological importance for the understanding of cultural evolution as the data that we obtain from what we have access to because we have access to the Bible, not to its historical temporality. Nor to the historical temporality of the Vedas, but to the Vedic texts, yes, we must work with what we have access to, but we must not put in the place of the temporality of the facts a theory of how things were and what they are. precisely those theories that have been most useful
and I don't even want to go to the beginning of your sounds without first giving you examples of themonstrosities to which evolutionism has reached, I am going to give you several examples of thosemonstrosities that demonstrate its fallacy, its ineffectiveness, its lack of scientificity.
I want to give you some examples of the harmful consequences of this evolutionism, for example, I like Clifford Geertz, I like several of his books, I like theinterpretation of cultures,after of the facts and local knowledge, however, I don't know if you haveread heanthropologist as an author that I haveread several times and I have studied it
if you read theanthropologist As an author you will realize the deformations that Geertz has that come from evolutionism in his way of discussing theanthropology
In the anthropologist as author geertzit is facing a problem ofrhetoric inanthropology he is trying to do some kind ofcriticism literary considering theanthropology classic, colonial as a form of literature that is, makingcriticism literaturebringing thequestion barthesiana, thequestion tel quel, post-structuralist of theconsideration of the sciences as letters that begin with all themotion French at the end of the century trying tobring thatdiscussion that turns everything literary and the thing ofpostmodernity that suspicion towards scientificity that postmodernism brings
one of the problems in whichfurther emphasis does is in the way the essays are titled the opinionfurther the leastscientists the but the least literary
He continually gives examples of ways to title essays, "ofas the elephant evolves from the mamu" as a way of titling the essay in a non-literary way and gives sometimes even funny examples ofas natural sciences title essays and compares it with the literary way of titling essays, he makes an examination of theanthropology as literature, but whenhe goes to thatanthropology to which he is going to dedicate his essays that he is going to criticize ascriticism literary because thatanthropology what is going to analyze was she aanthropology evolutionary and colonial, he has to discussover there deal with malinowski, evanspritchard, levi strauss, ruth benedict, anthropologists who have worked from evolutionary and colonial perspectives
that is, both from the perspective of theevolution of species, as well as phasesprehistoric, paleolithic, neolithic, by lewis herry morgan, etc., evolutionists in that sense of which Idistance and against which I position myself, and from the perspective of colonialism,anthropologies what wereinstrumented in what made them possiblethrough of colonialism
The presence of the Dutch, English and German colonies in the Trobriand Islands in New Guinea were what created the conditionseconomic in which not only malinowski but themost of theanthropologists who were in New Guinea at the end of the last century and at the beginning of the 20th century they were ininteraction with the Trobrianders of these Papuan islands, Evans Pritchard studied peoples ofAfrica the Nuers in a way that was conveyed with the English military colonies, there arehere aintersection between history of colonialism and evolutionism in the sense we are referring to
geertz hasover there what to write about thoseanthropologists and treat themfurther literally whathe can as aanthropologist whatit is trying to substantiate and legitimize its ownanthropology inside thattraditionWhat do you do when faced with that? When you have to reconcile the history of thatanthropology colonial and evolutionary with theanthropology contemporary Thatit is writing in timetransnationalization of theeconomies, in the time of post-industrial neoliberal capitalism, in the time of the processes oftransculturation, in the time of interculturality processes, he tries to resolve that dilemma throughthrough de sus ensayos being here and being there, estar here and to beover there, behere in universitiesAmericans writing about what I experienced there in the field work, theover there as field work and the aca as the desk of theethnographer, what are you doing? produces a textuality in which he confuses precisely because of these evolutionary deformations, he has to reconcile that idea of evolutionary stages that were in that anthropology that is going to discuss with the coexistence between current economic, transnational centers, and economically subordinate cultures, economically dependent as they are. Morocco, Indonesia, but he even generalizes it to the entire periphery. He deals within the same evolutionary stage. He treats within the same evolutionary stage those primitive societies that study that anthropology with countries and cultures in the process of development, at a time. and still today by certain leftists who, in my opinion, had their reason for being within what was the stage of the formation of the national stage, which was certainly a colonial stage, the national and the national ethnic, which were the processes of independence that they experienced. Both the countries that were colonies and the colonies themselves, the United States experienced it, Europe also experienced it, although the United States is not the case because the United States was a colony as well and this is very important for the cultural understanding of the United States that the United States is and it was also a colony, but I am referring to the fact that it unites the Arab world with New Guinea, it unites South America with Bali, and when it does so, the balance does not have to say, New Guinea is a third world country, but on the contrary, it is saying that developing cultures are primitive cultures, he is uniting them evolutionarily, there is a deformation even in Geertz himself who has clarity, I am not criticizing him one hundred percent, he does valuable things and has good intentions, but he is deforming, he is distorting, it is deforming due to scientific errors of evolutionism that ends up producing a primitivization, which ignores the phase in which cultures are in the process of development but have not yet achieved the development of the central countries, which confuses the evolutionary stage in which they are findsover there the whole person, the culture, the subsystems social, there is adistortion that is producedthere unscientific, because it does not manage to deform thecomprehension evolutionary ofMexico and it deforms it because it brings thoseparameters evolutionists who bring with them theanthropology colonial and evolutionary,there You have it, a current consequence of evolutionism, there are many others
for example levis strauss with the curare, among the tribesamazonian that presents them as poisonous tribes thatare poisoning all the time and that it is very dangerous to move between them the image that onecarry about the tribesamazonian you can't get inthere Because theyare poisoning and poisoned all the time, that's not true that's notSo The Yanomami do not live by poisoning themselves nor do they live surrounded by the danger of poison, curare is not the main substance of their culture, that is aextrapolation that levis strauss made a sensationalist,emblematism is adeformation of evolutionism incomprehension of culture, I am giving you just some examples of the disorders that evolutionism creates in thecomprehension of culture.
It would be interesting for you to read in my book "the couples of epistemology" my essay on the problem of realism in the epistemology of field work. In that essay I make a critical comparison in which I distance myself from certain forms that postmodernization has currently acquired. of anthropology without limits and without scientific control since since it is fashionable to be literary and not scientists, we can postmodernize everything and we no longer care that the concept of diaspora is scientific. The same thing speaks to us about a diasporic subjectivity related to the nomadization of subjectivity in late capitalism where there is related to transnationalization, with multiculturality, with multi-ethnic learning with coexistence of cultures in the same community contemporaneity, with immigration, emigration and migration, suddenly it is also the African diaspora that occurred in other centuries, it is also the diaspora Cuban for the United States of a nationalism towards what emerges from it and when you come to see the concept it does not have any scientificity what eco called the words sacks where you can put anything inside it that always means it, this is not the essay where I talk about the diaspora is another, in this essay I analyze I make a contrast between cultural modernism, that is, the ways in which it was generated in Europe in reaction as a response to the alienating effects of industrial modernity, the retreat that European intellectuals made towards what What Artaud called the magical in Mexico, towards Abyssinia, towards Africa towards Taiti and towards tribal cultures where the human being is more ritual. I make a differentiation between the way in which non-anthropological European intellectuals withdrew from modernity in search of the ritual and the way the anthropologists did it because the postmodernization that anthropology is trying to make of anthropological literature wants to treat those anthropologists as if they had been cultural modernists, whichknow in gauguin when he went totahiti I was convinced thatothers to befurther happy with the mulattashaitian that with the French whites, that is, he became intimate with the Tahitian culture,he converted to tahitian culture, then i compare a familiar gauguin painting,homelike, domestic in which he is with the Tahitian women in a way that convinces you that he has converted to that culture,compared it with aPhotography from 1910 ofanthropologists colonials in Asia showing the currency with which theTrobriandians meant the cost of a bride, and timeanthropologists whites and three Trobriand natives showing that coin that is two and a half meters long, the image ispathetic precisely because of the issue ofengagement, of love, of the couple, treating that as aspecimen In a rat museum, and I say,comparing it With the cultural modernists I say there is no way or possible way to treat this, to defend it or interpret it as cultural modernism.
Another of the deformations created by evolutionism is Marxism itself, which even confused Weber's problems, although Marx did not read Weber nor had any relationship with it, but when you read and study the sociology of bureaucracy, the sociology of religion and above all his sociology of rationality, secularization, the formation of professions and the relationship between subjectivity and social forms, the spirit of Protestantism and the relationship between society and economy, and you understand that the evolution of rationality cannot be separated of the modes of cultural reproduction, because the modes of objective reproduction of culture depend on a subjectivity that prepares them and makes them possible, when he analyzes the evolution of rationality, you realize that you cannot separate a thing that arises from that evolution of rationality as was the state that did not exist before those separations, and grab that thing as if it were a mechanism like the motor of a refrigerator works, and say I'm going to take the state and I'm going to get it out of here. He was born and what he is subject to because it depends ontologically and I am going to put him in the hands of another social class that has no connection at all with that form of rationality that made the state arise, there you have an example
that led to marx in thataddress?, an evolutionismmetaphorical, which was to assume that the worker was the next evolutionary phase of theslave In a sense and seen from an evolutionary perspective, the worker as the next evolutionary phase of theslave, and you have it in thephilosophy ofhegel, Marxism is a clear example ofconsequences disastrous of evolutionism.
As if the state were a mechanism with a lever and a pulley, it is almosthumorous, remember Chaplinmachines with which Chaplin played, parodying the industry, although Chaplintoward with boots with shoes like what was produced by thosemachines, that you grab a little lever and move it and this activates something else that in turn moves something else, it is like grabbing the state which is something that has neither substance nor ontos of its own without the same subjectivity that constitutes it because the state is nothing else. something that a form of the subject, and as such as a form of the subject it cannot be treated as a mechanism placed in the hands of a form of the subject that is not the one that gives it its own ontos, that gives it its ownreason being is an example of a failed thing of atheory evolutionist of thisnature where we proceed by working with what we do not have access to,
and in the same way thetheory of the bing bang as a primordial explosion as the origin of life because possiblycould justify theself destruction atomicWell, if we emerge from an explosion, why not?we can reemerge from a next explosion, sorry for evolutionism, the consequences it has had have been disastrous in culture,there if I'm According to the French, the efforts made by Derrida are of immense importance for theanthropology cultural, the efforts made by Deleuze saving the excesses in this case do I consider them important in the sense of the way in which Derrida relocates these problems, andalso I consider that thephilosophy the deleuzeadvanced a lot in thataddress, go on excluding foucault
I think that there are many interesting questions to discuss here, in principle I am going to return to the problem of Derrida and also of Hegel, precisely this question I am now remembering in "counterpoints" when you told me that Derrida postpones the origin and I made you quite a development on the problem of origin in Derrida, in his philosophy, and how interesting are the results that Derrida obtains precisely with respect to the origin, there are consequences in the way in which Derrida proceeds epistemologically in the relationship between all the elements that participate in his work. and now I'm thinking about the work of Derrida that interests me the most, which are the margins of philosophy, that is, I also read about grammar, deconstruction, writing and difference, speech and phenomena, I have read almost all of his books , the book that interests me the most is the margins because it is the book where everything is clearer, and that book helps to understand all of Derrida's work in a way that is the most accurate, I agree with you, Derrida's work It is like you call it a philosophical agenda, which tells me that with the little you have read you have understood it well that you have reached that conclusion is meritorious, I reached that conclusion after reading all of his work, and studying it. in depth but that is not the most usual conclusion that there is about Derrida, which rather confuses him in the opposite direction, and the whole reading of Derrida that places its emphasis on deconstruction wants to move the question towards an agenda that would not be philosophical, I consider that Derrida is a philosopher of the stature of Kant, of the stature of Hegel, his work is a program of great pretensions but at the same time I think that his philosophy is scientific, and the question of origin is one of it, in my book "thinking science" I work a lot with derrida and I have dedicated a lot of effort to it
It is true that he has dedicated efforts to Saussure, but in his magnum opus Saussure is not crucial, in themargins fromphilosophyDerrida talks about Saussure in a single essay.différance, which is in the book precisely the essay towards which I havefurther objections. ofthat another way this saussure in themargins fromphilosophy?, because what defines the book, no matter how immersed in thephilosophy be eachchapter, the second dealing with the problem ofphysical inaristotle around the question of whether or not the being brings in itsontology whilearistotle He denied it and Derrida ventured into adiscussion respect toas it is time in being in hegel and inheidegger, develop aphilosophy about space and time which is one of the essaysfurther scientists what have Iread onproblematic time space, allchapters they are veryphilosophical but in all of them what always marks the entrance and exit is thedistinction whatit is airing between the oral and the written, without mentioning saussure, theproblematic of orality he does not discuss it with Saussure, he discusses it withmichel Leiris, the problem ofphenomenology the work with respect to aanthropologist French, and thecomes back to work on thelast chapter in an essay about austin
In the essay on the origin of languages, theintemporalizes heanalysis of the origin of languages, he takes it out of evolutionism and brings it to another way of treating the origin, even when thetheorists whathe is arguing were evolutionists, the dismantlingthere that evolutionism, the conclusions ofIt is essay arescientific, synchronous and structured and the conclusions that it develops about the oral and the written agreement are notscientific to thelinguistics, butyes towards thephilosophy
He does not fail to say in the book, in the vertebral chapter of Hegel's book of semiology, where he talks about the origin of our interiority, of our inner world, but not from psychology, he analyzes how the senses, sight, touch, smell in the formation of our interiority, the soil of our interiority, there you turn as in a philosophical development it never stops dealing with the semiotic and linguistic but from and towards philosophy, in this case it is the sign that is analyzing but not towards linguistics, that is where he deals with what I told you about the phenomenological genesis of the sign, although I agree that this is divided between this essay on Hegel and the other on Hurssel, he is there re-illuminating linguistics, not with pretensions of being scientific towards linguistics but of giving scope to other approaches to language, not in vain he redeems Chomsky there and also redeems anthropology, he says that anthropology has its basis and foundation in phenomenology, and it does so in a way which in my opinion is important for an epistemological rearticulation of philosophical anthropology, which has important consequences in the retheorization of anthropology, and in my book "thinking science" this is crucial, in a way that was not its objective, because its objective It is not anthropology but as for me it is me, there I gave an important advance to this problem, I discuss there in my essay the self and what it symbolizes, which is a chapter by the way in "counterpoint" I told you it would be crucial that you read there two essays of mine that I would like you to read due to the training that you have in psychology because they are the philosophy and sociology essays in which I come closest to your psychology topics, one is called the self and the collection is an essay of mine of very theoretical philosophy where I propose the development of a theory of the self because it is a theory that did not exist although it is influenced by George Helbert Mead, if he had not developedthis theory I probably wouldn't have gone on that oneaddress, but it goes a lotfurther there by georgeherbert mead y carry thequestion from the self to adevelopment whatherbert mead but not even remotelycarry it
and thenit is in thinking science the self and thesymbolic and thisproblematic why derrida isscientific you're going to figure it out
Derrida redeems chomskythere but not literally like you, the time you take it literally, acomprehension of Chomsky that I share is very respectful, at least towards thephilosophy and theanthropology philosophical, pointing out the things that are truly relevant in Chomsky,regardless of many things in Chomsky,stand out others, I doI respect a lot to chomsky but to the linguistics of thesyntactic structural, thegrammar transformational, but I am less interested in the other Chomsky who starts making conjectures about other things
You told me that the concept of narcissism is not crucial or important in Lacan, I have been thinking that it isfurther important ofanalysis What I did to you is precisely the logic ofanalysis, the conclusionslogical to whicharrive there, the word that is used does not matter so much, suppose we remove the word narcissism and put the wordhedonism of the form, to distance ourselves from what for Lacan is thejoy since it acquires in lacan aconnotation different from those that I am giving when treating it from the point of view of the enjoyment of the form, of theaesthetic, because you tell me thatjoy For Lacan it is discomfort, I don't remember that detail.
I read the seminars in 1993, but I did not dedicate myself to studying it, in my opinion to become an expert on an author you have to read it several times, at least I do it that way, I have read the science of Hegel's logic three times the three volumes, therefore I can teach it in seminars, I master it as much as Hegel probably mastered it and I have also continued studying it after reading it from the first paragraph to the last without skipping a paragraph, oh, anyway with Derrida, Deleuze, Habermas, and with Shutz, they are readings that I have done several times without skipping a paragraph and then also studying them, I never did that with Lacan so I have forgotten things, and I trust you as a student of Lacan that I have not he used narcissism, but it doesn't matter, what matters is that there is a logic with the form that notices it, and that he enjoys it and that he enjoys it now, not in the Lacanian sense, because in the aesthetic that relationship with the form is presupposed, and because libido and drive as related to desire are undoubtedly sources of vital energy, as you say.
I do not consider that the existence of libido should be denied, because indeed our emotionality and our feelings, our very subjectivity is linked to the emotional world and the emotional world cannot be separated from our sexuality, sexuality is also the reproductive principle of culture, we reproduce, we are born through sexuality, it is through it that we are born and reproduce, sexuality has an objective importance in cultural reproduction, and therefore also anthropological and in this sense I consider that the concept Libido is a valuable concept, what happens is that it is a beautiful concept, it is beautiful, it is a nice concept, but at the same time it is a poor concept, it is beautiful and yet it is poor, its hard core is not rich, it is a A vague concept is beautiful but it is vague because what it designates is imprecise, it is intuitive, it tends to be a little murky, confusing, and yet it is beautiful because it designates something that is undoubtedly important as a source. I would mention the word source here, as a motor of a certain vital energy, not all vital energy, I do not consider that all vital energy comes from the libido but it undoubtedly participates in our vital energy, it is precisely the libido that when connected to sexuality is connected to desire, and when being connected to desire..
well the wishyou could To say that it can be integrated into the sublime of love and be less related to the erotic, the entry of thehedonism and of eros so thatanalysis logical that I made have complete plenitudelogic, that is, a certainnarcissism in the form of a certainhedonism in the way, likeMinimum a certain separation from content and meaning to enter into something that is above all form, and I consider that libido has a lot of form,although this related to the affective and emotional,further that with the content, it has aConnection important withmorphologic, with theenergy, is the waymaybe dispersed, disintegrated, in motion, with dynamism
solet's replace the wordhedonism for the wordjoy or narcissism and as such it is that I did thisanalysis, to talk again about that universalitylogic of what I call theontology of the signifier, as what engenders it itself is nothing other than defamiliarizing the form of the signified, and these things like libido and desire proceed in a similar way, that is, they separate thehedonism of the form of that which consumes them in meaning and content, is thereforethere from where I see that what is universal to thattranslation via significant is the university itselfdefamiliarization in the way that operates both on the tongue and on the libido, but we agree sincethere what operates is a fieldmetaphorical a field that operatesalso in many other things and I do not consider thatthe disabled the Lacanian procedure simplysituates in a space ofaxiology, of value that movesfurther within the system of values and within symbolism whichsituates further like atheory criticism that like a science
and I agree that this does not detract from Jung, it seems to me that without a doubtarrive to thereligiosity and to a mythology thatarrive to befurther religion what science,maybe andhe does not I would have gone in thataddress no there would be I have come to certain things that I find interesting in Jung and that must be recovered in some way, not all Jungit is lost, there are many attractive things in jung, precisely because of the way in whichproceed withmistaken in many things he didfurther religion what science but for beingpsychoanalysis, and schoolcriticism, and symbolism did things that I consider to be ofinterest and recoverable from the point of view ofanthropology.
I was talking to you about how interesting the mirror and the other's gaze in Lacan was for me. All of that is very interesting to me. I confessed that for me from a point of viewanthropological, because I am not interested in developing atheory psychological, not in developing a school ofpsychology not even in onetheory psychological
I like it a lotpiaget I enjoyed it a lot when I read it and I also enjoyed Lacan when I read it but I am not motivated to write apsychology like something that is my school
I am already a school in the sense of a development that establishes such a clear positioning in so many directions,decades working, my books, I am interested only in things related to what I am developing and I am also very interested in the connection that you make between the specular and the image, and between the specular, the image and the imaginary, both in the Lacan's sense as in yours too, the topic of the imaginary interests me a lot because it interests me from the point of view ofsociology and theanthropology, everything that can nourish atheory from the imaginary I am interested
I have thetheory that the concept of the imaginary understood from the point of view of an imaginary that has a correlate in material culture is not the same, where the correlate of that imaginary is theimagery, that the concept of imaginary detached from theimagery as the concrete correlate that this imaginary has in that material culture, undoubtedlyover there where there isimagery and they are many,imagery catholic with its changing rooms, churches, carpets,iconography, theimagery colonial with its furniture, the dresses, the ways of dressing, of upholstering the carpet, the shape of the patio, the way of treating the interior and exterior, the way in whichput to the horse at the entrance of the house, thedistribution of the benches and the gardens in the internal patios, in short, it is aboutimagery of material and visual culture that are very cutclearly from each other in their differences and specificities
it is aimagery, another, the local costumbristas like laplante or landaluce who painted the public square of the 15th century, the market where people go shopping, with their characterstypical Unlike the English and Dutch draftsmen who painted the same thing from another perspective, the image they made of the 15th century is aimagery which deals with customs that goes from the 15th to the 20th century andstill today we find it in a certain paintingnaive What does that custom look like?anecdotal ofas They are the things that are very typical of customs in the culture, that is aimagery
carnival is aimagery, that you can distinguish no matter how different the cultures are, you will always identify themask, dualism,symmetry, theexacerbation of the grotesque, elements that make theimagery of the carnival that are unmistakable between the Italian and Brazilian carnival, between the Cuban and the Indonesian, between theEurasian and theEnglish, the carnival has a unity in itsimagery further there of the local
Theimagery aresharp, they are so preciselines through which the differences that distinguish them from each other pass, which is a concept of great valueaxiological to distinguish forms of material and visual culture, Iwould say that almost all material culture understood as visual culture can be analyzed and understood through forms of theimagery, islatest They are structural and structuring of that material culture andperform in that a crucial place for yourcomprehension empathic andmethodological
It is a concept that comes closer in itscharacter prestructured, pre-registered, to Todorov's studies of formsgeneric in culture the modes of orality that have come to shapegenders of discourse in cultural oralityliterature not specializedleaving of thegenders fromelite, in everyday social cultural life, there are thousands, they are liketwo hundred ways togenders to which Todorov refers, in which you realizeas the ways of organizing the voice in addressing another in the waysas orality is organized in popular cultureare pre-registeredare So in thetradition cultural
a bit the same thing happens with theimagery, they have a cut, they cut each other with a high level ofprecision, therefore they are studyableanthropologically, theimagery Yoruba, the rule of ocha in the case of the forms of thereligion, we have differentimagery well differentiated in their material culture, theimagery It is a concept of immense scope in material culture and at the same time in culturalmaterialized of that material culture, because to the extent that there is a material culture full ofimages and symbolism thenthere it is Speculate it as you say, and when it is specularit is the immateriality of that materiality of thatimageryTherefore there is an imaginary, an intangible imaginary of the tangibility of that cultural material.
It is from this side that I am very interested in the problem from the point of view ofanthropology cultural, now that does not mean that I close myself off. For example, Jung himself is an interesting case of a way of approaching the imaginary that is different from what I am telling you, and the same surrealism is another, and the same Lacanian problem It's another, I'm also interested in those forms, less interested but I am.also they seem to mefurther speculative in a pejorative sense but nevertheless I think there is somesearch in which we can move forward in an interesting waythrough oftheories reviews andsymbolic and of forms of theideology whatcould at a given moment ruin things that are interesting from the point of view ofsociology and theanthropology
Here theproblematic of the imaginary that we can have, for example in lezama in borges, that imaginal thing but that enters an esoteric and mystical space thatalso it is in the way the imaginary works in Jung but that is not always in JungesotericI am not detracting from how interesting the imaginary eras of Lezama are. I recognize that it is beautiful but it is not towardsthere that I am interested indiscussion, it is not towardsthere, it is towardshere, to theanthropology cultural, and therefore I am interested in thatdiscussion in Lacan and in Jung and in all thetheories that things have moved towards the imagination that can be recovered from asociology and from aanthropology cultural.
Returning to thequestion fromlogicOkay, like I told you,read a lot about positivitylogical, I have not always studied the direct authors, but about them,domino the problemtheoretical because I have read a lot about it, but it is not my chosen school
However, there is something in which we have a difference, again, I returnand I insist, what it doesscientific to thelinguistics It is not exactly thelogic but those modelslogical are applied to the study of specific languages, studiesmorphemes andlexemes, are important because they open the studies oflexicology These are studies that demonstrate a highprecision scientific both of our languages, theSpanish or theEnglish, as in the study ofestate
for example the studylexicological about how Arabic is within Spanish, howit is the canary within theSpanish Venezuelan, the study ofas are the languagesaborigines Americans that coexist in the Andes with cultures in which the ruling language isSpanish How are those languages within regional Spanish,there thelexicology gives a high level ofprecision, but even more so not in the study ofas a tongueit is within another, but in the study of a language inyes without look for whatI would be thearcheology social of the language that is what it doeshere the studysemantic
I have practiced it, in my bookelucidation semantics, ventured much thearcheology of the language that is I do archeology of one language within another, I do studiessemantics of the presence of one language in another, but it isstill further precise when you study a language inherself, the studyphonetic, lexicon, semantic, structural,syntactic andgrammatological of a language, as much of a Western language as ours.Spanish as in a non-Western or Amerindian language, for example the studies that have been done I have notread in depth because I don't speak thoselanguages, for example the tongueyukpa has been studied in a very deep way bylinguists andanthropologists who speak those languages in studieslexicons, semantics, phonological studies of a high level of accuracy, it is in that sense that thelinguistics It is of a high level of accuracy
It is in that sense that thelinguistics it's aparameter of scientificityfurther that in the senselogical in thislast What it has had is an immense influence on the social sciences that is undoubtedly nourished byalso of that demonstrated scientificity
but I agree with you thatthere the influence isfurther logic that properlyscientific in the sense of what it doesscientific to thelinguistics but what makes itscientific Keep it upfurther scientific What a human and social science has reached, no other science has reached the level of scientificity of thelinguistics, not even thephilosophy of science because althoughlogic thelinguistics needs it and in that sensephilosophy of the scienceit is byon fromlinguistics and I agree with it even though I consider that thelinguistics isfurther exact I put to thephilosophy of science foron fromlinguistics in my diagrams.
Now what we have is a difference in the type oflogic in my diagram, because you give a lot of importance to shapes of thephilosophy that have been based on themathematics, in thearithmetic, in thegeometry that is, taking the exact sciences as a starting point forfoundation of the scientificity of that form of thephilosophy, andthere we have a difference I am a lotfurther Hegelian
when you read the science oflogic of Hegel you are going to read extensivechapters about himquantum What are theychapters scientists towards physics, essays onchemical and you are going to read long essays that are careful from the point of view ofmathematics veryscientists inmathematics, first was the first to do it, you should not be guided by Hegelfurther popularized
the difference is that hegel does nottoward putting those sciences foron fromphilosophy, it dabble with a high level of scientificity, demonstrated that he was one of the bestmathematicians of its time, in developmenttheoretical of theorems and solving for variablesmathematics, and then demonstrated that all that was notfurther that alittle detail thatit is well below thephilosophy inlogic
and that is thegreatness of Hegel that is what makes Hegel great, what makes him thephilosopher further important of all time in meconsideration much superior toaristotle, that is precisely theimmensity of Hegel the way in which he can develop theinclusion in exact sciences proving to be one of the best in it in developmenttheoretical mathematical andphysicist andchemical and the way it all is atiny detail being entire chapters, within theirphilosophy
because yourlogic puts to theproduction of thought byon of the exact sciences anddemonstration That thephilosophy must think must produce thought because only thought producesfindings logical not what derives from themathematics, there a reductionism of thought operatesphilosophical that has dire consequences on what science can discover interms logical when thephilosophy is subject to themathematics it becomes impoverished in a non-negotiable way, it impoverishes itself in such a way that the price that must be paid for an idea ofscientificity that is subordinated to that exact science is too high, withrelationship to the extent of wealth that can be reached in discoveries and infindings the one whophilosophy be thought without subordinating itself tologic implicit al calculation mathematical
you are going to find the thinkermathematical in Hegel that you want, that oneknow inasked, y russell, but you're going tocases in hegel in a very much wayfurther developed, I know you admire them, Ialso I respect them, but I don't put them as highly as Hegel. In this we have a difference that we discussed in "counterpoint" and we had very interesting results.
part II
The Mirror Stadium
by Alberto Mendez Suarez
Audiences and social groups
Alberto Mendez Suarez:
This boy, I think his name is Alex, whoit is doing this workanthropology of art, I find it interesting, it calls meattention tell me it's nottheoretical, but I wonder how you can do field work and doanthropology without a foundationtheoretical, must have elementstheoristsIn this sense I think of the samevia popper that for any experienceempirical always starts from syllogismsdeductive ofhypothesis on the ground of thededuction logic, it can be verytheoretical abstract or not but howMinimum, unless it hasn't given yousome text, butsome investigative text through which one can figure out what parameters it starts from, well in any case when I see it I will talk to him.
I don't have oneinvestigation ofanthropology properly withexception from a field work that I did once between ninety-one and ninety-three, with what are thecultures urban geeks I did some work with some of them and with the punks where we did a kind oftribute following the samemethodology yours intervening in that cultural praxis to a very famous geek known asfrankenstein, but his name was Mayito, I carefully analyzed the entire structure of the myth andI continued much thevia of levis strauss although it did not have many consequencestheoretical because I left a lot for field work passionate about what I was doing a littleempirical intuitive
levis strauss was whatthere was read with rigor and was inspired by your work as a maker, he used the tools of theater to show thatcould see the life of a given community, see it as a text and interpret it based onthere by way ofsemantics, hermeneutics I approached this community, the geeks and thesaw in the perspective of avant-garde theater, looking as if the cultural life of these social groups and their human positions were in harmony.some way related to theatrical life, as ascenification, processing of contentsymbolic, historical, and it was a season in which I did workphotographic, videos and a certain performance that we did in the house of culture in central Havana and that wasremained in Cuba at a friend's mother's housemine after shedied and the visual documents were lost and I could not bring them to the United States
It would have been interesting to share it now, becauseyou had worked with geeks and punks, it is theonly investigation of field work that I have done motivated by your work and by Levis Strauss, althoughhe does not enters, he does not enter into the cultures he studies, and that was the difference thatentailed a series of dilemmasethical anddichotomies around what I am authorized to intervene in a culture and if this does not somehow transform the object of study the same types of dilemmasethical That youconfrontational with your project of the maker that youimplements theoretically andmethodologically in a brilliant, masterful way, that is theonly field experience that I have had
Thomas many kinds ofpsychology when I came to the United Stateshad of thebetter, that of philosophy and that of phycology, but oncefurther I couldn't finish thislast and I had to concentrate on philosophy and philosophy of science, specifically the philosophy of mind, andthere was I had to do some labs that I couldn't do, I had health problems that didn't allow me to do it, I had to pass it for a minor.
But I told you that the field experience was only that in Cuba, although here in the United States I took an anthropology class, you had to choose a cultural group That very idea of an from a cultural group and rather present a work on the different schools that have thought about the relationship with the culture of the subject of the mind with cultures, not about Clifford Geertz but from analytical philosophy, who, when he proposes an example of the capagai and that he recreates it and the broadness, the inscrutibility of the reference, the untranslatability in his essay of the dogmas of empiricism in a congress in '51 and this for me was seminal, he planned to go against the separation between analytical and synthetic judgments, and I explained it also in that anthropology class, and also worked on Taski's methodology on semantic correspondence, various adjustment criteria on truth
I would like to discuss the concept ofadequacy whatyou sit in thehermeneutics because II found theadequacy as somethingbasic of debate in analytical philosophy, itit is inPlato in therelationship between thought and facts, between the sensible and the intelligible, thisrelationship ofcorrespondence, dichotomy between thought and facts, language and reality, these pairs, as you call them, that are dilemmas at the same time, thatare inPlato butalso in holythomas this dualism that appearsalso inleibniz between the truths ofreason and the truths of fact, therelationship of ideas andcorrelation of facts in Quine, and Kant worked this dilemma in the trialssynthetics aprioris in the preface to thesecond edition fromcriticism fromreason pure, the prior knowledge thatit is previously related tointuition Pure, it's another issue that Iinterest talk to you, first because Iit seemed whatthere was a badinterpretation of what Ithere was saying about the aprioris
I think that there are concepts that can be brought and adapted to thepractice in itthought anglo-saxon fromphilosophy of the science ofinvestigation cognitive, evenethology
theythere was mentioned the example ofkonrad lorenz this famousethologist German that speaks of the imprint something thatit is before the experience itself in the case of animal behavior, thepups of thegoose, For example,there was raised a group ofgeese fromlittle ones and thethey followed everywhere instead of their mother,he was aware of the care ofpups and thethey followed him, he was the director of this centerroot of the Second World War, they gave him the prizenobel There are certain reductionisms here, whichintuition appears before thereason pure, when Kant speaks of theaperception an unconditioned concept that appears byitself, isapodictic and the concept itself is based onitself it is enough toitself It does not need experience to be demonstrated; it works as if it were an analytical judgment, but it allows it to be realized in experience.would like argue about itfurther Go ahead, there are someelements that I want to reread to discuss it
Alberto Mendez Suarez:
I was listening to an audio thatturned out interesting andenigmatic, you meanthere to the type of reading audience that one can have, you have a forceful, robustly written work, I barely have a fewpapers loose and ideas, but I still don't have readers except for some friends and professors at the university
I have friends with whomconvert about the ideas of the works but they are not as rigorous as the ones I can have with you, in which I have to make them understand and make the authors that I read understand, it is verydifficult they have to have a basetheoretical, theHe said what is it for meenigmatic when you refer to the reader of your booksmetateóricos abstract that is verydifficult find people interested in this type of work and wheresingle canbe It's at the academy, and you were referringalso to museums of people who may have a lack of sensitivitytheoretical even having some reluctanceanti-theoretical, I don't remember having talked anything about museums, nor have I had contact with anyone about museums, they have always seemed like quite places to me.arid above allhere all very related to commerce and having arevenue productive of the works thatover there they expose themselves
Although I have met some sensitive people, a girl who worked at the Miami Art Museum, a great friend of mine, she was by my side, she took care of me when I was in intensive care, so I have herdear, these exceptions occurstudy art in miami and herit is immersed fully in conceptualism isphotographer study in San Alejandro in Cuba but herefollow his studies and even did a doctorate and right now he works in a cultural museum that existshere in kendal and it is the samefunction from a museum but when she was very young she was always very astute, intelligent and very interested in conceptualism, but outside of there you can't find people interested in this
my reluctance towards academia,specifically American, althoughalso it is what one reads about certain authors,it is sed or permeated by this type ofperception What do I have from those authors?
Me referred who are the types of readers and I agree with you that one should do one's work without thinking about it or independently of it, but notobsess With the idea of having an audience, I think it is a point that must be clear, the work of the thinker, the work that we do is a very solitary work, you were always very conceptual where the thought the ideasThey had a primary role
In the world of museums, retinal artists prevail,are wrapped in the sensitive and any concept is secondary for them, I think about theexpressionism German, polk o kieffer, pero also the Italian transvanguard, Ensosushi, Francesco Clemente, Sandro Chia, the paintingbritish bacon, lucian freud, david hockney that I like a lot but all of them pollock, rothko are always paintingsfurther directed towards a spectator willing to resolve all those dilemmas in thescope fromperception sensitive to thevision interms of lacan and freud it is about thefunction scopic that has to do with the look andcould think of onephenomenology fromperception in the style ofmerleau ponty, but this is already theoretical and does not coincide with the type ofpublic of these works although kieffer is very special, he has workssculptural, facilities that use materialplastic moves toscope of the concept in the sense ofmeaning andthere would be what to do onedistinction in front of others
There are artists who arefurther easy transmit thethrough of visual sensitivity where they areimages and not abstract thought
verytheoretical in itscope in which you moveyou with thatmetatheory is greatly reducedpublic That's why yours is a very lonely job.anthropology, semiotics, sociology andfurther In the case of your job, which is a job.theoretical high-flying, very dense that is madedifficult continue without a readingtheoretical it doesdifficult for an unaware reader and in this case I think theposition that havetheorists How you are to assume that lonely place and do the work
I too can't be influenced by anyone since a long time ago regarding it, thepassion tight recognized for abstract thinking, concepts andphilosophy hesingle space where these ideas can be discussed
I could have studiedsociology butrequires field work, and in the academy everything is veryempirical, for example in thepsychology which requires a lot of laboratory, experiments andnone sidesaw a high flighttheoretical in academiahere in the United States and that's what I didn't like about the academyhere In the United States, the only place I could find it was inphilosophy but really where Istudied at Florida International University I don'tthere was, it is possible that at the university of miami yes, inphilosophy was in front of thechair bitters at the head of the analytical philosophy department of that university that has more history, it is private, it is difficult to get in, the average score the averageacademic the demand is high, it requires peopleyouths what is itfurther look for thatchair
I came withtwenty nine years, I don't have many experiences in academia withexception by a teacher ofpsychology cognitive, I appreciate the help that was given to me especially by Antony Pick with whomI shared on many occasions in thechair but none of them nor in thechair ofphilosophy very kind teachers but not theI found high leveltheoretical, all I've had has beenstudied on my own here in the United States and in Cubatraining In that sense he has been self-taught althoughyes I appreciate much whatI received in academia at the levelmethodological, calculation of probabilities,logic formal Aristotelian and thenlogic predicative andsymbolic, I navigate in those waters and I defend myselfinstruments important not so much thestatistics, butepistemology andphilosophy of science thecalculation logical, quantifiers, the domain oflogic symbolic developed bybertrand russell Much of analytical philosophy is based on it, it is not thephilosophy offrankfurt or equally rigorous interpretative but of another type of development of the arguments where ademonstration in thataddress butfurther well interms of the arguments
but in that sense the academy does give you the right space for high-flying debatethrough from colleagues when you are going to submit apaper they review itpeer reviews through cross-pair methods, so in that sense it is sought that all conceptsare instead.
The North American Academybasically it is very focused on analytical philosophy more focused on neurosciences inphilosophy there is a whole stream ofneurophilosophy advanced by the spaces george wan and patricia george particularly tania benet if they do not work in thatline they work in thevia ofphilosophy fromreligion in avia mysticism, thespeculation philosophical in theline criticism offrankfurt the interpretation ofphenomenology andhermeneutics it is enoughdifficult to find, noit is very developedhere In the United States it is not very common either, some departments doare open to that type of continental thinking but it is not usualfurther are focused on neuroscience, I am interested in the return to analytical philosophy and continental philosophy
For me it is important to think about these concepts in both approaches and build a bridge, which is why myinterest In Habermas, Rorty, Ricoeur, and Lacan, in that sense the bridges between these two traditions, analytical philosophy and critical, interpretive philosophy, Rorty and Habermas, both can be striking.are in thataddress and I am interested in them for that reason, it does not matter that Rorty is a pragmatist, he was initially analytical and promotedConnection between both approaches.
Alberto Mendez Suarez:
Me would like If possible, be able to see those audios of your classes.sociology, I am always learning from our conversations and that in a certain way I find watching the videos completely instructive.I would be extremelyuseful for theproductivity to see your perspective on approaching sociological methodology
I tell you that today II gathered with alex in astarburst coffee He was going to take notes andI suggested whatcould record, we did like aconversation, I imagineSo it was with youthere in Cuba, and I told him what you told me to speak to him in confidence, andbasically thereferee everything I know and the idea I have about the project do about the context of theera And even after I left I thought that there were things that were left pending.
he wanted know why your thesistheoretical of doing and howsociologist empirical and howanthropologist you were interested in actors, in groups thatThey had aposition marginal with respect to whathe understood as a mainstream society of social life inany place United States, Cuba, and yet youmethod of study and your object of study was with those individuals, cultures or groups that functioned in a marginal way with respect to the main current of the social structure, intheir thesistheoretical and field work with your maker theses
TheyI tried to explain from the point of viewpolitical but of social life in Cuba imbued by an official discourse, the cultural project of therevolution Cuban, and like theinterest of the maker ofculturology practical It was for those groups that seen outside of a sensepolitical They had culturally aautonomy cultural, aexpression independent in urban spaces, punk rocker groups that you worked with or the vinateros of nile, or david Palacios with the adult toy company thatthere would be been interesting to tell him because it showed that it is not always necessarilyhad It had to be outside the main social structure in Cuba but they could also be with normal people, this is theexpression whatused alex
David's work was with neighbors, with neighborhood spaces, this shows that yoursociology have adiameter of scope that is not limited to marginal groups independent of whichalso These have been worked on or may even have been prioritized, but the studies were not reduced to those groups.
Also withjob with other social groups including thosehe calls normal.
Further or at least try to put it in context, he even told me about aarticle this meturned out interesting, a friend of mine who told me about your work as a maker, was the one whoinsisted What made me interested in your work Alejandro Campo, Campo segraduated insociology it is working inCanada, and somehow the work thathe did sociological asalso hemine has been influenced by thetheories, methodologies and field work that you did, this boy Alex tells me thatcontact to fields, his thesis ofgraduation It was about the institutions of culture,that role they played in Cuba in the eighties and thatrelationship they had with the avant-garde projectartistic Cubans of thatera
The field thesis told me that it is widely consulted, it gave me certainhappiness because this is something that was sedimented thanks to your project and all themethodology
Lacan and thepsychoanalysis anterior
Alberto Mendez Suarez:
You werecommenting
Wanted to refresh habermas and rorty to respond to you, and clifford geertz's book, I want to review it well
Well, I'm going to start more answers, the content already seems very complex to me, it seems like aelaboration very complex, there are many authors that I have read who have different schools of appreciation and the way in which they approach thisproblematic of the signlinguistic in saussure, being alreadyyes complex the level ofelaboration that they have being deep do not have the richness and complexity of thiselaboration What did you do about the sign?
the concept of signlinguistic, and I would like to clarify some things regarding Lacan and so that you know why I have been dragging certain interpretations that are from his school, it is not as simple as it seems but well thisone has to argue
Let's see you talk about thedefamiliarization of the signlinguistic, obviously what happens with saussure is notunprecedented, you consider thelinguistics 20th century scienceYou were speaking That thelinguistics was science, and indeed it has been considered the fundamental social science or for excellence, this was at the end of the 20th century, theconsideration was varying from therevolution cognitive up to the entirerevolution developmentneuroscientist current where we begin to talk about neuronal synapses, connections of a neuron with aspecific relationship Ocatchment of certain neurotransmitters such asConnection thiscatchment bridges can be createdneuralgic between someneurons and others and we are not going to get into thatline that I don't master it either, that I had to study it and thatfurther or at least I have read a little but it is a very thorny path, but that paradigm has changed a lot
Of course, for example, from everything that would be considered positivism or post-positivism, obviously Saussurian linguistics was not fundamental there, what was fundamental for them was logic, from Bertan Russell of the mathematical principles and the foundations of Freege's arithmetic, the abstract a situation that occurred at the level of mathematics and science and did so as the fundamental condition for thought to develop, this coincides in time simultaneously with the elaborations that Russell was doing although it is a different path with variations, freege as You say, it defamiliarizes all the scientific questions raised since Galileo, it desensitizes them, it desubjectivizes them as they had been thought of until that moment, as a logic, this logic is completely abstracted in a scientific situation, fundamentally in mathematical physics in a new paradigm that would be evolutionism. and it would be biology, in addition to the paradigmatic situation of model science, mathematical physics to cognitive biology, logic becomes a matrix science, whose explanation is for any scientific explanation, as in the case of wittheintein, who is the first of them to be interested. in the linguistic question and makes the first connection with language, but at no time is he related to Saussure even though they coincided in time, when the philosophical logical tractactus was published in 1921 in German and 1992 in English, Saussure had already written his courses that were published in 1911, by Saussure's students
We are in adecade difference, since 1905 the principles ofrussell, taken from the algebra ofbool and peano with whomgathers at a conference in Italy and realizes the importance ofarithmetic of peano and realizes the importance it has fromasked, uses the bowl alphabet and enters them in the field of thelogic, so that it already appears as a language and alphabetsymbolic with russel, they use saussure at all and ignore him between vienna in the twenties and thirties and the university of cambridge until nineteen hundredtwenty Where was Russell, the basis of what analytical philosophy will be?
having said this thelinguistics As a basic science, it is only representative as a social science in continental Western thought, notbasically in the british
This makes a difference becauseguide by avia all british thoughtempiricist neopositivist with russel for thephilosophy of language as in Oxford where thephilosophy of natural language withsearle and histraining from oxford the experience thathe has over there where it is austin, dummett, thinkerslogical from whatI would be natural language unlikelogic formal as well as variants,logical positivism andlogical empiricism they go forways different are two branches of the samerelationship of language with the real, thistradition and that other continental one they go forways different
Having said that, I am going to go on to discuss what you have discussed about saussure that you were complexifying and distinguishing, thataccording to your perspective there is oneinterpretation incorrect ordistorted of Saussure in Lacan and in this sense I am going to try to clarify what Lacan does.
