English

Counterpoints

Philosophical Dialogues

 Abdel Hernandez San Juan

Alberto Mendez Suarez

.

EDITORIAL

PRIMIGENOUS

Information about the book

Title: Counterpoints

Subtitle: philosophical dialogues

Type of work: literary theoretical dialogue

2022/2023

Authors: Abdel Hernández San Juan and Alberto Méndez Suarez

Digital publications

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/365715568_Contrapuntos_By_abdel_hernandez_san_juan_and_alberto_mendez

Cover design René Magritte 

Counterpoints

Philosophical Dialogues

(2022 – 2023)

 Abdel Hernandez San Juan

 Alberto Mendez Suarez

Conversations on continental phenomenology, hermeneutics, semiotics, sociology, functionalism, symbolic interactionism, axiology, theory of performativity, structuralism, anthropology, structural linguistics, psychoanalysis, grammatology, philosophy of science, philosophy of language,

 Anglo-Saxon logical-empiricist analytical philosophy and

 Scientific research methodology

EDITORIAL 

PRIMIGENOUS 

THEMATIC INDEX

Prologue. By Albert Méndez Suarez

Introduction. By Abdel Hernández San Juan and Alberto Méndez Suarez

Part I- 

The Exegesis of Culture: The Interpretant, the structure, the gateways inside/outside the language, the texere and semiosis in cultural understanding 

By Abdel Hernández San Juan

Semantics and morphology: meaning and syntax

Metonymy and the museum in fieldwork: criticism of Malinowski.

Three paradigms of research: 1- hermeneutics and ontology (world in itself) 2- exegesis and text, 3- interpretants and alternation.

Retheorizing the concept of structure after poststructuralism.

Societal intersubjectivity.

Criticism of predicative logic.

Differences from infinite chains: semiosis/culture, texere/text.

An analysis of structural statics: the timelessness of language

Phenomenology of the world, life world, mundanity and intramundanity, textual correlation and ordinations.

La Texere and the gateways inside/outside language

The Correlate. 

The interpretant: retheorizing Peirce from sociology and anthropology: questions of method of research.

Duality of the interpretant: the function of the sign itself, or a someone or an other.

The interpretant in the example of heritage restoration and tourism.

Finding language/giving language and the end of the unconscious (superficial unconscious or reduction in thickness).

From Lacan to analytical philosophy. By Alberto Méndez Suarez

After Lacan. The encounter with the volumes of the Library of Living Philosophers. Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein: founding fathers of modern logic and the philosophy of language. My turn towards Anglo-Saxon logical-empiricist philosophy from my study of the late Lacan. My two essays on Quine.

Scientific epistemology, research methodology and philosophy of hard sciences. Karl Popper, the falsifiability theorem and the Vienna Circle. 

Criticism of analyticity and the problem of synonymy according to Quine.

Two axes of significance in Quine's epistemology: the inscrutability of reference and the indeterminacy of translation.

Quine's critique of Carnap and the Vienna Circle: The origin of Anglo-American post-positivist analytical philosophy.

Duhem-Quine's thesis in “Two dogmas…” and holism as an alternative between nominalism and realism.

Criticism of the syntactic axis: on the clinical excesses of psychoanalysis. Limits of overinterpretation.

Predicative logic according to Quine and logical quantifiers.

From Husserl's “lifeworld” and Weber's “intramundane horizon” to Abdel's “world correlate.”

Lacan's reasons. 

Symbolic structuring of the imaginary.

Frege's example in Sense and meaning: Venus as Morning Star and as Evening Star.

Quine's example: “Rabbit” or "Gavagai".

The tourist in the Cathedral

Part II

From Semiotics and Phenomenological Sociology to cultural anthropology. By Abdel Hernández San Juan

Dialectic and dynamism of the sign/object and sign in a common source/exchange of the object/sign identity.

He Ground in semiosis.

My debt with structuralism and retheorization of structure.

Phenomenology and the side here: Hegel/Husserl/Derrida.

Derrida and the question of a new sense of origin.

Phenomenological sociology: the question of common sense and the heritage.

Stephen A. Tyler, Evocation, “middle voice” and the spirals of dialogue.

Differences in interpretation between Schütz and Gadamer.

Componential semantics: Culture.

Beginning of a critique of the significant/libido relationship in Lacan

The biunivocal relationship of language with the world: dialogue with the logical-empiricist approach. By Alberto Méndez Suarez

 “If Dummet thought about catwalks…”: the text as a world. From metaphysical realism to antirealism.

Demarcation of structuralism. After Lévi-Strauss. 

Significant and enjoyment: the double aspect of the subject in Lacan

Epilogue

General Bibliography

PROLOGUE

The origin of philosophical dialogue dates back to Ancient Greece. Its genesis is dated to the origin of philosophical thought itself from the dialogues of Plato as confirmed --- by our careful investigation --- by the verification carried out by the philosophical dictionaries of Abbagnano and Ferrater Mora as well as the well-known History of Philosophy in three volumes by Abbagnano himself. Our careful review continued further through the pages of the three thick volumes of the History of philosophical and scientific thought of Giovanni Reale and the History of the Philosophy of Frederick Coppleston and that History of Philosophy Western so biased by the empiricism of Bertrand Russell. Likewise, multiple studies have verified this throughout the history of thought. Since the 1930s, studies on the history of Greek thought by the philosopher and science historian Alexandre Koyré and especially his work dedicated to the study of the most emblematic Platonic dialogues have confirmed this, where the dialogue comes first. as it is located in Koyré's work as a philosophical instrument in Plato's dialogues through his notion of the anamnesis Using the Socratic method of maieutics, to later appear in other literary forms through the cultural development of the West. The philosophical dialogue that goes back, following Koyré, to the time of Plato, rehearses this genre as a vehicle for transmitting his teaching. But not only as a vehicle but also as a search for truth, as a teleological strategy as I highlighted a few lines above through Socratic maieutics and the anamnesis introduced by Plato in the Menon. For their part, Gadamer's studies have returned to dialogue its ontological value with the realization of his hermeneutic program in his book Truth and method (1960).

It cannot achieve its full right to exist if it does not first take into account its place in the semiotic studies of the national folklore of the Slavic peoples and cultures than in the literature of a certain ethos cultural is carried out as a form of dialogism with which Bakhtin defines his cultural character as a sign such as carnival and in the structure of the Russian novel of the 19th century and in the semiotic studies that will be eloquently developed in Bakhtin's own books and in his Linguistic and ethnological research. Bakhtin has laid the basal stone, the first stone on which the semiotic and ethnographic edifices of the work of Yuri Lotman and his disciples of the Tartu and Moscow Schools will later be raised simultaneously and indistinctly. Also in the same context of the theoretical studies of Slavic literature and the Russian formalists, Tzvetan Todorov has observed that dialogue is one of the generic forms of discourse that appears both in folklore traditions, as he has taught us as I emphasized above in the work of the Russian semiologist Mikhail Bakhtin when he studies ---for example---dialogism in Dostoevsky's novel. 

On the other hand, dialogue according to the laws that linguistics, semiotics, pragmatics and the philosophy of language have made available to our time, is a form of discourse that is at the base of Western philosophy and thought and that has led to the present day in the pragmatic modality of conversation in which the interlocutors exchange information, develop ideas, discuss content and evaluate strategies based on a pragmatics of communication, serving each other as indispensable references. to build intersubjectivity, interwoven as intertextuality, as a condition of possibility of culture.  For this reason, we have taken on the task of discussing problems tested from phenomenology, hermeneutics or semiotics as well as from the philosophy of language or the neopositivist and postpositivist logical-analytic philosophy of Anglo-Saxon empiricism. Counterpoints It arises not so much from the debate of ideas itself, in itself useful and productive in its problematic nature, but rather from conversation as a pragmatic discourse, as a dialectic and staging of the dynamics of the interlocutors, as a condition of possibility. of dialogic thinking itself in its performative character that puts speakers in a situation of intersubjective, theoretical and philosophical linguistic exchange, in order to manage and process the reconstructive development of scientific activity in the form of a science. comprehensive and an ethics of discourse.

    Counterpoints It is a work of its time; appropriates the media at its disposal, understood as digital social networks for the exchange of information and designed for the subjective interconnection of communication between speakers of the same linguistic, ethnic or different cultural communities, regardless of physical, cultural, distance. political, social or historical of the speakers involved in the communication. Of the interlocutors included in their dynamic game. In Counterpoints We have wanted to update the philosophical dialogue with antecedents specific to the new digital media that the information revolution with its high level of cybernetic and technological complexity and communication theory currently makes available to us through social networks. And we wanted ---- this was not initially our intention, the intention of us in our roles as interlocutors who exchange information that is not limited to its mere syntactic aspect but also reaches the meaning and significance of the communication between speakers of the same linguistic and scientific community---- we have wanted to simultaneously maintain the technology of printed information to transmit and distribute and make known, exposing it both to specialized critics and validating it for a much broader reading public, the testimonial document of our exchange philosophical, thus publishing in book form the scientific results of our dialogic experimental laboratory; results that not only account for and support our work but also consider as an objective of scientific research, and of scientificity, not only the theoretical material exchanged itself, but the act itself of that exchange, everyday language, and even the spontaneous style of prose. in which the information exchanged through sustained dialogue has been processed and the style and way in which we have executed this theoretical experiment, managing ways of thinking, conceiving and describing phenomenologically, and logically-analytically problems of philosophical, hermeneutic, sociological and anthropological nature that require a scientific treatment of language. 

This book that we present to the reader, although it is specifically limited to the period from July 2022 to August 2023, dates back in its genesis to the last decade of the 20th century, especially to the summer of 1990, when I met, personally, for the first time, in Havana to Abdel Hernández. Then we were both very young but despite our youth, Abdel, at 22 years old (two years older than me) had already embarked on leading a long-range epistemological project with very precise objectives within the field of cultural anthropology. 

But Abdel was considering something more than the simple ethnological compilation already made in Cuba by the functionalist anthropologist Fernando Ortiz, in some way, a disciple of Bronislaw Malinowski, that British cultural anthropologist of Polish origin who led sociological and anthropological studies. in the British Empire before and during World War I. Professor Ortiz who, with an academic background, studied Law at the University of Havana and belonging to the great republican Havana bourgeoisie of that time, had become an Africanist expert, scholar and sociologist of religion, taking into account that in Cuba for historical reasons As a result of ruthless colonialism, none of the indigenous population groups represented in pre-Columbian Cuba by the native Amerindian Taino tribes survived. guanatabeyes and siboneyes, but the ethnological residues that were hybridized came from a later colonial past and as a result of the expansionist desires of the Spanish crown as well as the racial mixtures between Europeans and black Africans that occurred from slave smuggling from Africa. 

Curiously, and contrary to Fernando Ortiz, Abdel came ---- in a different context and approximately two decades later ---- however, from a modest Cuban family of humble social origin, the son of professionals educated within the period of the revolution. Cuban. Abdel was trained in a Marxist-inspired environment, as he himself has stated in his phenomenological sociology conferences that are preserved in a digital archive, however, in his subsequent intellectual and professional development, and in his recognized leadership as theorist responsible for the project " Making" occurred in Cuba during the emergence of the Cuban generation of visual artists at the end of the 80's when it assumed, away from Marxism and taking a critical distance from it, an inspiring role for the young artists and intellectuals of the era, his students and colleagues, subverting the historical, philosophical and epistemological references of that time, while reconfiguring in a new axiological system, the ways of interpreting beyond aesthetic borders, the works of art and the theoretical postulates in which they are They articulated their aesthetic programs of reception. It is in this sense that for Abdel his anthropological concerns will take theoretical distance since the late 1980s from the understanding that any prejudiced ethnological conception had acquired according to an Afro-Cuban folkloric tradition based on the academic results of anthropological research from folklore archives and ethnological studies of Fernando Ortiz. 

Both Abdel and I had had, in different periods of time and in arbitrary non-simultaneous spaces, an anthropological experience of similar empirical experiments in densely populated areas of the Havana capital with marginal groups of urban subcultures affiliated with the "underground" world of the heavy metal music and Havana punk rock. As for my anthropological experiment with bands of rockers and punks that occurred between March 1991 and June 1995, it had been indirectly influenced by a previous pedagogical experience planned and orchestrated by Abdel himself among his art students from San Alejandro and some young people. of these non-institutionalized marginal groups identified with the rituals of these Havana underground rock subcultures that shared the same space in the nighttime atmosphere of a party implemented with very pedagogical objectives. concrete in the resolution of conflicts of a psychological and social nature aimed at differentiating the extent to which the identity of each student ran, confronted with the experience of a real social praxis in the unity and identity of each one where cultural identity and the imaginary were put on stage. social identity of the group as such as and beyond the sum of all individual identities. 

Regarding my experiment sustained with the rockers the year after the experience lived by Abdel a year before with very similar groups in terms of symbolic rituals, common interests, group identity, imaginary identifications, social imaginary, theatrical unfolding, corporal expression, iconicity and symbolism in the aesthetic representations of the groups, etc. In its beginnings, it consisted not only of observation guided by the anthropological principles of Levi-Strauss in his Structural anthropology, but sustained in that "participant observation" defined in his book The Predicament of Culture by James Clifford, one of the most emblematic theorists of postmodern anthropology after the notable influence of The interpretation of the cultures by Clifford Geertz. Only then, in 1991, I did not know that I was already doing postmodern anthropology, interacting with those groups without any predetermined conclusion and without predefining any ethnocentric value, starting only from what Max Weber defined as axiological neutrality.

    At the level of contemporary anthropological research we already know that all those anthropological incursions in Havana in the 90's initiated first by Abdel Hernández, a pioneer even then, in that current and later by my own anthropological experiences with the rocker and punk bands of Havana, are nothing more than representative projects of what much later both Abdel and I came to know later in different contexts and times of what was called "Writing Culture." Abdel learned in the late 90's ---and in contact with his colleagues at Rice University--- that all or a large part of the experiments mobilized by his "Make" project of 1990 were conceived within the parameters of what in the United States United was known as "Writing Culture" and of whose current he was an idiosyncratic and representative author of the contact zones between art and anthropology as George E. Marcus himself, one of the pioneering founders of that movement. At the end of the 80's Abdel had read James Clifford's anthological essay "On the collection of art and culture", a magnificent essay that was part of Clifford's book The Predicament of Culture. This essay was definitive for Abdel and had a decisive influence on the subsequent paths of his project and his work as a "maker." 

INTRODUCTION 

We have wanted to avoid as much as possible during the revision of our texts for the publication of this book changes that alter or distort the horizontal and dialogic societal nature of the way they were born. It is actually a format that at some moments acquires the structure of an interview through questions posed by one of the theorists to his interlocutor, while at other times his developments are immersed in such a way in the contents that the format of interview is disseminated and the genre that actually gives meaning to the entire book appears; more like a philosophical dialogue itself, than as an interlocution based on questions and answers related to the interview genre as such. On the other hand, it is a book written in the mode of correspondences, although these are not long letters prepared well in advance, but rather modern correspondence in digital media more subject to the principles of enunciation and counter-enunciation that Habermas refers to, from In a way we have come to the conclusion that the format of the speakers that we have in both Austin's theory and in Habermas's theory governed and dominated the book, which is why it made no sense to eliminate a number of expressions and detours. that are typical of colloquial speech, we have, therefore, maintained even references to everyday life - although there are some that were eliminated due to their unnecessary delay for a reader - that fully preserves the form that the colloquium of two interlocutors had in a manner practically integrated.

Also, beyond the morphological structure of these dialogues, we would like to highlight that, through them, a content and a telos are embodied - although these are not condensed only in the extensive and thick stripe that the substance draws in the length of time from Hegel's dialectic in the 19th century to Derrida's post-structuralist effort in grammatology in the second half of the 20th century - and the understanding of its implications for contemporary sociology and ethnomethodology is updated with which a first interlocutor intends to surprise the reader. Furthermore, those logical-positivist and linguistic megaprojects of the 20th century advanced in these dialogues by the second interlocutor whose epistemological alternative since the times of the Vienna Circle endorses the Anglo-Saxon logical-empiricist analytical approach also react opportunely to those avenues opened by our first interlocutor. defended by the latter, compared to the phenomenological-interpretivist response in the anthropological perspective of the first of our two interlocutors. On the other hand, each statement implies a fundamental methodological substrate, as well as natural linguistic expressions in the sense given by Davidson from the Anglo-Saxon logical-empiricist approach following the indeterminism assigned by his teacher Quine to the correlation of statements with the world through Tarski's rule or compositionality attributed by Dummett to the linguistic propositions of natural statements. However, this linguistic repertoire does not exhaust in the second interlocutor all the epistemological possibilities of a subject elided to the avenues opened by intersubjectivity through interpretive phenomenology, which, following Schültz and Habermas in this way, and also why not? to George Herbert Mead, our first interlocutor proposes the novel - and undoubtedly pioneering - ethical solution in these pages, of a “Self-Ethnography” that reconsiders the relationships of the self with the heritage or with the everyday environment from an axiological neutrality in reference to the most fundamental anthropological and ontological problems.

By Abdel Hernández San Juan and

Alberto Méndez Suarez.     

Havana, Miami, April 8, 2024

First part

The Exegesis of Culture: The Interpretant, the structure, the gateways inside/outside the language, the texere and semiosis in cultural understanding 

By Abdel Hernández San Juan

Dear Alberto, 

I understand that, without a doubt, the question of meanings is highly imprecise to base any criterion of truthfulness or verification around it. And I think you explain it very well.

I also agree that componential semantics is not the way, at least for understanding meaning when it is woven into relationships of forms and morphology; too dependent on the one hand on conventions, and on the other hand, on the variability of contexts and situations. Therefore, semantics, in my opinion, must adhere to syntax, since componential semantics is infinitely more imprecise than syntactic and grammatology. Morphological semantics thus refers to the meaning according to the form, componential semantics helps us understand the meaning according to the contents. 

The interesting thing in my consideration of semantics in general is that it allows us to analyze the relationships of meaning and content without falling into ideology, at least, if it is a morphological semantics. But it seems to me that you are trying to point out possibilities with Quine that move beyond or perhaps outside of semantics. What you call holistic in Quine sounds very good.

From the point of view of verification, that is, of verification, the argument you present is unobjectionable, I agree with it. I think this could be a first comment.

And I agree with the criticism of the general meaning that you mention we also have in Quine.

Now, the interesting thing ------not about meaning, but about hermeneutics in general------ moves outside the scope of verification, it goes the other way, which you have been able to identify when you broadly characterized , my position making references to Gadamer and Habermas.

I think that among my books The correlation of the world It is the most pertinent or let's say it might interest you, but you are focused on something that puts emphasis and attention on other things that I find very attractive.

This could be a first comment.

     I haven't been concentrating on the problem of truthfulness for a long time. It is a complex issue because it involves ultimate questions regarding truth and “ought to be.” That is to say, it turns the thought on itself in a way that focuses on its ultimate reason for being, this could lead to the political in which I am definitely not interested; but as long as it is a question of ethics, I am interested.

   As you can see in my books, I am passionate about let's say less ultimate things like the relationship between being, language and thought, for example, or things like that...

   You should, it seems to me, flow, let go, consider a book, the holistic for example could be fascinating approached in the way and from the perspective in which you are placing it when you refer to tautology or recursivity in the relationship to physics and natural sciences.

   But I understand that what you are considering is very attractive.

   Your interpretation of my texts is interesting, it is a very your perspective that I have never seen before about myself. Returning to your text and everything you have just explained to me, everything you are considering is very interesting to me and I think it deserves and warrants that you consider a book. I see you busy with much more recent things than mine, your questions are focused on broader problems, on the one hand, more general and on the other, more comprehensive than mine.

I understand what you have pointed out to me about syntax from the point of view of psychology.

As for Ricoeur, he is an example of the comprehensiveness of your view, that is, I am not looking at the general field of phenomenology and hermeneutics, understanding a discussion about what has been done, but rather, I am only writing my tiny, let's say, humble, work within that general field.

It is true that Ricoeur also dedicated himself, like me, to the relationship between phenomenology and hermeneutics. You are absolutely right. Yes, in Houston I read both volumes of Time and narration by Ricoeur in 1996, but I have not dedicated myself to reading it beyond that book.

Let me explain, it has taken me a lot of dedication to develop my own perspective and in that sense I recognize myself only as an island, an individual perspective within a map in which there are other perspectives.

But that's also why I'm telling you that you have a more comprehensive perspective. In fact you are working on the philosophy of science and from its most recent angles; I am much more in the micro.

My work in recent years, the reference in previous phenomenology is Alfred Schütz, but not all of Schütz, but specifically his book The knowledge in the worlds of everyday life edited by Ilse Schutz, his wife, and by Thomas Luckman his disciple. Published in Armorrortu editors.

If you search Luckman for example for his book with Berger The social construction of reality My perspective presupposes only the first chapter "The foundations of knowledge in everyday life" but not the entire book

Now, as you will see, I do something completely new within this tradition if you read my essays "The intramundane horizon" and "Superordination in the worlds of life." Read it in Spanish. 

Now, if you can visualize which aspects of Schütz's phenomenological research are of interest to me and in what way I have innovated from there, you will understand almost all of my books from the last, let's say, twenty years.

But yes, of course, I do something new and original although influenced by Schütz, so yes, also the phenomenology of Hegel, Peirce and Derrida are my other influences; but since I work phenomenology and hermeneutics together, then your interesting and very accurate appreciation of Gadamer and Habermas comes in.

I believe that every author in some way believes it, so what he is doing is unique, but of course your comprehensive perspective, your reflexivity from the philosophy of sciences, looks for points of relationship.

I have read criticism of Ricoeur and that book of his and the Derrida-Ricoeur discussion, but it has not been a reference for me, honestly; What Ricoeur does is very different to me, but it is true, you are absolutely right, that there is an undoubted coincidence. We have both considered combining phenomenology and hermeneutics, but your references and mine are completely different.

As I tell you, Alfred Schütz is the base, the starting point to understand me. You know that he had an immense influence on ethnomethodology and, as you have told me before, it is what I do: ethnomethodology, well yes, Schütz has been crucial for me.

I have experienced it as a process of decantation on two levels, a clear complex process, on the one hand intellectually and on the other emotionally.

Intellectually, I have been increasingly reducing my references to the minimum, that is, before in my twenties and thirties I was interested in many things, from my forties onwards I kept to the minimum, not in the sense of my readings, I have continued reading a lot. thousands of books as well as you, but in the sense of knowing for myself that it is mine where I am heading and of course this has a lot to do with what we were talking about before that my effort is on a micro scale not as comprehensive as the yours in fact much less.

As for “The sensitive concept” in my book “Pensado Ciencia”, I am sure that you just need to read it slowly, if it is very theoretical but you can understand it, it is better that you read it in Spanish that and everyone and of course it is not the same as reading online than a Word document, this is much more comforting, the next one that follows. "The restoration of the world" also in that same book "thinking science" is also very theoretical but if you read it slowly you can understand it, I am sure you can. It is a matter of how you tell me the greater or lesser comfort for the body, of course they are essays that require calm, calm and slow reading, and you can also ask me about any of the two and I will gladly explain to you how to do the same about any other that you have questions

   Then in that book follows "the self and the symbolic", I think that essay will be of special interest to you and 

Even more so, if you go to my book “The self and the heritage” and first read the chapter of that title “Self and the heritage”, I think those two essays will interest you.

I am very sorry that I do not have my essay La chrysalis of Being in Spanish. I translated it into Spanish but I lost the translation because that would also be interesting for you to read.

Regarding the topic of semantics-syntax you can read my discussion of it in my essay "Hermeneutics and culture" in my book The correlation of the world. It is the first, if you read it in full you will see when I approach it from a very semiotic perspective, different from what you have told me, but what you introduce regarding syntax from the point of view of psychology is very interesting and deserves to be read. you develop. 

And all this you say from psychology is very interesting.

And yes, of course, Greimas interests me a lot. In fact, he raised the idea of ​​a "sociology of common sense" which is very important in my theory, although I start from Schütz, not from Greimas, if I am interested in Greimas. It is one of those selections that I tell you that I make by choosing what interests me.

If you go and read my essay "On ordination in the worlds of life" you will read there my criticism of meaning and its replacement by the concept of "significance", "meaningfullness" or "significativity" but if you go to my book "The correlation of world "and you read chapters 1, 2 and 3 you will see how from Peirce I differentiate the meaning that the meaning acquires with Peirce's interpretants towards "infinite semiosis" and That idea of ​​significance in infinite semiosis does interest me, it is the one that I will also see in the future with Greimas but that I take to a level of maximum elaboration in "El correlato de mundo".

The question of reference is at the center of my attention in my next book "The enigmas of the ground" that I am writing, another point of agreement.

 In my book "The Correlate of the World" I deal with the matter in a very peculiar way, I propose a retheorization of Hegel's classic question about the distinction between the world in itself and the phenomenological world, and I develop a retheorization of the possibilities of the interpretants of Peirce in research methodology after an analysis that places the differences between Saussure and Peirce unlike the common semiotic approaches that tend to profuse them, thanks to that differentiation that I discuss, I then separate the chain of Derrida's infinite signifiers that I propose leads to the text/texeré/fabric relationship of the chain of Peirce's infinite semiosis theorizing three different research paradigms so that they can work separately or complement each other 1- hermeneutics and ontology (world in itself), 2- exegesis and text, and 3- interpretants and alternation

I retheorize the concept of structure after poststructuralism in a neo-symbolist phenomenological sense.

The question of the book is how to move between the world itself -- in my terms the intramundane horizon -- immediacy of culture -- and the world as a correlate of the text in the forms of theoretical and empirical research, a question that is behind the discussion. inside/outside the language on which I have focused in recent years, it is a very theoretical question to which I have dedicated great innovative efforts, if you read the most recent synopses of "El correlato de mundo" and "Pensando Ciencia" you will see explained there in a concise way for a reader who wants to know what it is about

But in this new book I am going to treat it from another perspective, not as a correlate of the text but as ground in the world.

"The correlate of the world" by the way includes a chapter that could close the trichotomy on textual reading that I told you before in my essay "The exegesis of cultural texts" and that you previously saw in "Performativity in research" and in the essay on Malinowski and Lévi-Strauss.

I am not going in Geertz's direction, although I know her well, 

I try to explain to you what my objective was with my essay margins of realism. It would help you a lot to have read the Argonauts, but if you haven't read it, I'm trying to help you understand what the matter is, Malinowski in a single paragraph of his 800-page book that I chose with tweezers only once and the only time in the entire book He says that taking those canoes to the museum would be removing them from their ethnographic reality and that, decontextualized in this way, it would be incomprehensible.

 From the beginning of his book, chapter by chapter, he practices a realistic descriptivism of social reality through which he describes everything from cutting the trunk to bringing it to the village to the process of manufacturing the canoe with the magical rituals it carries and then the navigation with its trade routes and mythology never enters the perspective of the museum throughout the book, in fact he opposes the museum not only saying that taking the canoe to the museum is removing it from its ethnographic reality but also by not doing in his way of presenting and describing reality, never what am I who, extracting with tweezers that loose and wandering paragraph in a chapter in a book in which he never talks about a museum, propose the opposite of what he does, I introduce the question of why Instead of thinking about taking the canoe to the museum, the opposite occurred to him: bringing the museum to the field work.

  I am the one who makes that proposal and then I begin to contrast, in a kind of critical collage, the descriptivist mode of naval engineering comparisons between the indigenous canoe and the European ships, in which he presents, describes and explains the canoe and its construction, with what would have happened if instead of having done it as he did he had thought the other way around, far from thinking about removing the canoe from its ethnographic reality to take it decontextualized to the museum, doing the opposite, reading the canoe and present it with the eye of the museum but in field work which would have led to a non-descriptivist and non-realistic method contrary to their own.

  To understand this you would have to see how he does it by reading his book, but I help the reader by bringing into my text fragments of the way he presents the canoe and contrasting it with the way I propose it would have been if I had presented it the way I propose it would be. in my proposal reading the canoe in its ethnographic reality with the eye of the museum, now I do not do this only to criticize its descriptivist realism, I also do it to propose a semiotic model that consists of my phenomenological concept of cutting, I propose cutting out the canoe using the example of filmmakers who point with their fingers at the box in reality that they are going to film and then sign it and I say that this cutting is defining the canoe as a text, a text of culture visual and material which we must read in order to read culture as a text, he sees the canoe as an object of naval engineering, I propose to see it as a visual text as an artifact of material culture as a craftsmanship cutting it out with the eyes of the museum but there in its ethnographic reality

I then placed the reader in the hypothetical situation of the museum where the only thing you have of the culture is a decontextualized artifact and a graphic museum, the canoe on a pedestal, and I say that for the purposes of the museum viewer who does not know the culture and only has that museographed object, I say that it is a metonymy, a part that evokes a whole from which it has been detached but not included in the metonymic sign par excellence, I say then that this metonymy, being the only thing one has, becomes highly informative, thus forcing the alphabetic text/visual icon relationship to highly constrictive textual forms and I say that this relationship between part and whole that occurs with the metonymy canoe/part-fragment/whole-evoked culture can be a methodological criterion to establish cuttings to read the culture metonymically but not from the museum but in situ there in the villages, I maintain that by cutting out the canoe as a sign in the field work with the eye of the museum then it is readjusted constrictively to this visual code of material culture the way of writing focusing on the relationship between two textual forms and putting them in relation the canoe text and the culture text, which instead of going to look for in the visual a text about the culture that one has and It was obtained outside of the visual, which is what they both do, bringing things about the culture that they did not obtain from the visual to go to the visual to confirm it, doing the opposite, reading the culture according to the visual text.

 In both Malinowski and Levis Strauss, the reverse is done, and just as I propose then the realist description is not resorted to, the entire first part of the essay is dedicated to discussing my phenomenological and theoretical concept of cutting for research.

This proposal of a phenomenological cut has methodological consequences on the way of conducting research from which I articulate a critique of realism in Malinowski (functionalist realism) and in Levis Strauss (structuralist realism), in fact I certainly deny categorically and radically that culture can be not only understood but not even known from the method of one or the other, as opposed to the method that they followed, I propose other alternatives and ways to read the canoe in Malinowski and the caduveo tattoo or the village bororó in Levis Strauss and the essay as a whole can be considered the exercise of different possibilities of intelligibility of culture in visual terms based on my method, I argue that in both cases, especially in Melanesia, the surrealist paradigm was much more suitable for understanding culture than the realist and I demonstrate it with examples, the essay is a critique of realism and representation aimed at showing the possibilities of my theories on research methodology in the field of visual anthropology.

 For another empirical application of this theory of mine on research method you could read my essay "Performativity in research" which is the last one below in one of my profiles and a chapter in my book "Rethinking intertextuality", there it is applied but to the relationship between tourism, restoration of heritage memory and habitation including an analysis of old havana

I came to Habermas directly, I read and studied him in Venezuela, his book theory of communicative action, both volumes, the ideal situation between speakers who state and counter-state in intersubjective terms in Habermas was then a discussion of the theory of the statement where the ideal does not It was a politically constituted community or society, but an abstracted corpus just as in Parson the concept of "unity act" is abstracted or in Popper the concept of "world" as a theoretical unit of a minimum social, the ideal situation here was not the politically formed community, but theoretically abstracted in an ideal linguistic situation of exchange of sentences between speakers where it was analyzed how the sentences are oriented to mutual understanding through the rationality itself inclusive of the pragmatics of intersubjective communication , here the horizontal societal aspect is presupposed within the world of life in which this intersubjective communication functions for the analysis of enunciative modes but not an effective and literal politically constituted society or community.

   The ideality of Habermas's parameter is theoretical in a universal pragmatic sense; it does not refer to politically constituted societies, but to principles of rationality in communication abstracted outside of concrete societies.

  It is true that Habermas later pressed for these political applications to constituted societies, modified his book in editions, but I objected to Habermas with those modifications, I consider that it was a mistake to make those concessions, that he should have left his work in the two volumes in its first version and resolve the rest without compromising the non-political theoretical-scientific character of his initial linguistic conception and as such I work with that first formulation of his theory, ignoring the changes that Habermas made to it later.

A preventive observation about predicative logic, this, since Aristotle, in my opinion, in the end it is grammatology, let's say, a type of proto-grammatology; It has no other mouth. And in grammatology, then already fully formed, as a meta-theory, as in Derrida or Chomsky, then predication dissolves; becomes marginal.

 On the other hand, the path of syllogisms and the judgment of predicative statements in logic does not lead anywhere else, but to a rhetorical tautology, in my considered exhausted, or, to the question of the subject of the statement and the subject. of the enunciation that Kristeva and also Lyotard work on. But this generally leads to fiction, although Lyotard tried to take it to the realm of discourse regimes, language games. I got very far from all this, I find this discussion repressive and manipulative -----disposing of language as a toy of cursed speculations----- this leads to repression and has ethical consequences, hence the need for a foundation adequate ontological in ethics, the question, for example, that there are no exteriorities to form in Derrida, that all presence is form, tells you: “let us take form seriously.” It is not something that we put on or take off at a whim or that we have as an instrument; That's why I distanced myself from Foucault forever. Since 2004 I decided to leave forever the little in which I very occasionally mentioned him, I am left with Tzvetan Todorov, his Symbolism and interpretation and their Speech genres and I move away from the relationship subject of the statement/subject of the enunciation, from my decantations and reduction to the minimum, choosing and dispensing since my forties.

But what you tell me about holism and epistemology is also attractive to me in an ethical sense.

We have a point of mutual interest, you and I, the relationship between epistemology and ontology, I discuss it in the last chapter of The linguistic presentational where I talk about the dissolution of ontology in epistemology, my essay "Hermeneutics and culture" discusses ontology and my essays "The interstice", "The liminals" and "Confines of the stratum".

Everything you say about Lacan is interesting to me, really very interesting, I congratulate you, do not give up on Lacan, you master it very well and it is a wealth, redistribute it, to achieve it you have to be creative, not take the discourses merely for what they are but a once you understand what they are, see there what is peculiar that you want to propose and develop

I think that the relationship between epistemology and holism is one of the most interesting things that you are considering, I even see the title of your book in it or thereabouts, something like

very quickly tell you that I am not saying that Derrida works on predicative logic for nothing, I have read almost all of his books and I have studied them, neither has Chomsky, what I am saying is that predicative logic since Aristotle in all its forms including the syllogisms and the judgment that if they work Hegel, and in the 20 Lyotard and that is behind both the theory of discourse if it is not generic like Todorov's and the question of subject of the statement/subject of the enunciation taken in Its pure logical form is a type of defective grammatology and rhetoric, affections, I will write to you later, thanks friend, we will talk in a while

Also regarding the topic of predicative logic, I want to be more punctual and precise with respect to my decantations because perhaps you have a different possibility in mind than those I am thinking of, since you are so voluptuous and versatile in your developments you could perfectly develop possibilities that explore interesting avenues, your example of the planet in the morning and at night the same person for example was very beautiful, I will try to explain myself better in order to look for the points of mutual adequacy on that specific, I do believe a lot in intersubjectivity exactly as you evoke it about our counterpoint a few pages ago, a hug, we talked, andel

I am referring to the application that you made to our own dialogue of intersubjectivity in the Habermasian sense, okay, I believe in it a lot, as long as they are individuals and as long as the societal world of daily life is free of external interference, that is, the linguistic model in its own logical purity in its ideality, given in micro situations of interaction but not in a discussion of politically effective society as a whole understood

Free from external interference, reviewing prayer, with respect to the world of societal life in which communicative intersubjectivity takes shape in Habermasian terms, I already downloaded the PDFs, tomorrow I review the counterpoints so that all the words are reviewed and I send you that explanation of my decantations that It can help us in the mutual adaptation regarding that specific topic of discourse theory and, before that, predicative logic, one more among many other topics.

I have been working since I woke up at 5 am reading the first chapter "Hermeneutics and culture" of your book "The correlation of the world." I haven't finished yet so I'll wait to conclude to tell you some very specific opinions about the work. Now I want to address your comment on the post we've been talking about.

I told you that Derrida was a very good writer as well as an excellent philosopher, Barthes too, while Bourdieu, for example, was a good sociologist but a bad writer, and that did not help him, thank you for praising me in that sense, I do enjoy the writing although I like the theory. It is the center of my work but one can write theoretical and scientific thought and at the same time good writing, it is in that sense that I praised you yesterday I like how you write you are very different from me but one always likes what is not the same as one and you write very good theory, of course, which is also the only thing I read.

It's good that you have motivated yourself and decided to focus and constrain yourself to write about The correlation of the world as a book, and then about thinking science, perfect, thanks

When I hear predicative logic I think of Aristotle: the syllogisms and judgments in the Organon,

Hegel in the third volume of the science of logic again syllogisms and judgments, subject and predicate

I think of Benveniste, his essay where he argues that Aristotle in the syllogism and the judgments considered questions of thought what were questions of language.

As you can see, I differentiate hermeneutics and ontology from exegesis and texts, the first refers to this, illustrating it with our counterpoint, what I am telling you, you have to elucidate it, if you do not elucidate it, you cannot answer me, I will help you elucidate it by trying to make myself explicit. Without explanation and elucidation it is not possible to state and counter-state something in which our dialogue takes place, this at the level of communication. intersubjective is ontological, it cannot be otherwise unless you and I avoid the topic and move on to another topic or choose a detour, but even avoiding and deflecting communication has topics that constrain it or more precisely that give meaning to it. Therefore, in the long run we must explain and elucidate, it is ontological also in the phonological soliloquy, what you say to yourself about what you experienced, what you heard or What you have experienced must be elucidated, it will participate in what you do or stop doing, undoubtedly these elucidations and explanations are also interpretative but of an ontological order at a hermeneutic level, they cannot go in any direction but in some and not in others, to go deeper into how I I theorize and analyze this in my essay "The intramundane horizon", there perhaps as I move away from the presuppositions about consensus in Habermas, consensus is not what actors or speakers need, but interpretive arrangements resulting from these elucidations and explanations, these arrangements do not guarantee that the interpreters interpret the same thing, they are open forms of understanding but they are arrangements that are necessary to generate shared horizons of expectations, well up to this point it is hermeneutics, hermeneutics in the practical, not phenomenology, phenomenology is that it takes shape in a world that is phenomenally a world for subjectivity, for the body and for sensations, it is true that this world is not intramundane. only to the extent that it is both the phenomenal world and the interpretative, hermeneutical world, it is the hermeneutics explained above that makes it an intramundane horizon, up to this point hermeneutics and ontology but not yet exegesis and text, the exegesis-text relationship presupposes something that is not there for one or for you but for many and for many who are not in a face-to-face relationship, before we talked about soliloquies, monologues, or face-to-face relationships well as intersubjective communications between interlocutors who respond according to how they communicate, our counterpoint for example

  At the beginning of the exegesis-text relationship, interpretation becomes more complex, that is where the dilemma begins regarding the interpretation of the dissimilar and non-coinciding text by a multiplicity of interpreters, however, this infinity of interpretations is not itself an infinite semiosis--Peirce- -, nor is it the chain of infinite signifiers according to differences -- Derrida

   Let's call them infinite chains. These two are not related to that interpretation that, as you rightly argue, is also infinite. Your point is interesting. It is true that this is also infinite, but that infinity is polysemy. Its infinity oscillates between entropy and order, chance. and causality results in pluralism, pluralism would be its infinity, polysemy

   But that is not Peirce's infinite semiosis, nor is that the chain of Derrida's infinite signifiers because these two infinities are not intended between an interpreter or many and the interpreted, which is what corresponds to the hermeneutic/ontology relationship and exegesis/text, but one is intended, that of the signifiers between the sides of a sign and the other between the sign and its object.

    If you notice in my essay after discussing hermeneutics and ontology and exegesis and texts as two forms of interpretation, I say well, if in one we found the practical contingency of communication (explicitation-elucidation), and in another we found the indeterminacy (nothing guarantees the coincidence between interpretation and text), now we must ask ourselves what a text is because ultimately, there is something interpreted and that something we must discern, we then leave the hermeneutic-interpretive plane of the first part of the essay, now we must enter into a structural one to agree on the text itself, both the infinity of the Saussure/Derrida signifiers and infinite semiosis are concepts that are born not from the relationship between interpretation and what is interpreted, but from the relationship between the sides of the sign

  The significant infinity: its sides are language and speech/sign: signified, signifier and referent

  Infinite semiosis: its sides are representation/object of representation that includes: ground, representatement, correlate and interpretant

The first leads to the text, a text that is form, morphology, it is text as a fabric, texeré, why form?, because the signifier replaces the meaning, postpones it, postpones it, always leaves it pending and because when substituting the meaning it does not complete the reference, then What happens? The signifiers relate to each other through differential relations. What is according to what is not, but it is nothing without what is not, then it is just a mark, that is the text, the inscription, the scripture, the mark, that fabric. fabric goes to infinity

But this infinity is not the same as Peirce's semiosis, in the latter the relationship is with the referent from the beginning is the sign and its object, then ground/representatement/correlate and interpretant are the infinite semiosis of the sign-world relationship, object sign, reality sign and beyond, thought sign, reality as a sign and conversely the sign as nature and reality, is another chain

    Now this is my next book in the correlation of the world. I only analyzed infinite semiosis in its consequences for a theory of culture insofar as the replacement of the object by its interpretants is nothing other than culture.

Now there is a difference between hermeneusis and semiosis, both are culture but the first is immediate culture as it is lived, the second is meta culture, the infinity of infinite semiosis is the semiosphere Peirce called it cosmology, but it is a cosmos of signs not of planets.

Here there is no other way you can understand than by giving examples

Weaving: readings of inscriptural and scriptural textual formations: topic in itself to expand on it as something in itself I have to refer to the reading of other books and essays

Semiosis: the sound of the neighbor outside my door who tells me if he knocks on my door or keeps coming up, the town crier's bells that tell me if he sells ice cream or rice pudding, the sound of a city that tells you traffic density of trucks, unlike rural areas, here ecological but also informational semiosis can enter, the sound of digital telephones, the visuality of an airport, which allows you to distinguish visual imagery, colonial visual imagery, urban markets, in semiosis always there is a world of reestablished presence, a world of reality there is always a reference, here is the everyday, but also the relationship between two languages ​​is semiosis, Spanish and English in the United States, or between Spanish and the idiolects of slang, acere what ball imbia escobio, lapura la madre el gao la casa it is semiosis, fashion as a visual system of clothing in which you read the social text, body languages ​​in the city all of this is semiosis

In the weaving of the chain of infinite signifiers you always read marks, writing, petroglyphs, calligraphy, also certain forms of text.

Now you must see the book as a whole, the objective of the first chapter is to differentiate methodologically what it is to elucidate what it is to read texts and what it is to interpret one thing with another that is its interpretant or something that is in its place as an interpretant, three differentiated research methods, hermeneutics and ontology (1- life world, intramundane horizon. Immediacy of culture, 2- exegesis and text and 3- interpretants

In summary, how to work on the three things separately or separately and how to cooperate between one and the other, that is to say, move between one and the other in a research of course.

The next chapters are therefore essential

First, the entire first part of the first chapter is hermeneutics, not phenomenology, although I remember that it differentiates them, phenomenology begins in the middle when it asks what a text is and begins the comparison between Saussure and Peirce, that proximity to the sign in both and everything The discourse is phenomenological, I am working hermeneutics and phenomenology together but not in any forms, in very theoretical and scientifically very exact forms, the lines by which they are related and separated are very precise and logically exact

Now you understand that from the moment the text is asked, the structure enters into chapter 1, the structure does not enter there by chance, it enters because we are going to find out why there is communication and understanding despite the impossibility of establishing which interpretations correspond to the text, and The concept of text enters, which is the same structural one, and you then have it theorized in the following two chapters, the correlation of the world places the general and main problem of the book, discusses the questions to consider and clear up between hermeneutics, phenomenology and pragmatism, proposes a discussion of nominalism, conceptualism and positivism that defends incorporating them into phenomenology, the horizons of the symbolic, then retheorizes the structure in a neo-symbolist perspective that theoretically explains how it is worked on in the book.

The exegesis of cultural texts is crucial, there you will see important methodological distinctions and finally the last chapter aims to expand the possibilities for cultural analysis from semantics as theorized in the book, opening the range of empirical research towards linguistic and cultural anthropology.

It is true that there is a general issue discerned in the first part, the humility of hermeneutics whatever its form and the place that the community of language has in it beyond our interpretations, but that community encompasses the three forms nor the infinite semiosis. escapes it because this linguistic community also has meta-text and meta-culture.

Now in my next book around the ground I want to demonstrate other things that cannot be agreed upon from the question of the correlation of the world, which is why it is another book, here I go back to my essays on the intramundane horizon and on ordination in the worlds of life, read them

I am very methodological, as you realize, research theory, each book has not only a topic but is also cut according to the problems of research methodology that I am theorizing in a way that is scientifically appropriate now in terms of training, that is, of teaching-learning, I am training researchers, let's say not just thinkers.