First of all what you calldefamiliarization it's a kind ofdesensitization or desentitivizationtaking it of the language of thepsychology behaviorist, when a person is exposed to the same behavioral experience it can be atraumatic leaves an imprint, for example in the treatment of phobia by apsychologist American Watson who develops issues ofnature behavioral to be able to work on the phobiahe discovers thatexhibition to an eventtraumatic, a violent event of some importance for achildFor example, he puts thischild to the presence of a rabbit initself it's nottraumatic buthe exposes hechild to the sounds of a hammer and at the same time visually introduces him to the rabbit, this negatively stimulates him in that he arbitrarily connects the presence of a rabbit with these aggressive sounds, which occurs every time hechild exposed to the presence of a rabbit? Will he react with fear of the rabbit because this sends him to theperception unpleasant sound and produces asensation of danger to thechild, at the brain level it relates thesensation or response tostimulus to theexhibition thissensation sound and the visual presence of the rabbit creates a response of crying, of fear, this is reproduced over and over again throughout his life every time he sees a rabbit
Professor Watson manages to explain thetraining of the phobia, the sensitivity exposed to astimulus unpleasant negative and a neutral one in this case the rabbit that has no threat to thechild and yet when this sound is placed next to it throughout its life, the rabbit no longer sees it.So, relates it to sound, that is,child establishes arelationship familiar between the sound and the rabbit, the same response orsignificance
theHe said this and meothers for thisvia to explain therelationship that can exist between a sign and thefamiliarization what do you call it ordefamiliarization
When you talked to me about saussure I thought aboutasked in that they are very different, saussurealso has a heritage oflinguistics historical that comes fromhumboldt
Try to distinguish what was thephilosophy logic within the analytical approach and what continental thought is, on the one hand in the firstasked, russell, wittgenstein, and on the other, in the second saussure thatwould take to lacan and to the whole structuralist fold and thelinguistics structural ofhelmet lever, fromgrammar transformational ofchomsky hesingle that bases his worktranscending borders ofphilosophy andpsychology with saussure allthe rest
Saussure does not arrive in the United States
in theyears forties and fifties a huge group of intellectuals from the center of europe fleeing fascistism andthere carnap arrives,He had been in vienna and prague taking summer courses, influenceswho, andwho He then develops it in the United States
insome time he was a professor ofchomsky, whose sources arelinguistics of an American behaviorist and a linguistics based on behaviorism, therefore, until the sixties and eighties, Saussure is not a base
Differences established,you speak of onedefamiliarization, I wanted to explain that behavioristsdefamiliarize Odesensitize thatrelationship of phobia of lizards, frogs, rats in a frequently closed space when they reach the level of phobia they can have claustrophobia the fact is that the therapy for these patientspsychologists behaviorists use to expose it so much that they become desensitized and the phobia is eliminated
This is the same thing that happens when you talk aboutdefamiliarization of the sign
Let's say that a subject throughout his life has become familiar with therelationship between a signifier and the referent, with arelationship two-wayFirst of all, understanding this about the signifier as you explained it as the imageacoustics while the meaning is not the object but the concept of the object
Saussure confuses object and concept in the same entity, whoeverreveals are benveniste in onearticle that in Cubapublic in the notebookslinguistics I'm sure you have mastered it and you know, he explains very well, he is the first to explain that not even Chomsky does it, whenI stumbled with thisarticle from benveniste meclarified many things because it was confusing for me reading saussure therelationship whattoward between the object and the concept of the object
The thing is thatit is the referent, untilhere has operated as you call onedefamiliarization because in the first instancethere was arelationship familiar between a word and a thing and what appears in Saussure for the first time is that he manages to separate it from his life experience toabstract in a signlinguistic which oneit is educated andthere work onedefamiliarization That is why you receive the freeoperation of lacanrestore arelationship offamiliarization of the subjects with the referents and with the signlinguistic as such
Lacan tries toget familiar this sign again, why? because what saussure does not say is that the experience that a subject has with thelanguage It is always particular, it is only given as universal in science as such.linguistics but therelationship of the subject with language in the field of meaningcommon and from social reality there are certainconcessions that are shared with other subjects with whom we can communicate and understand each other, but therelationship directness that that subject has with the language in his vocabulary is not the same as that which another subject has
we, for example, in ourconversation you see idiosyncratic certain waysmine of speaking that are not familiar to you and I see arguments and developments in your vocabularyprosodic that are striking andidiosyncratic, because each one has had a very particular experience with the language
and this is what saussure does not clearly establish
the subjects in theirfamiliarization with language andawareness with some references in that language of the family and social environment that has come from the mother, thatrelationship familiar is not what other subjects have, there are nuances that are not rescued by Saussure, they are not made explicit, it is as if Saussure had not noticed it, independently of his ideas about parole and langue, the speech of groups.ethnic andethnolinguistics but not precisely in each subject
this antipsychologismit is throughout continental thought, they evade, they evade all kinds ofpsychologism and thatfridge makes it very clear, in positivism and inrussell an antipsychologism has to operate, without thisreduction which only happens inhusserl nor in thelinguistics and thelogic ofasked andrussell is necessary aabstraction I don't get into Hegel because I'm not familiar with his thought in depth, and Hegel is very complex, but thedefamiliarization to which you refer is correct that it occurs in saussure, the sign itself alreadydefamiliarize therelationship of the subject with his environment with his life experience of naming things and referents naturally
but before that operatesdefamiliarization operates on the subject in this case in thechild afamiliarization particular of the subject with the language that comes from the mother and the family and social environment, we are in asituation vital in which the subject cannot separate signs, words, his way of conditioning himself to the real is through thisvia familiar and natural from the mother, thisrelationship fundamental of words and things
saussuredefamiliarize hesignificant with the object to form aalgebra and what creates structuralism
That le pasa a lacan with saussure?
when he gives his rome speechstill has no knowledge of thelinguistics from saussure this one comes to him at fifty-seven for thevia of merleau ponty, who suggested to lacan this reading thathe drinks as important foranalysis fromrelationship of the subject with theunconscious, and he is no longer going to speak fully orempty as in Rome in 1953 but begins to talk about the signlinguistic in 1957
But he makes ainvestment of the signlinguisticFor Saussure, the signified was above and the signifier below, the concept oftree below the imageacoustics, chomski has revealed that this appears inaristotle therelationship between sound and concept, form and content, these two units occur inaristotle and this comes to saussure, which is why he thinks of the sign as arelationship two-way, Lacan inverts this and thickens the bar that divides signifier and signified.
It is true as you say that adefamiliarization In Saussure, if we take the fundamental matrix as the foundation of social science we are not taking the vital experience of the subject but thatrelationship two-way, hedefamiliarize what was in the vital praxis and he abstracts it but he does not enter into a vital praxis he only abstracts it ascondition first talking signlinguistic
He establishes this and as you say, the sign comes here defamiliarized from the referent, taking this into account and taking into account the particular relationship of each subject, Lacan calls this the lalangue, a word invented, a neologism, to express that moment prior to Saussure as something intertwined in a vital praxis as something inseparable, as something prior to the linguistic sign, but in this case in Lacan it is a very particular familiarization of each subject, not in the speech of a nation or an ethnic group, the relationship of the word with a sensation, an experience and a stimulus in each subject and familiarizes the language, refamiliarizes as a doctor as a psychoanalyst on the couch in the psychoanalysis setting he interprets a mistake in language, a dream, separating the affectivity linked to this word from what is united with this word in his life in the way in which they have a particular weight, for example a possessive mother, a tyrannical imperative father, in this particular anomalous situation this subject is bothered by the parents through certain signifiers, the father can tell him, you will not be nothing in your life and this subject without reflecting on it is given because it is determined by this signifier
In Lacan the signifiers can be phonemes, it is not always a word, it can be aexpression, a verb, a subject, a noun do not appear separately, all this appears together in lalangue as youHe said, this appears in Lacan withoutseparation
Continuing with thisargumentation onrelationship of the signifier and the subject with thelanguage Because Lacan takes this in a particular way, I am not saying that it is incorrect, but rather clarifying Lacan's perspective regarding Saussure and because he has thisinterpretation idiosyncratic of the signlinguistic de saussure, he introduces to all consciousness a kind of dismantling
because you say that saussure abstracts the signlinguistic of a real vital experience and you call itdefamiliarization but saussure in the concept oftree is arelationship two-way in a language of acountry or a cultural doesabstraction of it
Hetree It is that vital object that has a trunk and some leaves that are other signslinguistic, otherssignificant, but if we take the objecttree and the signifiertree we naturalize that sign when we saytree in Spanish or tree inEnglish therelationship that is produced by the subject in that language is areaction idiosyncratic of the subject but this occurs in each subject taken individually and this is something that thelinguistics no reveals And what interests Lacan?
When Lacan speaks ofunconscious o todrive forhe does not There is consciousness as such rooted within the brain established as a mental entity, tohe is The signifier is exterior to the incorporated subject, the subject makes aappropriation, participate in thatlanguage, subjective experience is something else
Subject is not exactly individual, thislast It is an organism separate from othersindividuals each individual has arelationship with its imaginary mirror environment, but when we talk about subject andit is involvedhere From the Cartesian perspective this is something else, but from Lacan's experience a subject is that which represents a signifier for another signifier, therelationship of one signifier with another
Lacan thedefamiliarize in theinterpretation who proposes to dismantle the signlinguistic of Saussure,dissociate, associated in the experience of the subject that is not this consciousness, in his 1957 essay on significant relations, in therepresentation subjectiveunconscious, at this moment Lacan expresses questions ofrepresentation subjectiveunconscious not only from Saussure but from the Cartesian cogito because it needssensitize what for Descartes was a conscience
Lacan needs to place this dismantled cogito and produce a new cogito, theunconscious occursover there where thoughts are not expressedunconscious pops upover there where one does not think there is nonone type of experience of consciousness in thepsychoanalysis whichthere would be I would be this unconscious and he will reduce consciousness to the sphere of the speculative, the imaginary, the specular, which is secondary and the priority role is acquired by the signifier, which is the one related to theunconscious
the signifier forlacan is therepresentation par excellence ofunconscious, while consciousnessit is related to the social life of the subject
theHe said with lacan that throughinterpretation thedismantling of the signlinguistic Saussurean, he treats it as familiar because it isdefamiliarized of the vital, and has the sign arelationship high in the subject, so he takes thatrelationship like real likepredator in the subject and dismantlesvia psychoanalysis resignifying from a thicket reversing the orderhierarchical and putting the signifier in a higher ordersyntactic
isthere the target at which lacan shoots andre mean it a through fromtheory psychoanalytic in the life of the subject, the subject said again represents thisrepresentation of representing it so I can wake up from thisrelationship arbitrary in your life that relates a signifier with a meaning
It is true that Saussure abstracts it but Lacan takes it as somethingpre given and he disarticulates them, regardless of whether they were disarticulated by Saussure, but Saussure disarticulates the sign as a structural matrix but not in the life of certain subjects but in theabstraction of the structure of the sign, so that here there would be nodefamiliarization of the subject in subjective life is given as somethingpre given, is not represented in the signslinguistic but it appears naturally to him in the flow of life, in his seminar of '55 when he approaches '57 when he talks aboutpsychosis This is where you can see it bestdislocation because it is she who establishes the psychoses although he developsfurther paranoia
he relates thedislocation with psychosis, and these signifiers becomehallucinations, I wouldn't wantcarry it for thatvia I prefer thevia that I have tried to make myself understandas is that lacan takes the signlinguistic de saussure, sees it as somethingpre given in the subject independently of the fact that the sign in Saussure comes defamiliarized tothrough fromlinguistics and the wayit abstract isfurther or less what happens in thelogic that are a priori in the subject's experience with the world, determinations appear thatwe could calllogical
thisrelationship logic What does he doasked that laterrussell structures it better, processes of themathematics, mental processes, but notpsychological andfridge prefers to isolate it from thepsychology andabstract as knowledge in the way of knowing as something separate from natural experience experiencescientific as such is thelogic mathematics is aabstraction fromabstraction mathematics, isbasically what thinking doeslogical empiricist
thisit is separated from saussure when he extracts the signlinguistic of the subject's real experience with language, Lacan takes thatexperience as natural and at the same time as speculative, speculative and dismantles Saussure's sign, the apparatus, the universesymbolic is expressed in theunconscious sosymbolic What are these signifiers separated from theMeanings It islast is secondary, the signifier is primary in the subject's experience for theinterpretation psychoanalytic.
Alberto Mendez Suarez:
I start with thereflection about the sign inlinguistics and theabstraction of the signifier, Iit seemed very good example, the word man that you use seems like aexplanation very good of the signifier, aabstraction what does thedefamiliarization and it implies its materiality, in this case the morphe, the material aspect, the aspect as you say.factual from jakobson in hisfunction conative that Saussure called the imageacoustics, and lacan is notunaffiliated to that, in manyyears when I was immersed inreflection about Lacan I was convinced of theunconscious but over time I distanced myself as I read analytical philosophy, thoughtanglo-saxon logical empiricist, and to the extent that I went deeper so that today inday no could defend with the sameconviction to Lacan and precisely certain inconsistencies in his work, the way in which he presented therelationship of the signifier with theunconscious they took me todistance in the extent to which he advanced in analytical philosophy, why?, because he did an analysis of language that is not by way of Saussure, because I say not by way of Saussure, because a minimum atomic unit such as the sign is not taken and signifier, but what are taken are statements that constitute a proposition, the syntactic enunciation, in this way the analysis of language in analytical philosophy and empiricist logic is not articulated in the same way that Saussure would do with the atomizing signifier. language in small particles the acoustic image, both Wittgenstein and Russell called it logical atomism, logical empiricism that led to the current analytical philosophy. This allowed me to distance myself from a relationship that was supposed to be original between the signifier and enjoyment. I heard you talk about libido. , narcissism and image, it does not seem precise to me in Lacan's sense, image is related to speculation and speculating, and narcissism is related to the image, libido is something else, Lacan very rarely talks about it, it is a Freudian concept that It does not survive much in Lacan although he sometimes uses it because it is impossible to avoid it, the language of psychoanalysis was founded by a single creator, this is articulated very well by Habermas in knowledge and interest, psychoanalysis is a science founded by a single man who was the who gave him concepts that were used for his own value, libido, transference, superego, and other properly Freudian ones such as the death drive, which is attributed to Sabina, Freud's companion, and is how he was cradled, transcending thanks to Freud who gave him that imprint, created by a single founder, was not created little by little by many researchers, his students continued it and when there was a change in the concepts it implied either a break with Freud or a fracture within the psychoanalytic movement, as was the case of Jung regarding the libido and what he reintroduced dissonantly with respect to Freud, perhaps he gave it a deformed form and closer to mythology, he took it from being an individual science to turn it into a cultural science, ceasing to be science to a certain extent, the task of Jung it was generalized universal while Freud focused individual by individual, from one subjectivity to another subjectivity, not to a collective subjectivity as it was in Jung the collective unconscious, for Freud the unconscious was only the individual subjectification of each person, later came dissident currents Not only Jung, but also Stiekel, Alfred Ogler, Melani Klein who introduced new elements and contributions although in contradiction with Freud's daughter who was more focused on Jung's reinforcement of the self, which is Lacan's criticism of the American way of life, a work on consciousness, assuming that the ego was neutral between the superego and the unconscious, here there are two topics, the first was more original the unconscious, preconscious, unconscious, the second was, ego, superego and them, the latter is more interesting to the extent that it incorporates other elements regarding the individual that moves away from the unconscious understood through the word, rather the affects, the passions, the emotions that escape the symbolization of the unconscious, this in Freud, when Lacan arrives. He feels that psychoanalysis has been diverted on the one hand in all of Klein's preverbal analysis, which is a school of child psychoanalysis that works with the pre-oedipal where the child goes through certain moments or phases that are prior to the oedipus, first having autistic behavior. , then paranoid or a schizoid personality, but these are only strategic elements. This does not mean that autistic, schizoid or paranoid diagnoses have nothing to do with the structure of the personality that you will have later. I am still talking about personality because here there is no Once the concept of the subject has still arrived, which later comes with Lacan, Lacan means a rupture in a sense but also the reinstallation of something forgotten, he recovers the relationship of theunconscious with the word,there a concept offunction and field of the word that constitutes thefamous rome speech,there he does not speaksstill of significance butyes of the word and language, this comes from his reading ofheidegger, allows you to open the language field to locateover there heunconscious, therelationship why isunconscious with the signifier that comes from the firsttopical, for Lacan it justifies that the signifier comes to relate not with libido, libido,narcissism, are concepts that are not frequent in Lacan's vocabulary, these are conceptsfurther culturalists, of a Freudianismfurther cultural, a stage prior to Lacan, Erich Fromm, for example, there is no talk of narcissism in Lacan, narcissism in the mirror image corresponds to an imaginary stage thathe calls the imaginary universe that is constituted in the first stages of thechild something that looks likefurther Piagetian, but not part of a developmentphysicist engine, in the case of lacan these phasesare given in advance by an imaginary structure, a structure that is therelationship between the signifiers.
First we are in this imaginary phase that includes all that movement prior to Lacan that speaks of narcissism, of the image of the mirror events that occur in culture, all of this has imaginary implications, of course it does notit is loose is structured tothrough of whatsymbolic that articulatesafter with the signifier, it is the signifier that gives it shape and bodyafter to the imaginary, it is a previous moment of image,coagulated unstructured, an image with which a self is constituted, with the image of its body in the mirror, is thechild who begins to build his personality from his image in the mirror, which Lacan calls the mirror stage, this stage is thetraining of the personality which forhe does not is subjective, but it is paranoid, his thesis was called that, paranoid psychosis in its relations with personality, was his thesis ofpsychiatry whenstill he was a psychiatristFrench forensic
iva through the stage of the mirror, having said this part of the preamble to the symbolic, the universe of logic, the signifier and symbolic, prior to this we have the entire imaginary axis in which the personality is constituted, which Lacan had said that paranoid psychosis in all cases and for all people, in their relationships with the personality that the latter is paranoid in all cases, here paranoia is not a psychopathological illness, it makes one think in imported concepts, paranoid here means the identification with the mirror image that the subject has of himself he constitutes it as if he were in front of a mirror, maybe yes maybe not it does not explain if there is a mirror or not because the child can take as a mirror the look of another person the mother, who raises him, a grandmother, a nurse, in which the child himself is reflected and that look that the person returns to the child constitutes his personality, that moment from the look that the other directs at him is the imaginary moment for Lacan, it acquires its own constitution When the signifier is established, the signifier gives structure to this imaginary, the mirror stage is reconstituted and rewritten and at the same time articulated by the logic of the signifier, this gives rise to this previous moment, the entry of the signifier is possible only through the name of the father, it is a religious moment that he extracts from the Christian, Catholic religion, although he was a convinced atheist but had a Catholic education, the introduction of the signifier via the father can be via the mother but the father function can be transmitted to you whichever is in its place, is what allows the neurotic universe, it is the universe of all subjects with the exception of some who are psychotics, the latter is the exception to the neurotic, in the logic of the signifier that signifier in which there is no No logic was structured because the name of the father is not transmitted, these are those totalitarian fathers orweak, even a dead father can pass on hisfunction a through of the family.
Thefunction the name of the father, lacan tries to explain interms linguistic that what happens at the level of human sexuality butalso of language and human activity, vital force, are inappropriate concepts in a Lacanian language regarding thejoy in their language because they come from other spheres of knowledge that refer to Bergson, let's use the concept ofjoy, and in thelanguage also He finds enjoy, identifydrive withjoy, there is a language prior to the signifier where associationsignificance with significance in thisassociation whatstill It is not considered a sign, the flow of language occurs, in some way it denatures human activity
For Chomsky he supposed that there was a moment in human evolution in which the leap towards language had occurred and that was when he began to think not so much to communicate as to express his thoughts, the human order did not necessarily need grammar, it only needed signs. indexicals, the hands, indicating things, objects but the entry of language, a grammar is when man begins to think, only from there does a syntactic and a grammar begin to appear in man and with the decline of the structure of the larynx facilitated the phenomena, this occurs in primates, chimpanzees, gorillas, because they only produce screams, they could not distinguish a phoneme p and another t, e or be, because that difference could only be embodied by man to the extent that he had the physiological conditions and distinguishing the phenomena in a linguistic chain, a cognitive differentiation as a specialization of functions was then possible, of course, this is an idea of Chomsky but it has its bases in Cartesian rationalism which is also a source of Lacan although he leans More to Spinosism, this has its origin in the empiricist tradition and in naturalism, according to these an innate condition was not possible but one fostered through learning, only this for man allowed the entry of language and through evolutionary development this learning It would become more complex in such a way that through sensations and perceptions it could, through a process of development, be expressed syntactically, but only to the extent that, through the stimulus, language could become a response to those stimuli, the relationship between those stimuli. and the reference to similar objects allowed a subject to distinguish similar referents, it would promote communication between subjects to the extent that the same referent could be associated with similar stimuli among other subjects, this would allow communication and clear development.scientific, It isI would be the path of thetradition empirical, but in the case oftradition rationalist everything comes from the innate, language has that innate capacity in man only through evolutionary development a qualitative leap is reached Chomsky is an evolutionist but not in stages but through momentscatastrophic, by leaps, saltationist, for example the dinosaurs, only onecatastrophe the crash of ameteorite with the earth it produced a change in the species, in Chomsky's case the leap can be anything, language is the result of a qualitative leap the samecould say interms Lacanians without being an evolutionist butIf with a Cartesian rationalist inheritance, the signifier forhe does not It is innate, it is introduced tothrough of the family environment, on that side he is an environmentalist, he enters with thefunction of the family, thefunction paternal and parental, it is in this way that for Lacan the signifier is external
it is medifficult be able to abstract thefunction significant of therelationship What does she have with him?joy in lacan, when you talk about saussure and say thatthere there's amethod trulyscientific, because it ismethodologically useful, and walks awaySo of libido orjoy, it is abstracted of all this and it is clear that Lacan does not find bettermethodology thatlinguistics in its time to be able to express different articulations of the signifier with thetradition of thepsychoanalysis, it is these inconsistencies that led me to walk away, amethod interpretative
You told me that how was it possible to visualize the signifier in the mind ofthat way to look at it with respect to the brain orneuro connectivity How can this be related to the signifier? It is aquestion that I have questioned, for Lacan there is noConnection direct of the signifier with the mental
And this is what he said in '65 to Harvard logicians and linguists like Chomsky. These lectures have not been published, but there are references to it in Lacan's seminars here, although in Saussure there is the relationship of an acoustic image with a concept and a significance in Lacan is sustained in Freud's achievements, when he publishes when he writes a small book called a psychiatry program for psychologists, he explains in Freud's life when the neurological functions had not been isolated, he explains how there is a relationship between a moment trauma in the subject and a neuronal connection is the moment in which an episode is fixed and this conditions the signifiers that appear in the life of the subject, events, phrases coagulated in the human mind in his brain because the mental concept is quite ambiguous and in The empirical tradition has another explanation related to ideas like Quine or Locke, not with an organic sense, for Locke the mind was nothing more than the table, the place, the plane where the ideas are inscribed, ideas that are either simple or complex, these already inscribed, they are articulated in the human mind, which is the tabula race, man is born with a pure brain ready, these predispositions would not have ideas before that, but if we think about it from rationalism, there would be innate ideas that allow us to explain a transformative grammar in Chomsky. or allow us to think about popper certain a priori hypotheses that the man of science poses prior to his contact with the world for popper, both an amoeba and einstein have the same relationship with the world traversed by vicarious functions that mediate between the perception of the individual and the world are mediators in that contact although in the case of the amoeba there would not be these vicarious functions, they are relations stimuli responses in its contact with the environment, it is the minimum condition of an organism with the world, but in man there is a greater mediating instance and That is where the language comes in in all cases it is the state ofhypothesis and hiscorroborationIn the case of man,hypothesis regarding the world,So an organism operates with the world, it is a legacy of rationalism Popper is a rationalistcritical different from empiricism although there is in Popper arelationship to empiricism because allcorroboration it is related to evidenceempirical, it is a necessitymethodological that does not appear in another type of rationalism nor in the deductive syllogism that is sufficient toitself forksautotelic
following on thisline I would like to clarify that basically it has been a long time since I haverelationship direct with himpsychoanalysis and the study of lacan
even a little before entering university sinceI started to take courses inEnglish I started reading the books that dealt with empiricism andI started to study these authors, something that lieshere in illinoissouthwestern university onecollection published where a series of thinkers appearlogical empiricists or analytical philosophers, thick books dedicated to each author, one to Popper, about a thousandthree hundred pages, another dedicated to Quine, and are dedicated to each author where each thinker is introduced with aautobiography then his followers,critics, students dedicated to that thinker and then their responses to their students' essays andcritics and in the end onebibliography of his works, so that it gives the reader a very broad spectrum about this author, many authors of analytical philosophy, russel and many others, putnam,davidson, dummett, prestigious, and otherswere going to include a volume of assets more than everarrive to go out. They released a volume ofcritics of there being more but it seems that there are moregave up of the project, there is another dedicated to ricoeur, gadamer, jasper, this last shot in my lamotivation for the return to aexplanation of man's mental activity, andhere I refer to Lacan, he was a mentor and teacher inpsychiatry fundamental basis of which lacanleft and that's why myinterest because there is a lot of jasper in Lacan, thepsychopathology general and I am very interested in thatvia and that is why the turn I took towards analytical philosophy led me to jasper, I spent a long time dedicated to quine, popper,lately dummett and putnam that are similar but different within empiricismlogical
Within these are the internalists and the externalists, internalists are those who start from a relationship of the mind, a conception of the world conditioned by the mental, in the externalists the mental condition is separated from a conception of the world, the world has not been originated. for a mental condition, in this case I must say that who is a particular externalist because he operates with realistic elements but with some mentalism, in the case of Putnam we have a double condition when he was a functionalist he was an externalist there is no psychogenesis and any explanation of the mental is excluded by the stimulus response reaction, he is a functionalist to the extent that he explains the functioning of the brain and the mind through computers, at that moment of artificial intelligence he seeks the identity between both things, the concept of the Turin machine, I was trying to explain my distance from Lacan and how this position led me to psychopathology because it allowed me to explain the connection of methods. It is difficult because you said that it seemed to you in some way the mixture of methodologies whose developments were completely distant. it is doubtful, for example jasper comes via decarte, russel, heiddenger, in another direction, while empiricism comes from another side, parallel, on the other hand in another more epistemological direction hurssel, an epistemological explanation of issues related to the knowledge
The knowledge of the patient in Jasper describes part of his biography, events that triggered a certain relationship with the world considered psychopathological, but this descriptivist explanation allows a very different treatment to Lacan with the signifier, because the psychiatrist in Jasper tries to account descriptively for the origin of His pathology, a method developed apart from organicist history, both Craplin and others propose an organicist method where psychopathology has an organic genesis. He was the first to introduce significance and meaning to the treatment of psychopathologies, but a double methodology would be the unity. of the hard natural sciences and the social sciences, this double condition of the method in Jasper allowed me a much greater reading than that of Lacan, it would allow a much broader explanation of questions of psychopathology not related to Lacan's signifier, the relationship of the signifier With certain elements of the subject's life, the concept of the fantasy became somewhat arbitrary, the relationship between the signifier and the drive, so that I have distanced myself quite a bit from all of this, although I still understand Lacan in terms of the use he makes of the signifier, in terms of the relationship of the signifier with these particularities, specifically with enjoyment, which is not libido or desire, although sexuality is implicit and psychoanalysis could not be founded without the determining place of sexuality, but what it creates That determination is the relationship of the signifier with sexuality, it is enjoyment in the sense of the death drive, I am interested in advancing in another perspective, and if I am interested in emphasizing my current inclination for analytical philosophy, there are the documents that can be studied Likewise, with the cases worked on by Jasper you can have a clear idea of what it is about, we are talking about a theoretical activity.
Aspects that involve studies on mentality, mental studies, can be done atthrough of all the documents in which the casesare exposed, you can resort to aclinic empirical, reported by the literaturepsychiatric, which are what I base myself on
Continuing along this line in the development that I am taking here when you say that in Lacan what there is is a rhetorical exercise and that there is no relationship of truth or certainty and that in Lacan it is not a properly scientific method, with which not only do I agree, but Lacan himself stated that his explanation of linguistics in psychoanalysis was not properly scientific, but I wanted to clarify that Derrida's case in my opinion is in the same case as Lacan, his exercise of Saussure's linguistics is an exercise in rhetoric to justify a philosophical agenda, in this case it is not political, but if he has a philosophical project, his use of Saussure does so in a way that is not scientific, it is a use of linguistics in the field of philosophy because what concerns Derrida are strictly philosophical problems, his concerns are evidently philosophical, we can say epistemological, but they are not strictly linguistic as is the case with Chomsky, and I would like to clarify that Chomsky who studies in psychology, I took classes of psychology in which Chomsky was one of the sources just like Piaget, Piaget was a biologist, but Chomsky is strictly a linguist, but in Derrida and Lacan linguistics is only an instrument, in Chomsky it is merely linguistics because when he is interested in Politics, linguistics play no role and he has expressed this very well that he sees them as separate issues.
Plato's problem would be how the child can develop language and a series of grammatical elaborations from a few elements, he calls it poverty of stimuli, how from a ridiculous number of elements the child can develop infinite possibilities of language although the explanation of child development is used by chosmky, we can then distinguish when it is a rhetorical or instrumental resource of a truly linguistic analysis, Derrida's problems regarding the genesis of language, for him writing is an a priori condition of language developing a antilogocentrism, and this is directed directly at Plato, there would be a priority of logos over writing where the latter would be the forms of philosophical expression would be the vehicle in which philosophy would be expressed, and a conception of science that cannot be but from the works of Aristotle, but philosophy as such when it arises does so from the spoken word, all teaching is spoken, the logos, metaphysics is through the logos and Derrida highlights this and leads him to prioritize writing over The bottom line is that logocentrism, Lacan and Derrida could be seen from a perspective in which linguistics is only used instrumentally.
In this sameelaboration but in anotheraddress me would like emphasize that thecharacter of scientificity that you give to thelinguistics if you give them to herlogic from thefindings ofasked as founder of thelogic modern and inrussell fromlogic symbolic, there would be It should be noted that thefunction logic that haveasked andrussell, this is not onlyinstrument but it hascharacter scientific because she has a goalinvestigation
What works for saussure lalinguistics, So works in terms of scientificity inasked andrussell with thelogic, in that sense forasked andrussell thelogic I would be the fundamental basis this was the fundamental thesis ofasked, his language of quantifiers, using thealgebra to explain issuesphilosophical andlogical, logic Aristotelian, in this way he translated the elements ofaristotle a through oflogic algebraic androussel thearithmetic of piano,built alogic formal symbolic andmathematics whatafter the called logic propositional, expressed everything through propositions as foundationsphilosophical, and from functionsbasic asson thedenial, theimplication
Both Freege and Roussel develop the logical-empiricist philosophy through symbolic logic and this is an important point because the scientific development that came from Galileo acquires a much more elaborate conotation, the tradition of the observer, acquires a much more elaborate connotation with the empiricists Locke, Hume, Bacon, and from there, it becomes more complex with the entry of the 20th century from positivism and the 19th century and what was called empiricism and empiriocriticism Stuart Mill, match in the 19th, in my opinion opens a path that It does not depend at all on the path opened by Hegel, I think that Hegel's logic, both in the sense of dialectics or science, for Hegel, did not play a fundamental role in that development at all. I think that you can do without Hegel, when you open a book of hard, exact sciences, there is no mention of Hegel except for a caustic criticism, Popper in the open society and its enemies makes a whole criticism of Hegel, Marx and Plato, but this only happens in that book when you open a book like The logic of scientific research that he published in 1934 in German, you are in the presence of a book that completely ignores Hegel from Galileo to the science of the 20th century. With this I am not disparaging Hegel but I am raising questions of a methodological and historical nature that seem to me Fundamentals do not depend on Hegel, their genesis comes from Galileo, from Newton's mathematical physics, even where there is still not much separation, unless Kant appears, where philosophy allows a scientific path. Kant reintroduces philosophy into the path of science, until At that time there was a convergence between philosophy and science but then science began to separate from philosophy but in the 20th century they went on different paths, which is why both Quine and Popper consider that there is a convergence between science and philosophy, through scientific rigor. and this ignores Hegel because depending on the depth with which we approach this, Hegel is not an author that I know well and my perspectiveit is induced from the inheritance of analytical philosophy
Following the same elaboration and returning to the discussion of the signifier, returning to Lacan, I would like to accentuate the function of the signifier in Lacanian psychoanalysis as external to the subject, it comes from outside and what is produced inside the subject are the drives, these drives are not permeated. of signifiers but are associated with the language without that language having been denatured by the signifier, the drive is inside the subject and the signifier is outside, the function of the signifier is denaturalizing and substitutive of the drive, the substitution that bases the structure operates. of the metaphor would be nothing other than that signifier that comes in place of the signifier that replaced the drive, there is a primordial signifier that is in the place where the drive was that empties it and negativizes it, and that is desire, phallic desire. , while the phallus for Lacan is the primordial signifier of the paternal metaphor, all drive is signified in desire, it is always reworked by metaphor, for me it was an overinterpretation that occurred in psychotherapy in clinical cases, for me it became little little by little in a significant overinflation, not only of the drives but of the events of the subject's own life that in my opinion an oversaturation of interpretations was justified only by the transference, the enigma that produces the position of the analyst, the place of the analyst, The a priori subject introduces what would be the transference mechanism, in which the subject does nothing more than identify with the analyst's drive based on a transference background. It is not the interpretation itself that is important, but the transference. , is in the psychoanalytic interpretation, over time it began to appear to me that these interpretations were harmful and thus I distanced myself from Lacan, so that I became interested in Jasper in what way a patient through a narrativeautobiographical could allow avia of meaning, for Lacanthere was to empty the subject's narrative of meaning, since the patient comes with a narrativepre made, for this fact theinterpretation What Lacanian does is intervene by denaturalizing something thatbelongs to the registry of the imaginary, which allows thisanalysis is to dismantle the unitlinguistics of the subject with its memories with its memories, a signifier does not operate emptied of meaning but rather welded to the meaning, and what Lacan does isdismantle this welding, but this dismantling leads to aimposition arbitrary of theinterpretation, so jasperwould allow memories, memories, through the descriptivism of the patient's narrative, and therefore it seems to mefurther appropriate atherapy that understands the meaningfurther there of the signifier.
Returning to the explanations that I was exposing, the example of significant reduction seems very good to me with the example of the word man molded in a sculptural way. It seems to me to be a very precise and didactic example to understand the notion of the signifier, which is freed from the meaning and It is effectively a materiality, a substance completely separated from meaning, the way you explain it inclines me to think that it is as if for you linguistics were an exclusive science or Saussure's discovery had an exclusive character, of course logical defamiliarization of Saussure is not exclusive to linguistics, in fact I think that in the empiricist logical thinking of modern logic inaugurated by Freege and Roussel at the beginning of the 20th century, from the end of the 19th at the same time that Peirce was isolating the interpretant and the Semiotic issues, alternatively to Frege in England and Vienna, Freege began a work and Roussel continued it by basing philosophy on symbolic logic and on a logical philosophy in the sense of Freege, so that we find this same logical reduction precisely introduced by Freege, this analytical turn is based on logical assumptions made in 1901 when he published the foundations of arithmetic for a philosophy of modern logic, and later on these logical foundations, when he finished the second volume ready for publication, he received a letter in 1905 from Roussel in which he He dismantled the entire logical edifice that Freege had built on assumptions that were Roussel's paradox. He placed the entire Freege edifice in a paradoxical situation, the paradoxes of self-confirmation which he expressed negatively, such as, for example, the set of all sets that do not It contains itself, which would be contradictory if it contains itself and if I say that it does not contain itself or it contains itself the answer would be positive or negative but you demonstrate an internal contradiction of the freege building, thus demonstrating an internal contradiction to all knowledge, of course contradictions also appear in Saussure's linguistics, what I want to tell you is that Saussure's achievements are not exclusive to social science, in the hardest and most natural sciences, it is the case of that there is also an exclusivity for the exposition of linguistic problems, this logical turn is based on pre-given logical assumptions, Russell's paradox in the circle of Vienna and Berlin, led several to the incompleteness theorem because it dismantled Hilbert's mathematical program, the treatment of basing the sciences on a line similar to that of Freege from mathematical formulas and models, which were 23 mathematical problems that reflected the two conditions of mathematics, completeness, the most important thing was the incompleteness theorem that demonstrated how arithmetic programs always They needed a justification outside the theoretical system, with this he extended it to all science, the development that came from them and then Wittgenstein with this what I want is to illustrate the parallelism that operates both within the framework of Sausurean linguistics and logical empiricism. In this case, with this parallel I want to demonstrate to you the non-exclusivity of Saussure's linguistics as a specifically scientific field and as a theoretical model like anthropology, philosophy, psychoanalysis, the other point in this same line is that in the same position Wittgenstein discovers the importance of the linguistic problems of Freege and Russell, introduces linguistic questions about the meaning inherent in logical propositions, and circumscribes his work within the framework of a positivist philosophy, the philosophical logical tractactus, his attempt to explain the logical foundation in linguistic terms. of propositional logic, after Wittgenstein's program I wanted to highlight to you that Lacan at some point had made use of thefindings fromlinguistics de saussure, an extensive period from the 50s to the 70s but then there is a turnlogical in Lacan it moves away from the signifier based on thearbitrariness of the signlinguistic fromwittgenstein begins to be interested in who,fridge that serve you in that directionlogical towards the field of reality leaving the field of the othersymbolic and goes towards the realtaking it fromlogic, based in wittgenstein, it does notarrive to be finished andremained open to further work from his students
Precisely in thataddress and working on it I realized andI started to take distance by moving towards analytical philosophy and to base myself on the way of jasper, Ilooked like thatpsychiatry jasperoffered andinstrument further appropriate for dealing withdiseases mental, schizophrenia, psychosis, at the same time that the instruments that analytical philosophy gave me is an unfinished work in which I am immersed, since 2007 I distance myself from Lacan when I stumble upon acollection It's my encounter with that onecollection when I took my first coursesEnglish what mehe took to distance ourselves from Lacan.
It was stayingback merelationship with thepsychoanalysis
Well, trying to finish this onesession ontheory of the signifierspecifically therelationship with theillusion they had several things to close thissession On the one hand, it is important to highlightnone moment when we talk about all this we are meaning that people who go to aanalysis They are all crazy or to lock up, or that he is a subjecthysterical as in the speeches ofgenders, but these differences in subjective structures, there may be a structurepsychotic, what we are trying to say is that each subject relates to the world in a particular way that is very personal to each person, therefore the nomenclaturespsychiatric are eliminated, notthere would be a universal of the whole but of one by one so that for me, I am talking about a subject that has thisposition with respect to family, with friends, inscope social innone moment I'm talking about crazy, if it were spokencrazy We are not at all putting labels on anyone, everyone has one.position subjective with the real, and I believe that a personpsychotic that he has not received the signifier, the father cannot blame him
Joyce, for example, is not a clinical case and her life is schizophrenic, but from her discourse, according to Lacan, a psychotic structure can be suggested in Joyce, but the truth is that Joyce, in the absence of the father's name, constructed her own discourse of the signifier of the father. , and that is the heroism of the psychotic, he invents his own discourse to deal with reality, there is no subject that is outside the clinical structures according to Lacan, we can disagree with it but it is Lacan's position and all discourses are semblance with exception. of only one the discourse of the unconscious, that discourse that is not of the semblance has a phallic function, the phallic function is the only discourse that has nothing to do with the semblance because it is the pure signifier, controller of enjoyment, articulator between the symbolic and The real is the primordial signifier when it is not inherited from the family, it is constructed either in the form of a delusion, the allusions are elementary auditory or visual, on the other side of the neuroses, in the case of many psychoses, then they do something, it is the phallic function in the psychotic structure that is the delusional metaphor
this allows youdeal with the world, there are no structures outside theclinics, when it is said that someone goes to an analyst it has nothing to do with being sick, the subjectpsychotic It is not taken from the history of the madness offoucault at the endhe explains that the work is the absence of madness, there are many subjectspsychotic who have had aacceptance huge like joyce so there are subjectspsychotic who have not been able to articulate well thefunction paternal nomeans a prejudice
thatvision lacanit is pervaded bycriticism caustic despite seeming devious by thecriticism of having more and does not stop havingreason because his reference is not Lacan but rather the currents after Freud, including Freud, whomaybe maybe regardless of whether you haveread to lacan as I have read some derrida although I cannot say that I am a deep connoisseur of derrida like you, but you are not alien to lacan butmaybe In Myselfopinion sometimes lacan with the prism of habermas because of the influence that habermas has had on you and that is why you have thisposition you have your points of view with which you measure this
maybe no but in many media thepsychoanalysis It is reluctantly seen as the product of fiascos and it is possible that this creates a prejudice, not in your case because you have it well thought out and argued, it would be good for you to read it more although I do not think it will be for you.useful I think that thataddress in whichyou're developing your workmaybe hepsychoanalysis divert attention, but youI will invite to get closer to some of Lacan's texts, especially the seminarswe could address in thevia fromanthropology cultural
Another important point in this same direction when you talk about genres in your reading of Todorov on the genres of Lacan discourse not from literary criticism but from the structure of the signifier and from the forms of sensation that he brings from Aristotelianism and modern logic. from Freege who takes the logical quantifiers, Lacan uses four formulas that he brings from there, Freege's logic includes the affirmative universal, the negative and the particular in both forms, from there four characterizations are developed and this establishes, according to Lacan, sexual genres the man and the woman are divided and there is one that is psychotic exceptionality, so that Lacan is not in the same direction as gender discourses, that is, it is distorted as much as Foucault and even Derrida have used the works of French thinkers making them see as if he were from the left, although Lacan is the most conservative of all, they use formulas from Lacan that they find useful for their gender discourses, he did not identify with those gender discourses that are political discourses, on the contrary he distinguishes male identifications and feminine, in this way it is important to keep it in mind and not identify it at all with postcolonial or gender discourses.
Saussure's sign is an elementary unity, but it is neglected by focusing on it.prayer and then theproposition like for example in Chomsky, because I try, taking distance from Lacan butincluding even
It is possible that Lacan's speechit is distorting or deforming thefinding de saussure in the way he uses the signifier
It is not that I confuse the form with the image, what makes me unconsciously associate it was not the word form but rather the word narcissism that immediately referred me to the speculative concept of image, the image of a narcissus looking at itself. the water, of the child in the mirror, narcissus in the lagoon that look returned in the mirror which gives the character of the imaginary in that way narcissism brings me to the image, but curiously interesting, for Lacan the form participates in the imaginary and is part of the specular, of what has to do with the image, I understand perfectly that it was not the way of your explanation, it led to the material and the substance, to that significant materiality that you call the morphe detached from all sense and meaning, the signifier. In its pure materiality has been your emphasis, on the other hand you emphasize the aesthetic character of the graphic image, I would assure that I have read it that way in Saussure, there is a Spanish edition that I want to get at some point that are unpublished texts by Saussure that I do not enter into I want to read the publication that was made with the notes of the students who took part in the general linguistics course or supported it to clear up some doubts, to see how far the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign goes and see how far the materiality of the signifier goes and therefore Of course now that you introduce the graphic image as aesthetic, although it may have two aspects, acoustic and graphic, but its visual character strikes me. It makes me curious if this does not have some relationship with the epistemological criterion with which Derrida measures his revision of the sign. Saussure's linguistics, his review of the signifier, I would like to see if it is possible to investigate in this way, if this vision of the signifier is not sifted as something graphic in its materiality of writing but rather a perspective from Derrida, I find it curious and It seems like it would be a good way to investigate as soon as this is going for you.reflection.
I understand that there are concepts that, no matter how justified the reasons that psychoanalysis took, led in a direction that prevents psychoanalysis from being able to open itself to debate without misunderstandings when this debate is opened to the rest of the disciplines with philosophers, with sociologists, with linguists, with semiologists, the number of pitfalls and obstacles to which misinterpretations of terms lead, not as a result of a deviation of the readers but of a deviation from the polysemy of the signifier, unfortunately leads to misinterpretations and one of them is the concept of goze that I have tried to insist on in conversations with intellectuals throughout my life, it has always been the same problem with these terms, goze, desire, fantasy, libido, only an initiate in Lacanian jargon can notice the difference of the uses, it would require courses for the listeners of a Lacan seminar, that is why I think that the terms that Lacan uses are not happy, once again I say that enjoyment implies for Lacan a discomfort, libido is not used in Lacan other than to talk about Freud, but if the term libido is nonsense, the term enjoyment is still nonsense, and his entire very evident speech from Seminar 11 gives an account of enjoyment, when he talks about the real, enjoyment is in the foreground, enjoyment is discomfort. death drive, that is why we must clear Lacan's ojaracas
I will then avoid continuing with Lacan because it disperses us regardless of thetradition French andas heidegger a Sartre and Levinas, the concept of the other withcapital letter and withlower case the other of itsymbolic which comes from Sartre, from Hegel, from Levinas, the great other of the universe of thesymbolic
For me, the encounter with your theoretical theories of doing was a discovery because it cleverly made me see in a different way the genesis of language and evolutionary theoretical issues that were very familiar to the interlocutors. Introducing paradigmatic structural elements of linguistics, Saussure, were questions more structural and less ontogenetic did not enter into a genetics of the development of concepts although Piagget has something in his constructism in the concepts from sensory motor development to the development of the level that coincide with the development of intelligence and language, parameters that do not They were evolutionary, it was a privilege and I owe this to meeting you with your way of thinking, then Levis Strauss who once again introduced the structural and moved away from the evolutionary perspective, then came Lacan who did not look for an origin of language but rather I took it as it was, and this has a component of reality, it is impossible to avoid certain moments of development that are necessary and that play a primary role in certain schools and currents, issues in which their evolutionary roots cannot be avoided, in the connection mind body the neuron, in the synapse it is impossible to do it without taking into account without that high point of neurological development the same history of thought of the same history of science takes into account this gradual evolutionary development of thought itself and of knowledge as such we could think that has been surpassed, it is known that much has been taken and at the same time surpassed from Thomas Kunsh, in the Anglo-Saxon world for example, and although Popper suffers from an excess of evolutionism and the concept of progress, it is indisputable that the concept of evolution there has a primary place since Popper's concept of science is not based on verificationism in the direction of a review and refutation of statements and even complete theories that were wrongly founded and that the evidenceempiricist will demonstrate through revealing statements, that thosetheories they would not have beenfurther what fictions andmythology being nofurther that astep in a progress of science that, although it includes leaps, is evolutionary, thereputation incorruptible constant, nothere would be nonetheory that was immune torevision of experience as Quine says in that perspectivewould be worth evolutionism is worth supporting
Part III
The shapepreinterpretive
Phenomenology and Hermeneutics: theoretical analysismetaempirical
By Abdel Hernandez San Juan
The shapepreinterpretive
Phenomenology and Hermeneutics: theoretical analysismetaempirical
By Abdel Hernandez San Juan
A classic read
It is a complex issue of mind/body as you do.know, everything you have told me again is a point to which you have returned many times regarding which I do not believe that we have lack of communication but simply that I have notread Neverpsychiatry even though as you explain to meinterest lesttherapeutic Oclinical butepistemological.
It is important when we have communicationstheoretical that the other hasread, nicethere andempty typical of not havingread, now therelationship mind body like youare posing I understand that it has a different nature to the way Icould address that topic
I have never worked on that topic, not in a way that calls meattention in that way but given that you notice a lot about it in a way that is very typical of the way in which you have been arriving at that dilemma in that way Icould As much as possible, try to translate within my research, try to locate some points that may be of certain relevance orinterest for you considering that you have told me that youinterest isepistemological, but if we see it from the point of viewepistemological and from my knowledge and readingsepistemologically talking never to methere was presented as arelationship mind/body
If we look at itwe could say that the whole dilemmait is in thephilosophy classic Western world with respect to sense data and which represent language, concepts, consciousness, representations and perceptions against those sense data that have beenfound different responses in different schoolscould calledrelationship mind/body, but it has not been considered that way.
In Hegel it is the substance and it was since Thorny, that is, it would be the body.epistemologically speaking in thephilosophy Hegelian? andalso in the Kantian, because Hegel is a follower of Kant and in thisspecific point, although it introduces new things with respect to Kant, it is based on Kant, there the question would be what differentiates the concept, how is the concept formed?, what differentiates it from the primary data of the senses?as the concept is formed?
The body although it is not focusedover there like bodywe could say is the substance asheadquarters first, that is, it isthrough of the body that the data of the senses enter as datatactile, olfactory, auditory, visual to that contact with the data of the senses in thephilosophy classic It was called the world of the sensible and the intelligible, it was called sensible precisely that through which wewe were in sensory contact with things, the world of the senses was called the sensitive world, the world that was linked to what they called palpable sensoriality.
Andwe consider the concepts of sensible and palpablesensoriality in thephilosophy classic, desde kand a hegel, schiller,fichte pre-Kantians and post-Kantians we see thatover there the palpable sensoriality was the way in which in thistradition withcould to say thatover there there was the body, at the same time it wasunderstood in contact with the substance, that is, that to which that data belongs, around which perceptions, representations and concepts are elaborated that are already substitutes for that immediate sensory data, for that palpablesensoriality could It was considered the world of substance and was understood as such, that is, it was not called a body. since it is not always a body, that is, from the point of view of sensory data, it is the body of the person, the human being, whoit is receiving that sensory datathrough of his body, itsaw as a substance they even spoke oforganic, all that world that you call body was the substance in thephilosophy classic.
On the other hand, from a point of viewfurther there fromdimension properly human, although in the humanit is the substance and equally in language there is substance (the conceptsemiotic of substance of theexpression, for example) but that world that they called palpable sensoriality was at the same time the world of substance and as suchwe could to say thatI would be the bodyaccording to your way of trying to place the body within aproblematic epistemological.
On the other handalso the bodycould tell yourself thatit is present inleibniz because all thephilosophy Leibnizian part of dualismparadoxical and almostantinomic fromrelationship mind/body not posed in that way but if given in advance or presupposed, his concept of the monad was dualistic is both the mind and is at the same time the body, a monad is an individual in the face of a multiplicity, it is a one In front of amultiple, that one can be acell or it can be a subject therefore it can be a subject and it can be an object, it can be a mind and it can be a body.
We have the same duality in the concept of the soul as it was seen in the world of theclassics, therelationship between the soul and the body has been, both from the point of view ofphilosophy fromreligion, fromsociology o toanthropology as from the point of viewepistemological fromrelationship between the material and the immaterial, that duality has crossed Western thoughtclassic, the soul is supposed toit is further there of the body, not in a religious sense, but in the sense that it cannot be located within the body, we know that it belongs to the body, to a body, but it ispriceless at the same time, it cannot be located in the body in which it is knownit is or to whombelongs, that is, it seemsoverflow.
The soulit is in the body as if it were hisblanket or your house, when we askwhere it is the soulwe respond it is in a body, that isphenomenological, but at the same time it seems to overflow the body and seems to be the opposite of the body, it is intangible, it is immaterial, the body is matter, the soul is immaterial,
And yetit is in the body,there there is a problemepistemological that has always been in Western thought and that runs through it, backbones it, deleuzeHe said that the soul is like asheet of folds where you see a shadow and a lightthrough from which they are distributedvolumes, reliefs of folds, where youknow one side ofhere and one side ofthere butit is created by the same surface, they are not several surfaces but a single large surface that folds and unfolds, it is like imagining that somethingphysically tangible can be transformed into adimension intangible, in this case through the folds of the samesurface
That is, there appears an inside and an outside, an up and a down, a light and a shadow, complex notions.dialectics with the sole movement of the same surface, with the sole folding of the same surface the soul like the folds of a surfaceit is contained within the body but on the other hand it overflows it, and has that duality of the material and the immaterial, the tangible and the intangible, it is another side from whichcould see this topic of body and mind.
Also it is in theissues of time when one differentiates the time of the sensible being from the time of the being of what is not sensible the "is" appears, that "is" is the non-sensitive time, the is of being in the verb in language, we say is and being are the same thing in two different forms, but the "is" can be the time of occurrence, of a thing that can be substance, can be atmosphere, can be movements of matter, it does not have to be a sensitive spiritual being with subjectivity.
Both what does not have a sentient being and what has a sentient being "is",there also we have a contact betweenorganic and theinorganic, betweenphysicist and the immaterial, between the sensitivity and the non-sensitive, between the body and the mind, between the body and subjectivity
Now, I would also say that in the sameextrinsic tion that makes the subject realize that there is this dualism because whatit is just being without distance towards it, withoutextrinsic in view ofitself could be said to occur in adimension in what is itidentical with herself when we don't have oneextrinsic tion towards what simply is by not beingextrinsic and just being isidentical with himself and notit is differentiated, since it is not differentiated it has with it everything andthere it is the body
Now whenextrinsic to be, that is, when we noticehe and We realize that the feeling that we are a being that is only acquiresperception for us in a concept thatextrinsic, we realize howidentical a itself can be that being to the point that if notwe would have extrinsic tion towards him alone it would be and not evenwe would have the concept is to say that we know what it is because we have the concept, this is a Hegelian problem, HegelHe said the concept is all nowe would know of the being that only is without the concept of the being that is, only in the conceptextrinsic, if we do not have the concept we do not even have thedimension that there can be something that just is.
Returning to the point I have insisted on in thisquestion epistemological whatalso is the same that we have between subject and object in a wayfurther scientific andmethodological To see the matter, all this problem that begins in thedistinction between the data of the senses or the palpable sensory and what is in front of it to have arepresentation, have aperception, form a concept, and the consciousness itself that reflects it we therefore have arelationship that passes through the body side and through the mind side in a different way than thepsychiatry.
Because we are not seeing that mind within it because of its turbulence or itsdimension internalpsychic, it is a mere concept, if there is a subject, that subject does notit is being understood by projectionspsychic that are reflected in his mind.
In my essay The sensible concept in my book I thoughtscience I discuss this problem thoroughly I go in and develop a counterpointtheoretical very refined with theproblematic fromontology of the concept, that is, of thetraining of the concept, I analyze therelationship concept, subject and object, what happens in thatrelationship?, in that essay the problemit is widely treated, I discuss it with Hegel and Kant, a work thathe took a lotdedication andconcentration
and effort oftheorization
I need an object to define my absolute otherness at the moment whenthrough of the objectto transform the multiplicityheterogeneous in an object tome like subject in a concept.
There you have theproblematic mind body but not as mind
the fact that it is calledrelationship mind bodyit is out of metradition both inlinguistics like insociology inphilosophy classic It is not called mind in thistradition epistemological thereto
The mind has aacceptance of substance and substance in the highly abstract thought of thistradition in which I work the substance beware suspicion with it, pierre bourdieu,anti substantialism, substance is a concept with which you have to be very careful.
The idea of mind already gives way to substance supposes a concept of subject that already brings substance, it does not go from substance to subject ascomfortably
how youHe said, is the fact that the concept of subject is that in which it is summarized interms epistemological the moment that would correspond to thataccording to your way of seeing the mattercorresponds the mind versus the body, but it is important to emphasize that in the concept of the subject there is nopsyche internally, the concept of mind brings with it a certain substantialism, cognitively it corresponds to what emerges from the body as its other, its alterity, its observer, its counterpart that brings with it components of the substance.
The mind asnotion brings with it substance andpsyche In the subject there is neither one thing nor the other, what defines the concept of subject is precisely thecomprehension of onedifferentiation Thatextrinsic of whatidentical a themselves, that is, there is a sensible multiplicityheterogeneous that is presented to the subject as a palpable sensoriality that enters through the five senses, this is sensitive multiplicity andheterogeneity for the subject, thislast becomes subject as long as that heterogeneity isextrinsic for him, therefore ifextrinsic then it is not at allidentical a herself as a thing that has no exteriority beforeherself.
They're not hereidentical a herself since the momentin what al extrinsic in the subject notthere would be not even concept that something can be initself.
Substance is an absolute that has noextrinsic tion towardherself an absoluteorganic, substantial, substantial, the occurrence of time that is timephysicist and not time of the existential and sensitive being.
The world of substance isheterogeneous but the subject and thislast is constituted as a subject as such since all thatmultiplicity becomes forhe in an object that for that subject becomes a concept. It is important to note this, there is a tendency to think that the object, being the other of the subject, is theitself and that sensible heterogeneity or that palpable sensoriality that enters through the data of the senses, that is, to think that it is inyeah I know object but it is notSo.
Those things inthemselves They are not an object and they are not the object, they are only so insofar as they are for the subject, they are not in their ontos, they are an object only for the subject, from the moment the subject appears those things become an object for the subject.subject but where do they become an object? Only in the concept.
Soas Do you realize if we are Kantians and Hegelians in this?notion concept begins at the moment in which the substance or essence is divided, it goes from being material to being immaterial, it goes from being substance to being immateriality, there is adivision of the essence in the conceptaccording to Hegel, which is crucial.
The concept no longer has substance, where if it has substance it is in the mind, it is important to understand thathere epistemologically there is a difference ofroot, the concept of subject does not bring the substance, it excludes it, thepresupposes your otherextrinsic and turning the object into a concept of it for the subject, it presupposes its other because the beingextrinsic in the subject and as such no longer has a mind, there is not a step of whatorganic or the substance, from the substance to the subject, there is no step norchemical, isphysicist, nor is there a steppsychic to theinteriority of the subject that can be understood as mind asprojection imaginary o imaginal.
So the concept of mind does not apply in theepistemology classic from kant to hegel throughfichte Oschelling, and does not apply either in thephilosophy of the language ofroot Saussurean structural and thoughtFrench of the end of the century, it does not apply to Derrida, it does not apply to Deleuze, it does not apply to Habermas, it does not apply to almost all of thethought sociological from which I work does not apply to Peirce, the concept of mind is important to understand this difference, part of aacceptance of substantialism and I am positioned from acriticism to substantialism, we could say that its momentparadigmatic is thesociology of pierre bourdieu one of whosecharacteristics main is thecriticism of substantialism.
Here from theepistemologies with the ones I work with, the mind does not exist, it is excluded, it is not considered, it is too much of a concept.weak, weak for theepistemology, is a concept that has given way to substance and has given way topsyche, So, therelationship mind/body from the perspective in which I am speaking to you is aepistemology different that does not stand in the same way in front of theimplications of notions, and that is the difference we have, it is not asolitary confinement but onequestion of the literature we read, I am notpsychiatrist it isread psychiatry.
I tell you the same thing about quine and holism, you have talked to me about it and I see that it is adilemma not sodifficult to elucidate as part of theproposition logic and of therelationship between the word and what the word refers to, this is quite ABC, almost all analytical philosophy and language is defined by it, it is a problem that I know well
The untranslatability andindeterminacy to which you refer not addressed in the same way has aexpression very clear, thesemiotics, but thesemiotics has an answer to all of this, it is the problem of the referent, the question of whether the referentit is on the object orit is in the language
There what is applied is the torquedenotation/connotation, thedenotation are thedeictic It isindexicales from language tothrough of which language indicates the world here, there, that that, the referential horizon table table, presuppose the denotative instance but the pairlogical denotation/connotation has it resolved because it islast works without denoting.
In theconnotation the object is not referred to, it ceases to be important if it isindeterminate uncertain or untranslatable, what matters is that the subject resorts to a heritage that allows him to decode and mean, I was asking you if that holism of who does notit is resolved in theconnotation.
It is importantrender attention to this if it is the same or not and ifit is or unresolved as another way of signifying the object for the purposes of the cultural heritage without going to the object throughvia of onepresupposition representational.
Regardless of a greater or lesseruncertainty of whether helanguage whether or not it connects to the object. On the other hand, all thisquestion of language and the object and language and the thing I have been dealing with from myperspective from a high variety ofwaysI await your point of view.
Phenomenological and linguistic structurality: exploring research with the interpretant in sociology and cultural anthropology
I think I'm going to start with the structure, as you say, it's a topic already talked about when you remember that I say there are structures and they are unavoidable, if I think there are structures, there are them in the language, wherever there is stability andrepetition, wherever something is stable, regular and continuous and is maintainedSo that way in time with aminimum variability a structure is established, for example, you are living in the United States, your native language isSpanish, in your home they speak Spanish but in the society in which you move they speakEnglish.
HeEnglish as a language may have varied, and even regionallyit varies, it is not the sameEnglish that is spoken in Florida than that spoken in Texas, but regardless of those variationsidiosyncratic own tofolklore and to thedialects and social dialects that provide nuances to the use of the language, there is no doubt that theEnglish It has been the same language for centuries, all the time, from the moment it is the same language both grammatically andsyntactically We establish an invariable stability over time, that is, for a long time, for many centuries, certain cultures speak that language and this is not merely something descriptive, to say that the language exists, it is not a mere construct.archaeological, from acivilization extinct or existing, that in the museum of languages it is established that he speaks that language, it isalso right where you careacquisition of language, a question also synchronic, ofthere therelationship in betweendiachrony andsynchrony in the concept of structure.
The language is the same, thatEnglish that surrounds you is the same in a set of cultures throughout centuries invariably, it is the sameEnglish the variations it has had have beenminimum over time, thegrammar It has been the same for a long time, therefore itsacquisition, and when we talk about acquisition we are in thesynchrony, We are in thehere and now social of subjects who have to learn it since they arechildren, or from people from other cultures who have to acquire it in order to communicate and understand each other, all of them have to acquire the structures that make that language one stable and not the other invariable
There there are structures not merely as something descriptive, saying thatit is there the language, but as a fact ofacquisition, it is a structure that must be incorporated socially, once it is incorporated, the entire society speaks it and that establishes astructure.
When one starts from concepts of culture, either from thetradition by edward sapir, well by taylor, hasthrough of which we have acomprehension of what a culture is,difficult It is almost impossible to deny structuralism the inseparability between language and culture.
This is an interesting topic, Derrida himself addresses it in hisdiscussion withRousseau and condillac, on the origin of languages, how it was that from nature somethingSo How could language occur? and the theme of the chicken and the egg as a Kantian antinomy, whichit is first?, nocould there would be culture if there was no language before but neithercould there would be language if there was no culture before.
Any Whether the answer to the chicken and the egg is one first or the other, the truth is that they are inseparable, from the moment in which whatprecisely distinguishes culture from nature is the emergence of language, the study of cultures cannot be separated, andhere This is so broad that it covers everything.semiotics, hermeneutics, already from the concrete forms of language including the entire history of analytical philosophy, without excluding a single author includedwittenstein, presupposes thisdistinction. It is adistinction between culture and nature whose principle is the emergence of language and its existence, it is not possible to avoid language in theanalysis ofnone freak cultural including languagealso as analytical philosophy sees it, therefore if language is a structure due to its invariability, itsacquisition and its learning and because all social communications are governed by that language, then there is structure in society from the moment there is language.
This does not mean that the language is theonly social structure, nor does it mean that thecomprehension ofas they interact all aspects of social life, their meanings and meanings have to bereduced to theprimacy and existence of that structure, but what cannot be avoided is that anyfreak that is studied has to resolve entering and exiting thestructuralities, you have to solve theas Put inrelationship elementsdynamic with structural elements.
Having said this, I return to the point that our differences are not insurmountable, especially because I like analytical philosophy and have always been interested in it and becauseepistemologically even the problem ofobservation participant in social sciences is none other than the central problem of analytical philosophy.
The observer and the observed, the subject and the object, language and reality, there are issues of analytical philosophy that cannot be avoided in science.social and I take them into account, butthere If we have a salvageable difference,none So I consider Wittgenstein to be a reference of greater scientificity than structuralism.linguistic, neither of rigor nor of systematicity, itsphilosophy it is full of pitfalls and absurdities, there are even moments when it becomes a tongue twister not because it is motley ordifficult to understand but by what she herself chooses as principles ofanalysis.
There are comparisons ofwittgenstein with artaud and the theater of the absurd, they are not betweenhe and surrealism, between him andmagritte For example,analogies that have been done, there are not a fewanalysis about the relationships between zero and no, problemslogical of metalanguage when theinformation at the moment of arrival to theentropy, whyit is governed by binomialslogical, and all of this is very reducible to themetaphor and to anachronism,So how it inspires the relationships between zero and no or the zero condition,also carry to the random and to theanachronistic.
Ofnone mode isfurther solid the basescientific ofwittgenstein compared to thelinguistics theoretical always structuralI will keep to thelinguistics theoretical as the highest paradigm of scientificity, and I will never give in tonone type of organicism by which I understand that I completely ignore anyinvestigation that there may be aboutthat happens with a certain datachemical of the brain in a certainlocation Oregionalization neuronal, I will never establish as a paradigm of scientificity anyspeculation organic.
The sametheory fromevolution is objectionable, that man descends from the ape is completely debatable, following deleuze and his serialized thought,none data in the column is sufficient proof that man descends from the ape, man and the monkey may have always been parallel series, just as the horse and the donkey are equines but do not descend from each other, all of this is millions of timesfurther speculative that the science oflogic of Hegel, I do not believe that the data considered exact isnecessarily the one that must be used to establish standards of scientificity.
of what weif we have constancy and proof is of language, it is that we speak a language, that it serves to communicate and that it is what distinguishes us from nature, that our cultureit is made by her, we do have it within our reach, we are sure of that, and therefore we are veryfurther in the ability to know each otherthrough of theknowledge language that from knowing each otherthrough of certain speculations about assumptions about the worldorganic,
This does not mean that I deny that it is proven that using a certain pill to reduce the tendency todepression in certain people cannot be controlled in a wayempirical certain impulses and demonstrate that ingesting it reduces a tendencypsychopathological of a subject, I am not denying that organic interventionism can dominate a fragment of reality by controlling it, but this does not tell me anything aboutrelationship of that statement with the truth.
The data to which thepsychopathology with the supply of a medicine which has been reachedaccording to an assumption about something in the brain, it only explains onerelationship control of aportion fragmentary reality, such as knowing that if you don't put your foot correctly on the ladder you will fall, it is a knowledge ofstimulus answer yourperimeter inrelationship to truth is extremely limited, it is not enough to establish a science if we consider science from the Hegelian point of view that science must produce thought, not simply controlempirical of reality.
A through frommathematics and thecalculation we can do the math and establish a certain way ofadministration and accounting in the way we carry money that regulates a certain reality, but this does not produce thought, it does not produce ideas, only recipes to control a certainportion fromreality, there We have a difference, we cannot know ourselves better by knowing about a certain brain substance, or how it is controlled than by knowing the language, we are not in a position to know ourselves better, that is why the transposition of the positivist analytical sciences to the social sciences has given terrible results.
It is true that levis strauss is aanthropologist very interesting without a doubt, especially when theorizing at an abstract level but at the same timealso It is true that from the representational point of view, that is, precisely in that aspect in which we have to evaluate his books insofar as they are offered as knowledge about cultures, those same books that are very interesting at an abstract level are thenparadoxically absolutelyeuphemistic and failed.
Nonerepresentation that we can obtain about the Indians ofSouth America a through of Levis Strauss comes absolutely nothing close on a representational level to theknowledge of those cultures, the image that gives us of those cultures are false,distorted, deformed and they areSo precisely because the paradigm ofscientificity What is the idea ofobservation andrepresentation containsstill thatsubjection to this ideaApparently exact that a paradigm of accuracy must be sought in the sciencesphysics, chemicals, natural.
In levis strauss through thecybernetics I was looking for the idea of an exact data, the ideaempirical of objectivity has demonstrated its fallacy when when studying cultures we realize that if we renounce therelationship between language and culture, and to know the culturesthrough of the scientific paradigms that we obtain fromtheory of language, we cannot really understand them, we deform theanalysis What we do about knowing ourselves culturally.
Levis strauss is already an effort to move towardslinguistics and in this he is a pioneer, but not enough, and not with enough knowledge, there is alot of knowledge that was occurringsimultaneously a he in the social sciences thatthat levis strauss no incorporated and you have to incorporate them.
Don't see this as a radical thing, I'm interested inquestion of analytical philosophy and language because it is not possible to solve the problem ofobservation participant without thatdiscussion
Having made this reservation, I am going to go to the beginning to start again with the problem of the self and go through it, I want to enter into the topic of the self and the heritage, Iwould likeBefore you read the texts, I want to give you a summary of what mytheory about it, which you will find in the texts but I want to expand.
So far they are two essays, I think they are important, capital, crucial, I don't think mytheory of the self can advance without those two essays thatI wrote, I feel happy with them on a scientific and philosophical level, they are foundational, but I think I can continue to deepen and advance and enrich myphenomenology of the self, and directions can be a good opportunity for this since I say that thephenomenology of the self is aphenomenology of the culture that is the basis for atheory cultural so that it fits perfectly with my concept ofanthropology cultural.
Especially that wayspecific in that it occurs when the self is seen from the point of view of the individual, of course once it occursSo In an individual we can generalize that it isSo in every individual and can be generalized as atheory cultural general, but I have corroborated itempirically individual by individual, but this is going to get me into a very extensive sequence of audios, and I want to finish the topic that I alreadyI started of the structure, I'm going to continue with the structure even though youadvertisers which is a topic that we deal with a lot in counterpoints, I am satisfied with the development we made, we reached levels ofabstraction theoretical important both me and your illuminators, which of course would not be possible without my book El correlato de mundo de mi lado where I retheorized the structure but in counterpoint there was that possibility of expanding, especially on a very abstract planetheoretical.
Whichit is raisedhere it is not the verytheoretical butfurther well itempiricalHow to work with structure in field work? How to consider structure problems in field work?comprehension of concrete cultural forms?, when we are already faced withphenomena of the culture we are theorizing at a level that presupposes that specific correlate of culture to which we are referring.
Isthere where I am interested in expanding here in directions, youalluded ouraffirmation that the structures are inescapable, in the previous audio I made a development about why they are inescapable because undoubtedly the first way to appeal to thatinescapability It is the language, there are othersstructures that are relevant in the society thatalso They are unavoidable but go for itaddress withwould do very extensive and wewould take to the debate on structuralism andwould do extensive
Leaving it well like aconsideration linguistics is enough to take for granted thatthere are the structures and are unavoidable, but now what interests me is to aim at the levelmetamorphic how to work with structures in theanalysis cultural and isthere where the questions ofhermeneutics andphenomenology
It is one thing to be a structuralist or to have a foundationscientific in structuralismlinguistic of influence and quite another is to deliberateas one works with the knowledge of thatcomprehension, how does one work with that precept astransfer one therecomprehension of thephenomena structuralanalysis of concrete cultural forms and howdecides one thererelationship between operational structure andontological, I'm going to give you several examples.
It is undoubtedly notsusceptible a hermeneutics theconsideration of the structure itself does not matter if we see it as something operational, a modellogical abstract formal with which to operate acomprehension cultural or as structures thatare there and are unavoidable inthe social, in either form the very idea of structure should not be exposed to ahermeneutics considering it from his own selfhood.
In language, for example, it should not besusceptible a hermeneutics thecomprehension diachronic andsynchronous that the English languageit is there and it exists and forms a structure not only becauseit is over there and it has been the same invariably for a long time, not only because it is the one that enters theacquisition of that language for the learnerchild and for anotherculture that you must learn it tobe able to move in it and express oneself in that language, but it is also notsusceptible ofhermeneutics Once we understand that the structure must be learned and acquired, it is then the language in which that society communicates and in which it communicates its senses and meanings.
Therefore there isalso an inescapable structure in the systemsemiological fromcommunication of that society,it is over there the structure participating in a way that cannot ignore what Derrida regardinghusserl callsgenesis and structure, to the extent that thesociety it is generating meanings and sensesit is always generating new meanings based on the matrix structure of the language, it is not possible togenesis Without a structure, we produce new language acts by creating new senses and meanings but we do so in a grammatical structure thatit is preset in a language.
Now, once society is understood as a systemsemiological of many practitioners who have acquired that language and who communicate tothrough of her yesarise a series of problems in which to understand thatfreak cultural we cannot, since we need to move between the structural moments and thedynamic of culture between elements of structurality and stability and elements of dynamism and variability, which are no longer part of the internal variabilities of that language, thatlanguage inbut issusceptible ofhermeneutics when we consider it structurally, but when we have to put intorelationship thecomprehension cultural phenomenon of dynamic meaning phenomena with the way these participate in culture.phenomena structural if we need thehermeneutics and of thephenomenology.
Therefore we have to go back and forth between the structural elements and thedynamic, and in that coming and going we have to work with thehermeneutics and thephenomenology, I am going to give you several examples, I insome moment I already turned to the case of culturewayuu, these Arawuacos, a cultural group that lives on the border of Venezuela and Colombia that produces this beautiful material culture ofbasketry, of dance fabrics from split representations, ways of painting the body, Guajiro communities that have their territory near Maracaibo, and that have their own language.random, let's askas goes intohere that moving betweendynamic and the structural.
I'm already in Laelucidation semantics I treat it but not with the depth of now, thearhuacos they have thewayuu He lives on aarea culture in whichare theircommunities which he has in hisproximity border thetraffic from the border, atraffic dominated byPetroleum, the oil industry, culturewayúu it is affected by that traffic but thattraffic is in Spanish, the raw material that they need to produce theirbasketry and its fabrics, so important at the level of material culture andsymbolic and visual so important at the levelsymbolic andaesthetic They cannot completely self-manage it, there are some things that they can grow but not all the raw materials can be obtained from their own lands, so what do they do?
So what do they do, the sametraffic of the border that functions as ainhibition because culture affects them; on the other hand, it istraffic from which they obtain thematter premium that matters, that is, it moves,transport to their communities to produce theirculture material, and we cannotinclude here salaried work, manywayúu find paid work on the other side of their communities, that isover there whereit is thattraffic or in communities close to where that traffic is, this generates acomplexification of culturewayuu.
Now if you are going to do a study of the culturewayúu and you are guided by what society does notwayúu says about culturewayuu interms ofclichés, what you will find in the press or in the university studies that are done in the universities of the provinces that arethey find close to culturewayúu but they have a reading completely from the Hispanic culture of what the culture iswayúu that is on the other side, you are going to see a series of stereotypes such as thathey they live threatened byPetroleum, that theit is exterminating theculture of the border, which is a threatened culture and you are going to find the effects ofrhetoric policy in a way of speaking and representing culturewayúu who really doesn't know the wealthsymbolic and the complexitieshermeneutics of what thatfreak means to them.
For example, you will find that the same culturewayúu while it is perceived and discovered represented in that way from the Hispanic side that is relevant to it as aover there receives its raw materials, imports theseclichés, to their ways of self-producing social experience oforganization such as women's organizationswayúu to defend women's rightswayúu to preserve their language against the threat of extermination that the oil industry in thetraffic of the border means for the languagerandom.
In theteaching of that language to their children, this is one of the best examples, there are others in which it becomes even clearer, like the culture itselfwayúu begins to import ways of organizing imported from those representations that Hispanic culture makes of the culturewayúu.
From the point of view of therelationship between structure and dynamism, if we take into account that for the purposes of their material culture they need inputs from that other side of the border and from their communities, we have to take into accountbesides to levellinguistic that by needing thereSpanish there is arelationship between symmetry and asymmetry, that is, the language that isstructural for the purposes of their communitiesparadoxically Arawak being the structural languageendogenously for its culture, it ceases to be so as long as from the point of vieweconomic The Spanish language is presented to them as a structural language, therefore they have to becomebilingual, and what is its structural language, Arawak becomesasymmetric regarding Spanish.
That implications this has for thecomprehension of the relationships betweenstructure and cultural dynamism? On the one hand, we must separate theclichés, get out of the naivety that we are going to understand interpretively,hermeneutics andphenomenologically thephenomena culturalsurprised going only to the way the reactionswayúu al freak from the border they repeatclichés of theimages that they make of themselvesaccording to the representations that Hispanic culture makes of them.
Now, we are going to note that although we cannot appeal tocases in their culture some representations that they as a cultural group have ofthemselves What would be the authentic ones if they were truly not contaminated by theSpanish and Hispanic culture, the trulyautochthonous nowere permeated by Hispanic culture since thisI would be a mistake, it is not that we have to let ourselvescarry for theclichés but if you separate and understand thatalso the crucial moments of theself representations culturalhey are made ofthemselves They bring with them permeabilities, ways in whichrepresentations that Hispanic culture makes of them participate in the way they see themselvesthemselves, but not anymoreover there where they repeatclichés butover there where hebilingualism it has becomeendogenous for their own culture.
Once it has turnedendogenous we cannot separate from the self-representations that they make ofthemselves theimages that they have of the representations that that culture that is made about themit is on the border, this samefreak I have analyzed it with the studies that Itoward to understand punks by objectifying how it is not the same to ask a punk what they think about their body styles and clothing expressions in urban culture, appealing to them to answer the question by going to an essence of what they are like.fruitful I would be resort to the fact that the representations that other urban groups have of punk culture participate in a decisive way in the way in which punk culture is seenherself in urban form.
Thereforehere there is a problem that is the timemethodological andontological, methodological because it ismethodological interms ofobservation participantdives in acommunication interactivesymbolic with the punks interpretively resorting to something that they already have codified about how the rockers or the geeky geeks see them because for them that neighboring or sister or twinned urban culture is important to them.consideration to distinguishsymbolically
That is to say, at the same time they want to separate themselves from what a rocker is, but at the same time, what a rocker is is relevant to the way they perceive themselves.distinguish Therefore it is part of yourself-representation The way rockers see them is a similar example, otherwise we are moving in a different way.interaction between urban and ruralinteraction between the metropolitan urban and the metropolitan urban,here we have a clear example ofas They must work on the relationships betweenhermeneutics and structurality in thecomprehension and theanalysis ofphenomena specific cultural backgrounds, this coming and going as I call it, whichhere I illustrate it with simple examples, it becomes more complex at important levels/
That is, the requirement of the problemshermeneutics andphenomenological in the way of understandinginteraction social goes a lotfurther there of these examples and there are manyfurther deep, I have even reached theconclusion that interms ya detheory sociological the very guiding concepts of thestructuring of onetheory sociological they must becrossed bycomprehension of the decisive role played byphenomenology and thehermeneutics in theconformation The very nature of social experience is what I call thecharacter pre interpreted of experience and the world.
If we analyze a social microinteraction of a single group, even if we do not talk about constituted cultural groups but rather about mere social interactions between people in everyday life situations, we will observe that the very definition of the concept of situation, making it clear that the concept of situation to which I refer here is completely separated from the political uses that have been made of situationism as a theory of social activism, I refer to the individual in everyday life in the same way as it is analyzed in extraverbal studies as the human being It communicates with gestures that accompany the words and as such it is abstracted from an empirical way politically constituted by groups, we speak of the Weverian ideal type that we abstract in axiological neutrality, to build a theory based on a concept that in this case is the concept of situation understood in a social microinteraction, when we analyze what makes up a social situation between interactants in a minimal space of daily life, a stop where there is a queue and someone orders the last one, a supermarket in which a group of people buys and others do a question, something that you drop on an urban bus on an interprovincial trip, interrupting a group that is in an ice cream area and entering a conversation they are having to ask a question and relate your questions to the dialogic situation that they have, every time we analyze what constitutes a situation in its endogenous character, what the situation is in itself, a man sitting in a chair having a beer in a bar that is located in a bar without a roof in A recreational place and some children playing in an adjacent space create an interaction between two situations. We ask what defines that situation? When we analyze the very concept ofsituation We see that we cannot separate from youranalysis thestake of elementshermeneutics andphenomenological, that is, thesituation sameit is crossed and defined by interpretive issues.
Note that here it is not about interpreting a culture, but rather about finding the processeshermeneutics that already make up theontology fromsituation itself what makes the relevance of thesituation, which defines it assituation It is nothing other than thecharacter regularized frompre interpretations that these subjects have of what is pertinent to the typicality of thesituation itself, the cultural worldit is reframed by the subjects.
Theput the example of my staircase, I am not aware of its soundsall time but as soon as sounds occur on my staircase, I put them inrelationship with the typifications that I have pre-established of the typicality of my staircase, of its sound. To the extent that I have previously codified that experience and given it meaning, I have a sense of relevance, if there is a knock on my door it could be an evangelist preaching the Bible or a neighbor coming up, or a visit to a neighbor but never aharlequin from a circus therefore I have the sound of my stairspre interpreted anything that may happen regarding her seems to mefurther or less relevant with respect to aresignification that I have of her,So meaning is organizedcommon, all the structurality of meaningcommon it is governed by principles of relevance that presuppose a worldpre interpreted that goes throughhermeneutically thedefinition same of social situations, once we understand itSo we arrive atconclusion That theobservation participant is not possible without arelationship hermeneutics whatit is given not inas interpret the culture but in finding the interpretations that it already has of thesituations social to put intorelationship our text with the texts that that culture has already developed about itself, that is, to work intertextually.
As you realize, the relationships betweenunit structure o regularized elements,here of course we have already moved on from structuralismlinguistic to structuralismphenomenological which as I told you is one ofthe searches further important at this moment, moving from the structure in the language to the structure in theterms who discusses it defunctly in hisanalysis fromphenomenology ofhusserl, referred tostructures that form stable regularities within the worlds already signified, that is, in the field that Greimas discusses insemantics structural andprotection has worked inanalysis ofas the social corpusare based on recipes and typifications of the meanings that people assign to the life world, this does not deepen itprotection I have deepened it, I have influenced it, and I have made it more complex, I have been influenced by thephenomenology social, I have put youthere another example a lotfurther rich and complex fromwhere my work moves with the relationships betweenphenomenology andhermeneutics in the considerations ofstructurality in the social world understood as a social world now not seen as we saw in counterpoints an abstract world but as a concrete social world.
I believe with thisterm to draw some coordinates in a summary way that ends up pointing out how I see thisfreak of structures, because I work with structures and because they are unavoidable and inthat modesspecific we put inrelationship phenomenology andhermeneutics with structural considerations inphenomenology social.
A phenomenology of the self
I have been thinking that I would like to articulate these analyzes on how hermeneutics and phenomenology ontologically traverse the very definition of the symbolic interactive and social interactive situation, that is, to the very concept of "situation" understood as the minimal unit that unravels what We could call a social nucleus or a first form of the social, bring this phenomenological and hermeneutic question to the question of the self and interrelate both things, on the one hand, it is necessary to delve much deeper into it, Shutz's studies on what the He called the formation of the world based on typifications and recipes, it was very reductive to those two concepts, the fact of typifying and the recipes based on which it is typified, he started from the orientations of actions, some for what and others for why. , and it boils down to typifications and recipes, what he called the reciprocity of perspectives between some social actors and others, which destroyed a first general definition of the importance of subjectivity in the formation of the social world, is not enough. It is necessary to go further, to deepen the understanding of other concepts such as experience, heritage, significance, that is, things that become significant in terms of relationships of meaning for the subject, for the actor, and what I call relevance. which are the experiential results that structure the ways in which what is already typified is expressed for social interaction, the subject already has meaning and preinterpreted the social experiences that are presented to him in his worldly course, both in his solitude and in his interactions with others, but the margin between greater typicality and lower typicality is regulated by relevance, that is, when the situations are novel that are not yet integrated into their heritage, such as a trip to a new, unknown city, meeting a person who has a heritage. different professional and talk to her, with a specialized world that is not her domain, talk to a person who is not from her same city and she has to take her to meet her or vice versa, they take her among other forms in front of which the pre-meaning world that makes up the social situation meets with novelty, with the unexpected and that has to be learned, once this is the case, the accumulated experience that makes up the heritage becomes structurally regulating through relevance, the subject goes to the experience already acquired and relates it to the expected new, to the extent that the fragments of things that are presented to him in the new become relevant, the subject advances, to the extent that they are not relevant, the subject regresses, this is a bit the relationship between phenomenological structurality and hermeneutic configuration of the subject in life worlds, there the sociology of common sense is formed in a much richer direction than what Alfred Shutz began to outline but did not develop, he made certain clarifications that were founding for a certain way, but it was reduced to a few parameters. I am also articulating the relationship between the self and this world of common sense and culture based on my theory of heritage. That is to say, I consider that face-to-face intersubjective relationships are literal, as in a dialogue between speakers or two people who have a relationship that goes beyond speech but also coexistence, for example work or family or some kind of social relationship in which activities are compared, I consider that communication between people is regulated by heritage, it is the heritage that regulates, participates and defines the forms of communication.
However,here It is necessary to move towardsrelationship between the self and the heritage as I have discussed it and then come back to trace those interconnections.