It is true that the concept of texere woven in Derrida still preserves the fact that he conceived it based on Husserl and therefore that relationship to the noetic and the eidetic of pre-expressive consciousness in the direction of expression, but I have already demonstrated an infinite number of times that works both in authorial texts and in authorless texts forms of the text in visual and material culture that dispense with consciousness in their genesis

On the concept of reality I work with Alfred Schütz, first of all the idea of ​​a world accepted and typified by common sense as a tacit everyday and a-problematic world until further notice.

Speaking of rereadings, I read Lacan's seminars in Caracas, in fact I also had them

You have developed many things regarding Lacan in your new counterpoints, all of them very interesting, what could I add to this? Tell you the following, even in Lacan, despite the relevance he gives to language and, as you say, to the signifier, the presupposed subject. or omitted behind that language is unconscious, let's say that with Lacan the concept of unconscious loses thickness and depth, it stops being an unmanifest and inaccessible stratum to whose mysteries we must go with ways of interpreting symbolisms of which the subject is unconscious, but still redistributed in language, even if we come to admit that the unconscious is attached to signs and signifiers, even so that unconscious is inaccessible to the user or performer of that language even if we wanted to dissolve the idea of ​​a single subject. and indivisible, the individuated monad by in turn thinking about the relationship between the interpretation and the interpreted, even there the unconscious without or with less thickness is inaccessible to the subject, we continue depending on the latent and the unmanifest, much as the structures in structuralism were unmanifest to the subject,

I am working with exactly the opposite, what subjects say and know about themselves, the way they signify and give meaning to their world is the most important thing we need to know in order to understand that world, there is not something unmanifest of which they are unconscious. where we will find a truth beyond their reach, the truths are accessed by understanding how they make their world meaningful, not by studying what they are unconscious of, therefore, if we were to somehow reconcile what I just said with Lacan in some sense It would be necessary to say that the unconscious is what we have not given a language to. As soon as we have a language, it stops being unconscious and what we must work on is giving language and finding the language.

This could be my comment on the Lacanian theme, the unconscious is certainly in language according to Lacan, but only until we have found a language. As soon as we have found it, it stops being in language and stops being unconscious. The question would then be where it goes. does it displace the unconscious once we have given it language?, once we have the language and it stops being unconscious?, does the unconscious disappear or is it relocated somewhere else?, where?, I think that is a good question.

Well, for example, if it is relocated to the imaginary, then we would have to ask about Jung, or not? Well, the only way not to return to Jung at that point would be to say that this imaginary has a syntax, it is an imaginary in the signifier, but as You say that there have been clinical excesses with syntax if that imaginary is there without syntax then what do you do? Archetypes again?

 I now try to conclude the topic of predicative logic. As Aristotle told you, syllogisms and judgments in the organon, anterior and posterior analysis is predicative logic, logical paradoxes are achieved by relating subject and predicate in syllogistic and judgment forms through which, for example, inferring conclusions about species, classes, genera , etc., using predication

Then Hegel in the science of logic resorts to predicative logic in the third volume again syllogisms and judgments, the same thing, relations between subject and predicate from which logical inferences can be derived.

Benveniste has an essay where he criticizes Aristotle's predicative logic, saying that with it Aristotle considered the logic of thought what were actually the logic of language.

 Derrida in turn writes an essay on Benveniste's critique of Aristotle's predicative logic that is titled Supplement to the Copula: Philosophy versus Linguistics.

Here in Derrida's discussion he leads to the question of the relationship between thought, being and language, a question that theoretically moves away from and dispenses with predicative logic since he does not resort to it to develop the matter but tries to reveal what the question is. background that is behind the Benveniste-Aristotle diatribe, which towards Aristotle, used relations of predication to the subject to deduce and derive logical conclusions, Benveniste says this is the logic of language not of thought

I read the syllogisms and judgments of Aristotle, also those of Hegel and I agree with Benveniste,

The path that Derrida takes with that essay ignores predicative logic, completely disregarding it, demonstrating how the relationship of thought, being, and language is a much deeper and broader philosophical problem with respect to which Benveniste Aristotle's dilemma regarding Predicative logic is just one more of the specific ways in which the deepest and most general philosophical problem is expressed.

According to what you have told me, you are referring to uses of predicative logic in analytical philosophy specifically in Quine, I do not know Quine well, I can tell you within pragmatism and specifically semiotics that even Peirce resorts to it, I have no objections to the way he resorts to Peirce, yes I have objections to the way of Aristotle and Hegel but in Peirce and Hegel the recurrence to it is marginal, I mean their systems are not built on that logic, other logics govern them, in Hegel it is a section, a topic treated in a minimal session within his vast non-predicative logic, in Peirce it is not even used for demonstrative examples, he only sometimes goes to it, I can however assume recurrences interesting at the same time and I am not closed to it, despite it, I do not doubt that you can surprise me with an interesting exploration

Now when I spoke of a preventive note saying that I have distanced myself from predicative logic, I was referring specifically to the place that it acquires in the theory of discourse specifically in Cristera, in Lyotard and in Foucault, especially in these last two, I said that I distance myself from them, especially from Lyotard, his book The Difference, and from Foucault, his book The Strategies of Discourse and the Microphysics of Power, between my 20s and my 30s, still very occasionally from time to time. time I mentioned them, since I was 40 I stopped doing it forever for countless theoretical and scientific reasons that for the moment I prefer to keep to myself

And regarding speech I stick with Todorov, his books symbolism and interpretation, theories of the symbol and the genres of speech

And good friend, I won't take you any more time so you can concentrate and it's good that you save your ideas to write the prologue.

I will be writing the next chapter of my new book and the three critical texts, in addition to reading, and now on top of that I have to do the translations, all of this will be in December so wait to talk to your friends at the publishing house and move forward reading the books and writing the prologues or otherwise present the book to them so they can decide and tell them that the translation of the fragments will be available in December

But at least if I send you my two books again by Gmail because those copies had old details, work with these, I will still send them to you again in December with the translations and revised details

As for my prefaces, each book already has a preface, but a prologue is not just anything, it is something that the reader reads before the book has effects on the way he reads the work, therefore I reserve an additional preface to the edition, that is, to that publication that will include your prologues.

You underline and you realize something crucial, if we call this duality of the interpretant we find it as it is directly in Peirce, sometimes the interpretant in Peirce is part of the same sign, which performs let's say a function, it is not even a someone, its same example , the metal rooster on the roof of a country house, as it moves it becomes an interpretant of the direction of the wind, there the interpretant is physically an element of the sign, not a someone, it is literally the metal rooster, but it is not alone, Peirce says that in this case the object modifies the sign, what is the object of the sign?, the direction of the wind, but if the direction of the wind did not move the metal rooster, the latter could not be a sign interpreting the direction. of the wind because it is required that the rooster move so that we can see it and infer the direction of the wind. He calls this an indexical interpretant, there the interpretant is an indexical sign, it is formed by the metal kitten and its movement.

   But what happens is that in the end the interpretant always supposes a someone in that same example without the peasant who at night and in the morning looks at the eaves of his roof to see his little metal rooster to know how the wind is, nor did it open a sign, and the duality of the interpretant in Peirce consists in the fact that sometimes it is a component of the sign, other times it is another sign that helps complete the meaning of the first and sometimes it is actually a someone.           

    Peirce himself has that ambivalence or duality, sometimes he says in his science of semiotics, we know that separating a single sign and its single object is relatively arbitrary since it is always a relationship but we need that reduction and from now on when he says sign and object I will be speaking methodologically of a single sign and its single object, at that level the interpretant is a moment of the sign that gives it its meaning, but other times the interpretant is another sign that becomes an interpretant of the first, and other times it is focus in the interpretant as a someone and in various forms

   For example, a reader anticipated in writing but not yet read is a virtual interpretant in what is written itself, it is a second or third point of reference because what is written is directed to him, not yet effective, there the interpretant is a someone but still non-concrete, non-real is even a function that is made inclusive of writing as an anticipated interpretant, when writing, as usual, is oriented to an unspecified reader, Peirce does not call it a function, he calls it an abductive hypothesis - he says, let's imagine something that we want to achieve but we still don't have We media then hypothetically evaluate what we would have to do and make a diagram, he explains it to explain the hypothetical abduction that explains that type of virtual functioning of the interpretant.

  But if indeed sometimes the interpretant is a literal and real someone, for example when he says that every thought is a sign, that we cannot but think in signs, that outside of the sign, thought is not possible and that every thought is an interpretant of a sign. previous thought there is a someone, then the answer is that the duality or ambivalence of the interpretant of being able to be one thing or another is in Peirce himself, which, being true, is an ambivalence in Peirce himself, far from seeming to me to be an error or confusion of I find Peirce fascinating, it is a clear indication that Peirce, no matter how much he wanted to distance himself from Hegel, although he recognized himself as a follower of Hegel, there is still no logic that explains the coherence of his system better than dialectics to understand his same semiotic logic. In fact, he says the Semiotics is another name for logic, no matter how much he wanted and in fact managed to be recognized as the founder of pragmatism, his system scrutinized with high-precision magnifying glasses still belongs to neo-Hegelian dialectics.

   I announced to you that my next book includes two essays, one retheorizing neo-Hegelianism and the other on Peirce's ethics. I don't even know if there are two if it is one or what form it will finally take, as you see, it is a book that has just begun, but it is going somewhere. Of course this does not mean that Peirce saw it that way in any way but it is my retheorization of the matter.

  But its general definition is that an interpretant is something that stands in the place of an object as its interpretant sign.

  Now with regard to my book the correlation of the world

  In chapter one I constrained myself, let's say only to discuss what was necessary to differentiate Peirce from Saussure, there I am alone saying that Peirce's semiotic theory is born from philosophical reflection on the relationship between representation and its object, sensible or palpable multiplicity. sensoryity and that which through signs allows us to distinguish one presence from another and then replace them with signs that are in the place of the object, all in Peirce's semiotics ground/representatement/ correlate and interpretant always refers to the reference to what relates the sign to its object, its reference

   Peirce's model is the perception of nature and reality, Saussure's is alphabetic language, the signifying relationship, meaning of the sign in Saussure has alphabetic writing and speech as its parameter, in that chapter I only focus on discussing The differences that, of course, are also the differences between linguistics and semiotics, as you rightly point out, not without forgetting that although Saussure, unlike Peirce, did not develop semiotic science, however, he did announce its need and it is something that occurred simultaneously since they coexisted in time, but what is crucial here is that almost 100 percent of semioticians in the 20th century have extended Saussure and Peirce the opposite of distinguishing their abysmal differences that are clear at the same time the What is between linguistics and semiotics?

  The majority have proceeded to indistinguish them by mixing the notions without finding out their differences, treating the interpretants as if they were significant and conversely, I say that this has been an error and an excess, I proceed to rediscuss the difference of the post-Hegelian philosophical and phenomenological origin. in Peirce, linguistics in Saussure, representation and object of representation in Peirce as a philosophical problem, language and speech in Saussure as a question, as you call it, linguistics, you would have We must know to what extent they have been fused and the consequences that this has had in semiotics and semantics to understand why I consider it urgent to distinguish them and then return to discuss how they can cooperate.

  The discussions of both Derrida and Lacan with the signifier refer to the Saussurean matrix, nothing to do with Peirce

  But modern semiotics have obviously mixed them with the total primacy of Peirce since he was the one who really developed a semiotics. Remember that in Peirce the sign is not only a triadic unit: ground-representatement-interpretant and among them correlate, he also established the iconic trichotomies - index- symbol with its differences, rhema, desissign- saying sign, qualisign- sinsign- legisign, among many other developments that come to make up the first form of the semiotics as a science, but Peirce's semiotics, if you read it directly by studying as I have done Peirce directly by reading his books, was still logic in the strict sense of this in philosophy, and modern semioticians moved away from that way in which semiotics was still a moment of philosophical logic between neo-Hegelianism, phenomenology and pragmatism, they reinscribed Peirce's semiotics within the structural logic of Saussure's linguistics and to that profusion that you rightly Controversial llamas, none of them escape, neither echo nor Tuesday, none of them, the list is immense.

  When you read science thinking you will see there my critique of semiotics where I announce the need to renew it and my program is a return not only to its previous form in Peirce but also back to the classical philosophy from which it comes, but this is not the correlate of world the correlate of world reaches methodologically only as far as the problems of cultural theory with regard to the three methods discussed in the book hermeneutics, exegesis of the texts of culture -- it is crucial to read that one -- and work with the interpreters

  Thinking Science has its own theme and objective as a book but it is already beginning that return, which is what I am going to focus on in my next book.

  Returning to the world correlate, in the first chapter I am proposing separation to arrive at crucial distinctions

   In the second chapter I then proceed to explain the interpretants more deeply.

   And it is in the third chapter where I proceed to discuss how we can work with the interpretants in research methodology, which already presupposes the answer to your question, is this, the subject or the agent subject in my book the correlate of the world is a hypothetical researcher someone for whom I am theorizing a research methodology for cultural theory and I say, working with interpretants is neither reading a text in the sense of exegesis of the text nor interpreting by elucidating in the hermeneutic sense in the sense hermeneutics-ontology, interpreting something is not the same as relating things that are interpretative of each other.

  In the first two one directly interprets either an experience or something said or a text or objects, with interpretants we do not directly interpret the text, we choose something that we will put in relation to something else that will be its interpretant, a text as an interpretant of another. text, a book as an interpretant of another book, a culture as an interpretant of another culture, a structure of another

    And if indeed, in research methodology, the perspective of the tourist as an interpreter of the restoration process offers a different way of understanding the latter that without resorting to reading the tourist as its interpreter it would be impossible to find it or the other way around if we use the perspective of restaurateurs to understand tourism, here is an example of working with interpreters in research methodology. The eye of the museum if you want and the canoe metonymy in the museum to read the culture in situ metonymically would be another example.

   There, in the micro-social, elucidating in intersubjective communications is not the same as reading texts-- by the way, see my three concepts of reading, textual reading, archaeological reading and free reading in my essay hermeneutics and axiology, and it is not the same as working with interpretants, where we choose one thing that will be an interpretant of another, this choice is of course not arbitrary or on a whim, it is necessary to understand the logic of the interpretant well to work with it using good forms, we have just seen an example with tourism and restoration, but work with interpretants is not the same as "Performativity in research" despite having used the same example that I use in my essay of that title

    The example that you have chosen of the cathedral is very good, an extraordinary way of working with the interpretant, here the cathedral and the example of the tourist helped you to bring and construct a reading of what was happening in our intersubjective communication in transit From the general to the detailed that you call baroque that otherwise would not have been achieved, far from interpreting our dialogue directly you placed something else in its place as an interpretant of our dialogue and it was effective, leading it to the understanding that you have reached. referred to, there you worked very well methodologically with interpreters and also to understand my books and my style, yes I already know that you told me baroque, I like baroque I see it as a compliment

   You see the difference of merely reading - exegesis of the text or merely elucidating, of working with interpretants, is different, I discuss this in chapter 3 not in 2, it is in chapter 3 where we land with an idea of ​​the subject with respect to the interpretants. or what you call him agent

   Note that there is structure in the work with interpretants but that structure works differently from the operational versus ontological parameter of structuralism, it requires a retheorization of the concept of structure that I undertake in chapter 3, but if it is chapter 2 where I talk about your analytical philosophy tendencies , neopositivism, etc.

   Regarding the ground, it is a concept of Peirce but both in Peirce and later in modern semiotics it is extremely limited on the one hand to the concept of quality and on the other it is treated as a side of the sign that at most becomes recognized as a sign. In the icon, I am retheorizing all of this. I am proposing that the ground is logically autonomous and self-sufficient, and it is mine. I am giving it a new scope.

   And if to take it towards the world, as a dimension in the world

    But if it is always called ground in English, even in Spanish translations it is sealed so it is always used in English.

  I do not foresee going in the direction that you tell me about Lacan regarding the real. I am not working with Lacan like you who have dedicated yourself to him as much as I have to Peirce, Hegel, Derrida, Schütz, Habermas, I only read his seminars in Caracas but I have not dedicated myself to studying him in depth like you.

  But of course if I can engage in a theoretical discussion in Lacanian terms and I consider it one percent I can be your interlocutor at that level because I read it but I didn't dedicate myself to it.

 As for what you tell me, the imaginary is symbolically prestructured, that's how I see it too without a doubt, how well it coincides with Lacan as you explain to me.

  Again, everything you explain to me about Lacan is very interesting and your way of theorizing it is fascinating. In fact, I read you and enjoy your very interesting analyses. You have developed very attractive analyzes around Lacan throughout our counterpoint, but what I have more to say is that Listen in that sense, enjoy your very interesting theorizations but I don't think I have much to say in that direction other than minimal notes like the one I told you last time.

  And thank you for answering my question, I knew that nothing survives of Jung with Lacan but when I saw your criticism of a clinical excess with syntax I had doubts. I asked myself how the imaginary could be theorized without syntax because I didn't see how to understand the imaginary without syntax and at the same time not regress to Jungianism.

   I read the whole of your recent message, very interesting, the example of the cathedral and the way in which by distinguishing levels you reach understanding, yes definitely understanding is a more complete level, hence, among other things, my predilection for Alfred Schütz from the mid-nineties to the present to the point of being my tendency, phenomenological philosophy and research, phenomenological sociology, comprehensive sociology -- Weber in the background, and in general understanding at an interpretative level at the base, I especially appreciate that you feel motivated to This with respect to my books that you are going to preface, you will see that I continually include "The problem of understanding in social sciences" by Habermas in the bibliography in almost all my books, one of the chapters on the theory of communicative action, how good it is that Let's agree despite how you tell me in your messages prior to the recent one, our epistemological differences and references to different authors that you listed, as well as I appreciate it as valuable in relation to our counterpoint regarding which you tell me about a book together that they would be these same counterpoints

There are some details in your previous theoretical messages that I would like to consider as a closing to the first part of our counterpoint.

  First, in relation to the static. I consider that there are two notions of the static at play here, one structuralist and the other related to the question of neo-positivism and post-positivism in analytical philosophy and language that refer to very different aestheticities from each other and I would like to point this out.

  Indeed, the static in Saussure comes from the fact that the structure is static in itself, let's say that it timeless here and now synchronically, since a structure also has dynamism but these occur within a dimension largely abstracted as timeless, however, although Saussure's structurality given in the basic separation between language and speech that structures its linguistics effectively leads to a series of minimal units, it is necessary to note that these minimal units are in turn comprised by structural relationships through which the elements in it are constellations.

   Indeed, it is this, this bipartite relationship between language and speech, writing and orality that distributes language structurally between the synchronic and the diachronic, making it so that, given that the synchrony in question concerns both language and speech, both are accessible for both learning. and transmission of the language as for its performance and therefore for its study, the diachronic can never be detached from the synchrony that retains it in space, thus being a timeless diachrony and as such reinscribed in spatiality versus temporality, that is why the static of the structure is brought in by the sequential, transforming it into micro sequences that no longer work either in the historical sense, nor in the sense of the evolution of the language nor in the sense of a long temporality in memory.

  This Saussurean cut is at the base even of theoretical forms that seek to distance themselves from traditional structuralism, that is, it prevails in all modern semiotics, including Tel que, and the different types of post-structuralism and structuralisms, for example, it continues to be decisive in Derrida, the margins. of philosophy, his main book for me is crossed from side to side by Saussure's language-speech, writing-orality distinction, of grammatology, of deconstruction and writing and the difference as well, Barthes and Eco are crossed by it and even Pierre Bourdieu in sociology who in his Logic of Practice confesses his debt to Saussure in "Saussure: structure and practice" after a long time in which the synchronic components of his sociology seemed to be due only to last.

  Now of course, this would have to be analyzed case by case because as much as it is a precept that crosses the principle of static timelessness of structuralisms, poststructuralisms and neoestructuralisms, it is also at the same time the principle around which or around each author more or less in that inheritance manages to distinguish itself with its own proposal regarding it and I include myself. The way Derrida works with it is not the same as the way he did it Tuesday or Border, the originality of each one, and I include myself here seriously, depends on how each of us has deliberated our own alternative to how it should work as it should. which does not escape any post-structuralism.

   Now, with regard to structure, I have become more and more interested and I am very attracted to Derrida's study of escaping around structure in an essay titled Genesis and Structure, and at the same time very interested in the concept. of structure that we have in Alfred Schütz the structure of the life world, life world and structure of meaning. These two perspectives, Derrida-Husserl, Schutz-Husserl, attract me more and more and presuppose a relationship with structure very different from that which takes Saussure's linguistic parameter as a basis.

   Unlike the previous static, the statism in question in the positivism line, post-positivism neopositivism is very different in epistemological terms, it is another static. It is and you know this about the veritativist relationship-- you call it verificationist, of a representationalist type that sees the word/thing relationship as synonymous with greater or lesser verifiability as long as a reduction operates in that relationship would bin a criterion of greater or lesser adequacy of the representation with respect to its object

  That is to say in epistemological terms - theory of knowledge where the word would be the subject versus the object: the thing, as if saying, more or less realistic in both reality and the objective, passes the bill to the language as the object would pass it to the subject for being more or less objective, scientific or verifiable in its regard.

  Statism here is given in that the position of the subject with respect to the object is fixed, or what you call between thought and thing, between word and thing. Reality, the referent, the world, the thing, the object remains as in front of the language, in front of the subject, in front of the thought, in front of the word as on its other side or on the side there, this parameter presupposes that according to the representation

  What happens with it? If you look at reality only according to language, word or thought, you are excluding the way in which the world is not yet organized according to representation, that is, in terms of classical philosophy, considered as heterogeneous multiplicity, sensitive multiplicity, palpable sensoriality, sensation, form, substance and matter are presented to thought, language and word from the side here, that is, not according to the static that cuts it out on the other side as its object or thing, as its referent which is a representationalist parameter, but rather as They are presented to him in his own reality of thought, language and words, in fact even in their genesis.

  And obviously ignoring it means leaving out everything that cannot be understood if it is not seen from here, the list is immense and I am not going to break it down here in all its systematicity and details because it would become very extensive but for just to mention a few: nothing could be studied that presupposed, for example, identity, the self, the relationship of the self with the social, motivation, intentionality, the meaning essential to form a thought or a language as these require the being, the noetic and the pre-expressive and expressive eidetic, the forms of the alterity before itself of the being or the subject, interiority, idealization, subjectivity, consciousness could not be studied, but neither could everything that relates thought and language, as well as everything that involves as the form is presented to thought, language and word, and as the substance and matter, the studies that involve the substance of the expression, or the lexicon. Phenomenology itself arises and is epistemologically structured from that side here, differentiating the form, the appearance and the phenomenon as forms of the presence of the substrate, the absence, the stratified and applies this to interpretation and understanding because when you interpret you go the same way. from what makes you present in the forms to the progressive elucidation of senses, contents and meanings that are not present in the form at the same time, if the substrate were present in the forms we would know everything with the sole appearance, of a single relationship of statements you would know all the content of what the author or enunciator wanted to say or were his authorial intentions, just by seeing a Thai you would know everything about Thailand, just by listening to a Mexican from the northern border in Monterrey speak you would adapt to living among Mexicans from the north and we know that is not the case, if you see a petroglyph you would already know everything about the civilization or culture that you would have to read in accordance with indications

  Including in this any form of the world whose genesis occurs on the side here.    

   So if indeed the very idea of ​​the world is phenomenal, it even requires apperception to such a point that it completely dispenses with representation. I analyze all this in depth and in profound ways that it is not possible for me to repeat in our dialogue in my book Thinking Science, if you read it carefully you will see how all this is deliberate there.

   And if Hegel is essential from this side, although the idea and Phenomenology of the world does not come from Hegel but initially from Husserl and Dasein, the philosophy of being in the world, in Hegel it was still only what he called existence or determined being but in Hegel does have the concepts of the living individual and of life. In fact, it also refers to the world from time to time, but it is true that it does not focus on making a Phenomenology of the idea of ​​the world and uses only the word. But he does have the relationship between thought and object, thought and thing, well defined, but his response to this is that far from looking for the object in itself and the thing in itself on the other side, as through a representation, the thought itself is the thing in itself and the object in itself on the side here.

  Then Peirce still starts from this side, Peirce directly, not as he was later incorporated by modern semiotics recalled from post-Aussureanism. But Peirce himself was both a neo-Hegelian and a pragmatist, actually considered the founder of pragmatism.

   That is to say, in Peirce, language, word and thought are not yet faced with an idea of ​​reality projected by representation, but still between the quality and distinction of presence, that is, what distinguishes one presence from another, which for He was the quality that he called qualisign, even in the rhema there is sensation, that is, ground, although of course he already begins a certain turn towards representation, his sign in fact is a representatement but if you read it directly you will see that he distinguishes representatement from representation the first has not yet detached himself from the phenomenal quality of presence, the second is his reply, and in this sense his theory remains neo-Hegelian - something that Peirce himself says - I even consider that without Hegel Peirce's theory in direct It doesn't hold up. I say that it does not hold up not because it was not the same original, it was and its system impresses with its high elaboration, but exposed to all the underlying epistemological questions it needs Hegel.

  There is a very important essay by Derrida "Introduction to Hegel's Semiology"

    What modern post-Saussurean semiotics inscribed in structurality does is if it statizes Peirce, takes advantage of his entire semiotic alphabet, icon, index, symbol, trichotomies, etc., but reinscribing in structural statics the result is a clear disconnection of his concepts with the ground, the sensation and the dynamism, thus the representatement that in direct Peirce was still a quality in itself differentiated from its replica becomes only the latter the replica, the sign is separated from the object as something else because in modern semiotics convention governs, what Peirce called thirdness, meta-culture, where at once everything is included within the pragmatic sender, message, decoding, receiver. Peirce's distinction between dynamic object and immediate object is deformed, it is enclosed between rigid cuts before and after in a way that is barely used to distinguish ground from object and barely works under those parameters.

  To understand the dynamism of the sign in Peirce, we must therefore return to it directly and we must also develop theorizations deducible to its purpose, but which he himself does not develop, which were, let's say, with him in the making.

  I sent you the first chapter of my next book, which grew a lot there and completely blew up the matter.

   What does analytical philosophy and positivist and post-positivist language usually do, what is its static? It distances itself from ontological immanence, nothing can move thought -- also say subject, language, word -- according to a movement other than his own, this presupposes a kind of super-subject, the subject is statically presupposed in front of the object.

  This can sometimes be methodologically useful but in the end it is arbitrary, to be thought, to be language and to be writing or word they have to be in both senses, being of being, of that, of becoming, of being being without exteriority towards it and being of what is to say of its genesis, to be thought and not something else, to be language and not something else, to be writing and not something else, without being the thought not only could not be but it could not even have a meaning without which it is impossible write, speak, think.

  So if in Hegel and Derrida also certainly thought and all science depend and are part of the logic of being and one could say if being were only what it simply is without exteriority towards it, it could lead to accidents, yes and no , not because effectively grammar in writing, logic in thought give a direction to being, they take it to where thought and grammar want and not because none of them--neither thought nor language--would have direction without being, relationship is dialectical and as such does not admit a subject rigid and static in front of the object but even one capable of becoming an object in its self-alterity.

   On the other hand we ask about the substance, the organism, we certainly want, we need in many cases to stop the substance not only because everything that is an event is not a substance when it comes to, for example, a social or cultural flow, what happens cannot be captured. with chemistry the mere mechanism or physics since there are meanings and interpretations irreducible to the substance and to evacuate the latter we need a more rigid static subject in a more fixed position in front of the object, a self-certified subject that says no here regarding this without substance Although the substance is there in the organisms, for example in the climax, it is of no use to understand what makes a course social or cultural.

  Now there are cases in which you cannot avoid it, what do you do, for example, if that course is art, painting or sculpture, for example, where language, meanings, interpretations and what makes it cultural is given with clay, with pigments, with objects. , with marble, with wood, with polyethylene, with earth, molding substances, materials and shapes?, that is, where you cannot separate language from substance. You need a dialectical, dynamic relationship between the subject and the object or you don't understand anything

   So all this is Hegel, there is no above without below, there is no left without right, there is no father without son, you remove one and the other loses its identity. What's more, all of this is in Hegel, the positivist and post-positivist statics of the subject is nothing other than what Hegel discussed about the dialectic of the positive and the negative, it is contemplated in Hegel only that in Hegel it is a pole of dialectical work. , we go to it when necessary, we go through there and relate according to that logic according to what it is about, but we cannot stay there because it is in turn denied by its opposite and is engendered in its own identity, on the other hand, comes and goes, moving the negative and the positive from one side to the other.

   For all this, I suggest you read my book Thinking Science, in the first essay, epistemology, performativity research and cultural theory, you will see how I propose there to unfix the subject-object relationship and open it in epistemology to research what I have called theory of performativity, read that essay, then the next one delves into the subject-object dialectic once unfixed through the mediation of the concept, read that entire essay too, it takes you to all the complexities of that relationship, proposing how to capture it in its different moments without excluding the positivist and post-positivist moment, only that this is just one more.

  Then you read my essay The Restoration of the World that proposes differentiating full presence from deferred presence and presence in difference, the first phenomenologically is the one that works and is required in the world, it requires a subject in full presence of itself, the other two refer To other forms of presence, forms of presence that tend to be confused, I propose to untangle that skein by clearly distinguishing them.

   And my essay the inscription and the couple the penultimate in my book rethought intertextuality puts you in contact with my new theoretical developments around the relationship between genesis and structure that I told you interests me more and more, there you will see how I discuss the relationship between being, thought and language from here.

   In that book I also suggested performativity in the research that I assume you read because tourism worked there.

   Deleuze is already the extremism of anti-positivist immanentism, the ontological immanence that moves the entire positivist and post-positivist static subject is impossible, it is dragged by the unconscious, which is why Deleuze wrote empiricism and subjectivity about Hume, inspiring many analytical philosophers, his objective was to demonstrate that That subject is continually inventing itself, it produces itself, it is artifice, it is not a subject, rather it must be pulverized, atomized into subjectivity like the disseminated subject. (I help myself here with Derrida) in the immanence that moves it, which is the subject is its in/matter its trans/substance is mere subjectivity something continually reinventing itself. But Deleuze, like most French thinkers of his generation, was an extremist, having called them excessive. I agree with Habermas that they went too far. It is not possible ethically to renounce all analytical philosophy, there is much to rescue from it, but it also went too far in countless directions.

   The work of my biological generation, at least what I am individually doing, is with tweezers. And Hegel is a compass against all these excesses. Impossible to renounce Hegel.

   We consider that scientificity only lives towards theoretical abstraction, the more theoretical a thought is, the more science has an eye, the more science achieves and has, the more science is, the science is achieved.

   No work, no matter how effortful and meticulous, is ever all of science, science is always something that is achieved in that work as a result of flashes of deep theoretical elaboration, it is not obtained towards the real as something to be corroborated but towards the conceptual as something to elucidate and find, it is reached towards the capacity for theoretical abstraction of thought, not towards reality or according to it, not towards language or according to language.

   The usual rejection of Hegel is anti-theoreticalism, while Hegel, if very theoretical, requires a very dedicated reading, study and understanding effort that not everyone is willing to undertake. And this anti-theoreticism finds its way into the historicist works of Hegel, I exclude them, I do not work with them, only with the very abstract Hegel.

  All of this positivism was denied in Frankfort, the school that previously answers the question of what it is or how to define Frankfort's critical philosophy as that which is anti-positivist and anti-postpositivist. I am not as anti-positivist as the tradition of critical philosophy of Frankfort Adorno, Hoikemer, Benjamin is, but not for the same reasons as Habermas, being from Frankfort, let us not forget that Adorno gave him his chair and supported him tirelessly, he has been more flexible towards that post-Anglo-Saxon positivism

  I am not so anti-positivist because I consider that from the most theoretical classical philosophy there is something in that positivism and neopositivism that is redeemable from the point of view of self-care, versioning and care.

   Going into content regarding your questions, it seems to me that you are referring not to something that comes before the preface but on the back cover of the Spanish version. If the synopsis of that book in English is very theoretical (I attach it to you), however the synopsis in Spanish makes certain promotional concessions for a Spanish reader.

  I say concessions not in an ethical sense but in terms of allowing oneself to make simplifications in order to attract an audience that, paradoxically, one does not allow within the content of the book. As you will read, I rarely speak or mention the concept of reality within that book with the exception of the reference to the phenomenology of the concept of reality in Hegel which I quote, his paragraphs on the internal and the external. (Included). Despite this, what is said in these simplifications is based on the scientific nature of the book according to the clarifications that I make in it that I will explain to you at the end of this answer, but that you do not get them inside the book due to reluctance to the concept of reality because it is not its topic (but once I have explained what points in that book are based on those simplifications, I can refer you to other essays of mine in which I do talk about the concept of reality).

  What's happening? My book The World Correlate is after my book The Intramundane Horizon and the jump from one to the other is immense. The first actually refers to the world of everyday life in its pragmatic immediacy as the world in which our experience takes place. , what I define as the intramundane horizon, the second refers not to the world or worlds themselves but to the worlds according to which they are a correlate of a text, that is, effects of the text to the world or worlds according to the or the texts with all that this implies for the three research methods that I discuss in the same

1-Hermeneutics (interpretation) and ontology (elucidation, explanation)

2-Exegesis (reading) and text (read or interpreted)

3- Alternation and interpretants (which we have discussed before).

  Once this difference between both books is understood, I will then try to answer your questions because certainly what is complex despite these immense differences, and at the same time what is rich, but also what is difficult, is that when we consider the world and the worlds according to the text, that is, as a correlate. of the text and not as a world or worlds in itself, that is, without mediation or instance that mediates between us and that world, we have at certain points that there are walkways, walkways between what "is in itself" and what is reflected and symbolic .

  I will return to these walkways later, let's understand walkways for the moment as a narrow or tight passage, let's say a very steep slope, you have to go to the other side, and there is a narrow walkway, or in a cavern a tight passage between rocks, but like all There is only one narrow walkway or there are very few and it is necessary to know which one it is, where it is and what it is like, otherwise one is on the same side, that is, one does not cross to the other side believing one has passed or one thinks one is on the other side. when it is in the same or not He hits one and falls down the slope or freezes among stalactites.

   It is the very theoretical problem of the relationship inside/outside language, when we are inside language and when outside language? The gateways would then be between language and non-language, between the world and the text, between the intramundane horizon. and the supra-discursive over-ordinations, between reality and the symbolic.

  Once it is "your self" or "mine" as something that "you are" and in which you "consist" or "I am" and "I consist", your being or mine, and again it is within language, the being. that we are when you say or I say "I am" or the time in which you are or I am as beings when we say "it is my birthday" and the fact that that "is" is a verb in the language. According to Derrida, in a Saussurean way, the subject is a function of language, according to which there would never be a way out of language, we would always be inside it, included when we believe we are outside it, because every time you feel or I feel being, you will do it or I will do it in recurrence to the verb and through mediation. his.

  In the correlation of the world I maintain that they are both things, not one, once it is outside of language, and once it is inside.

  Indeed, outside of language, the sole extrinsication through which we notice that we are understood as a feeling or certainty that we are, that self-alterity of noticing that we are is itself what distinguishes between being and subject, being alone is and becomes, it is not extrinsic, when it is extrinsic as if it could be external to itself there it is a subject, two series: one that is only another that notices what it is, the relationship is dialectical as I explained to you in our first part, the moment that is extrinsic although there it is a subject that is already in another way that is not only without exteriority towards it, but that continues to be and conversely the one that is extrinsic is the same as it is.

(See my essay the chrysalis of being on the logic of being in Hegel)

  As I told you before in our first part, the main objective of the book is to theorize how to move between the immediacy of the world - call it experience, experience, situation, being that is and the world as an effect of text and language - call it memory, story , memory, inscription, transcription, writing, symbol, language, representation.

  But I am not going to avoid your questions, which rather focus on previous issues, prior to the correlation of the world, rather related to the intramundane horizon of my previous book.

  What distinguishes "world" from "intramundane horizon" and what from "reality", do I start from Husserl, from Schütz?, or from whom and how?, I quote:

"It is also not clear to me if when you talk about "worlds of reality" you refer to these as effects of the text as an effect of interpretation and as distinct from the factual immediacy of the facts of the world when you emphasize that reality takes place in the immediacy of the world. of life. I wonder if it would be pertinent to consider "the intramundane horizon" with an immanent value.

Is it relevant to distinguish "world forms" and "reality worlds" here? as they are ordered in the paragraph that I quote below:

"[...] forms of the worlds of reality that are projected as effects of the texts, unlike the intramundane horizon in which reality takes place in the immediacy of the life world."

On the other hand, when you talk about "reality" it sometimes gives the impression that you treat this idea as if it were understood as a common and shared concept of reality between the author and the reader or understood as a historical and social reality, in short " rational" in a Hegelian sense. How is the concept of "reality" to be understood?

When you talk about "world" here, what do you mean? Are you referring in a phenomenological sense to the world experienced by Husserl in "The Crisis of the European Sciences" when he speaks of the "Leibenswelt" as a "world of life"? Is it directly related to any specific concept articulated by the phenomenological sociology of Alfred Schütz and that has influenced you? What would this concept or group of concepts be?"

I will begin by answering you with what is already discussed within my books, that is, according to what I have already analyzed and theorized before and he as I have done it, that is, both in terms of my own elaborations and in terms of what you call answers. There are certain aspects of your questions that I have already discussed and I will limit myself to summarizing what my elaboration on the matter has been, then there are other aspects of your questions that I can answer honestly and making explicit my precepts or implicit assumptions, here they are It deals with things that I have not necessarily called my text in the way of focusing and thematizing them but that are implicit or taken for granted and that sometimes refer to what other authors have said and what my position is on the matter and finally I will answer you accordingly. to my prospects, that is, what I am currently writing.

Theorized and discussed from my own elaboration in my books regarding your questions is:

1- the distinction, what differentiates, distinguishes and separates the phenomenological concept of the world understood as an abstract concept and the concept of the intramundane, my concept of intramundane horizon.

What do I say about it? I say that a world is a phenomenal world for sensory impressions, for subjectivity and for the body, but I say that until then that phenomenal world is not an intramundane horizon, I say that what makes a world intramundane is hermeneutics, until then there is no interpretation, until elucidation and explanation enter, until they are considered - well we see it from the point of view of the phonological soliloquy, ways in which we self-elucidate what we experienced and the experience that decides what we do or stop doing and our reflexivity about it, or from the perspective of intersubjective communications, the way in which we elucidate what others tell us and mean to us, until these hermeneutic forms of to give meaning and to attribute meaning, a world is not even intramundane, it can be a phenomenal world for sensations, subjectivity and the body but not an intramundane horizon.

  Now if you ask me what concept of the world have you taken for granted up to the point of this previous analysis? Husserl? Schütz? Popper? I would have to answer that precisely because I distinguish phenomenal world and intramundane horizon, neither, and I try To explain it, I say intramundane horizon and not intramundane world, because effectively the concept of world considered in itself in its pure theoretical abstraction without calling it the world of something is completely and absolutely phenomenological without even entering there the hermeneutics and interpretation.

   Now my phenomenological concept of world in its difference from the intramundane horizon is not Husserlian, nor Schutzian or Popperian, I define the concept of world before with Leibniz and Hegel, Leibniz's monad and Hegel's distinction between what he calls

 "world in itself" and "reflected world" or "phenomenological world"

  In fact, he placed me in Leibniz, Leibniz's monad, the one versus the multiple of Hegel, which is a Leibniszian derivation, why did he place me before? Because it is necessary to distinguish what makes a world, what is the phenomenal genesis of the idea itself of the world before giving it a surname.

   And then what would distinguish the genesis and phenomenological specificity of the idea of ​​the world and the intramundane horizon, to distinguish them we have to go back, retheorize the world from Leibniz and Hegel, which they did not do, take the concept back to them and rework it, which is what what I have done:

What is the monad?: the world individuated and perceived from the body and the subjectivity of the one or the one versus that which is not one or is multiple, the internal and the external according to that body and its subjectivity

 1-first part about the cutie of my essay the intramundane horizon

  2- my essay the being and the cutie

  3- my essay the chrysalis of being

   4- my essay the restoration of the world

  And then, not confusing the world and the intramundane, develop the theory of the latter as a horizon

1- my essay the complete intramundane horizon

2- my complete essay on ordination in life worlds

3- my self essay and complete collection

  In summary, I believe that my influences regarding my phenomenological concept of the world are Leibniz and Hegel, not Husserl, the monad in Leibniz, Hegel's distinction between "world in itself" and "phenomenal world" and the way in which Hegel theorizes that relationship that the treats as a difference between "what is in itself" and "what is reflected", through the concepts of the internal and the external, also the one and the multiple in Hegel. We do not have in Hegel as in Husserl the concept of the world of experience or world of life, but we do have the crucial and widely theorized distinction between his concepts of "world in itself" and "phenomenal world" or "phenomenological world" cited by the way. in chapter 2 of the correlation of the world.

   To expand on how I theorize this matter at an abstract level, my essay "The Restoration of the World" in thinking science, what am I doing there?, I discuss how you say context, the topic would demolish the distinction between a "self-centered subject in presence full of itself" -- that Derrida says this is presupposed in speech (la parole, speaking, oral enunciation) -- and a "deferred and proffered subject", absent from the presence that Derrida declares implicit in writing, and I propose to untangle the phenomenological skein of the concepts of presence to distinguish full presence from deferred presence and presence in difference, and at that point, theorizing what full presence is, I propose a concept of restoration of the world that once defines the full presence of that self-centered subject in full presence of itself to oral speech as a tacit intramundane world, already known.

   This concept of mine of a tacit world in full presence in which my intramundane horizon is established is similar to what Schütz calls problematic until further notice, but it is different and he underlined the different

1-The first thing is to have followed this Leibniz/Hegel/ journey to distinguish the world from the intramundane horizon

2- the second is to have followed this Leibniz/Hegel/Derrida journey to restore the world through presence with the distinction reconstructed in "full presence" instead of going directly from Husserl and Bergson, which is how Schütz does, who does Schütz?, of a world of life that in Husserl is abstract experience as data for consciousness but not experience in itself and a duré or internal temporality of consciousness -- Bergson-- moves to the everyday world, but he does it from a theory of action, it is like Schütz does, so I do it in this other way: distinguishing and not confusing world with intramundane horizon.

 What interests us about sutás? Schütz has been distinguishing from Weberian comprehensiveness (axiological evaluative) what is subjective meaning and what is objective meaning in the relationship between motivation of the action, significance of the action by the actor and observation of the actor and then asks how the actor means the world, to resolve the dilemma that we do not have access to the motivation and intentionality of the other's action, but only to our own, he asks how we come to know about the self of the other, To do this, he resorts to the reciprocity of perspectives, guided by the relationship between current ongoing/neutic experience and retroactive noematic experience in escaping, arguing that only the noematic, that is, retrospective/reflective, is significant and makes sense for the actor. According to Schütz, the ongoing experience does not It is, and combining this with the temporality of the flow of consciousness in Bergson, distinguishing action from completed act, up to this point Schütz separates scientific representations from representations of meaning. common, says that the former must take the latter as a parameter but they are irreconcilable

   What interests us about Schütz is the conclusion reached by the result he obtains, we access the self of the other through typifications, through heritage at hand, through experience and through meanings, it is the latter. What interests us about Schütz, that the actor gives meaning to his action that makes it meaningful, but on the one hand we must ignore the question of access to the self of the other and once understand that the relationship of experience, typifications, belongings, heritage and meanings is itself already the world of everyday life, on the other hand we must also remove its division between scientific representation and common sense. Not only must science be based on common sense but knowing common sense is knowing ourselves, not We must treat common sense as something other than ourselves, maintaining sociology as separate from that common sense that it studies. Unlike this, sociology must be situated in the sociologist's own common sense, it is not about studying the life world of a person. abstract idea of ​​actor and action, but in our own life world and this is my main difference with Schütz, we must situate ourselves in our own life world

My concept of intramundane horizon is then different from Schütz's in that it is not an abstract representation of any actor and any action, but rather it is our tangible and real intramundane horizon, the one in which we live.

But there is another merit in Schütz, he relativizes the generalized other of George Herbert Mead but does not deduce from it an ontological retheorization of the formation of the self and its phenomenology but only attaches more importance to the fact that the actor gives meaning to his actions, The latter, that the actor gives meaning to his actions and that this is what matters most to us, is my main influence on Schütz, but Schütz does not deduce from this that I retheorize the self. I do, and I do so in my essay, the self and The collection, read it, is a retheorization from classical philosophy that develops a new phenomenology of the self indebted to Schütz's criticism of Mead, but articulates a phenomenology of the self that Schütz does not develop (since he was never interested in the self or I address it) a new phenomenology of the self that is different from that of Mead, which was based on the concept of the generalized other that Schütz assimilates as the self of the other but at the same time criticizes but without ever developing a theory of the self

 In Gadamer the hermeneutic horizon is such for the abstract being without world and without practical world of experience, without pragmatics, that interests us in Gadamer?, that in Gadamer hermeneutics ceases to be a mere philological concept related to the exegesis of texts of fiction literature and acquires an ontological value for being any being that only exists without a literary work to be interpreted, that the concept of hermeneutics is freed from philological subjection and acquires a dimension ontological for the relationship between being and aesthetics, but there it is the hermeneutics of an abstract being not situated in the practical experience of life

  But what happens is that Schütz has been working on the matter since Weber and since Weber has been asking how the actor means and gives meaning to his action, and there we are already in the interpretation, -- although it is not a hermeneutical interpretation in the sense of Gadamer (this difference deserves development but goes beyond your questions) - practice and meaning and at that point my position is Schutzian despite his Bergsonism and Husserlianism.

  The above does not mean that I am not interested in Husserl, if I am interested, I have been following him via Derrida in genesis and structure, but I have not yet positioned myself regarding Husserl, I have not focused on answering or thematizing escape, regarding the Derrida/Husserl perspective and Schütz/Husserl, but I have not commented, I am studying and researching it, two books from now I may discuss it, even in the next Husserl is not the focus of my attention.

   Husserl's concept of lifeworld refers to experience in its noetic, noematic and eidetic forms for consciousness, that is, it distinguishes between ongoing experience and its retrospection. Seen in this way, the very idea of ​​the world in Husserl is effectively phenomenological but it does not distinguish the world from the intramundane.

   His experience falls within my intramundane horizon but the experience in Husserl is abstract, in what sense is it abstract? It is considered only and only as an abstract data of experience for consciousness, not from the experience towards itself, I situated myself before it to define the world.

   "world of experience" is already a surname, in fact without placing ourselves first it would not be possible to distinguish the concept of world as something purely phenomenal from the concept of intramundane horizon as something that is generated and defined by hermeneutics, by interpretation, there is intramundane worlds?, without a doubt there are, but they are already intramundane, in the intramundane hermeneutics and phenomenology are united in the world but the concept of world in itself is a phenomenal concept not hermeneutical.

  What is world in popper?, minimum unit in the abstraction of a social minimum. Both Husserl's lifeworld and Popper's world would fall within my concept of intramundane horizon in the sense that the latter presupposes the experience and includes it and presupposes the social and includes it, but the experience in my intramundane horizon is the experience. not its data abstracted for consciousness and the social in my intramundane horizon is the social itself, not its abstraction as a social minimum, in Husserl the experience is an abstraction of experience as data for consciousness, not the experience itself, which occupied Husserl? The retention and evocation of the experience in memory, the way in which it is completed or left by retrospection, the noesis and the noema that complete the experience considered in progress or retained, is the abstract experience for consciousness.

  So his concept of world already has a surname: the world of experience -- or world of life -- but considered in the abstract for consciousness, seen this way the phenomenal world could not be distinguished from the intramundane horizon, the same with respect to Popper, world is For Popper, an abstracted social minimum would fall within my intramundane horizon, but since for Popper that world that is a social minimum is an abstraction, it does not allow me to distinguish the world from my intramundane horizon, since if it is social it is within my intramundane horizon, like Husserl, if it is experience and the world of life is within my intramundane horizon, I say that they fall within my intramundane horizon because my intramundane horizon includes experience in Husserl's two forms, noetic (the ongoing experience) and noematic (the experience according to the retrospection that retains it, evokes it or reflects on it), but that experience in Husserl is an abstraction of the experience for consciousness, it is not the experience itself and my intramundane horizon is not only the experience itself, not only its abstraction for consciousness, but it is also the pragmatics of the experience, the heritage, the typifications and the significances, as well as above all the interpretive process of elucidation and explanation through which, as experiences make sense to us, our course goes in one direction and not another in our phonological soliloquy, or in our intersubjective relationships they go in one direction and not another according to us. they mean.

Husserl/lifeworld: experience as minimal data abstracted according to consciousness/includes ongoing or current experience in progress/noetic, or noematic, that is, retrospective, retentive, evoked/noematic

Popper: social minimum, the smallest particle or unit in which something begins to be or can be considered social

I/intramundane horizon: explanations and interpretative elucidations, ways of giving meaning and meaning to our experience that organize its course, the practical course of experiences/includes: 1- the conversion of the extrinsic into intrinsic, the passage from the external to the internal to ) cultural = passage from culture to the individual self via experience and heritage (accumulation), b) - social: passage from the external to the internal/individuation of the external and symbolized socialization of the individuated and c) self-perceptions, self-perception of our self = identity, formation of identity and transformation of it, also includes: elucidations and explicitations (self: solitary self as self-elucidation of what is experienced) and intersubjectives in our communications with others, and includes interpretations or interpretive arrangements and shared horizons of expectations

  So my concept of the intramundane horizon to this day in what I have already written-- my books--is more related to Gadamer/Schütz/Habermas.

                    we would have

My phenomenological concept of the world: reconstructive retheorization via Leibniz/Hegel

My hermeneutical concept of intramundane horizon: own theoretical elaboration influenced via Gadamer/ Schütz/ Habermas but different from them

   But the perspective of Schütz and Habermas when they say "world of life" presupposes Husserl, so Husserl cannot be excluded because in addition, and here I return from Derrida, he is the only one who has a definition, albeit abstract, for the "living present", as he called Derrida, Hegel has life and the living individual, but not a "living present" in the terms that this acquires in Husserl.

   In summary, from this last point of view, only Habermas refers to our own life world, our own society, but what then is our difference with Habermas, in Schütz we already have the ideal type, this comes from Weber and we continue to have in Habermas the type The latter ideal in Habermas is more referred to our own effective and real life world, although still considered as an ideal type, but what happens with Habermas, that this life world is so ideal that while on the one hand all forms are objected to? in which its horizontal societal nature is invaded by the logic of the system (technologies, jurisprudence, markets, instrumentalized reason, politics) on the other hand it has been idealized so much that it ends up being the object of all the ultimate questions of science, Habermas is too busy in the matter that statements are susceptible to criticism and as such too busy imagining how to resolve discrepancies by obtaining a consensus idea, the result is an invasion of the life world with all the questions of science ending saturating it, given that according to the system it has invaded the world of life, so what difference does it make to also invade it with the questions of science hoping that the world of life will answer them.

It distanced me and I distance myself from it, I prefer Schütz to Habermas because of the image of the life world that we get in Schütz, but then in Schütz it is not our own life world but that of an abstracted actor and action,

My intramundane horizon is therefore very different from the three

Let's go back to your questions in order to answer them.

"It is also not clear to me if when you talk about "worlds of reality" you refer to these as effects of the text as an effect of interpretation and as distinct from the factual immediacy of the facts of the world when you emphasize that reality takes place in the immediacy of the world. life".

You are very interested in the concept of reality, I am less than you, I am not referring there to the purposes of the text but to the factual immediacy of the facts of the world as you call it, but this is an intramundane horizon, I should not have called it there for the sake of to simplify the world of reality but simply the intramundane horizon, I do not in any way affirm or use an idea of ​​the world of reality accepted as an effect of the text and I would like to advance here the answer to a question I saw in Messenger, you have made me new about my concept of correlate of the world, I accept that my concept of the correlate of the world, that is, the worlds as effects of the text, is a still philological concept. I try to clear up an operation similar to that of Gadamer when he moves Hermeneutics from its philological meaning beyond the exegesis of a work. literary but still maintaining the initial philological meaning, the worlds as effects of the texts in my concept of world correlate are:

For example, you asked me about the effects of the hurricane and I told you about some trees turned upside down uprooted, it was not fiction but something real but you did not see it, I told you, that world was for you a correlate of my text was produced by text effects

The basic extreme parameter of a world correlate is what Eco called possible worlds in the novel, an idea of ​​the world that is produced by fiction in the novel, the story, the cinema or the fictional theater.

Now, following this philological parameter of the text/world relationship, let's ask ourselves what happens if we experience something and then tell it to a third party, A who also lived it but interpreted it or meant it differently, and even told it expressively differently, and B, let's ask ourselves what happens if in instead we tell it to someone who didn't experience it

In both forms the world is an effect of the text

Other forms of the world as a correlate of the text

1- a transcription of an oral speech by one or more people

2- taking field notes in participant observation

3- any way to inscribe: inscribe thoughts. Or desires of expression: writing

4- a diary

5- the photographs

6- the filming

7- two or more that speak

But let's go further, let's ask ourselves how the forms of the worlds as effects of the texts enter the same intramundane horizon.

My essay on ordinations in life worlds

A study of the supra-discursive forms that are superordinated to the world of life

The internet is a presentational that repeats, a tautological that presents worlds that correlate with the text.

Metatextuality in information technologies

But let's go further

We are simply reading and interpreting a culture, for example, but according to its texts, the text we read is a metonymy of the culture that we read through it, that is, a correlate of that text.

Let us interpret the restaurateurs according to the perspective of the tourist and we arrive at a reading of the restoration process which otherwise we would not have found. The text tourism in all that it implies to read the culture has led us to find an understanding of the restoration process. which is its correlate and conversely, reading tourism according to the restoration process leads us to a reading of tourism that we would not have otherwise found. It is a correlate of the restorers text.

Here we return to the interpretant, the sign is the interpretant of the object of another thing in its place of which the object becomes a correlate through meanings, some signs become interpretants of others translating them by meaning them and this replaces the object that remains as a correlate of their interpreters

I keep quoting you

I wonder if it would be pertinent to consider "the intramundane horizon" with an immanent value.

Is it relevant to distinguish "world forms" and "reality worlds" here? as they are ordered in the paragraph that I quote below:

I think not that it is not immanent but it is ontological. If we understand ontology from hermeneutical parameters, what is ontological? Being in itself, identical to itself, but above all we assume as ontology an assertion in which something has to be in a way and not from another, it is ontological because without explanation and elucidation there is no course of action if you do not elucidate what you have experienced and give it a meaning and not another according to how you elucidate it, you would not take a path and you would not another, in the course of your experience you would remain paralyzed between options, without interpretative arrangements, explanations and elucidations would not be possible so that even if we interpret something different we adapt ourselves according to what, thanks to explanations and elucidations, generates shared horizons of expectations, it is not immanent but it is ontological

"[...] forms of the worlds of reality that are projected as effects of the texts, unlike the intramundane horizon in which reality takes place in the immediacy of the life world."

What I am interested in distinguishing with that immediacy is not so much reality as culture.

On the other hand, when you talk about "reality" it sometimes gives the impression that you treat this idea as if it were understood as a common and shared concept of reality between the author and the reader or understood as a historical and social reality, in short " rational" in a Hegelian sense. How is the concept of "reality" to be understood?

Not the latter, no, it is not a historical reality that is implicit and inclusive in me and I do not agree that the image of reality that we obtain from Hegel is rational, irrational, it is not, without a doubt, it is a scientific idea of ​​reality but it is also an experimental idea of reality the concept of reality is one of the most experimental concepts in Hegel, it is not a rational idea of ​​reality that we obtain in Hegel but an experimental idea of ​​reality. This reading of Hegel again seems influenced by the historicist reading of his works, which I exclude and I do not agree that the phenomenology of the spirit is a historicist work.

I am an eminently synchronic thinker, I always take great care to stay in synchrony with society according to a synchronic cut here and now, this is my debt to structuralism, linguistics and semiotics, in sociology Durkheim, Bourdieu

It is true that there is diachronism in Weber and Schütz even in Gadamer and Habermas, I take care of it, I work with tweezers

Here my other influences Pierce and Derrida

 And in general the primacy of semiotics in my books: Todorov, Barthes, eco

We discussed it in our first part when we talked about the static, the timelessness and timelessness of structures, a language is the same for centuries, time is almost stopped within that structure.

My concept of reality is a micro sequence, I am an ethnomethodologist, my next book is another demonstration of this,

The truly transcendental, says Derrida, is the living present. He did not detranscendentalize the world of life as Habermas intended. This distances me from it. On the contrary, I sublimate it in love. I am a neoromantic. I dawn and dusk. I observe and feel pleasure in the dew of dawn. The light that comes through my window inspires me, my concept of reality is experimental in the Hegelian sense and romantic in the sense of the sublime.

And yet I recognize that without reading Habermas I would not have reached my elaboration either, so as I said, it is not taking the speeches for what they are once understood and studied what they are, but rather defining what is original and proper that one wants to develop.

The transcendental for me is in fact not historical, on the contrary it jumps from prehistory to posthistory, history is religion, it progressively succumbs to myth.

I know that in this we are very different, you and I.

When you talk about "world" here, what do you mean? Are you referring in a phenomenological sense to the world experienced by Husserl in "The Crisis of the European Sciences" when he speaks of the "Leibenswelt" as a "world of life"? Is it directly related to any specific concept articulated by the phenomenological sociology of Alfred Schütz and that has influenced you? What would this concept or group of concepts be?"

Regarding the latter, I think I have answered you in a certain way.

I know that you have sent me more questions but I have not been able to download them or read them well and if you sent me two more I will try to read all of them to complete the general meaning of my answers since your accentuated interest in the concept of reality in the correlation of the world that It is about the worlds according to the text and not about the world itself. I am going to answer it by going back to the catwalks and then referring you to essays in other books of mine, but I will do so once I complete the meaning of your other questions.

I just downloaded them, thank you, I will continue my answers during the week   

 The synthesis that you make when you explain my way in which the clipping of the synchronic enters into what you call micrometric is very interesting and at that moment the accurate way in which you summarize it because you have captured something to which I dedicate a great effort in the book , the texeré gateway between the internal and external to language, I discuss this several times in a book about how to move between the immediacy of the world or intramundane horizon and the level of the text and the worlds as effects of these is crucial in the proposed and discussed research methodology.

  At this point it seems to me that it would be interesting to return to the catwalks which are the only ones that specifically in my book the correlation of the world answer your questions because again we have to go to the specific book and what I discuss in that book, your questions are based at the very beginning of the book where the previous book is still being talked about, the intramundane horizon and everything we have talked about more recently wants to go back to previous books or towards the next, but if we really stick to what was discussed in the correlation of world where the text is the main thing and the world is its correlate, its effect, only one problem that I discuss throughout that specific book answers your questions: the gateways between language and non-language, inside/outside language.

   What do I say in that book about the catwalks?

What are the gateways?, as they are discussed and theorized in the world correlation

I say that these are the following:

The texeré or the fabric to which we have arrived after differentiating Saussure and Pierce through the way Derrida treats the signifiers, Derrida assumes the Saussurean distinction of signifier and signified but his theory of the matter moves towards what relates to the signifiers. each other regardless of the meaning, the texéré or weaving establishes the order of the text

   In fact, I quote in chapter 4 of the book "The exegesis of the texts of culture" the moment in which Derrida explains it

Derrida says, I quote it here too

"The interweaving of language, of what in language is purely language, and of the other threads of experience, constitutes a fabric. The word Interweaving leads to this metaphorical zone: the strata are woven, their imbrication is such that the weft of the warp cannot be discerned. If the stratum of logos were simply laid on top, it could be lifted and allowed to appear beneath the underlying stratum of non-expressive acts and contents. But since this superstructure acts, on the other hand, in an essential and decisive manner, on the lessons, we are obliged, from the beginning of the description, to associate a properly textual metaphor with the geological metaphor, since fabric means text, Interweave here it means texere. The discursive is related to the non-discursive, the linguistic stratum intermingles with the pre-linguistic stratum according to the regulated system of a type of text."

About the other walkway, also very narrow, I reach it through the Interpretant's replacement of its objects.

   As I explained to you in our first part, the signifiers do without the signified but the interpretants do not do without the object and replace it with meanings, but the meanings in Pierce cannot be understood as those of Saussure do not respond to a form-content relationship where the last is meaning and the first is morphology and syntax and where the meanings seem intrinsic or deposited or contained by the forms, but the latter, rather, result from a translation between interpretants. In this sense, the infinite semiosis is then formed, which is the second gateway in the relationship inside and outside language or between language and non-language. Infinite semiosis through interpretants always returns to the referent or reality; The latter, in fact, now seems to be part of semiosis, semiosis is thus culture

Derrida: texeré/ text/ fabric (narrow walkway between language and non-language, between its inside and its outside)

Peirce: interpretants/semiosis/culture (narrow walkway between language and non-language, between its inside and its outside)

It is the gateway of semiosis / which in my next book I discover as a meta-cultural dimension of ground in the world, which in one of its forms can explain that other real or reality that can be assumed in thought itself and in concepts when Peirce says that we cannot think except in signs and that some thoughts are nothing but interpretative. of other thoughts.

The third, also very narrow, gateway is hermeneusis. This refers to the passage of meaning; That is, given hermeneutics as ontological, we approve a hermeneusis that also ensures the passage between language and non-language.

They are very different: one is textual fabric, warp, grid, film, sometimes even texeré/fabric/text, the other is signic, interactive, communicative; but also, it is osmosis and ecological, forms, semiospheres of dynamic meta-culture... It is like a cosmology of signs that between interpretants are no longer but interpretants, one of another, in a dynamism that is culture but culture according to the objects they become. placed by their interpretants and as such forms the inferential reality, the coded, semiotic-interactive reality, has a significant pragmatic dimension but a pragmatism that in turn is symbolism is not a simple pragmatism of facts and functions, the other is hermeneusis, this is of the catwalks the most related to the immediacy of the world, it is culture, not meta culture like semiosis, its layer is the very immediacy of the world and its logic is hermeneutics which, given as ontological, becomes the very hermeneusis that makes culture

To these three gateways is added my reference to the passage between the internal and the external in Hegel because only according to what Hegel discusses there between the internal and the external on a phenomenological level can it be understood as three notions that seem to belong and that in fact belong to language. They can also belong to the world or rather ensure a passage between language and non-language, inside/outside language.

Language/text/texéré/fabric

Sign/interpretants/semiosis

Interpretation/sense/hermeneusis

I quote what Hegel says about the phenomenology of the internal and external that I quote here as I quote it within my book, Hegel says

    "This unity of the interior and exterior is the absolute reality," Hegel said. "The interior is determined as the form of the reflected, bone immediacy of the essence, compared to the exterior, determined as the form of being, but both They are just a single identity, this identity is first of all the pure unity of both as a base full of content.

     Therefore this identity is continuity and is the totality that represents the interior which also becomes exterior, but in this it is no longer something that has become or that has been transferred but is equal to itself, the exterior according to This determination is not only equal to the inner according to the content, but both are only one single thing

   However, this thing as a simple identity with itself is different from its determinations of form, that is, these remain extrinsic to it, therefore it is itself an interior that is different from the exteriority of those.    

   This exteriority, however, consists in the fact that the two determinations themselves, that is, the interior and the exterior, constitute it. Therefore, since the interior and the exterior have been considered as determinations of form, they are firstly only the simple form itself and secondly because they are determined there as opposites their unity is the pure abstract mediation in which one of they are immediately the other and it is the other precisely because it is the first, so the interior is not immediately but the exterior and constitutes the determination of the exteriority precisely by constituting the interior, conversely the exterior is only an interior 461-462-468

In fact, precisely in this opposition of both worlds their difference has disappeared, and what would have to be a world in and of itself is the same a phenomenal world and vice versa the Phenomenal world is the same an essential world, the phenomenal world and the world in itself are, therefore, each one in itself the totality of the identical reflection with itself and of the reflection in its other, world in itself and Phenomenal world, one would have to be only reflected, the other only in itself, but each one continues in its other and therefore it is in it the identity of both moments, what is therefore present is this totality that by itself breaks into two totalities, one is the reflected totality, the other the immediate one, both are before all independent but are such only as totalities and are such because each essentially has in it the moment of the other. The different independence of each one, of the determined as immediate and of the determined as reflected, is therefore now placed in such a way that each one can be only as an essential relationship with the other and have its independence in this unity of the two 447- 448"

These paragraphs of Hegel explain the phenomenological principles according to which what is once internal to language can again be external to it.

 I must add something here, the walkways are not the only way to understand and theorize the paradoxes about what is internal and external to language, they are the only ones that ensure passage, as I said in my examples of the hillside and the cave, but the language relationship does not Language takes on other, much more complex theoretical forms, only they do not refer to the passage or the walkway from one side to the other but rather to antinomies in the Kantian/Hegelian sense, the thought/language relationship, which comes first?, the being/thought relationship. , the relationship being/language and the trichotomous antinomy being/thought/language is a very theoretical matter that we saw in our first part with Benveniste/Aristotle and to which I believe I am the only one of my generation who has dedicated myself to it, read my essay the inscription and the couple a conference I gave in Havana Hispanic-American Cultural Center, for example

   Derrida and Stephen were also interested in these antinomies, Stephen for example has his essay Being out of language.

  However, I think it is worth drawing attention to an unexpected coincidence. It turns out that when I had begun to answer the third question before reading your summaries, I was telling you things about yourself that were very similar to those you told me when you assumed that I had I included our counterpoint in the blog deliberately, because I certainly observed in your questions that your interest in my book the Intramundane horizon and especially in 2 of his essays the Intramundane horizon and on ordination in the worlds of life was became more and more notable - what you have now called - interest in the ontological - notable to the point that in my answer to your third question I told you that your questions refer me more to the Intramundane horizon than to the clear-as-one world correlate. It is the one after the other, the correlation of the world begins by summarizing the previous effort and that is why you mentioned it.

  But despite this, your interest in the subject is so accentuated that I believe it also undoubtedly expresses your preference. I believe it is something undoubtedly related to your readings of Habermas. I understand. Don't worry. That is to say, I have no objection to what you tend to lead me to the book. prior to the correlation of the world because they are your interests and as I said I want to please your expectations, however, listening to you now I think that it is best to leave what I had written to you before reading your later summaries because in those answers I I made an effort to make very clear what the main differences are that make the transition from one book to another abysmal and I think that although your syntheses invite us not to make unnecessary delays in this, it would be good for our reader to highlight the distinctions.

Below I put those paragraphs that I thought of removing when reading your new synthetic messages, they began by quoting you

you said

In the fragment above you announce that in your book you are going to include both a theoretical analysis of symbolic structures based on work with interpretants, and the theorization of semantics from semiotics through syntax.

I continue

Up to this point what I do in the book is exact, but in the next sentence you jump to my next book, in the world correlation my developments of theorizations "the theorization of semantics from semiotics through syntax" do not refer there to the intramundane horizon but rather at the level of the text, in fact in that book such analyzes begin with regard to the sections and as a development of what I discuss about the concept of text as a structuralist concept.

I want to clarify here regarding our first part that I did maintain that there is synthesis in the imaginary and there it seems to go beyond the text without a doubt but that analysis of mine has nothing to do with the correlation of the world as a book where I do not mention the word imaginary not once but where the analyzes of semantics and syntax discuss the text, grammatology, semantics, syntax and signifier

Quote:

This is on the side of the "Intramundane horizon" but instead on the side of what you call "forms of the world" that are a "correlate of the text" and that from your point of view are the "correlate of the world", which seems to me confused I wonder if this distinction between, on the one hand, what you consider "Intramundane horizon" and, on the other, "world correlation," can you clarify it much more clearly?

It seems to me that in some way I already answered all of this with what you call my long previous development after your first 2 questions

I continue:

   The intramundane horizon is mentioned in the world correlate only in the preface in the form of a summary to the reader about a previous investigation preceding the world correlate but it is immediately said from the same preface in this new book, however, we will discuss not that world itself. in its immediacy of the world but other forms in which the world is the effect of the texts, which go beyond the intramundane horizon.

  What happens again? My essay, the intramundane horizon is the world itself in its experienced and practical immediacy, but my essay on ordinations in the worlds of life in my book, the intramundane horizon, already began the investigation of forms that are superordinated to the intramundane horizon but within it, that is, of daily life, supra-discursive forms, if possible, go and read about organization in the worlds of life.

  I am right now reading within the world correlate the moment in which from the preface I recapitulate those two essays and announce what is different about the world correlate when the world effects are produced by the text to the point that It is the text, not the immediacy of the world.

   Your questions now seem to be about ordinations in life worlds where certain over-ordinated and supra-discursive forms, such as telling something to a third party or remembering it, establish from within the life world itself a relationship between something that refers to the world from language but has still been within the intramundane horizon and is part of it.

   The correlate of the world, let's put it this way, is saying goodbye to it at the beginning to begin the study of much more over-ordinated forms so much so that not only are they already the text but at a moment there is no longer a world except according to the texts.

   Of course, at this other level, already textual and meta-textual, on which the correlation of the world focuses, we are going to discover throughout my theoretical development a few but several gateways, which I have just summarized before, but we are no longer in the experiential immediacy of the world itself. intramundane horizon still persistent in over-ordinations in the world of life, now everything will happen from the text, from language, between signs and texts where the world and the worlds are only effects of the latter.

   In the world correlate there is no "theorization of semantics from semiotics through syntax" that refers to the intramundane horizon but rather at the level of the text, the text and the sign in the world correlate have established an opacity not transparent with respect to the experiential immediacy of the world, they have interposed an intermediate film between us and the world that is the text, the language, the signs, the representation, now the world and the worlds only seem like effects of texts, signs and languages, signs have replaced objects, the signifier has replaced the meanings, the interpretants have generated meanings that have replaced their objects.

Of course, before entering into the complete opacity of that textual film of which the worlds are only effects, we must prepare the reader in the scientifically adequate mode of transition, a mode that is none other than that of the distinction between two forms of reading, two forms of interpretation

1- hermeneutics and ontology

2- exegesis and text

 The first part of chapter 1 develops that comparative distinction in which it becomes clear how the Hermeneutics/ontology relationship being interpretation still belongs to the ontological immediacy of the world (the previous book), while it is the exegesis/text relationship that replaces that immediacy through the text, begins a development on the interpretation of texts around Eagleton's examples and then says let's start with the text and that is where the theoretical and semiotic linguistic discussion begins with the sections

The structural genesis of the concept of text

Grammatology

Syntactics

Semantics

The signifier

That's where the comparison begins.

Saussure/ Peirce

  As I maintain in the book, we will discuss the differences between Saussure and Peirce usually ignored and once understood, re-theorize how they can cooperate, that is, how to move between one level and the other, level or plane of the text: my analyzes of grammatology, semantics, syntax, semantics and the Peircian level or plane: ground, representatement, correlate, interpretants

Saussure (text/structural stability of language: grammatology, synthesis, sinifiers, semantics)

Derrida (signifier: substitute-meanings/text-texere

Peirce/ground, representation, correlate, interpretants (replace the object), meanings replace the object), semiosis

I continue then continued

Text and world (correlate)

Te cito

This is on the side of the "Intramundane horizon" but instead on the side of what you call "forms of the world" that are a "correlate of the text" and that from your point of view are the "correlate of the world", which seems to me confused

I continue:

What confuses you is the word correlate, let's go to Pierce who extensively developed the correlate.

I dedicate extensive developments to this in chapter two and throughout the book I often explain and theorize Peirce's ground/representatament/interpretants/correlate relationship.

We have two correlative concepts here in their sources, in the end it is one but we say two as one evolution of the concept comes from philology the other from semiotics, would you like me to highlight them again?

   What is the philological and literary critical meaning of the world correlate and what is a correlate in semiotics would be the questions, I dedicate careful attention to it in the book but more development on the correlate within the rest of the concepts of Peircian trichotomies and perhaps americe in our counterpoint expand on the correlation as a concept from its two sources

Correlate (source-philology and literary criticism):

Correlate (source- semiotics):

With the above said, I think I can try to answer your questions about Stephen.

Stephen is of great importance to me, as you have clearly realized. Now, if you had asked me that question in Caracas in 1994, I would have given you an answer that would be more or less the same until May 1997, but once I started in June 1997 my position as a complementary research associate of the faculty of anthropology at Rice University, which was renewed every year every June for many years of my life, we are already talking about an everyday relationship because we saw each other in the faculty practically every day, rare was the day that we didn't spend at least an hour or two having coffee and talking, on the one hand we became great friends, on the other hand my relationship with Stephen is the center of my academic position at the faculty and finally they were also years of intense theoretical development in which a whole new boom, even the boom of a completely new turn in ethnomethodology, I began there a whole new era of my phenomenological and ethnomethodological theoretical work that radiated and generated a lot of influence around defined by a high level of experimentality among scholars, visitors and students.

  That same boom, the boom initiated by me and Stephen, was reflected in the relationship between me and Quetzil Eugenio Castañeda, who began the theorizing of new forms of anthropology, a relationship that was also daily for many years, seeing each other every week reading each other and theoretically discussing our readings and participating. together in several panels, ethnomethodology congress, Houston, national anthropology congress, Chicago, event on tourism and anthropology markets between Mexico and the United States, Lake Forest College, Illinois, congress Lasa Florida.

  Then even when after divorcing in 2003 I began to travel and stay outside the United States for periods of time including Cuba, Stephen and I continued our continuous theoretical dialogue and our relationship first as friends then as colleagues. So I think the best thing is to answer you with a sense of the whole and not as if we were in 1994 because I think that the past in this sense in which you ask could rather be autobiographical.

  I try to place the main issues below.

  The first, the discussion of postmodernism, I come from Venezuela even before developing a very tenacious and demanding criticism towards the entire discourse of postmodernism, including the idea of ​​postmodernism itself, in 1989 I gave a conference at the Gran Teatro de Havana entitled Postmodernism. , in 1993 I published a critical essay in an Italian newspaper in Caracas in which I compared naming something postmodern with the popular story of the good pipe, remember that? You want me to tell you the story of the good pipe? Yes, no, I'm not saying yes, I'm saying that if you want me to tell you the story of the good pipe, which in Venezuela is the story of the bald gayo.

  That same year, a few months later, I read Stephen's texts on the advent of postmodern anthropology and his essay on postmodern ethnography and I found myself for the first time in my life regarding postmodernism, I read a theoretical meaning of postmodernism that I not only share and coincides with mine but also with which I agree and where the problems located at the center are the same ones that interested me. My relationship to postmodernism was always critical and objectionable, even more so the more essays I read, not only Lyotard but thousands of essayists naming postmodern, you will remember that Desiderio published all Western and Eastern European and Anglo-Saxon literature on postmodernism.

   Only when I read Stephen did I go from being a critical objector to converting, that I was postmodern they told me countless times and they also wrote about it since the eighties but I had never recognized myself in it. Until I read Stephen, I did not identify with any discourse on postmodernism and I went from being critical to accepting or recognizing myself for the first time. I then wrote my essay on the postmodern work and gave that essay at Rice University Fondren Library in a 45-minute lecture. to which by the way Stephen came

  Motivated by this, in 1995 I had given a 6-month seminar on postmodern anthropology where what I have in mind is Stephen, it was in a museum of popular or naife art called the petare museum in Caracas.

   What are the main concepts for Stephen at a postmodern level, defamiliarization, therapy, ways of being, paths of being, ritual, common sense, harmony and the transformation of the concept of ethnography into a prospective, hypothetical, experimental and propaedeutic concept crossed by a discussion philosophical theorist of the concepts previously located

    Second, the critique of representation.

    This central issue in terms of experimental avant-garde that we have on the one hand in the contrasts between theoretical abstraction in philosophy versus representationalism, theoretical abstraction in very theoretical social sciences versus representationalism in social sciences but that generally defines avant-garde experimentality, for example the abstraction relationship versus realism in art and in general experimentality versus realism in art is very unusual if not in reality almost non-existent in sociology and anthropology but even more so in the latter and in ethnography which are usually realistic, it acquires in Stephen especially in his more theoretical essays on postmodern ethnography, then other voices without mirrors, prolegomena to The Next linguistics, presenter (Displays), Viles Bodies and above all more than in any other essay in his essay evocation: The unwriteable: a response to Abdel Hernández San Juan where in fact an unprecedented balance and attention is already called into the text and discussed as a philosophical problem, he is the only truly anti-representationalist anthropologist, crucial if not the most crucial in his influence on me I suggest that you go and read this essay that he wrote in response to my essay The eclipse of evocation, you can read mine in The indeterminist true and in The crysalide of being, his in one of my Profiles

And I quote the moment dedicated to the critique of representation, says Stephen

"Your idea of ​​non-repetitive repetitions or of repetitions without identity is, on the one hand, a reestablishment of the idea of ​​representation insofar as a representation is, after all, the repetition of a non-identity.

   Representation as something that is not the same as or as something that is not identical to what is represented, but on the other hand, at the same time, your idea of ​​a non-repetitive repetition or a repetition without identity, is also a refutation of the function fundamental of representation, which is to provide us with the repetition of identities.  

   So in a sense it is more of a type of collective forgetting in which instead of forgetting differences, we forget identities. This reminds us that one definition of the idea of ​​identity in representation is precisely that of forgetting differences, identities become identities when we suppress differences and then forget the suppression. They are fictions whose fictionality we have forgotten. Indeed, I think you describe our current situation. The critique of representation left us in practices that were conventional before critique." (He sent you his essay translated by me via Gmail.)

   This is where evocation is presented as an alternative to representation and it is in this sense that it becomes highly relevant to include my essays, one on Stephen and the other on evocation, in two books so crucial in my positioning of the correlation of world and thinking science.

    Then I bring up a crucial issue for me throughout my life from the place that Bourdieu acquired in my first book since that year 1992. Positioning myself in a unique way in the discussion about objectivity versus subjectivity in sociology became a continuous obsession, something I that I dedicate constant attention and Stephen too, I have never before found in another author and especially from previous generations that balance closer to my ideal than in Stephen, he discusses it in his essay then other voices without mirrors.

   Here comes the discussion about medlee voice that Stephen emphasizes so much and that we have in Derrida and also in my recent books I also include the subject in creativity here. It is a complex topic that perhaps deserves attention as much as I told you before, the differences in the concept of interpretation between Gadamer and Schütz, as well as the two sources of the concept of correlate, philology and semiotics.

    Fourth, Stephen and I agree in our deliberations around Jean Boudrillard and we metabolize him in our styles in a similar way, but what has been explained before makes us stylistically similar for reasons of trend, I am original in Stephen's style too, each one is unique but Stylistically we are similar and the relationship of both of us to a certain Boudrillard helps to understand our similarities.

    Fifth, the place of semantics in cultural analysis, after I wrote the world correlation where I dedicate so much attention to retheorizing semantics, everyone in the United States has begun to define themselves as semantic scholarsds is one of my influences on them, but before Of me only Stephen had done it, de facto, if something defined Stephen's anthropology as main, his linguistic and cognitive anthropology was the place he gave to semantics even in essays from the seventies that were still structuralist such as Point of order on India another point of relationship between Stephen and me, structuralism acquired a much more convincing form in Stephen than in Levis Strauss, and in Stephen's first stage before moving away from structuralism, I speak of not only in a Point of Order, a gem indeed. also in india: an anthropological perspective and in koya kinship.

    Sixth, the type of symbolic analysis or symbolism, we arrived by different paths and without knowing each other at the time, to very similar conclusions in market anthropology, and paradoxically I cited him in my work on the market when I had not read his studies from the 70s on the markets of India, the type of markets and the way of studying them that Stephen studied in India is the same, there is no perspective more similar to mine before my study of markets than Stephen's, this already makes it not only important and influential but also my only precedent, before only Bakhtin's studies on medieval carnivals were precedents for me with the emphasis on polyphony, but Stephen's studies are much more similar to mine than Bakhtin's, we are talking about the street. (The markets that unfold on boulevards or in the same streets), which are the ones that I have studied in my empirical books about those markets in Venezuela, the only anthropologist before me who had studied them is Stephen in his case in India. .

    Seventh, bringing intertextuality to the social sciences, specifically Stephen to ethnography and the sociology of culture.

    The place that translation acquires in Stephen

    Stephen's development of the concept of performance within linguistics is completely different from Austin's and more related to my meanings, although different from mine that I discuss in thinking science.

   Here is his prolegomena essay to the next linguistics, but I read it and it influenced me despite our differences. That essay influenced me even more than others.

Perhaps the points of relationship and differences between the concepts of performance in Austin, Stephen and I merit discussion.

Austin/performance: theory of speech acts, relationship between sentences and practice (illocusion, perlocussion), so-called performatives

Stephen/performance: level or plane of redundancy between presentation and representation and representation, moves in the distinctions between presentation, RE- presentation, representation, mediation, remediation, has therapeutic connotations

Abdel: performativity, epistemological concept of work between subject and object in knowledge, as an unfixed relationship exposed to research, specialty in epistemology, based on the theory of knowledge in common sense/Schütz and understood according to everyday performance

Stephen's response to me is also influential. All of this is influential if you add what I explained to you before what we started in Texas and our years together already makes us the same trend, in fact we are a trend and a new school within which I include also to Quetzil Eugenio Castañeda and Suri Angelini. This is because each one is a school in itself.

  This is a movement of theorists who are primarily writers and authors.

  You do not have to see this at all separately from my individual past that you know and that you have understood so well and as few have understood, my experiments to which you have referred and my theories and theses of the maker, but if we must highlight a crucial difference I have left a great influence since the eighties with those projects but ask yourself how many of them write very few.

   This boom that I started in Texas is about writing, we all write a lot, but a lot too much, sometimes I visit Quetzil online, you'll see, he is like me, very productive, hundreds of essays every year, that's how Stephen was too, Surpik writes less than us but much more than all of his colleagues. Of that past that they write very little or nothing, I am referring to my biological generation, of course, that is, those who were directly or indirectly influenced by my thesis of doing and the experimental practices of sociology and field work that I did with social groups, it is difficult integrate a thing with another while they don't write.

    Those are Stephen's main influences on me

    Now you mention the others, James Clifford, Clifford Geertz, I always liked Geertz, I liked not all of Geertz but the Geertz of the interpretation of cultures and after the facts, but I always had immense things that distanced me and distanced me from him, All those things, however, are resolved in Stephen and only in Stephen, James Clifford, diasporas, travel, migration, translations, museums, art and culture collecting, I like it too but I always had immense things that They distanced me and distanced me from him, all resolved in Stephen and only in Stephen.

  So, as you told me in the first part of our counterpoint, my positioning from a postmodern anthropology is true that I have positioned myself like this but from an exclusively Tylerian perspective, then from postmodern anthropology, being a Tylerian, I am also an island because my personal journey that you know well comes from the modern and contemporary sociology of our own Western societies, it comes from ethnomethodology in sociology, Weber, Schütz, Mead, Bourdieu, it is true that my sociology of the The eighties was cultural theorization, understanding of social groups as cultural groups and sociological theorization of culture, but the relations of alterity were always self-Western and only in that sense from a very semiotic theory was it cultural anthropology not related to primitivism.

   So transculturality and Western interculturality versus ethnocentrism. No other postmodern anthropologist has my balance, only Stephen. Quetzil Eugenio Castañeda also had it for many years, especially while we worked together, and even in many of his essays he still has it, but later he has been leaning more and more towards indigenism and has been losing that sense when we sought for anthropology to be an experience itself. transcultural and intercultural therapeutic and ritual multiethnic learning and cultural translation.

  And there is something here that I must tell you, you know that sometimes you have an influence from which you later distance yourself, for example, my relationship to Bourdieu from whom I later distance myself. I envision the next twenty years of my authorial productivity not moving away from this trend that I myself started in Texas but on the contrary deepening it, enriching it and expanding it for an all-too-important reason because I am motivated, because one must be inspired to write and the sources Inspiration comes from what you are passionate about and this continues to be, more than ever, my main passion as an author, meaning that I will not move away from postmodern anthropology but will deepen my positioning from it in my next books.

  All my books that we are talking about are what they are because they are my authorial works with my unique style of theorizing, thought and formality, my style since my first book and unique experimental way of venturing into hard theoretical and social sciences since always. but they are also what they are because in that authorial and stylistic whole of each book my positioning from postmodern anthropology has been reflected more strongly since 1998 from my own characteristics as an author and they are part of this trend.

   We speak here of me as an author only as an intellectual individuality only in culture

  However, regarding what you have told me that I distance myself from structuralism, I would like to make several qualifications since the concept of structure is so crucial in the correlation of the world that it is even in the subtitle in the same form as the title of chapter three, whose The most important development is precisely the retheorization of the concept of structure, secondly, in addition to that focused discussion of the concept of structure in chapter 3, which also subtitles the book in chapter 1, from the first third I begin to discuss the concept of central text. In the book I discuss that I begin by stating that the concept of text is eminently a structuralist and broad concept with details on why and I discuss it, third long passages in chapter 1 are analyzes of grammatology, syntacsis and semantics that presuppose the structural stability of the language the sections the signifier, the semantics, etc., and that I develop them regarding the text, then chapter 4 the exegesis of the texts of culture is focused on the concepts of text, pretext, textualization of the non-textual and construction of the text in that chapter I discuss questions of central research methodology in my book and finally or even more crucially what we talked about before in our first part when I told you, note that there is structure in working with interpretants even though The structure is different there from what is usual and it is to that distinction that another interpretant of the research work with the structure in the interpretants is to which I dedicate my greatest effort.

   However, it is true and I accept that I have been retheorizing the concept of structure in a way that distances itself from the two predominant forms of traditional structuralism, which would be ontological structuralism and operational structuralism, the latter understanding the concept of structure as a model. formal logical or exclusively operational formalist, that is to say that it referred not to structures in the social world, of language or of any other type, but to the structure as an operating system for analysis, the second on the other hand referred to structures ontological in the world, I have re-theorized other alternatives for both the theoretical and the empirical research that exist and propose other different and innovative modalities of working with the concept of structure and this is explicit and demonstrable both in my most theoretical books and in my empirical books where what I theorize about structure on an abstract theoretical level is then demonstrated in the empirical analysis of culture.

   When I say that I have innovated and found new avenues, I am not willing to accept that I have done so at the price of distancing myself from a certain idea of ​​traditional structuralism if we summarize that between operationalists and ontologicalists, however, I agree with echo when in the absent structure the It speaks of a self-destruction of the structure implicit in the structuralisms that were permeated with psychoanalysis (Derrida, Barthes, Kristeva and many others), and here what I am telling you might be interesting for you. to say in Lacanian terms.

  Traditional structuralism and psychoanalysis, the latter from Freud to Lacan, shared a main similarity, that of the relationship between the latent and the unmanifest. In short, both presupposed one with respect to the structure, the other with respect to the unconscious, which both structure. on the one hand, unconscious on the other, were inaccessible to the conscious voluntary activity of the subject, the structures were supposed to be what science had to study in order to discover the unmanifest in the latent, for example in grammar, Subjects are exposed to objective conditioning given in deeper structures that condition them, in this way these conditioning structures were presupposed as inaccessible to their reach or to make it more clear, it is assumed that objectively understand a culture, social groups, individuals, languages ​​or works of art, requires studying objective structures that are out of their reach, are inaccessible to them or simply because they condition them, they cannot avoid them and as such, the true understanding of their realities requires studying what which are, let's call them now to make the similarity explicit, "unconscious", in the same way psychoanalysis operates with respect to the unconscious independently and without the fact that this unconscious with Lacan is symbolically relocated between signifier and signified in the Saussurean sense, and it is precisely at this point that More and more structuralists are turning towards psychoanalysis, Derrida, Barthes, Kristeva, etc. without becoming properly psychoanalysts (philosophers, literary critics, etc., and in which more and more psychoanalysts are becoming structuralists (Lacan, Revinas and others), where I see more accurate what eco calls the self-destruction of the structure.

   I made an analysis of this problem by studying in depth and repeatedly a specific essay by Derrida that I consider to be the cornerstone of the dilemma. This essay is titled differ and in summary what Derrida does is once he establishes that according to Saussure the subject is a function of language at the same time that once said, citing Saussure, that language is a system of differences, a signifier is what it is because it is not another signifier, that is, according to what it is not and acquires its identity only from it-- emptied as form and syntacsis of any meaning, the signifier can only be recognized in a negative identity that it receives from the difference, at this point given that being form the signifier is a body before the meanings that are immateriality, soul, etc. ., language is deployed as a system of marks between differences and there in that difference of the marks that Derrida declares unconscious, the difference given by the unconscious itself destroys the structure, echo says it self-destructs because this understanding has been reached starting from a previous Saussurean structure of signifier and meaning in language.

   Precisely in that essay in which Derrida comes closest to Lacan and vice versa is precisely where I distance myself from Derrida, not from all of Derrida, I must clarify, from Derrida of the difference as he discusses it in that essay with a differ, it is true that Lacan initiates a crucial turn from psychoanalysis to structuralism, but this turn that is beneficial for psychoanalysis is at the same time disastrous for structuralism, in fact its destruction.