I. .. youI sent the two textsmine about the self but I'm going to give you a summary, if you read Mead's work, one of the things he supports is the idea that the self, the social self, the self of the person is shaped and made up of a social world. pre-existing, that is, the self acquires itssetting from the outside in, what the person is, what the self is, he receives from the social world, thisvision of mead, although he was the first to bring therelationship same to onedimension micro where the selfit is from a micro approach to the social and the social tothe how person was the first to take out thesociology of the macroparameters, did so to say that the self is structured by the social and formed by the social.
On the other hand, he did not see it the other way around, he did not look at the social from the self, why did he not do it? He did not do it simply because even before the concept of self from the samerelationship between the individual and the social,it is already budgeted oneextrinsic tion andfurther that it aestrangement between the two concepts, that is, they are presupposed as two external things betweenIf that if you knoware inrelationship and that it can be stated ifare in arelationship of dependence or not, as Mead did, considering the individual formed by the social as dependent, but what never happens is that it is investigatedas that happensrelationship, which is thetranslation whatover there if it does. inthat mannerspecific the sieve, the filigree, the funnel takes shapethrough from which the social passes to theconformation self and conversely, the self passes to theconformation of the social, I consider that theconformation It's double, nothere would be the social without individuals does notthere would be A social world without the self is not from one side to the other but from both sides at the same time because societyit is made of individuals, but even having affirmed thatcharacter the inverse does not even say thatthat way to give thisrelationship and theinvestigation what I have done at the levelphilosophical First and thensociological is to theorizeas takes shape thatrelationship.
I propose that there are three moments of the self that acquire a valence orworth own within the system of the study of subjectivity and the social independently of the spheres of the self, the ego, theanother self or other concepts that are structuring of the way in which that individual world has been imagined, understood as an internal world, what Derrida calls thetraining from the soil of our interiority, there is notheory o nothere was because I have developed it, which iswill occupy to develop a studyphenomenological thoroughly ofas is that that sieve takes shapetranslation.
Hearea It is a current level,it is always in a situation here and now from the point of view of temporality, it issimultaneous to experience and is not cumulative, this is defined as therelationship that occurs betweenself and the social directlyseeing him from the perspective of therelationship between the individual and the social, thisrelationship that is continually updated means, on the one hand, theinternalization of the social world by the self of the individual and then theexternalization insymbols of that social world, theexternalization symbolized of that previously internalized world, nowas that happensinternalization?.
The process ofinternalization that introspects the social and turns it internal is a process oftranslation, the social world whenit is Seen from the sieve of the internal, it ceases to be an exteriority for the self and is transformed into an interiority, this process of returningintrinsic and theextrinsic It is very complex, it cannot be studied in depth without studying therelationship between experience and heritage that is cumulative, ifit is formed by experience and if it properly forms a cultural heritage.
Bothareas are functionally differentiated, one of themrelationship between the self and the social is shaping the social itself, which enters the self and thesetting of the social by the self as it participates in thesetting of the social.
This side is aarea that is constantly updated, is current,it is always now andhere, in it mutual permeability occurs, the way in which the self is permeated with the social is tothrough thisarea, once understood as therelationship individual/society but thatthrough of the self and the social is understoodfurther properly thedialectics in which this occurs.
Here it is understood how theindividual With the social, this is a continuous and constant process, to the extent that the individual changes environment and context he has to adapt and in the process ofadaptation either environmentalphysiological o social intersubjective whether or not it includes a language that is the same as its own or another new one, the individual updates his or her self andpermeating with the social with which that self is updated at the same time that it configures the social by externalizing thesymbols internalized
Now we cannot understand thetranslation what intrinsic lointrinsic without the cumulative level of experience and heritage, on the one hand while it isarea issynchronous that of experience and heritage isdiachronic, has its synchronicity, but it is cumulative, what forms the experience is an accumulation, it is this that, by fixing the data of what is experienced in memory, transforms whatextrinsic and intrinsic When transformed it forms thememory same as nowit is being considered not as a memory but as a heritage thatI would be the concept thatwould come here to combine the aspects of memory thatare budgets in thatintricacy of whatextrinsic but they are not memory as memory nor as forgetting, but rather they are the accumulation formed by that intrinsicness of whatextrinsic, which is already memory but not as a memory but as an accumulation, the accumulation of experience is not the experience itself because it islast turn somethingintrinsic it forms something thatit is inrelationship with the acquis but does not merge with the acquis.
Whichyes it happens is that therelationship experience and heritage become one and the same thing with the self, now thisrelationship is none other than the one that establishes the step between "I had this experience" where the concept of experience refers to what was experiencedover there outside to the reference to the experience already lived internal to the subject, already acquired, that process makes theintricacy and it is the one that explainsthat way there is that sieve that between the individual and the social, translates the processes ofinternalization and ofexternalization of thoseinternalization, there is a step between these twoareas a communicating vessel, but are functionally relatively independent, one issynchronous the otherdiachronic, thislast shapes the culture or the cultural in thephenomenology of the self,it is less permeated by the social world, hasfurther selective processes isfurther active with respect to what has been experienced because it chooses the relevant and significant experiences tothrough of onerelationship in betweenretention andevocation of the experiences lived.
Therelationship self/social does not have that cumulative depth it isfurther snapshot, further playful, further random andit is exposed to a process of mutual permeability is current and continually changing, which is why the selfit is in continuoustransformation, one thing isdry that remains the same since yourchildhood untilhis adulthood and a very different thing is your self, which makes up your culture, your acquired experience, that is, the person you are now is not from the point of view ofphenomenology From the self, the same person you were in Cuba, however, from the point of view of the self, yes.
Now, to the extent that experience and heritage make up an accumulation that is cultural as opposed to the otherarea that makes up the socialphenomenology of that self is already the cultural, thetheorization culture must begin withcomprehension phenomenological of the specificitiesphenomenological of the self in thisarea, now another one is missingarea, the third that is as relevant as the other two and thatinteract with them, which is theperception of the self, this third explains aarea functional distinct from consciousness, perceptions and representations.
When we talk about consciousness, we talk about arelationship extrinsic That is to say, one thing is what is reflected in consciousness and another is what that reflection reflects the problem of the sign, one thing is thesofa and anotherperception of thesofa on the retina, the sign denotes the object, encodes it, but it is not the object even though it resemblesThe when is icon, thePhotography of thesofa looks likesofa but it's not himsofa, is its sign, in the same way consciousness, Derrida does not say it that way but he does say that when we perceive ourselves in consciousness we enter intorelationship with the first form of the sign, consciousness has thatseparation what we have in thesemiotics between the sign and the object, between the reflection and the reflected, theself-perception not of the self, for onereason simple the self when self-perceives self-perceives thatit is doing, that is, enterscontact with identity, the process oftraining of identity and this differentiates theself-perception of the selfself-perception of consciousness.
Therelationship between consciousness and the conscious speaks of twoelasticities that refer to each other,self-perception of the self and what it reflects does not speak of a thing that isextrinsic but of something thatit is the muterelationship involved in a continuous process oftraining. that is to say,we self perceive the process of making us form our own identity, once we understand this we must move on to the development of atheory aboutas they articulate whatsymbolic In the universephenomenological of the self, therelationship the self and thesymbolic
Now I'm going to get into theConnection epistemological, methodological andphenomenological that takes shape between thislast that I explained to you, mytheory phenomenological of the self with its threeareas, cumulativecultural, permeable and changing social, and configural self-perception, and the above
that I was talking to you about, that is, it is now about putting intoConnection metheory phenomenological of the self, with theanalysis where I define the structure as a relatively invariant stability and a dynamism of coming and going where the proceduresphenomenological They do not refer to theontology of the structure itself but to thesway same, that is, the same coming and going required for thecomprehension of a culture orphenomena cultural specific in a way of understanding them, comprehending them, reading them.
It is true that at times I have to move between social interactive examples of a situational type in parameters that could be understood from a notion of a Weberian ideal type, for example my theory of the self does not refer abstractly to a concrete subject or a concrete form of culture. but it can refer within a certain generality to anyone, myself or another, in that sense it is about the construction of an ideal type, of an abstracted logical figure separated from a concrete social being, but when I analyze situations of the social actor I am not talking about a specific social actor, at the moment when I am theorizing or theorizing philosophically or sociologically metatheoretically or logically and the moment when I am developing metaempirical problems where what is at stake are the methodological questions about what the Adequate or desirable modes of relationship and adequacy between understanding, interpretation and observation in traditional anthropology, sociology and ethnography, the idea that the ethnographer inscribes social facts, that is, what he brings to the page in the form of notes, has been presupposed. or of writing the lived experiences or observed facts, what are called the data of the observation, this conception, although to me the concept of inscription seems necessary in a much richer and more complex sense, in the way in which it has been understood as a mere record of the experience in some medium that retains and fixes it, but I am interested in the analysis of the inscription at all levels and moments of the analytical and phenomenological process of culture, the exegesis of the texts of culture and the relationship of textual forms.
There is a need to think about the inscriptions, let's call it that I move the concept ofinscription outside of mere registration, the moment of registration almostparadigmatic theinscription, ainscription is to write or fix on a subject athought immaterial but in the same way I consider that memory and cultural heritage function and work. when we are talking about processeshermeneutics fromobservation participant, understanding the participant observer as oneself associologist ethnographer but evenfurther ideal type even without us being thesociologist or theethnographer, in this case me, but in the mererelationship between subjects in social life when it comes to putting intorelationship asituation endogenous with aexogenous that is, the input of an observer who is notit is proposing a jobscientific but merelyit is putting inrelationship areinformation andobservation of onesituation social applies to the ideal typeabstracted where it is not specified if one speaks of thesociologist or theethnographer or if we talk about a social actor, what was previously the place occupied bytypification in the way we interpretively regularize the social worldpre interpreted those interpretations thatyes they go through what are the situations that are notfurther whatcumulus ofpre interpretations already made that cross the meaningcommon that defines thesituation It then becomes a problem ofinscription.
That is, the subjects who are in the situation bring with them previously given inscriptions about what the subjects with whom they enter into a relationship mean to them. This is planned in the following way, for example, a person who has lived for a long time in New York of Cuban origin. He has been in New York for thirty years and arrives in Havana, meets a group of young Cubans and is talking to them, at the moment in which that interaction occurs you cannot remove it as a situation in itself from the presignifications that young Cubans Those who have not lived thirty years in New York have and have previously asked themselves about what young Cubans who arrive to the island after thirty years living in New York mean to them. It is not possible to separate what that interaction means as a situation from the pre-meanings that These social actors have what that has previously meant to them, even when the new element at play has novelty and the social actors cannot refer in their heritage to previous experiences exactly or exclusively equal to the precise way of what they have in front of them in that is occurring in the specific situation, in any case the social actor resorts to a heritage that allows him to call his pre-typifications about situations of the same type or of the same type and put them to work at that moment in the way they interpret and understand what What do you have in front of you? I call this inscriptions.
In a sense that goesfurther there from the mere registration ormemorization how writing inscribes immaterial thought, I speak ofinscription to refer to thismodality of memory because they are inscriptions that social subjects bring about what the experiences that are presented to them in interactions andsituations len mean previously therefore it is not possible aobservation participant merely understood from the perspective of an observer whoit is In front of onereality that describes that reality as an objective data in therelationship Simply between language and reality, between thought and thing, between observer and observed, between subject and object, it is necessary to understand that the social world and experience precisely consists of putting intorelationship the novel elements of asituation with the elementsreinterpreted that cross thesituation itself in its heritage, on the one hand, in itsregistrations as much as those of the other in his presence.
Where you already realizethat way they enter the procedure therehermeneutic andphenomenological in theexegesis of cultural texts in this case are not textual forms that can be reduced to a textual framework that takes asparameter the text book,here it is necessary to work with the conceptethnographic oftextualization, that is, treating the non-textual as text, and constructing the text, the first thing is apractice reading the second isfurther that onepractice of reading is to deduce from thesituation the texts that make up it and construct its textuality as afreak textual to be able to read and interpret it.
The concept of reading replaces the concept of mereinterpretation understood as theinterpretation of a thing they tell me about which I form an idea or point of view in the traditional sense of interpretivism
And on the other hand, it is important to take into account theanalysis what I'm doingfurther recently about theconformation semantics Osemiological of the world of life, in my new book The enigmas of the groundwhere are these twochapters the enigmas of the ground and thecharacter pre interpreted fromexperience and the world, that is, it is important to understandthat way I'm making atheory that takes the squaresemiotic frompragmatic that reductive one in whichplaced thesemantics informational where everything ishad whatdiscern between the sender, the message and the receiver,
That is to say, I am returning to logic, to the origins of semiotic science, where the theory of the sign was still closely related to philosophical logical problems and this is of course a work that I am doing in relation to Peirce although the bases are in Peirce of course and I am doing a much more careful and attentive job to those elements although in Peirce he already had that philosophical logical basis, despite his classificationism of the types of signs, I am returning it to mere inferentiality, I am saying that there are signs wherever there is inference, it is the inference that defines the existence of signs, not the ontology of these in themselves, wherever there is inference, the relations of meaning are functioning meaningfully, the relations between signs and objects appear, the signs replace to the objects or they generate each other as moments of each other, dialectically they originate, what interests me here when returning the sign to inferentiality, is to understand the semiotic organization of the life world and the everyday life in which they are where the social actors are situated and where the participant observer is also situated, of course, in sociology, anthropology and ethnography, already at a methodological level.
by understanding the world of lifesemiologically we nourish, we fillencodings thecomprehension of social experiences and social groups, interactions and situations bothtypical ideals, likeempirical concrete in theanalysis of a culturespecific, we fill them withcoding.
The Self and the heritage
I am putting inrelationship this with metheory of self and heritage, and I am doing it because the concept of heritage plays a very important place not only in face-to-face relationships, which is where I have directed it.brought I, we know that the concept of heritage plays an important placealso in what Derrida calls the uttered audiences or theiteration, it analyzed based on writing, an absent audience, when we write we speak to another who does notit is in the presence of usit is absent, refers to an absence pronounced by the sender of a message that does notit is in face-to-face contact with the recipient of that message, within the framesemantic pragmatic reductive traditional, informational.
What I want to say isalso in the framesemiotic traditional reductive is the heritage inlast instance of both the one who issues the message and the one who interprets it, the one that allowsthe decodingIn fact, in any case it is the heritage that gives theparameters frominterpretation and thecoding of the elementsisotopics of the message, that is, those elements that establish congruencesemantics and they dolegible the message is thesynthesis of what is encoded in that message.
Let's get it out of that boxsemiotic reductive and bring it to an indeterminate social space, that is, marked and defined by day and night, by the passage of the daily experience in whichsituates both our lives,as withsituates also field work at an observational level in culture, the mere daily life in which both we andsociologists doing the work ofcomprehension of society around social actorstypical ideals orempirical specifics likealso are taking place field work observations.
Bothparameters everyday life and field work work within thelogic of day and night that establishes whether apragmatic but not reductive, not reduced to sender, message, receiver, it is anotherpragmatic which is none other than that of the course of experience, that of what we do or stop doing, that ofthe how elucidations and interpretations participate in the way wewe elucidate what we experience in what we do or fail to do, both in the soliloquymonologic of the individual person as well as in communications and intersubjective relationships, andas participates in what they tell us or stop telling us in the sense that they do to us or stop us from doing what others tell us in relationshipsintersubjective of muteelucidation andexplanation in what we do or don't do.
That is to say, it is apragmatic also but whatit is understood dissolved in the course between theday and the night whereplace the world of life and the intramundane horizon.
Because the intramundane horizon? because it is the one that comes to fill that mere sense of the world of life not understoodstill like apractice phenomenological andhermeneutically woven by a fabric that is what I am analyzing, we already know that my book, the correlation of the world goesfurther there
It goes a lotfurther there The correlation of the worldwhy searchalso theproduction of world effects in the text something that I developthere in a very rich and complex way, which has implications for thistheory semiotics of the world of life and for theanalysis properlysemiotic of textual forms where the worlds are effects of the texts
my goal is to give you a maplogical whatsituates the passage from one problem to another
When I was talking to you about connecting with my theory of the self and the heritage I was referring to it, that is, once we are working with the self and the heritage from the perspective of a subject that is not a concrete subject, we can bring that to the situation. typical ideal of those social actors where the interpretive situations occur that make up both the world of the mere actors acting and interacting interpretively in front of their preinterpretations in the social world as well as the participant observer who is doing a reading, an exegesis, an enactment. relationship of an observation and a participation in the analysis of a specific cultural phenomenon, social cultural groups, specific cultural forms, then how do I make these two planes work, the phenomenology of the self, which is a general theory of the self that seemed to apply only to what The individual acquires a value here not beyond the individual because he continues to work from the microrelationship of an interaction between a self and the social, but he can move towards the analysis of how those relationships occur between social situations that remain abstract for understanding or Moving between the logical model and concrete social experience, I wanted to give you these elements because I believe they have value and importance in what we are discussing.
From the moment thesituation social itselfit is she crossed defined in what she is byreinterpretations and we understand that what makes the situation is therelationship between what is new in it and what isit is predefined by thepreinterpretations we arrive atconclusion That thehermeneutics fromobservation participant does not referonly a interpret but to interpret interpretations, that is, we must arrive at the meanings and meanings that social subjects assign to the experience, not merely to theinterpretation that we are going to make of what we have seen understood as arelationship between a mere observer and a mere what is observed, we must work withphenomenology and thehermeneutics so that thereadequacy here the concept ofadequacy I use italso in a senseepistemological but not from analytical philosophy but fromhermeneutics, that is, it ishere theadequacy?. It is the moderate, ponderable way of dealing or dealing as much as possible with the truth, we arefurther close to the possibility of approaching in a somewhat moderate wayfurther accurate to what the culture is like in ourinterpretation andexegesis of her, in ourcomprehension of thephenomena cultural when we work with these adaptations, we arefurther in the ability to approachas are thephenomena cultural that when we start from aparameter merely observationalempirical that transports the binomials to the social worldlogical of observer/observed, language/reality, thought/thing that structure not only thepositivism logical and analytical philosophy derived from it, with its current forms but in general structure the entire problemmethodological fromobservation participant in the social sciences, that is, they structure it in a limited and narrow way, all of this has to betheorized, reworked, as I am doing it.
We have already seen the structure. Here I need to place the problem of the interpretant and the definitive role it plays at a methodological level through a semiotics expanded to the everyday social world where the heritage plays the necessary place to understand the codification of that world without entering into a pragmatics. reductive but located in the horizon of the ideal-typical social experience analyzed, or of the participant observational experience of social science, the place of the interpretant here is crucial. Let us remember what we analyzed in counterpoints when we asked ourselves if the interpretant is a function, a component of the sign from the functional point of view isolated from a social other or from a for someone, or if it requires an other from someone who interprets and I told you that this ambivalence is in Peirce and that I do not see it as a limitation but as one of its richest moments because it is that ambivalence that allows us to place the sign problem in the logical inferential field, it allows us to release the power of the interpretant that is always in the place of the object but that is not always a function of the sign with respect to the object but it can be another sign or a someone, that is the key, being able to be another sign or a someone opens us to the possibility that what completes the meaning of what we interpret is the relationship between that sign. and another sign that helps its translation, the example of the Wayues and the rockers, the way I make it clear that a sign that apparently is not part of the endogenous dynamics of a specific cultural group can be the one that helps the understanding of the other. , we had seen it before when I told you that the interpretant is nothing other than the way in which asking about tourism, for example in Old Havana, from the perspective of the restaurateurs, offers a way of reading the tourism text in a way that only reading it through Through the restoration process it is possible to reach it. I havethere as work with the interpreter,
That is to say, we do not arrive at the data in the same way if our interpretant is the process ofrestoration at the time of reading thefreak of tourism that if we try to understand thefreak of tourismdirectly sin tomar como su interpretante from the trial ofrestoration, here el interpretante no es un mero capricho, no sechoose therestoration as ifcould choose anything else on a surreal level to interpret tourism, you have to choose something related to something evenhermeneutically and inferentially connected at the levellogical to what we are going to study in the case ofhey the interpretant is nothing other than theculture Hispanic who has arepresentation of thatculture wayuu because it is going to that other sign that allows uselucidate the first in this case thebilingualism He already brings it inrelationship endogenous exogenous we realize that what from one perspective isexogenous from another it appears reflected within thesetting same asendogenous.
I am going to continuehere With the topic of structure, I think there are some issues that I told you in counterpoints and that I now corroborate again. I even think that the interesting thing was that you never fully understood when I told you that Itheorized the structure, youHe said that I didmoving further there fromdichotomy to which echo refers to structuralismontological and operational structuralism, in your next comment you told me that myconception of the structure was operational, and is adichotomy that we have adoptedyou and I am legendaryit is between thefurther lucid about structuralism that echoes, if you read withprecision in The correlation of interpretative world and structure in thetheory postmodern cultural, you will see that there what I do is say that I movefurther there of these twodichotomies
and I explain it quickly with this I am not going to avoid what I said before that the structuresare there and they are inescapable, whether they exist or do not exist is not so important to me although I am also going to talk about it, starting from the fact that I ask what is astructure? Which It's their nature? and I answer that the structure as a concept participates in the samedichotomies of notions that are dual, that is, that are half representational and half object ofrepresentation, this type ofphenomena which occurs for example in thenotion of perspective.
When one sees a layout of a room made in an architectural drawing one can perceive that thelines drawn on the map seem to go towards depth and imitate the impressions of depth in which they move for the purposes of arepresentation in the planeimages of thelines that in the three-dimensional plane they go towards depth but if you analyze the plane it is actually aillusion, theline that seems to go towards the depth, it does not go towards the depth, it is just a diagonal, which gives theillusion ofdepth are the perpendicular and the horizontal, which are drawn at the end of thatline diagonal, so it is aillusion deep than by mimesismock the impressions that theperception fromdepth in three-dimensionality
Let's imagine aroom in which we see aline that goes from us to the door at the back we see it in depth but if we take it to a plane, the perspective belongs to the formal model that explains that such adistribution of thelines on a planebeginning depth, is it a formal model of that reality or is it asmimesis contains something of the depth of that reality, if we analyzeperceptually therelationship between perception and what is perceived we are going to see that we have thatdichotomy throughout. That is to say, perception perceives what is perceived as something perceived, one thing is theperception and another what is perceived, but at the same timeperception complete perceived, there is a moment in which it does not differentiate, to be able to perceive whatit is being seen, asofa, a freezer, a door, a perspective in theroom, to be able to see it for what it is initself you have to override the fact that one thing is theperception and another what was perceived
Perspective works in the same way, the modellogical that in the drawing of the plane abstracts theroom we cannotice in theroom itself without drawing it, that is, if we look at theroom, in its depth we abstract the drawinglogical of the planeabstrayendo in it without drawing it, therefore there is in the very concept of perspective a duplicity or duality that causes it to be distributed between halfrepresentation half reality, I mention the case of these characters from theantiquity Greek half man half animal, the centaurs
I say that perspective is like a centaur that is half representation and half reality and therefore is a symbolism, and I say that the structure belongs to the same species, I give several examples of logical figures of the same type, this is related despite being of a different nature with what Peirce called the iconic sign, it is a type of sign that seems to contain components of the object, its qualities in the sign itself, it is not like smoke, a sign that replaces its object, fire, like For example, the child who jumps out of bed making the sound of the helicopter by moving his arms like propellers, the example of echo, is a representation of a helicopter but the sign itself does not replace it, it imitates it, it contains elements that repeat the helicopter , iconographic signs are examples of this analogism, the same analogical representation contains that principle of repeating in the sign qualities of the object to the point that the sign seems to be a reflection of the object or a repetition of it, the structure has that duplicity as much as it does. has the perspective, she is a type of centaur and as such I say that she belongs to the symbolic and must be retheorized from a symbolism, this refers to the fact that it is a structure in its ontology separating it from both the merely formal and the merely ontological
the very question about what she is tothat species belongs?which Is your class? How to classify it? Withinthat like themodality she is indexed", classified?, she is the type ofsymbols and I theorize itsymbolically, and I say it must therefore be studied and understoodthrough of figures of thelanguage what we considerprecisely like figures, figurative languages, I am not saying that the structure is ametaphor or that it is exactly a trope, it is not exactly a trope but in some way it is alanguage figured
Not all forms of the trope aredystopian, it is true that themetaphor yes, I eat meatCanyon ofgongora for example, it isa dislocation, while a canon is never of flesh and a flesh is never the canon, however, there are within figurative languages some figures that are notdystopian or disjunctives, for example metonymy, it can function as a trope from the moment youknow just a fragment of a whole thatit is absent from your perception that you have to evoke and imagine but it does not mean that it isdystopian If it is a fragment or a texture, it refers you to the whole to which it belongs, therefore it is notdystopian therelationship to the referent
The same happens with thesynecdocheFor example, thevehicles At commercial vehicle sales fairs, there are serial stands where objectsare exposed to be shown offit is promoting because they are going to enter the market, you see it situated within a spatiality, if you bring thecodes exhibitions ofthe fair from cars to a museum, you alter thecoding that the museum space has, because a museum is supposed to present from a neutrality, never like a fair, if you bring a fair way of presenting, if you bring theimpression synecdochic of a space that has entered another
for example of a very good dutch artist alfred venezomer, you come walking inside a very modern museum with glass walls from whereknow fragments of the external architecture of the museum, the viewer sees that thearchitecture of the museum there is a moment when it is transformed into a church bell tower, the architecture intervened, it is thedisturbance of a sense of a space with thecoding from another space, in both cases we have a trope but they are notdystopians, I say that structure and perspective are examples that share that thingsymbolic to have a part of it thatbelongs to what is represented and another to what is representational and that have that dualism, they are figuressymbolic, symbolisms notdystopians of certain figurative languages
you will see soas I explain that the substitutive principle that characterizes the interpretant and let us rememberhere in peirce that the interpretant can be afunction of the sign, something locatable in its own materiality, like thecocky on the eaves indicating theaddress of the wind,there isfunction, but requiresalso of someone who is interpreted by the peasant who looks towards his eaves, but let us not forget that Peircealso spoke of another sign that helps the peasant deduce theaddress of the wind, is not the case but there are plenty of examples, especially inlanguage alphabetical
What clarifies that this sign is an interpretant of its object is resolved by another sign that helps itscomprehension, leaving the elemental or microcrocopic signs, towards the interpretant in the examples that I gave you, the Hispanic culture as an interpretant of the culturewayuu or the process ofrestoration as an interpreter of tourism in old havana, there you have another sign that helps to interpret the sign thatit is inquestion.
Heinterpreting moves betweenfunction, for a someone and atranslation, this makes it another sign,function the sign itself, and for someone it is the person, for whom it works in that way.manner, but let us not forget that the interpretant is above all inference, and I would like to say that it is precisely that the interpretant is inference that allows us to seeas works atrelationship with the structure, theinterpreting preserves and works with that duality and allows movementinside fromdimension symbolic of the structure, which the interpretant himself makes possible.
I just wanted to tell you that I manage to move outside the operational dichotomyontology, but this does not mean denying them, it is rather about coming and going, not staying on one side or the other, but moving between them, we are not going to ossify any of the moments, we are going to understand that it is dual and we are going to move among them.
Here the inferencecarry thisdichotomy that you have placed with respect to quine and the first and second qualities a kind of return, it is verydifficult not to tell you impossible to deny there signs even in the mere qualities, I amPersian in it, the same one who does notthere would be able to think in qualities without signs, the thought itself is a sign, we think in signs a thought is a sign of another thought, because it is only possiblethrough of inference and the inference is from cover to cover entirelymeans, if there is inferenceover there There is a sign, even when it is the inference that makes the sign in the same way that it is the reading that makes the text.
Culture and language sciences: Criticism of observational and natural sciences
I want to move nowfurther towards what you said in your audios
I want to clarify several points that remain to be deepened. There is a point on which you insist thatstill you need to go deeperfurther so that you understandwhich are the implications of mycriticism to thetransposition of theparameter from the natural sciences to the social sciences, whichtransposition mechanics Extreme organicism, the mere provision of a medicine, is objectionable, we agree, but it is not simply a matter of stating that a procedure from natural and exact sciences cannot be mechanically transposed to the cultural and social sciences, the problem isfurther rich and complex, and I am going to illustrate it to you in a verytight, I will not deny that the figure that firstOpened this debate was schutz in itsdiscussion with pareto, that the social sciences must be governed by themselves and dispense with the natural sciences, I am going to delve into why they are not theparameter.
Let's see it So, the problem ofobservation, the example that Iponies of cats is a good example of an exact procedure in natural sciences,there We have how an accuracy experiment operates in natural sciences. It is an excellent example, what can that experiment be used for? Good for veterinary medicine, once thatconclusion If you have it, you can advance achievements in recovering the eyesight of cats, in operationssurgical incompression onvision in cats andfurther there thevision in general that can be useful to man at the leveldoctor, in the field ofsurgeries ocular, I do not know if it has had consequences or not when transferred to the human, but in any case the natural sciences in these types of variables can only arrive at control relationships with reality, what use can this be for man? intervene and control through operationssurgical or knowledgehorny or eyepieces, to control thevision, which is therelationship with the reality of thatconclusion scientific?, theconclusion does not offer a thought about the reality to which it refers when concluding one or another result about thevision of cats, of whatover there withconcluded we don't get aelaboration or a development of abstract thought which brings tocollation These are data that have results in your ability to control aarea partial of reality, that experiment will never be concluded, for example,as relate interms philosophical and from thought the sensitive and the perceptive, we cannot, through the experiment with cats, deduceas are mutually related andas the sensitive and the perceptive pass through one into the other, why?, because the way in which it intervenesthere the experiment, theportion of reality with which he plays and which he controls in its variables does not abstract in the real components that allow deducinglogically thetraining of a figure of knowledge that allows us to know what is real, not to control it but to think about it, toget absorbed in thoughts, to generate new figureslogical.
I don'tread what you tell me about quine del stimulos meanings, but I have essays in which I reach theconclusion that man integratesperception with which theperception perceives that it tends not to separate that perceiving is one thing and what it perceives is another, but rather it tends to integrate it because it integrates it? Because when we look at a reality thatit is In front of our eyes we integrate what we perceive with what is perceived? I ask, can we separate this integration that we make from the meaning that things make to us? Yes or no? Is it completely isolable as an entirely fact?physicist and devoid of relations of meaning, the fact that knowing that one thing is the sign and another its object, the fact thatknowing it I can't at the moment of looking at my refrigerator see that I see the refrigerator and see the refrigerator that I see?
It can be understood thatfull when we know that there are two thingsperception and what she perceived as a mere factphysicist?, do you consider that there is an ocular fact that says that there is a point of theoptics in which the perceptual apparatus and the reflections of the perceived object are united to the point that it can be demonstrated as a merely factphysicist when we know completely wellphysical What are two separate things?there would be that affirming how cyberspace wants to affirm something intermediate between us and reality, that there is a middle point between the perceptual apparatus and what is perceived that integrates one reality, as theesoteric whenthey believed in ghosts and apparitions like in Maria Teresa of Calcutta who wasappeared to believers?
there would be than to affirm that there is an intermediate reality betweenperception and what was perceivedit is at a midpointesoteric?, what is it that makes theperception and what is perceived in oursensation What we see is integrated? Why is it integrated? Where is it integrated?you think that this can be solved with a variable merelyphysical?, undoubtedly not, it is integrated because it makes sense to us, we have aresignification from the refrigerator, from it we obtain food, it means something to us previously, therefore, the moment we see it, seeing that we see it and seeing what we see is meaningless, as much as the refrigerator, the emotional world, makes sense to us. , the sensible world and the worldphysicist they integrate
Derride itHe said clearly in theiranalysis about light and he was not the first, Hegel knew how to see therelationship of light with the firsttraining From the state of our interiority, we cannot separate the fact that we see with the fact that we have consciousness, but not in the sense that having consciousness is a reflectionphysiological from the fact that we see, we cannot separate it because we must understand how the fact that we see happenssemantically to theconformation idealized look at your idealized of what derrida calls the ground of our inner world
we have an inner world,monadic leibniziano, in which the meanings related to the meaning that things make to us cannot be separated, that is, how we understand them from the point of view of language,semantic, given by the meanings that things mean to us from the literal senses merelysemantics, touch, sight,ear, smell, this is something that Barthes analyzes in hisanalysis of the look when he asks when the soul arises? and it responds when the baby's gaze arises
And inthat moment exactly we can say that a babyfurther there After discovering that moving the rug brings the object closer, do you begin to look at the object? and to be betweenhe and the object a look?, whenhe can synthesize everything that means having corroborated that by lifting the rug the object reaches his hand, all that movement can be synthesized in the meanings that the objects give it, just whenhe acquires a sense of objectsfurther there of control andfunction, just whenreinterpreted the world and it becomes sensitive, the gaze arises,alive, before looking at the see merelyphysiologically, before having a look that from the outside we see with a soul and a sensitivity, alreadyhe saw, butsaw without seeing, that is, what you see does not see what you see, to see what you see you have to have arelationship temporal with the fact that he sees in which the meanings and meanings that the subject hasreframed andpre interpreted.
I don't know if thisit is related to thestimuli meaning of quine, but I am expanding to the field in which you have wanted to place thediscussion metheory about himcharacter pre interpreted of experience and the world, what I want to tell youhere is that thedistinction between thinking about reality and controlling reality is not at allnegligible, the natural sciences help us with ways of relating to portions or fragments of reality through control but they do not allow us to think about that reality, a mereconclusion experimental biology or physics does not allow us to understand that the gaze requires meaning because these cannot be verified throughthrough of a variableoptics or reactivates on an exact date onas an organism responds to astimulus, it requires atheory that abstracts a figurelogic through a thought, which thinks with thelogic, which does not use thelogic forabstract variables to control the real but to produce thought about the real
Here whichit is At stake when we move from the natural sciences to the cultural or social sciences is how we know ourselves as a culture, as a society, and whatit is raisedhere For the social sciences it is knowing ourselves and whatit is demonstrated in the applications that have been made transferring natural sciences to the social sciences is that bringing the way observational data works in the natural experimental sciences to the social sciences has resulted in monstrous deformations in therepresentation and in thecomprehension of the cultures
There you have the museum of indigenous cultures treated as laboratory specimens as if they were rats or cats exposed to laboratory experiments, you have it in the pathetic effect produced by the majority of anthropology books that were guided by that type of transposition of the exact sciences to the human ones that Clifford Geertz called the crimes of the natural sciences, and in this I agree with him, when transposing parameters of the natural sciences to the social sciences you study man as if he were a mouse, and you cannot understand to cultures as if they were specimens, you cannot understand a culture based on mere data, let's see it in the case of a structuralist, precisely where the transposition fails is where we want to understand a culture, where we paradoxically want the representation or interpretation that we are going to offer of a cultural or human group is at least moderately, moderately, modestly, without ambitions, close, comprehensive, hermeneutically speaking adequate to what that culture is, Levis Strauss who started from structuralist principles and tried to transpose them to the social sciences parameters of linguistics still proceeded with too many precisely positive empirical conventions about what data is and about the level of considerations that must be taken with the natural sciences in the study of culture and society, and precisely for this reason despite From the contributions he made and the things he managed to advance, the representations that we obtain in his books about the cultures represented are not appropriate to those cultures, it is enough to have walked, to have moved, to have interacted with southern Indians, it is enough to take a trip to Merida in the Andes, having visited the Andean indigenous ceramic markets, having bought in the weaving markets, having walked among southern Indians, and seeing what they are like and what their world means, it is not necessary to have a very careful work of ethnography or anthropology, it is enough to have moved between these cultures to which Levis Strauss refers without being realistic, and without believing too much that arepresentation can faithfully represent a reality, reach the immediateconclusion that the image representationallyconsiders What Levi Strauss' books offer a reader about what those cultures are isdistorted, it is false,euphemistic, monstrous, we can say that the cultures of southern Brazilnatives Are they like Levis Strauss represents them?only way to hold itI would be not knowing them, it is enough to know them a little to immediately reach theconclusion that they do not matchrepresentation and what is represented, and why do they not coincide? Precisely because even though he was the first to understand that culture must be studied atthrough of the language, and applying modelslinguistic, left too much budget transfersempirical whatthey try to apply to social and cultural sciencesparameters of the natural and exact sciences interms of dates and interms observational, becausestill The human being was treated too much like a dataexperiment as observational data.
The problem of observation is crucial here, that is, if we think in terms of participant observation that understanding a reality is observing it perceptually, excuse me, I am here now walking around my house and seeing objects, undoubtedly all these objects that I am seeing. , a phone, a sofa on which I sit, a bed on which I sleep, a glass in which I drink coffee, have a meaning for me that I have attributed to them, if we bring here a person who does not know my house and we tell him to walk through it and try to interpret it, undoubtedly he does not have the emotional relationship that I have with the objects that surround me, if that person wants to get a relatively faithful image, no longer faithful if we are not representationalists but relatively adequate to hermeneutic level between what he is going to say about my house and what my house is, he cannot make a mere description of what he is seeing at a physiological level, he cannot make an indexed classification in which he distributes how many Carmelite objects there are in my house and how they are located and conclude that the Carmelite objects in my house are made of leather and are in low places, or that the container elements tend to be at a certain height, he can try to classify what he sees descriptively, no matter how much he classifies it. It will never be able to hermeneutically adapt to the world in which I live and to what those objects mean to me in terms of the pre-meanings that I have given in my experience to those objects, it is not possible through mere description as inscribed data, As a record, as you said, it is not possible when the immediate data obtained is transposed from the natural sciences, mere descriptive observation, the same one that is used to classify botanical objects, to conclude on the visual experience of cats. For any natural experiment, the observational description of data that is taken as something first-hand and then corroborated is used.according to stimuli and answers, thatprocedure observational with respect to reality offers with respect to aportion of reality only variables to partially establish arelationship of control over that reality, but not to understand it, not to understand its senses and meanings, not to adapt arepresentation to a cultural and social experience, imbued with relationships of meaning, we must review what data is, we must review what it isobservation, understand that in social and cultural sciences it is no longer possible from the sameperception work with the naive principle ofclassification fromdescriptionGeertz called it theattention, fromattention fromattention, that is, the first data is merely descriptive observational, I see acasserole in my kitchen, how manycasseroles Is there in Abdel's kitchen?description, second level, classify that description, try to give it an order,index, third level try to draw comparative conclusions based on the objects seen, nor in the firstattention first degree merely record of data, elements in thecontiguity, not even in the second one that serves theattention not even in the third one that serves theattention fromattention nicecomprehension ofnone type because it has not worked with senses or meanings.
On one occasion we already talked about the fact that the concept of meaning is debatable, we agree on that, I do not work with the concept of meanings, I work with the concept of significance, that is, what is made relevant to us via meanings of course, but not It is the meaning as something enclosable in this question that you are dealing with with whom of the untranslatability or incorrespondence between the language and the object, it is not the meaning as an entity that must be enclosed that contains it, it is what becomes relevant, it must be working with significances, and these require access to the preinterpreted world, we must get to how individuals assign meanings and meanings to their experiences, how the world is preinterpreted, it is not enough to ask a subject how you interpret your experience, what meanings or senses you give to those objects, because what it does is reflect the surface interaction between the observer and the observed, what it does is say, well it is true, the mere descriptive data does not allow me to understand, well let me then ask the subject of that world, but that also reflects your exogenous situation, your position in relation to that subject reflects that your interaction with him is superficial, to arrive at the meanings and meanings that the subject attributes to his experience, and above all to the preinterpreted characteristics that make up your intramundane world where things are woven by a semiosis, a hermeneusis and a fabric of senses, you have to abandon the naivety that observation is the way to understanding, this does not mean, returning to shutz in his relationship with Weber that it is not important at a methodological level for us to distinguish between subjective meanings and objective meanings, or that it is not important for us to go back and forth from observation to understanding, but not attributing scientific primacy to observation by him. fact that she keepsrelationship with theconception naivety that exact natural science has regarding the observed world
So returning to your great topic, that ofrelationship between thought and reality, language and reality,here whichit is At stake is that experimental natural sciences do not allow us to understand the cultural and social world simply because of theirtransposition is not thevia For the cultural and social sciences, it is not, theselatest must establish their ownparameters ofscientificity and thoseparameters are in theconformation linguistics of the senses and meanings that organizesemiologically what makes that world cultural and social, therefore the paradigm of scientificity must be thelinguistics.
In summary, I agree with what you tell me about Piaget and Habermas, inlast instance if there was any way to implementConnection cultural and social sciences with the natural sciences that does not start from the principle of takinglatest as a paradigm of scientificity for the former but rather to seekrelationship between both things in another way and to achieve between those two worlds something other than authorizing one with the other Iwould surprise because I don't know anythingSo butcould to result interestingmaybe piaget could having explored something in that sense, where notthis authorizing social and cultural science with the natural and supposedly exact but anothervia, othervia different something else look for the other wayrelationship interestingcould be open, and agree that habermas and piaget are our points of referenceConnection further important
Excuse me for being a little passionate, it's not so much about you, or about your references in analytical philosophy, but about how those paradigms have been transposed by other sociologists and anthropologists, the field of social sciences, it's thepassion ofcriticism to the results that have been obtained, but I am going to address another variety of topics
I would say that indeed we could affirm and deny the structure at the same time, never from my perspective denying that they are there and that they are inescapable, but we could from the logical point of view affirm and deny it but not in the sense of the structure itself but to the fact that a structure presupposes a cut and that cut may not be the one chosen as a parameter to evaluate a certain reality, this is seen epistemologically clear in the relationship between the given and the not given, just as in the colors the Red, yellow and blue are the primary colors with no other color in the color range can you obtain a yellow, a blue or a red, therefore everything starts from them and everything returns to them, therefore all the others Colors can be obtained, secondary, tertiary and quaternary, a carmelite uniting a red and an orange, or the latter with a red and a yellow, but you have no way of obtaining red, blue or yellow, in the same way the relationship between the given and what is not given is an epistemologically primary relationship, almost all logical problems in the philosophy of science require that distinction, what is given and what is not given, what comes to us predetermined and what is yet to be done, everything comes from it and returns to it. Everything, we could say that the structure is almost always on the side of the given, there is structure where things are predated, however when we think about the non-given, in that which is to be made by being founded by being generated, it seems that there are not so clearly structures there.
We speak Spanish or English and when we do so we produce new meanings and meanings, establishing new relationships between the components of the language not foreseen in the matrix structure from which that language is based. How these meanings and meanings are boiled in intersubjective relations of communication, we could to say that to a certain extent everything that is responsible for producing a new world of senses and meanings moves away from the structure and as such is subject to hermeneutics or hermeneusis, to interpretation and elucidation, it could be less subject to structural parameters. and at that moment affirm, as you say, your A is B and A is not B, affirm that there is no structure there or there is less of it or that it is not equally subject to the structure, but note that from the very moment in which those senses and meanings cannot be created without starting from the structure of the language in which that language is being articulated. The structure is there in the relationship between genesis and structure that Derrida refers to, that is, for there to be genesis there must be structure, precisely because the structure cannot be affirmed in the same way when the world is not given, we can reach the conclusion that it has an unmanifest component and this leads us to the problem of Levi Strauss, even of Lacan and psychoanalysis, which he attempted relate the structure with the unconscious, we speak in a grammar, the grammar of the language that has a structure but when we are speaking as you told me we are not aware of that grammar, to know it we have to study it therefore it is inaccessible to us in the way in what it presents itself to us when we deploy it as something logical that we study dissected or paralyzed in a map of its form, we could say that it remains unmanifest to the presence, as related to the predated, not always completely explicit, I would say yes. not that it is unconscious, but that it shares with the notion ofunconscious therelationship con lo unmanifiesto, las structures noare always completely manifest, they may be not given to presence, not given todemonstration a phenomenon of thefreak inquestion but ofany way what countshere and it is important is that it is not possible, it is notinescapable the fact that to understand a given cultural reality you have to work with them
The fact that theproduction of senses and meanings moves away from the structure in the field of language andimmersion in the space of semiosis, of hermeneusis in a spacedynamic in which the structure seemsin manifest does not allow us to ignore the fact thatit is over there and you have to work with it.