  This analysis that I have just summarized requires a very complex level of discussion about the relationship between language, difference, brand, and the unconscious, which would be very extensive here, but I hope the summary is enough to understand us.

  I consider that the so-called post-structuralism in general is largely a consequence of this self-destruction of the structure, I say largely because there is not only the confusion between structure and the unconscious, but also other ideological conjunctions about what is science and what is literature. Derrida's essay to which I make paradigmatic references to the problem due to Derrida's very high theoretical level, that is, it allows us to discuss the problem at the deepest level of science and philosophy.

  And here again Hegel is the compass now facing Derrida, Hegel's essays on identity, difference and diversity pour all the phenomenological clarity necessary to dismantle the Lacanian operation through which Derrida wants to make the unconscious enter language via difference. , a well-focused criticism of that essay will demonstrate the close relationship between the union of structuralism and psychoanalysis and the self-destruction of structure.

  I then try to discuss in a very summary way since it is discussed within the book, because I distance myself and distance myself from it both from the relationship between structuralism and psychoanalysis and from the destruction of the structure caused by it that is at the base of the entire hotbed of poststructuralist discussions, intertextualism as a replacement for text (eminently structuralist concept), even as a replacement for intersubjectivity, literature and literary criticism in aesthetics with science, pleasure and instinct with signs, etc., etc., etc. until we reach all the self-declared post-structural forms, Jonathan Culler for example. There is a close relationship between the union of structuralism and psychoanalysis, the self-destruction of structure and the post-structuralist emergence.

   I distanced myself from all this, my retheorization of the structure, if you go to chapter 3 and read it, is certainly symbolist or more precisely neo-symbolist but not in the sense of the relationship between the symbolic and the unconscious but between the symbolic and the relationship objectivity. /subjectivity for the analysis and theorization of culture in research, directly methodological issues, I think that everything I weather about the structure is novel and unique but if I had to refer to a neo symbolism closer to the one I development there I could only mention Cassirer and a certain Pierre Bourdieu, not all Bourdieu, I mention Bourdieu with the exception that my path is different from his but I mention it above all in the sense of the balance that we have between structurality and symbolism in Bourdieu Regarding culture, all my retheorization of the structure aims to show other ways and forms to work methodologically with it in an objective sense, that is, with respect to empirical realities of language and culture we could then speak in me of distancing myself from structuralism, which could be understood as a neo-structuralist symbolism different from post-structuralism, it could be called post-structuralist, but here again the problem of the ideologically dominant uses of words returns, it is not possible to get rid of the sense of self-destruction of the structure involved in the structuralism/psychoanalysis relationship that permeated and even caused poststructuralism through a mere useful use of the prefix pos

   That is to say, I accept, as you have pointed out, that I distance myself from traditional structuralism, that is, ontological versus operative, but in a way and by means very different from the usual ones, while in Gadamer, Haberlas and Schütz there is no structuralism in me, if there is still one, and I still say, well I recognize that I am moving away very slowly and progressively, especially in my most recent books, however, there could not be structuralism in me since linguistics and semiotics are so decisive. not only in my theoretical authorial books but in the empirical authorial ones and also in my art criticism.

  Regarding this, I want to say two things. The first is there is no better way to recognize and visualize what was previously explained as something accomplished than by reading my empirical books, semantic elucidation, rethinking intertextuality, indeterministic truth, rethinking urban anthropology, there I rethink it. theorized in the abstract about the structure taken to the empirical way in which I methodologically work with it, even extending the empirical notion my books on media and why not my compendiums of semiotics of art (art criticism).

   The second, it is true that I am taking a new turn even with respect to myself of which the correlation of the world, and even more so thinking about science and even more so my next book - already fully devoted to dynamism - are its clearest expression. and that in this turn, on the one hand, dialectics is acquiring more and more relevance, in short, classical philosophy from which I am retheorizing semiotics back to a dynamism that is moving away from that structural static or resituating it in other ways.

  I accept that too.

  So while I praise your synthesis I did not want to fail to point out my debt to structuralism as well as my distances. In no way does this mean that I devalue or ignore Lacan, I accept that structuralism did very good for psychoanalysis and I greatly respect Lacan's work and your way of metabolizing Lacan in that kind of post-Lacanian analytical philosophy that they are drawing I find fascinating but Not so, conversely, psychoanalysis did not do good to structuralism - we must recognize it and take care of ourselves against it - then the main reason for my distance is that I am not a psychoanalyst. Now I have a question for you, if you are so interested and even focused on obtaining results by combining analytic philosophy and Lacan, why aren't you focused on studying Derrida?

   This is being told to you by someone dedicated since the early nineties to reading and studying Derrida year after year until today. You really should.

   I think that so far our best way of convergence is Habermas.  

  And I would like to close this point without failing to say that although not even Derrida escapes my distances, my care and my criticisms, I work with the most classical, theoretical and abstract Derrida, distancing myself from interpretations that see Derrida as profusing science and literature, Let's say for example in his book the margins of philosophy I distanced myself and objected to the chapters being different, the ends of man, the metaphor in the philosophical text, Valery and even criticizing philosophy, instead I praise and celebrate the copula supplement: philosophy versus linguistics, introduction to Hegel's semiology, notes on the phenomenology of language, the Geneva linguistic circle, ousía and gramme and communication on Austin

  From which ones do I distance myself? Precisely from Derrida's relationships with Freud, Nietzsche, Lacan, Foucault, the difference, the unconscious, the literary, rhetoric and the metaphorical, which ones do I celebrate and praise? Derrida's relationships with Hegel, Husserl, Rousseau , Condillac, Benveniste, Aristotle, Chomsky sometimes Heidegger.

   I have things left to tell you. At the beginning I wanted to pay much more attention to your demarcated interest in the concept of reality, dedicating a broad development to it. I also found it necessary to elaborate on the concept of correlation in its two sources, philology and semiotics, but I think it is enough for the moment, I will leave it for later.

From Lacan to analytical philosophy

By Alberto Méndez Suarez

Hello Abdel. What a joy to hear from you. I was about to write to you, but I'm still reading your texts, not without some enjoyment and a little randomly, sometimes at the wrong time.

 That in part has led me to postpone my decision to write to you because it was about more than just greeting you, but rather an exchange of ideas. And I have my good reasons for doing so. I have also preferred to postpone it because I do not have any work ready yet, to submit it to a critique, which, coming from you, cannot be less than rigorous and I do not believe I have at this moment any text ready to meet that requirement. I remember that in our last email exchange you asked me that our dialogues be based on that principle and based on exchanges of texts, answers and counter-answers situated in the context of theory. This was approximately two years ago.

At least I have two texts, but in English, which are what they call here in the United States papers, more scholastic in the academic sense, that I submitted for discussion and that were accepted here in the academy that I think perhaps could respond to that criterion and meet your expectations. They are texts that I love very much and that represent a period of my academic training here in the United States. The first is titled “W.V.Quine’s Duhemian holistic approach in scientific epistemology using modus placing” and the second, which I presented as a final project in the class of Philosophy of Mind, it was a paper titulado “Overcoming detours of Mind-Body dilemma through Quine-Duhem holism revisited”. 

Specifically, they refer to issues implicit within Anglo-Saxon post-positivist analytical philosophy. Approach to which I arrived, and which I later adopted, after an extensive period of deep study of Lacan's work, the systematic reading of his Seminars, to the conceptual and linguistic decipherment of the two volumes in Spanish of his Writings, and a meticulous study of the North American edition, the first and most complete in the English language ---- curated by Bruce Fink, clinical psychologist and Lacanian psychoanalyst from Pittsburgh ---- in addition to some miscellanies and other Lacanian texts scattered throughout throughout psychoanalytic literature. In the last period of his teaching, Lacan makes a turn towards the logic and philosophy of language with an Anglo-Saxon approach, directing his attention to major authors such as Karl Popper, Bertrand Russell, Rudolf Carnap, Ludwig Wittgenstein and even W.V. Quine. Suddenly, I saw myself in a world (Miami, Chicago, New York, the United States in general) with other cultural, political, historical, social and even semiotic paradigms of another genre, which you know perfectly well, of course, too.

 Furthermore, I found myself reading a new philosophical and scientific literature on epistemology, symbolic logic and the philosophy of hard sciences after discovering in the library of the university campus where I studied my Bachelor in Philosophy, the renowned collection Library of Living Philosophers from the publisher Open Court of Illinois directed by the editor Paul Arthur Schilpp, who dedicated himself to dedicating extensive individual volumes to the work of a constellation of Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-American thinkers among many others with a recognized career of international reach, most of them analytical philosophers, such as Russell, Whitehead, Popper, Carnap, Alfred Ayer, Quine himself, Donald Davidson, Hilary Putnam, Michael Dummett, Peter Strawson and Richard Rorty among many others. Mentioning Rorty's name in that list can be at least striking, if not contradictory, since Rorty is much better known from his more mature work as a neo-pragmatist follower of Dewey and whom he updated through a renewed interpretation from the work of Heidegger and Wittgenstein, but in reality his origins as a philosopher come from the theoretical framework of his early work in analytical philosophy.  So, reading and studying the books in the collection that I mentioned before led me to delve deeper into the neopositivism and logical empiricism of the Vienna Circle, Anglo-Saxon analytical philosophy, epistemology, and the philosophy of science with a particularly Popperian orientation. , the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind and symbolic logic, heir, mainly the latter, of the work, at the beginning of the 20th century, of the founding father of modern logic, Gottlob Frege, updated shortly afterwards in 1900, 1905 and 1911, by Russell, who certainly turned upside down much of Frege's theoretical edifice, with the introduction of the well-known “Russell's paradox.” So, suddenly, I found myself reading and taking notes, now properly in English, of the texts of those authors representing this logical-empiricist and analytical neo- and post-positivist philosophical approach, driven, indisputably, by that final period of the work of Lacan, who was neither an analytical nor an Anglo-Saxon philosopher, but a French psychoanalyst with a structuralist orientation, who promoted “The Return to Freud” in psychoanalysis, but who in his final period, his work, It runs from the Saussurean-Hegelian structuralist paradigm towards the neo- and post-positivist Anglo-Saxon logical-empiricist paradigm, and which definitely brought me much closer to the Anglo-American academic environment, facilitating my understanding of its intellectual framework within analytical philosophy itself. 

However, after many years, and many books, that same reading, in turn, has invited me to currently search, after my study of some texts by the North American post-analytic neo-pragmatist philosopher Richard Rorty, points of contact (bridges ) with continental phenomenological-hermeneutic and interpretive-descriptivist thinking and with the performative pragmatism of Jürgen Habermas about the intersubjectivist normative theory of communication that you know perfectly well and that you have dominated by years of sedimented and systematically developed readings, and where I believe we have a point of contact.

As you may have noticed, I have been reading your texts and some of your essays in recent days and I have avoided expressing any opinion or leaving any comments, out of pure prudence and because it does not seem to me that this is the essential objective of your publications. On the other hand, I don't think I have many points to object to and I really don't want to add redundant, and sometimes gratuitous, comments that contribute nothing to the debate, other than simple flattering praise. That is why you have surely been able to notice that I have only limited myself to very limited observations. 

I don't know how much time you have, but if possible, I would like us to be able to talk about your work, about which I have many, many questions, since I also knew about your work on the theses of the maker which was the reason why we met in 1990 and then met again three years later in 1993, following a conference of yours at the Center for the Development of the Visual Arts. On that date we met to talk and you gave me some photocopies of some of your texts published in a newspaper in Venezuela that were reports on what you then called a practical ecoculturist and real reports and fragments of chronicles of the experiments of your project "Make" in Cuba.

Later, once I was settled here in Miami, I had the opportunity, as if by chance, to stumble upon some of your essays published on the Internet, on a portal for anthropology and futurology texts, where I had the opportunity to read your essays "After the Ethnomethodology", "Confines of the Stratum" and "The given and the not given" among others. These last two have a difficult language but above all many levels of complexity.  My surprise now with this mass of essays has been with eloquent evidence how much you have distanced yourself from your first texts and your initial theses and the development they have achieved based on your knowledge of reading the phenomenological sociology of Alfred Schütz but also of the influence of Hans-Georg Gadamer and of course ironically of Habermas, for being a bit at the antipodes of the hermeneutic spiral.

The metaphor of the canoe as you describe it totally changes the perception that the anthropologist, located in a colonialist context and taken in the scientistic paradigm, cuts, not from the geographical reality of the native, but brings with him the museum to the ecological space, to the native environment and cuts it right there.

Although you don't mention it much, it seems to me that there, also implicitly, you seem to highlight the descriptivist perspective of Clifford Geertz, his interpretation of an increasingly symbolic anthropology.

Is your perception in line with that of Geertz in his critical review of Lévi-Strauss?

I don't know if you know Geertz's debate with Rorty on the critique of ethnocentrism in The Uses of Diversity (ed. Paidós, 1996) and the response that Rorty dedicates to him in "Objectivism, relativism and truth" which is part of the first volume of his Philosophical papers published by Cambridge University Press, 1991. In this debate the discussion moves to the philosophical field of the confrontation of relativism versus ethnocentrism.

I confess that it was difficult for me to follow you in the elaboration and journey of the concept in Hegel in your essay "The sensible concept." The last essay of yours that I have read so far. In all of them I have recognized the same style, sometimes with more complexity, in other essays with more clarity, but always as a reader I have recognized here the same voice of the author, the same tone, which gives it a perfect organicity and coherence. I read your last essay yesterday and it was "Annexes: margins of realism." Reading it was much calmer for me because the content was clearer. And your positioning within a postmodern anthropological theory, which distances itself from Lévi-Strauss for example and highlights the unfolding of Malinowski's anthropology and its cuts from the reality of the natives of the Pacific.

I want to respond in detail to your comments to try to explain my perspective more clearly so that you can understand where I am going now and what my current position is regarding the theses that I address in it and what I point out there. The concept of "holism" that I highlighted about Quine on several occasions during the development of this essay of mine that you read last night and that I would have liked to have had translated into Spanish so that it would be more fluid to read, is a central concept in the Quine's epistemology that distinguishes Quine's own theoretical position from the rest of his colleagues and students. 

Regarding the English language, I wanted to highlight that, although I have submitted in class, with appropriate academic rigor, let's say, satisfactory, what is called "scholarly", many essays, I feel that I have not yet reached the necessary level, which I demand of myself. myself, to get closer to the objectives and grammatical complexity that I have set for myself. Regarding the translation of the essay into Spanish, I blush to confess that I am somewhat lazy to devote myself tirelessly to a laborious and tedious effort of translating my own texts. On the other hand, I find the translation work that you have done of your own essayistic and authorial work to be very meritorious, which allows readers of both languages ​​to access the same content with the same unity and coherence of style and, above all, with its own voice, where the author Abdel Hernández is recognized, as James Joyce is recognized as the author of Dublineses and of Ulises, Picasso as the author of his great paintings "The Young Ladies of Avignon", "The Three Musicians" and "Guernica", or Michel Foucault as the author of "Words and Things" or "The Archeology of Knowledge".

   Regarding the syntactic and semantic levels, it is true that the latter has lent itself more to covering the field of ideologies, as you very correctly point out above. That is why it seems to me that it is a very important point that you have highlighted on two or three occasions and that seems extremely important to me: the primacy of syntax over semantics.           

   However, the syntactic axis, although it lends itself more to the scientific rigor that makes it appear to be a very seductive system of rules and morphological networks to the point that it can provoke a deceitful seduction, ambushing science itself until it exhausts its own potential, as I It seems that it may occur with a certain excess in the clinical interpretation of classical Lacan that from 1953 to 1964 was based on the linguistic structure of the unconscious, which was indisputably the syntactic condition. a priori of unconscious discourse that until that moment did not have sufficient rules to constitute a discourse. This scientism can also be found with more "literary" evidence in the grammatological theses that can be extracted from a post-Husserlian and post-phenomenological Derrida. But above all, this syntactic logic is formalized and scientificized through the transformational or generative grammar of Chomsky, for example, who operates a syntactic reductionism, in my opinion, essential at the time to understand the mechanism of language acquisition in Universal Grammar. Someone like George Lakoff, a student of Chomsky, who is a notable leader within post-Chomskian cognitivism, will lead the attack or assault on syntax from semantics through the North American current of Cognitive Linguistics to which the Oxford University Press will dedicate a thick collective volume of more than a thousand pages. However, no perspective appears in Lakoff that makes him turn to look askance at the phenomenology of the subject and the field of subjectivity itself. Greimas' work in France is illustrative and rigorous, as you well know, in comparison and in the opposite direction to that of Lakoff, directing linguistic research in the field of semantics that he describes as "structural."

Going back to Quine, I would tell you that in my opinion the most important thing is not the linguistic aspect. In any case, his most important thesis is based on linguistic elements such as "indeterminacy of translation" or "inscrutability of reference." And although its philosophical basis, on the other hand, is fundamentally epistemological, hence my greatest interest and which leads me to more ontological questions. Ironically, some psychology professors allow themselves to be ambushed by this confusion. I remember my neuropsychology professor at Florida International University with an excellent academic background in neuroscience who, however, still had a limited vision of Anglo-Saxon post-positivist analytical philosophy, to the point that, in a conversation we had in his department office of Psychology, at the same moment that I mentioned Quine's name, that professor immediately referred to the Harvard logician as if he were a linguist, or rather, a linguistic philosopher, suggesting that I enroll. better in the class of his wife, who was also a professor at F.I.U., and who taught the "Language production" class in the Psychology department. I had registered in what is known here in the North American academy as a minor. After my major was in Philosophy and I wanted to enroll for the Graduate Studies level in a Philosophy of Mind, for which some psychology classes validated me well for that Master degree. But well, for health reasons, which I told you about, I couldn't continue my studies. 

In fact, I am interested in something beyond, something that is at the limit of these theses of Quine. I am interested in the epistemological problem that Quine raises of the inadequacy of thought with the thing whose articulation is done through linguistics with the language of predicative logic or logical quantifiers, a logic that Quine inherits, by the way, from Frege, and that reaches ontological indeterminacy. But Quine knows the danger that it implies, if he wants to maintain a consistent philosophy, to continue down this path that can lead him to an anti-foundationalism like the one that Rorty would assume much later. And although Quine himself dismantles Carnap's own positivism with his theses, he saves it again and reinstates it on the path of empiricism or behavioral physicalism. That is why it claims, for psychology, to constitute a first moment of epistemology. However, this path, which seems limited to me in that sense, is also very useful and essential to me, in the type of epistemological problem that I am interested in investigating. And that forces me, within the Anglo-Saxon logical-empiricist paradigm, to develop the epistemological approach of a rationalist philosophy of science that opens the debate on realism again. Therefore, in the essay you read, I start from Quine and lightly address his theoretical antagonism with Popper. In the same essay, I emphasize how falsificationism, which also questions the positivity of science itself, also subverts its inductive value, although it builds its logic of scientific research, from the deductive model, from methodological negativity, while Quine does it from the positivity indicated by the setting the mood of logic. But I would like to develop this more clearly, even explain it to you and explain it to myself, more clearly, later.

Regarding your emphasis on semantics, I am struck by the fact that you do not make any mention of the hermeneutical work of Ricoeur who, influenced by Greimas, emphasized the semantic value of metaphor based on his actantial model and the Aristotelian square of opposites. , its role in discourse and literary texts. In my opinion, Ricoeur is a master in this regard.

    On the other hand, although Quine rejects any theory of meaning and sense, other than "stimulus meaning" obtained from the nerve endings of the body, where precisely Quine indicates that there is a ontos, where its ontology lies, proposes, however, there, an ontological commitment, as explained in The ontological relativity and other essays and one of his last and clearest books: Pursuit of Truth.  A very particular way of understanding Leibniz's law of identity of indiscernibles. I have outlined some of that but it is just a simple outline. A slight outline that will allow me to guide myself in the direction of a book that runs between meaning and reference, but also in approaching holism from falsificationism. I stayed, a little over ten years ago, with Quine's work, at a time in my life when I was very immersed in academic language doing the bachelor of Philosophy although I was not exactly taught to read Quine at the academy. I read Quine, self-taught, when I was still in the first years of college, taking the classes called requirements; but, on the other hand, the University did provide me with some tools of symbolic logic, scientific research methodology, probabilistic calculation and statistics that helped me understand in what languages ​​the philosophy that I had already begun to read was expressed, distancing myself a little from the massive influence that Lacan had on my intellectual and personal development, why not?

Lacan had allowed me to systematize an entire corpus of knowledge, but at the same time, he came to expansively colonize my own way of thinking about the methodologies of the different philosophical schools of the 20th century, in a way that was becoming a kind of intellectual and worldview. professional, between the mid-90s and early 2000s, and the best vaccine against that was an epistemology like Quine's, an epistemology that he would define as “naturalized” by being closer to sensations and psychological perceptions through an analytical philosophy of language such as that of Quine himself, that of his disciple the coherentist analytical philosopher Donald Davidson, even close to the metaphysical approach of Hilary Putnam and the debates of both positioning themselves within metaphysical and scientific realism against the antirealism of the Oxford School. I think of their debate with Michael Dummett, also the philosophy of mind of John Searle, for example, epistemology such as that of Quine or Putnam and the philosophy of science of the critical rationalist type that Popper had carried out since the time of the 30's and a little against the grain of the positivism of the Vienna Circle as Alfred Ayer and more specifically, Lakatos have also done. Although I owe much more to Popper for his extremely important contribution to the hard sciences in terms of the methodology of scientific research, his demarcation criterion through his falsificationist theorem expressed with the structure of the logical calculation of the "modus ponens" and his approach fundamental methodological: the hypothetico-deductive method. Without a doubt, I owe precisely to Popper, his “principle of rationality” through which the logical necessity of “situational analysis” for the social sciences was theoretically justified as it is deployed and developed throughout the extensive and enormous volume, published in English by the University of Illinois Press in the collection Library of Living Philosophers and titled The Philosophy of Karl Popper about which I have spoken from time to time in these dialogues. Also of enormous importance is the essay of the same title that gives its name to the concept with which the British epistemologist of Austrian origin methodologically justifies the axiological system of rationalist scientificity of the social sciences.

My encounter with Popper's evolutionary epistemology was decisive, to the point of being enthusiastic about his way of answering the mind-body problem which is nodal in its interactionist Cartesian dualism.  That's where my interest comes from and also partly as an obligation to write what, as you know, here are called papers, to expose my own internal philosophical debates, my own epistemological position, with my own language, a little commenting on the systems of these thinkers in relation to the quantum paradigm and the Darwinian paradigm in which this entire philosophical approach seems to be anchored, especially from Russell, Wittgenstein and Popper passing through Quine, Davidson and Putnam and reaching Ayer, Strawson and Dummett to close with the neo-pragmatism of Richard Rorty. The idea of ​​a book didn't occur to me then. And many times, I have been thinking about it, more recently. Hence, I have outlined some titles and some half-finished books more developed, a few of them in dialogue with the continental tradition of the 20th century, especially the phenomenological psychopathology of Jaspers, the hermeneutics of Ricoeur and the psychoanalysis of Lacan. As I'm sure you know, there has been a certain discredit for a way of receiving these currents in the Anglo-Saxon world. But both Rorty and Putnam have come to build bridges of understanding, of consensus between both approaches, analytical versus continental. And that is where my interest in Gadamer, Ricoeur and Habermas comes from. My reading of Foucault or Derrida is collateral to this dialogue and does not represent much in it, except in rethinking the chapter, or Lacan's approach, who owes, the latter, more to Hegel, Jacobson, Lévi-Strauss, and Jean Hyppolite than to Foucault or Derrida despite the tense debate between the former and the latter, to mention a few.

Of course your work is inspiring. It always was in my personal case, even when, still, you did not consider the theoretical scope or the hypotheses that you pose today and now. They were others at that time, more field work, more empirical, when the maker's experiments. During the time I was in Lacan's psychoanalytic group in Havana, which was from 1994 to 2000, I did not meet a single university student and I had a lot of contact with the Faculty of Philosophy and History and professor friends of mine who invited me to talk about Lacan. , to teach classes on Lacan, on the same university hill, for example with Professor Paul Ravelo, in his contemporary thought class, where everything that the academy grouped together there, under the supervision of the Dean, as contemporary bourgeois philosophy. Ravelo who published in 1996, if I remember correctly, a little book on Lyotard and post-structuralism in the collection New Pines, was passionate about French philosophy, especially Foucault and Lyotard. And he gave me the opportunity -----I will never be grateful enough for the trust placed in me at that moment------ to give me the platform of his teaching, which was his classroom to teach his disciples from the faculty. of Philosophy and its students everything that I had been able to catch in Havana in the 90's, from reading and studying Lacan's work, and in fact, on the other hand, no less important, being more in contact with the factory of thought Cuban if one can talk about it, isolating the phenomenal of that thought, as what is properly “Cuban.” And in all sincerity, in all that time, I did not know, among the university students, although some were quite systematic in their own and verbose theses or in the periods and authors they worked, such as the late professor Eduardo Dominic, to whom I owe having started me in the study of Kant. Even though all of these great Cuban academics were prepared for systematic thinking, none of them were especially interested in dedicating themselves to the development of radically new thinking - I'm not even talking about transdisciplinary thinking - but simply a totally new creative thought in their way of articulating the interdisciplinary understanding of texts within their own professional development. They did not lack material for this, since their scientific presentations brimmed with a lengthy theoretical flight. They were perfectly equipped for it; But they lacked the self-management capacity of an institution capable of hosting an initiative of that caliber and they lacked the appropriate professional encouragement for it. And on the other hand, on the other hand, in all that time, I did not find a single person, not a single intellectual, not a single thinker, not a single teacher with that enormous capacity for work that characterizes you, and that innate precondition , I believe, to draw relationships and connections of understanding of a high level of complexity between dissimilar authors and between theoretical assumptions and divergent schools and theses and reconcile them in turn in an idea, in a unique work, in a way of thinking. methodologically speaking, as you do.

And that from that time of the “doer” was inspiring to me. I can today say, paraphrasing Kant about Hume, that I owe you "for having woken up from the dogmatic sleep" in which I found myself. Afterwards, came my encounter with Lacan, through this group in gestation that sought to expand and a period of training came, more established, and above all more systematic, more systemic, if you will, which was the entire period that I was working with Lacan. with an interest that went beyond the merely clinical, with an epistemological interest, etc. until reaching the United States.

This time your message has been longer, which I really appreciate as it makes it much more packed with content where each word has its weight in gold. To that extent I will try to respond as exhaustively as possible to each of your comments.

Regarding inspiration, it is necessary for me to explain myself by returning very briefly to the past because that retroaction that Freud called "Nachträglich", and that Lacan, following Jakobson, defined as metonymy or "aprés coup" proposes the act of the subject of returning to his own past. I say that it is necessary since with each retroaction the signifying chain is re-signified, - I learned it from Lacan - the entire content of the sentence acquires a new meaning. Paraphrasing Frege, I would say that the man who in the morning says "Morning Star" to refer to the star Venus is the same man who in the evening provides a new meaning to the same planet Venus by calling it "Evening Star."

The ignition point began there with our encounter in 1990, it is what Lacan called "the encounter with the real." As I told you in a previous message, it happens a bit like Kant when he said of Hume that he "awakened him from his dogmatic sleep", I would say, bridging the gap that my encounter with your work woke me up from my lethargic ignorance, it was the encounter with your work and with your theses of Doing, the encounter with Abdel Hernández subject of an enunciation, of a way of reading Adorno, Benjamin, Foucault, Derrida, Canclini, Levi-Strauss. That was the way in which your work and our conversations became a decisive and positive influence on my subsequent reading and my subsequent intellectual choices. As I told you, my readings were marked for years by those conversations that we had as if in another time and another latitude, they were those of Eckermann with Goethe. But fortunately I had to find my own path, walk alone, with the tools I already had in my hand and above all with the desire, the impulse to know, etc. That's how I started some random readings of what I could get my hands on, especially Structural Anthropology by Lévi-Strauss, scientific research by Mario Bunge, History and consciousness of class of Lukacs and some chapters of the two volumes of Economy and society by Max Weber, all published in Cuba. Occasionally I got into my hands Critical essays by Roland Barthes, The Political economy of the Sign of Jean Baudrillard, many of these readings had enormous difficulties for me to understand at the time due to a tremendous gap in the understanding of philosophical thought. That's how I studied History of Philosophy in 3 volumes by Abbagnano to be able to understand the gnoseological bases from which all those authors of the 20th century started. The XX. In particular, it was the work of Lévi-Strauss that provoked the most enthusiasm in me, as well as the interviews that Chardonnier did with him.  It was with this base that I found the work that was being done by Lacan and I immediately joined in being part of a team and a common task of which I was part as those of us who were in the Lacan School and the few who still Today they are there in Havana we had the feeling of belonging to something of enormous importance, to an intellectual and clinical feat that was the Lacanian movement in Cuba of which we were pioneers in the Cuban context in the mid-90's in whose history I soon discovered myself in a new relationship of my own self and of those unconscious formations of discourse as a subject, which revealed that form divided between an imaginary self constituted by ideals and a symbolic self constituted by the failures of language, Where the signifying chain was short-circuited to give rise to a opening of the truth. That work allowed me to produce three crucial texts that would determine my place in the group and my position regarding the reading of Lacan. At that time I read with "feverish devotion" the biography of Lacan written by Elisabeth Roudinesco and that reading was inspiring for the intellectual path that would begin in Cuba and that would later continue for almost seven long years here in the United States. Later, and located in the Anglo-American context, I studied in depth and not without notable effort, the texts of Harvard logicians (Quine, Davidson, Putnam), or British philosophers of language such as Michael Dummett of Oxford and philosophers of the mind of Americans like John Searle or philosophers of science like Karl Popper. In short, a whole constellation of thinkers that for the first time was a direct result of my own choices.

That is why you find as your own voice, mine, the essay of my authorship that I shared with you and that I presented here and submitted here in Miami as a final class project in the Bachelor of Philosophy at the University. So in this way I do not believe that our works point towards the same objective but I do want to emphasize the importance of highlighting the common points of our readings and not so much the objectives and scientific production of our works. I ask myself in my work very scholastic questions that you describe as general questions and you, on the other hand, ask yourself in your work ------much more prolific and abundant than mine------, a more creative experimental analysis , inaugural, which recalls what Foucault referred to in his 1970 lecture "What is an author?" as "establishers of discursivity." As you say, I am more tied, not because any institution ties me down but because I believe myself to be tied to schools and authors. On the other hand, you are in a moment of elaboration that is a detachment where you are inaugurating a new way of interpreting and observing, a new way of discovering and describing new continents within the new rubrics about which you are talking, investigating, answering... That is why it does not seem to me - and I think it is important to emphasize this - that our works can be influenced in such a way that each one becomes the other. This reference loss must be avoided at all costs.  I believe that each of us has enough intellectual maturity, enough theoretical rigor to know how to limit ourselves whenever necessary without avoiding dialogue but respecting the boundaries of the interlocutor's work and we also have enough experience to recognize how far we can go with our work. without the need to involve it in the searches and investigations of the other's work. This must be clear so that our meetings and conversations are completely transparent and in a space of trust, respect and friendship and, above all, intellectual honesty and loyalty to the truth. That said, the theoretical interaction of our readings and interpretations seems to me to be completely necessary and even desirable, taking into account the previous premises. That's why I want to emphasize for your peace of mind that you don't worry, that if at any point I find myself in the theoretical need to cite any of your texts or paragraphs or ideas that are absolutely yours, don't forget that I will do so with all due respect following the academic and legal citation rules. that are required in our environment. For now, Abdel, I really enjoy reading your highly theoretical texts because of the idiosyncratic interpretation of the authors interpreted by you as well as your unique style of exposition and argumentative reasoning. However, my questions regarding my essays and my reading work, the objectives as well as my working method and exposition style as well as the authors that interest me make a substantial difference with respect to your work and your objectives.

My greatest interest is our conversation and the mutual exchange of our ideas. It is possible that at some point a common project will emerge that becomes a two-handed book that captures the spirit of these conversations, that serves as a record and archive if the possibility of a concerted dialogue of our work is not already emerging. , of our work.

I would be honored to have that dialogue with you. It is possible that from time to time we will have to rectify our positions and contrast our interpretations and independently and in parallel carry out our own work following our own intuitions and reflections.

As for the decision to write a book, I have outlined three or four for some time now, but only in outline and perhaps with the occasional completed essay. In one I maintain a discussion between levels of truth, on the one hand between epistemology and ontology, on the other between significance and reference. In another book outline I maintain a discussion with all the notable currents of the 20th century, on the side of the Continental tradition: neo-Kantianism, phenomenology (Husserl, Jaspers), hermeneutics (Gadamer, Ricoeur), stru

turalism (Derrida, Foucault), psychoanalysis (Lacan), anthropology, (Lévi-Strauss versus Geertz) historiography, to the critical theory of Frankfurt (Habermas in particular) and on the other hand with the Anglo-Saxon post-positivist logical-empiricist and analytical approach since the founders of modern symbolic logic (Frege, Russell, Whitehead, Moore and Wittgenstein) and the Vienna Circle (Carnap, Gödel) as well as the Karl Popper's philosophy of science and his debate with Copenhagen quantum physics and with the Darwinian evolutionary paradigm and to a lesser extent with Hempel's nomological method, passing through the postwar Harvard logicians (Quine, Davidson, Putnam) and the School of Oxford (Austin, Ryle, Dummett, Ayer, Strawson) to the debate between Searle's North American epiphenomenalism and Daniel Dennett's cognitivist eliminavism on the one hand and the anti-foundationalist neo-pragmatism of Richard Rorty on the other. Here I am faced with a difficult and cumbersome job. A very ambitious company that may undergo necessary changes along the way until I am left with what is absolutely essential.

On the other hand, there is the maturation time of a book and finally the time of writing it, which goes through many stages. And in that sense I am much more indecisive than you when it comes to facing my own writing. It's something I admire a lot about you. Continuous effort even when it is exhausting at times and is intellectually exhausting work even to the point of physical exhaustion. The perseverance of work that implies the abandonment of other vital and essential issues in one's personal life also requires a high degree of work ethic. In my personal case, I maintain a fierce fight against my health condition because when discomfort prevails it is not possible to continue working. I can force it on my body but not for long. In that case then I must rest to continue later because there is something there from the soma, that is, from the body, that becomes present and the body claims its space. If you are a Cartesian dualist you would understand it immediately through the interconnection between the body and the mind, or between thought, and language and their interdependence in the left hemisphere of the brain, or in the frontal area of ​​the cerebral cortex, between the synapses neuronal and interconnectionism or neuronal interconnectivity. These relationships are all involved in this process that goes from stimulus to memory (bottom-up model) or vice versa from mental construction to physical action of the body (top-Down model). But if you are a monist, this process occurs as if it were a single module where these interconnected mechanisms stop being two processes and become one, that is, one and the same process.

Of course, the production of thought and its realization in a book is undoubtedly an essential work. Only that I have my time and I know that I must go gently, with a certain prudence in the face of an unavoidable task.

Going back to Quine, I would tell you that in my opinion the most important thing is not the linguistic aspect. In any case, his most important thesis is based on linguistic elements such as "indeterminacy of translation" or "inscrutability of reference." And although its philosophical basis, on the other hand, is fundamentally epistemological, hence my greatest interest and which leads me to more ontological questions, ironically, some psychology professors allow themselves to be ambushed by this confusion. I remember my professor of neuropsychology at Florida International University with an excellent academic background in neuroscience who, however, still had a limited vision of Anglo-Saxon post-positivist analytical philosophy, to the point that in a conversation we had in his office at the same time as I I mentioned Quine, the professor immediately referred to the Harvard logician as if he were a linguist, suggesting to me, at the same time, the class of his wife who was also a professor at F.I.U. of "Language production" in the Department of Psychology.

I was registered in what is known here in the North American academy as a Minor. After my Major was in Philosophy and I wanted to register for the Graduate Studies level in Philosophy of Mind classes, some psychology classes were a good fit for this Master's degree. But well, for health reasons that I told you about, I couldn't continue my studies. In fact, I am interested in something beyond, something that is at the limit of these theses of Quine. I am interested in the epistemological problem that Quine raises of the inadequacy of thought with the thing whose articulation is made through linguistics with the language of predicative logic or logical quantifiers and reaches ontological indeterminacy.

But Quine knows the danger of continuing along this path that can lead to anti-foundationalism and although Quine himself dismantles Carnap's own positivism with his theses, he saves it again on the path of empiricism or behavioral physicalism. That is why it demands a first moment of epistemology for psychology. As this path seems limited to me in that sense, it is also very useful and essential to me in the type of epistemological problem that I am interested in investigating. And that forces me within the Anglo-Saxon logical-empiricist paradigm to develop the epistemological approach of a rationalist philosophy of science that opens the debate on realism again. That is why in the essay you read I start from Quine and lightly address his theoretical antagonism with Popper. In the same essay I highlight how falsificationism, which also questions the positivity of science itself, also subverts its inductive value although it builds from negativity while Quine does so from the positivity that indicates the modus tollens of logic. But I would like to develop this more clearly, even explain it to myself more clearly.

On the other hand, although Quine rejects any theory of meaning and sense other than "stimulus meaning" obtained from the nerve endings of the body where precisely Quine indicates that there is an ontos, where its ontology lies, that is, its ontological commitment such as he explains in "Ontological Relativity and Other Essays" and one of his latest and clear books "Pursuit of Truth."

A very particular way of understanding Leibniz's law of identity of indiscernibles. I have outlined some of that but it is just a simple outline. A slight outline that will allow me to guide myself in the direction of a book that runs between meaning and reference, but also in approaching holism from falsificationism.

I came across Quine's work a little over ten years ago at a time in my life when I was very involved in academic language, doing my bachelor's degree in Philosophy, although I was not taught how to read Quine, I read it self-taught when I was still still I was in the first years of college, but on the other hand, the University did provide me with some tools of logic and statistics that helped me understand in what languages ​​the philosophy that I had already begun to read was expressed, distancing myself from the massive influence that had Lacan in my intellectual development.

First of all, I want to thank you for the enormous work and tireless effort without the adjectives, far from reaffirming, impoverishing the intensity of my words by desensitizing the nouns of "work" and "effort." Indeed, it has undoubtedly been a Promethean effort to organize and transcribe what we talked about in Messenger. Especially because of the difficult working conditions.

I want to respond in detail to some points that I think are essential to highlight and that I will prepare to do calmly throughout Saturday. There are many fundamental ideas in your comments.

I want to emphasize that it is incredible the presence that the text of our conversations acquires once organized in a first revision that will be constantly rewritten and reorganized. As for the signifier of "Counterpoint" or "Counterpoints" to represent or define in a single notion the basic foundation of our dialogue, it seems undoubtedly "masterful" to me. If we were to materialize a future publication of this dialogue, the title "Counterpoints" would be, in my opinion, at least tentatively the correct signifier to represent our conversations.

I have just read them all and I have taken advantage of the tranquility of the early morning to do so. I will be ready to respond to those that seem essential and very important to me today, Saturday, so that they are ready no later than Sunday. Those related to our epistemological differences that are not insurmountable but are very productive and above all and more importantly our connections, our areas of understanding about common work projects in the very short term and areas of common understanding of conceptual phenomena resulting from of those areas of intellectual complicity, areas of symmetry and similarity, not so much in the methodological assumptions and understanding procedures that, although undoubtedly different, preserve an area of ​​common exchange in the field of ideas.

Very pleased with the first transcription you have made of these "Counterpoints". Thanks for your work. As I told you, I will be there all day Saturday responding to you and organizing some ideas from our Counterpoints. I also want to at least start reading your book "The Correlate of the World" and initially skip over "Thinking Science."

I have sent you a couple of emails with a book attacked by each email. The first with "Truth and justification" by Habermas and the second email with "Ontological relativity and other essays" by Quine. The latter, in my opinion, will be very useful in your investigation into issues of ontology, significance and reference. With particular emphasis I recommend chapters 2, 3 and 4. In chapter 4 Quine addresses the logical problem of "existences" in The Sense of Predicative Logic. That is why I disagree with you that this has been treated as you claim by Derrida in grammatological theory. Likewise, Chomsky's emphasis is more linguistic and Cartesian, very rationalist, while in Quine you notice the Carnapian logical-empiricist bias in his approach to the ontological problems dealt with by predicative logic. It is true that there is much of Aristotle's logic in the monistic sense, but predicative logic has the caveat that it frames an ontological interest.

Of course Abdel, not only am I very interested in initially prefacing at least one of the two books that you propose, but it also gives me great satisfaction to share the intellectual work with you not only in the common project that brings us together with one of your books but also in our debates that you masterfully nominated as "Counterpoints".

  Also, the enormous pleasure of reading you again and updating me on your current work and that of recent years.

In principle, I am interested in focusing on this first book "The Correlate of the World." Then if there is an opportunity for a second, for me it is perfect. The only thing I ask of you is to work slowly but progressively.

Despite these premises, I recognize the need to do the work, to write and produce books with reflections that emanate from and evoke the readings of the authors that are part of our own worldview as authors.

   Readings that determine the perspective with which we relate to such authors and their theories. In my case the constellation Lacan, Wittgenstein, Quine, Russell, Popper, Putnam, Rorty, Davidson, while in yours now Alfred Schütz, Peirce, Hegel, Garfinkel, Gadamer, Umberto Eco, Habermas, Derrida and in another time perhaps Foucault, Deleuze, Lyotard, Adorno, Benjamin, Max Weber, Baudrillard, Bourdieu, Jameson, again Eco and also himself Habermas, Canclini, etc.

For me, writing books is not a necessity as it is for you, due to your own nature as a creator, from your time creating anthropological, sociological and ethnomethodological experiments.

  It is in your role as author where writing, more than a necessity, is not only the instrument but also the object language and metalanguage of the same language crossed by super sets and subsets as rigorously expressed in the hierarchical theory of types, introduced by Russell ago. little more than a century and consequently as you have described in your essay a few years ago "The linguistic presentational" interweaving the grammatological interrelationships as they were understood by Derrida in discussion with the acts of discuss Searle with some thoughtful derivations of "flaky" strata in your essay "Confines of the Stratum."     Personally, I have more of a vocation for reading than for writing as such; What's more, I find the latter occasionally unpleasant. However, I do not fail to recognize its importance in the presentation of specific objectives, in the discussion of concepts and theories within the scientific-philosophical community, in the argumentation and exchange as vectorizing knowledge in the intersubjective sphere, the relationship of the author with his possible readers, assuming myself as a reader of other authors and as a potential author of other readers and taking into account not only the social and cultural environment but also the starting point objectified as a condition of possibility, in which every author has previously been a reader and that every reader is potentially an author.

If I make a somewhat crude and forced comparison, it is because I notice in this theoretical discourse something similar to the reality of the phenomenological method, which if taken as part of the eidetic reduction based on the different descriptions of the object, these never reach the limit, the ultimate description of the essences because, rather, they point towards the infinite, each interpretation is part of that detour of the truth, of that construction of the object through exegetical competition between different objectified versions of the description hermeneutics.

  It is precisely what you explained, with other words perhaps more precise the more elaborate, of course, in "Hermeneutics and culture", the first essay of your book "The correlation of the world", that the ultimate truth of the phenomenological method is its scope. to infinity, that each interpretation enters into a competition to assert itself as the most rigorous and the one that best opens a new descriptive field.

   These may not be your exact words, but the essence of the idea, if I understand you correctly, is more or less what I just mentioned here.

  Since this seems to be its mechanism after there is no last interpretation, because there is always one more, that limit is never reached, that limit is projected to infinity as its horizon of objectification. It is precisely what you have evoked that must be faced with phenomenological "humility" in reference to the descriptive activity of the "hermeneutic" method.

   And that in some way - and this is how I perceive it - updates, in my opinion, what Carnap called the "principle of charity" later readjusted by Davidson with a reductionist operator of said principle to the key of the relationship of the author of the statement with their environment and that Rorty tries to encompass with the notion of "solidarity".

As you have surely noticed when reading my epistemological essay on Quine's logic, my essential concern, which I maintain as a subject of inquiry in my dialogue with the Anglo-Saxon logical-empiricist, post-positivist and analytical approach, has been for more than two decades the biunivocal relationship of language with the world, of the word and the statement with its referent. An investigation that started and took root from my study of Lacan's work over the years, thus extending to immersing myself in the analytical approach.

In particular, the first period of Lacan's teaching was not as decisive for my study of the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle and the Anglo-Saxon analytical approach as the last stage of his teaching was in determining my turn to the linguistic epistemological approach of positivism. logic and Anglo-Saxon analytical philosophy. The first period of Lacan's teaching is known as the period of classical Lacan, which corresponds to the period of the structuralist theory of the Saussurean linguistic sign. In that classical period, Lacan had radicalized Saussure's linguistic theses with his theory of the signifier and had inverted that arbitrary biunivocity of Saussure, imprinting an absolute, core value on the signifier as such, discarding and confining the sphere of meaning and meaning to the realm of the imaginary. constrained between the real and the symbolic. Of course, the symbolic being the articulation of one signifier with another and its effect as a barred or divided subject to account for meaning and unconscious desire, this is articulated as the two paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes of metaphor and metonymy about which Lacan followed the theses of Jakobson and the Prague School.

The decisive influence of the last period of Lacan's teaching, on the other hand, is completely different. In this last period from the 70's to 1980, a year before Lacan's death, we witness a Lacan attached to reality. A Lacan who introduces a clinic of the real of the blurred clover knot, a topological knotting of a new dimension of the unconscious as real. What does this idea mean?

 It is not about a Lacan interested in describing physical reality, a tangible reality of objects, nor is it about Lacan's interest in a social or contextual concept of reality, nor is it the postulation of an intuitive or empirical reality of meaning. common. Rather, with the real Lacan proposes a beyond his thesis of the symbolic register and the theory of the unconscious made from the matter of the symbolic and the logic of the signifier.

   The real in Lacan is presented as the limit concept of psychoanalysis and of every logical proposition or significant articulation. This "real" will be associated by Lacan as the sphere inherent to what he calls "enjoyment" or unpleasant excess originating in the body.

   At this point Lacan takes up the direction of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological reflections on perception and some other phenomenological theses in particular related to the description of the body as a phenomenological precinct of "enjoyment" as Lacan names this notion and this "enjoyment." "as the logical anteriority of the signifier.

In this perspective, the real is a beyond the symbolic, a beyond the limit of meaning and encompasses the entire scope of that which has not yet been signified, that which has not been taken by word, and that has not yet been replaced by the signifier.

 Lacan here takes up Wittgenstein's logical postulates in his "Tractatus logico-filosoficus", very particularly the "mysterianism" of his last proposition in which Wittgenstein emphasizes that "What cannot be said, must be kept silent."

 Lacan made a particular use of this thesis by taking another turn and proposing that what could not be said was better to "show" thereby revealing the importance of the encounter with the mathematical topology of the real.

Abdel, everything you tell me here is very good!!! Excellent friend that you have summarized and organized your work for years. It was already giving me headaches to understand where everything came from and what position it occupied in that chronology. That's why I was a little disorganized reading some of your works in a certain way, reading them disorganized in time.

Definitely, it has already been decided, when we propose something for publication it will be initially and first of all "The correlation of the world." I will then prepare as you asked me to read it carefully. I agree not to dismember the works, that is, not to arbitrarily separate essays that were born as a whole; in not starting essays that are part of the same body of essays with their own autonomy and that function as an organism with its own voice as well. So we discarded the idea of ​​an anthological collection of essays gathered somewhat arbitrarily under a common signifier; although also arbitrary.

How good, Abdel, that you address this point for further clarification about "predicative logic." I would like to know in what sense you understand it and from what derivations you reflect on it. When I speak of predicative logic I am referring to that first-order logic or logic of quantifiers introduced by Gottlob Frege in his reinterpretation of Aristotle's logical quadrilateral that articulates the generalization of universal logical statements and their also universal negation with the instantiation of particular logical statements. and its also particular denial. In this way Quine proceeded to operate a reductionism of the propositional logic developed by Russell in the 3 volumes of his Principia Mathematica, treating sets as elements. I am almost certain that it is not in this sense that you were referring to with the expression of predicative logic.  

On the other hand, as for the reference to the planet Venus, it is not exactly a "voluptuous" metaphor; it is, instead, an "astronomical" metaphor, although its purpose is neither one nor the other; rather , has an explanatory purpose and at the same time, has a connotative value, since it evokes an epistemological reference from the history of analytical philosophy itself. In fact, the phrase comes from Gottlob Frege, the founder of modern logic. he daring to repeat it without referring to the source because it seemed to me that it had unnecessarily overloaded the colloquial language of our "Counterpoints" and I assumed that it would be familiar to you in some way.

Regarding the concept of "holism" it is possible that in reference to it I find myself restricted to Quine's logical-epistemological method. Holism can also be translated by what has been called by Quine himself, the "Duhem-Quine thesis", in his seminal essay "Two dogmas of Empiricism" and which refers to the verification of a statement from one point From an epistemological point of view, it is not carried out with the corroboration of the statements taken in isolation one after another, that is, individually, in contrast with reality and the sensory data of the empirical evidence; Rather, it is done by taking the statements as the elements that make up a set or a logical-mathematical matrix of statements and/or propositions, or the sets of concepts that make up the entire system of science. This is the instantiated sense of Quine's "holism" that seems to be distinguished from that "holism" of which you have been thinking.

There I implicitly propose a thesis that I have not seen -------with the exception of Lakatos

And ironically, with the exception of Popper, no other author poses it, in the same way and at least openly as I do in this and in another essay more focused on the mind-body dilemma in the philosophy of mind. A thesis that resolves methodologically at least if not epistemologically the inevitable theoretical disagreement between the methods of Quine and Popper. That essay will probably only come to light, I hope, translated into Spanish and forming part of a book on "epistemology and reference" or "ontology and significance" to give it a temporary title as an example and following your recommendation to develop that a little more. essay until culminating in a book. I will continue later by responding to your comments.

I can't help but be surprised when I read you saying that I must display that "writer" talent that you see in the characteristics of my prose when in reality it is you who really, in all honesty, has an incredible facility with language as a writer of a high level. Truly impressive abstract flight. However, I cannot see you as a fiction writer precisely because of that high conceptual flight and that level of abstract thought.

To be frank with you Abdel, philosophy is really not only an abstract language with which, personally, I identify better, much more than the seduction that the language of fictional literature could exert with which I do not identify but only as sporadic and circumstantial reader. On the other hand, I also find that philosophical rigor allows me to manage questions of the correlation of consciousness with the world, of the adequacy (or inadequacy) of thought with the thing that are certainly basic questions and that are also the conditions of possibility to develop the rest of all the relevant conceptual and epistemological questions.

On the other hand, philosophical thinking is what calls me and what I have studied not only at the University but long before in a self-taught way with a lot of vocation investing time and effort with the certainty that is with the conceptual and methodological rigor of the philosophy that during For more than twenty years I have tried to find answers to those fundamental questions that have been at the same time foundational. That path has been that of philosophy.

I studied with the aim of dedicating myself to teaching, which is what I am most passionate about, dedicating myself to teaching philosophy and the history of philosophical and scientific thought. I couldn't do it as a teacher because my state of health broke down at the most important moment of academic development, just before finishing the level of Undergraduate and start the next level of Graduate Studies.

What strikes me powerfully about your observation is that after having read my essay on Quine and reading me in our exchanges, this is not enough to convince you that my vocation is to dedicate myself to philosophy and not literature. Although, given my health condition, it is practically unlikely at my age to devote myself to teaching the history of philosophical and scientific thought, or to pursue a professional or academic career in the scholastic field of thought, I can still try to publish some of the theses and ideas with which I enter into discussion with the authors who question me the most. I recognize that I must let go more as you have pointed out and look for a more authentically personal language and philosophical ideation. This is daring to walk alone without the protective reference of the ideas of the authors that I have been studying for years, taking distance from those authors (meaning Lacan himself, Russell, Popper, Quine, Putnam, Dummett, Rorty, Searle or Dennett and putting their ideas to work, subjectifying them in new reflections, and new perspectives, perhaps with the expectation of contributing to one's own philosophy, with the emergence of new questions. 

I just read all your latest posts and I'm done phew! and...Wow! as if full of doubts and at the same time amazed at so much sometimes variegated elaboration as in Baroque art where every detail counts. You can see a painting or contemplate a cathedral as a visitor or tourist but you cannot notice and mentally represent the image and concept of every detail of that painting or that cathedral. You can even talk about your first visual experience to an acquaintance but you cannot detail everything about that painting or that cathedral that you saw or visited on your tourist trip, on your visit to the museum and on your visit to the cathedral. You have to make a second visit to recognize the invisible elements there in a general view. On the second visit you are already armed with certain references that function as guides, you have previously consulted a book on visual architecture and you have already seen in an art book several plates and details of the painting that you had not noticed regarding their real presence in your first visit. However, in this second one, with the previous references, your observation of the painting or the cathedral is more acute and reaches a more complex level of representation. You are no longer a vulgar tourist or a naive visitor. Now you are more prepared, more warned but full of questions about even new details that have been revealed to you in your new interaction with the cathedral object or with the painting object that you did not see in the books but that you found because you already asked your questions about the object. They are no longer naive, and as questions themselves have a certain level of elaboration based on the new images that are revealed to you in this reunion with the cathedral and the painting. But you still need a third level to answer the new questions that have arisen from this new interaction with the cathedral reference and with the painting reference. At this point I now find myself in front of your work where new questions arise in the face of a higher level of complexity.

I was prepared for it because I knew the level of complexity with which you worked since the times of the maker. At that time, the empirical aspect of some areas of field work functioned as experimental laboratories in which the maker worked with empirical elements and with some ideas that were neither purely theoretical nor purely methodological but partially empirical, and in a certain way observational. This guaranteed a zone of intersubjectivity with other subjects. But now it is a much more complex level. In the example of the cathedral and the painting, the object did not change substantially. These changes operated at the level of semiotic and mental representation but the object did not substantially change its appearance and kept its main references almost intact. But in the case of my encounter with your work, after we are at an intersubjective level, changes have also occurred in one of us as subjects that help new interpretations that may arise. Here you have gone deeper into the realization of your work, your work to the point that it acquires a greater level of elaboration and complexity that requires a work of understanding on my part. This is the moment we are in now without taking into account the time elapsed between the maker's theses and the current critical essays, without taking into account the transitory elaborations that mediated between the maker's theses and the current ones.

Where am I going? I need you to give me about three or four days to respond to all your very complex and very elaborate comments and also some very controversial ones in my opinion that deserve a slow reflection regarding the differences between linguistic levels and semiotic levels. At the semiotic level I wonder if when you mention and explain the sign in Peirce you have taken into account the function of the agent or if you want of the subject when Peirce refers that the sign is a sign of "something" (the object or the referent) for "someone." " (agent, subject).

I think you must have taken it into account, however it is not expressed explicitly, at least in your comments about the concept of sign in Peirce. On the other hand, many of the questions of interpretation are resolved or produced in Lacan at the level of the subject. And here the concepts of the unconscious and psychoanalytic interpretation of a Lacanian type are intertwined, which operates at first very much at the level of the signifier, very much at the syntactic level. I also want to answer your question about the relationships between the imaginary and the symbolic axis in Lacan. The imaginary covers a symbolic sublevel that is the subjective metalanguage of that imaginary. But the symbolic structures that imaginary. So the imaginary, phenomenologically speaking, is also structured by the symbolic. However, there are details that depend on each moment in Lacan's teaching. I emphasize the term teaching because for Lacan this concept is operational and reflects all of his teaching work and his pedagogical purpose given that this teaching is the result of oral work. This orality was later transcribed and scanned, grammatically and syntactically later. Another thing is his "Writings" that "are not" didactic because they are pure reports of the completed work, which of course contain a lot of extracted material and content in a compact way. 

By Lacan of the oral teaching of his Seminars. That's why I mentioned it to you above fundamentally about the entire categorical development of its Seminars. In the last stage of his teaching in the 70's and which culminates in 1980, Lacan makes a turn and comes out properly speaking of a syntactic theory of language where the unconscious will be nothing more than significant articulation that operates through the unconscious repression that It is an operation of symbolic substitution, (Jakobson metaphor and metonymy). This unconscious has a certain "thickness" as you call it. Lacan notices it, he realizes it and that is why he makes a turn towards the real. Then he begins to talk about the concept of "enjoyment" (jouissance in French). This concept does not mean anything about pleasure but rather a kind of unpleasant drive that is the unconscious as real; once this unconscious has been interpreted, it is no longer unconscious. As you say, "once we have language, it stops being unconscious," it stops being so as truly unconscious, as real, when it has not been taken by the symbolic. Once taken by the symbolic it disappears because in Lacan's last teaching the symbolic and the imaginary appear fused while the real plays a primary role separate from the symbolic-imaginary. The real seems to have the value that the symbolic had at the beginning of his teaching. In another order, it seems to me that your concept of "ground" is the closest thing to the concept of "enjoyment" in Lacan. But this "enjoyment" as such passes through the experience of the living, anguished, or hysterical, phobic, perverse or obsessive, delirious or psychotic body, it passes through the experience of what Lacan calls the "speaking being" ("parlétre" in French). . I'm not sure that your concept of "ground" has that same dimension.

I have two very specific questions.

1). Is the concept of "ground" your own creation, your elaboration, phenomenological as in the unconditioned in Husserl or the pre-reflective or is it rather a concept imported from Peirce? If it's not by Peirce, why in English? Is there a way to think about it with a Spanish word?

2). Is the concept of "interpretant" referred to the activity of a subject or is it a condition of some type of referent, sign or semiotic structure that owes its origin to Umberto Eco of "The Absent Structure."?

After my answers and questions and after your answers to those questions of mine, I want to begin reading "The Correlato de Mundo" very seriously. I would suggest keeping this chat for the debate of random topics, collateral, etc. that would appear in a joint book tentatively titled "Counterpoints." And at the same time I would suggest that you initially work in depth on your essay "El correlato de mundo" in the chat that corresponds to your Facebook page dedicated to that text (Te world correlato, Spanish). And so with the others as the time comes. If it's okay with you let me know.

By the way, there is nothing of Jung in Lacan. Jung does not survive even on an imaginary Level within Lacan's theory of the imaginary register. Because even the imaginary covers the symbolic register that gives it structure. This imaginary of Lacan owes more to the phenomenological imaginary of a Sartre. However, Lacan surpasses Sartre here due to his linguistic-structural dimension. Regarding syntactic excess within Lacanian psychoanalysis, I am referring particularly to the over-exaggerated clinical practice of interpretation that operates in practitioners of Lacanian psychoanalysis. But this occurs only tangentially in Lacan himself, although the oversaturation of syntactic-linguistic elements is clearly highlighted.

Where am I going? I need you to give me about three or four days to respond to all your very complex and very elaborate comments and also some very controversial ones in my opinion that deserve a slow reflection regarding the differences between linguistic levels and semiotic levels. At the semiotic level I wonder if when you mention and explain the sign in Peirce you have taken into account the function of the agent or if you want of the subject when Peirce refers that the sign is a sign of "something" (the object or the referent) for "someone." " (agent, subject).

I have been awake since 5 am racking my brain, reading and rummaging through an Oxford Encyclopedic Dictionary of Philosophy, also consulting Ferrater Mora's Dictionary of Philosophy, and three books of Logic to see what Benveniste's observation about Aristotle is based on. predicative logic. For me it has always been something that I took for granted (or as the expression of the same meaning in English says "for granted") the perspective of predicative logic as assumed by "symbolic logic" as Russell called it in his "Principia Mathematica". " to differentiate it in part from the traditional formal logic introduced by Aristotle. As assumed by most logicians from Bertrand Russell through Quine to Hintikka or Michael Dummett. For example, Hintikka invented a kind of Independent Friendly Logic that has been understood in academia in which he stands out as a representative of "epistemological logic" where the difference between belief and knowledge is stated in logical terms. And Dummett on the other hand stands out as a representative not only of the Oxford School but also as a representative of the "intuitionist logic" that leads him in philosophy in a very elaborate way to "metaphysical anti-racism."

Here I have deviated a little from the essential problem that I am interested in elucidating correctly: whether or not there is confusion of language and thought in Aristotle's logic according to Benveniste as you refer to me. Unfortunately I don't have Benveniste's book on Aristotle. So I'm going from that premise. As for Hegel, it has been many years since I read a page of him and I really have very little desire to do so. If I read it in the 90's around my 25 years it was motivated by reading Lacan and as a necessary reference to the first Lacan who refers a lot to Hegel's dialectical method and who uses a lot the well-known episode of the dialectical forms of the master and Hegel's slave to the Phenomenology of the Spirit. So that is the only and incomplete reading I have done of Hegel. I reserve the opinions I have of Hegel so as not to incur presumptions and, above all, gratuitous gestures of ignorance. However, it is the opinion of all analytical philosophers with the exception of Brandon.

Your question seems very pertinent to me and I'm glad you asked it so I can think better: what content do we want our "Counterpoints" to convey? Could it simply be that we want them to convey a dense concentration of ideas and counter-ideas, all of them reflections of a philosophical nature, abstract thought, philosophy of science, sociology, epistemology, philosophy of language, phenomenology, hermeneutics, semiotics, linguistics, psychoanalysis, etc.? . At the same time I understand your ethical position. You have a very great conviction - at least, that's how I perceive it - in the transparency of the subject, no matter how intertwined its "strata" are and no matter how "flaky" they are. I quote those words because I borrowed them from your essays, although I don't know if I have used them correctly or if I have come close to understanding them. I said that you have a very strong conviction in the enunciation of the subject, in the clarity of its contents because in turn this conviction is supported by the ethics of your own reasoning and the certainty that they are intimately overdetermined by the phenomenological description of the experiences and everyday experiences. On the other hand, I reserve enormous value for the private sphere, convinced that only the search for the truth could justify such public exposure. But at the same time, the subject of the enunciation still has the right, in this search for truth, to limit to what extent this public revelation is possible and in what context such a search for truth is possible. For my part, I am convinced that the subject is not transparent either in itself or for itself because the signifying chains that determine it are "really" unconscious. I emphasize that "really" because not even the symbolic reality of the unconscious, its own nature, governed by enlightened reason itself, is effectively real as real as a lack or a priori condition in the scope of the real itself. The identity with which Hegel places the real and the rational in logical concatenation does not hold where the unconscious is an unspeakable real, and undecidable but not unintelligible. I mean that there is a real that has not been processed for enlightened reason, although it can be processed retroactively and go from unsaid to said. By this I mean that there are deeply personal questions that can be said according to each context and that are not always transparent and acquire more and more depth in certain contexts where light is shed on the shadows (recurrence of Plato's cave myth) as in that lapidary Freudian sentence: "Where It was, I must come." Where an It still without structure existed, a subject divided by language came. Light is shed on the shadows in the space of Christian confession, or in that of psychoanalytic confession, in the psychoanalytic office for example. In essence, he distrusted the destiny that the signifier can have in the public space.

I am reading with great pleasure a book of counterpoints, by the way, very interesting entitled "...And what tomorrow." A book that is the result of meetings and exchanges between Elisabeth Roudinesco, Lacan's biographer and historian of psychoanalysis and also a psychoanalyst, and Jacques Derrida that does not need any introduction for you. There is one of the chapters that when reading it I asked myself if I would be able to publicly reveal similar experiences if I had them like the passages where Derrida reveals details of the relationship with his father, the perception that Derrida himself had of him, of his Judaism, of the weakness of that father in the midst of the occupation that reached Algiers during Derrida's adolescence. It is a very revealing book in itself of this problem that concerns us when it comes to publicly revealing passages of private life. I don't know if you have read the book. If you haven't read it, I recommend it. Of course, it is a circumstantial, tangential book, which does not contribute much content either to your phenomenological concerns or to my logical-empiricist readings. 

After this explanation of my possible objections to revealing details of private or personal life in a text that is going to be published, I would tell you that for now I have no objection to publishing the details revealed so far but that I might have reservations about publishing any Another detail later if I consider that detail would not be appropriate for me, to see it in black and white in a publication outside the private framework of a real conversation. The date above is not August 19 but August 10. Sorry for the typo.

I confess that my Peirce references are too basic to be able to discuss them in depth with you who manage to swim masterfully in those deep and turbulent waters full of sinuous waves. On the other hand, as for my references to Peirce, these go back to some pages of the Cambridge Companions to Peirce, which was the first book I bought here in Miami years ago devoted by several scholars to reflecting on the work of the North American semiologist and pragmatist philosopher. . Also in Spanish, my knowledge of Peirce is restricted to a translation by the Lumen publishing house of "The absent structure" by Umberto Eco, which, as you well know, the reference to the North American semiotician is very recurrent and I am not very clear about all the details in the elaboration developed by Echo there. I would have to reread it. However, I can argue from the Anglo-Saxon post-positivist analytical philosophy of Quine and his followers whose elaborations are not semiotic as such but share areas of a certain similarity since there are characteristics of Peirce's work that are also found in parallel in the work of Frege. In fact, both logical philosophers invented their own symbolic language, with Frege navigating with more luck in that sense by expanding that vocabulary, that algebraic lexicon borrowed from Viole towards the territory later developed by Bertrand Russell of mathematical logic and analytical philosophy that remains today in the language of contemporary propositional and predicative logic and in other types of logic such as the intuitionistic logic of Michael Dummett's anti-racism, passing through the deontic logic of Georg H. Von Wright. or Jaakko Hintikka's epistemological logic.  I can also think of some of the problems between language and thing, sign and word addressed before by Peirce that, although in a different way and at a certain distance, have also been thought about from the philosophy of language whose roots in the logical atomism of Russell and Wittgenstein are very evident.

However, when you ask yourself about the object of that sign elaborated by Peirce's semiotics, for example the metal rooster and the direction of the wind, it reminds me of a certain text by Benveniste "Nature of the linguistic sign" where the French linguist reveals what is hides beneath Saussure's linguistic arbitrariness: the reference to the object. However, Benveniste does not seem to wonder much about the nature of this object because he does not question its reality as a physical reality, which according to him, Saussure confused with the dimension of meaning. For Benveniste it is something fixed even though it is dynamically syntagmatically, that on the other hand, I have the impression when reading you and from the little that I have been able to consult in Eco, it seems to me that in Peirce it has a certain dynamism, the sign as seen in movement different from a static Saussurean assignment by Benveniste.

On the other hand, where I have found a dynamic similar to the semiosis of the sign in Peirce or at least to an approximation at an elementary level, since I have, as I expressed before, hardly any notions of Peirce's semiotics. However, it has been in Quine's holistic perspective regarding the relationship of analytic and synthetic judgments; a distinction that he dismantles, distancing himself, in this sense, profoundly from Kant. The relationship that exists there between word and thing is only resolved in Quine in a holistic way since this underlines a criticism of the meaning and the concept of analyticity properly speaking, specifically concentrating his attack against two central dogmas of empiricism: 1) the distinction of analytical and synthetic judgments and 2) reductionism. The linguistic relationship of words with objects does not occur in a singular way in the referential case of word in relation to object, but through the "modus ponens" which is a universal mode of propositional logic to which Quine assigns values ​​to his predication. truly instantiated in the significance of a holistic context of countable sets of singular objects designated by variables.

If the logician Quine's example had been the relationship of the metal cockerel with the wind, as occurs with Peirce's semiotics, as you explain to me, then the logician Quine would have posed the relationship of the metal cockerel, not only with the wind, as Peirce does, according to your explanation, but also with the house, with the climate, the atmosphere and with the owner of the house who, once placed the metal rooster on the roof of the house, will proceed subsequently as long as "interpreter" to interpret it eventually. Quine would also attend to the non-verbal and pre-verbal behavior of the interpreting agent and consequently to his linguistic behavior.

From my ignorance of Hegel, I believe that his philosophy of identity where "everything real is rational and everything rational is real", I think that his way of understanding logic would not allow us to think about the irreconcilable epistemological differences between thought and the world. What Russell's logical atomism reveals is the difference between propositions that he considers atomistically different, while Hegel's monism, logically and epistemologically speaking, reconciles opposites, dissolving the infinite into the finite and producing a dialectical synthesis of the real. and the rational. For Russell, Hegel violates in "The Science of Logic" and with his dialectic the three most important logical laws of Aristotle: 1) the principle of identity {p=p}; 2) the principle of non-contradiction {p v ~p} and 3) the principle of excluded third {~(~p)= p}.

Although Popper's epistemology, on the other hand, dominant in the area of ​​the philosophy of science of the 20th century, proposed, in turn, as a critique of Hegelian historicism, to rescue the deductive method from logic as a method of scientific investigation of epistemological confirmation with which to give substance to his "demarcation criterion" to displace -----as follows from a careful reading of The open society and its enemies----- the dialectical method of Plato, Hegel and Marx. In turn, Popper, in his criticism of inductivism, adhered, for his part, to the theses of the logic of the Polish school of Alfred Tarski, who introduced his redundant theory of semantic correspondence as a verificationist theory, thus confirming the truth value of statements like "'snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white." This tautological model of Tarski is explained following the scheme of truth-inferential logic known as "modus tollens". Popper would take this negativist model as a basis to support his falsifiability theorem and later his epistemological criterion of demarcation --- a tool created by Popper within the theory of knowledge ---, to distinguish scientific work and research from pseudoscientific practices. . Popper's negativist model of falsificationism corresponds to the logical inference of the "modus tollens" used by him:

1)  p-->q

2)  ~q

3)  : ~p

Which translates to:

1) if p implies q

2) then no-q

3) therefore not-p

However, Popper, who was a Russellian and denied Hegel, ironically much of his metaphysical theory of the three worlds seemed to derive from the former's dialectical method. On the other hand, much if not all of Anglo-Saxon post-positivist analytical philosophy distances itself from Hegel, considering him to be the recipient of an outdated deterministic historicism and a disproportionately abstract mechanistic idealism that is also too speculative and incapable of providing scientific analysis with the language of a theory and a method capable of explaining the relations of language with the world not only in its referential sense (denotative in the sense of Russell or the logician Tarski) but also in a methodological sense of intralinguistic relations, of the language with itself when it takes a portion of itself as the language-object of an also intralinguistic metalanguage and when the language is capable of eventually assuming the roles of one or the other depending on the perspective and according to the universe of discourse from which It is cut out as a universe or set and as language.

I still have to read Derrida's text to understand Benveniste's criticism of the predicative logic in Aristotle that you mention.

As I told you before, on the same topic, I confess once again that my Peirce references are too general to be able to discuss them (I'm not even talking about discussing or debating them) with you in depth. I can, if you don't mind, rehearse analogies and identify points of convergence with this or that analytical thinker, but not even remotely dare or even venture to argue about them. However, at this point in our conversation, I have the enormous pleasure of reading you and following your developments and abstract explanations.  

My references to semiotics are quite simple and go back to some pages of "The Absent Structure" by Umberto Eco, which, as you well know, the reference to Peirce is undeniable and very recurrent, sometimes quite helpful. Therefore, I do not have, clearly, very present, all the details and convolutions in the elaboration developed by Eco there. I would have to reread it. However, I can argue from the Anglo-Saxon post-positivist analytical philosophy of Quine and his followers whose elaborations are not semiotic as such, but share areas of a certain similarity since there are characteristics of Peirce's work that are also found in the work of Frege and that were even later rescued by Popper, when he developed his conception of World 3 fundamentally in Objective knowledge in relation to the conception of the Terceread by Peirce.

I can also think of some of the problems between language and thing, sign and word addressed before by Peirce that, although in a different way and at a certain distance, have also been thought about from the philosophy of language whose roots in the logical atomism of Russell and Wittgenstein are very evident. For Russell, instead of semiotic signs, he thought of propositions as minimal atomic units of language that he replaced with symbols extracted from Boolean algebra. Wittgenstein, for his part, took language first in the "Tractatus..." for its singularity as a formal language of propositional tautologies with respect to the world taken in its entirety as a case and then in the "Philosophical Investigations" Wittgenstein proceeds to naturalize that language of the "Tractatus..." taken now in its extension, that is, in its naturalness as it appears in the world.

However, when you ask yourself about the object of that sign elaborated by Peirce's semiotics, for example the metal rooster and the direction of the wind, it reminds me, as I mentioned above, of a certain text by Benveniste "Nature of the linguistic sign" where the linguist French reveals what is hidden beneath Saussure's linguistic arbitrariness: the reference to the object. However, Benveniste does not seem to wonder much about the nature of this object because he does not question its reality as a physical reality, which according to him, Saussure confused with the dimension of meaning. For Benveniste it is something fixed even though it is dynamically syntagmatically, that on the other hand, I have the impression when reading you and from the little that I have been able to consult in Eco, it seems to me that in Peirce it has a certain dynamism, the sign as seen in movement different from a static Saussurean assignment by Benveniste.

As I told you before on the same topic, I confess once again that my Peirce references are too basic to be able to discuss them (I'm not even talking about discussing or debating them) with you in depth. I can, if you don't mind, rehearsing analogies, but not even remotely daring or venturing to argue about them. However, I have the great pleasure of reading you and following your developments and abstract explanations.  

My semiotics references are quite simple and go back to some pages of "The Absent Structure" by Umberto Eco, which, as you well know, the reference to Peirce is undeniable and very recurrent. Therefore, I am not very clear about all the details in the elaboration developed by Eco there. I would have to reread it. However, I can argue from the Anglo-Saxon post-positivist analytical philosophy of Quine and his followers whose elaborations are not semiotic as such but share areas of certain similarity since there are characteristics of Peirce's work that are also found in Frege's work. . I can also think of some of the problems between language and thing, sign and word addressed before by Peirce that, although in a different way and at a certain distance, have also been thought about from the philosophy of language whose roots in the logical atomism of Russell and Wittgenstein are very evident. For Russell, instead of semiotic signs, he thought of propositions as minimal atomic units of language that he replaced with symbols extracted from Boolean algebra. Wittgenstein, for his part, took language first in the "Tractatus..." for its singularity as a formal language of propositional tautologies with respect to the world taken in its entirety as a case and then in the "Philosophical Investigations" Wittgenstein proceeds to naturalize that language of the "Tractatus..." taken now in its extension, that is, in its naturalness as it appears in the world.

However, when you ask yourself about the object of that sign elaborated by Peirce's semiotics, for example the metal rooster and the direction of the wind, it reminds me, as I mentioned above, of a certain text by Benveniste "Nature of the linguistic sign" where the linguist French reveals what is hidden beneath Saussure's linguistic arbitrariness: the reference to the object. However, Benveniste does not seem to wonder much about the nature of this object because he does not question its reality as a physical reality, which according to him, Saussure confused with the dimension of meaning. For Benveniste it is something fixed even though it is dynamically syntagmatically, that on the other hand, I have the impression when reading you and from the little that I have been able to consult in Eco, it seems to me that in Peirce it has a certain dynamism, the sign as seen in movement different from a static Saussurean assignment by Benveniste.

On the other hand, however, where I have found a dynamic similar to the semiosis of the sign in Peirce or at least an approximation at an elementary level since I have hardly any notions of Peirce's semiotics, it has been in Quine's holistic perspective in regarding the relationship between analytical and synthetic judgments, a distinction that he dismantles, distancing himself, in this sense, profoundly from Kant. The relationship that exists there between word and thing is only resolved in Quine in a holistic way since this underlines a critique of meaning and the concept of analyticity properly speaking. The linguistic relationship of the words is not with the object in a singular way but through the "modusponens" which is a universal mode of propositional logic that Quine assigns to that predicate truth values ​​instantiated in the significance of a grouped holistic context. by sets of singular objects designated by variables.

If the example of the logician Quine had been the relationship of the metal cockerel with the wind, as occurs with the semiotician Peirce, then the logician Quine would have proposed the relationship of the metal cockerel not only with the wind as Peirce does according to your explanation but also also with the house, with the climate, the atmosphere of the place and with the owner of the house who, once the metal rooster has been placed on the roof of the house, will subsequently proceed as an "interpreter" to eventually interpret it, but also It will have a very close relationship with his behavior and his non-verbal behavior (we must not forget that one of Quine's epistemological bases comes from Scanner's behaviorism and Bloomfield's functionalist linguistics).

As for Quine's example that explains these theses already mentioned above and that I had mentioned in previous messages (so it is possible that he repeats some content) you can find it on pages 27-33 in the Oxford Univ.Press edition of " Word and object" (1960). This is what I have noted in the copy that I have with me. In fact, the example used by Quine was that of an English-speaking linguist who visits a tribe with the purpose of writing an English Dictionary that translates the terms of the dialect spoken by the "savages" of that tribe. Faced with the visual experience of a rabbit, the wild man will pronounce the sound "Gavagai" which the observing linguist will understand as a word that will be arbitrarily translated by "Rabbit" influenced by the ocular sensation and visual perception of seeing a rabbit jump in the undergrowth. That is, in front of a common stimulus for both, "linguist" and "native", the visual image of a "rabbit"🐇jumping, the "savage" will compliment a heard sound as "Gavagai" and the linguist immediately stimulated by the same visual image; but also because of the sound "Gavagai", it will translate "Rabbit". Faced with the visual perception experience of one or more rabbits 🐇🐇🐇 the savage will only be able to point his finger and pronounce the word "Gavagai". To which the linguist translates mechanically and with a false certainty that it is, indeed, a "Rabbit." However, he is not immediately sure if when he translated it he followed a correct procedure since he will soon notice that on the occasion of the "savages" of the tribe being visually stimulated by the real presence of one or more rabbits 🐇🐇🐇 They also use the same phonetic form "Gavagai". It also happens that in the presence of the hunted "rabbit" or the "rabbit" served as food in the tribe, the expression elicited will also be "Gavagai". In this way the linguist realizes --- as Quine highlights --- that there is no exclusive word for each situation; the same word "Gavagai" will be pronounced either in the case of a rabbit🐇, two rabbits🐇🐇, or many rabbits, 🐇🐇🐇, and it will also be used in the presence of a rabbit jumping in the undergrowth, a rabbit captured by the hunter or several rabbits hunted to feed the tribe, or the rabbit cooked in the pot ready to eat.

Quine concludes from this example of his own creation, that following in this the example that I told you on a previous occasion of Frege about his paradigmatic example of the planet Venus when it is perceived in the morning and is called "Morning Star" while which when perceived in the afternoon is called "Evening Star". In Frege's example a single and unique condition truth, that is, the planet Venus can have two truth values, "Morning Star" and "Evening Star" as Bertrand Russell restated them in his essay "On Denotan" (sometimes translated as "On Reference" and other times as "On Denoting") using his examples of "Walter Scott" and "the author of Waverley" both correspond to the same person called "Sir Walter Scott".

Umberto Eco, for his part, appropriated both examples, both Frege's and Russell's in "The Absent Structure" also reinterpreted by Quine in "Word and Object" referring to the concepts of "Morning Star" and "Evening Star." "reconceptualized by Eco as "semiotic units" or cultural codes." These examples are paradigmatic of the ABC of the origin of modern symbolic logic, Frege, Russell, Moore and Wittgenstein, of Carnap, Popper and the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle and the Anglo-Saxon post-positivist analytical philosophy of Quine, Putnam and the Harvard logicians It is a very recurring reference in the philosophical literature of a logical-empiricist or neopositivist approach. on page 80 of Eco's book but without an eloquent development as you can find in many texts by North American authors. Eco already assumes an informed reader.

In the example cited by Quine, the same linguistic operation occurs with "Gavagai" and its referent the rabbit 🐇 that the native of the tribe points out to the linguist as if he understood it with mathematical accuracy when a linguistic indeterminacy operates between them about the same truth condition (referent) to which different truth values ​​(statements or propositions) are attributed. Given this ontological indeterminacy, Quine concludes that in the relationship of the statement with its referent there is always a linguistic imprecision, an ontological indeterminacy of origin that he calls "indeterminacy of translation." Quine highlights that this imprecision, this original ontological inadequacy, this indeterminacy of the translation occurs between the "savage" and the linguist while, on the other hand --- Quine specifies ---, an "inscrutability of reference" occurs (inscrutability). of reference) when the linguist tries to locate, decode and unravel the enigma of the exact meaning of "Gavagai" with respect to its referent 🐇 be it one, two or more rabbits, be it a group of hunted rabbits or a group of these that will be cooked in a pot.

In my opinion, both Quine and Peirce represent a philosophy of language with an Anglo-Saxon approach, whether considered the heir of empiricism or pragmatism, it always takes language holistically in its own dynamics and undertakes epistemological management from a holistic point of view. empiricist and naturalist, although whether it involves managing signs, interpretants, semes or rhemes, or first-order logical quantifiers linked to variables of second-order logical propositions, correspondingly. Popper and Chomsky are here two exceptional cases of rationalists, internalists, and Cartesian dualists, both of whom contrast their hypotheses based on empirical evidence.

But when you change your perspective and then you are faced with the structuralism of a continental approach of rationalist inheritance of an a priori nature in many cases such as Saussure, Jakobson, Benveniste himself, Lévi-Strauss, Derrida, Genette, obviously Todorov and even up to Lacan, the relationship of Language with its referent is articulated systematically and in minimal units that can be linguistic signs, or linguistic matrices such as my themes of Lévi-Strauss, him for Genette's text, or the discourse in Lacan. Lacan's discourse is an apparatus not only linguistic but also sociological, linguistic and semiotic, at the same time operational and logically articulated on the basis of the Aristotelian quadrilateral of opposites in a matrix of four places: the agent, the other, the truth and the product, temporarily occupied by four terms: the barred subject $, the master signifier S1, the knowledge S2, and the "object a" or plus of enjoyment. According to the relative arrangement of the places and the position of the terms, four discourses are articulated made up of four logical matrices that Lacan reworked from the actantial model of Greimas and obviously from the Aristotelian quadrilateral of opposites from which Frege drew on in the construction of the four formulas of logical quantifiers that articulate second-order logic with first-order logic.

Indeed, as you point out, both Derrida and Lacan critically systematize their common Saussurean heritage and deliberately ignore, perhaps, Peirce's contributions. This statement is completely accurate in Derrida but suffers from a certain ambiguity in Lacan for the reason that in the latter the notion of signifier is closely related to the notion of subject. However, in Lacan's notion of the divided subject there is something of Peirce's sign that cannot be isolated with the naked eye. Since Saussure only works with the phonetic alphabet as you masterfully point out, he remains in the linguistic perspective of the sign as such without worrying about the agents of language and its interpreters. On the other hand, and following your development, the semiotic notion of sign in Peirce integrates the notion of subject in the form of the "interpretant", but also of that "someone" for whom the sign has been destined in the form of an enigma to be deciphered. From where Lacan would base his theory of the signifier beyond Saussure: "The signifier is what represents a subject for another signifier." *

Greetings,

Alberto

(*)

His definition of the subject as a "divided" or "barred" subject can be found clearly in his Writings, in particular in "Subversion of the subject and dialectic of desire in the Freudian unconscious" (1960) and outside the Writings it has been recorded by the Lacan himself in the "Proposition of October 9, 1967 for the psychoanalyst of the School." Tangentially there are constant references to his conception of the subject, an elaboration by Lacan halfway between the Cartesian philosophy of the subject from a Husserlian phenomenological point of view and Saussure's theory of the linguistic sign, and the concepts of metaphor and metonymy of Jakobson and the Prague School, as well as Heidegger's ontological conception in the existential analysis of Dasein and his first present hermeneutical approximations, as I told you throughout Lacan's entire work and whose foundations are sometimes expressed with equal clarity and sometimes with a greater or lesser degree of ambiguity through allusions, opaque references, sometimes in the midst of their conceptual thickness and other times implicitly. .

Abdel, I am very happy to know that you are aware of the functioning of capitalism. As a theorist of the social sciences, even in Cuba, before leaving, you yourself managed concepts and ideas with tremendous clarity and that was always a useful tool in the understanding and objective analysis that as a result of the conversations with you at that time -- basically I speak from June 1990 to February 1991---had enormous relevance in my later philosophical vocation.  I'm glad to know that we are then on the same page regarding the editorial issue. The problem with this publishing house is that they barely survive. Their situation is precarious but they try to get ahead. I have a plan at some point to finish one of the books I have conceived and I hope to publish it if possible with Angel's publishing house called Exodus. Regarding capitalism and the global situation of neoliberalism, it hit me very hard and helped me wake up politically, above all I read a lot of Chomsky between 2007 and 2012 when I entered the University. However, my specific interest was never political science but rather abstract thought. If I approached psychoanalysis it was always from the epistemological and philosophical perspective, above all, typical of Lacan's teaching. The turn towards analytical philosophy occurred in 2007 when I distanced myself from the Lacan study group here in Miami. I distanced myself for reasons of institutional policy and because at that moment I began to question the theoretical assumptions that I had been thinking about during my Lacanian period in Havana 1994-2000. But that's a topic for another time if you like.

Your statement that anti-Hegelianism is based on a prejudice for reading its historical texts assuming that the Phenomenology of the Spirit is part of them is interesting. However, I believe that the position of many anti-Hegelians such as Karl Popper derives from a rapid but masterful reading of Hegel, hence his criticism of his historicist determinism in "Poverty of Historicism" and in "The Open Society and Its Enemies." It is common for vertiginous positivists like Mario Bunge to launch frontal attacks against Hegel although he does not seem to have made an effort to read him. And at the same time they filter through the same dump all the thinkers he calls "irrationalists" from Nietzsche and Heidegger to Vattimo. In all the years that I read Lacan, I also occasionally consulted very specific topics in the Phenomenology of the Spirit itself, such as the chapter greatly helped by Lacan from Kojève's reading of lord and servant or master and slave depending on the translation. On very rare occasions I approached the Science of Logic, the abridged edition by Rodolfo Mondolfo. I did it to understand the twists and turns of being as Lacan himself explained it. The same for the concept of negation to which Lacan dedicates two classes of his first Seminar and a debate with Hyppolite on that Second moment of the Aufhebung that was useful to Lacan to qualify the condition of the Freudian unconscious as that moment of negativity contributed by the concept of Freudian "repression."

It seems very good to me in principle that you publish the Counterpoints on Facebook ---with the agreed reservations--- and that you update it as they continue to another level with another reason to exchange in the next ones, and to debate them. I greatly appreciate the effort you are putting into fixing them and almost editing all the text blocks that will appear in the Counterpoints. It is definitely a tremendous intellectual and time effort. Then I can imagine the importance that time has for you, what it represents for you in the writing of your work and what any interruption means. As for "Counterpoints", they may also be useful to you and allow you to organize your own ideas at the time and in the way in which you present or measure them, or elucidate and clarify them. As for me, it is extremely beneficial for me to have an interlocutor like you, due to the acuity of your analyzes and the rigor of thought.  Likewise, the thesis of your phenomenological work, the interweaving you make of Peirce's semiotics and the function that his work plays in yours allows me to consider other points of view and other ways of approaching abstract thought, the philosophical thing. The "Counterpoints" allow me to react with counter-responses to these positions and to our common readings such as Habermas or Gadamer.

Of course I have the two Lacanian psychoanalysis essays, but I do not have them in digital format but published in the monographs of the colloquiums where I presented those essays in the form of presentations. One of them is my complete authorship and the other essay I share space with the collaboration of another colleague in the group. In that last essay I focused on The Last Lacan and the exposition of the Lacanian topology of the Borromean knot. I have the texts as they leave you but in the publication. In fact, I threw away the drafts. They were practically illegible, so I didn't have a computer and it was my wife who gave it to me in digital format when it was on a floppy disk that I didn't keep with me once I had a copy of the publication. What I can do is through a friend of mine here in Miami who has a scanner that is a little old but works and asks her to scan them for me in PDF. But that's going to take me a little time. The first (1997) is titled "Dialectic of the not-everything in Jacques Lacan" which is rather a report on different moments in Lacan's work about his positioning regarding the logic of being. The second essay "Anti-Oedipus by Dr. Lacan: from myth to structure" (1999) is a journey through Lacan's work regarding the function of the paternal metaphor and its place in the period of his last teaching. . As soon as I have them ready in PDF, I will send them to you.

Regarding our Counterpoints, I completely agree with maintaining their unity and taking as a closing of the first part everything discussed in them so far and opening a second part to new themes. In one of the texts already edited by you, while I was rereading it the day before yesterday, I dared to amend a part of my intervention because I realize that I have concentrated a lot on explaining my position regarding Quine and the place he occupies in my theoretical reflection when In fact, that is my position for almost ten years. Although I have not distanced myself from Quine or what his empiricist behaviorist approach contributes to my theoretical reflection to maintain my own epistemological perspective. In fact, I have been moving more towards an epistemology based on what Karl Popper considers an evolutionary epistemology of a rationalist, competitive and Darwinian nature and supported by a realistic approach from a hypothetico-deductive method without detaching from the empiricist approach. So Quine's system becomes an initial moment, a particular phase of a more comprehensive model that rests on an open system like Popper's, with Tarski's semantic correspondence as a verificationist (understood as non-justificationist) model. This is not a metaphysical monstrosity since it is a conclusion of Popper and even in Popper's time of his student Lakatos.