The examples I gave you of thewayúu, the punks, the rockers, old Havana, tourism andrestoration I think they are good examples. but I want to go deeper into this, you have made me adimension, you have made me notice something that alreadywe had spoken when you tell me that I am moving from the structural problems of structuralismlinguistic towards whatwe could call a structuralismphenomenological or a structuralityphenomenologicalYes, I actually told you that every time I amfurther interested in theproblematic that derrida discusseshusserl to therelationship in betweengenesis and structure, and this certainly moves us to a fieldphenomenological, it is true that I am moving from structuralitylinguistics towards structurality in a fieldphenomenological I accept that.
But I'm not doing it anyway and above allfurther important I'm doing it in a way thatit is giving tofret withfindings intheory cultural, insociology of the sensecommon and insociology of culture, not sodifficult to demonstrate, I have already demonstrated them in several books butstill I can prove themfurther, and in the future I will prove itfurther, an example is my studies of relevance.
The world of meaningcommon It is a little studied world, there is no highly developed knowledge, only Alfredprotection in thephenomenology social and greimas in thesemantics They approached the possibility ofsociology of the sensecommon, theethnometodologia interactionismsymbolic rub approach certain issues or aspects that may be ofinterest but they cannot be properly defined associology of the sensecommon.
The study of common sense, which is a specific area of sociological research, has had little development, the main disciples of Shutz have not gone in that direction, and neither have the majority of his followers, neither Goffman, Garfinkel, nor the disciples of Shutz, as are Peter Berger and Luckman, his closest collaborators and followers, have not gone in that direction, with the exception of Nathanson, the only one who really realized that common sense sociology is one of the most promising areas of the work. of shutz, and this disciple of shut did not go beyond writing a few texts and essays, he was not one of the most productive despite his assertiveness, so that there is no very complete development of the sociology of common sense other than that which I myself I am developing, I who neither knew Shutz, nor was I his disciple, I will not be the first, none of the great semioticians of the 20th century, fathers of what made modern semiotics become a specialized science, knew Peirce, nor was he his student nor his disciple and yet they established and founded semiotics without ever having been students, disciples or even acquaintances of Peirce, so I will not be the first to advance a science. I have chosen this tradition in an authentic and honest, true way. coincidence and above all because it is the one that takes advantage of the experience that I have acquired over the years as a theorist and as a person.
Relevance and intramundane phenomenological structure
I have reached theconclusion that relevance plays aperformance structural in theorganization of the sensecommon, right now I'm studying in this new book that I'm writing what I call theorganization semiological of the world of life,there I want to demonstrate important structural problems, I want to demonstrate theorganization semiological from the world of life, I'm trying to unite mytheory of the heritage with the problemssemantics of thecode unloading thecode fromconstruction pragmatic reductionism to which he was exposed both within thetheory general of theinformation and theentropy, of thetheories informational andsemiotics like inside the squaresemiological of the message, the sender and the receiver, I am bringing it to metheory cultural heritage within asociology of the sensecommon that works within the intramundane horizon and isover there where am I getting toconclusion of the place of relevance in thestructuring of the world of meaningcommon
In that step of thelinguistics and thesemiotics to thestructure phenomenological, or structuralismphenomenological, I don't see it as structuralism but as neostructuralism, of course.postestructural interms of phase or periods, heir of course to consciousnesspostestructural, but not a departure from structuralism, we saw it in counterpoints in a very deep theoretical discussion about the place thatjuice hepsychoanalysis in thedestruction of the structure, and regarding my distance from it, I do not advocate thedestruction of the structure but for itstheorization, restoration andreconstruction theoretical, andneostructuralism postestructural not a post-structuralism that destroys structure.
Metheory of the not fully developed relevance, I have developed some experiments and problemslogical regarding it but I want to delve deeper into the enigmas of the ground, I agree with you onthis definition What do you make of me as a thinker who is moving away from structuralism?linguistic al phenomenological, which does not mean thatabandonment structuralismlinguistic, I come and go and work with him, I move between one thing and the other.
If you read Levi Strauss you already know the main way in which the social sciences imagined applying to the study oranalysis cultural problemslinguistic as you realize it isthrough ofhomologies, homologies structural, there is nofurther there fromaffirmation merely descriptive that culture is a system of signs or theacceptance what is a systemsemiotic, there is nonone study nonetheory of the culture that has demonstratedthat mannerspecific you can pass on knowledgesemiotic disciplinary toanalysis cultural doingsemiotics of culture, as youHe saidAn effort is the Tartu school, but again, how does the Tartu school do it? By moving towards culture through the passage that fictional languages already make towards culture, that is, by extending the literary paradigm and the cinematographic paradigm to the study of non-cinematic and non-literary phenomena such as the study of mythology through the study of literature and cinematography, no, I am not referring to that step, I am referring to the step that is made from disciplinary sociology and from disciplinary anthropology, that is, to the questions that in sociology there have been the few that there have been, in reality, the little that there is towards sociology from semiotics, are steps that have been undertaken very defectively. limitedly more from semiology than from sociology, it is I who is studying in depth the tradition of social phenomenology, it is I who am reaching the conclusion that it is through Shutz's social phenomenology that sociology and semiotics can unite in a truly fruitful way, which destroys the truly effective possibility of developing a theory of culture and a sociology of culture that is truly semiotic, that continues to develop the semiotics program within sociology and not work on semiotics. by mere homologies as the tradition that from the social sciences has imagined transporting linguistics and semiology to the social sciences, the example of the interpretant is one of the way in which I work methodologically with the interpretant and the examples that I have given you are already demonstrations. concrete aspects of that step, of that bringing the linguistic and the semiological into cultural analysis in a way in which semiotics continues to be done by doing sociology and doing anthropology, and doing cultural theory, I am not going to deny that without the slightest doubt in a way very different from what Lotman anticipated, cultural anthropology is possible and very fruitful from the semiotics of art, without a doubt, we can carry out cultural analysis by analyzing art, this is out of the question, what we should not do is generalize a theory about culture by extensionalizing towards it the paradigm of art as the general paradigm of culture, but there is no doubt that we can do cultural anthropology by doing semiotics of art, however, there cultural anthropology is subordinated to the semiotics of art and it is undoubtedly that for countless reasons we need the work of cultural anthropology also outside the program of a semiotics of art, and it is precisely there where the richest and most complex diatribes are today of what cultural anthropology can be, I work on cultural anthropology regulated by sociology as I told you at the beginning of the course, distancing myself from ethnology, it is important to remember, we are doing well approaching problems of cultural anthropology from different angles, I don't know whether to expand on my theory of relevance, I gave you the example of novelty, such as relevance It replaces experience when the subject, when the social actor is presented with an unknown or novel world, that is, as it is relevance that examines the limit, of what common sense is willing to negotiate between the known world and the unexpected world or to be known, right there where relevance is presented in that extreme case in which the world is new and unknown as the only thing that survives from the experience, it is made explicit for the social actor that the ultimate limit that phenomenologically structures the intramundane structures. Common sense is regulated by relevance, this does not mean that studies of relevance have to be reduced to extreme cases that put us in front of learning circumstances such as getting to know a new city, learning a new language, talking to a person whose language you do not master, talking to a doctor about treatments you have to ask everything, from what erythromycin means, to why a pain reliever is called acetaminophen and not duralgin, and not tylanol or paracetamol, that is, you will be in a jargon that suits you. to demand to learn a world whose heritage you do not know from the moment you enter that learning process everything that you have pre-typed in the structure of your common sense in the pre-interpreted universe that was previously decisive in defining what organizes stable situations , regularized and typified, rituals and repetitive that organize common sense, organize our interpretation and elucidation of what we experienced, that even organize how we fix the experience and transform it from something lived and experienced out there to something that remains in a memory that integrates a heritage in the monologic soliloquy as well as in the elucidations of intersubjective relations, of a world in which the analysis of the situation itself to the analysis of the fixation of the experience and its evocation in memory, to the analysis of the intersubjectivity that It structures the social dialogue in which everything is preinterpreted and we must continually relate the actuality of a situation with the preinterpreted that passes through it in which relevance is performing the function, the regulatory position of structuring that world.
That is to say, in short, relevance is not understood in its structural place only in the face of learning situations such as learning the jargon of adoctor or meet a person who does not know your city and has to move around it and you are going to help them, you have the heritage and that person is not unlike a friend who has lived there and you share it withhe that collection and you can communicate withhe in theterms intramundane of a city whose places both know, when the universe in which you are going to immerse yourself is new or unknown, the typified components andpre meanings that organize situations and go through them are reduced to theMinimum and the heritage and experience do not offer everything that the subject needs to orient himself, justover there Relevance appears as the element that governs that accumulation as meaning.common manages to advance or retreat in the face of the unexpected, but that does not mean that its regulatory place is seen only in thenovel, sheit is integrated, and at the same time regulatingalso precisely what defines the stability of social interactions.
We could give many examples, interact with a slushy seller on the corner, give and receive an object, interact in any circumstancepre-typed by the subjects of theinteraction social, precisely what makes acervical relationships come intorelationship with each other, between subjects in social situations ofinteraction, which makes thatcompatible Oincompatible, accommodate or adapt theparameters collections of the actors ininteraction, whether forms of speech or extraverbal communications, is therelevance. It is she who of the universepreamp rendered plays the place of demonstrating the regulatory stability that organizes the rituality of that world, there is a relationship there between structure and rite, between structure andphenomenology, here relevance is a conceptphenomenologicalI hope with this I have expanded and at the same timediscerned a bitfurther aroundto structuralism andphenomenology.
Yes Alberto, onestructure interms phenomenological inside of metheory It is a relatively invariable regularity, that is, it is a ritual if we define the concept of ritual as something that is repeated in the same way over time, it is arepetition relatively invariable and stable ritual in aline diachronic andsynchronous, let's see it in the place thatplays the relevance in theorganization structural of the world of meaningcommon On an intramundane level, I think the doctor's example is quite clear.
When he is talking about medicine, not a doctor in an office who only sees your face when he examines you, he puts the device on your bronchial tubes or the spatula on your tongue, he takes your blood pressure, to give you an on-call examination, general medicine to know your health condition but one who comes to your house, a friend of your family, and they start talking, about things in life and suddenly they talk about pills, diseases, medical treatments about which you know little more than what through your experience you have come to know, you have come to have a certain knowledge you know how your body reacts to certain medications, you have learned names of medicines, universe or constellation of medicines the fact that you learned all of this It does not make you a doctor but it allows you to advise a friend, there is a range in which your heritage gives you enough knowledge to advise a friend in the face of certain symptoms and based on the knowledge that you have been acquiring, the field of experience that you have acquired, to what extent do the experience and heritage serve you in the common sense as you make use of them to advance or go backwards in making decisions linked to that experience and heritage?
Let's say recently I had a urinary infection repeatedly, it manifested itself in that I couldn't sleep, I needed to go to the bathroom every five minutes in a desperate way like when you are on the street and have nowhere to urinate, which didn't let me live. nor sleep, undoubtedly my body presented me with a set of symptoms that were new to me, the other element was that when I went to the bathroom it hurt when I urinated, look at how the relationship between the experience and the novelty works, the pain that I felt when Urinating was not completely unknown to me, here I am already relating a previous experience but that had not been associated with not being able to sleep and with not being able to lead a normal life, I knew, my body in its accumulated experience, the relationship that the He had an acervical record of previously interpreted pre-typifications about what a certain way of feeling pain when urinating meant to him, but He did not know the relationship between that type of pain, he knew the pain but the way he knew it had not presented itself to him along with a continuous desperate need to go to the bathroom that did not allow him as a body to carry out normal activity.
When that happens thecodes to which the bodyrecurs to put inrelationship the knowledge learned, the wealth, the accumulated experience, about pain in the penis when urinating was faced with new things,could Can I deal with such a type of pain when urinating? The experienceHe said yes, don't worry about this pain like thatcharacteristics similar is not unknown to you, you have experienced it other times and at the moment in which it has been presented to you it has been progressively disappearing, therefore it is circumstantial and controllable, that heritage meHe said to do,according to the experience ishould not being so attentive to the problem, IHe said that the times when Ithere was occurred were avoidable by me andcould live with itdisengaging, being in contact with it only at the time ofnative and thatwould go diluting in a fewdays, but that resource to which Irecurs in my collection this time it stopped working, when a new one was presentedsituation comeaccompanied of a desperate sequence it no longer worked for mereinterpretation and thetypification, then I was inrelationship ainformation coded by me butcame accompanied with a new problem,as me could guide me in the face of this new problem? My knowledge was not enough,had to seek help, that newinformation was the one thatforced to go to onedoctor, itnovel makes you act out of relevance
When the pertinent is presented in asituation unexpected comes to the fore and regulates what is done or leftof doing, going back or forward, but it doesn't work aloneSo relevance, works a lotfurther intricate in meanings and senses, the other example, the treatment that gave me two pills a day, one for sevendays the other forcatorce days, the sense ofbelonging of my mom and myaunt THEHe said nothey could be two pills and they arrived at theconclusion that in the recipedoctor should say o, they told me look for the o in the recipe, to them its meaningcommon arebelonging I told them that there had to be an o in the recipe, at that moment I didn't see the o, what I told my mom and myaunt it's notHe said or, the sensecommon ofbelonging He told them that I didn'tshould Acttaking the two treatmentsantibiotics at the same time without consulting thedoctor
If the prescription does not say or you have to ask the doctor, the relevance does not validate the step of moving forward to take the two antibiotics, on the contrary it validates going back even in the absence of the or, it is not pertinent to take the two antibiotics at the same time, Therefore, relevance says regress, not the two treatments at the same time, and in the absence of the o, it validates moving forward in another way, consulting a doctor, this is how relevance works within the rituals of daily life, it validates the step of consulting a specialist, here I am putting contingent examples that move within a plane that you really like to work on, which is the action/reaction, stimulus/response relationship and the behavior of the organism in response to it, which is not the type of examples with which I work, these problems, seeing them in an example more similar to yours, are validated in the same way for the structural place of relevance in the repetitive rituals of everyday life in a dialogue between speakers when we examine the acervical relationship between the two speakers, and we examine what relationship is established between the utterances spoken and the acervical correlations between the speakers.
If the heritage of the speakersmatch further or less, the course of what they speak takes one path and not another, depending onas the known are correlated,pre interpreted, and thepre-typed in front of itnovel involved in the development of the collections, if the collection is different in one sense or another, arelationship betweenpre-typed and the novelty that the content of the other cervo means to that collection.
When this occurs in speaking, the possible statement that the subject can give between what is said and what is left unsaid, one says something that brings new components to the other, who searches in his or her heritage and does not find the course they take. theutterances of theagainst speaker When responding, one begins to be guided from that moment by pertinences of the same type as those that made my mother and my brother decide.aunt I would look for one or in the prescription and if not, I would have to look for a specialist.
The interesting thing is that as I got closer to thedoctor ashad betterlightning you the ophenomena of the same type as that of the or occur in therelationship between speakers in the course they take or stop taking the utterances and thecounter enunciation analyzed from the point of view of acervical correlations between phrase exchangers, in the same way relevance regulates structurally at the levelphenomenological heperformance of social actors in situational interactions. I hope with this I have better illustrated what is the place that structurallyplays to levelphenomenological in the intramundane structure of meaningcommon the relevance, which makes it structural, the place it plays in the stability of the world of meaningcommon, it is she who regulates therepetition and therelationship between variability and invariability, in that which in the world of meaningcommon establishes therelationship in betweenhabits, acquired repetitions and elementsnovel and unexpected by thesituation between the interactants, play a placestructural in the stability of rituals, regulatesrelationship between invariability and variability in theperformance of social actors.
I'm going to expand a littlefurther In the implications of all this that I have told you, I am going to give you an examplestill further intricate, examples aboutas theobservation of a world based on itsperception The naturalist does not understand that world, neither merely describing it as an external observer nor trying to involve the components of observation and participation in a narrative.descriptive participatoria.
On the other hand, therelationship what levis straussdeal to establish between considerations of structural elements byhomology to thelinguistics and elements related to social data coming from theobservation or arrived from therevision of archival material andhistoric, whichhe called historic, neither of the two procedures is correct interms representations between language and the world, betweenrepresentation and reality when that reality is a cultural and social reality, it is not possible to adapt in a moderate waylow Without being ambitious, honestly and humbly moderate to a given cultural reality that we are analyzing, theorizing or studying, it is not possible to understand it if we do not start from one side that we have to understand.as These individuals mean and give meaning to their world, if we do not access the possibility that accessing those senses and those meanings is not only and never predominantly through thevia of a mereinteraction of surface between thecharacter exogenous of a question and the answer we can obtain to that question from that observer and thathe or what was observed.
Therefore neither the interview nor thequestionnaire, neither the question, nor any way to get past theobservation when doingparticipant to the observed or studied or to the members of the cultural or social group that we are analyzing or of thefreak cultural inquestion to be understood,none transit fromposition exogenous a position endogenous solves theadequacy hermeneutics.
Three areas of science education
Theeducation hermeneutics has to be resolved firsttheoretical in this case I, one whoit is doingtheory cultural, sociology or cultural anthropologymetaphorical to ittheoretical, of whattheoretical to itmetaempirical to the concreteempirical whatI would be ya latheorization culture ofphenomena whether it is material culture, visual culture or immaterial culture or cultural meaningsspecific that make up the systemsemiotic of a culture,adequacy is not possible without exploring ways to match thecomprehension phenomenological of a world with itscomprehension hermeneutics, a worldphenomenological empirical that has certaincharacteristics when we abstract itphenomenologically must contain acomprehension hermeneutics, without thislast theobjectification phenomenological no it is complete and conversely, now it isnecessary that thatphenomenology and thathermeneutics be the one that puts us in contact with the universepre interpreted andpre-typed that organizes the intramundanity of that world in which subjects attribute senses and meanings to their experiences, again not meanings, in which things are to themfurther the least relevantaccording to thesignificant.
However, it cannot be excluded fromthere the fact that theposition that you occupy astheoretical, asscientific and as an observer,it is also meaning,pre-typed andreinterpreted for that cultural and social group, I return to a previous point in which it is necessary to know that this works in the same way for the caseempirical concrete, that is, theimmersion in a cultural group, for the ideal type case, where it is not aimmersion in a specific cultural group but theconsideration of a social actorabstracted of onesituation concrete cultural, and for the social science observer, theparameter It must work in all three cases, if it works in one and does not work in the other two, it will not work.it is solved the problem, it has to work in the ideal type, in theanalysis observational that is, theposition of thescientific social and has to function in the intraworld, in the concrete experience in the face of that social worldliness.
Now, when observing a semiologically organized social intramundanity within a world of common sense, we cannot exclude that we as scientists are also part of common sense and we establish a common sense relationship with social actors, whether typical ideals, whether they refer to the mere metatheory of cultural analysis in social sciences, or refer to that intramundanity of concrete situational interactions that we are analyzing, therefore if in a social situation of mere interaction between the exogenous and the endogenous in which the development of a scientific investigation is not yet proposed social but it is merely a matter of relating two situations, one endogenous and the other exogenous to each other, it is not possible to relate reciprocal observational positions between social actors in interaction situations without a social science question being mediated without the The same question that is posed to us in social science is also posed to us in the analysis of the endogenous/exogenous observer/observed position in that intramundane situation in which there are no social science questions, it has to work the same for the ideal typical case that examines the social interactive situation and for the empirical case of social scientific research in which intramundane immersion occurs in which acervical correlates are put into relationship between the social scientist and the culture with which he is working, this implies that the inscriptions that occur in The level of intramundane intracommunications between social actors in which there are no social science questions must also be examined in the relationships between the social scientist and the cultural reality he examines.
This means that it is not possible to imagine arelationship betweenexogenous and theendogenous in theinteraction between observersreciprocal in asituation of the world of life in which social actors do notare previouslypre interpreted andpre-typed for each other in one world, therefore it is not possiblesuppose that a social science observer may not bepre meaning Opre interpreted andpre-typed by a social reality in which it is inserted, therefore it has to work with the meanings that the culture attributes to its presence, it cannot exclude them and from the moment it includes them thehermeneusis in which the image that culture makes ofhe has to be considered in the way that workscientific social solves therelationship semiotics between what we write asscientists social and semiosis of the culture about which we write, a very important problem ofadequacy hermeneutics.
To the extent that these problems are considered, the work of social and cultural theory has more possibilities of hermeneutic adaptation, which means that the euphemism of giving representation for what is represented is considerably reduced as much as possible. There is here, of course, an awareness of the which Stephen has been the main leader that representation and what is represented never coincide, precisely because of problems of philosophical anthropology and philosophy that Stephen has discussed around representation and that lead us to the alternative of evocation versus representation, I I would even dare to say, since I have theorized hermeneutic adequacy, something that no other social science theorist, semiologist, sociologist and anthropologist that I know has worked on, in the field in which I am working that I know of there is no one who has worked on this as I am doing, but to the extent that I am part of a trend in which I recognize myself, and with the exception that you do not like the word trend, you prefer current, I have no prejudice towards the idea of tendency, I could say that one of the things that characterizes the tendency of which I am part both in the field of social phenomenology, symbolic interactionism and ethnomethodology from my individual perspective, as in the field Of the postmodern philosophical, linguistic and cultural anthropology of which I am a part, one of the things that define it is an unprecedented adaptation.
I am not saying with this that Stephen's studies on India, Quetzil's on the Mayan culture or my studies on thephenomena cultures that I have analyzed and studied are the most ultra imagethrough of which you cancases therepresentation end of what those cultures are because and I share this with stephen aanalysis cultural social sciences can never befurther that oneevocation can never be totally onerepresentation, but precisely because of all the problems that we have reviewed each one on their own in their owntheories, we are the trend that is defined by a surprisingadequacy Unlike other trends within theanthropology culture oforientation postmodern,wanted to I tell you this because I think it is important, I can take thislicense to apply a concept that is mine, is not Stephen's, is not Quetzil's, is not Surpik's, is not yours, I take thedare to say that thistheory that I have advanced from theadequacy hermeneutics I am satisfied with the level ofadequacy that, as far as possible, there is in the exponents of thisinclination,
You know that in these critical reviews that I made towards Levis Strauss I also made laudatory evaluations, and it is precisely the laudatory aspects to which I have drawn attention to those who have reached a level of development in Stephen that they did not reach in Levis Strauss, undoubtedly we must recognize Levi Strauss as having been the first, but in reality it has been Stephen who has taken them further and advanced them in a fruitful way in a direction to imagine a future to what the field of cultural anthropology may be in my case. regulated by sociology, I would like to finish by saying that I agree with Quetzil when he says that the future of ethnography is an interdisciplinary cultural anthropology, I agree with him on that, I think his vision is very accurate. I agree. with him in it and in many other things, really in many, but there is a problem prior to the problem that Quetzil is posing, which is how to arrive at a truly scientific cultural anthropology if we are starting from a criticism of the decline that postmodernism has implied. For the problems of scientificity, that is where Quetzil and I are at a moment that will imply for us in the coming years a communication process that has already begun, but that will see its fruit in the next ten years.
I am worried about theinaccuracies fromanthropology cultural and I am working to rearticulate all of this in a way thatfurther scientifically possible.
I wanted to tell you that I do not consider you alien to this tendency, to the extent that you have counterpoints with me, directions and that part of you that connected us with the field work that you did and the relationships with what was the question of doing and to the extent in which you made the prologue and we continue working together without a doubt despite our differences, you are taking part in your own way, from your own career, from your own personal history and from our relationship, the differences that there may be between us are not greater than those that we there may be between me and surpik, which in no way distances us from being part of the same trend. We have too many things in common, many more than those that differentiate us, but I am interested in following up on observing those things in which the parameters with the that you are working on, for example your continuous recurrence to quine, I am going to make the effort when I write the prologue to your little book to solve these problems, I did an analysis today where I asked you if the stimuli meanings of quine can be equated to my theory that I have developed about the integration between perception and what is perceived as something that only has a response through the life of the senses and the meanings that things do to the subject.
I do not start from whom I know very superficially, if there issome connection point I think that whatI would be fruitful as you did in counterpoint when you tried to apply theexplanation what I told you abouthypothesis abductive en peirce, applying mitheory from the catwalks to the case of whom you strive to put intorelationship the elements ofthe theories that you find attractive and those of the authors with whom you are working seem similar to you, on the other hand, do not transfer myfindings On itare being careful when it comes to the authors you work with don'tSo in the same way with those that I work withtend to attribute to themfindings mine To those who have influenced me or from whom I am based, I am not asking you to attribute things to me just for the sake of it.question of ego, I'm aloneinviting to explore as far as possible ways of understanding that there are developments that, although they have influences or atradition of whichare permeated achieve original developments thatare acquiring in whattheories and not in those that can be references for me.
In the same way that I accept what you have invited me to as long as it is a way of giving spaces of interconnection to the natural sciences in the cultural sciences that does not imply that the former become paradigms of scientificity of the latter, since You propose an alternative to make them enter in some way, I am open, in the same way I invite you to the analysis that I am doing in the enigmas of the ground, I am working on the reintegration of the theory of the sign to logic and hemeneusis in a way that in the intramundane horizon returns signs to logical inference, as long as the theory of the sign reintegrated into a dialectic of the object and the sign in a matrix on a common genesis reintegrated into the ground can work in a way less dependent on the sign but without at the same time ignoring the semiological component that organizes the world of life and therefore the relationship between sign and object implicit in all inferentiality, since faithful to Peirce we accept that we think in signs, if the sign that you invite me to is not one of these , I am open to opening myself to a critique of signcentrism as long as the theory of the sign and semiotics are reintegrated within phenomenological sociology and common sense to an understanding of the place that coding plays in inference, and sign-object dialectics in the inference and the sign in the very formation of the structure of thought, so we can treat fruitful horizons
Itpreinterpreted: meaning, meaning, interaction and situation
The crucial problem ofsociology phenomenological onproblematic itself of asking a mere question about the world of life, that is, the social actor, the man of meaningcommon lives the world of life without asking the question of creating atheory about that world, that does not mean that in that intramundane world in which he operates he does not develop forms of knowledge that are part of the experience as a mode of knowledge.
What establishes the distinction between the social science of the intramundane horizon and the world of life as sociology of common sense and the mere experience of just living it is the fact that we have a theoretical question about that world of life, I wanted to notice the fact that that to a large extent and in a high percentage phenomenological sociology does not deal with the interaction between worlds that are necessarily exogenous, the problem that I am discussing also applies to the mere fact that we are living in a world of experience and that we have before it questions that go beyond the mere fact of knowing how to function in that world because we need to inhabit it and develop ourselves in it with meanings and meanings, for example, I live in a world that is my social world in Houston Texas in which I am in my neighborhood, in my condominium like you there in Florida now, in my neighborhood, in my urbanization in my university in my work group that world in Houston is my cultural world, as it was also in Venezuela, and as it is in Havana, that cultural world of which I am a part, is the object in my theories of a type of attention that is not the attention given to the simple elderly couple who arrive in their Chevrolet to put gas in their car at the same gas station in that I have breakfast and that while he puts the gas he has breakfast or the same African-American couple who frequently goes to wash their car at the same car wash on weekends in the same one where I wash mine and that we already exchange gestures and glances because we frequently go and see each other, that African American couple does not wonder about car wash in the same way as me, who at the same time I am experiencing it I am asking myself questions, this problem is a classic problem already at a methodological level both for phenomenology social as it is for ethnomethodology, to the extent that the life world is our horizon of attention, to that same extent we have the problem of distinguishing between the layman and the scientific man, between the sociologist and the mere social actor who lives an experience, I have tried in a very relevant way - on the one hand not to separate between the world of life that I study and my own world of life, between the common sense that I study and my own common sense which does not mean We have to develop a social theory that does not distinguish between what it is to merely live in an intramundane world and what it is to develop a theory about it, but the reason why I am bringing this up here now is not to say that there is a difference between build, for example, a theory of the media about the mediative society in which I live and write about those media because to a large extent I try and I think I have resolved that the theory of the media that I write is relevant both for a social scientist and for a individual of common sense who has at least merely something more than an experience and wonders to a certain extent about knowing himself, that is, what it is possible to know through my books about the mass media is not very different from what he would have that it would be possible or desirable to be known by a man of common sense who wonders why it is his experience, his memory, his sensitivity to being a cybernature or living in a world of massive media within a universe of new technologies in United States
I am not asking the question here to confront the traditional social phenomenology problem of the distinction between sociologist and non-sociological lay experience of life-world knowledge, I am asking it to say that the theoretical problems I am discussing here cannot be subject as its only space of corroboration in forms of participant observation that involve high levels of contrast between the observer and the observed, that is, between a cultural theorist, the culture of the author and the culture about which the author writes, usually I work with cultures that are my own cultures, although as an emigrant and diasporic subjectivity, those cultures are, as I say in my seminar, living among cultures, various cultures that are not always my own culture of origin, which is why my sociology is not only sociology of culture but also intercultural and transcultural sociology, which differentiates my situation from the situation of an English, French, German or Polish anthropologist who does a study of a culture that is not the culture of which his cultural and social experience is part, but despite From this I am of the conclusion that the problems that I am applying to the modality of sociology that I am doing theoretical and empirical and of cultural anthropology apply to the same problems to any form of cultural anthropology, including those that involve a high contrast. between the observer and the observed therefore I go back and forth from one modality to the other because the problems I am discussing apply to one case and the other.
In relation to the problem you address of structure, do not worry about what I say about the fact that you thought that I was more on the side of operational structuralism than ontological, when in chapter 3 I tell you that I move beyond that, do not worry. Worry, I am clear about that, I know you are referring to the audios, and I was also talking about interpretant at a very theoretical level and this logically led to thinking about the operational, it is logical because in directions we are more on an empirical level of urban sociology and urban anthropology, which from the theoretical-empirical point of view presuppose concrete orders of reality or at least that they are there and we are discussing methodological problems, which is why we are now more focused on the ontological, when I remembered my retheorizations it is because This retheorization is necessary so as not to ossify the structure on one side or the other and to be able to move between one thing and the other. In reality, what I am proposing is a back-and-forth, I think that the movement between the operational and the ontological is the that must be suspended, move in a coming and going, just as I maintain that in the relationship between structurality and social dynamisms, which epistemologically are expressed between what is given and what is not given, social, that is, the structure is more of the given of the given and the not given, in language for example, its structurality inclusive of grammar as well as in semantics, well let's not forget structurality in the structural semantics of Greimas as it also becomes obvious in the componential semantics that Stephen has worked on in anthropology. cognitive and that I work too, to the extent that we move away from what is already given we move away from the condition of the structure itself, whether it is considered as a formal model or as a social structure which neither on one side nor on the other should be susceptible to a hermeneutic procedure, but at the same time, it is not possible to move between the given and the non-given, the moment in which we are more on the side of structurality and in the moment in which we are more on the side of genesis, derrida genesis and structure, in my essay the inscription and the couple that you tell me you liked that I taught at the Hispanic American culture center, I connect problems of linguistic structural theory with phenomenological structurality, I discuss the genesis and the structure in the analysis of the relationship between thought, being and writing, this leads to a problem that is both philosophical and linguistic. In that essay I advance an epistemological, theoretical and methodological relationship between these two notions of structurality, linguistic and phenomenological, it is in the genesis In the case of language, when we produce new meanings and meanings, the element in which we distance them from the components of structurality that are in stability more on the side of the predated of that language, there I speak to you about the unmanifest, the unmanifest structure that It is similar to the concept of the unconscious because it is not present in the phenomenal of empirical phenomena, it seems more on the side of what is not within the complete reach of the subject but rather as a precondition. There you reminded me of Lacan and the question of the pre-established that On the side of the production of new meanings and meanings, when the question of structure moves the phenomenological field outside of linguistic problems, such as the entire field that I am analyzing in common sense sociology, for example, my analyzes on the structural place. of relevance, in the order and stability of the world of life and intramundane common sense, new things begin to happen, but notice that also there, the structural is on the side of the predated because if relevance has a structural place in the order that goes from the pre-typed pre-interpreted that crosses the very definition of the situation, towards the side of the novelty or the unexpected in which the heritages are not compatible for a variety of reasons or reasons. Note that it is what allows us to move forward or backward because it is the that from experience and heritage guides the subject in therelationship between what is known and what is to be known, that is, between what is given and what is not given, then it is like the last limit of whatpre given, it's like the point ofpre given that marks thelimit betweenpre given and what is not given, that is, it still belongs to the side of what is given, what is not givenI would be what you have to learnnovel everything that must be opened to and everything that must be generated, in the intramundane horizon we generate experience ofaction pragmatics, you donails things and not others, once you do them it is not a given butit is regulated between the given and the non-given, then structurality always remains on the side of the given and the non-given
There is undoubtedly a relationship between structure and repetition, there is no doubt about it, the slightest discussion, between structurality and repetition, between structurality and ritual, understanding ritual as something that is repeated, between structurality and habit, structurality and custom, everything that is stable and regularize with a minimum level of variability that does not affect stability, now that is why I tell you you have to move, notice that this is the empirical expression of the epistemological question, moving between the hermeneutic and phenomenological components and the problems of structurality in the empirical work is a coming and going, and at the same time moving between the operational formal logic of the concept of structure and the concrete social structures, the ontological forms of structure requires a coming and going, now how to go and how to come, it is not stay on one side or the other, but remain suspended, not ossify any side and for this it is necessary to understand that the structure itself is nothing other than a symbol, it is helping us because it is a symbol that has a half of itself in the way it logic and another half of it in the world reflected as perspective, that is, what I do in the correlate is to place that it itself is symbolic, shared with perspective and other figures that are figurative languages but at the same time it is not a trope. compatible only with non-disjunctive non-dystopian tropes such as metonymy and signegdoque, which opens the possibility of working with structure in a much richer way because it allows us to understand that elements of structurality can occur wherever there is codification, it has that ambivalence, It moves between formality and the reflected dimension, referred to in a similar way to how it occurs in perspective. It has that duality, it can be seen as something formal but as soon as it is seen like this, ontological elements begin to appear, coming and going, knowing that you are working with an operating model with an objective structure, and knowing that you cannot work with it withouthermeneutics and withoutphenomenology
I wouldn't sayhere adialectics butyes I would say that you have to receive theimagination aboutas work with it from the problemsempirical the material that tells usas every time put onrelationship itdynamic and the structural, fromempirical towards the concrete towards the consideredstructures predated
we can move without ossifying, and at the same time work withphenomenology andhermeneutics between structurality and dynamisms, it is towards this that the non-given corresponds, Iwanted to tell youhere there is a field thatstill I'm about to work, I think aboutsemantics structural, greimasarrive a through of the studiessemantics to theconclusion of the needs of asociology of the sensecommon, but at the same time there is a problem in it that I want to solve, I make aanalysis very deep in the correlation of the world between the superficial and deep structureas are consideredsemantic, thesemantics componential uscarry to the idea of content, to the elements that make up thelexicon of language as a corpus of meanings that words already have, meanings that contain theconsideration synthetic fromsemantics uscarry to the relationships between form and senses, for some things thesemantics formal and for others the componential, but it is verydifficult from thesemantics as it has been developed in thephilosophy of language and inlinguistics
In semantics we are working with words and meanings. It is very difficult from mere semantics to derive the development of a fully configured sociology of common sense, fully established as a sociology with all the required components. It needs other elements that should not always be subject to meanings and meanings. meanings of words, require leaving the order of the language but not to abandon it but to enter and exit that is why I wrote the correlate of silent and that semantics is important in the correlate, that is, it is not about completely detaching ourselves from the language towards the world of everyday life in a way in which we are working as if there were no language there, to a phenomenological field, we are moving between experience and the reference to it and we make that reference through language, in research we We move between experience and writing. Furthermore, we cannot think without the scriptural dimension, we write and what we are going to do about a culture is nothing other than writing or making a film in the case of the exploration of new media in the social sciences, but even the film is the order of discourse and in the case of writing it is this with all its theoretical problems, then there is also the problem of inscription, it is a field that goes from what you called the registration, ways of memorizing the experience, the observational problematic from which we receive the empirical data at a first level and the intramundane considerations that are required within the instringulis of participant observation, for example the case of the Cuban who comes from New York and of Cubans who have not left there you have the example and how this inscribes the meanings that some attribute to others, how we cannot work on participant observation without considering hermeneutical problems not in the sense of how to interpret culture but of how to understand it, which itself is traversed.hermeneutically and that theinteraction in it both to analyze afreak of which we are not a part as one in which we are participant observers cannot occur without considering those problemshermeneutics including the presence of one whoit is reframed how I develop in my essayconstructivism insociology about can collectors inas approach a can collector who haspre meaning that everyone who approaches him comes to buy cans from him, and everything that has to be taken into accountconsideration to enterrelationship with that can pickerregard which one wants to know how it means and gives meaning to their world, ainvestigation ofsociology urban andanthropology concrete urban,empirical.
So the field that I am theorizing encompasses three dimensions, thedimension ideal type which isconstruction of a modellogical of a potential type social actorhypothetical It is possible that it is not a concrete social actor, but rather an ideal type concept. For example, when I analyze the self, it is mine, but it could be anyone's, and that of others.any social actor that can bescientific social or it can be a concrete subject in the culture, as in the examples that I give that are situations buttypical ideals, moving from the ideal type to the problemsmethodological fromobservation participant in social sciences,problematic of specific cultural groups, forms of material or visual culture that we are reading in theexegesis of cultural texts have to function on all three levels, not on one
What you say about theposition of the subject veryinterestingI very much agree with you in everything you tell me.there I remember that in counterpoint we discussed theposition of the subject when youyou said that destroys the structurelooked like be suspended without a subject,it is well treated in counterpoints and you treated it very well now, that diversity of subject positions works for me because I have to move between those different forms of the subject
I cannot not work with Derrida even if I am working from an intramundane sociology because I have to look for the interconnections between the language considered in terms of sociology and the concepts of culture, I have to resolve that step from there my theories of the catwalks, and There is no way to solve it without Derrida because he is the one who inscribes the problems of textualism and textuality in the field of classical philosophy, he is the first to connect transcendental problems with logical problems, he is the figure of the end of the century who devoted the most gave the connection between problems of philosophy, epistemology, logic and problems of theory of the text, essential that is why I cannot renounce Derrida, but as I told you I decant many things, in these messages on the topic of neoromaticism I tell you that I am moving away of Derrida's relationship with Niesch, it is not all Derrida, it is certain things about Derrida, which have influence on me, I have to move between these different forms of the subject, you are absolutely right, and it is something implicit from the autonomous theoretical problems disciplinary aspects of sociology, in that trilogy that I tell you between the ideal type, the participant observer and the empirical case in the cultural group or material and visual culture, from the same sociological disciplinarity the problem of moving between different forms of the non-subject is posed. The subject that I take for granted in an intramudnano world where I put very specific examples of experience referring to things known to everyone but that do not have names and surnames is the same. That form of the subject is not the same as it is in the ideal type. abstracted or as it is at the meta-empirical level of methodological problems in research methodology, there are three moments of the subject and you have to move between the three, and this within sociology, but yes, as you yourself say, I don't think I am already as transdisciplinary as I was in another era, at the beginning in my first book it was very transdisciplinary, but the rigors and demands of scientific rigor have been leading me to interdisciplinarity, the transdisciplinary field is very beautiful from the point of view of ethics and I still like it but it is a little imprecise sometimes to resolve diatribes, it applies to certain things but not to others, especially where there is holism it works, but when we are working with great precision, both abstract logic and empirical methodology it does not always works, I move between various forms of the subject within the disciplinarity of sociology, but I have to go to others when I move interdisciplinary, because all these problems that I address in these audios that are more disciplinary in sociology require when It moves to the field of exegesis and writing and the relationship between inscriptural memory and field work experience, forcing interdisciplinarity on the one hand with philosophy and semiotics, retheorizing sociology from semiotics and vice versa. , I am focused on it, between sociology and linguistics, sociology and semiotics and between sociology and philosophy, there is the field, then there would be another space of interdisciplinarity that is the one regulated from sociology, but from cultural theory all my sociological theory does not work towards another place than towards the understanding of the cultural world, my entire theory of experience and heritage integrates phenomenological sociology and common sense in a field of sociology of experimental culture, new, that is something that I am creating influenced by shutz and a little by mead, but I am taking it in a completely new direction, so it is from the sociology of culture and cultural theory that I am having regulated by disciplinary sociology the possibilities of cultural anthropology, of course we cannot here either ignore the tradition that sinceanthropology cultural we haveassimilation interdisciplinary issueslinguistics where stephen comes in with a very important job insemantics and inanthropology cognitive, in its first stage, the stephen of theanthropology postmodern andphilosophical of thelast years, andthere nicealso a very interesting interdisciplinary field to solve many of these problems, my goal in the future is to thoroughly read and write therelationship in betweensemantics andsociology of the sensecommon, thatrelationship It cannot be given in any way.
Thesemantics as it is structured disciplinaryly, which I know very well because I have read everything in the disciplinary field of thelinguistics, and of thesemiotics where thesemantics it's aarea, as it is constituted does not in any way take the step to derive from it asociology of the sensecommon that may be sufficient or complete, one cannot go beyondoutline, aintuition guess hypothetical of onesociology of the sensecommon but you cannot advance from it to it being a true conceptual apparatus with all the elements that asociology of the sensecommon requires how I am working on it
thattradition Luckily we have it in what was started byprotection and it is fromprotection that you have to work on it as I am doing, but I do think that integrating elements ofsemantics thissociology of the sensecommon It's an interesting field.
I am already doing it as you know in theconsideration of the elements ofanthropology cultural that I take into account in mysemiotics of art, I propose thatmoving enter heresemiotics and thesemantics, thesemiotics of art can becomethrough ofanalysis cultural inanthropology cultural, the pairsemiotics Of art/anthropology cultural, but there it islast it is subdued al analysis of the textsymbolic and offiction and we cannot excludeanthropology cultural that refers to live culture, material cultural in a muchfurther broad, study of heritage, tourism,restoration, thewayus or the type ofsociology that I did in the eighties and you too, that type of work requires a different way of being in the culture that cannot be subordinated to the way artit is in the culturethrough fromfiction, requires anotherrelationship with culture and isthere that I am moving forwardways in theanthropology cultural from this other side of thesociology of culture andtheory cultural, of asociology phenomenological of the sensecommon
on the other hand, thequestion ofwittgensteinIf I like it I haveread some rehearsals of him more than three live andfurther abouthe does I know him and I like him like himphilosophy becomesinvestigation It is very conducive from the social sciences to see thephilosophy like ainvestigation, on the other handalso I sympathize with itsympathy that all conceptualism has always had towards it,remember that I was originally a conceptualist and still am, and conceptualism and nominalismare very together andhe is quite valued in thetradition conceptual
while conceptualism cannot do without Hegel, Burguer, all thetradition of self-awareness, becausesociologically no there would be been possible without that self-awareness as it is part of the avant-garde, neither can conceptualism be understood without thecomprehension of the place that certain exponents of thephilosophy of language as precedents within thephilosophy of what has beenlogically conceptualism, in fact when I talk to you about zero and no andgoal zero as notions Ireferred to the connections of conceptualism with
but at the same time all thatlogic metatextual, tautological, ofgoal zero that occurs in thelogic, not for therelationship withheidegger, but because she herself haslogic certain anachronisms
Frege when you tell me thatleft ofaristotle, we could enter onediscussion ofaristotle If you want, I have the organon, I read it, I studied it, the organon is even funny, a universe of perplexity for therelationship between the qualities and the name of things, ofthere all that is bornlogic the universals, the particulars, the syllogisms, all of this seems very defective to me, the idea of enclosing the world in aproposition logic, but I accept thatsome problems of conceptualism are seen in thatvia, there would be what to see,there would be that reading is a winding path, Ilogic in science oflogic of the concept I am even a friend of removing all thesections related to syllogisms and propositions
atheory mature concept made in the 21st century must get rid of that adolescence of science, if it is trulyscientific, if there isthought that syllogisms and judgments and all thetradition ofaristotle must be part of thetradition of the scientificity ofconceptualism, maybe It was his adolescence, his moment intraining when the conceptstill he was trying to find himself,to be discerned as if asking well what is a concept?judgment?, a syllogism?, thephilosophy sleepwalker wandering at nightpeeking Let's see how to get to what a concept ispassed for all that butwhen science is now truly elevated from the concept to a true science, all that falls
The complete Aristotle falls from top to bottom, nothing of the organon survives, the complete organon falls, the organon is rhetoric, literature, that is how I see it, the future the organon is Borges, I do not see much horizon for either the judgments or the syllogisms orapodictic ni denone like, amy all This seems to me like protogrammatology,grammatology overcome all that,grammatology inlinguistics theoretical, abstract,logic, Derrida's,replace all thattradition, now it is true that in analytical philosophy, in Vienna and inphilosophy something original happens from language, which does something different with thattradition I agree with you on this, it is true thatthere something new happens, that's what you havereason, and that new is thesynthesis the best that could be rescued from thattradition, but already very transformed, I no longerwould speak neither of syllogisms, nor of judgments, even the concept ofproposition, well it is true that it is a first unit of thepositivism logical, with whichfurther the analytical tradition is defended, we would have to see where all this is going
You are dedicated to that, you have gotten into the study of that, I thought about it at one point, I studied it a lot but no.I decided dedicate myself or specialize in it so I wentseeing a through from the sieve of problemsscientists that II chose work thenmattered but as they were seen by the social sciences, but I am not closed to returning to it, there are things in it that interest me
recover onesynthesis, which gives it a new shape, Iwould say whatmaybe apossibility to recover logical positivism it would bethrough of conceptualismscientific, recovered thattradition in that sensewittgenstein I would play An important paper
It is not only amerit but onefeat the role you are playing in itvery important inIt is work let's see it is possible that ourcollaboration can give sometrack or horizon, you have to readalso I need to read all of it, read it again and read other things, notread theyhad many of those things in my library but I have not been able to recover them until nowafter about divorce, I had it all there, positivismlogical That's why I thank you very much for the books because I'm starting my library again, which was aroom
excellentlast audios I amagreement In everything you say it is not even necessary to read in fullwittgenstein to tell you that I agree with you, although I can't stop telling you that all thatlogic It has many anachronisms andsusceptibilities of falling intometaphor as much ashad aristotle.
these audios are a lotfurther richer than what I was able to address, listening to your audios I realize that they have a richness of elements that I quite agree with both when you talked about the subject and whenyou spoke fromcondition prestructured in lacan andalso It is interesting what you talk about performativity in your way of understanding, reading andinterpret my work when you talk aboutperformativity You are very correct, you are right about that, it is true that it is crucial that there is myquestion of performativity that worked in thinking science in the firstchapter and in my essayperformativity in theinvestigation
I have told you that it is an important essay especially because I illustrate performativity as workingperformativity in a research, and it's true, you have all thereason it is true and it is verysynthetic that you have grasped that, it is true thatit is playing an important place in the way I'm working
I summarize that I quite agree with all the development you did, even you alwaysaccording to what we are discussing, you comb it againto reign about the same but alwaysaccording to the new thing that we are discussing and that gives you thepossibility to revisit your sources and in those revisitations I really like what you achieve and this is one of them
in counterpoints you achieved it several times, there are times when whenyou review Your sources, at least for me, generate more controversy.further points the need to make clarifications or clarifications, but there are times when when you comb, I quite agree with the way you discuss it and what youdid you do I liked it, it is one of the best revisits I have ever seen.further I have agreed with you with the exception of the part about syllogisms and judgments and whatapodictic
that part is what works for mefurther objectionable notI know even that point it is possible to make aanalysis comprehensive ofas It was precisely thattradition predicativeaffects and inthat formspecific andwould be worth worth doing thatsearch
But I see in you as afeat that thanks to youinterpretation from those sources andtradition that they havepossibilities to savethere moved conjunction clearances that ruined new results even thoughtry to authorize with thattradition, the weak thing is that they continue to be authorized witharistotle, I'm not saying it's not aphilosopher interesting, or is it not a starting point if I told you once and I think that here is the bottom of this problem, that ofnone manneraristotle He is superior to Hegel, nor does he reach his ankle in scientificity,aristotle It was not ascientific, let's start withthere, it was aheuristic, to tell you interms moderns, he was an eminence he was brilliant and we must consider all his books not only the organon
but notit is inaristotle that scientificityfurther that becausetradition The source authorizes it to defend what may be interesting in positivismlogical, or whatever you call thistradition in which you have specialized and become so erudite, not merely because you are aphilosophical important of theantiquity
All of this from syllogisms, and thelogic predicative is very imprecise, we mustcases The source of what is interesting about these authors is in themselves, in what they achieved, not in the sources that served as their sources.inspiration, what are you doingfridge?, some important change you had to make if you are very dependent onaristotle it is fried, there must have beenthere amutation, a change, if it is very dependent onaristotle there is no sciencenone side, withexception From that point I agree with everything you discussed.
very rich relationshipswe establish between things, from my point of view of thefurther successful in potential to offer usways to work with them,it is said everythingthere, allit is achieved by you
and in a way yours because it is something that is born from your sources andit is very intricate within your interconnectionsepistemological very well done,further Well, what I have are accumulations of pending things likeyour theme of the theater, pavis,shatner, in whichyou spoke about your field work.
Elements of social psychology
I. .. youthere was said a few posts agoback that Ihad some ideas aboutas spin the parttight and your part in directions, here the point is quite pertinent to aobservation that you made me where you told me that for you it was not ainterest inclinical in your topics of psychology and psychiatry it was notclinical butepistemological. That reservation that you made, although the fact that you have resorted topsychiatry It creates certain difficulties for me in approaching the matter, in any case the connections that I see would be more similar.through frompsychology social and notpsychology of the mind, less of thepsychiatry, but we can polish and refine it, Of course, as you know there are some points in which thesociology by georgeherbert mead is interrelated with elements of psychology as well asphenomenology by alfredprotection, they are not at allpsychologists, they are schools ofsociology well formed, interactionismsymbolic, phenomenology social, innone case matters the interior of the mind and itselucidation but if they aremethodologies whatthey restore in an important way the micro in therelationship of the individual with the social and as such they are structured based on, either through ideal types in the sense of Max Weber, that is, establishing an ideal type of social actor that is not with a specific name and surname, but anyone, or before somethingempirical, if they presuppose elucidations that intersect some things that may be ofinterest in the field ofpsychology.
In the case of my elaborations and research, and not the current ones but in the past, I recognize that at the very beginning I had a certain interest in social psychology, it was not the center, it was not the starting point, it was not the axis of my system and my ideas, but I did take it into account, in that analysis of social groups as cultural groups, especially from the perspective of the observer, in this case the student who was taking the workshop and was making these sociocultural immersions in the urban space of social groups, while I proposed that the analysis that an observer is going to do in certain social groups could not be seen as something separated from his own social reality and his own self-compression, this element, the fact that analyzing one social group as another cultural group has some relevance for the cultural self-analysis of the subjectivity of the observer, it gave a component of social psychology not to what they were doing but if certain consideration was given to that element, you cannot do a study of geeks as merely a cold and distant phenomenon, without taking into account certain elements of psychology both from the people with whom you are interacting and from the people who are immersing themselves in that experience to do work for a result, both towards the object and towards the subject, both towards what is studied in which the observer immerses himself, and towards his own conformation of his subjectivity where this study of groups is at the same time an autosociological and autoanthropological self-study, in the sense of a cultural theory, there were also certain elements to the extent that I was designing this concept of a sociologist and a sociology with certain characteristics in which media elements considered to be art such as video or photography were incorporated, the observer who had to immerse himself in that group had to consider the theories that I developed in my main classes where I theorized the concept of culture and issues of methodology, metatheory about methodological issues, because they had to incorporate, I told them, I theoretically see the theories as immediately related to the concrete experience that they were having in the immersion. urban cultural, and that it would be relevant for their own purposes, in this sense given that it was an empirical dimersion, the understanding that they must have of my theories they had to internalize it to the extent that it became relevant to them so that what they were living, this is a component of psychology or rather of psychopedagogy, it was how they learned the theories that I taught them to go from the theoretical abstract to the empirical dimension, they had to see how it was reflected and that translation that they had to do was translated in a certain psychopedagogy on my part, not psychodrama in the sense of theater or psychology at all, but in the sense of an experimental didactic theory of learning, but the idea of psychopedagogy, although it was not exactly that, explains a little the type of relationship between the subjective and the methodological that the observer had to explore between theory and empirical or experience. I distanced myself a lot from all of this and began to ignore all of it, but it would have to be said that I initially considered it.
Semiotic theory, narratives of experience and cultural analysis
On the other hand, I was also telling you there is an experience that I had as a theorist, in this case a theoretical curator in 1996 of an art and anthropology workshop that I directed with the participation as co-directors of Surpik Angelini from Houston and Fran Rodriguez, director of cinema of the film school, was a cultural production workshop aimed at producing seven exhibitions that the chosen artists should do to address the issue of the relationship between art and anthropology, we offered them elements of reference on the contemporary situation of anthropology, the social sciences, and we proposed, based on the analysis we did of our theories and analyses, to also make an exhibition that would deal with the topic. These exhibitions were then taken by Surpik and I as co-curators to Rice University in Houston, Texas in 1997. in the spring from January to April and we exhibited them there, I am interested in talking to you about this experience, I don't know if I should discuss it completely now but in principle there is one of the concrete experiences both within what the workshop was and what They were the exhibitions presented, as later, that is, after I settled to live in Houston, Texas, another workshop that I developed with another artist Maria Cristina Jadick in which I consider that in those two cases, certain elements of Social psychology
Already in the experiences of my projectsimmersion field worksociology culturalist andtheory cultural that I did in Cubathere was There were two cases, two examples of investigations that led toautonarrativas on the one hand one of the artistsadhere martinez withinterested less about looking outward for social and cultural groups, but rather she had the attitude of saying that what she was interested in was herself, and I was open to that.understood that it was bold and interesting that she developed it that way, and shedevelopment a jobself narrative linked to the relationships between objects and narratives of experience, objects of your daily life and the narratives of life and experience in yourbiography that were connected to those objects from the emotional point of view, of their interpersonal relationships,here at rice university in the results of the workshop there was a case that was quite relevant interm of certain elements ofpsychology because of thatcharacter self narrative of the experience that I will explain to you later. Another case that occurred in the eighties was when at the end of the workshop we asked ourselves what should be presented in the spaces of the art institution, considered in the traditional conventional sense, in its spaces to be coherent with what the project had been essentially of theory. very theoretical and social science, we came to the conclusion that there was no way to represent what was experienced and that what had to be done was one more exercise, one more work aimed at that institutionality focused on what I told you before the cultural analysis of the subjectivity of the observer who immerses that auto-sociological and auto-anthropological sense, and one of the experiences we did was to ask the center for fifteen days so instead of doing an exhibition of works, we could do a kind of therapeutic circle where all the participants who had done immersions like Observers in the cultural groups will then talk about their own narratives of experience and life, talking about their subjectivities and personal self-analysis, ruining therapies also around family issues, and there I invited two psychologists, Lulu and Nuria, mostly oriented psychologists. in social sociology, so that they could ask questions and participate by giving their opinions, this experience was interesting, it had a therapeutic nature. The boys spent fifteen days talking about their life narratives, there in the spaces where works are usually presented, it was this circle of dialogue that that there were for fifteen days, and it was also a precedent to what I am going to tell you about these two artists, first surpik angelini, the result of the art and anthropology workshop that we did in Caracas in 96, and the exhibitions that we presented in rice both as co-curators, Surpik's experience had a very self-narrative character, she explored the relationships between objects in her life, let's say collected things, relics, elements belonging to her relatives, affective things that could be considered at the level of visual culture material culture, things collected, postcards from museums collected throughout her travels, some rag dolls that her Armenian grandparents gave her, her hair that she cut at different ages and collected, she worked with the relationship between self-narratives of experience, the semiotics of the objects that I analyzed in the workshop, and the possibility, here I was directing the workshop, a wonderful experience between the two, I participated theoretically guiding focusing on these problems, the thing here was to relate as self-narratives of experience related from the point From the point of view of semiotics, objects analyzed semiotically from the point of view of visual culture could result in a staging, a staging, an installation that was a way of doing cultural self-analysis, what we would call cultural analysis, in this case the relevance of doing cultural analysis through the self, this experience was important not only for Surpik, not only did it nourish me too, it helped me a lot to shape and advance my theory about the self that I had already been working on since my book Edges and Overflows Starting to immerse myself in it and that I have already matured with my book self and heritage and my essay the hinges of the self and what I symbolize in my book thinking science, these essays are about philosophy and sociology but above all about philosophy, as I say phenomenological avenues between philosophy and sociology, they are not about psychology, but the way they enter the world of what Derrida calls the ground of interiority, the inner world of the person, by the way they transit or move between the conformation of the self and its relationship. with the social they inevitably go through certain elements of social psychology, they are not practices of psychology but of sociology, but certain elements, I am completely reluctant to see this type of elements of psychology as something political, not at all, I amreluctant and closed atpoliticization frompsychology, with which I make the reservation that there are certain colleagues in the scene whoare enacting apsychology policyI don't want to mention names now but I think it's good that it be heard and let it be known in our book, I disagree with it as much as Stephen. Tyler remained neutral andskeptical to thepolicy, I disagree with thepoliticization of the person's space, I distance myself from it, from the therapy of the emotional world I am contrary tobecome politicized, because I think it is ainvasion what does thepolicy to the universe of the person, and in that I disagree, I consider that thetheory de foucault ismalevolent, malignant and does not have good consequences in thesociety, it is not healthy to politicize thescope of emotional life because there are many dimensions of the individual's social experience that are not dimensionspolicies, I am in this sense very neoliberal, I maintain thedepoliticization as an ideal which connects with thequestion of theneuroticism what you asked me on the other hand,you would have what to see the works
The other artist Maria Cristina Jadick who was a workshopespecially oftheory semiotics same as with surpik butalso includes therelationship between narrativesbiographical of experiences andsemiotics of objects foranalysis cultural a through of the self. It is relevant that you have told me that you see it epistemologically, specifically psychology, while psychiatry has no entry here but let's say subtle elements of psychology, this is consistent with the therapeutic, autosociological and autoanthropological way in which I have seen and treated these problems, I call it therapeutic because once the individual does a cultural self-analysis through the self, he obviously obtains a non-therapeutic experience, less clinical, not at all, but restorative as a self-analysis in that area, I have called this, from the perspective of my phenomenological theory of the self, as a form of self ethtnography, in continuity with that self sociology and self anthropology that I did in the eighties to which I have referred, I am interested here in pointing out, it is about the self-study of the observer, which I do here from a phenomenological theory of the self that is not and has not previously existed in the tradition of ethnography, it is my own theory and research elaborated in the tradition from disciplinary sociology, which comes from the relationship between philosophy and sociology, but from perspective of the research that I am doing of taking philosophical anthropology back to classical philosophy, which rearticulates in another way the passage from philosophy to cultural analysis, I have found this possibility of immersing ourselves in the phenomenology of the self that in ways that in certain types of experiments can give autoethnographic results, or self, better not auto, here it is not about the self-analysis of the observed culture but of the observing culture, which is going to carry out a cultural analysis project, in the case of surpik the analyzes They were about emigration, about the subjectivity of emigration, which is a topic that I had been working on from Caracas, in a menjugue book where I began to work on the self-perception of the intellectual in diaspora, writing about myself perceiving myself in Venezuelan culture, this had a certain influence on theexhibition from surpik, shejob this matter and he did it in a very unique and original way that I really liked, and I gave a seminar that wascalled living between cultures at the houston hispanic institute coordinated by diana gland psychoanalyst the hispanic emigrants were fascinated by my lecture on this topic and this gave rise to a seminar thatimparted once a week for ayear of these relationships between philosophy, sociology and cultural anthropology.
There are other themes that I have in mind for directions within things that have acquired a waycritical especially in me, although I think that on your side you have developed some constructions in directions that have been verytools for you and ourdialogue It's quite interesting whatwe develop over there about what for you are the paradigms of scientificity, thecriticism what are you doing to thelinguistics As a paradigm of scientificity that you say has changed, it is important that you have clarified your perspective.
Even though Ialso explain it to youtight and we have that difference that I think is enriching; it does not isolate us, on the contrary, it allows us to see where each one of us is starting from, that is why I have tried to make thatConnection due to your insistence onpsychology, psychoanalysis andneurology.
Now I would like to talk to you about some topics that I consider to becharacter controversial of some of the topics discussed in pending directions, at one point in my developments I talk about myselfcriticism to thedecolonization and postcolonialism in which you agree with me
I would like inrelationship to that topic return to a beginning ofdialogue that we had in counterpoints on the topic ofappropriationI would like to bring thisproblematic to the context of postcolonialism anddecolonization to articulate acriticism further completes both things, thedecolonization and postcolonialism - on the one hand and on theideology fromappropriation for the other.
I remember and it was not unfamiliar because I am familiar with that when you tried to develop aapproach a bitfurther postmodern a littlefurther fashionable in certain cultural attitudes favorable toappropriation, as soon as in a waysemantically to understand thenotion that is aboutdeprive of certain prejudicesideological and of certainparameters about whatauthentic, the original, the author and a number of things that in certain discussions of postmodernism have in some way questioned, for example, the way in which Frederic Jameson speaks of ashow availability
The whole question of postmodernism in contemporary socioculturality both in the United States and in Europe as well as in general in the Americas, postmodernism itself as a phenomenon especially in aesthetics and in literary movements and literary criticism and culture in general has been a trend. to this thing of appropriation in a sense that you were trying to point out that sees it as positive in some perspectives, for example, Ventury, this architect who is seen as an iconic paradigm of what is considered postmodern when you see those buildings with a fragment of classical architecture that seems to be from the 15th century but at the same time another fragment that refers to a folkloric thing of the local culture, and perhaps related to another completely different cultural code such as Gothic, that idea of mixing styles that in diachronic linear history They did not have a relationship with each other but the architect has these references as cultural codes that he in the mode of a quotation which generates an eclepticism, what Jameson calls the spectacle of availability, you have the cultural texts according to an attitude of quotation, of imitation, of pastiche, which generates a type of eclepticism, of imbrication between what you are doing and the cultural references with which you work, this way of seeing the question of appropriation, first of all it is not necessarily actually dealt with in this case of an appropriation in what Jameson calls the spectacle of availability, with the exception of Shery Levine, who did directly copy the work of other artists of the past in most other cases, such as Ventury and the majority of the so-called postmodern artists. This ecleptic juxtaposition does not imply at all appropriating the work of another author, that is, originality, intellectual right, right copy, authorship, the conception that another author has had of something that, when appropriated in some way, hurts or misunderstands. that it is something generated by that author, but that it is actually about cultural codes in general, for example the notion of style, we could consider in this case making a contemporary building in which the art deco that was invented by architects at the beginning of the century and classical architecture that was invented by architects of other eras and contemporary folkloric architecture are combined when in reality there are no direct allusions to a precise architect but simply to the notion of style, this is a bit what happens with the question of intertextuality, when it is studied how underneath a literary text there are other literary texts, specifically as discussed in literary criticism where it is said that in a novel there are several novels, because in certain ways of writing they bring with them the relationship between the text of the author who writes that novel and the history of the novel, the accumulated literary corpus, ways of writing, gestures, styles, things, even not being cited by that author, are inscribed in some way according to the intertextuality in the relationship that is generated between a text and other texts that he superimposes, there is also Douglas Crimp's theme that beneath every painting there is another painting, one reads one painting and reads another one after it, in none of these cases is it about appropriation, in any sense that implies the ideological criticism to which I am referring, that is, they are notions of appropriation that in reality is defective and even incorrect and unscientific to call it appropriation, it could be called a spectacle of availability, quotation, collage, juxtaposition, imitation, I believe. that these notions of imitation and pastiche are the most appropriate to talk about it.
That it is an imitation can be understood in two ways, you can understand it from the point of view of the sociology of culture of the cultural field and specifically in this case of the field of art and social sciences, to the extent that by For example, novelty becomes more difficult, socioculturally it becomes a condition of possibility in terms of Bourdieu's notion of a condition of possibility, at a sociocultural level for the authors of works, more the possibility of imitating texts that are already pre-existing in the culture than the possibility of to innovate, to create something completely new on the basis of tradition, that is the sociological focus to which imitation leads, the idea that everything is already done, imitation has those two sides in my perspective, this is something that I have developed, which can be seen not only as a semiotic procedural figure in the analysis of the text when we talk about mimicking as a linguistic form that is expressed semiotically in the traces of the configurational mode of the work where you see there is a juxtaposition or a superimposed eclepticism where texts of culture have been imitated but also at the sociological sociocultural level when the author's condition of possibility is to imitate, in these senses there is no diatribe or ethical contradiction in the terms in which I morally and ethically must be given that relationship and I agree with you on that although without using the word appropriation I do not call these figures appropriation, it is true that there is the case of Levinne, but the fact that this has happened two or three times in which yes It has been used by another author, but this is not enough to generalize that the word acquires an axiological value with respect to these figures of speech typical of postmodernism. This is a phenomenon that comes from pop, which already imitated images of culture, massive figures that were created. by publicists, Marilyn, the burghers, it is precisely that positive side that I have referred to in that we are not talking about appropriation that by deliberately using the word appropriation - it is wrong to have called all this appropriation, it is a bit to have called it All this appropriation, which cleaned a little, which healed a little, which gave a little that feeling that appropriation could be a positive thing, well, something else was already being called appropriation, the term was modified and From a postmodern perspective it acquired a certain good fortune, I am closed to that because I do not consider that those figures of language and those sociocultural conditions of possibility, imitation, pastiche, quotation, juxtaposition, exclepticism, I do not consider that they are appropriation, It was a license that certain idioms took, to call that appropriation, due to the attitude that there is no longer the author creating something on the background of nothing but rather an author who is working with material that he collected pre-existing in the culture and we must make a distinction about what this means semiotically and what appropriation is, so having said this, I do want to draw attention to the negative conditions at a level not only ideological but also ethical and moral that the concept of appropriation continues to have even where it is being used euphemistically to name things that are not appropriation as a supposed good use, I do not in any way consider that the concept of appropriation can be freed from its ideological load and I now want to bring this discussion to the field to the topic. of postcolonialism and decolonization where the negative consequences of these uses are very clearly seen, the contradictory aporias of continuing to use that word
On the contrary, rather I consider anthropologically that the social and cultural conditions in which eclepticism, variegations, such as the Roroco with respect to the Baroque, occur, the periods in which novelty seems impossible, are precisely the periods in which it is being generated. the preamble to new reinventions of culture, all of this is nothing more than the crisis of a series of codes that need to be dismantled, deconstructed, that are exhausted and that what is behind eclepticism is nothing other than a cultural reinvention that is taking place. place both in the transformations of subjectivity and in language, today the novelty in my consideration is not at all closed, quite the opposite today more than ever innovative languages are being reached as much as the period of the early avant-garde, in terms of novelty, yes I believe in innovation, I do not use I believe in a religious or speculative sense, I am sure that every time I find more original results in culture in terms of authorial results that are a next, what has come after of the eighties when everything seemed exhausted, novelty is important after postmodernism
I I distance myself in an important way from certain positions that have recently emerged in theanthropology, and some of which have touched me quite closely. such as george marcus who is one of the editors of writing culture and schneider, who is an editor whopublic an essay by george in which george talks about me, in that essay that georgepublic in berg, oxford university, not in the part where he talks about me but where he talks about an event, thecuratorship that I did with surpik angelini at rice university, he says that it is an experience conducive toappropriation
I don't share thatposition from george which doesn't mean that i don'tthis according to other parts of your text,specifically I disagree with that, and that gave rise to schneider, who is a kind of follower of george, the editor of contemporary art and anthropology, in whichpublic he george essay, deliberatelywill publish an essay titledappropriation aspractice, appropriation as practice, they have given rise to this positioning in favor ofappropriation, tofreak sociocultural from which I distance myself and from which it distances itselfalso stephen to tyler, as I say in these new sites that I have published ingoogle sites, yo, stephen A tyler, quetzil eugenio castañeda and surpik angelini we are a trend, atrend in theethnometodologia, interactionismsymbolic and theanthropology cultural, completely different from other inclinations that the so-calledanthropology postmodern than you in the essay onme very clearlywe develop, we are a different trend from the course that George and especially Schneider's path have taken, theyare promulgating theappropriation, and I disagree with that
This does not mean that they do notare influenced by us, ifare, ifare and a lot, georgeit is for example, in fact practicingquestion of the facilitiesethnographic that I was the first to do itconceived and that I proposed it, georgeit is exploring the field ofanthropology in a way that I was the first to propose it andI carried to thepractice Yet thetheory, andare influenced by me, but they have taken a course that isdivert of the original turn, of the original impulse, of the original boom that this had between me, stephen, quetzil and surpik
There is an ethical difference between us, there is also a different relationship with politics, they are more politicized and more interested in politics, we not only less but not at all, with the exception of Quetzil who at some points negotiates certain things related to cultural politics, I don't even have that, I am very closed to politics, as I told you in the analysis I did about the book, the difference of Lyotard, when he states very clearly that the modes of language, discourse and contemporary enunciation, are structured as discursive regimes. that separate the areas from each other, for example doctors, who have a technical language, who talk about medicines, treatments, diseases, etc., sociologists who talk about core concepts that define the social, situation, social action, social actor , which are part of the jargon of sociology, etc., art, which talk about styles, that is, there are specialized technicalities that make up the vocabularies of those discursive regions that are the regimes to which Lyotard refers and there is something that he analyzed very important when he said that if there is a form of social consciousness that is not articulated on the basis of specialized, specific discursive regimes, such as disciplines and fields, it is precisely the discourse of politics that lacks its own discourse, that lacks of specificity, given that its discourse is rhetoric and whose specificity consists of nothing other than lacking its own discourse and appropriating the discourse of these specialized areas.
I am closed to this appropriation of science by politics, I am also closed to the very idea of political sciences, in fact I consider it in Habermasian terms, although I distance myself from Habermas from the moment I accept certain political debates, in terms of the Habermasian discussion on reason and rationality, I consider that politics is in no way rationality, there is no way to defend the idea of scientific reason and the neutrality of reason based on politics and it is not possible to establish a parameter to articulate that a science can be politics, or there can be a scientific policy, policies always lead to oppositions that in the most extreme cases lead to war, to combat between positions each of which believes to be right, there is no possibility of political reasoning , politics is ideology and reflects in another way the situation of cultural and social groups and cannot be elevated to the rank of science, in this sense I remain in the tradition of axiological neutrality and for a long time, throughout my theoretical training, my theoretical readings between the eighties and the nineties saw me clearly discerning that science must always remain neutral with respect to politics, I continue to maintain my position in this sense.
Once these reservations have been made that you already know, I do not consider that the concept ofappropriation can have onevia possible or a path in the field ofproduction intellectualcontemporary, I consider itethically a decadence, adepravity morality in whichfallen certain type of postmodernism, I consider that thepostmodernism In general it has excesses and in that I agree with Habermas, Habermas stressed that postmodernism is ainclination extremist, and made manyreviews to postmodernism in his essays on modernity and postmodernity, which werearticulators of the Habermas Lyotard debate in the eighties, a debate that is crucial for me, in everything I have developed, areference crucial in my work, they were focused on thisproblematic and I very much agree with thereviews from Habermas to postmodernism, postmodernism,in many of his inclinationsfallen in adepravity moral andethic in adecay that has several edges
one of the artists is precisely, for example, with all that play ofindefinition between literature and science produce such a gamesemantic with the meaning of words and concepts, which ends up denying thecategories, anti-scientism, I am closed to that edge of postmodernism, anti-scientism, why?, because it leads to deformations in knowledge, deformations that areethics and moral butalso scientifically otherciables
Theput the example of the concept ofdiaspora that names everything and names nothing,also the words sacks that umberto echo refers to in the absent structure, that you put anything in the sack and the word means it, you reach such a level ofprofusion of the sensesemantic of thecategories that he refusescore hard that defines theprecision of the concepts required and necessary so that the concepts can have a correlationempirical that at least meets certainparameters important aspects of objectivity and scientificity, ceasing to even matterthat point that knowledge maintains arelationship asMinimum offeedback enriching in true contact with thephenomena studied
It reaches such a level ofprofusion of the concepts, whichtheories not only thetheories, the discursive modes because it is an edge thatcarry to therhetoric, to theindistinctness in betweenreason andrhetoric, in betweenreason scientific andpersuasion, to a point in which everything is profuse and we no longer know what it is about.it is Speaking, I distance myself from that edge of postmodernism and in the same way towards the way the wordappropriation that I consider it a tangent of decadent postmodernism that represents one of the extremes and decadent excesses to which Habermas refers
There are other decadent, mediocre consequences, because I believe thathere the best word is mediocrity noonly decadence, which speak of a tiredness of an exhaustion of asituation of lack ofproliferation, of lack of boom, of lack of cultural vitality, of lack of cultural revival where postmodernism largely appears as aideology exhausted, tired, repetitive, which often leads to conservatism and neoconservatism, for example, in the field ofanthropology, one of the things that causes thatindistinction itself categorical is to nodistinction between the author and the official
then suddenly certainethnographers are called tothemselves photographers because they write two or three essays or four or five or a little book that collects such or such essays written in this or that period, while on the other hand thatethnographer is a cultural official who operates in the culture with a level ofinstitutionalization of his practices that he is more of a minister of culture, abureaucrat, a cultural official, abureaucrat that an authorauthentic, what a true creator
I am definitely closed to it, the author is non-negotiableauthentic with the official orbureaucrat, with this I am not saying that an authorauthentic at a given moment cannot be an official, such as a good writer or a good intellectual who at a given moment is given aposition in ainstitution but if that person does not have control that allows him to differentiate his authorial work from theposition given to him at a given moment in his life, in a given institutionality, and he begins to mix the authority provided by theabout institutionalization passing hispractice authorial from within the consequences that this bureaucracy and institutionality has in anything that is done from it that author has doneconcessions andit is producing in the culture an effect of truth caused by the effect of authority provided by the authority he has as an official
Today inday a greatnumber ofethnographers They are actually cultural officials,bureaucrats of culture,are doingfurther policies institutional government andpolicy cultural, are workingfurther as officials who asauthentic authors,authentic creators, why?, because postmodernism in its decadence no longer matters, it no longer matters if the author is the author, in short the authorit is deadaccording to Barthes in his decadent period, it no longer matters who the author is, it isfurther who is the author asHe said Foucault in one of his essays, how it no longer matters and all the categories are gone to the ravine and now all the gamessemantics are accepted and it no longer mattersprecisionWell, it doesn't matter thedistinction in betweenthat is to be an official and what is to be an intellectual, no no no I don't deal with that, I distance myself from it, then theappropriation is apractice of irresponsibility, especially when we see it from the point of viewprecisely fromquestion of postcolonialism anddecolonization around which I already made acriticism before on which we agreed on an early part of directions, I want to return to that now, to make someanalysis between one thing and the other.
It isdistinctions postmodernists of theprofusion of the sensesemantic precise of thecategories, in the disbelief ofcore hardness of the meaning of concepts, in anti-scientism not onlyit is expressing in theethnography where a greatnumber ofethnographers whichare doing In reality it is bureaucracy, its books, its publications are bureaucracy
I have serious objections to the editorial negotiations that in the field ofanthropology and theethnography withare doing at the editorial level where they enterpolicies cultural, gamesbureaucratic and official institutions that express transactions of officials in the field of literature, and that is one of the reasons why I am giving so much importance to theself-publishing, to the freedom of being able to publish one's things without negotiating withpolicies that youupset the texts that involve the author's texts in manipulationsMachiavellian governed byofficials and bureaucracies
today inday the amount ofethnographers that they are actually officials is very high, not all of them of course areSo but it is a danger that in general hasethnography from which I distance myself.
On the other hand, it is not expressedonly in theethnography, it is expressedalso In the curatorial field, curators today have almost become ambassadors of thecountries, they have become officials of culture. I object to that, I consider it a sign of decadence and I consider that it is not possible to compromise in thataddress, in the field ofcuratorship we assume thatemerged in the field of art, now becausealso nicecuratorship in the field ofanthropology, arose as a consequence of thecomplexification fromtraining of the value of the work of art and thecomplexification with theappearance of the mass media, of the forms ofmediation cultural relationship that occurred between the museum and the creators, between the institutional system, its connections with the mass media and the artists' studios, among others.phenomena how are theyproduction cultural events
was required at a given period that figures that were previously separated as distinct things in thescope of the fieldartistic such as for examplecritical of art that wasfurther a commentator, areflexologist about the exhibitions and the works, and the producer who was seen as the one whotoward possible the event somehow those two figures had to join together, they leftblurring the edges between one and the other, thecritical had to start producing and the producer had to start makingcriticism, and from there it emerged in megenealogy in itanalysis that I have done this at the levelsociological, the figure of the curator, the emergency, the need for the figure of the curator
but the figure of the curator when it arises in hisorigins the moment it arises in theirorigins at first, especially at a certain point in the eighties, it had aconnotation whatdiscussed me at a meeting of curators in theyear 94 in Venezuela in Puerto La Cruz, where he saw himself as an intellectualicily participating in adiscussion creative in the field of ideas, that is no longer the case, if there are some curators left, you can count on the fingers of one hand who maintain the authenticity of the curator as an intellectual whoit is discussing ideas, andit is truly linked in a lively way to the creative processes andartistic, and to the processes of culture, exceptions aremost of curators today are cultural officials, they arebureaucrats of culture have become figures thataffect in what the secretaries of state say or do not say. have become such politicized figures andwrapped indynamic bureaucratic that have becomemonsters deformed.
I away from all that soradical, not business with none of that, all of that seems like a great decadence to me, I'm not interested and I'm not going to doconcessions in any of those directions, I will never do them, whatever the implications that this may have on my career.
how youHe said This is one of the reasons why I give so much importance toself-publishing, to publish one's own sites, to be one who publishesitself, I consider that it is very important to participate in culture with works, with thoughts and with ideas thatare itfurther close as possible toscope ofproduction from which oneit is working in aConnection vital with the processes that one brings negotiating to theMinimum mediational transactions andintermediations who thus go through the danger of falling into bureaucracy and of falling into which the author becomes a civil servant, anddistinguish these concepts
So returning to theappropriation, wanted to give a clear sign that thedecolonization is impossible and that it is a fallacy, and that postcolonialism is a fallacy, precisely the issue ofappropriation air that this isSo. When an author of Hispanic origin, whether in the United States, Europe or from thecountries Hispanics, innovate something, for example, in thetradition Habermasian, let us suppose an author of Hispanic origin whoit is starting from certainparameters Habermasians in theanalysis by onefreak very specific
Let's take for example in Caracas where therelationship among some alternative mass media that exists in a university in the faculty ofsociology in this case simon rodriguez who has asession of stockings foredition of films andprojection from an alternative television station, therelationship between that faculty of stockingssociology, the community in which the universityit is inserted, andchurch in therelationship between that university and that community, for faith projects andhappiness, cecap and cepap, in Venezuela, when youare analyzing thisfreak the relationships between mass media, church and community, for example in this case you are a Hispanic intellectual andare analyzingempirically It isfreak and suppose you resort to the concepts ofsocietari age of having more, but when youintertwined that with the reality thatare analyzing obviously you are not analyzing German modernity,you're analyzing afreak specific whathardly has been givenrelationship such between university, community and church in Europe in such a way
therefore inevitably when you make your own construct, areflection, a writing, a thought, a book, a set of essays on these problems, it is inevitable that you innovate, it is inevitable that it has an innovative consequence regarding thetradition Habermasian, what does a Mexican or Hispanic intellectual do in the United States, Europe or in the sameAmerica Latina or the Caribbean wherever, what do you do when you receive this author's book? In an essay in which he writes about Habermas, he attributes all the innovations that this Hispanic author made to Habermas.
and he does this himselfintellectual Hispanic than on the other handit is speaking ofdecolonization and postcolonialism, theredecolonization It is impossible and it is a fallacy, the intellectual of Hispanic origin is never recognized the possibility of innovating atradition that comes from Europe or the United States, that is, from thecountries central, of thecountries that were colonial, always the innovations of thinkers of Hispanic origin,caribbean, whether they do it from the United States, from Europe or fromcountries Hispanics, they are never recognizedinnovation in thetradition colonial, in this case Habermas is aGerman and germany was one of thecountries colonizers, which makes the Hispanic intellectual a colleague or cultural compatriot of the one who made thatinnovation?, theinnovation to the Hispanic, attributes these innovations to Habermas in an essay in which, speaking of Habermas, he uses everything that this Hispanic authorinnovated forassign to habermas.
I seeI'm I confront it continually, I am an analyst of thisfreak and I have already corroborated it at an empirical and scientific level in countless cases, Europe and the United States, of course, especially Europe, does not waste a second in this awareness, if a Hispanic intellectual, for example me, as I did in a video that moves the issueshermeneutics within sociology in a way that never in any Gadamer book israised, ni seasked inwrote, after three months the European translators and editors of gadamerare preparing aedition about gadamer things in the social sciences. I have seen and confirmed it continuously
the opposite of what the colonial intellectual does?, the one who comes from the dominant cultures, shamelessly appropriates this Hispanic thinker, I'm telling you, whether he lives in the United States, Europe or in hiscountries of origin, stephen to tyler of course is aexception, because it is a realethnographer, a trueanthropologist with aethic blameless, consistent and he recognized the innovativeness of mythought and of my work in some reviews and comments that he made to me when reading several booksmine He told me you are still as innovative as always, he recognizes it but it is not usual, there may be exceptions, some cases that realize and recognize it,could give you many examples of theseappropriations in a negative sense Icontinuously I am confronting appropriations of things that I do.
You told me at one point about my cousin Robertico, he lived in Orlando, then he went to Kansas, he lived in Kansas for several years, and now he lives in Orlando again, it's good that you are communicating with him, remember that Robertico and I are very emotionally important to each other, he lives there with his wife and two children, we grew up together, we grew up together with our grandparents, he is the son of my mother's sister, we grew up from about one year old to three years old sharing a room, We are like brothers, and we love each other very much, it's good that he sent all those photographs to me. I really like that project of his. I wrote an essay about his theater that he told me he liked a lot and I really liked the twist that He came across this project for a book on stilt culture, I criticized that project that I find very interesting, extremely interesting, I want to write about it, but I think that it has to be curated, like when you come to a study of an artist who is very productive and you realize that he is a little disoriented, in the sense that to reach important mature results he had to travel many paths, it seems to me that there are things that are left over, it seems to me that he loses the thread, it is like If I had illuminations in the sense of Benjamin, he always gives good results but he goes too far, he goes too far towards entertainment, the marabarist, the clown, the project would have to be curated although I think it stands on its own, it's good that I sent you all those images
I very much appreciate theshipment of the books you have made for me, the structure of thelifeworld ofprotection and luckman, writing culture, the predicament of culture, as you know I am very immersed in thediscussion of writing culture not only because Stephen is a decisive influence on me and we work so many timesyears together as you say in yourForeword was in writing culture, which is actually theposition intellectual that I considerfurther novel, daring, more interesting, more original, than I have been since the first time Iread I understood whatI would be an obligatory reference for me, as much as it isprotection, Habermas was, Derrida or Peirce, I was very trapped by that essay by Stephen in Writing Culture, his essayethnography postmodern
On the other hand, I am very interested in James Clifford, Iread the predicament of culture, I read it inSpanish published in gedisa, and inEnglish lo revise, y lei en ingles routes, travel and translation in the late xx century, y also thetranslation al Spanish, transcultural itineraries, which is not atranslation but anothertitle but it's the same book,which I honestly like James Clifford a lot, not as much as Stephen, I have some differences with him, well as I do with Levis Strauss, I have much lessreviews him, alreadyme levis strauss me I include, buttook some distances, but hey he is the editor of writing culture
Thediscussion of writing culture I know it well, I read in Caracas the compendium of Carlos Reynosos The advent of theanthropology postmodern that is apresentation of the movement at that time but that includes many who did notare in writing culture, who were not in santa fe, the writing culture manuscriptread further recently, I have my points of view,discussion I master it very well becauseknow its sources inanthropology, dennis tedlock, michael taussig, among others
I read it completely, I have my points of view, it is adiscussion which I master very well because I know its precedents and its sources, and well, I was and still am when I was in person for long periods of time.years in the faculty ofanthropology from rice universitybecoming In one of the main figures there, as has been made clear in many publications, there is apublication specifically thatPresents itself within the context of writing culture that I talked to you about.
He begins the essay by discussing and rediscussing and remembering things about writing culture, and he compares me with Victor Turner, with Shetner, he is from George Marcus that I had mentioned before, then he goes on to discuss me, on a theoretical level he analyzes performativity in Nor, it is interesting what he analyzes there about me, I have published some fragments of his text that I really liked, here and there that are very good but I have some discrepancies with some parts of the essay, but well one You can never agree with all the parts of an essay, agreeing one hundred percent is almost impossible, one always has distances and objections, I appreciate it, I think it was a valuable effort from the first time he wrote it because he He wrote in 2001 in a first version that he shared very closely with me academically. I even had the possibility of giving editing suggestions. I know the original manuscript, and then also the one he published to which he made subsequent modifications. He left the main things. I left the ones that I liked the most but added others that I didn't like very much.