Each time I have come closer, following the advances of Putnam's internalism and Rorty's antifoundationalism from Popper's deductive-conjectural method to the phenomenology of Karl Jaspers and hermeneutics with particular interest in Gadamer and Ricoeur but not in a systematic way as You have worked in these continental schools. Hence my approach and my most recent interest in the work of Habermas in his treatment of intersubjectivity. Why Karl Jaspers? Because precisely his "Weltanschauung philosophy" and in particular his "General Psychopathology" have allowed me to justify a concretion of the mind-body problem, one of my theoretical concerns, both as it has been addressed by Quine's monism and by Popper's dualism. Jaspers has allowed me a comprehensive concretion of the Popperian-Quinean epistemological approach (epistemological, theory of knowledge, objective scientific method) in a philosophy of the subject that justifies a mixed method of two methodologically divergent approaches in principle, a mixed method that forms a link between a logical-probabilistic language and a qualitative phenomenological-hermeneutic method. In the case of Jaspers, the hermeneutic, except in his interpretation of psychiatric semiology, is not clearly stated, but the unity or double methodology that comes from Dilthey and his differentiation between natural sciences and human or social sciences and that was fundamental for the entire 20th century. On the one hand, the method of "Erklärung" (causal explanation) for the hard and/or natural sciences and the method of "Verstehen" (understanding) for the social sciences. In Jaspers this connection is made concrete, it is interwoven through and fundamentally his "General Psychopathology." Also my choice of Jaspers in this sense is precisely because his essentially theoretical German Psychiatric School is the one immediately prior to the emergence of Freudianism from whose source Lacan precisely drank. Let's say that Jaspers was his teacher in psychiatry, imbuing Lacan's first psychoanalytic approach with a phenomenological flavor in his first Seminars. At the same time, Jaspers' phenomenology was immediately prior to the emergence of Lacan's structuralism from the philosophical point of view and perhaps one of the last attempts like Weber's in sociology to propose a conjunction of the two explanatory and comprehensive approaches whose best elucidation is found in a little book by the logician Georg Henrik von Wirght entitled "Explanation and Understanding." However, with Lacan we witness a linguistic turn that we have not yet witnessed in Jaspers. Nowadays, and with the emergence of neuroscience, scientific efforts have been made to return to Jaspers' phenomenological psychopathology, his criticism and revision of Kraepelin's model based on the scientific advances of neurophenomenology and neuropsychopathology that very appropriately make a rereading of Jaspers that It can be consulted in the Oxford Handbook of Psychiatry and Philosophy. From all the above about Jaspers I have an essay that I can send you by email. It is a work that is not yet a mature reflection at the time I published it and even the version that I am going to send you is much more updated than the one I published but in any case in an essay that goes back almost ten years in the year 2013.

Yes, Abdel, indeed, as you suggest, it seems good to me that from these messages we can conclude a first thematic part of our Counterpoints and move on to discuss your books "El correlato de mundo" and "Pensando Ciencia" with which We can begin the debate on the second part of the Counterpoints. I would start with The World Correlate. However, the correlation of the world as you have previously explained to me in other messages requires a prior elucidation of "The Intramundane Horizon." To what extent is this absolutely necessary or is just the explanation of the difference between hermeneutics and exegesis a sufficient basis to begin "The Correlate of the World"?

I wanted to ask you, independently of the work on your book and the Counterpoints, to send me your essay "Hermeneutics and Axiology" whose title, as you cite it, announces two topics of my interest, although a tangential interest with respect to axiology. I don't know if this essay of yours is a loose chapter belonging to the body of a book or if it can be read as an independent essay. Then I would be interested in reading your 1992 book "Edges and Overflows of Art." Please send it to my email when you have a chance.

This weekend I begin reading "Hermeneutics and culture", the first chapter of "The correlation of the world."

I just read your new messages. As always, creative and instructive, above all generating new complex proposals and at the same time an extended invitation to challenge.

In principle I agree with the idea of ​​taking a break, and at the same time taking a step back to review what we have exchanged. This is what Lacan called "the time to understand." So it will be a period to recapitulate what we have worked on and how far we have advanced in this productive exchange. It is a period of retroactive calculation where the subject rectifies and compares, weighs and chooses, reflects and decides.

Before closing this period and taking this time for reflection and sedimentation to be able to start reading your book and then jot down some ideas for the prologue.

Once I have read these last messages of yours and understood your proposal, if you don't mind, I would like to modify some points. For now, I'm going to focus on your book "The World Correlate." As for "Thinking Science" it would be the next project and I would prefer to tackle it once your book with my prologue is ready for publication. Not before because it would be carrying out two difficult readings simultaneously and two complex developments that would only cause confusion. It is my way of working, reading and sedimenting what I have read and not working on many other texts of the same degree of difficulty and complexity. For now I prefer to work on a single book, that is, "The Correlato de Mundo", precisely because it is a type of text with a level of high-level theoretical elaboration like yours, it is not only a matter of you being an author of difficult prose but also by the degree of complexity of the arguments and elaborations of your texts.

I understand that you are worried about the three requests for texts that you have to write in the coming three months. Don't worry, we will continue at your pace if that is what you are asking of me. But for my better understanding of your book "The Correlate of the World" discussing with you some ideas from the book will help clarify them. There is not always the opportunity to ask the author of a book about the meaning of a concept such as the clarification between hermeneutics and exegesis. I think that's a privilege. And it helps the understanding of the text, I insist, due to its degree of difficulty. But if you think it should be another way, we will do it as is most comfortable for you.

It's a pleasure to have you here again. How have you been in these months? I hope you have been able to make progress on the texts you had pending. Thank you for the interest you have taken in our Counterpoints. I've seen them on your Facebook. I really appreciate the effort dedicated to it and the space you have dedicated to it on your Facebook as well as sharing it with your academic colleagues. I had the opportunity to see the space you opened for them on Facebook and I reiterate my gratitude for it. When we return to the structure of the Counterpoints it will be as we had agreed, this time around The Correlate of the World.

I have been writing down everything I can through reading your book. The text is difficult due to its style of argumentation and exposition and many times I have to go back and read the same segment two and three times. I will send you the first questions from the note prior to the Preface and from the Preface itself. I will also send you some other questions as I progress in reading it. In this way I am reading and rereading the introductory note, the Preface and the first essay Hermeneutics and culture for now.  But the questions I have developed are based on the introductory note prior to the Preface and the Preface itself, which are inherently difficult in style beyond the complexity of phenomenological elaboration. In a while I'll share the questions with you.

Below I share with you my first concerns and questions in an initial reading of your book "El correlato de mundo".

I begin with the synopsis or summary of the book that you have written prior to the preface.

1).

In the attempt to define an initial notion that qualifies the concept of "world", some questions appear from these first lines that you have presented as prior to the preface to your book "The Correlato de Mundo".

If I understand you correctly, I wonder if it is relevant to distinguish "world forms" and "reality worlds" here? as they are ordered in the paragraph that I quote below:

"[...] forms of the worlds of reality that are projected as effects of the texts, unlike the intramundane horizon in which reality takes place in the immediacy of the life world."

[End of excerpt quote]

It is also not clear to me whether when you speak of "worlds of reality" you refer to these as effects of the text as an effect of interpretation and as distinct from the factual immediacy of the facts of the world when you emphasize that reality takes place in the immediacy of the world of reality. life. I wonder if it would be pertinent to consider "the intramundane horizon" with an immanent value.

On the other hand, when you talk about "reality" it sometimes gives the impression that you treat this idea as if it were understood as a common and shared concept of reality between the author and the reader or understood as a historical and social reality, in short " rational" in a Hegelian sense. How is the concept of "reality" to be understood?

One last question referring to the lines quoted above: When you talk about "world" here, what do you mean? Are you referring in a phenomenological sense to the world experienced by Husserl in "The Crisis of the European Sciences" when he speaks of the "Leibenswelt" as a "world of life"? Is it in direct relationship with Weberian intramundanity or with any specific concept articulated by the phenomenological sociology of Alfred Schütz and that has influenced you? What would this concept or group of concepts be?

Here I add the second question.

2).

Likewise, in the Summary of your book and prior to the Preface it is written that (and I quote you):

"[...] discussing the differences between Peirce and Saussure, theorizes the possibilities of semantics from semiotics to develop cultural studies via syntax and forms, proposes a symbolic theoretical analysis of the structures from which to work with the interpretants— not only with interpretation-, between books and sociological and cultural research, through which we move between direct forms of the world—the intramundane horizon—and forms of the world that are correlates of the text—the correlate of the world [...]."

[End of excerpt quote]

In the fragment above you announce that in your book you are going to include both a theoretical analysis of symbolic structures based on work with interpretants, and the theorization of semantics from semiotics through syntax.

This is on the side of the "Intramundane horizon" but instead on the side of what you call "forms of the world" that are a "correlate of the text" and that from your point of view are the "correlate of the world", which seems to me confused I wonder if this distinction between, on the one hand, what you consider "Intramundane horizon" and, on the other, "world correlation," can you clarify it much more clearly?

Part II

From Semiotics and Phenomenological Sociology to cultural anthropology. By Abdel Hernández San Juan

By Abdel Hernández San Juan:

It has been a long time since 1993 when I read the seminars, I have not read Lacan and without a doubt to explore the subject at full power the best thing would be to have read it more recently when in fact I would like to read Lacan again in light of the maturity of my thought and of experience but I continue to prefer to focus on what is pertinent to my books as an author related to my life as an immigrant in the United States and in neoliberal capitalism, all my twenties, my thirties, my forties, and my current research and evade Lacan for the moment, enjoying instead your developments on the matter. Do you have digital Lacan things if you have and would like me to be a more active interlocutor, if you want, send me, I promise to reread it and approach you with something productive?

I would like to tell you that I agree in general with most of all the things you say about Derrida, as you will have noticed, I do not assume him as he is but rather critically. However, although he placed me critically in my metabolization and assimilation of Derrida, none of my distances escape him. his influence and I have ended up accepting since my 40s that Derrida's influence on me is irreversible as is that of Schütz, which is no less than the result of my own elaboration since it is difficult almost unimaginable how two things so disparate, different and even contrary can be in relationship in a third.

  I go to the points where I can have something to say

  It is true what you say, there is indifference in Derrida towards the referent on the one hand and towards the meaning on the other.

  It is also true what you say that I make certain initially Derridarian springs work and generate productivity -- or make them produce -- far beyond Derrida to places that Derrida does not suspect of going to, -- it is my thought --, for this Precisely and in general this is precisely what thought is about, it is what it consists of and above all the idea and tangible realization of one's own authorial thought in science and scientific, one positions oneself from some epistemological clearances and parameters that They are such and can be defined in this way in the cut or the cut - knowing and studying with high precision that cut - that a budget or epistemological precept becomes discernible as a generating principle only through the genesis/structure relationship if we objectify that cut. not to history it from an external outside - or to explain it finished and closed on the outside - alien but to generate and produce from there one's own thought - one's own clearings of what it is one who clears - from there as he from there in a tradition that for one can only become a principle of productivity by placing oneself in that genesis -- it is the subject/object relationship as an implicit principle generating knowledge to that cut, which can only then generate from that cut according to a structure, (Derrida on Husserl in "genesis and structure: of phenomenology", anthropos.

    It is an honor and I feel both proud and satisfied that you have understood me in this and that it is like this

"But on the other hand, you make Derrida say beyond himself - it is my thought, the commentary is mine - on the way to the gateways between language and non-language, between language and world and between language and writing. You lead to Derrida to the limit even interpreting it from Peirce that for the purposes of your phenomenological inquiry the use you make of it is indeed masterful (thank you).     

   However, I speak with an essay by Derrida, a phenomenologist and reader of Husserl, who asks about the initial conditions at the moment of the genesis of phenomenological reflection. As you know, this is not yet a Derrida armed with Saussure. The text in question is a jewel of this phenomenological stage that you know how to make it produce." (Thank you, and how much, and in how many new directions, the commentary is mine)."

I am happy that you have been able to perceive it because you have located something that not only understands me but that precisely places crucial questions regarding Derrida to be understood which, on the one hand, I hope and wish will dispel your doubts or reservations regarding Derrida, (I continue to defend him ) I will discuss below and on the other hand confirm what I agree with in your reservations and how mine are related to it because as you will see, right there where your reservations are located is where the crucial problem of the medlee voice in Derrida is located. which Stephen both emphasizes as "semi-vocal subject or middle voice", a question related to how the balance of the objectivity/subjectivity relationship should work in scientific and philosophical thought which, as you will see, will in turn explain to you why you yourself have that let's call it ambivalence or apparently contradictory oscillation at once saying on the one hand there is no closure of the discourse there is no outside and on the other saying about the same thinker

Since he seems to succumb to the same error of logical positivists who alienate the subjective dimension under the spell of scientific objectivism.

It is not a contradiction of yours, as if you were talking about two different thinkers, one without external closure, always in an inside that places closure, another from an objectivist outside that succumbs to the same error. "of the logical positivists who alienate the subjective dimension under the spell of scientific objectivism." In reality, something crucial in Derrida is a certain oscillation and ambivalence that explains in turn how the medlee voice works and what concept of the subject is implicit in it, thus responding to your concern with the subject.

   He then highlighted the critical points in which I am going to place my discussion.

"This in Derrida where the signifying chain is infinite, where there is no closure of the discourse and makes the interpretation constantly sent back outside its limits, a kind of infinite "recursion".  Default if we make a synchronous cut but whose origin is always postponed. Where the function of the outside becomes the place of writing in Derrida. On the other hand, Derrida's formulations on Grammatology and writing seem indifferent to the referent and the meaning" (...)

(...) The problem is that with Derrida there is no subject effect.

Derrida's structure is subjectless, and seems to stand alone.

This is the reason that always distanced me from Derrida since he seems to succumb to the same error of the logical positivists who alienate the subjective dimension under the spell of scientific objectivism.

The same catwalks Derrida does not use that concept or even consider it in that way, nor does he situate the relationship inside/outside as I do, they are something of mine and not only in the abstract theoretical but also in the empirical. (I cited the way he mentions those threads that are like a fabric between language and non-language.)

  I'll talk to you about it later -- about the catwalks, not only theoretically but also empirically, research methodology, why are what I call catwalks important? and in what ways I work with them in my empirical research.

  Derrida saw the texere but he does not finish placing it in the culture beyond the text as I do in my chapter "The exegesis of the texts of culture" and in general in my hermeneutical work, exegesis and research methodology where that texere is not inside as an interior dimension of subjectivity or of what Derrida calls "the ground of interiority" or "the internalized idealization of consciousness", it is true that his analysis of the threads of that fabric that it supports connect the discursive and the non-discursive, the language and the non-language (there I received the light of its clearing), but there they still refer to the experience, to the relationship between the pre-expressive, the expressive and the discursive, and thus they do not acquire towards that texere a sense of externalization that sees it from the outside as forms of the text in the culture and of the culture as a legible and intelligible text, elucidated, above all. all not in a way that disconnects those threads from that body from which they emanated, not in a way that disconnects them that cuts those threads from the objective of an exteriority to language, it is as if in Derrida it were a body by using an image allegorical that would have original threads around it attached to that body or even more like the caterpillars to what is born from within more related to the experience, to the expressive, to the pre-expressive, to the still formless origins of the "wanting to say", of the desire or motivation to say, which would then continue in the language connecting its inside and its outside (experience-motivation-wanting to say before/outside--then language and its inside), but not from an externalization that it objects it as language from a world external to it, from its external exterior at the same time and then, but whose relationship inside/outside would merely be the distinction between an inside of what is properly alphabetic -- writing or orality -- and what is non-alphabetic, experience, desires to say, motivation, what has been experienced, the 

experience, that is, its fabric moves between the extra-verbal and the verbal. You remembered Husserlian intentionality because certainly all of this arose from that phenomenological essay on Husserl that you call a jewel, so I also see a jasper as a jewel -- Derrida loved the precious stones--, and if all the richness even leaving aside the texere--that fabric--of Derrida's developments around this matter that I call an inside and an outside of the language does not admit in Derrida any extension outside the scope of the antinomies being/language, which is first?, being/thought, what is first?, being, thought, language?, a matter that certainly interests me in the terms raised by Derrida. (my essay "The inscription and the couple"), which is first and how that couple is generated, copulation, courtship of one with another, being/thought/language, I discuss it in that essay closest to its meanings but still making it work on its perimeters beyond the scope in which Derrida discerns them.

   But if it never goes out, not only towards the referent that, as you say, it does not even avoid but is simply indifferent towards it, but it also does not externalize the subjectivity in question between that previous "meaning" and the language, it is as if it always It were just a being towards which there is no exteriority and that lack of exteriority is also clearly what you call the lack of the subject.

   I would even say that those threads that he mentions make a weave between experience, language and non-language do not refer to a concept of experience fully situated in the objectivity of an accumulation that makes the culture of the individual its heritage, nor is experience as experimentation of what is lived, which is experience outside, as when we say I had this or that experience and then experience inside, the acquired and accumulated experience that is intrinsic, the extrinsic, which is how I work, the experience in the phenomenology of the self, but rather it is an experience understood as a mere source in both of it is nourished by a "wanting to say" that is called from that source or deposit by a motivation and a "wanting to say", it is experience as a trunk of expression, an expressionist notion of experience so that its 

texere are threads that go from that trunk to the pre-expressive motivation when wanting to say to the expression to the form to the language in fact the essay is called "notes to the phenomenology of language" so in Derrida the texere is a mere relationship inside outside in a section short in that I have brought that texere to the culture through a semiotic extension of the concept of text towards fabric, texere, text/fabric in culture externalized beyond the textbook, writing is the text defined in culture by what is legible, what is legible and interpretable in areas that include objects, situations, material culture, etc., as you say from Peirce and beyond, that is, on the one hand I argue that the phenomenology of the self consists in intrinsicizing the extrinsic, becoming at that moment the experience one with the self, reflecting the culture there in that legible phenomenology towards the intrinsic through the heritage (it is the experience as heritage), legible in the self as the exteriority of a textualizable, legible, interpretable culture, on the other hand that experience in me is complete, it includes its prior to what is intrinsic in what is experienced outside -- in pragmatics, what is experienced, and then my texere is also even in the world distributed in its own exteriority, deployed in that in ways according to which the threads are cut, they no longer go from the body or the caterpillar as something from which they hang or from whose inside they emanate like a latency, My texere can crucially be many times something that we have out there in the legible externalized texts of culture, I give many examples in "the exegesis of the texts of culture", one of which is easily accessible is fashion, another is the city, the culture as weaving that text, but I continue there even though I am so far from Derrida, faithful to him in the sense that, for example, in that intelligibility, in that reading I reserve for the texere a place there externalized different from semiosis (in which there is goal and reference) and in turn different from hermeneusis (meaning).

Well, I have perceived that the chain of the signifier in Derrida -- as you say, Derrida, a phenomenologist from one Saussurean side to the other, are connected, the texere never exceeds a certain syntacsis and as such its space is that of scripturas and inscriptions, its tested modality even extended and externalized outside in the legible texts of culture never abandons a certain idea of ​​writing, even if it is not literally written one reads it as if and thus preserves its epoché it is a text according to the reading but if As you say, I move much further, inscriptions, scriptures, legibility texts outside, I am going to add two examples because fashion and the city are already quite rich and sufficient, the reading of graffiti in the streets.

So with just those examples

1-Cultural analysis in urban studies

2-Cultural analysis of the social text in the visual text, clothing, styles, bodies, makeup, manners, customs, advertising

3-Cultural anthropological-linguistic semiotic analysis of the scriptura

Then, however, you speak of an origin always postponed and in saying this I felt a certain additional justified reproach (in addition to the previous two, indifference towards the reference, absence of subject and now postponement of the origin), in this last point to the Once you notice something that at the same time brings you closer to and distances you from Derrida, it brings you closer because the question of origin is central to Derrida, only in a very peculiar way, it distances you if the synchronicity of the way it does is omnipresent due to its atypicality because the discourses on the origin have been and are usually diachronicist, evolutionist or historicist, and with Derrida it is about another origin, another sense of the origin, another search, another path with respect to the origin that cannot be reduced or to the productivism that reversed the aesthetics of reception and replaced it with the aesthetics of the production of the text (Kristeva, and all the productivism of the text), which led in literary criticism to intertextuality, is not an investigation of the origin either. that merely seeks a first genetic causality or genetic code.

There is, in Derrida's texts on Husserl, a focus on the phenomenological genesis without a doubt, but let us see that it is not the origin of the production of a literary work or of any type but rather the very origin in which being/thought and language are generated one by one. another in the Benveniste/Aristotle sense that we saw in our first part, is the question of antinomies such as these are, for example, in Kant to remember only one of his antinomies, that which is first part or the whole? On the one hand it is that origin that Derrida refers to but on the other hand it is also that of the space/time relationship

   In ousia and gramé he examines, for example, the production of space, the generation of spacing, the production and genesis of surfaces in his analyzes of the relationship point, line, the latter as a union of points that are in turn denied, then surface, union of lines at the same time denied = production of the surface, spacing.

In the linguistic circle of Geneva, the entire essay is dedicated to investigating the question: how was something like language possible from the pure state of nature? Not language/society antinomies, how could a society arise or be formed considered from the pure state? of nature without there being language before? and the inverse, the emergence of something like language without there being society?, but rather the antinomy of nature/language itself, which in the pure state of nature could have made that return?, taken that form?, is the problem of origin. same of the languages ​​and the language that he examines by comparing languages ​​with and without verb.

   Instead of the question when we see a natural miracle how something in nature could have come to acquire such a shape, a very encrypted and elaborate branch of a tree for example, with the same sense of the question as how something natural could turn around continue The journey that led to something like language, alphabet, grammar, consonant, vowel, morpheme, lexeme, which visual/graphic and sound/acoustic principles had to generate such an elevation, is the origin but another origin, a timeless synchronic origin

So questions of origin in Derrida

1- The origin of language from nature

2- the genesis of saying between the pre-expressive experience (motivation), expressive (meaning, intentionality) the way it is said, its acquisition of form, here are questions of origin about the break, about the relationships between morphology, eidesis (the eidetic), and noesis (the noetic)

3- the question of the origin between being, thought, language, how each one forms the other to such a point that it is undecidable which is first, there is no first, without being there is no "meaning", without meaning there is no way to form a language, where you take it or even how you rectify or correct it once it is written spoken language or of any type if you do not go from how the paragraph goes when meaning the previous one that was still without form in the cloud of being and thought , and conversely as language it engenders being and thought.

4- and even more so the origin of interiority, how the semiotic senses of hearing, sight, touch participate in the origin of the soil of our interiority that he calls internalized idealization

5- But even more so the origin, the phenomenological genesis of the sign when he says the sign is the first way of our appearing before ourselves in consciousness, in Derrida there are two things regarding the sign a) the investigation of its very first origin and b ) also that of his dissolution and his death = here is his introduction to Hegel's semiology

6- the origin of spacing

So it is true that an idea of ​​origin is postponed, you are right, but it is a certain origin that is postponed in favor of another of a certain idea of ​​origin while another idea of ​​origin is investigated.

As for the structure, yes, okay, I would say even more that the distinction of significant meaning is the distinction of language/speech, writing/orality that makes structure in Derrida, although also that of significant meaning.

But here it is already cleaned by me, I have removed, let's say, all the garbage and cleared the area, leaving the vector poles, the criticism of Austin = orality, the follow-up to how orality is treated each time, and the writing on the other side, critically removed everything that in which he contradicts himself, I did the same with Hegel

"However, it is interesting how you seem to distance yourself in "The Correlate of the World" from the Derrida of "On Grammatology" and open a possibility for this inside/outside bipolarity by returning to the phenomenological Derrida. Instead you say that equally to define that inside /outside of language Derrida goes to the "catwalks" that you mention and try to define from your perspective. I only find it difficult to admit that in that fabric (texeré) we are talking about catwalks. a fabric that is text but that is in no way "world" but whose transit, however, is text that goes from language to non-language. It is confusing for me to think of the catwalks in Derrida as a texéré that processes text from language to non-language. How Derrida can configure that text in the place of non-language is undoubtedly a mysterious creation."

If according to what Derrida puts it, it is impossible, one cannot see how, it is I who have done those clearances and that work, not only with reference and with meanings eluded by Derrida, also on the one hand articulating the experience in another way before /extrinsic in the relationship culture/acquis/phenomenology of the self (intrinsic), and located in pragmatics, before at the same time and then not only outside of language but even outside around the individual (in that at the instead of the action not only before/outside-outside/after), but displayed there, the fashion text, the city text and many other examples.

Then my concept of catwalks, as I told you, is central as an inside/outside relationship in my theory of research methodology at a theoretical and also empirical level. I will mention only a few examples, they are unlimited.

1- First in my analyzes on structurality and asymmetry in the discussion and analysis of bilingualism and multilingualism

English/Spanish

English/Amerindian languages ​​United States

Venezuelan Spanish/ Amerindian languages ​​in Venezuela

Cuban Spanish/African languages

to the catwalk is semiosis, not the texere that we saw before, it is about semiotic/sociolinguistic and semantic theory of culture, the research of concrete forms of language that are actually lexical, words, but which are dialects and idiolects, which form a semisphere cut out on itself with relative autonomy but which then lays out the paths for research from the sociology of common sense and semantics (Schütz/Greimas), a semantic path towards the sociology of things such as religion, imagery, material culture, entering and leaving the language between its inside and its outside, feasible only by working with the three gateways with high precision in empirical research, is an example, I could put many very different ones from each other.

2- in the work with pretexts, texts, textualization and construction of the text, I elaborate on this extensively in the chapter "The exegesis of the texts of culture"

3- in matters of research methodology in field work, I mention only 3 at this time

a) in moving between the course of experience (world of everyday life/intramundane horizon and the inscription in field work,

b)- in participant observation / I set an example in my own field work when I say a phenomenological analysis of intergestural and intercorporeal interactions in markets - in the give and take - is then the way to immerse oneself in its hermeneutic understanding

And I mention two references in addition to my precedents which I also take much further in new directions, this is ethnography, one Stephen ethnography and intertextuality, the other certainty the ethnographer inscribes (Geertz in the interpretation of cultures), I will not focus here on I will elaborate on how I take this further and to other sides unless you are interested, but in summary the center of my position is the work with metonymy, reading from the metonymic fragments, the whole can only be being evoked, one goes along with intelligible reading (with all that it entails, interpretation of pretexts and texts, textualization of the non-textual, construction of the text where there is none), this along with rhetorical coursework. of the text one writes. The book or essay itself shows the method in writing it, even involving how the method and interpretation are elucidated in the writing itself, there is no totality, only metonymy, that is evoked (a culture for example as a whole) , and moving between the intramundane horizon and inscriptions, including writing as inscription, centers the requirement of work with the gateways inside/outside language: semiosis, hermeneusis, texere

For all this I work with my concept of the catwalks, in fact, I conceived this concept that reflects what you call my inside/outside extrapolation (which you very clearly realize I do with a Peircian sense), from an ethnographic perspective, of research methodology Although ethnography in me is an incursion into a sociology of culture that is first semiotics and only then anthropology.

  I say that I am a dabbler in ethnography because I dabble in certain essays, books and works in other media, but not everything I do is ethnography but rather sociology, ethnomethodology and semiotics, unlike Quetzil, which is mostly ethnography in my opinion. Of the best ethnographers today, Lisa is an intermediate between me and Quetzil.

You then make what Peirce calls an abductive hypothesis when you imagine or figure out what it would be like if Dummett had to think about these walkways.

 Very interesting, but I emphasize with this a little if the writing once inscribed what was experienced begins the preservation and communication to a third party where that previously intramundane world is now the effect of the text as inscribed in the although for me the concept of inscription has a value also in field work in the field of experience, significance and cultural translation

  On the other hand, the question of the subject whose absence you reproach Derrida in whom this only seems to be an internal function of the language where the structure, as you say, seems to sustain itself, we had left the matter in my development around the medlee voice or middle voice that brings I achieve the balance between subjectivity and objectivity, as Stephen says, where the subject in the medlee voice is semivocal, what is the importance of that semivocal middle voice and what is the subject to it implicit, even without going to psychoanalysis, I allow myself this last reservation. preambulate?

   In the middle voice we are eluding on the one hand in terms of philosophical epistemology the externalized relationship between subject and object, let us return here to my developments in our first part on two different forms of a static, the structural and the positivist or post-positivist, let us also return to everything I discuss about defixing that relationship and because where my theoretical and empirical concept for the research of performativity is located, on the other hand, is the abolition of the separations we the others very characteristic of all forms of ethnocentrism, including the past of ethnography and even a good part of the course of its present, essentially theocentric in positive and in negative culture of the observer (in positive), observed culture (in negative, its ethnocentricity, its essentialism). .

  All of this is abolished with the medlee voice. In fact, I maintain that polyphonic is not the anthropological or ethnographic text, that what is polyphonic is reality itself, in my case the popular urban markets themselves are the ideal of polyphony.

Derrida is for me in fact, and I have said this several times, the first postmodern ethnographer and probably to this day the only one.

I move away from those directions, there is no other in the sense we and the others, there is only what Stephen calls mutuality and cooperation, it is a therapeutic and ritual one or we.

  Hence this effect in Derrida of a semi-vocal subject or middle voice, middle voice.

  Then we must not forget that the critique of the subject is central in the discussion of postmodernism but also characterizes it. Here my essays “The Eclipse of the Eye” and “The Eclipse of Evocation” where I literally say there is no other, neither in the unconscious nor in the real, the other's speech was an inquiry and a gesture in the chrysalis of being (my essay on the logic of being in Hegel).

I have some questions about the subject that you place with Lacan.

The main distinction that is assertive and clear in your emphasis is that certainly without it it would not be psychoanalysis, that the concepts of meaning and signifier are such for Baconian psychoanalysis only and only from the moment in which it presupposes the subject. Now, in what ways is the subject there?

The implicit notions of subject require us to ask ourselves how we can go from a literal subject with respect to language, let's say the one who writes and the one who speaks, which in this case would be a productive subject of that language and which would in turn have to be differentiated according to the type of production. of language because it is not the same if it produces mere writing as a message or discourse in mundane speaking or writing as if it does so in a work whether it is philosophical, theoretical or fictional, then there is the reading and receiving subject of that language whose position is passive towards it.

  In what way could one or the other be figured according to symbolisms such that the signifier can be considered phallic enjoyment? According to the drive, which is the desire, the productive energy, we would be talking about who produces that language. But who produces it can be the philosopher, it can be the psychoanalyst, it can be the fiction writer, it can be the mundane language of common sense and it can ultimately be the patient to whom the psychoanalyst listens to interpret it. In all cases of discourse, is the signifier phallic enjoyment, rumination of the word? In all cases of forms of discourse, "the very path of the drive is what will isomorphically determine the alternation of the signifying chain"?

  If the answer were yes, which is in all cases, then we would have to talk about a psychoanalysis of language but just when we see it like this we have abstracted from a specific subject and, as in Derrida, the structure also seems to stand alone.

  My answer, however, mine, is that no, it is not even in all cases. My answer is also that symbolizing the signifier in this way is not necessary to the signifier itself but only a possible way of symbolizing it that is neither necessary nor immanent to it. to the signifier but that can be sustained as a way of symbolizing it only under the condition of neither more nor less, as with any morphe that is susceptible to being symbolized in this way, that is, as long as it is equally symbolizable, so is any way of defamiliarizing the form of meanings and senses.

  But if the answer were yes, the only way to differentiate the subject that is there in psychoanalysis as opposed to that omitted in Derrida or given by the function of language would be that there is a presupposed subject in a certain equidistance of use.

But the inclusive exteriority to the notion of use, user, acted function, speaker, writer, is such for psychoanalysis because the symbolization that the latter elaborates of that language requires a subject for whom that symbolization is such again what I was telling you. the previous time a subject for whom it is inaccessible for whom it is not within his reach - when he compared the similar latent/unmanifest relationship between structuralism and psychoanalysis - but as a psychoanalysis of language and not of a The subject is equally omitted as in linguistics and semiotics the subject is.

  The question then would be why do this psychoanalysis of language? If that subject is supposed to be the symbolizer of that language in the terms that psychoanalysis uses, we would have to ask in what way a signifier could be figured as phallic enjoyment and the journey of drive could determine the alternation of the signifier.

  Certainly in the substantial abstraction ousia and substance of the expression acoustic sound and spelling the two ways of being morphe of the alphabetic signifier, since let us not forget that there is also a tactile signifier in the palate and touch in general, the relationship intangible immateriality/materiality or thingness tangible, they are abstracted as morphe, as pure form and morphology, but let us remember that this is an abstraction in which we have removed the sense and meaning on the one hand in order to abstract its invariable regularity, separating it from its situationality and semantic contextuality, an abstraction that in linguistics and semiotics is methodological but let us not forget, an abstraction that is arbitrary not only because the meaning-signifier relationship itself is arbitrary because it is not necessary, (it could have been another and is in fact another in another language) but also the very abstraction that separates them since semantically they are united as necessary by common sense, use and convention.

Bourdieu has focused on this violence of arbitrariness that becomes deconstructive of arbitrariness that signifier/signified or at least cautious towards that according to a so that we defamiliarize them if we know that they are not separated.

To find stable regularities that can be isolated according to the form?, fine, but for what else?, care, caution, why mark the signifier when we know it is the same, the signifier itself, generated by a defamiliarization between form and meaning?

Now we admit that we do not only have abstractions of this type that postpone the meaning as an analytical operation of a methodological procedure, we also certainly have them in the aesthetic principle itself, for us to relate aesthetically we must abstract the how, the form, perceive the saying not what is said or perceive the latter what is said according to the first, the saying, it as the form, erotic pleasure as well as enjoyment are thus exacerbated forms of aesthetic perception, a relationship to how and form, postponing the meaning or what. subordinating the perception of the whole of the latter - the meaning - according to the pleasure or enjoyment of the former, the form.

  In short, I would choose and prefer to think that it is not that the signifier is phallic but rather that any form of separation of form and meaning, form and meaning, wherever morphe is abstracted, can be symbolized like this -- not It has to be alphabetic language. It can be a juice, the tactility of a plant or a polyethylene, it can be both phallicized and vaginized.

   Is there a relationship to fetishism as a mode of symbolization? Not in the sense of the money-commodity relationship that fetishizes the latter, but in terms of subjectivity?

   On the one hand, falizing the signifier is not necessary for the latter; rather, it is a universal principle for any form of defamiliarization involved in separating form from meaning, a governing principle in turn in all forms of sexual and even merely sensual presexual pleasure that is ignored. of sense and meaning to enjoy the form and take pleasure in the form, is it a type of narcissism that can go more or less to the extreme in that defamiliarization, of what is defamiliarization? of what integrates pleasure and enjoyment into sense and meaning whose most integrated pole to meaning would be integral love? In loving there is fullness of meaning and meaning, sexual pleasure is subordinated to the latter, the sense that integrates pleasure and meaning. enjoyment of love causes the impression of the form to notice it to introduce a complementary eros that does not exceed and that returns integrated to the sense proportionally, making the most sublime more pleasant and, conversely, the most pleasant more sublime.

  Couldn't the signifier also be perfectly the pubis, the female sex in all its splendor and also the vagina, just as it could be the enjoyment or jouissance of the pure formal in any form emptied of meaning because it is abstracted in its form in the desperation? familiarization, and not necessarily alphabetical?

Isn't the subject in that psychoanalysis of language equally omitted and that, as you say about Derrida, the structure could stand alone with the exception that symbolization presupposes the subject that symbolizes it?

  And by the way, I understand everything you tell me about structuralism in you, which is like that, I just wanted to limit and point out that the entry of the senses into the formation of subjectivity has both a philosophical and semiotic explanation and that the entry of psychoanalysis into language It must have a justification, why symbolize it like this?

  You saw before my caution regarding the entry that Derrida wants to give via difference

  If it is by simply psychoanalyzing language that I distance myself, as I do, from that Derrida, I am not attracted to statements such as language is phallus-centric, writing is patriarchal and masculine, as statements about a symbolic ontos of language, the opposite of writing could be symbolized. and the language are feminine from the moment in which, for example, the word is heard and seen, while it would be masculine to avoid that it is like that in favor of what it works.

   It seems to me that they are procedures of a symbolism that uses language but that could be undertaken with other means.

  That language helps to symbolize them? This seems clearer to me. Well, if that were the case, we could admit that this would be neither more nor less than the same as studying erased villages and caduceus faces as if they were phonemes when we know that they are not and that Finding phonemes in the structure of villages is building a homology with the structure of one thing with respect to another, it would ultimately be a type of traffic processing, processing symbolizations about subjectivity and sexuality using the help of the structures. of language but that they would not be about it language but using the latter to with its help build homologies about subjectivity and sexuality

  But it even becomes clearer to me that it is not the signifier in alphabetical language that would be the centric phallus, but rather the phallic eroticism that, abstracted in eros, would be a non-verbal signifier, but the same could be said of the vagina, which would be a non-verbal signifier

  All this also refers us to the body/soul dualism that Derrida has also worked on when he says that the signifier is the body and the signified immateriality is the soul.

  And now I go back because I don't want to be unfair to Lacan in the same sense in which you say not to be unfair to Levis Strauss -- Okay -- and you have developed many other interesting things around Lacan also this time not only the signifier/phallus thing.

   As I told you in our first part, I see both for therapy - critical psychoanalysis (theoretical discourse) or clinical, the possibility of psychoanalysis between language and non-language, where there is no language, it is unconscious, where there is language, it ceases or ceases to be so. capable and strata both for the rehabilitation therapy of affected people and for criticism, but thus, post-Lacanian, it is very refined, it is then not about the language nor about the subject but appropriate to the therapy in question when it is therapy and to criticism in question when it is critical

 However, in this last point I see an excess no more than I see it in much of French thought at the end of the century, Deleuze for example, "criticism and clinic" seems to me an excess, I do not approve of a conversion of criticism into clinic, I approve of a post-Lacanian dissemination of psychoanalysis as a redistribution in a thought that is no longer psychoanalysis, as it seems to me that you want to do with analytical philosophy a post-Lacanian modality of the latter which would be neither psychoanalysis nor clinical.

  This could make us think of a death of psychoanalysis, I don't see it that way, I think that psychoanalysis with Lacan gained a lot of ground in the rest of the social sciences, the humanities and literature but I think that psychoanalysis does need to rethink, perhaps it is time For psychoanalysts to sit down and take stock and ask themselves what psychoanalysis should be if it does not want to be, like structuralism, a paradigm that is dispersed among many sciences. If, like semiotics, it wants to be a science in itself or simply a discipline, it is time to take action. recover the best of what was obtained certainly without excluding or discriminating against Jung, even partially surpassed in Lacan, there is a lot in Jung to recover, lay ground with other schools of psychology, Piaget for example, psychodrama, and reinvent oneself, also Eric Fromm, in short This was what I thought 30 years ago when I read Lacan. Maybe reading him again today will completely change my perspective, I don't doubt it.

   For me, the main thing about psychoanalysis is two things that are a form or modality of symbolism and two things that are a form of discursive psychology as thought, from those two unique matrices to psychoanalysis reinvent itself. It was what I thought at that time.

   And excuse these ramblings in a territory that is not mine -- Psychoanalysis -- but who knows, maybe they will inspire you or serve you in some way.

  I return then to what concerns me in this new, rich and refined development that you have made. Everything you say in analytical philosophy seems very interesting to me.

What of all this affects me?

I think that the question of reality and realism and I would like to tell you something about it that in a certain way I told you before, my positions regarding the concept of both reality and realism are, on the one hand, phenomenological sociology and common sense derived from sociology. comprehensive, on the one hand, one that is the main one, I define myself in fact in this as my main orientation since the Alfred Chuts school, phenomenological sociology, ethnomethodology and semiotics, and on the other hand Hegel its phenomenological definition of reality, what do both things mean? The first presupposes not defining reality outside the scope of a common sense previously accepted in the natural attitude as problematic until further notice, that is, our everyday world is formed by experience. , the heritage, the typicality, the significance and the relevance and that this is in itself reality, a concept of reality beyond scrutiny accepted problematically by common sense, beyond scrutiny both in the face of perception and in relation to what is not. real the unreal or fiction but note that in itself the concept of reality brings with it the aporia of a scrutiny always defined according to what is not real or what is more or less real given according to the effects of reality created by representation, then it is a defective concept to capture with What he himself wants to emphasize, let's talk about common sense, this is for me a concept superior to that of reality and according to the latter, let's talk about the intramundane horizon, never forgetting that chuts talks about multiple realities in his essay of that title where he discusses finite universes. of meaning and accents of reality, it is not in vain that we do not deny that the symbolic and the products of the imagination are real, they are also real

  On the other hand, in the Hegelian sense, it is to accept that if the concept of reality suffers from this defect, defining itself under scrutiny is because at a phenomenological level the very idea of ​​reality depends completely on the concept of presence, the phenomenon or the phenomenal and the appearance and as such it is always on the one hand accidental, on the other contingent and in short experimental.

 This is my positioning based on long years of maturity in the relationship between my experience, my thinking and my values.

In closing I would add again sublime and romantic

  Regarding realism, which is already a question related to the ways of representing reality, I was recently pleased to see that Jameson has an essay entitled antinomies of realism, I have not read it, but placing it as an antinomy seems the most accurate to me in the sense it acquires. the concept of antinomy in Kant the forms of realism are so many and so contradictory to each other that they come to form antinomies, one of the characteristics of antinomy is invincibility because it is antinomian, the The antinomies of realism are therefore those of the representation of reality and I am an anti-representationalist.

   As a closing note on the topic of Cuba, thank you also for your words about me in that distant past. In this regard, I would tell you that, as you know, I emigrated like my entire generation at the age of 20, barely a child sees it on Facebook where, with the exception of you and two or three others, all my friends who surround you on my Facebooks, one by one, are my migratory communities, My complete 20s, my complete 30s, my 40s, they are not people I met on Facebook, they are all friends of mine related to my life as an emigrant in the cities where I have lived. I distanced myself a lot from the Cuban issue. because I completely immersed myself in my new cultures with which I permeated and transformed, becoming my cultures and I an expression of them, the United States, Texas and before neoliberal Venezuela until 96, as much as Derrida and Todorov in France or the same chuts in the United States emigrants all.

  Despite this, I have tried as much as possible to be fair, consistent and ethical with what I consider to be good values ​​in that past which, by the way, have not abandoned me since I have them in my own parents, in my family, not One can actually avoid one's entire past no matter how much one changes in one's autobiography.

  I am also currently experiencing a new process of individual changes and I need time to process them, but I can tell you that the main motive of my life is love.

I have just just re-read your recent previous development, I was afraid that because I responded so quickly according to the imprint of immersing myself in family festivities, I had neglected or not addressed something regarding your developments, but rereading you I want to tell you that it also seems necessary to me and beautiful in our counterpoints, something that you said very early on when you spoke or actually evoked a certain parallelism where each one is developing their own things and not all of them necessarily have to be taken up by the other in their own way. next development, at times you take a part of my development that becomes the object of your notes, riddles, affinities, interests, questions, etc., but for long moments it inspires you to return to the developments that you bring from before, returning to them again and again. again to each time enrich here, bring a new angle there in which I am pleased to be the reason for your inspiration and this previous time I think you managed to move forward and give a refreshing and very attractive twist to many of the things that you have been developing throughout throughout our counterpoints, I know that you are still waiting to send me an additional message regarding previous topics

> On the other hand, the crucial thing about these counterpoints is that dialogue, which is also the vertebra and the richest and most attractive juice of the whole, the very idea of ​​dialogue, which, as I told you not long ago, should be, in my opinion, our main positioning with this book. in the academic discussion first -- crucial -- and non-academic -- second, also valuable, the field of museums, socioculturality, etc. -- in the United States, the ethics of dialogue, the teros of dialogue in all its implications, also in terms of form and rhetoric.

>   With this said I want to evoke that sometimes I simply enjoy that you can fully develop your arguments without necessarily having to go into each point and vice versa.

>   And yes, I certainly have lots of pending things to address, but I don't want them to be content that falls like flying aliens in our counterpoints, but rather I will intersperse them when it is pertinent. In short, they are not extrinsic things but arise from our counterpoints, sometimes I think about the students of doctorates, masters, postgraduates or universities as well as institutes in general, other times I think about the extensive baggage of understandings and the motivation arises to expand on certain things that help our reader, this does not mean at all replacing dialogic intersubjectivity with work oriented to that omitted reader who, as Derrida says, is uttered and absent, in no way would this be just maintaining communicative intersubjectivity as a center to develop certain things that Furthermore, they will first be attractive from that same counterpoint.

>   Now that the new year has entered and I take the opportunity to congratulate you again, I tell you two things, one that I look forward to your next announced development and two that I think it would be very productive to continue moving forward to have some printed copies, not to distribute them but for our own reading, reading in print helps to have a more complete sense of the whole for you it is easier to print there in fives, here it is very expensive, and with that said I send you a copy by gmail, I open the year and leave the next on your side

There are many themes accumulated this time and the twists and turns where your counter-answers take us are also complex.

 As an opening, I am going to summarize by maintaining that this time you have chosen to position yourself similar or adjacent to my book, the correlation of the world where the text effectively governs and dominates over the world where it is last is produced by the effects of the text, that is, in your terms. in favor of language, which you now call extending from your perspective in analytical philosophy on what language is with respect to reality and its greater or lesser adequacy, that is, moving your analytical philosophical notion of language to my semiotic notions of text and sign, mediation of the real by the sign, also remembering that moment in which the performance of language and its competence, acquisition, learning, etc., as mediation by the subject, is recovered with Chomsky, all this does nothing but put you on the side of my book the correlate of the world that is precisely this, that balance and that cut, and then move away from your previous propensity to take us backwards, towards my previous book of the intramundane horizon.

I have nothing against the fact that when you find that coincidence in my book the correlation of the world, you discuss it from your analytical philosophical perspective, taking it there, towards the context of that discussion, I understand that it is a book that could be discussed from that perspective because it offers a balance and a unique and original resolution, novel if you will, of how this problem has been treated before, and I think that a discussion of yours in the prologue in that direction could be very interesting, you just did it although not discussing the book but immersed in the intricacies of the series of logical questions that characterize our book counterpoints and as a moment I understand well of greater elaboration of your arguments that are fed back with the dialogue itself, I liked your development this time too

However, I must confess to you as an author, although in a certain way you already knew it, that I did not write it looking there or to answer those questions but rather looking here at my discussion on methodology of research in cultural theory, sociology, ethnomethodology and anthropology. In principle, I will feel comfortable answering your first question about whether I epistemologically connect my interpretation of Derrida's theory ------what he calls the idealizations that form the ground of our interiority-------- and how the differentiated senses enter and participate there in forming the floor of our interiority: sight, hearing, touch, etc.; each theorized in their differences and captured later, by the way in which they are idealized, they come to participate in the soil of that interiority, as a phenomenological genesis of the sign with or to what extent the evocation as Stephen and I have discussed and theorized it in our philosophical dialogues, and or as I have continued to develop it in my books, if I see a connection between the one and the other and you use the expression condition of possibility of the sign, concept, that of Bourdieu's condition of possibility.

On the other hand, I am not concerned with what reality is like or what is real in itself, or how thought or language adapt to the world according to ultimate questions, but rather according to methodological questions, that is, from a theoretical research methodology. -- on the one hand, the theory itself understood as research, as a search and exploration of findings with which to work and make thinking work towards itself, logic, and empirical on the other, how to methodologically develop empirical field research .

It is this difference that then differentiates our preferences as far as realism is concerned, I from Alfred Schütz, phenomenological sociology, common sense, experience, heritage, typifications, relevance, significance and my developments in this regard that we discussed before when I told you about it , -- my essays the intramundane horizon and overordination in the life worlds and now my upcoming book the enigmas of the ground, including how I have worked from classical philosophy on the self and its phenomenology to then capture it together with the heritage in what for the individual is the cultural dimension whose phenomenology I maintain can be a legible and intelligible theory of culture of that phenomenology and its symbols, you, on the other hand, your preference for seeing reality through its mediation by language in analytical philosophy that you now connect with my correlate of the developed world from that side, thirdness in Peirce as it is scientifically a book of theoretical linguistics and theoretical semiotics, and if indeed that deepening that you have developed this time of your previous abductive hypothesis around dummet of what it would be like if he had to think about my gateways between an inside and outside of language (semiosis, hermeneusis and texere), rearticulating in a subtle way my theoretical developments around of Peirce -- as you tell me in my theory of the exegesis of the texts of culture and of culture as a text, and the insistences that you bring from before, typical of analytical philosophy in favor of language above the real, or its mediation of the real, you now connect yours to mine as I told you at the beginning, extending your analytical philosophical notion of language to my semiotic notions of text and sign.

I agree with everything that you have just developed, that is, taking as reference the parameters that you yourself set to then develop the analysis, I believe that it is epistemologically consistent and I share it, for example, how it could be understood, interpreted, analyzed, a iconic cinematographic, photographic or visual work without that understanding?, as everything in it is a sign and thirdness, I even regarding the analysis of motivated signs, that is to say that they are created to communicate from their very genesis, I would add more, it is not only necessary capture there that separation that the analyzed work makes in that the signs are in the place of the real, not only for this is the semiotics of that language required, also, together with semiotics, it is necessary to articulate from semantics, a hermeneutics and an axiology that be it as an interpretive activity, disciplinary regulated by semiotics, a linguistic anthropology

However, I think we should note that while for you this completes and satisfies a well-constructed idea of ​​what reality is like for you or what the relationship between language and reality is like, you also come back to confirm it in my quote to Hegel, -- and I understand it and it seems good to me that it is like that for you, you are an analytical philosopher and it is a responsibility for you to decide on an idea about how it is in itself as long as what concerns you is to achieve the image

But for me, however, the world correlate is just a book conceived to work with thirdness and not with all terrenities, it focuses on research methodology for the exegesis of cultural texts there in direct cultural reality without mediation regarding to it of art, maintaining that with respect to earthly things, art must be treated separately due to its different ontology for which my book is not the correlate of the world, the book is only the necessary or required journey to understand how we should work the world. research well towards theorizing itself, the paths that we follow at the logical level, well empirical, and its methodology when we are working with third parties and I am very pleased that you have reached the correlation of the world, which is my book for it, but I have books for many other things, including art, to whose science I have so far dedicated only my books the subject in creativity and edges and overflows; sociology of transart, then I would say that yes, we agree and agree regarding the implicit epistemological assumptions also discussed between my book, the correlation of the world and what you have just developed in the art section, although what you have said applies to art. , but with only one difference, which for you is an image of the world, of reality and of language, or the relationship between the two as ultimate questions about what they are in themselves, while for me it is only what is necessary to have understood to be able to work in forms of research that presuppose that thirdness where the text dominates the world or where, as you have told me, the sign mediates reality. But this is not always the case depending on what the cut is, and when the cut is different for the research, the relationships can even be reversed, where can we then maintain the opposite, and if this is without a doubt the main difference between me as an ethnomethodologist and you as an analytical philosopher, because no matter how much you change in that feedback of the dialogue you will always be an analytical philosopher and this will maintain your responsibility in that direction and will prevent you from following me on the infinite paths that are rearticulated again and again according to the methodological questions in For this reason, I think that the point or topic in which you and I could have a dialogue about ultimate issues would be ethics, since methodology is ethics and there I could not avoid your demand for ultimacy, but we are not yet ready for that dialogue and I think it is another book not counterpoints because it requires not only that you read all my books to me, not only the correlation of the world but also thinking science and all the others but to all my references and I to yours. But I am pleased that we now have two points of mutual understanding, not only Habermas but now also semiotics, the sign.

How I argued in my application to Oxford the correlation of the world is a book disciplinary in theoretical linguistics and semiotic theory, but it is also a book of classical philosophy and could be discussed in that direction more akin to your parameters in analytical philosophy, but as an author You ask me, beyond readers and audiences, what you were thinking when you conceived it, I was thinking about completely renewing, opening new paths of research methodology in cultural theory, sociology and anthropology.

  Before me none of this had been developed in terms of research methodology in cultural theory, sociology and anthropology. Either the world and reality were understood as something that is in itself per se to language which the latter only had to describe by subordinating itself to a mimetic and representationalist idea of ​​reality by language as it is supposed to be in itself or It comes to us predated or in the opposite direction. What was considered a text was only that written text that is in itself the writing of social science as something rhetorical, but never a theory of culture itself as a text and of the texts of culture there. outside like me I have done much less of the elaborate work that I have done in depth with Peirce to differentiate three forms of research

Hermeneutics and ontology

Exegesis and texts

Interpretants and alternation

Reserving for the work with the latter, the interpretants, a whole new scope in research methodology both in field work and in the relation of textual forms in the interpretative activity of culture. I noticed here and now the empirical examples that I have been putting throughout our counterpoints in order to give you an empirical correlation of the why, between what and what, and where of my theoretical insights, which perhaps helps the understanding to expand in more empirical examples in my own research, my books, but I will leave it for last immediately before lacan.

Well, on the one hand, up to this point I have completely excluded Lacan, both what you have told me recently, as well as what was previously said by you or by me, is an agreement or point of coincidence between your concerns and my book, The Correlate of Such a World. which as you just discussed, removing all the lacan.

Lacan takes in another direction than my book, the correlation of the world excludes, with which I also say everything that I have said in our counterpoints to this specific topic. I will try to briefly discuss what, in my opinion, is that other direction that Lacan takes, but I will do so after rereading it.

Returning then to the beginning, the phenomenological genesis of the sign and the evocation, then the medllee voice.

  It is required and necessary to disentangle and clarify some things related to my interpretation of Derrida. It is an essay of his titled introduction to Hegel's semiology. In that essay Derrida maintains that this appearance of us in front of ourselves in consciousness deduced in his theorization of Hegel where he takes as a parameter the phenomenology of the spirit, which is phenomenology of consciousness, is also or becomes also the revelation that we appear for the first time before ourselves externalized in the sign and in language, that the sign is the same as that externalized appearance of us before us there in a sign, in a language

 But note that up to this point there is no contact in Derrida's development with an external world on the other side of language or consciousness or on its side there, as you say, his avoidance of reference, what there is is yes and that is Cartesian --Derrida recognizes the influence of Barthes--well Barthes had done it, abstracting the senses, sight, hearing, touch and theorizing them in his essays, for example in right in the eyes and in listening, but Barthes does it merely analyzing signs of one type or another in music or visual arts, Derrida instead retheorizes the senses to capture in them how they ideally participate in that ideality that is in itself our interiority, however he does not properly speak of a phenomenological genesis of the sign. On the contrary, he focuses on the death of the sign with beautiful developments about the coffin, the tomb and the pyramid of Egypt. He compares the sign and the effigy in Hegel, however, I am the one who sees it. a phenomenological genesis of the sign, especially if we are careful to connect his essay on Husserl and this one on Hegel, but that phenomenological genesis of the sign that I see exists in Derrida, as well as that phenomenology of both the genesis and the dissolution or death of the sign. , is not in contact with Pierce, therefore several genesis of the sign would have to be accepted.

This from Derrida would be, to use your words, internalist, everything would be generated from what something is idealized, our senses and the formation of our interiority, unlike the genesis of the sign in Pierce, which would be inferentialist, there is a sign every time there is inference, We infer through signs, it is like my analysis that it is a text, when I say the text is done by reading, every time we read, when something becomes legible to us, it is a text, we would say with Pierce every time we infer. This is a sign but we could not, however, say whether Peirce was an internalist or an externalist, since in thirdness thought is a sign and meanings are reality, but in firstity a sign is a rhema, a mere sensation or quality that has become sign, there would then be two genesis of the sign, the Peircian and the Derridarian (Hegelian-Husselian), although there is Hegel also in Peirce, but this is the Hegel of the science of logic, not that of phenomenology of the spirit.

In my new book that I am writing I discuss in a section what I call the object-sign dialectic where I try to demonstrate how any object that is not a sign in itself becomes a sign and how both object and signs share the same source or origin, the same genesis, the same ground originates one from the other, unlike the usual presupposition according to which sign and object are different things, the first denotes the second, substitutes it, replaces it and I give an example, imagine that You enter your bathroom early in the morning and see the wet towel and feel hot humid steam, neither the steam nor the towel are in themselves signs, they were not meant to communicate, however you are told that your girlfriend has bathed, well, just She shares the house with you, which also takes you back to the night when you fell asleep and reminds you that she did not tell you what she would do the next day, so you assume that she has left the house with her wet namesake and the steam in the bathroom. that are mere objects have become signs of an entire network of senses and meanings

But when you leave the bathroom you see a mug warming up in the kitchen which tells you that it has left but it soon returns. As soon as you went to the corner and returned, a succession of objects have become signs. This would then be the other genesis of the sign that is the ground -- and it is from this explanation, demonstration and understanding, that I am developing in my new book an introduction to what I call semiological sociology, you would have to understand how experience and the world for common sense in phenomenological sociology and as in semiotics to understand how I am here at the same time retheorizing one with the other and renewing both traditions, it as a genesis and a dialectic unlike the one I see In Derrida, in your words, internalism occurs only in the idealization of the senses that form our inner world and in the ways in which we appear externalized to ourselves in consciousness and its expression in languages.

This other genesis is inferentialist, rhematic, Peirce would call it, although Peirce said the sign is in the place of the object, it replaces it. We see in my example that not always, in fact only in thirdness, does this occur when the interpretants govern, which is what discussed in my book the correlation of the world - consecrated to the texts of culture to its exegesis, not so much and even less to the text that is in itself the work that one writes, at the level of thirdities, hermeneutics and ontology at the level of the intramundane horizon -- previous book -- and as its center the research methodology in working with interpretants, theoretical linguistics, theoretical semiotics, and cultural theory in sociology and anthropology. Where the phenomenon of art is treated as an ontological aside in the chapter on the exegesis of the texts of culture, that is, not excluded, but separated.

But in the firstity where the ground rules, it is not like that, we discover at the level of the ground or firstity that sign and object have a common source, they are even dialectical, one becomes the other and participates in their identity, then with several examples I demonstrate how semiosis works. between this ground level that I also discuss in e

Chapter three of my book semantic elucidation and the meta level or thirdness.

So to what extent is there a connection between what I call with respect to Derrida the phenomenological genesis of the sign and evocation?

Evocation is a concept whose dyadic logical pair is representation, as I say in my chapter, the dialectic of evocation in thinking science, it is the opposite or opposite of representation, but Hegelianly, because they are opposites, they are needed, at the same time they exclude and are They include, however they are never the same although one cannot be without its relationship to the other. In fact, in that essay I maintain that we evoke the senses in memory both in the memory of the body and in reflexivity, we evoke not we represent.

Stephen, however, says that evocation is in the condition of possibility of writing, of tropes and of language itself, these would not be possible without it, but he never said if also of the sign, nor had I made the sign/evocation connection. via a condition of possibility, I have not previously connected sign and evocation other than in reference to the tropes that are figurative language but not always signs, although sometimes also, but when faced with your question, I believe that yes, that evocation does participate in the genesis of the sign as in fact it is in every relationship of meaning and especially in abstract concepts where the relationship between the name of the concept and what it means does not occur in any other way than through evocations, not representations, and the more theoretical and abstract a concept is, the more evocative it is. and the less representational it is. (In the dialectic of evocation, the final chapter of my book, Thinking Science, I developed this extensively).

However, since the 1980s Stephen would no longer speak of an epistemological connection because although he symbolized and was almost the pinnacle of the scientistic paradigm in anthropology of which many of his books and essays are examples, in the 1980s he changed and took a postmodernist turn. exhausted towards scientificity, exhausted let's say before the dogmas of science, his essay postmodern ethnography a gem, questions that this should be science, rather it should be Ritual, a path of being, must evoke an ethos therapeutically, it must be evocative and more poetic.

  Then in being outside of language he denies epistemology, in his reactivity to epistemology and science I distance myself from him, in this you and I are in a more similar position or the same distance from the Stephen who toured in the eighties, however , I don't think I need to go into much detail to know that you share, as I do, the motives and reasons for that position towards dogmas, even if it goes to an extreme as Habermas objects to postmodernism, but in what Stephen says about what and how they should being postmodern anthropology and ethnography I agree and it has been crucial for me and has influenced me.

 Also by positioning ourselves in the dialogue with our book we would agree with Stephen who has spoken so much in favor of dialogue and I would like to evoke here by returning to what I told you about the complex and challenging nature of dialogue when Stephen tells me that is why dialogue has been a possibility so attractive internally and externally and it tells me although the dialogue has that apparent indirectness, multiplicity, simultaneity, then in our philosophical dialogues we talked about what would be the logical and rhetorical figures of the dialogue, in which They would differentiate, for example, from controversy as a figure of debate and the said, the logical figure of dialogue is the spiral, but a spiral with no return to the beginning, a continuous spiral that is always on another step that always passes through a similar place, returns to the beginning or to its place. center but never at the same one but at another level that once again become the elements of the spiral but where it is never the same, after the dialogue there is no return to the starting point or the first origin but what we have is a repetition and here I connect this explanation about the logic of the dialogue with my concept of non-repetitive or non-identifying repetitions, and in fact while he spoke he drew a spiral that seemed very beautiful to me. I have reconstructed almost his exact explanation. In these lines.

He said evocation is the appropriate means to work with your concept - referring to me - of non-repetitive repetitions with respect to which he said this concept of mine is on the one hand a refutation of representation insofar as the latter is never identical to what is represented. .

That is to say that according to Stephen we should never take reality or the world for its representation or according to them, the representations, he says that language is always lacking or in excess or does not express our intentions and our thoughts well, or does not represent that well. that reflects or, on the contrary, exceeds them with respect to them, that is, it is excessive with respect to our thoughts, intentions or objects of our representations.

   But then he says, but your concept also captures something crucial about representation in that every representation is nothing more than a non-identical repetition, that is, not identical but that is passed off as if it were, as if it were a repetition of an identity.

However, in my opinion, what is important is evocation, and here if this is already completely central and defining in me, the central thing about evocation is that it leads us to renounce representing cultures and instead

evoke them, evoke the ethos, a certain ethos of the culture, and of one in that culture and in relation to it, how do we achieve this? We achieve it through how we compose our authorial books, here what is prioritized is the part/whole relationship , a book is a compound of parts, of chapters, and here then what it is about is analyzing how each of us writers of thought and social sciences deliberate as authors when composing that balance that evokes more than it represents.

But the evocation is also crucial not only with respect to the representation but now in the purely theoretical as a proposal and logical authorial development as each scientific book that one writes makes a system or deliberates to make a system with the system of science, what idea of ​​science it proposes, Evocation is the way to explore other possibilities that evade the dogmas of science and the aporetic conservatism of the science program, articulating in other ways the relationship of books as scientific works with the lifeworld relationship of the author, author/culture, book as a text, culture as a text, that interprets a book and how it articulates it, evoking is also a path of what Stephen calls co-occurrences, which are the patterns that constrain the text as a discursive whole and I would add co-occurrences by adding an or so that we deliberate not only the internal elements of the author's text but also those of one in its relationship with culture through that text we evoke not only the culture but ourselves in it, for example in my books it is transculturality and interculturality sometimes even the fusion of cultures, in my books it is also how one is in the cultures so that the field work can be evoked

On the other hand, I do see a relationship outside the scope of the books that one writes as an author between evocation and the genesis not only of writing, of tropes and Stephen says until our everyday common sense language It would not be possible without it, let us not forget that Stephen says that it leads us to a sublime of the everyday in affinity and difference with the Kantian aesthetic sublime, but now I also see it in the very genesis of the experience and I deduced this not from Stephen but of Alfred Schütz when we see the such a relevant place that evocation has in the transition between ongoing noetic experience and retrospective or reflective noematic experience, which Schütz called significant, here it is closely related to memory and the very act of retention, the way we retain some things and forget others. , the relationship to memory and recollection is at the center of the way I theorize evocation in my essay the eclipse of evocation where I propose a different articulation than the previous one around the present of the present or triple present, the present that it extends between what is no longer or is not yet, and there it is true that I cited the Ricoeur of time and narration in a section on the ontology of the present, and Stephen agreed with me arguing that the evocation does move in that timeless dimension and then developing important analyzes on the relationship between evocation and zetesis or forms of memory and passive or active memory between zetesis, semantic memory, passheim or memory of the body and its passions and the so-called episodic memory.

You ask me and ask me to expand on the medlee voice. Stephen refers to her as far as I know twice in his essays then other voices without mirrors and in evocation in response to my also extensive about her in our philosophical dialogues although not much, but I can based on my studies of Derrida and what said by Stephen make an effort to further develop the theorization of this concept already in our previous exchange begin to make this concept more theorized

I would add that we must not forget that the concept of medlee voice includes the word voice that refers to the oral, that is, to the transparency according to which writing is always a transcription of a spoken voice. If we are talking about something written, we look for the clues among its inscriptions. that it is a grapheme of a sonority so that we reduce the opacity that completely disconnects writing from speech, that is, performance in the same sense that you reconstructed in Chomsky with respect to Saussure, but the medllee voice also refers to an intermediate space between the active and passive voices of grammar, a middle voice is something like neither an excess of subjectivity nor an excess of objectivity, both cases in which subject and object are externalized, it is something like this how to say keep talking in writing, not write according to her or what she asks, when you write the writing she asks according to her grammatical rules, if you listen to her a lot you no longer write what you think but you think by writing, you no longer write what you speak but you speak writing, the middle voice would be not to lose the connection of writing with performance so that you do not separate between the situation and the representation, or between the representation and its objects, or between the living/writing process and a telos external to it.

Stephen says it is not the instance as when we say the voice of an author but rather it is the provocation of the speaking of the voice, it is the revocation of the speaking of the voice, it is the provocation of the voice as writing and as grammar

And it also says the kind of reciprocity involved in the middle voice is not expressed in the grammar of differentiated subjects and objects, or of us and others, these are no longer separate, but mutually implicated in some kind of ongoing process whose meanings cannot be be foreseen in anticipation but found only in the activity itself or in what unites us in its contemplation

It is obvious that here Stephen is revoking the simultaneous temporality of the procedural; he says an ongoing process or performance and literally says the idea of ​​reciprocity and mutuality linked to the middle voice establishes a world of participation in which the differentiation between ourselves and others does not exist. a world works more where others are not objects of our desires or where we are not possessed by them

Because the rest of anthropology that has called itself postmodern, with the exception of Stephen, in my opinion, precisely in the cultural sphere, suffers from a chronic backwardness with respect to the rest of aesthetic postmodernism, the latter in both music, film and visual arts has established fusion parameters. of cultures even beyond the interculturality that I prioritize and work beyond transculturation has represented not only the interweaving of cultures but the total fusion of them contrary to ethnocentrism and Ethnic fundamentalism still and much I would say almost the main characteristic of the so-called anthropology, unlike and behind the saga of the culturality of postmodernism in the avant-garde, think for example of Sting albums made almost like African music, in the mosaics of fusion of cultures that define aesthetic postmodernism outside of anthropology, let us not forget that the so-called anthropology has proclaimed and made the other and otherness a standard, seeking others or trying to produce or invent them all costs, Fabián for example time and the other where anthropology demands that the other be an ontos in itself different from the ontos of the anthropologist's ethnicity, exactly the opposite of the avant-garde of aesthetic and cultural postmodernism in cinema, music, the arts visuals and the theory about them where, as I exemplified in my essay postmodernism and dualism in my book rethinking intertextuality, the fusion of cultures reaches the point that already listening you cannot differentiate if it is an emigrated musician from India to Europe or a European Celtic musician who emigrated to India, in the mosaics and juxtapositions of postmodernist fusion of cultures in the avant-garde, it is precisely the opposite of what was proclaimed by a considerable part of the so-called

Anthropology minus Stephen, me, Surpik and in certain books and essays Quetzil, Lisa, Joy

In postmodern ethnography Stephen denies all this for which he was rejected at the time, he separated himself from others, in then other voices without mirrors he says that otherness is mathematically systematizable and unthinkable, that there is no other, only fear of difference, In Beyond Alphabet, ask the interviewer what field work are you referring to? The traditional one of going to distant lands? the exotic then We can do field work among ourselves, in evocation. In response to me, he says, evocation cries out for a participatory world where the distinctions between us and others no longer work, rather it is a performance in process in which we participate in mutuality, reciprocity and cooperation, with Derrida he is the only one who brings anthropology closer to the rest of the fusionism of the cultural avant-garde and here we would have to distinguish avant-garde as the opposite of ethnocentrism or ethnic essentialism, the avant-garde can only be intercultural and transcultural and now extreme fusion of cultures.

Postmodern ethnography or a certain dose of it, a percent of it in the sociology of culture and intercultural cultural anthropology, must arouse in the native culture an image of itself through an ethos that evokes that in which both or several cultures become one another in such a way that each native culture recognizes itself in it or recognizes as the authorial work the book that one writes deliberates what I call the inscriptions that in the way I have re theorizing this concept is nothing more than an acervical deliberation. The relationship between self and heritage, and between heritage and backgrounds opens the phenomenology of the self between the individual and the cultural in a way that the work of social sciences, the book is the same as interfaces an intercultural deliberation on the relationship between heritages

But if we make a crucial distinction between the concept of medlee voice as worked by Stephen, which is directly and said by him in affinity and coincidence with the medlee voice in Derrida who uses the concept of medlee voice only once in the margins of philosophy, we must exclude the use made of the word by Evans Prittchard who in his Nuers speaks of a middle voice in educated English

So returning to common sense and the importance and relevance it has in my work, my books as works first and foremost of phenomenological sociology and common sense, I told you a few exchanges ago that it is crucial, as much as it was to discuss the sources. philological and semiotic aspects of the concept of correlate make a reservation or differentiation between the concepts of interpretation that we have in Gadamer and in Schütz

In Gadamer, interpretation is the activity of interpreting in itself. The way in which the hermeneutics of what is implicit becomes ontological with respect to the being outside and beyond the parameter of interpreting a literary work is given in the fact that the one who interprets is the being. The ontological here itself is suspended in time along with the time or temporality of being, which is why in Gadamer, when we immerse ourselves in the temporality in question, we can grasp that this being suspended in time presupposes either a certain historicity of being or a happening or event, the question of the event and being, I move away from the historicist bias towards what a certain interpretation of Gadamer may tend to, however in Schütz the interpretation takes for granted that the world in which we live and mean is pre-interpreted and that precisely what makes it ontologically a world of common sense is its being pre-interpreted, we live in a world already previously interpreted and endowed with meanings, the typifications that organize or explain the way we access it from the outside to that self of the other of which we have no news regarding its motivation or intentionality is through typifications, as I say in sobreordination in the life worlds if I hear footsteps behind my door it could be or the neighbor who lives on the floor above or the evangelist who comes to profess the Bible or an unannounced friendship but never the circus harlequin who when he opens the door will start doing acrobatics, so I have it pre-interpreted as a typical probability and those typical probabilities they organize our entire surrounding world accepted in the natural attitude as unproblematic, in Houston Texas it is not typical for the newspaper delivery man to proclaim the newspaper with his voice he arrives on his bicycle silently and leaves it in the mailbox if he proclaims it it is completely atypical it is not incorporated Thus in the world pre-interpreted by experience, however in Monterrey and Caracas it is the opposite, the one who carries the newspaper proclaims it with his voice, the typicality orders the pre-interpreted world and the pertinences. They give the structure to the world of common sense as they establish the guidelines for how the isolated monad the individual processes the world that is presented to him as external, if it is relevant to his pre-interpretation, common sense advances, accepts going in that direction even if it is about something new, such as a trip to a previously unknown city, meeting a new person or moving forward in a dialogue according to what they are told, if it is not relevant, he hesitates, observes that it does not coincide with what the experience validates, he hesitates and probably either evade and dodge or go back, the same What happens then is with the other guiding concepts of my sociology, experience, heritage, significance, self that I have developed under the influence of Schütz, which is the main thing here now for the work of social science, the following, we do not interpret culture as who merely interprets or makes an interpretation of what another tells him or of a book, in reality we understand that we cannot understand a culture and understand it without understanding those pre-interpretations, without accessing how social actors mean their world and give it meaning, we work with the acquis, we put in relation acervical reinterpretations including that of oneself that we must first know, then once these pre-interpretations are understood we put in relation textual forms at the same time the interpretive activity is incessant not only is it given as pre-interpreted but the world of The action of what we do and what we tell ourselves about what we have experienced is again and again always interpretive.

So let's say in Houston, Texas, I do not share with the ice cream seller of Cuban origin the heritage of being an ice cream seller or that of being a theorist, I nevertheless share with him the heritage of living in the same city, I can therefore According to what Schütz calls finite universes of meaning, I engage with him in a dialogue about Houston as a city but not about philosophy or selling ice cream. On the other hand, on the university campus I share with the native Anglo-Saxon the reading of the same books and more or less a similar expectation about what it is to be a theorist, also the heritage of having the same colleagues and friends. I can speak with him about it as a shared heritage or the shared heritage of living in Houston, but I do not share with the heritage according to which I, the theorist, and the ice cream seller can talk about what it means to us to be Cubans living in Texas.

Very well, here we are now at the very center of phenomenological sociology, to understand what implications this has in the way of practicing research we could refer to many very different examples from each other, but methodological would be an example in which the pincushion contrasts are high, for example, suppose that beyond a simple passing conversation, it is a sociology project about ice cream sellers and now the acervical correlation will not only be faced with a question of mere communication or superficial interaction of simple engage in a conversation, but we want to know how that ice cream seller means his world and gives it meaning, that is, let's resort to an example in which pre-interpreted universes have to be considered in the deliberation of alternatives for a research, for example in my book "The indeterministic truth" the first chapter if possible when you can go and read it, we are faced with the situation of understanding how a collector of discarded soda cans in the city who lives by collecting them and selling them It means its world and gives it meaning, on the one hand, in order to understand it, we must access its pre-interpretations, but we must also, in order to access it and decide how we will do our research, understand how it pre-interprets us and how those textual forms should be put in relation. , our preinterpretations about the can seller and his about one must be put into relation from a variety of possible alternatives in such a way that we can obtain a certain cut or a variety of possible relation of textual cuts between our acervical relations , our The objective is to find out how he means his world and gives it meaning, but what we are going to obtain, and I resort to your memory of that concept in your previous analysis of Chomsky, will be an interface between these different acervical correlations that will be nothing more than the essay, the book we write, or the film we make, go and read that essay when you can.

Excuse me for not immersing myself in the Lacanian discussion,

 As I tell you, I prefer to read Lacan again before we talk, that is, before committing to a definitive articulation of him. Despite this, he did hold me responsible for what I have said so far in our counterpoints regarding Lacan and psychoanalysis, well. It is not something to have read the seminars but it is worth considering having read them so long ago, therefore I can at this moment take responsibility for concise articulations like the ones I have made and not ambitious in terms of a discussion of Lacan,

 Going back to the first thing I told you in my counterpoints; I am working exactly from the perspective contrary to the presuppositions of the unconscious for a long time. For a long time, in phenomenological sociology, at least as I understand and practice it, we are primarily interested in not what the subjects are aware of, we do not consider that there are structures inaccessible to the knowledge of the subjects, which are what should be studied in order to understand it from what they do not know and that from a position of superiority and authority science declares condition the lives of those subjects who do not know themselves sufficiently until they access the knowledge of those structures that conditions, call it the unconscious, call it kinship, call it the institutions, whatever we put in the name of that which is inaccessible, we think exactly the opposite, that is, exactly the opposite of what to understand the subjects, the culture and the society in that they live, we must access how these subjects give sense and meaning to their world, that it is in the knowledge of common sense where the jewels of knowledge of culture and society are and that we must work with what the subjects say about themselves to understand them not with what they do not know or of which they are not in control

This does not mean, however, that I deny the unconscious, I do not deny it, and if I consider it should be considered in a certain percent in a moderate and subordinate dose in any scientific research, but never as the center or the main source of knowledge, there is something Dionysian in my consideration in giving so much importance to the unconscious

With this said, I return again to my previous reasoning, which has as its starting point not to assume psychoanalysis but to ask ourselves what in the discourse of psychoanalysis can serve us outside of psychoanalysis.

Schütz does not deny the imagination, nor does he deny the dream, in fact he reserves for them in phenomenological and common sense sociology a finite region of meaning, he reserves a province to which we can go with the same common sense, understanding its relevance. So we need to visit that region to find that in it, and to thereby return to the main regions of our action and our conscious experience.

What does it mean for what Schütz calls the individual awake and attentive to his world in the natural attitude to visit that region of dreaming, of the sleeping individual, of dreams and of the unconscious.

We are undoubtedly producers of symbols through language and when these symbols are externalized in the social world as socialized symbolizations we see in the presence of ourselves that our symbols form imagery that is well differentiated from each other as visual and material culture, not forgetting that our languages ​​also alphabetical both the ideograms or signs of Arabic and other languages ​​have visual and graphemic expression as much as the Egyptians, Mesopotamians and other ancient civilizations had, we also see in front of ourselves that if we turn our backs on those regions or provinces of visual culture that form our symbols, looking for example towards the horizon of the sea or towards the moon at night, that is, if we turn our back on culture, looking towards nature, those visual and sound imagery that form our symbols , they can only be with our backs to them remembered in an immaterial memory, the dematerialized intangible character of the images in our memories and that seen what were previously imagery before our eyes is now an imaginary before the zetesic, semantic or episodic associations of our memory, that is, of that which, back to nature, is not present before us at the same time, here we should say in English fancy

  But I would not in any way underestimate the question of presence either for any form of theorizing that presupposes or attempts to process symbolization with respect to the unknown, and although my perspective is phenomenological, not psychoanalytic, we should remember here the relationship with what is yet to be known for those who we start from phenomenology

  Starting with the real or reality itself, as I told you in our previous exchange, the concept of reality depends completely on the concept of presence, what reality we are talking about, listing one by one the realist philosophers that interest you if you do not imagine it every time with each one. in front of your eyes, what reality can I speak about, for example, right now if it is not the illuminated room I am in, the closet that I see, my window that I see when I separate my gaze from the keyboard, only what is present thanks to the light so let's not forget that without light we cannot we see, it is real for us or only what was present in our memory we remember that it is and remains there because although it is no longer present to us we remember it in the presence you never talk about a real that does not presuppose presence and in the same way that Hegel He said we are never in contact with all matter but only with a specific matter that has a form, also the real is not available to us all at the same time, if all reality if all space were present for us at the same time, then we could deny Hegel his main definition based on what phenomenal, in form, in presence and in appearance, reality, Hegel said, is first accidental, this is a law as undeniable as Newton's law of gravity, the real is accidental because we are in contact only each time with one limited region of the real according to what makes us present, asking ourselves how many things we see a day, your contact with each region of the real is increasingly accidental, it is a gesture of contact between two things that in terms of presence are to a large extent like this by accident, the second real is contingent, another law as law as the law of gravity, because once it is accidental it begins to be like this and not otherwise and once it is like that at some point it will stop being like that and will become something else, it is therefore contingent it is here and now like this for contingency. And if the real is accidental and contingent, what is it? To the presence, therefore, it is experimental, reality is a cinema of contingent and accidental gestures from the very moment in which all reality does not make itself present to you at the same time. time.

I am thinking here of duration (Bergson in duration and simultaneity), all those who have imagined going, for example, against duration as the linearity of time, something as we well know, an avoidance is impossible, it is not possible to go back in time making all times coexist, more impossible It is still making the entire space coexist at the same time for presence, imagine for a moment that you would have in front of your gaze at the same time all the streets of all the cities in the United States and at the same time before your presence all the streets of Japan It is so absurd to separate reality from presence or even more so than to go back in time because at least you can remember time knowing, as Schütz says, that someone else also remembers it and that they remember the same time although of things experienced in different spaces and by two or more. many different living individuals.

So what importance does it have for us that things do not make themselves present to us at the same time but rather gradually, progressively? I would say that gradualness is a law of experience and that this has immense symbolic importance for man. Let's move on. from the physical realm to the realm of sense, interpretation and meanings, if everything were present at the same time we would know everything with just the presence, so someone would tell you something and you would understand it all at once, you would read a book and you would understand it all in one go. a reading, but we know not It's like that, you read it several times and each time it makes a new sense to you and you begin to understand a new layer each time, you would see a Pakistani before your eyes and you would know everything about Pakistan so that not only is realness gradual for us in presence but also that with presence alone we do not know everything, once we understand this we acquire a sense that everything we know we know through presence but with presence alone we do not know everything it is necessary to search in it and therefore behind him go to the strata and substrates, but what are strata and substrates but subsequent forms of presence? Then presence has for us not only a cognitive value but also an investigative and hermeneutical value. We begin to call presence not only what appears physically but also what everything that we learn with knowledge but that we do not acquire at once but gradually, a presence is not enough, but searching in it, behind it, searching between presences, phenomena, forms, appearances is also to find the meaning to find the word, to understand

We can only know through it but with it alone we do not know everything from that moment it is not enough for us to appear, what appears is not enough for us, we begin to search, we need to know more, we want to find out behind the presence but only we can achieve it gradually, this very simple principle explains the ontologically phenomenological and hermeneutic character of knowledge and explains why there are certain dimensions of the symbolic that cannot be deduced at the same time with the sole presence, but by strata, from that moment on what is not present begins to acquire a certain relevance but we will never be able to access it except through subsequent presences, the imagination of the stratified, of the substratum appears here as a hermeneutics, it is stratified at the same time because on the one hand phenomenologically it only goes from the appearance and the phenomenon to subsequent phenomena in a way gradually and on the other, because interpretively at the same time we cannot understand it except by reading the strata, gradually the senses are defined, what did not have language progressively acquires a language, before we did not know To say it, we could not find the word, we could not achieve that a relationship of meanings articulated in language sufficiently confirmed the meaning that it made to us when we had not understood it and here the presence returns, finding it is nothing if not giving with its presence in the language a presence another stratified, and it is thus that a certain region of knowledge processes a certain symbolization of the unknown.

Now up to this point there is no name for the unknown and the name that it acquires once there is language is not named unconscious but something else, so if we call the unknown unconscious we would have that the unconscious is that which does not yet have a name but if it does not has a name has no identity

But this up to this point is phenomenology, not psychoanalysis.

 On the other hand, I wonder why we think that the fact that language preexists us and we acquire it and learn it as something that comes to us predated in culture is above our conscious activity with it, on the one hand, it makes no sense to say The language preexists for us if we do not say at the same time that we have to process it to reproduce ourselves, therefore the conscious task of transmitting the language as an activity through which we reproduce ourselves culturally is much more important cognitively for the culture than the fact even though it preexists us.

  What is the point of it pre-existing if we do not transmit it and if we do not guarantee our reproduction through that transmission? That said, the most important thing about a language is not to receive it predated but once learned to create culture with it and that is how it develops. Conscious about language is the most important thing, I think if here, choosing between schools of psychology, that Piaget is at least for me until today the most accurate.

I will reread Lacan and I promise that once I have reread it, I will be productive about him in some way that is useful for our dialogue.

I will answer you about Lotman in another exchange, it requires a disciplinary context in semiotics, but in principle I will tell you, what Lotman did is completely different from what I did within semiotics, his studies of literature and mythology, cinema in culture, It is a kind of extension of the parameter of art into the parameter of culture, but despite this it is different if I like it and I have always mentioned it when it has been relevant in a criticism essay from 2 years ago I mention it in its references to neo-mythological art, and I have cited him several times, I like his concept of the semiosphere, it has possibilities although he discusses it from different parameters than those that I would use if I were referring to the type of phenomena that he discusses about the semiosphere that I assume you are interested in, but I share the concept , his notion of text is very impregnated with fictional literature, it is not my notion of text but Lotman could be my great-grandfather when I saw him in 1992 in Caracas he was 70, I was 20, but of course I mention it sometimes and it is a type of textualism in semiotics that is different from Barthes. On the other hand, I do not agree with the replacement of text with intertextuality as many intertextualists claim. This is not the case of Lotman, but I see textuality studies and of intertextualists as two different things, I also do not approve of the replacement of intertextualists with intersubjectivity and I place limits that depart from the extension of the textual parameter of art towards the texts of culture. I understand the latter directly without the mediation of art and I work on the semiotics of art as an ontological section, but of course Tartu is a precedent in the semiotics of culture that cannot be left unmentioned and I will not fail to do so, but it will require attention at some point. future book Thank you for mentioning it, yes I have referred to it as many in Houston essays as in recent years

The biunivocal relationship of language with the world: dialogue with the logical-empiricist approach

By Alberto Méndez Suarez

I am very happy to receive a new message from you. I also congratulate you that you have had enough time to work on your own projects, on the pending art criticism texts. It's good that you were able to finish it and resume your authorial work on The Enigmas of the Ground. I think that's the title of your latest book.

I have read in a first reading all your latest messages, your answers to my initial questions and your reflections based on those questions as part of your answers. Intellectually of unsurpassed rigor and superior quality with the usual complex and structural plot elaborations and with a high theoretical flight. That in a general sense. In particular, I am very interested in reading your author's work and then your explanation of it because your reflections allow me a very productive counterpoint with my own. Your last response in the first part of our "Counterpoints" was very interesting when you explained what our methodological differences were. On the one hand, your phenomenological, dynamic vision regarding the very movement of the concept and its adaptation to reality where that same concept is full of reality as well and where that real is prior to the linguistic development of the concept itself and on which it supervenes as a second level of reality that is also superordinate. I emphasize here that the very epistemological terms that you skillfully handle not only determine that same phenomenological reality from which your ethnomethodological bias is derived on the one hand and exegetical interpretative bias on the other (influence of Gadamer) and where influenced by Peirce's semiotics you begin to work on the meaning that is derived from that phenomenological reality that is also part of that same phenomenological reality and then performative and intersubjective influenced by the pragmatic development of Habermas.  To this is added the micrometric synchronic aspect in your phenomenological and then hermeneutical analysis of that reality and the self, the self and the being in itself, noumenon and its implicated correlate and subject where your influence from Schütz's phenomenological sociology is transpired. .

This is up to now on your side while on mine an analysis of the adequacy and inadequacy of the word with the object seen in its general static form of signifier and signified influenced by Lacan in his structuralist scheme of unconscious language and from the logical empiricist perspective. to which the influence of the late Lacan led me (I reject the fully positivist framework although I recognize the analytical-aprioristic Carnapian heritage of the Vienna Circle) the relationship ("de facto and de re") logical propositional (Russell) and logical predicative (Quine) of thought with the conditions of truth and with the values ​​of that truth in its generality and in its existence (Quine, Davidson, Putnam). This is in regards to my way of seeing abstract thought and the type of bite that it manages to give to physical reality to convert it into a more abstract notion and its theoretical indeterminacy due to the fact itself (Quine versus Popper). The powerful influence that my reading and study of Popper has had has led me to a slow movement of epistemological and methodological analysis from Quine to Popper. Hence his dualistic vision (Popper) of the mind-body problem has a greater influence on my analysis. From the point of view of the philosophy of science, I start from Popper's realism about conjectural thinking, the a priori condition of the hypotheses and their corroboration and/or falsification of these, how to establish their demarcation criterion to define a scientistic criterion and I arrive to the indeterminacy of translation and inscrutability of Quine's reference. Lately the pragmatic influence of Rorty, his antifoundationalism and antirepresentationalism and then of Putnam in the analysis of logical propositions and their internalist (mentalist) determination of reality as well as the influence of Dummett on the epistemologically antirealist vision of the Oxford natural language philosophers and the linguistic realist influence of Searle's emergentism, have been inclining me towards an interest in reading Habermas immediately prior to our first exchanges of messages that little Little by little they became the Counterpoints. I do not yet know what place Habermas will occupy in my reflection. In my case I remain at that structural level that you observed very acutely. So much for the reference to your final message from the first part of the Counterpoints.

Then come my questions and your extensive explanation at the beginning of the second part of the Counterpoints, this time focusing more on an explanation of your book El correlato de mundo.

I want to have a little time in the midst of daily activities and what my health allows me to slowly and carefully reread your answers for two reasons:

1) because they objectively seem to me to be very sharp and precise reflections that are very illuminating of your work, of your abstract thinking, of your reflections as a phenomenologist.

2) because I am interested in responding with counter-responses to your answers at the points where our elaborations with their own independent developments converge and at others in which I distance myself from some of the epistemological assumptions that your reflection conveys (for example, your imprint Hegelian or what I would call your Hegelianism, cornerstone of your phenomenological elaboration of the concept of the world).

It will take me a week or so to send you my responses to your arguments. They will not be answers based directly on your book but indirectly around it as we agreed that this second part of the "Counterpoints" would be.

In the last paragraphs of your answers you emphasize that you consider yourself an ethnomethodologist because your reflection on the "lifeworld" is reduced to a micrometric space "intramundane horizon" and "world correlate" included. I agree with that aspect but in its phenomenological form without becoming historicist (that's not what it's about at all) but I do think it's convenient to emphasize that in your phenomenological development there is a Hegelian diachronic perspective that looks at the movement of the world in its own dialectic. which leads to your relationship with that "world" unfolding throughout that diachrony and like an observer who cuts out a synchronic fragment from the fabric of the world to describe his own internal dynamics and his own future. micrometric. All this in a movement prior to the structural and then structuralist framing from which you undoubtedly distance yourself and in which my points of view are framed as well as in my post-positivist empiricist logical reflection.

In the next week I will be reading and responding to your long reflection and your responses. And in turn for this weekend I send you two other questions.

I think it's good that you share our dialogues with your colleagues. I trust your perception and observation. And I believe that abstract debate and reflection on philosophy, although closely related to thought, undoubtedly creates a subjective effect and an intersubjective need for which the scientific and philosophical community is necessary for the clarification of concepts and ideas.