But it happens to me with George in general, there are things that I like about him but there are others that I don't, he has a concern for politics that I don't share, he has interesting concepts like multisite, but he later made modifications to it, he is always very refreshing, I really liked his edition in late edition, he was given the edition of a magazine at the university of chicaco press for ten years, late editions, where he did a phenomenal job, very good, excellent, cultural studies at the end of the century, I really liked that, the traffic in culture, refiguring art and anthropology published in Chicago is also a very interesting volume, but sometimes it is not right and I have my objections and I say them frankly, I said that I agree with his concept of multisite and that except for many pages of his essay on that topic, the emergency of multisite ethnography, I agree with him on many things he discusses in that essay, but disagree with others such as his appeal to an economy. politics, to politics in general, and how, for example, he makes a criticism of the relationship between hermeneutics and structure that I do not share, and I said it in a text that I published that I do not agree, accepting, by the way, certain criticisms that What Foucault does to that relationship that I disagree with and distanced me is that I do not agree and I will never agree, even though they sell me to Focuault as the god of European philosophy,
Now what those who put Pierre Bourdieu as an influencer and that seems to me is the last straw, Bourdieu didn't say that, the translators and editors who prepare those sites that make those exogenous decisions in which those things are published are doing it, they are decisions that are not considered from the point of view of the endogenous decantation processes through which theorists, authors and thinkers decant over time what our influences are, of the intellectual processes that lead to an intellectual like me or bourdieu to the difficult process of decanting over time what our true endogenous influences are, that is, considered by oneself from their honest processes of decantation, selection and distancing, that takes us a lot of effort over time, it cannot then come from outside in a way that is exogenous to those endogenous processes of self-explicitation and authorial self-elucidation, theoretical, thought, even style, positioning, to say that this or that one, is influenced by this or that other that one itself from its endogenous processes has not been considered in that way, nor mentioned and recognized in that way.
There is nodecision further important andfurther related to the processes ofdecantation personal, of thebiography by onetheoretical as one who precisely decides over time, after long and extensive maturation, who have been our true anddecisive influences, it is adecantation very pure that each one establishes and thatit is related to the originality of each person as an author, thinker andtheoretical
And this is another topic in which what I told you before about the harmful effect of policies is clearly seen. Let's say for example, over long years of individual intellectual processes endogenous to my own works, to my own style and preferences, choices, I decide that my main influences are shutz, peirce, derrida, stephen, and then along come these bureaucrats, these officials that I was referring to before and he says, oh look, these that Abdel is defining here about himself, it turns out that if the conjugation that Abdel has made as a result of personal processes of authorial, theoretical and scientific, biographical and individual decantation, It results in its own original conjugation that is successful, well look how well Abdel is doing with his choices, let's do the same, let's draw it up as a policy, and in a matter of a few months or years after you make it known your influences, it turns out that they have made cultural policies so that all the ethnographers and anthropologists whom they have wanted to benefit in their cultural policies, suddenly appear overnight also referred to as influenced by those who you as an individual have said influence you. , come from outside with exogenous considerations of political convenience, and shamelessly appropriate the endogenous profile of an intellectual, this is a good example of how so-called cultural policies work, they ruthlessly appropriate very personal endogenous intellectual processes of the authors, thinkers and Theorists, they appropriate the profile of an individual intellectual to make politics with the same profile in favor of official and bureaucratic policies to benefit and favor others without ever mentioning that your individual profile has been appropriated.
To say that pierre bourdieu was influenced by foucault is a complete lie, bourdieu jamesspeak of Foucault, in no work is it very forced that because Foucaultdedicated to power and bourdieu worries about capitalsymbolic and the ways ofdomination, it is said that Foucaulthad an influence on bourdieu, that seems to meatrocious, oh wellit is happening, unfortunately we are living in a world of special effects wherepsychology of the special effects he has everything mastered, the truth isaccording to This is a special effect like the cinemahollywood and thefilms of aliens, the special effects are what convince you, if youconvince What does it matter if it is the true truth, whatit matters is that it convinces
I object to it and distance myself from it in a radical way
and that's the way george embraces thatcriticism from foucault torelationship in betweenhermeneutics and structure in his essayethnography multisituated I object to it, I refute it and I distance myself from it.
On the other hand, with James Clifford I have a lotfurther affinity, I am very interested in his themes and his developments of course never like Stephen, Stephen is already for me a figure whose workit is a lotfurther close to my positionsepistemological already at a levelfurther hard totheory tough positionsfurther you would be as much asprotectionFor me, Stephen is a must-see material. But I have publications aboutmy what me situates in itscope of writing culture, this same young man who washere interviewing me alex wernergetting a doctorate in cunny, he told me several times yourposition is that of writing culture, andwe were talking about topics that were not about writing culture, we talked about stephen, about geertz, but not about writing culture, and he saw therelationship from me to writing culture, because if there are indeed a series of issues inanthropology that I amfurther in thataddress inside ofanthropology than in any other
But in reality I already valued and pondered all this a long time ago and from very early on.I decided precisely in the sensehere pointed out, thatposition which is truly coincident with thetight in all thatdiscussion It's Stephen A Tyler's, in that senseprovide for me to distance myself from certain thingsformed part of the movementanthropology postmodern from a perspective of a newgeneration contemporaryOf course, itoccurred en 1986, writing culture y santa fe, we are in 2023 and whatoccurred in Houston and I did from Houston it waspractically 30 years after, then it is a movement in which there were many mutations, many changes, Geertz, for example, in the anthropologist as an author GeertzHe said she spokecryptically He said thatanthropology Nevercould be transcultural and todayday in this movementtransculturation fromanthropology It's almost a sin equanon, Iwould say which is something main
There are therefore many things in which the new generations ofanthropologists postmoderns we have been moving away from that wayoriginal whathad the legitimacy of that trend, haschanged much theanthropology postmodern with its new exponents including me. Well, yes, I also believe that these are references that you have placed in your essay about my book The Correlate of the World and in your interview and in the books that you have sent me that are going to help us a lot both in the interview that Iyou wanted do as in ourdialogue theoretical I am going to continue exploring the matter, we have pending the issue of how to pass inmethodology frominvestigation fromsemiotics and theanalysis linguistic al analysis cultural where you alreadyforward metheory soberly from interpreting.
If that photo of Stephen is veryfamous in theanthropology United States and North American at this time it was at that time and it still is today, Stephen played with it, it is valuable, it is not in vain that it is the cover and Stephen who is it from my point of viewposition the figurefurther interesting movement, it is a movement initself from always until his writingslate in thelast periods of his intellectual life, he is aarchipelago an island within postmodern inclinations in theanthropology, an island indeed one of whosecharacteristics further notable is that it has always been maintainedskeptical and distanced frompolicy and of thepoliticization.
What I am referring to is not an essay that I wrote but one that George Marcus wrote, if you look closer, writing culture is not edited only by Hames Clifford but between James Clifford and George Marcus, they collaborate Writing culture is both of them , titled between art and anthropology, is long where he begins discussing writing culture and then talks about me, it was published in 2006 where he discusses my ero before entering me, just as you have made a whole introduction for your interview with me, The discussion of writing culture to introduce me, things that could not be achieved, raises a series of problems typical of the discussion of writing culture, what I am telling you is that that essay that was published in 2006 in London in Berg, the published version in 2006 it is not the same as his essay that he wrote in 2001, I was there at that time, it is the year I crossed the border from Houston, I went to Monterrey, he wrote the essay and put it in my inbox, the email address he has One, as a scholar in the faculty, gave me the first version, I gave him my impressions but it was not yet published, he published it five years later but he made changes not to what he discusses about me but to other things, things that are not about me. my. things that were not there and in those changes there are several things that I do not share, some seem normal to me, I have some objections but it is excellent, it is interesting I have chosen the burned parts I like the fragments that I like because it has parts that I do not like
The other is a very later essay by my friend calledmulti sited ethnography, en It is essay discusses his concept ofethnography multi-situated and I don't like that essay that mixes it with questions ofpolicy, politicizes certain components of theethnography and I distance myself from it in the same way that Stephen said it
Stephen said itin it essay in response to me and said it in an interview with scott thathe is except towards thepolicy, I keep the sameposition of Stephen that science must be neutral, that science must not allow itself to be persuaded, nor permeated bypolicy, and then in that essay george cites acriticism from foucault torelationship between structure andspecifically to therelationship in betweenhermeneutics and structure, cite acriticism What does Foucault do to that one?relationship, as a way of telling you that I have my distances towards him
The 2001 essay was about my Collaborations in the field, in 2006 he introduces references to thecuratorship What I did with Surpik at Rice University, he did it in the essay.public almost the same but I add thereferences to those seven exhibitions and some conferences that Surpik and I gave at the rice media center and that is why I changed the title
The concept of structureit is overcome, a certain type of structuralism that isexhausted but the structures still exist and are relevant and we cannotavoid them, there are structures, there are in thought, there are in language and there are in society, what there is is thattheorize, theorize the concept of structure
Part IV
By Alberto Mendez Suarez
RESPONSE TO ABDEL ON THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM AND THE FUNCTION OF PSYCHIATRY AS A DISCIPLINE THAT TARGETS MENTAL NEURALGIA AND ITS CONSEQUENT THERAPEUTICS.
Abdel, how are you, it's Alberto. Thank you for your audios, your comments are very valuable to me. Thanks again. I am now going to answer you and now getting into the matter I also want to underline my epistemological interest in the question of the mind-body dilemma about the place where the connection between the mental world and the physical and organic world occurs in an individual and its effects on the subjectivity. As you know, this is a very recurring topic to which I return with some frequency on multiple occasions, as you may have noticed given my interest in epistemological problems related to the acquisition of language by the human mind at a level not only evolutionary but also in an intrinsic perspective, the way in which it incarnates in consciousness as the different frames of reference are distributed as well as the different points of view that the different schools of philosophy of mind and philosophy of language within a much broader framework of philosophy of science in the general scope of Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-American neopositivist and postpositivist logical-empiricist analytical philosophy of the 20th century in which a considerable number of prominent researchers, professors and thinkers of the magnitude of Karl Popper, W.V. Quine, Carnap, Russell, Von Wright, Davidson stand out. , Putnam, Dummett, Hintikka and Richard Rorty among many others.
The problem of consciousness as a truly autonomous problem takes off from the beginning of modernity with Descartes' method and his definition of the so-called cogito. The problem of the mind as a problem of psychology as a philosophical discipline has always been a concern in the history of psychiatry in its research and mapping of the human brain to define the anatomical areas and their different neurophysiological and neuropsychological functions with the explicit purpose of locate, as Descartes expected, the pineal gland where Descartes located or assume that in that gland the connection was made in the brain where the mental had this extrinsic connection in the body between the res cogitans and the res extenso according to the definitions given by Descartes himself. Forms and modalities derived from this initial principle typical of Cartesian dualism that evolved in the face of Thomistic Aristotelianism since the end of the Middle Ages when all the cognitive and ideological constructs began that were sedimented, giving shape to these phenomena that were interpreted from the problems of the soul and body, where they secrete these forms of purification of the soul through the martyrdom of the body. With the beginning of modern thought, Descartes introduced this double dimension into the scientific terms of his time. This dualism is continually revisited throughout modernity until reaching the 20th century where a large constellation of very interesting thinkers began to dedicate themselves to the study of the mind, highlighting these same problems that motivated Descartes to establish his formula of the mind.I think, therefore I am. The list may be enormous but it will be enough to first mention Karl Jaspers who, as you know, was a German psychiatrist who was a student of Husserl and whose intellectual mentor was Max Weber. I don't know if you knew that, but Weber was an intellectual personality who greatly influenced young Jaspers intellectually and personally. Jaspers, however, had, on the other hand, the merit of introducing the dimension of meaning in the history of psychiatric thought, which until the beginning of the 20th century was based purely on the organic explanation of mental illnesses, starting from an organic causality of psychopathologies. when the founders of largely theoretically oriented German psychiatry both Greisinger and Khalbaun and shortly thereafter Emil Kraepelin had hijacked German psychiatry in the perspective of organic causality of psychiatric illnesses. Kraepelin, by the way, had been the one who prepared one of the first manuals on mental illness that existed until then based on a symptomatological catalog of psychiatric disorders of an organic nature. So the advent of Jaspers to the scientific scene of his time revolutionized psychiatry, reconciling on the one hand the scientific causation that starts from the organic cause and is reflected as a consequence in its symptomatic effect of the psychic disorder and on the other hand the comprehensive phenomenology. of the individual history of the subject or patient and the empathy of the psychiatrist with the introduction of his own personal and autobiographical history in an intersubjective creation during psychotherapeutic and psychiatric treatment.
Jaspers' place was of enormous importance for the history of 20th century psychiatry with the contribution of his bookPsychopathology general as much or more than Freud in his time for integrating the personal history and biography of the patient in the therapy itself and in the psychotherapeutic treatment itself. In the tradition opened by Dilthey between Erklärung (causation) and Verstehen (understanding), Jaspers reconciled Husserl's phenomenological project with Kraepelin's organicism. The importance of Jaspers' contribution to the psychiatry of his time was that the German psychiatrist reconciled the phenomenological thinking of the 20th century with the scientific research of his time. And he wrote the epistemological assumptions of his phenomenological research using Weber's methodological conception of ideal types to describe psychopathologies as phenomena susceptible not only to classification but also to comprehensive systematic elaboration of both the patient and the therapist through the subjectivation of regional ontologies. of the typical personality ideals of the different descriptive phenomenologies of mental illnesses. Jaspers' work had a similar dimension in the same positive sense that both Freud's psychoanalysis and Michel Foucault's History of Madness contributed to the 20th century. Because precisely both Jaspers' Psychopathological Investigations and Freud's psychoanalysis and thehistory of madness of Foucault freed the mentally ill from the brutal, merciless treatment of the beginnings of modern medicine that still manages residual forms of medieval Aristotelian medicine. The brutalized practice with which the mentally ill was treated as a sick animal with an unsalvageable, untreatable and impregnable soul, precisely because many mental illnesses are incurable and become insidious due to their chronicity until the problem of causality remains unresolved. the phenomenon continues to be thought about. I do not agree with the often cruel and merciless consideration with the perspective in which the mentally ill were considered almost less than an animal, sometimes due to ignorance, other times due to religious considerations, or caused by relative pagan traditions of a folkloric and popular nature. to demonic possessions of a secular nature that considered the mentally ill as possessed by diabolical influences that had to be removed from the patient's body, forcing him to go through martyrdom and torture or social exclusion and eventually physical death through ----- -on many occasions------ a brutal and ruthless treatment carried out by the Holy Office or protected under the complicit tutelage of the Church. With modernity and from the radical changes introduced by the French Revolution in the field of medicine and especially public health in Western Europe, it was with the help of Pinel that the reforms to biopolitical treatment acquired a liberating character and in In a certain way, the previous public practice of exclusion and alienation of the mentally ill as part of the traditional exclusion practices carried out from Greek antiquity to the European Middle Ages allowed the mistreatment and inhumane treatment of the mentally ill as a demon possessed to be replaced along with the exclusion practices. of lepers, vagabonds, thieves, criminals and murderers by the systematic practice of confinement and the still painful treatment of medicine brought by the modernity of the exorcist practices of the Church with the purpose of healing souls through of the martyrdom of the flesh to extract from the body possessed by the demon that, far from martyring, or murdering the mentally ill with capital punishment, proceeded to the exclusive confinement of the patient, this time considered as a patient in the traditional sense of Western medicine. . If it were not for the humanization of medicine in the treatment of the insane as mentally ill, psychiatry would not have been able to become a medical discipline or specialty with independence and autonomy. We will have to wait until the beginning of the 20th century for Jaspers to introduce the long-awaited project of humanization of psychopathologies into the psychiatry of his time. Likewise, we will have to wait for psychoanalysis coming from the hand of Freud to produce a second moment of relevance in the process of humanization of the mentally ill. Jaspers would introduce the patient's autobiographical significance and his ability to historicize his own psychic drama. Freud, for his part, burst onto the mental scene at the dawn of the century withThe interpretation of the dreams (1900) through whose method he provides the exegesis of the unconscious dimension and the explanation of the mechanism of repression that produces it and eventually its treatment and cure through the unprecedented method of psychoanalysis. This represented an indisputable and essential liberation of the psychiatric patient forced to hospital confinement for long periods and in serious cases almost permanently suffering all types of abuse since the condition of madness has awakened the perversity of the medical confinement system structured in the same way as the systems more oppressive prisons, denigrating individual dignity and nullifying the rights of the subject and eventually hindering the regular course of treatment and consequently negatively affecting the healing and recovery of the patient. That is why I totally disagree with continuing to reproduce the old analysis and classification schemes of the 19th century that have proven not to be supported by any scientific evidence to continue considering madness as diseases of the soul and continue defining psychoses from the perspective of the gaze. medical advice on organic diseases. Psychic causality is still under discussion. And if a Freud, a Jaspers or a Foucault have emerged, it is because in some way the structures that were destined to defend the moral and bodily integrity of patients and to defend their subjective condition as well as the "ontological need" of the institutions in charge of safeguarding Its psychotherapeutic functioning has failed and therefore the new circumstances have caused the gestation, speculation and reconstruction of new strategies that dignified and resignify the subjective nature of madness and a horizon of hope to dignify its truth. By this I do not mean that there is not a certain correlation between some symptomatic types of behavior and certain organically deficient characteristics, such as in the current bipolar disorders of psychotic structure, once called manic-depressive psychoses in Kraepelin's now obsolete classification, where a deficiency in lithium levels in the blood that conditions a type of reabsorption of neurotransmitters determining a type of symptomatology related to an alternation of euphoric episodes and episodes of depression. It is enough to maintain lithium levels at their optimal level to prevent symptoms from triggering.
For his part, and regarding the subjective condition of madness, Michel Foucault in the 60's at the end of the 20th century reveals in his bookhistory of madness(1961) his discovery of the conditions of possibility in his Kantian sense of the strategy of confinement as a mechanism for the production of madness as a disease of the soul. A first archaeological period of Foucault that you seem to master with great skill and with which you are very familiar from your readings and studies of youth. On the other hand, I would like to take advantage of this exchange and emphasize that in the same direction there is, by the way, a letter from Derrida addressed to Foucault about the use that the French epistemologist had made of Descartes' second meditation, where he denounced the dependence of Foucault of the discourse of reason in particular ofCartesian meditations making this history of unreason another side of the same coin, as a dependent effect of the one through which Foucault could not escape from the very discourse of modernity that he had planned to carefully expose and denounce at the same time the mechanisms in which The phenomenon of madness has been isolated and produced by the authorities through their practices of exclusion, isolation and confinement of modernity as explained in his book. Of course, Foucault would never forgive Derrida for this defiant presumptuousness and notorious irreverence explicitly exposed throughout the letter published so far in the existing translations of theHistory of madness in classical timesonly, for now, in the British edition carried out by the Routledge publishing house and titled very simplyHistory of Madness. I have no idea if the original French edition includes the letter as such in the appendix section of the book. Derrida in turn has an essay ------that you most likely know------ and that revolves around the same problem entitled "Cogito and History of Madness" where he develops these theses, expanding and deepening them. the same theme.
RESPONSE TO ABDEL ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE SELF WITH THE WORLD.
ALBERT MENDEZ:
Abdel, hello brother, how have you been? How have you remained healthy? It's good to hear from you again. It's also good that you spent these days of winter vacation well accompanied by your girlfriend and how nice that you have been composing a common project because that gives a lot of strength and meaning to the couple. I am very happy for you, and I tell you this as if it were happening to me due to the fact of the importance that I give ----and I think that you too ------ to the function, to the very important role. What does a woman play in the life of a man, a man like you and me and like any other who is centered and focused as we are in a work of reading and studying texts and theory of hard sciences and epistemology that is focused like us in the production of ideas, that is focused on reflection and construction of thought just as it happens to you and me and the importance that we both give to the presence of a woman in our personal life, to a companion who accompanies us in that space and in that trance and in that transaction with the everyday to the need for the love of a woman that every writer and that every thinker needs for his tranquility so that the rest of the thingswalk well in such a changing world and where intersubjective relationships are in a process of constant reconfiguration. I tell you this from my own experience because after I separated from my wife I went through very difficult periods where in a country like this they became more bitter, full of immense loneliness, in moments where I couldn't find work where everything became more difficult. And later when he had a girlfriend it was always for short periods of time. Unfortunately they never materialized into more serious stories. For many reasons of a social political nature that I do not want to resolve in this space, couple relationships in a neoliberal capitalism as ruthless as this one in the United States with all its organization charts of liberalism and democracy are reconfigured according to very specific demands related to values that are sedimented and crystallized in the collective imagination and constituted according to the reconfigurations of the social fabric. And we must understand these in the particular character they assume in a city like Miami. This has meant that my relationships are periodic and sporadic due to a series of limitations, mostly economic but others of a cultural nature, since in a city as competitive as Miami where we are all immigrants, relationships are based on very particular values. And as such this directly influences couple relationships, setting guidelines even for these intimate relationships as Anthony Giddens has explained in a very attractive little book that recently appeared. That is why I am very happy for you, and for what you are experiencing at this moment with your girlfriend and in Havana, which although you may think it has no influence, it makes a substantial difference compared to a context like Miami.
I hope that regardless of this we continue with equal interest in the Rumbos project and in the rest of our projects that we have being carried out simultaneously and that we can in perspective clear their priorities for their eventual realization. I also greatly appreciate the trust you place in me by telling me about your medium-term projects with Vicky and the possibility of returning to Venezuela -------I assume that is what you mean by commenting on moving to Caracas------Still Even if it happens that you move to Venezuela, I hope that our projects, although they may be modified, maintain in essence what they started with and what makes them a common work project for the two of us as researchers and thinkers who are thinking, reflecting and writing. with very precise and very clear objectives.
Getting to the point: I really liked these latest audios that you sent me. There is a lot to comment on and I am going to start discussing and reacting to your comments and reflections as in my answers. In relation to the self and the relationships of the self or the self with the social, the interactions between the two, I would like to make some clarifications. It is true that I told you ------and it is something that I have repeatedly shared with you my opinion------- that my greatest interest in addressing problems inherent to psychiatry and psychology is social. or cognitive, or behaviorist, or even psychoanalysis itself and in particular that of Lacan, for example, is a particularly epistemological interest. I told you that my greatest interest in it was precisely of an epistemological order and especially how the problem or mind-body dilemma in epistemology is essential to understand the different recombinations of the fundamental transaction of subjectivity with the world that is defined. in terms of consciousness or the mind on the one hand and in terms of the external world on the other, that is, of empirical reality and the scientific evidence of experience because I am interested in understanding the phenomenon as an object of scientific inquiry, and not as a psychotherapeutic clinical interest. I do not know how psychotherapeutic treatments can be introduced or implemented without first having defined a methodological strategy for a concrete investigation into the theoretical and concrete and real organic functioning of consciousness and the mental world -----using the metaphysical terms of the three worlds of Popper------ regarding his interpretation of the physical world and its interconnection with the mental world and the production of the argumentative objective world. The relationship of the self, whether mental or social, with the world is something that also concerns not only Popper but all analytical philosophers from Quine to Putnam. And in that sense it is surely very similar to eating milonga as Mead thought or as you have thought about the relationship of the Self with its collection of multiple layers of cultural phenomena sedimented one on top of the other, constituting the reticulation of a real social world. Or as you say in your first messages of this second stage of Rumbos. It is a problem that you seem to address in Self and the collection that undoubtedly arouses my interest.
In fact, today I happened to be watching and listening carefully again to your video lectures that are on YouTube, in particular. I think that in the lecture corresponding to video number 6, if I remember correctly, you approach this phenomenon by commenting in a general way on the problem addressed in your book The Self and the heritage, the relationship of the Self with the world following the elaborations of the anthropologist Herbert George Mead and that now in these latest WhatsApp audios you suggest that your students read them. Yes, of course, in fact, the idea excites me and I find it attractive since it is a topic for my center. I hope you share the book with me. I don't have it, if you have the chance please send me an electronic copy of that text.
Continuing on this topic, I told you that for me the mind-body problem in both psychiatry and psychology introduced issues of an epistemic nature. Therefore, this problem has a fundamental meaning from an epistemological and not a clinical point of view, something that took me years to clearly define.
I had told you that between 1991 and 1995 I did a job ------indirectly influenced by my knowledge of your thesis of the maker and by the important cognitive mark that the conversations we had from August 1990 to February left on me. 1991------I told you that I had carried out an experimental laboratory of social research in cultural anthropology with a sociological intention with groups and bands of rockers and punks from Havana, they were basically sociological experiments with the intention of social class therapy. in the most relevant figures of the Havana rock scene, first locating a deficit neuralgia in these groups as the authentication of their own urban mythology where the objective of the small work team that I formed then sought to reinsert the myth of Frankenstein, as you know, is the story of a Cuban rocker from the late 70's and one of the emblematic figures of the Rampa hippies in Vedado whose sudden death we had detected had left an unresolved void in the history of these groups. The objective that I had set for myself at work was to reconstruct this myth and then insert it into the collective imagination of these groups. The situation and our presence among them made conscious a history that had somehow been elided, erased or at least eluded.
Inspired precisely -----as I told you before------by what I learned from your creative method of the maker in the late 80's and whose project I heard about in 1990 when an old friend of mine told me about it. your conferences within the framework ofThe object sculptured.I told you that both your thesis of the maker and the reading of theStructural anthropology by Levi-Strauss when I studied the entire book from beginning to end, a year later, in 1991, they served as inspiration for the anthropological experiment with rockers. The work carried out by the small group that I formed with two friendsmine a plastic artist and aphotographer We reconstruct the story of Frankenstein until his death in 1984 in the form of a myth following the guidelines outlined by Levi-Strauss in the chapter on the structure of myths in Structural Anthropology. Precisely because of the ethical issues inherent in all work with scientific pretensions, such as the sociological experimental work that we were doing with the geeks, I asked myself a lot of questions that put me in front of a dilemma that is at the very center of anthropology. It is about the participation of the scientist or the observer in the reality and internal dynamics of the group, understanding all rock groups as a group in its cultural sense. This implies breaking a rule, subverting a code that imposes certain regulations on the observer. It was more about crossing theboundaries of the observer and participate in the sense of the "observer-participant" as was thought by Clifford Geertz, yes I am not mistaken since introducing elements and variables not anticipated by the observed group implied disobeying a historically established norm in thepractice of every experimental scientific discipline of social sciences, the position of axiological neutrality towards the social sciences about which Max Weber has always warned us. Your "Make" project, which had inspired me, justified the participation of the observer not only as a creator with the tools of art but also justified the transformation of the cultural dynamics of these groups. This is how they serve me in that direction of the History of the theater and whattheoretically They admitted the four theatrical methods although they were fundamentally interested in Richard Schechner's Theory of Performance with whose theses the experiment we intended to carry out was most congenial.
While the work of Levi-Strauss ------which had also served as inspiration to me after my reading and study of hisStructural anthropology------- clearly established a prohibition on interference in the cultural dynamics of the group, the presence in itself of an observer within the group is always a dissociative and irruptive element in that dynamic. The research that you subsequently carried out on the proxemic function in the theater based on the conclusions reached by the French theaterologist Jean Dauvigneu that you have conveniently cited on various occasions would have been very useful to me to be able to understand and diagram situations and problems that only They can Intuit very empirically. I certainly didn't know Duvigneau's work.Had some theatrical references that came from different theater theorists and authors such as Stanislavsky, Samuel Beckett, Grotowski, Tadeuz Kantor, or Eugenio Barba, but Schechner was definitely the one with the greatest influence on me, as well as the experiential experiences of laboratories such as the Living Theater or Teatro Estudio by Vicente Revuelta and even the Escambray theater experience andfurther late Teatro Obstaculo by Victor Varela.
At this point I remember years ago in approximately 1994 ----------and this below is the fundamental reason for this long journey through that anthropological experiment that was for me more than anything a self-training laboratory---- --- after attending some conferences on ethnopsychoanalysis, at the Faculty of History of the University of Havana, a kind of two or three day workshop to which I was invited by some friends from the faculty of philosophy and history of the University of Havana. Havana who informed me of some anthropology conferences when in reality it was an Italian researcher and professor of ethnopsychoanalysis who had come to Havana to give a seminar by Norbert Elías, an author that I did not know at the time, and talking with this ethnopsychoanalyst about my cultural anthropology work with these young rockers interrupted me --------after taking a quick look at the visual documentation that I had just shown him in the two voluminous folders in which I preserved the photographs of that experiment that lasted initially a period of months and then years intermittently------ he asked me with curiosity as if he already knew the answer or as if he intuited it, he asked me about the reasons that led me to do that research, how I had chosen the object of my research and why. I responded evasively as if avoiding him, something he seemed to notice and very gently we said goodbye and separated in different directions. But your question stayed in my memory for a long time and today I remembered it again as a result of these important points that you have been developing and deploying in the relationship of the self ------ I would add the "Mind" or the mind------- with the world that is in the approximation that you have made of the results of Herbert G. Mead's Research on the self and its intricacies in the social. Precisely because the choice of my object of anthropological research had not been chosen at random but was motivated by strong personal reasons from my family history in relation to my own identification with the role of rebellion against the paternal function in culture and in the family space that the often marginal behavior of these groups of young people evoked in me, taking into account the notoriously subversive character that on many occasions this type of behavior and even subcultural forms acquire in the midst of a socialist system with strict codes of social behavior defined and preformed by historical, cultural,ideological andpolicies.
In the relationship between the self and culture there are various conflicting opinions. For example, there are the theories of Mead, whom I do not master since I have never read him. I only know some of his doctoral theses as one of the main heads of symbolic interactionism, which I have seen cited and referenced when I readKnowledge and interest From Habermas, there I was able to find out who Mead was and why he was important to Habermas's theories. I know his name. I have seen him cited in many other books, not just by Habermas himself, and of course I have seen him cited in your essays and in your book.The Self and the heritage. I know that it is very important to you, you take it very seriously in your system. It is not my case that I was not interested in his work, in any case, rather, I, like you, were influenced by Levi-Strauss first and later later I personally approached Lacan's work after meeting a group of friends. who were studying his work in a clinic in the neighborhood of El Vedado. In my case, I became interested in another type of thinking different from the evolution that you went through with your own references and in that sense we had different developments even though my first intellectual motivation in thescope of theoretical thinking was the influence of your maker theses and your theoretical references when I met you in 1990. I became interested in other philosophical schools after they took me along different paths than yours, which you did because of your own theoretical evolution. thought and for your own intellectual development they took totally different paths. What I still find remarkably curious is that after more than thirty years we still have multiple very attractive and interesting points of contact.
However, based on all the conversations we have had, I would like to point out some ideas that seem necessary to highlight. I don't exactly believe that we are in different periods of understanding and interpreting our own intellectual development. It does not seem to me that I am going through a moment and a period of a type of relationship to thought and reality that you have already gone through. In this sense, character Abdel, I can only disagree with you on that point. Rather, I am fully convinced by our differences ----that they are not irreconcilable, mark how I say it, I think that they are completely salvageable and that to a large extent we can reconcile ourselves with a lot of travel and a lot of theoretical elaboration--- that what happens as I perceive in the beautiful work that we are doing that each one has very peculiar ways of overdetermining the real, of describing it and reinterpreting it in a particular disciplinary framework. I think, for example, that despite having spent years reading and studying Popper's hard scientific work on the philosophy of science and negative falsificationist epistemology, my strategic approach to the work of the thinkers I am interested in discussing and theoretically evaluating their theses is constituted by positively around and gravitating around a hard core of ideas whose theories are at my own request defended in the form of ad hoc hypotheses or auxiliary hypotheses in the same constructive sense in which Quine's reconstructive models are developed. It is not that I find myself in a moment in which I let myself be fascinated by each new author or each new book or author's idea, but that our preconceived models of defining the real establish a priori rules that condition an idiosyncratic way of making ourselves explicit by discussing the authors. and his works. On the other hand, you, for example, having a constructive journey of many years of experience in the field as a culturologist and ethnomethodologist, manifest a way of making explicit a questioning way of the authors and their works, always starting from negative strategies. I am not saying or expressing this in a derogatory sense but rather in a manifestly subversive sense. By this I mean, in a negative sense, rather how Popper's peculiar way is developed with his falsificationist theorem.
It seems extremely important to me to highlight that there is a type of philosophy and thought inherited from German idealism that is more humanistic in its theoretical sense and more romanticism in its historical sense that perhaps deliberately ignores the evolutionary development of a natural nature that led to a branch of the philosophy of science. by other paths. Personally, I am more interested in schools and intermediate thinkers who mediate and intercede in the liminal zones between one tradition and another, such as Piaget, Jaspers, Popper, Searle or Chomsky.
As for one of the fathers of neuroscience and pioneer in artificial intelligence research in the United States, Michael Gazzeniga, who was also one of the most outstanding defenders of the school of lateralism along with its founder Roger Sperry and other defenders. of liberalism at a cognitive level such as the great pioneers of neuroscience Karl Popper, John Eccles, Noam Chomsky, Jerry Fodor, John Searle and the father of neuroplasticity Eric Kandel. I told you that this cognitive neuroscientist Gazzeniga defends the theory that the evolutionary development of the human brain is unique and distinguishable from the evolutionary development of the brain of other mammals and even primates, especially the four great primates within which it is scientifically proven in the sense of the exact natural sciences, genetics and primatology, for example, have proven the great similarity and incredible closeness of the gorilla and the chimpanzee to the human being. The first, the gorilla is known for its genetic predisposition to social bond, its predisposition to social hierarchy and gregarious life, as well as the stability and establishment of family identity ties in the group. As for the chimpanzee, a 98% genetic coincidence with us humans has been isolated. Hence its enormous cognitive and behavioral predisposition. For Gazzeniga, the genetic characteristics of the human brain compared to that of primates reveal a disproportionate increase in brain mass and volume compared to our closest relatives and even our hominid ancestors in the evolutionary trunk. This peculiar characteristic that distinguishes us means for Gazzeniga that we have a special neuro connectivity that guarantees a structure of thought and the potential possibility of creative activity at an evolutionary level in the human brain; that same predisposition in the syntactic and metaphorical construction even before the production and understanding of language. Gazzeniga distinguishes this hierarchy and subtle difference between thought and language.
In a version very similar to Gazzeniga, there is, as you know, Noam Chomsky's generative and transformational grammar. As you know, Chomsky is characterized by considering the innate condition of language. His theories have been, as you know, very controversial for many continental philosophers. And with regard to analytical philosophers, what they find uncomfortable about Chomsky and nativism is that it does not start fromstimuli empirical but from an innate rational condition of the human brain and its oral apparatus where the larynx has descended enough to emit distinguishable sounds from each other, not only vowels but also consonants such as the phonological vocalizations with which Jakobson once worked to distinguish a type phoneme of others in the oral chamber. Chomsky's nativism opens a rationalist perspective in the field of natural sciences and introduces new elements within structural linguistics. Chomsky has also been a reference author to get to the point where I have arrived. However, the majority of analytical philosophers, starting with Quine, start from considering that the acquisition of language and the logical construction of logical propositions occurs through a process of stimuli and responses, in short a process of empirical and behavioral learning from which Quine draws the elements necessary to build an epistemology that he calls naturalized because contrary to Chomsky and prior to his work, it does not start from any innate condition of the human organism in which language is already inscribed at the genetic level as the last Chomsky of the biolinguistic turn affirms. about the FOXP2 grammar gene. This is the Chomsky afterThe Minimalist Program . Both Quien and many of his students and followers started from a serious influence of behavioral psychology and Bloomfieldian and post-Bloomfieldian linguistics in reference to Leopold Bloomfield, which starts from considering the acquisition of language from stimuli and learning processes acquired through through conditioning.
Contrary to this, it is worth highlighting Wittgenstein's theses, I am referring to the first Wittgenstein who addressed the well-known problem of private language, even though he was very attached to scientificity, and to a scientific rigidity, he later distanced himself from this innatist theory.further It was late in the late 1930s and early 1940s when he began to write his Philosophical Investigations, which he did not publish during his lifetime, since this book, already in the form of a book that two well-known students of Wittgenstein composed and edited, is something that occurs later in life. death of Wittgenstein. These two students of his are Anscombe and a brilliant philosopher. At least I greatly respect his work, Georg Henrik von Wright, who has developed his work and I consider it very serious that they have also developed a rigorous and forceful work after the death of their teacher. He was even the one who inherited Wittgenstein's chair at Cambridge after his death because he was head of the philosophy department at the University of Cambridge in England. On the other hand, for Chomsky both thought and languageThey're a inseparable unit from a predispositionbiological innate In this sense, for Popper and Eccles in the book they co-authored togetherThe Self and Its Brain (He I and your brain) this peculiar linguistic characteristic of man is correlated with an evolutionary leap corresponding to the evolution of the mind at the same time and as a result of the evolution of the human species. In this perspective Popper defends his scientific hypothesis of the three worlds and his Cartesian interactionism. As you know, Piaget, although he also defends an evolutionary hypothesis very similar to Popper's theses, defends rather the emergentist thesis that sensorimotor development is prior to cognitive development, which depends on the evolutionary development of the sensorimotor system through the different cognitive phases of the development where psychological development is correlative to the child's linguistic development.
Regarding the mind-body problem, I have been distancing myself from my previous position regarding this problem. In relation to this, when I distance myself from Lacan, I have been gradually assimilating a large part of this scientific literature that I have been reading since I discovered it in the College Library where I began to take my English classes and later my "requirements" classes. "which are classes required to validate the pre-university classes that I brought from Cuba, I discovered, as I told you, in the College here already established here in Miami, I discovered an excellent collection in the philosophy section. A collection entitled Library of Living Philosophers. In it I find enormous monographic compendiums dedicated to each of an incredible constellation of logical-empiricist analytical philosophers of the English language, including British and North American and some Central Europeans like Popper for example or Scandinavians like von Wright himself. Among the North American volumes are the volumes dedicated to Quine and another to Davidson. The volumes dedicated to Rorty and Putnam had not yet been published. That will happen 10 and 15 years later respectively. I'm talking about volumes of more than 800 pages, almost all of them. Then I took out the volume dedicated to Quine because although I practically did not know any of those philosophers with the exception of Popper and Carnap among the philosophers referenced by that collection, the name of Quine seemed familiar to me because I had seen him cited on a couple of occasions not very frequently by Lacan in his Seminars. Carnap's name also appears in the final index of theWritings of Lacan. At some point Lacan mentions it in theWritings to refer to the relationship between science and logic and between language and logic if I remember correctly to make a criticism of logical positivism as such. And there my interest in analytical philosophy began to arise. Although I did not understand anything I read, even with difficulty, I am telling you about my first year living in the United States and residing as such in Miami. I told you that although I didn't understand anything because of the poor English base I had from Cuba, that no matter how much English you have, there is nothing compared to total immersion in a context surrounded by that language or that language. It is what is called in English precisely as I told you "total immersion". As an immigrant to the United States residing in Houston, Texas and then as a scholar at Rice University in Austin, Texas, you surely know what that "total immersion". Regarding my intellectual development here in the United States later as a Philosophy student at FIU, this is how I can say that I was introduced to analytical philosophy here in the United States. Although it seems something accidental, it actually happened because in some way it was that I read it in the Lacan Seminar where many of these authors were cited and referenced or because I found some reference in one of the books read in Cuba, the names of these authors were already registered by me unconsciously. I rememberhave read from Cubalogical positivism by Alfred Ayer that had been published in Mexico by Fondo de Cultura Económica. It is a very instructive and very good book, especially to get started in the philosophy of the philosophers of the Vienna Circle.
Although I did not make the complete turn towards analytical philosophy until six or seven years later when I alreadybought my first English volumes of that collection which were the volumes that had just come out of Hintikka and the Michael Dummett volume. The first of these two Scandinavian philosophers Hintikka who had taught in the United States had introduced the so-called epistemological logic referring to the difference between knowing and believing between belief and knowledge, while the second British Dummett from the University of Oxford was representative of the philosophy of language dedicated to natural languages, a current that comes from the performative current inaugurated by Austin. And so with those first two volumes ------ plus the one by Quine already studied ------, it was how I devoted myself completely to the study of analytical philosophy, reading it and studying those books daily from morning to night. in addition to working and studying the first time at the College and later at the University. I had to practically learn two languages. The first, the English language and the second, the logical language, the language of logic to be able to really understand all that knowledge that came to me in a considerable amount. Around 2007, when I bought the volume of the Library of Living Philosophers collection dedicated to Popper, I was already 100% dedicated to the study of the scientific philosophy of the Vienna Circle, logical philosophy, and the philosophy of language, analytical philosophy. in general. And I bought Popper's volume, a huge volume of more than 1,300 pages, which were actually two volumes in one, truly impressive. Each of the volumes of this collection carried an intellectual autobiography from the pen of the author himself as an introduction, then a voluminous body of critical essays by students, followers and critics of the philosopher in question to whom the volume of the collection is dedicated. collection accompanied by the philosopher's responses to one of his critics and to close each edition a bibliographic annex of the philosopher's work in his language and in English and a content and name index and a general index of the book.
Audio No. 3 - [Rumbos 2nd stage] - RESPONSE TO ABDEL ON RELATIVISM AND THE MORAL CRISIS OF POSMODERNITY. CRISIS OF TRUTH IN THE FRENCH POST-STRUCTURALISTS
Abdel, Good morning.as are? I'm Alberto and I'm going to answer some of the topics you sent me in your audio messages. As I have already told you in other audios, I am not going to respond one by one to each comment of yours, each audio message of yours. What I am going to do, as I told you in another audio, is to respond to each topic that is of interest to both of us globally, more holistically by topic and not by each audio message because since there are so many it makes it very difficult for me to remember your point by point. messages. However, I will try to answer as many topics as possible, so I am going to ask you, Abdel, to forgive me if I skip some or overlook any specific ones. In reality, it is practically impossible for me to retain all the ideas and it is very difficult for me to remember each point of the audios. On the other hand, if I do it by theme it is much easier and more spontaneous. Because this way I can allow myself certain freedoms in my responses, associating a little more freely within the topic.
I agree with you that we are living in a time of mirages where images refract and reflect themselves and each other, producing noise, interference of images that are reproduced while the observer loses track of the truth and where the image original is diluted into millions of copies to the point of being itself its own copy. In the midst of this refractory fabric, the sensation is created that the truth is polysemous and full of folds. The truth loses its meaning and becomes relativized. That is the purpose of those who contribute to the reproduction of these simulacra of truth as we find in the descriptions of the texts of Baudrillard, for example, and similar authors who are epigones of a peculiar and very harmful way of conceiving postmodernity. I met many of these authors encouraged by your suggestions when we were both very young andread These as well as others from the same school with the same enormous pleasure with which I read the first of them, initially believing I found a truth in their books and then getting used to the fact that these authors always moved with their works through discursive strategies. I think of FoucaultThe archeology of knowledge, in Baudrillard'sThe system of objects and in Lyotard's The Postmodern Condition...
The concepts of reality and truth are relativized in a dizzying manner, making them slippery notions. Even the very concepts of culture or ethos are also relativized to make anyone say anything about anything to the point of exploding the etymological references, relativizing the semantics itself, impoverishing the values of truth, significance and meaning that begin to appear. associated with mercenary meaning constructions of that relativistic obscurantism. I agree with you regarding Umberto Eco's bookThe strategy of the illusion where Eco contributes precisely with this poor book, that state of confusion of postmodern culture understood in its most derogatory sense and from the conditions, and effects as well as the circumstantial designs of the relativistic cultural effect of contemporary cultural postmodernism.
Regarding this relativism, I am absolutely convinced that a large part of the responsibility for the polysemic and hypertextual debauchery of what became the intertextual collage of postmodern culture and the relativist aestheticization that brought with it a type of cultural fashion that we can define as postmodernism, we can attribute to a large part of the constellation of post-war authors and thinkers who derived from the decline of phenomenology as a current of thought and from structuralism in France. I unquestionably think of Foucault, who I told you about at greater length in another audio message because it seemed to me that the subject itself demanded anddeserved special attention. That is why I will be very brief in my comment about him specifically. And I barely mentioned the other authors as I already did because I only need to add Deleuze and Derrida -----although I have not read the latter with the constancy and rigor with which you have done so through your own books. authors------ since I am of the opinion that despite his unavoidable contribution to the even ethical confusion of this century, and I still say this with great respect for his work, especially that of Foucault, Derrida and Lyotard of The Difference, for example. I think that his works still have an exceptional value beyond the irresponsible contribution that has led our current society to the moral disaster in which it is now anchored, to the crisis of its ethical references and to the lack of an ontological notion of truth. . I agree with you on the need for an ethical reconstruction in the very center of the intellectual field, hand in hand in that enterprise by Bourdieu.
I want to add here that I admit that many irresponsible slips of Lacan throughout his intellectual journey through three decades of Seminars have also contributed to many other misunderstandings and misinterpretations with serious social consequences with harmful effects on the discourse of feminist activism, for example, who misunderstood much of what was said by Lacan, by his students, his followers and by many of the current Lacanian psychoanalysts. It is not my intention to attack here the Lacanian psychoanalysts who did and continue to do commendable work, in my opinion, necessary and practically essential, receiving all those cases that have been previously rejected by behavioral psychologists, by cognitivists or by more psychiatrists. organicists. However, the irresponsible debauchery of many Lacanian psychoanalysts, compelled to insatiably repeat Lacan's slogans and slogans, led to serious and irresponsible effects of overinterpretation that had harmful impacts on many patients. However, the positive social contribution of Lacanian clinics mainly in France and almost all of Latin America is, of course, necessary to treat patients with a history of addictions or violence or identity problems or intractable phobias and obsessions. However, I maintain serious objections to important parts of Lacan's theoretical development and in particular I distance myself from his overvaluation of grammatical syntax as a linguistic structure of the subject of the unconscious as an interpretive model of psychoanalytic cure as such. All this from the even epistemological point of view related to language acquisition. I never understood the dirty way in which Lacan himself directly and a close group of followers and students from the closest circle of the Freudian School of Paris between the 60's and 70's rudely mistreated Paul with a certain amount of mockery and some cruelty. Ricoeur after the publication of his bookFreud: An interpretation of culture(1975) considering that Ricoeur had forgotten to recognize his debt to Lacan of the concept of the unconscious structured symbolically by the significant pair S1----->S2. However, I bought the book here in the United States in English and I read it completely and years later I reviewed it again in its Spanish version and I found a total coincidence in both versions where, in effect, I was able to distinguish where it does refer to the Lacanian theory of unconscious signifier and the subject divided between two signifiers. Right now I don't remember the page and I would have to look for the book because I have it stored in some bookcases that I have behind some cabinets, which is why it is very difficult for me to look for that book at the moment. I have to make some time and when I find the book in English or in the Spanish version I will make a separate note because when I read the retaliation taken against him by Lacan and his followers it seemed extremely unfair not only the attack on Ricoeur to the point of what He even preferred to leave France and move to teach for almost five years at the University of Chicago, here in the United States, but also because this meant a lack of professionalism and honesty and intellectual rigor. In the volume dedicated toLibrary of Living Philosophers to Ricoeur's philosophy in 1995, he narrates very briefly in his intellectual autobiography as an introduction the bitter anecdote of this episode that embarrassed him greatly for years and that the followers of Lacan opened such crossfire power on him that he barely found a place to teach. philosophy in some Lycée in Paris as long as it was not already contaminated by the slander of the Lacanians of the School of Lacan.
Although poststructuralist French thinkers contributed enormously to this state of confusion and exponentially enhanced with a high degree of relativism many of their theses in the field of linguistics and philosophy of language, in particular Derrida's deconstructionist theories, or the invention of desiring machines. Deleuze or the praise of postmodern discursivity in Lyotard
The 20th century from its beginnings in its clearings and enormous detachments that were forging the new emerging disciplines, major philosophers such as Karl Popper, as you know, established negativist theories such as his falsificationist theorem and his demarcation criterion to determine the character of scientificity between sciences and pseudosciences. dismantling in turn the positivist character of the theories of the Vienna Circle. Popper, for his part, highlighted the characteristics of his antipositivism with his indeterminism. In approximately the same period and perhaps a few years after Popper, Quine introduced his two complementary hypotheses of a methodological nature. In fact, they were the most outstanding hypotheses in this period and of great epistemological scope about the inscrutability of reference and the indeterminacy of translation as he defined them in his book.Word and object (Word and object). Already in that bookquine defined the same deterministic postulate of Popper. Forged in anti- and post-positivist indeterminism, both epistemologists, after reflecting in depth on the scope of their theories that would leave their discipline devoid of ontological substrate, orchestrated certain ontological strategies. Regarding Popper, he would base his conception of truth on Tarski's logical model of semantic correspondence, radically placing himself on the side of realism. In the case of Quine and due to his partial commitment to North American pragmatism and at the same time with relativism and its holistic theses, he took on the task of developing a compromise solution to lay the foundations of his ontology, defining it based on what he called "ontological commitment" in his bookOntological Relativity and other Essays (Ontological relativity and other essays). Hence his slogan "No identity without entity" from which it translates "There is no identity without entity." WithitWhoit is Although his epistemology rested on conceptual determinism, ironically his ontologythey landed in a materialist realism of physical and ontic entities.
Regarding these ontological problems raised within the philosophy of logical-empiricist science and analytical epistemology, I recover in our path towards cultural anthropology the ontological problems raised by the bookThe uses of diversity by Clifford Geertz about which once -------I don't know if you remember-------we exchanged our ideas about it inCounterpoints.I then purposely recalled that Geertz's book reflects the essay in which this anthropologist maintains a radical critique of the notion of ethnocentrism and his defense of cultural relativism that motivated Richard Rorty's controversial response in which, on the contrary, he attacks without barracks the relativist positions and defends on the other hand a perspective that he defines not so much as anti-relativist but rather as an anti-anti-ethnocentric position and the subsequent counterresponse of Geertz defending cultural relativism again and counterattacking Rorty's position against the cultural phenomenon defining itself as ethnocentric while Geertz places himself in a perspective in which he defines himself, rather, as an anti-relativist, placing Rorty under the label of an ethnocentric anti-relativist. Although during the debate the authors display a range of reflections that are very useful for anthropological reflection, I think it is a topic that would be very useful to return to here in Rumbos. I read it a long time ago and I was very excited at the time because it seemed to me that it addressed questions of special interest in the field of cultural anthropology and philosophical anthropology that could even make us return to Kant and his fundamental ontological question about the being of man in the attempt to synthesize into one all the transcendental questions that Kant himself advanced very tenaciously through his anthropology at the very heart of his great epistemological program.
Audio No. 4 - [Rumbos 2nd stage] COUNTERRESPONSE TO ABDEL ON THE PROBLEM OF STRUCTURES.Inbox
Hello Abdel, good evening, how are you? Thanks for your audios todayas answers to whom I had sent you. Thank you, I really liked all the elaboration you do on them. I would now like to respond to your audios today, especially where you respond about structures. It seems to me that when I answered you about it I was not very clear about it. Why do I say this? Well, I say this because I should have specified which structures I was referring to. I think that in this problem we must make necessary conceptual distinctions whose definition seems to me not only essential but unavoidable. First of all, I want to point out the importance that in philosophy of logic and philosophy of language is given to the logical differentiations of what on the one hand is known as the problem of universals and on the other is known as the logic of quantifiers. . Firstly, we would have to start from the logical turn introduced by Frege in the philosophical thought of the early 20th century. Frege uses the Aristotelian logical square of opposites that separates an affirmative Universal and a negative Universal in a quadrilateral at the top, with each logical condition corresponding to a linguistic expression or propositional statement. In the case of Universals there is no way to affirm an existential expression of a universal type as it would be antilogical, we would be in the presence of a logical fallacy. It follows therefore that everything that weoccupies In logic it has a relationship, as Wittgenstein explained in his "Tractatus..." with tautologies constructed from categorical syllogisms that are always deductive and inferential in nature. From the above, the following logical expressions follow for the affirmative and negative Universals:
1). Universal affirmative
"All A's are B's"
"All structures are real"
two). Universal negative
"All A's are not B's"
"All structures are not real"
On the other hand, for cases related to the logic of quantifiers or existential particulars, the following logical statements are associated:
3). Existential o Particular affirmative
"Some A is B"
"Some structure is real"; O well
"There is a real structure"
4). Existential o Particular negative
"No A is B"
"No structure is real"
"There is no structure that is real"
In the first case, in the case of universals these are expressed through statements that are always plural while in the case of quantifiers they are expressed in statements that refer to or denote singular and individual objects. It is what allows us to talk about existentials. So if we say "the structures" in plural as you expressed in your audio about the structures, it is obvious that it is impossible to grant existential value to statements of universal value. For example, a philosopher like Russell was characterized by working with a high degree of logical complexity on universal statements to the point of stating that logical propositions do not refer to any element in concrete reality. And on the other hand you have a logician like Quine, who proposes -------through predicative logic-------- a theory of existential quantifiers or logical quantifiers. Who ventures into the enterprise of the logic of quantifiers, thereby defending that the only possible ontological way to speak of the singular existences of particular individuals are abstract or concrete things and objects such as physical forces, subatomic particles and formulas math. ButQuine Here he is working with predicative logic, forms typical of propositional logic, which would lead to logical antinomies. This wayQuine would come into contradiction with Russell and at the same time with himself, that is, with his own logical program. Again, what does Quine do? Well, I'll tell you right away.Quine is prepared to do a reductive operation, that is, it reduces the elements of propositional logic that are brought from Russell's set theory that works with sets and sets of sets or subsets and reduces them to their condition of existential elements or variables, thus reducing propositional logic at the level of existential logic, that is, predicative. However, how did Quine understand this?Quine presented the program of his ontology, eliminating in logic all vestiges of transcendental sets and in philosophy of language, dissolving those universal statements or those that expressed transcendental or universal linguistic forms, translating them into expressions or linguistic statements of an existential predicative logic so thatQuine he treated Russell's supersets of his propositional logic as if they were or rather reduced to the elements and variables of the language of predicative logic. This wayQuine He resolved once again on the ontological level with a compromise solution the logical antinomies that were presented to him on the epistemological level.
Having said this, after explaining theoretically throughout this brief, although perhaps, a little for you, tedious, but at the same time, beautiful tour regarding the problem that concerns us, how an important part of the analytical philosophers from Russell toQuine They see the problem of universals. Both you and I have been talking about structures without defining the contexts in which these structures are constituted, although in the following audios you have explained your own development of the existence of structures very well and very convincingly. My journey through Quine's predicative logic, although rushed, at times rushed, since it would need a lot of space and time to be able to fully explain a truly complete development that could exhaustively exhaust all this problematic, may even have been somewhat tedious for you. I apologize because I know that it is an author that you do not know or master and that you are not familiar with him as, for example, I am not familiar with Alfred Schütz or George Herbert Mead.
I think delving deeper into the problem of the existence of structures after we are confusing both you and I, two contexts that are at least necessary to distinguish, a real context on the one hand and a linguistic or symbolic context on the other, which we have not always been clear about. This differs from what Umberto Eco in "The Absent Structure" called an ontological structuralism and a functional or operational structuralism. Although it seems fair to me to highlight that with respect to these two notions of structuralism you haveEye further and you have been more systematic and systematic in clearly defining these two notions. However, this has not prevented us from, at the same time, confusing a natural context on the one hand and a social or cultural context on the other, undifferentiating the nature of culture; that is, what is natural from what is social or cultural due to its own intersubjective and linguistic condition; In Sartrean language it would be defining a context in itself, and one for itself; or according to Popper's three metaphysical worlds, say "contexts" instead of "worlds", separating a tangible concrete physical context from material and organic as the concrete external world, the living body and the human brain. This on the one hand and an immaterial mental or psychic context mediating between that physical world and a social and cultural context here material and objective a scientific and aesthetic, critical, philosophical and argumentative objective world. Or, as Bertrand Russell very keenly knew how to distinguish, a context of discovery on the one hand there and a context of justification on the other, here. To each of these contexts, let's say typical ideals, for example, to think about it a little, in a Max Weberian sense, to each of these contexts there corresponds in any case a type of structure to which we would be willing to assign a language; that is, a logical proposition or a linguistic statement. Each of these structures, in my opinion, are assigned retroactively because in the real, that is, in the flow of the real of the world, there are not those distinctions inherent to the structure that you mention, very attached to structural linguistics and the structuralist model that does not It is nothing more than a formalist model to deal with what is real in the world because let's accept it, language as it is presented to us in the world, does not present itself to us with subject, verb, and predicate nor do we speak mentally separating signifiers from meanings as Saussure seems to think, since he did not prevent this confusion in which his students and his future readers could incur -------from his students' notes---------- after they presented a structural linguistics that seemed to confuse the real of the language --------its acoustic flow in the real, its vital world praxis--------- with the sign, the properly linguistic sign.
When I talk about language flow, I mean an empirical real without distinction. This problem is realizedQuine for his part ------obviously, from his frame of reference-------- and defends this thesis since 1951, when he defends his holistic perspective against a background of analyticity and synonymy. In fact, the theses presented by Quine at the Toronto Congress of Philosophy with his essay "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" are a critique of Carnap's inductivist positivism and the theories of the Vienna Circle with the purpose of defending against the reductionist conception of analyticity, his so-called Duhem-Quine thesis that maintains that there is no biunivocal relationship of language with the objects of the world, that there is no synonymy of singular statements but that meaning is only achieved at a holistic level; since, since there is no distinction between analytical and synthetic judgments, it is impossible, therefore, to isolate the uniqueness of the theory and its connection with the fact, with the referent, event or real physical object,Quine He therefore concludes that it is not possible to defend the primacy of epistemology as the first philosophy as Descartes aspired. So from this conclusion Quine deduces that only a holistic and ecumenical methodology within predicative and quantificational logic can allow the validity, not only of his Duhem-Quine thesis, but of what he calls, very sharply, " naturalized epistemology" which is nothing more than -----in Quine's terms-----a behavioral psychology. Here by psychology we mean empirical psychology, the psychology of perception and not like Husserl, who at the beginning of his career proposed a psychology of cognitive mental operations that he later suddenly rejected as part of his anti-psychological program.
So returning toQuine, behavioral psychology means language acquisition according to the stimulus-response model, since behaviorism inQuine It means "learning process", and "stimulus meaning". By psychologyQuine understands first "empiricism", then, psychology of perception and with this Quine seems to take up the debate on first and second qualities that very recently John Searle ofBerkeley University in San Francisco has been revived again in a little book of his on the subject. However, at the end of his career, Quine posed the behavioral epistemological problem in the form of a pragmatics of discourse, somewhat taking up the empiricism of Locke and Hume, very indirectly the semiotics of Peirce and the psychology of James and at the same time contributing to stimulate Rorty's neopragmatism that followed him in his linguistic-pragmatic elaborations as can be recognized in the first essay of Rorty's own book "Consequences of Pragmatism". With "speech acts" too, Searle, who came from the Oxford tradition with Austin, in the natural languages tradition, right at the apex of his career, seemed to be implicitly interested in Quine's own linguistic pragmatism.
With all the above, I just want to point out that, for Quine, the ultimate, possible epistemology is psychology in the sense of a theory of linguistic behavior elicited in response to stimuli perceived from the environment, empirical, by the nerves of the body, from the surface of the skin, from the surface of the body. His theory here is excessively naturalistic and empiricist since for Quine those perceived stimuli are already stimuli loaded with meaning. For Quine, the child exposed to stimuli related to certain meanings and words acquires, through a redundant learning process, not only a redundant vocabulary, in the sense of Tarski, of the Polish logician Alfred Tarski, but also with respect to the meaning associated with the stimulus, with which certain meanings were perceived and adhered to certain linguistic statements.
I agree that both philosophy and the rest of the social sciences are directly related to thought and that this involves, in addition to logical operations, also linguistic propositions and the theoretical articulation of concepts, obviously in the same sense as Hegel as you. you propose and in that sense I subscribe to Dilthey's division between natural sciences and social or human sciences supported by what Popper added as a criterion of validity for the social sciences; that is, what he called the "principle of rationality" in his seminal essay of the same title in 1967. But it also seems important to me to maintain a balance based on the articulation between a speculative continental phenomenology of a hermeneutic-descriptivist type and an analytical-logical philosophy. -Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-American neopositivist and postpositivist empiricist in the same sense that Habermas has explored from his philosophical program already in "The logic of the social sciences" and later in "Truth and justification" or Richard Rorty in "Consequences of pragmatism" as well like Hilary Putnam in "Renewing Philosophy."
However, I invite you to imagine the assumption that it is a condition of nature to be a real without structure, a real flow without a subject, to be, let's say, right?, a "knowledge without structure", the knowledge of a world that rotates. only without extrinsics in a sign language. Obviously, let us observe that the first Chomsky, an innatist, the Chomsky of generative and universal grammar and deep structure, would not think of it that way; for that Chomsky, nature is human nature from the beginning and therefore it is thought and language, self-generated as a function in a biologically innate way; but, on the other hand, the late Chomsky, based on his biolinguistic turn and his minimalist program from the late 80's of the 20th century to the beginning of the 2000's of the new century, would perhaps agree with the initial statement that nature is a real without structure. But suppose that the "real" being truly real, there would not even be a "knowledge in" or a "knowledge of" the real. And I understand here the concept of "knowledge" as analogous to "structure": That is why I do not maintain that there are, as such, immanent structures other than in the form of predispositions that are not truly structures but more or less conformations of the internal relations of a organism and its relational adaptations as occurs in the case of the notion of "imprinting" isolated by the experiments of the ethologist Konrad Lorenz. Likewise, for example, the experiment with newborn felines by Hubel and Weisel comes to mind, which consists of verifying the dependent variables from the transformation of an independent variable, an experiment consisting as such in two groups of cats: an experimental group and a control group. In the experiment the researchers manipulated newborn cats from an experimental "group A", exposing them to darkness for a long period to observe the outcome or dependent variable while maintaining a second "group B" or control group that had not been overexposed to no photosensitive stimulus. The experiment showed that newborn specimens exposed to darkness had their retina and a large part of the ocular tissue atrophy, consequently preventing partial or complete development of vision, while when contrasted with the control group they verified that all The individuals developed healthy and normal vision within the usual parameters of development of the species. With this experiment it was proven that the functions of an organism are biologically predetermined to the point that these predispositions reveal that it is precisely a reality of the biology of the body that determines or decisively influences the degree and range of perception of the senses of an organism. organism or individual of a species. The published results of this experiment allowed many logical-empiricist analytical philosophers and philosophers of science, mind and language to develop consistent theories about the foundational character of the biological real with respect to the cognitive development of the mind as in the case of psychological theories of Piaget or the transformational linguistics of the generative grammar of Chomsky, in a first period and the emergentist theories of the philosophy of mind of John Searle, the same philosopher of "speech acts" that you yourself have worked on. .
However, a predisposition is the closest thing to the a priori conditions of existence in its Kantian sense, but far from constituting synthetic a priori judgments as such. They cannot be conceptually assimilated to Kantian categories. In this sense, in my opinion, there would not be an a priori structure in the real. For example, as I told you, an ethologist of the caliber of Konrad Lorenz proposed the hypothesis of "imprinting" as an innate predisposition of the organism in reality to elicit a behavior that is not learned but as an innate logical priority in the biology of the organism, as a condition of possibility. of his very existence as an individual of a species. Despite this, Lorenz clarified its hypothetico-deductive character in the same sense as Popper's philosophy of knowledge based on conjectures in a hypothetico-deductive system tested by the refutations of theories given empirical evidence.
From all this it is understood, in any case, that predispositions are variable and that, at the same time, they are variations that occur in a physical object or process or, in the living organism, possibly even, at a genetic level, although I precisely I distance myself from genetics as the ultimate explanation of biological reality. Genetics is useful when it serves as a tool for natural selection to explain the inheritance in future generations of the reproduction of the species. I mean that it is a useful tool at the level of the species, not of the genetics of the individual, of the individual organism. I, for my part, also maintain serious objections to the currents championed by genetics and molecular biology, to the hyper-genetic and ultra-Darwinian theses of Richard Dawkins, for example. I think that genetics helped a lot to the evolutionary development of Darwin's theories long after his death, even; but converted into a mechanistic explanation of evolution it immediately becomes metaphysical reductionism. It allowed, in turn, on the other hand, the emergence and development of the evolutionary school of modern synthesis, at the head of which was a well-known zoologist and scientist of great importance Ernst Mayr for whom neither life nor biology nor Evolution was determined directly by genetic information. For Ernst Mayr, the determining level in natural selection is the level of the species because it is in the species where its processes and relationships are articulated with the selection units of the group, with the environment and with the phenotype or genotype. in this way to transcend or cross the Weismann barrier through the Baldwin effect.
I recently bought a book by Piaget titled "Biology and Knowledge" that tries to summarize everything that I have been talking to you about and you have been reacting to a somewhat tense topic that stimulates us a lot to dialogue and conversation. It is, in effect, the mind-body debate, the reflection on the connection of the body with the mind, of which debate not even Piaget himself with his high theoretical flight and his experimental training, his methodological experience in scientific research and of course epistemological, and his extensive mastery of child psychology and pedagogy once managed to resolve. As I know of your sympathies for Piaget as well as those of Habermas for Piaget, the Habermas of "Theory of Communicative Action." We have two authors in common who are key pieces in our research and with whom we share interest. I am very close to Piaget, I read him a lot in my classes at the University, his Research reaches very attractive conclusions. His colossal epistemological project of evolutionary developmental psychology tests the interaction between diachrony and synchrony, between the diachronic processes of development and the synchronic structural phases of child development. I told you that I had acquired this little book by Piaget through Amazon because I wanted to remind you that I have serious objections to the materialism of organic causality, as I have expressed to you in other audios, and that I deeply distrust psychopharmacological therapies to treat mental illnesses and Hence the importance of Jaspers for the history of 20th century psychiatry due to his introduction of meaning in the phenomenological description of psychopathological phenomena. At times it gave me the impression that you had precisely forgotten that my adherence to the Phenomenological Investigations of Karl Jaspers does nothing other than combat that materialism of organic causality prior to Jaspers' entry into the history of 20th century psychiatry and his contributions. epistemological and scientific and emphasizes precisely that I completely distance myself from organic causalism, precisely given the central role that Jaspers' phenomenological psychopathology plays in the meaning of my research. Hence what Jaspers contributes to it: precisely the duplicity and at the same time the interdisciplinarity or the double scientific condition of the sciences because Jaspers places himself precisely in a privileged situation as a scientist, in the middle of two research methodologies and two different epistemologies and at the same time At the same time, operating in both, they flow interstitially and interdisciplinaryly between both. That is, on the one hand the causal explanation typical of the natural sciences, in its casespecific, of scientific medicine and specifically of psychiatry as an organic and psychopathological science of the mind on the one hand and neuroscientific science of the brain on the other, while on the other hand Jaspers is situated in the space of the social sciences or human sciences in the division and classification made by Dilthey at the end of the 19th century. Both Jaspers, in his capacity as a psychiatrist, first, and later as a philosopher, falls within that double condition of the classical thinker and the humanist intellectual of the early 20th century. Precisely my adherence to the inclusion of Jaspers in my Research responds precisely to the fact that this double condition of Jaspers explains his noble concern as a humanist thinker concerned with the scientific results of the social sciences of his time, the influence of comprehensive sociology and axiological neutrality. of Max Weber at the same time as the scientific results of Husserl's Phenomenological Investigations that guide Jaspers in a double-range epistemological orientation and that this allows him to introduce his own epistemological andscientific and his own clinical experiments and psychotherapeutic treatments in the field of phenomenological psychopathologies.
This double condition of Jaspers will be a similar double condition in which the philosophical thought of Karl Popper is located as an epistemologist and philosopher of science framed within critical rationalism and what he himself has called evolutionary epistemology and at the same time Popper as a humanist. classic devoted to the analysis of the development of historical thought and the field of social sciences stimulated by his Research in Political Philosophy, to whose development he has contributed with two very stimulating and rigorous books. Popper has maintained himself as a rigorous thinker in the middle of these two waters and at the same time swimming skillfully in both: on the one hand, the waters of the philosophy of science (his debates and reflections on evolutionism and Darwinism, on the double condition of theoretical physics between Einstein and quantum physics, and its conclusions in the field of scientific research methodology and its attractive epistemological conclusions) and on the other side, the waters of political philosophy and the philosophy of History terrain that Hegel and Marx had taken over in the 19th century and over which Popper, displacing them, would now reign throughout the 20th century above an enormous constellation of other brilliant heads of social historians, economists and political thinkers.
I don't know if you paid special attention to my developments in these latest audios where I express my distrust towards the scientific organicism of medicine and psychiatry of the 20th century. Judging by the comments you make in your second or third audio of the last two blocks that you sent me yesterday. In them, when you develop your conviction about the existence and ontological necessity of structures, you once again return to an analysis that you had already done before around this same problem. In previous audios you highlighted, a little out of your anger towards the repressive theories of the confinement of madness tested by Foucault, that from your point of view mental illnesses did exist, even recognizing ------perhaps in a slightly ambiguous way- ------ the existence, in the form of psychic structures, of depression and schizophrenia among other modalities of the broad spectrum of psychopathologies and admitted, not without conviction, that many of these were susceptible to psychopharmacological treatment. Indeed, although definitely in a high percentage of reported clinical cases of insidious and chronic mental illnesses, many start, in principle, from an organic origin; However, this does not prevent such psychopathological diagnoses from being reviewed and eventually even challenged. Even that they can, at the same time, also be treated by implementing psychotherapeutic treatments which will take a humanistic and sociocultural bias that is phenomenologically comprehensive and autobiographical for the patient. Many of the diagnoses of mental illnesses are biased by the objectives and purposes of the different schools of psychiatry, which they maintain from dogmatic and deterministic assumptions, on many occasions, and advance as a result of their clinical investigations, conclusions that have been determined only from of correlations of facts and theories, of psychopathological definitions on the one hand and spectrums of symptomatologies on the other, of situations and concepts that are only correlative and for which an explanation that follows the scheme of cause and effects cannot really be sustained. That is why Freud's psychoanalysis was revolutionary at the beginning of the 20th century when it emerged because it gave its space of dignity to the symptomatology of mentally ill people far above the nosological and taxonomic predisposition of mental illnesses. Influenced by his time at Charcot's clinic at the La Salpetriere clinic in Paris where his teacher treated intractable hysterias through hypnosis. Freud humanized hysteria by saving hysterical women from the morass who were confined to mental clinics. With this, he relativized the prejudice that was placed on the consideration of mental illnesses, most of the time sustained on a background of scientific falsehood and founded on categories of dubious epistemological and ontological origin. With this I only want to expose the relative nature with which many times for scientific purposes categories and conclusions have been established based on false bases and on a generally shifting ground of uncertainties.
Curiously, however, in this last audio module you develop the same idea but, this time, far from admitting it, instead, you proceed attacking this organicism, against which ----by the way------- - I also carry my revolvers since I do not subscribe completely, but only partially and in fits and starts. The current psychopharmacological industry has had a decisive weight in the field of psychiatry and psychopathological sciences, constraining the diagnoses issued by psychiatrists in the exercise of their profession and imposing on the destiny and dignity of patients as well as on the supposed axiological neutrality. of scientific practice in public health, the motivations and subsequent expectations of corporate policies of micro-business interest, and making the shifting terrain of the broad spectrum of psychopathological diagnoses a truly dangerously slippery ground. Because the medical sciences and, dangerously more than anything, psychiatry itself and the scientific research that accompanies it in the field of psychopathologies, have been contaminated by a development metamorphosed by the interests of corporate and neoliberal capitalism, of psychopharmacology in psychotherapy reducing the latter to the former. It is therefore of my interest to enrich the field of epistemology, Anglo-Saxon analytical logico-empiricist philosophy and research in the philosophy of science, methodology of scientific research and philosophy of language and mind, with useful instruments and attractions. developments of phenomenological research in the field of social sciences and psychopathological sciences from a comprehensive perspective in the sense of Weber and of course Jaspers.
Audio No. 5 [Rumbos 2nd stage] COUNTERRESPONSE TO ABDEL DISCUSSING WITTGENSTEIN
I cannot help but recognize that if I had not gone through the study ofQuine I would be fully subscribing to you right nowformula that there are ontological structures. Because? Because this structural condition is already inherited to me theoretically from the structuralist Lacanian tradition, from the sphere of the symbolic predetermined to the subject, from where Lacan brings the Saussurean signifier articulated to the Freudian unconscious, a secularized unconscious. My logical turn towards analytical philosophy -------if I had begun with Bertrand Russell's Mathematical and Logical Investigations------ I would have placed myself on the same page where you are located and from where you are stating and from where we would be stating and counter-stating in the same epistemological position. Because? Because for Russell there is also a priori structure, only he does not call it that, but defines it as "symbolic logic" or "propositional logic"; nor does it turn out that for him --------for Russell I mean------- it is an a priori linguistic structure since as Russell sees it there are only a priori logical propositions that instrumentalize the real . Lacan always forced Russell to make him say that logic was the signifier and therefore from what we can deductively infer, if logic as a priori is significant and the latter constitutes the structure; Therefore, the structure is a priori like logic and therefore has ontological value. Russell had stated that:
"Logical propositions must be a priori. A philosophical proposition must be such that it cannot be proven or refuted by empirical evidence.[...]"
Given that Russell was convinced -------as can be seen with the same conviction with which you are now in your statements about the ontological value of the structure------ I told you that Russell was absolutely persuaded that the a priori and necessary connections found in reality were conceptual or not, they were definitely logical connections for him, since Russell had assumed that the task of applying them following both Boolean algebra and Peano's arithmetic sequence, involves , either the search for mathematical or logical definitions, as happened with the reduction of arithmetic to logic as had been Frege's great project, or it was then about decompositional analysis such as his analysis of statements about the world exterior in terms of statements about simple perceptions. Although the resulting description of reality came for Russell from philosophical analyses, the raw material for such a description came, rather, from observation.
Put this in perspective, if I had followed Russell this far, even Russell himself, founder along with Frege, Moore, Whitehead and Wittgenstein of the most rigorous logical-empiricist analytical philosophy movement in the Anglo-Saxon world, I would have agreed with you on this precondition. interpretation of the structure. However, given that my entry into the field of analytical philosophy was only, first, through the epistemology of the American logician Quine and a little later, also delving deeper through Popper's philosophy of science, It was then that I managed to distance myself from Lacan's thesis - which I carried forward not without a sad disappointment - that the signifier was in the real, that it was the real and therefore that had no reference in concrete reality, but was distinguished from it by constituting an autonomous universe with its own functions inherent to that universe.
For both Popper and Quine, the definition of truth implies an empirical starting or arrival point of reality. Popper starts from a series of conjectural postulates tested by facts by introducing his hypothetico-deductive method of conjectural theoretical propositions with the purpose of being falsified by a subsequent refutation through empirical evidence. So if in Popper the truth is the semantic correspondence in Tarski's logical sense, which survives as a result of the refutation of scientific theories, then his corresponding semantic definition of truth will be determined by the refutation of the theories themselves. through empirical facts. Therefore, there the conjecture is a hypothetical-deductive assumption of knowledge without this allowing it to be, in ontological terms, an a priori structure as such. Only empirical testing at the end of scientific research will reveal the indeterministic nature of the truth.
For its part, also regardingWho This seems to start, rather, from a theoretical and empirical determinism of the practical facts of real experience, as stimuli of meaning, perceived through the nervous endings of the body on whose basis the truth will consist of the logical-linguistic construction. of the modus ponens through the logical quantifiers of the logical-Aristotelian quadrilateral of opposites refounded by Frege. However, given the indeterminism preceded by an indeterminacy of the translation, Quine admits, as a result, an inscrutability of the reference and consequently: an ontological relativity. Faced with it, Who will be forced to propose as a solution what the Harvard logician will call, "ontological commitment." From where, however, Quine's ontological maxim is based in "Word and object" (1960) which expresses that: "To be is to be the function of a variable linked in a language."
On the other hand, and independently of all the previous development, I am still not, as such, responding with it and trying to elucidate why I have the development in a place of certain relevance.philosophical of Wittgenstein. I want, by the way, to discern inwhat In this sense, his "Tractatus logico-philosophicus" seems to me to be much superior to the undoubtedly attractive results of Saussure's structural linguistics and his Course in General Linguistics. Because?
Wittgenstein through his "Tractatus...." proposes to go beyond the point to which Frege, Russell, Whitehead and G.E. Moore brought philosophical logical development. Both Frege and Russell ended up ignoring empirical reality with the use of the deductive syllogism. Frege precisely refounded Aristotelian logic with the combination of logical propositions with their logical quantifiers through the Aristotelian logical square of opposites, establishing aquadrilateral logical for the analysis of logical propositions that occur in logic as an expression of the world, the truth values of logic as a significance of the truth conditions of the reference. From which Russell's thesis is based that logical propositions do not need the referent.
Wittgenstein, on the other hand, is going to introduce the linguistic turn in philosophy on the path opened by a semantic theory of meaning. Wittgenstein, in his aim to cure philosophy of its metaphysical lucubrations, wants to simultaneously, after retranslating philosophy in the logical terms of Frege and Russell, rescue philosophy itself from the conceptualist logicism of Frege and the descriptivist logicism of Russell. For Wittgenstein, in both cases it was about the logicist use of the deductive method in which the philosophy that was intended to be freed from the metaphysical trap in which it was trapped was trapped.there was fallen enclosed by the deductivism of Frege and Russell. The path opened by Wittgenstein is not formalist like the logicism of Frege and Russell. Wittgenstein proposes a linguistic turn in the path of meaning based on empirical concerns developed inductively and immediately expressed in the structure of linguistic statements as articulated forms of meaning based on the figurative structure of the sign. For Wittgenstein, this is a propositional sign of the statement or sentence as distinct from the linguistic sign in Saussure's sense. Wittgenstein took the sentence as a whole, that is, the logical propositions in their linguistic expression. The meaning is captured as the totality of the sentence or propositional statement and it is when the logical propositions have reached a significance of truth that Wittgenstein considers that a truly philosophical result has been reached.
I want to emphasize Abdel that I do not harbor any reservations against Saussure's linguistics, which for years was a constant reference and the closest tool I had to deal with the language phenomena available to my study of Lacanian-oriented psychoanalysis in which, as you As I have commented on multiple occasions, I dedicated myself for years to studying, deepening and explaining Lacan's work. As far as Saussurean linguistics is concerned, it is fundamentally reflected in Lacan in his first structuralist stage. His logical turn occurs later and the study of that second stage that is known as Lacan's last teaching inclined me to initially be interested in modern logic initiated by Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein. And with respect to Wittgenstein, the most stimulating thing is what concerns the linguistic turn within logical empiricism; and subsequently, as such, its legacy for the history of analytical philosophy as such.
I am almost convinced, Abdel, that if you could go deeper into the Tractatus and everything that has subsequently been developed from that text, it is possible that you would change your opinion about Wittgenstein. I don't know what authors you may have consulted that influenced you to form that opinion about Wittgenstein. Many authors of continental thought have the tendency to underestimate the importance of Wittgenstein's work and make very pernicious and tendentious comparisons that contribute more than anything to obscure the already dense writing of this thinker's work. Regarding my studies within analytical philosophy, Wittgenstein has not been the center of my attention, despite having read and studied him quite frequently. If I have not devoted special attention to it, it has perhaps been motivated by the brevity of his work, written in concise and dense prose that was not a special reason for encouragement in my own research on analytical philosophy.logical-Anglo-Saxon empiricist. I became more interested in the founders of the field of modern logic and symbolic logic and particularly through the subfields of Frege's quantificational logic and Russell's propositional logic. Wittgenstein was always, for my taste, much more hermetic than tolerable and much darker than many authors of this type of logical-philosophical literature are. This darkness can lead to a wrong perception of his work. This hermeticism perhaps resulted in the opinion that his work and his logical statements participated in an isomorphism with the surrealist manifestos or expressions of Artaud or Magritte, for example, and with regard to your respective comment. Likewise, Wittgenstein's hermeticism has been responsible for many investigations in the field of continental phenomenological thought that have found some familiarity of Wittgenstein's work with Heidegger's philosophy. It is also possible that Wittgenstein's hermeticism in his condensed propositions and his theoretical density have also contributed to a confusion of interpretations of this nature and magnitude. I invite you, if you have not read it directly, to do so and if you have already read it, to delve into it much more based on these clarifications. You will find other perspectives that are much more attractive than perhaps what you know about his work until now. However, I do emphasize that in my opinion he is not one of the most systematic thinkers of the analytical current.
On the other hand, going a little deeperfurther I would like to clarify, for example, regarding his work that when Wittgenstein, in a kind gesture towards Husserl, calls "forms of life" situations and contexts that group and condition the significance of precipitates of semantic statements and at the same time bring together vacuoles of meaning, sets of culture or ethnological formations plausibly defined in statements of meaning, folkloric meanings or cultural ethos, constituent structures of meaning of a group, a linguistic identity, or a circumstantial context of extra-linguistic referential entities, when Wittgenstein calls them "forms of life" It is referring to indefinite and indeterminate but not immaterial forms in which two or more speakers interact intersubjectively in semantic contexts and specific linguistic and meaningful situations with linguistically, historically, anthropologically and culturally predetermined forms.
The above leads us to a Wittgenstein that transcends the propositional logical framework in which the "Tractatus...." is conceived. Wittgenstein in both his brown and blue notebooks develops other aspects of his own logical reflections. Most of his work ------it must be taken into account-------- is not only unpublished but what has already been published until now was unpublished during Wittgenstein's lifetime. Even his last work, which he left unfinished and was later published, "Philosophical Investigations" (1951), transcends the rigid logical framework of the "Tractatus...". And it is not only because of its hermeticism but also because of its interstitial aspects from one field to another of philosophy that Wittgenstein starts from logical questions and moves to reflections of a metaphysical and ethical nature; since the most important thing for Wittgenstein is life in all its aspects, in which case he relates it much more to the phenomenological investigations of Husserl in his last work "The crisis of the European sciences..." (1935) where he introduces his conception of the "Lebenswelt" or "life world". As I told you before, Wittgenstein recognizes a debt here with Husserl more than with Frege, who was, along with Russell, one of his two most important mentors for his entry as a doctoral student at Cambridge and later for obtaining a position as a university professor there. same. Wittgenstein realized that strictly logical elaborations were insufficient to express everything he proposed and that would later stimulate him to transcend the strict framework of logic itself in the writing of the posthumous work "Philosophical Investigations."
Audio No. 6 [Rumbos 2nd stage] COUNTERRESPONSE TO ABDEL AROUND PHENOMENOLOGICAL STRUCTURALISM AND PRE-INTERPRETATIVE TYPIFICATIONS. ACQUIS AND HERMENEUTICS
The development that you have eloquently produced in the penultimate block of audios is truly stimulating and very rich in its own articulation and prospects very attractive avenues to develop as we advance Rumbos. For this reason, I have greatly enjoyed your different elaborations and at the same time everything that you have explained about the Wayúu culture in the border area of Venezuela with Colombia about the relevance of the problem of ontological structuralism has been highly instructive and very beautiful. I thank you for all that effort to explain, honestly I thank you very much because you have made an effort to clearly present to me the logical reasons and the ontological justification of the a priori nature of the structure. And speaking of relevance after you have made very profuse use of this signifier, it seems very pertinent to me that precisely you have already begun to address issues inherent to the problems treated in turn by cultural anthropology in a very particular way in the conception of a phenomenological structuralism and its distinctions with respect to linguistic structuralism and the structuralist movement. The difference specifically lies in the position in which the subject is located in the experience; That is, in what place in your development have you been locating, through new explorations of the heritage and significance, the place of the subject, as a creative subject of the structure as a performative experience. In the linguistic structuralism of Lévi-Strauss, Lacan, Saussure, Jakobson and the Prague School, the subject is the effect of the signifying chain and the sense and its meaning, a consequence of the use or padding point like the knots of the ropes and threads used in sewing and making mattresses. But, on the other hand, in your system the structure ------ I understood it after a review and rereading of The Correlato de Mundo ------ the structure is the effect of the creative and performative activity of the subject in its worldliness in an intersubjective situation. Which places you beyond the polarized dichotomies of structuralism towards another different development of the concept, with a completely different articulation and definition. Abdel, I would like to clarify here for the work of Rumbos that on many occasions in my audios I am responding to the audios that you have previously sent me and that only when I am taking your authorial books as a reference, except in that circumstance, I will do so only with prior clarification. . When I refer to something that you have said I am referring to a comment that you have recorded in your audios. I would like to make the distinction here if I refer to your books, which I will do by making the pertinent clarifications in advance. I find it useful to make that clarification here since on many occasions you will hear me saying: "When you refer to structuralism you mean that... such a thing." On those occasions my statements or counterresponses will only be directed or will take as reference your comments. , recorded by you in your audios. If I refer to fragments, paragraphs or chapters of your books or ideas or general summaries of them, I will do so by specifying which book it is.
However, and I purposely want to rectify here the error made by classifying your position in this regard as ontological structuralism when in reality you orient yourself by transcending this double dichotomy of structuralism explained by Eco and subdivided between ontological on the one hand and functional operative on the other. In the development that you have been doing in your audios about structuralism, you refer to what you define very well as your own position on it in chapter 3 of your author's book "The correlation of the world" as transcending the two-dimensional framework outlined above. by Eco, to go on to define your own research from the perspective of what you define as phenomenological structuralism where it is evident in my opinion that here you are giving another meaning to the notion of structure. I want to apologize here for having recklessly advanced and risked statements about your work, overlooking what you already explained very well in that chapter 3 of "The Correlate of the World" regarding the idiosyncratic treatment that you have given to the notion of structure in its sense. of "phenomenological structure." The phenomenological-descriptivist incursions that you develop there are the product of a subject that seems to produce that structure similar to the concept of "agent" in the conception of the notion of "structuration" by Anthony Giddens throughout his excellent theoretical developments deployed in his systemic and explicitly articulated book "The Constitution of Society" although I recognize that Giddens is not an author that you include as part of your system of phenomenological understanding nor that you are influenced in any way. On the other hand, if the situations that this subject confronts in their mundanity and in the reality of the life worlds of others with whom they interact intersubjectively, those worlds that bring them the culture of others as predated and resignified spheres, according to you you explain in your audios -------if I managed to understand you adequately while your difficult development continued------- in your audios going beyond where Alfred Schültz seems to have arrived, those life worlds of others with those in which the subject interacts are pre-meaning worlds, that is, worlds that come to the subjectpreinterpreted already of situational logics in which the life worlds of others are prefigured. And from that condition of the world aspredated, you feel a sufficient reason to justify the substantive priority of the structure, its a priori character as such.
In his doctoral thesis on the phenomenological genesis of the sign, Derrida starts from the phenomenological interpretation of Husserl, which Derrida reinterprets in light of its link with structuralism.
FENOMENOLÓGICO Y LAS TIPIFICACIONES PRE INTERPRETATIVAS. ACERVO Y HERMENÉUTICA
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