Regarding the personal framework that sometimes infiltrates our Counterpoints and that is sometimes part of our reflections, I have no objection to you eliminating those that talk about your relationships, your marriages and separations, etc. if that is how you understand it and if you also want to eliminate it from what you are going to publish on Facebook or send to your colleagues and friends. If you don't mind, when you review it, also eliminate those segments where I have explained in more detail important aspects of my medical condition that I have no interest in making public because I have no interest in publicly disseminating important aspects of my physical health. Not so those where I mention it in passing because they do not go into detail and I have no objection to maintaining it so as not to upset the dynamics of the text itself, its own flow. On the other hand, I understand what you have gone through and felt in these years of loneliness and intense intellectual work. I have gone through that experience after my wife's divorce, which was a breakup full of outbursts on her part, unnecessary and excessive claims and a lot of misunderstanding. Lacan said among those lapidary phrases that he used very French-style that "loving is giving what you don't have to someone who doesn't want it" and that "the greatest love ends in hate." The first of these phrases corresponds to the place of transference in psychoanalysis in the book corresponding to Seminar 8 of the same title and the second to Seminar 20 entitled "Even."

I would like, if you don't mind, as we have agreed, for the last part of this message to be removed from our Counterpoints and from any version or copy that circulates publicly beyond the framework of our dialogue.

Thank you for reading my extensive comment carefully and paying attention to the points I pointed out and the lines I drew until I was able to underline the places and perspectives of our points of view. Those areas where we converge and our work and collaboration becomes more intense and the broken lines where we diverge. You have been very generous as always, sacrificing your valuable work time by contributing your substantial opinions and useful definitions to our joint work around your book.

By the way, it has been a very pleasant surprise to receive this message from you this morning, when at the same time I coincidentally received by mail a book that I bought on Amazon, a compilation book of postmodern anthropology texts compiled by a certain Carlos Reynoso, apparently an Argentine academic expert on the subject. The book contains texts by anthropologists such as Clifford Geertz, James Clifford and Stephen A. Tyler, among the most notable. The significant thing that connects the anecdote of the book with the reading of your message is the name of the anthropologist Stephen Tyler of whom I only recently became aware through you, reading you after having noticed that you give a certain particular value to his work and theoretical influence in yours and after discovering that you dedicate a chapter to it if I'm not mistaken in "The Correlate of the World" and another at the end of "Thinking Science" if I'm not mistaken. And I would like to ask you, Abdel, a little tangentially to the framework of our work, and motivated, specifically by your book and your authorial work, I would like to ask you more as an intellectual curiosity: why is Stephen Tyler's work so important to you? as a thinker and as an ethnomethodologist? Taking into account that Stephen Tyler as an author and anthropologist is referenced on multiple occasions throughout your work and especially in these two books. I am referring in particular to two chapters of your two books "The Correlate of the World" and "Thinking Science" since you cite Tyler repeatedly in one of the last chapters of "The Correlate of the World" and at the end of "Thinking Science." " where you include your reflection on "evocation" as a phenomenological concept and Tyler's response to your comment.

I think your decision to wait for a response from me is very good, but I am also very afraid that it will take longer than I anticipated. It will take me a little more time. I am making an enormous effort to avoid reading any of the books I have, any scientific philosophical essay, any text or some other books that I have occasionally purchased on Amazon, because I do not want their reading to contaminate my study and reading of your book. The correlation of the world. Your long answer before this short and last one is actually quite complex and I feel like it's going to take me a little more time. If it pleases you better, you can respond if you like my long response previous to this one and when I am ready to respond I can include my counter-responses to your last response. As you feel better. It is true that these counterrhythms can create confusion but I will try to include in my counter answers all the points addressed in your answers. As for questions No.3 and No.4 that I had not sent you yet, they were already answered in some way in your extensive response previous to the latter. I hope to be able to respond to you as soon as possible. 

As for what it is to be? inside and outside of language as inside and outside in contrast to Derrida's "Of Grammatology" for whom, thinking with Saussure, the subject is language and therefore whenever we speak and think we do so within language, that is, within that predetermined structure. . This in Derrida where the signifying chain is infinite, where there is no closure of the discourse and causes the interpretation to be constantly sent back outside its limits, a kind of infinite "recursion".  Default if we make a synchronous cut but whose origin is always postponed. Where the function of the outside becomes the place of writing in Derrida. On the other hand, Derrida's formulations on Grammatology and writing seem indifferent to referent and meaning. But instead, you make Derrida say beyond himself on the way to the gateways between language and non-language, between language and world and between language and writing. You take Derrida to the limit, even interpreting him from Peirce, who for the purposes of your phenomenological inquiry, the use you make of him is effectively masterful. However, I speak with an essay by Derrida, a phenomenologist and reader of Husserl, who asks about the initial conditions at the moment of the genesis of phenomenological reflection. As you know, this is not yet a Derrida armed with Saussure. The text in question is a gem of this phenomenological stage that you know how to make it produce.

If we compare the post-structuralist Derrida with the structuralist Lacan, we can recognize in the latter a limit to the infinite interpretation that Anglo-Saxon post-positivist logicians try to avoid at all costs: the feared "infinita regress." This limit is posed from outside language, a limit of meaning that would be in Lacan the dimension of what he calls "jouissance" which is a different notion from the Freudian pleasure principle. Lacanian jouissance occurs inside and outside of language. Inside as phallic enjoyment, rumination of the word, logo centrism. And it was like feminine enjoyment. This occurs in an outside of language that borders and limits it and ultimately gives it meaning. In fact, in Lacan it is the very path of the drive that will isomorphically determine the alternation of the signifying chain where the real itself is the limit of language. The real makes edge. In the first moment of his journey as a Freudian psychoanalyst, for Lacan, the signifier is the cause of phallic enjoyment and unconscious repression. But in a second moment to which Lacan progressively arrives, it is the subject of enjoyment that causes the effect of the subject of the signifier.

The problem is that with Derrida there is no subject effect.

 Throughout these years I have read Derrida's books "Of Grammatology", "The Problem of Genesis in Husserl's Philosophy", "Writing and Difference", "Margins of Philosophy", and "Spectres of Marx" and very recently reread his article "La diferancia" based on our dialogues, and I have not found anything in Derrida beyond what Lacan has given me in terms of the philosophy of language, regardless of the enormous pleasure that results from reading it. of many of his books for his stylistic skill and his skillful and masterful use of prose.

Derrida's structure is subjectless, and seems to stand alone.

This is the reason that always distanced me from Derrida since he seems to succumb to the same error of the logical positivists who alienate the subjective dimension under the spell of scientific objectivism.

This is the Achilles heel of the logical empiricism of the Vienna Circle and the Anglo-Saxon post-positivist logical-analytical approach. by ignoring the subject that phenomenology seems to rescue and preserve in all its descriptive forms and, in turn, accounting for its concept of "intentionality" not only through Husserl but also through Jaspers, Gadamer, or Ricoeur. However, with logical empiricism (Russell, Carnap, Wittgenstein, Vienna Circle) and analytical philosophy (Quine, Putnam, Davidson, Dummett, Rorty, Dennett, Churchland) the notion of the referent as the outside of an objectified language is rescued. , that is, of an "object-language" that guarantees and sustains the logical propositions of a metalanguage. On the other hand, the deductivist internalist current of Anglo-Saxon philosophical thought itself (Popper, Chomsky, Dummett, G.H.von Wright, Hintikka, Gazzeniga, Chalmers, Strawson, Chisholm, sometimes Putnam, definitely Searle) seems to restore the central role of intentionality or propositions and dispositional attitudes, regardless of the metaphysical notion of the subject.

In Lacan it is the opposite, it is the subject who is alienated in the Other (the significant register); The subject is alienated in the exteriority of a code (the Other) and is divided between that code (Other) and the message (the subject barred by language) that separates from it, leaving its place to the object as an effect of castration. produced by the paternal metaphor. It is on the subject, the subject of the unconscious, where the responsibility for the interpretation and echoes of language, its constant derivations and its effects falls. But the subject in Lacan is also the place where the registers of instinctual enjoyment in the real and the significant register in the symbolic are articulated.

This brings us to the debate on the problem raised by Wittgenstein about "private language" and the question of whether there is language before its socialization, rather, its interpretation. And the paradox that this means, in Wittgenstein, seems to lead us to a crossroads that he resolves from a logical point of view; operating a reductionism of the real world to a problem of language, ignoring every private instance and coming out a little from the shadows of that Platonic cave, desubstantializing the same cave of being, of the Platonic essences later taken up by Husserl. Even Quine, in his search for a certain nominalism, seems to flirt with this thesis when he states that "language is a social art" and thus strips it of any individual or private feature, also desubstantializing it.

However, it's interesting how you seem to distance yourself from He world correlate from Derrida's From Grammatology and you open a possibility for this inside/outside bipolarity by returning to the phenomenological Derrida. On the other hand, you say that, also to define this inside/outside of language, Derrida resorts to the "gateways" that you mention and try to define from your perspective. I just find it difficult to admit that in that fabric (texeré) we are talking about catwalks of a fabric that is text but that is in no way "world" but whose transit, however, is text that goes from language to non-language. It is confusing to me to think of Derrida's catwalks as a texéré that processes text from language to non-language. How Derrida can configure that text in the place of non-language is, without a doubt, a mysterious creation.

For example, if an anti-realist analytical logical-empiricist philosopher like Michael Dummett of Oxford who has based his work on a logical-linguistic flow between the Platonic realism of Frege and the nominalism of Wittgenstein, if Dummett had to think about these Derrida bridges --- -I accept that the example is a forced foot to rethink these exuberances and the articulation of the gateways between language and non-language------, I would have affirmed that there is also a world in the text, or rather, that the text is a condition of the world, blurring the separation of text and world.  

I confess that I have no reservations towards structuralism. Despite its rigid binary scheme, inherited from Saussure, Jakobson and the Prague School and of course from the anthropology of Lévi-Strauss, structuralism undoubtedly conceived the orchestration of an epistemological model. Structuralism brings back fond memories for me and personally it meant an intellectual feat for me when I discovered the enormous scientific wealth that it then offered me and the subsequent path by which I continued following its channel. It was the school that, retroactively, initiated me into philosophy. I think that as an approach, methodologically instrumental, and systematically applied, it can be very useful for the purpose of building a conceptual framework, a supporting skeleton, a "hardware" to be able to turn on the computer as a kind of Turing machine, let's say, like the classic example of Wittgenstein's staircase -----without this mention making the Austrian thinker a structuralist since the genesis of his work, although it responds to the philosophy of language where it is inaugural and fundamental, is in no way a result of linguistics of Saussure, it seems essential to highlight this distinction, it is crucial to distinguish that his theories have different genesis and developments-----, whose image Umberto Eco appropriated, commenting on it recurrently on multiple occasions and exploiting it until obtaining the resin, the juice necessary to feed, to build its own semiotic building, again the classic and recurring example of the staircase. Structuralism was the original knowledge that allowed me personally to approach, decipher and understand the thought of my time, of my time, which came to me perhaps at the wrong time, and arrived in Cuba perhaps a little late, ten or fifteen years late. . Although the book Structural Anthropology by Lévi-Strauss had already been published in Cuba in 1971 by the publishing house Ciencias Sociales, this event apparently went unnoticed without major theoretical consequences because an adequate scientific and historical social context was not found for its development due to the central role that the theses of Marxism were in play at that time and that, because they were derived from the designs of Hegelian dialectics, they were totally opposed to the structuralism of which Lévi-Strauss was one of its most rigorous protagonists. We would have to wait twenty years after the Cuban publication of Lévi-Strauss's book for the conditions of possibility of structuralism to be truly mature in Cuba at the end of the 1980s when, as you must remember, an intellectual movement would take shape. starring Cuban avant-garde artists of the visual arts with wide national repercussion in which you were one of the most outstanding protagonists who in a certain way became the critical self-consciousness of your generation to the point of representing a possible moment of consonance with the cultural project of the political vanguard.

I insist, I do not deny structuralism nor is it my intention, in turn, with this denial, to undermine your critical vision of the phenomenon. I understand, yes, clearly, the difference that you explain to me between ontological structuralism and operational structuralism that comes to us from the last chapters of "The absent structure" by Humberto Eco when the Italian semiologist presents the anthropology of Lévi-Strauss in the face of this dichotomy. It seems logical to me, given your own theoretical development of enormous complexity and variegated rigor, that you distance yourself from structuralism as we knew it in its ontological form with that critical statement and that you assume it in a rather tactical sense, which you call, together with Eco, "operational", that is, functional, and in a certain way utilitarian and that you distance yourself from its ontological character but on the other hand, however, it seems relatively unfair to me. I am a little sentimental about the past and the details of life, certain books, or the love of a woman in all its extension and in this I think that I am overcome with a certain nostalgia for what once represented something of enormous intellectual and at the same time emotional, and symbolic, for me. I can't help it, it belongs to my nature. I believe, however, that, for my part, I owe a lot to structuralism, and because it is also part of my past. My current state of thought, the development of my ideas as far as I have been able to go and as far as I have been able to take them would not have been possible without structuralism as a basis, nor without the fact of my inaugural reading of Lévi-Strauss at the age of 19, nor nor all my journey through Lacan's work from my 20s to my 30s in my youth, what was the experience of psychoanalysis in my life in Cuba and later after leaving Havana at the beginning of this century and with more equanimity and more intellectual maturity my subsequent encounter with analytical philosophy and epistemology in the United States in my 30s and 40s in the first decade of the new century, with all the problems of the cognitivist debate on the table, The problem of artificial intelligence in the one that Chomsky, Putnam, Searle, Dennett, Churchland and other first-line cognitivists had worked on and the mind-body connection that in my opinion both Popper and Eccles, pioneers on the subject, resolve masterfully in his book as Michael Gazzeniga, one of the epigones of neuroconnective lateralism. On the other hand, the metaphysical problem of scientific realism, the divisionist and verificationist problem in matters of philosophy of science and logic as a language and tool of philosophical demonstration, my encounter, in short, with all that theoretical and scientific arsenal, my encounter with the work of Popper, Putnam, Chomsky, Rorty, Dummett, Davidson, Searle and of course Quine.

This turn from my reading of the late Lacan towards Anglo-Saxon post-positivist analytical philosophy occurs as I have told you on other occasions at the end of my 30s around 2007 when I stumbled upon already residing here in Miami and studying my preparation courses at the library of the University with an incredible collection titled Library of Living Philosophers published by Open Court, a publisher that worked with Southern Illinois University at Carbondale. The collection directed by Paul Arthur Schilpp, a renowned professor and editor now deceased, who inaugurated this collection that has included for decades great Anglo-Saxon and other European and Middle Eastern authors to Iran and India but fundamentally Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-American authors since Dewey, Bertrand Russell, Karl Popper, Rudolf Carnap, Quine, Putnam, and Davidson to Rorty and continental Europeans who excelled in phenomenology, existentialism, and hermeneutics respectively, thinkers such as Karl Jaspers, Sartre, or Gadamer to Ricoeur, or Finnish Scandinavian analysts trained along the lines of Wittgenstein in Cambridge such as Jaakko Hintikka or G.H. Von Wright. I remember being especially captivated by Quine's and Popper's volumes. The latter, the most extensive of all those in the collection, a gigantic volume of more than 1,300 pages devoted entirely to deciphering and presenting Popper's entire theoretical edifice. The volumes of this collection all contained an intellectual autobiography written by the author, the philosopher in question to whom the volume was dedicated, in which he specified the personal and socio-historical conditions in which he developed his intellectual career as a thinker. An extensive body of critical essays followed the introduction presented by different collaborators, students, professors and scholars whose critical texts dealt with certain points of the thinker's work, and the volume concluded with the philosopher's responses to his critics as well as an extensive list reference and a bibliographic review.

Once again returning to the criticism of structuralism, I want to explain to you, Abdel, that when I place so much emphasis on the last period of Lacan's work it is because it cannot be measured with the same standard with which all structuralism is measured. I want to highlight that, in this last period of his teaching, he abandons the biunivocity of the bipartite significant/signified structure that comes to him from Saussure, he abandons his elaboration of the phallic metaphor of the Name-of-the-Father, a crucial concept for understanding the differential clinic that distinguishes neuroses from psychoses and to introduce and/or add to it a third element: the space of the real as a limit to the structure where the phallus will no longer be the privileged signifier of the logic of the structure. but it will become a logical function of the plurality of the father's names, a bit like the texeré, or the catwalks that you observed in Derrida. This is Lacan's phallic function in the 70's---here perhaps it could be thought of in terms of a walkway between the verbal and the pre-verbal, between language and the pristine moment of the child's first babbling--- ----, a logical operator between the real and the symbolic and its knotting of the blurred knot of three ties (knot of the real-symbolic-imaginary) with the fourth knot of the symptom (sinthome) with which Lacan He abandons his dialectical Hegelianism of Platonic, logo-centric and phenomenological inspiration of the 50's and 60's to transform his teaching into an orientation towards writing that indexes the being of the subject and makes it disappear in the plexuses of the real. The subject of the unconscious will be a real effect on what Lacan calls "lalangue" -----written in this neological form-----, in which the unconscious is covered in the real and being of the subject knotted topologically in a knot Borromean, named after Lacan and which is written as a limit within this knotting of the speaking being ("parletre" Lacan calls it, a neologism that condenses parlé [to speak] and être [to be]). This is the moment of the total abandonment of structuralism by Lacan towards the topology of the knot and the entire turn of Lacan himself towards the real, having this time as a background reference, the modern logic of Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein, the logical positivism of Rudolf Carnap, Karl Popper and the Vienna Circle and the analytical philosophy of the Harvard logicians with Quine at the head. Lacan will have the Anglo-Saxon post-positivist analytical philosophy of the 20th century as the backdrop for his new epistemological transformation of his latest teaching in the 70s. without any of these references making Lacan a positivist of psychoanalysis. Which would be a contradiction since he himself had considered that property of psychoanalysis of being halfway between science and non-science. That is why, starting in 1964, in the first class of Seminar 11 on the four fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis, Lacan defined psychoanalysis based on the value of a praxis, where the influence of the theoretical Marx of the "Theses on Feuerbach" ----only from the theoretical practice aspect of Marx, Lacan was a conservative in politics------, and his friendship with Althusser are determining factors in these epistemological decisions. Previously, during his Seminar 7 (1959-60), and supported by his reading of Kant's second critique, he had defined psychoanalysis as an ethics

Even now that, subsequently, I have been interested in the problems of semantics, the meaning of intersubjectivity and the phenomena of language acquisition, after so many years interested in structuralist syntax with Lacan first, cognitivist with Chomsky later , pseudoscientific with Popper and Eccles later and even investigated the post-Bloomfieldian behavioral functionality with Quine, now that I have been interested in general questions of the phenomenology of Husserl, especially Jaspers and in the hermeneutics of Gadamer and particularly Ricoeur, I have allowed myself to become interested in Habermas, who was for a long time a critic of structuralism or rather of many structuralists such as Foucault, Derrida and Lyotard. And I have been inclined to wonder if it is possible to deduce an ethics from normative aspects of modal logic for which I am finding the philosophy of the Finnish post-positivist empiricist logician George Henrik with Wright inspiring. The most important thing is that my discovery of structuralism in Havana in the early 90's and the explanatory adoption of its method in Lévi-Strauss and Lacan was largely due to the powerful intellectual influence that that meeting with you and that period of our conversations between the summer of 1990 and the first months of 1991 that ended with your departure to Venezuela. My "initiation" in Lévi-Strauss and of course my encounter with structuralism and later with Lacan's psychoanalysis was the immediate consequence of those conversations of ours and the influence of your thinking and the set of your ideas at that time. These apparent accidents and furtive "encounters" with authors, ideas and schools associated with the choices made in my personal life have subsequently been re-signified and thus taken on, as I began to perceive a common thread, a new meaning. If structuralism has bequeathed us any crucial lesson, it is that no meaning is a priori but is determined by the mathematical place that an event or a sign occupies in the set of dispositions and in particular by its relational vectorization with other signs within that set allowing the inference of a meaning that organizes and coheres the set creating the sensation of a space or symbolic matrix.

Regarding realism, certain clarifications seem necessary to me. I understand that in your phenomenological perspective and even you as an ethnomethodological thinker and practitioner, you do not adhere to that debate directly and only tangentially. Realism as such does not have a crucial discussion in your work, at least in "El correlato de mundo" and unless one as a reader is interested in taking some parts of your book in that direction and putting them into discussion with the philosophical debates around to realism, around the "how" and "what" of the world, whether in the Anglo-Saxon empiricist sense originating in Locke's philosophy from a certain artifice between first and second qualities, as representative realism and not so much according to Berkeley's Subjective Idealism, or rather as discussed in the 20th century, by Husserl, Bergson, Cassirer, Weber, Schütz, and I would add Russell, Wittgenstein, Popper, Carnap, Quine, Davidson, Searle, Dummett or Putnam and even the systemism of Mario Bunge to name a few within the Anglo-Saxon logical-positivist approach within which Bunge himself is an exception. However, the discussion of this topic has been a recurring topic since Plato's approach to "forms", taken up by Husserl in the ontological treatment of essences, as unobservable realities. This same realism implies the reality of Platonic universals or essences, the discussion that arises from that problem as well as numbers in the abstract and unobservable entities such as statistical frequencies, force fields and elementary subatomic particles as has been done. Popper pointed out in the 20th century in Logic of scientific research, in Conjectures and refutations in Objective knowledge, and in the three volumes of his Postscriptum.

From my point of view, realism is a topic, if not central, at least fundamental, as you must have noticed, since it allows me to pose questions of a methodological nature to resolve one of the crucial problems that concern the adequacy or inadequacy of thought. with the world, that is, with the physical, mental, pedological, social, cultural and historical-scientific reality as in Popper's three worlds, which retroactively constitutes an essential part of thought in its sense metaphysical and epistemological to be able to build a large part of the theoretical framework that I have been building not without effort and difficulties because with that search I try to rethink in epistemological terms the different research methods with a certain preference, on the one hand, for the philosophy of science of type evolutionary rationalist of Karl Popper, his falsificationist theorem and his demarcation criterion, which privileges the hypothetico-deductive method and on the other hand interests me as a counterpoint but more than anything cohesive and integrated as a stage prior to the naturalized epistemology of Quine and his followers, which is rather a holistic and extensionalist perspective within Anglo-Saxon post-positivist analytical philosophy. This is an aspect that has already been highlighted by Lakatos and that I have reviewed and subjectiveized to deduce other consequences from there. In this construction of methodological research, the notion of reality is crucial since it enters into debate with different systems that I incorporate in my epistemological reflection, such as that of Karl Jaspers with a phenomenological orientation or that of Lacan with a structuralist orientation, respectively.

It is worth clarifying that Lacan himself radically distanced himself from structuralism starting in the 1970s, as he realized in the Seminar that he began to teach in those years at the Ecole Normale Supérieure of Paris when he made his logical turn based on his reading. of Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein in the case of Lacan who in a certain way abandons his own Kantian Hegelian inheritance of the subject to try an approach fixed more on the referent than on his structural signifying perspective. syntactic, here the referent is enjoyment, drive and sinthome. The sinthome in Lacan is like Derrida's arch-writing but with the incorporation of the subject and its articulation to the enjoyment (Jouissance) of the body, that which outside of language bites into the body, that part of the unconscious not processed by language; that is, enjoyment in the real. This, on the one hand, where the notion of reality is associated with certain symbolic or rather subjective-descriptive determinations, such as the use I make of the phenomenological approach of Jaspers, who in turn proposes a double method subdivided on the one hand into a causalist scientific approach. explanatory and objective (Erklärung) and by another comprehensive subjective historical (Verstehe). In this case, it is necessary to think methodologically in the terms introduced by Georg H. von Wright of explanation and understanding to understand these epistemological differences.

On the other hand, however, I also understand realism in a crucial debate on metaphysics that occurs at the center of the 20th century Anglo-Saxon post-positivist empiricist and analytical logical approach between realists and realists. 

Anti-racists and between internalists and externalists that ranges from a certain Platonism in Frege to a certain monistic realism in Russell and a criticism of both in Wittgenstein that initially until the publication of the "Tractatus logico filosoficus" is closer to realism. On the other hand, later he seems to lean towards a linguistic nominalism in his second stage after the epistemological break that occurs in 1929 and from which the "Philosophical Investigations" are subsequently derived.

In the same logical-positivist analytical direction Carnap was characterized by trying to take the course of the Vienna Circle along the path of an a priori analytical-linguistic realism of logic based on nominalist induction, his methodological illusion was to unify the deductive method of Modern logic initiated by Frege with Reichenbach's Statistical Induction, possessed as it was by the scientism of its time, retreated into a physicalist reductionism where it gave a glimpse of a epistemological contradiction between an almost realistic logical apriorism and its physical-materialist nominalism.

However, in a general sense, in Anglo-Saxon post-positivist analytical philosophy my two fundamental references are Karl Popper and W.V. Quine, my two Trojan horses. Popper, for his part, interests me to the extent that his methodological indeterminism allows him to play a fundamental role as an outspoken anti-positivist on the one hand and as a realist and critical rationalist on the other, with a certain confidence in empiricism when it comes to maintaining a falsificationist model based on Tarski's theory of semantic correspondence, ----the Polish logician who introduces the operational notion of metalanguage in his theory of semantic correspondence----, which allows him to corroborate or refute theories and hypotheses based on empirical evidence based on the classic example that distinguishes a metalanguage from an object-language:

"Snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white.

Where "Snow is white" is true is the metalanguage while "if and only if, snow is white" is the object-language. Here we would have to develop another very complex problem about what Popper will call vicarious propositions and Quine will define more clearly as "observational sentences" based on Carnap's definition of "protocol-sentences". These definitions are not sustained without a deep reflection and a critical approach to the distinction between first and second qualities and the difference between sensation and perception, which are decisive when appreciating and evaluating the place of the stimulus in determining the meaning of propositions. logics and their eventual construction of scientific theories.

As for Popper's rationalist attitude, it is, however, empiricist, despite this apparent contradiction and his bitter fights against the induction in which he engages after the revelation of Hume's problem. Popper, like Russell, also interests me because he is one of the few most comprehensive analytical philosophers whose investigations have a breadth and extension that covers several fields of philosophical interest ranging from metaphysics, epistemology and the philosophy of science to political philosophy. Needless to say, he is the most prominent epistemologist of the second half of the 20th century. Of course, due to his fine epistemological sense and his methodological and systemic acuity, Popper is the philosopher who has interested me the most given his theoretical emphasis on the philosophy of science, his criticism of Hume's problem of induction, his falsificationist theorem and his method. hypothetical-deductive as well as with respect to the most crucial of its hypotheses: the demarcation criterion between science and pseudoscience. But fundamentally from the metaphysical point of view I am interested in his discussion regarding realism, its derivations towards the mind-body problem and its place in the analysis and criticism of confirmation paradoxes. Popper has been for the 20th century what Hegel was for the 19th century in terms of epistemological diversity, but not so, of course, with respect to its contents, methods and methodological assumptions.

The critical point is Hegel for a very peculiar treatment of the concept of reality when he is thinking about the place of philosophy in the history of the West and says that philosophy arrives too late to explain or reveal something about the world. Hegel says and I quote him:

"This -----that is, philosophy [the clarification is mine]-----, appears as the thought of the world only at the moment when reality has already concluded its formation process and has been finished. "

In the face of reality, for Hegel, thought is insurmountably delayed, because thought is the already conceptualized substance of the real itself, which has been collected in the extension of the concept collected "like the harvest in a barn." With Hegel it happens that for this substance to be understood it had to first be "being", "ontos", but when "it is" understood it no longer "is", it is no longer that ontos but that "being" is "already been." ". The being of philosophy in Hegel is a being in its form of "has been." That is to say, it is a being that has already been ------here it is as if Hegel "heideggerized" himself, he thought of the logic of being as an ontology plus the reality of "Dasein." In this Hegel meets Heidegger but without his anthropological aspect------, then if it has been, it is because it has gone from its pure existence towards its essence. When I tell you this it seems to me to be trapped in a conceptual paradox whose warp is impossible to unravel, it seems to me to be lost in logical contradictions that are impossible to dispel. In a way it is the same sensation that Heidegger gives me and that is why I think critically that much of Lacan's teaching is contaminated by that hermeneutic phenomenological Hegelianism that is a characteristic of 20th century French thought since the times of Sartre and Levinas. Although Lévi-Strauss will later appear as inaugural with his structuralist Copernican revolution and the appearance of his new linguistic methodology in social sciences, he will undoubtedly be in opposition to this backdrop of Hegelian dialectics and phenomenology.

As I told you, other responses from me to your reflections are still pending, which I will try to respond calmly without rushing by the beginning of January. But I did not want to let the year end without at least leaving some reflections here to keep the machine of thought oiled if subjectivity admits to being reduced like a Turing machine to machinism. But that is another topic of inquiry and reflection.

I hope and wish you that you spend these Christmas holidays in the company of your family with your mother. And also that you have a good time at the end of the year holidays with your family and friends. It is a tremendous luck to have you here as a friend and colleague and an excellent interlocutor. And it is a luxury to have been able to maintain a productive and truly constructive dialogue this year. It is my hope that next year we can make more progress in the publication project of your book and continue our Counterpoints. Nothing would be more pleasing to me. These meetings and reflections will surely be a "landmark" on the horizon of possible spaces and dialogues.

It is an immense joy to receive an affectionate and thoughtful message from you about New Year's greetings. Likewise, congratulations to you. First of all, thank you very much Abdel for the transcription you made of our "Counterpoints" from July to December 2022 and for sending them to me in an attached document to my Gmail. Thank you also for your critical self-reflection of our "Counterpoints". I also congratulate you personally with the expectation of new topics for our debate. And your feedback is great. It's good that you think my own development of our debate is good, fed back from "indications" of your own developments of theoretical concepts and ideas in general in your comments.

However, for me the work of reading and analyzing your book "El correlato de mundo" is still pending, just as we were thinking about it from our first exchanges prior to writing the prologue for the publication project of your book. Very recently these days I have resumed some readings from the end of last year after a brief period of convalescence. On December 29, I tested positive for Covid. Since the 25th I had started having symptoms that looked like pharyngitis, so I waited four days to consult the doctor. Thanks to antivirals I was able to overcome the disease quickly but I still spent the end of the year with the discomfort of Covid until little by little the symptoms dissipated and the day before yesterday I tested negative. I confess that I had managed to avoid Covid during these two years since March 2020 when the first cases were reported in the United States. This time I was convinced based on false premises and a certain presumption that I would no longer be infected if I had managed to stay healthy. However, that was when I got infected. And I realize that getting infected was a matter of time in an increasingly globalized world where a large volume of immigrants travel from the poorest parts of the planet to the most developed metropolises, creating new cultural and social dynamics in the hemisphere. This constant flow of entire populations implies new demographic densities where the possible contagion of certain insidious viruses such as covid is inevitable. So it's a matter of time.

This delayed me in the answer that I had promised you and in certain rereadings that I was doing of some analytical philosophers (Dummett, Davidson, Putnam, Searle, Rorty) that I wanted to return to before answering you and that I could use. for some reflections motivated by your extensive and complex previous reflection, exciting for its rigor and depth and for the intensity and masterful expertise with which you approach the different themes and developments in which the threads of your reflection on Derrida in your last message. Especially about the phenomenological genesis of language, which impressed me greatly due to the rigor and level of detail in the development of the concept of the conditions of possibility of the sign based on phenomenological reflection. I promise to do my best to develop an answer that can live up to your expectations. This also includes in my response that it will have to be extensive to be able to respond and explain myself clearly. I hope to live up to that expectation. The most important thing is to enjoy writing that reflection. You speak to me Abdel on two occasions that I think are important to highlight, one at the beginning of your message and another at the end of the message. Both address the concept of evocation. It did not escape my attention and I emphasize it because of the special value that you give to this concept in your correspondence with Stephen Tyler. From your point of view, does this concept have an epistemological value similar to that of the conditions of possibility of the phenomenological genesis of the sign in Derrida? I have not yet carefully reread your and Stephen Tyler's reflections on evocation. It's something I want to do and it's part of my reading of your books. Something I want to do little by little.

Responding a little to your last message. I'm very excited about "Counterpoints." It is an exciting job and project. They keep me in constant mental and theoretical exercise. When you refer to expanding the information for the reader, thinking about the multiple possible readers, it occurs to me that editorial-type footnotes could be included with their bibliographical references whenever possible and some gloss of comments regarding the main text. But anyway, this must be an editing job after writing the text and transcribing it. You have to review grammatical and agreement problems, plus spelling. I would also like to suggest that you insert subtitles and regroup our comments according to related topics. The objective of the subtitles is that they give the reader indications and at the same time serve as small pauses and breaks in reading so as not to overwhelm the ideas in such a way that the reader feels overwhelmed and overwhelmed by the load of theoretical information.

There is a two-handed book titled "What makes us think: nature and the rule" that I read a while ago by Paul Ricoeur and Jean-Pierre Changeux and that I think could serve as a model for us in its general structure. The book is the debate between the philosopher Ricoeur that you know and a neuroscientist Changeux about different topics in which they differ and others in which they converge. Their different references, for example Ricoeur speaks of Canguilhem and Bachelard to refer to their references and epistemological ruptures while Changeux does so in turn referring to the joint project of Karl Popper and the Nobel neurophysiology pseudoscientist John Eccles that concluded with the book in two hands of Popper and Eccles "The Self and Its Brain." In our Counterpoints there is a certain similarity although it is more about, on the one hand, the open debate of an ethnomethodologist like you trained in the tools of sociology and anthropology with rigorous references in philosophy, linguistics, epistemology, aesthetics, hermeneutics and art criticism. and on the other hand, a philosopher like me trained in the tools of analytical philosophy, the philosophy of science, epistemology, with forays into pedology, cognitivism, the philosophy of mind and Lacanian psychoanalysis.

I definitely agree with you about working with a hard copy. As such, I do not have a printer at home and it is becoming increasingly difficult to find places dedicated to printing texts, documents, photocopies, etc. (stationery). There used to be Kinko's in Miami. He was very efficient. I made photocopies there many times. There was one with an excellent location in Coral Gables in Ponce D'Leon and Andalucía. If you ever had the opportunity to get around Miami, you would surely visit it. Today there is a FedEx store that is dedicated to the same stationery business and offers the same services as Kinko's. Only there are not so many of these stores. As interactive information storage hardware developed and as the Internet and social networks diversified, as well as different digital platforms such as scanners, etc., commercial establishments dedicated to office materials and services began to disappear. These stationery business commercial places such as Kinko's have been disappearing. Digital development was displacing analog technology and the techniques associated with it. Now where the Kinko's was, if you want to make photocopies you must visit a FedEx or UPS office, any public library or the Office Depot department store. I could make a paper copy and send it to you but shipping would be extremely expensive and it is preferable to leave that option if we need it for a book or if later it can be obtained here to send you a computer, even if it is used. However, I am going to try to make that copy on paper. I thank you very much for the transcription that you made and that you sent me by Gmail. 

After our last exchanges and extensive comments last December, this is my first extensive message from the beginning of 2023 in what are our Counterpoints (Part II) that began in the last months of last year. My intention is to respond and react as much as possible to everything that the conceptual development of your extensive and punctual messages evokes in me about your conception of "intramundanity", the texere in Derrida, the description and theoretical development of the catwalks that is very much yours. , your interpretation of Peirce's semiotics around interpretants and their theoretical consequences, which is also very much yours. About this point I have tried to answer you with a very limited scope starting from my own references of the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle and the Anglo-Saxon post-positivist analytical philosophy, fundamentally Quine and his holistic theses (especially the Duhen-Quine thesis) and the critique of analyticity in a theory of meaning and the function of "observational sentences", which is a very limited aspect of the problem because Quine lacks a theory of meaning, after the American logician rejects the reflections on meaning. This is discussed, as I told you, with a very limited scope also due to my lack of detailed knowledge of Peirce's work, which you master with rigor and depth. These answers are in many of our previous exchanges from last year that are dated in the periods July-August or September-November 2022, although I recognize that this does not exhaust the infinite number of meanings that can be extracted from Peirce's semiotics and that you have known. conjure up much of the enormous amount of implications of meaning that its scientific consequences can evoke in a deep analysis of meaning and the infinite semiosis of culture. So I move on without delay to the content of my message.

First of all, to situate our debate, I would like to understand the context within which and in your perspective -------if I have understood you correctly------ the text as an organized articulation of signs with a sanctifying intention operates as correlation of the world as you have defended in the first chapter of your book "The correlation of the world." The interconnections that you make between the type of grammatological interpretation of Saussurean inspiration that Derrida consecrates to the text as an autonomous entity of correlation between "language" (langue) and "speech" (parole) or between syntax (signifier) ​​and semantics (meaning) with All the phenomenological-Hegelian developments on the one hand and logical-empiricist developments on the other of Peirce's semiotics evoke in a certain way the sociological reflection that reading the book of Giddens "The new rules of the sociological method", of Durkheimian inspiration, or rather the relief assumed by Giddens in those pages methodologically committed to a previous book of his authorship "The constitution of society" with whose respective titles you must surely be very familiar given your own vocation as a researcher and social scientist. Giddens, in addition to making a methodological x-ray of the founding sociological schools of 20th century social theory throughout the text, traces in "The New Rules..." certain no less important affinities between three major thinkers: Gadamer, Habermas and Wittgenstein . These affinities have as their central core concentric developments around the problematic of language, rather, as discussed by the new modern Protestant theology (Bultmann, Barth, Tillich, Bonhoeffer), the neo-Kantian historicist theory (Dilthey, Weber), the psychologism (Brentano), phenomenology (Husserl) and hermeneutics (Heidegger, Gadamer), social theory (Habermas) and thesis logical-empiricists (Wittgenstein) of the same 20th century. Giddens discerns that logic of language in which Wittgenstein, Gadamer and Habermas are trapped, leaving as an unresolved remainder the problem of the truth of meaning, whose limit Wittgenstein does not dare to cross, remaining at the antipodes of the true meaning of tautology in logical propositions (as stated for example in the last proposition of the "Tractatus...": "What cannot be said, must be kept silent") but whose answer about the truth of the sense of "understanding" (Verstehen) seems to offer more clearly Gadamer's comprehensive and interpretive treatment of hermeneutics as a methodology and scientific task not only of the immediate "understanding" of the world but of that self-conscious and reflective task that is given to us from Hegel through Dilthey which is the very act of the historical interpretation of the text. This is a very precise observation by Giddens in this regard.

In reference to these problems addressed from within and from that same perspective of adaptation of language to the world, thought out logically and in line with the innatism of idiosyncratic elaboration in Leibniz, whose philosophy is so close to your phenomenological approaches to the sign, just as you have subscribed from Derrida's grammatological inquiry and Peirce's semiotics, I would like to remember here that dictum of Leibniz so helped that in his never-finished discussion with the empiricist theses of John Locke, the German thinker observed that "there is nothing in understanding that is not already in experience (and that does not proceed before the senses) except understanding itself." ". So much so that, although it is enough to affirm with Leibniz and why not, with the philosophy of natural language of Austin and his disciple John Searle --------to whose reading of his books I dedicate myself since my turn towards analytical philosophy for fifteen years, whenever I can, with enormous pleasure--------that our access to reality is not direct but rather is inevitably mediated by signs and that it is the signs that represent things of the world as in all representative or indirect realism and that a development around this is necessary. problematic that can sediment the conclusions that we will have, after a certain effort, finally reached through those representative mediations, perhaps linguistic, semiotic, observational that Karl Popper called "vicarious" and which Chomsky preferred to define as "interfaces" between the cognitive system and the sensorimotor system for example. It is known -------and I would like to emphasize it here------- that Chomsky after his criticism of Saussure's distinction between "langue" and "parole", finds a "mediation" of the role played by the agent located between the syntactic structure and human nature through linguistic creativity where that agent of "mediation" is inscribed that allows cognitive and linguistic creation and the foundation of creative culture based on a transformational generative grammar.

Regarding that subjective dimension of the "half voice" that seems to inhabit Derrida's discourse and that acts as the function of the subject according to what you tell me if I understand you correctly, as it has been defined by Stephen Tyler, I had no idea about it. Without a doubt, what you tell me is very interesting, a unique perspective of isolating a totally new phenomenon for me. I don't know the concept, so thank you very much for making it easier for me to understand. I haven't read practically anything by Stephen Tyler, whom I actually came to know through you. For the eloquent paragraphs you dedicate to it right here in our Counterpoints. I have only read one article that was published in Carlos Reynoso's compilation of postmodern anthropology that I mentioned to you a couple of months ago in these same "Counterpoints." Stephen Tyler certainly has a style at times that is very reminiscent of a syntactically and terminologically very creative hybrid between Heidegger and Derrida with a narrative focused on the anthropological, political and literary aspects of the author that are distilled from the text. In my opinion, there is in Stephen Tyler a Foucauldian concern for the operations of power within the texts, defining from there their meaning and their way of articulating the content. It is my epidermal impression, perhaps too hasty, of Stephen Tyler's exposition and argumentative style, but I don't think I am too far off the mark.

Can you expand more at another time about the notion of "half voice" in Derrida according to Tyler? I wonder if this is a discovery exclusive to Stephen Tyler or if it is some accepted concept in the community of postmodern anthropologists. However, and this is the difference -------I insist once again as I have reiterated before------- regarding my inclination towards Lacan, much more than towards Derrida, after Derrida renounces that mediation that for Lacan passes through what the French psychoanalyst called the barred subject or subject divided between two signifiers.

In your last message you ask me many questions about Lacan from an epistemological point of view that seem very pertinent to me. Frequently among Lacanians we start from assuming certain "truths" established as given when in reality nothing is assured unless it is explained and transmitted. This behavior and this forgetfulness is common ----------as I told you---- among Lacanians and there is a tendency to explain concepts in closed circles by turning on themselves and not making them explicit. didactics to transmit them adequately and make them understandable. Lacan's hermeticism comes from the fact that he used the coded, encrypted nature of the unconscious to make his clinical experience vivid in the transmission of scientific discourse. But that was the time of seduction and Lacan's seductive style. Later, the relief of his disciples was necessary to shed light on that darkness. Curiously, some of those who were his closest disciples were present even in his family life. This is the case of the general editor of his work who would marry Judith, Lacan's youngest daughter, whose person -------due to her commitment with his father's work------- is closely related to the founding of the Lacan study group in Cuba to which I belonged. Jacques-Alain Miller, who was Lacan's son-in-law since the 60's, is the one who has taken over the didactic transmission of that dark Lacan. Very different from what Slavoj Zizek does in the United States, which redoubles that darkness while maintaining its philosophical opacity and which seems opportunistically cryptic to me.

I speak a lot from Lacan because they were my theoretical references for many years in Cuba and they were linked to experiences of my personal life, fundamentally intellectual and emotional that imply being immersed in an intersubjective and interactive world, vital, full of cultural and intellectual richness. And Lacan was the last step in that world until my frame of reference changed after five years in the United States precisely when intellectual changes occurred in my life such as contact and immersion in North American academic life that influenced me in a change of perspective. and in a turn towards Anglo-Saxon post-positivist analytical philosophy from Russell, Wittgenstein, Popper and the Vienna Circle to Quine, Putnam, Davidson and the Harvard logicians on the one hand and Michael Dummett on the other hand, which is largely the greatest representative of the Oxford School in terms of the philosophical analysis of natural languages, of course after Ryle and Austin whom despite their importance I have not had the opportunity to read much, together with the Finnish School of epistemology, especially with Hintikka and Von Wright, who are for me two fundamental pillars of epistemological logic. This entire constellation is part of the conceptual framework from which I find myself thinking and reflecting today. I cannot say that I do it from Lacan all the time and although I distanced myself -------a necessary distance------ from many of his assimilated and sedimented assumptions Lacan, his work, his thought and even his clinic , his way of interpreting the unconscious as a life world is still present in that epistemological foundation because the genesis of my current philosophical considerations in terms of epistemology come essentially from that last moment before leaving Cuba, they come from my understanding of the last Lacan's teaching in which Empiricist logical thought began to be part of the obligatory references in Lacan's Seminar: Russell, Wittgenstein, Quine, Popper, the Vienna Circle, etc.  But in reality I am thinking today and I am studying and reading outside the academic framework all that constellation of thinkers and problems that were contemporary at the end of the 20th century within the philosophy departments of North American university campuses.

After this brief digression, I return to Lacan. You asked me in your last extensive message about the subject in Lacan. And I will try to answer part of it now and in a later message in a few days I will answer your questions in detail and come back to them. I told you that Lacan's divided subject or barred subject is constituted by a significant pair S1----> S2 ------here the question of meaning in Lacan is marginal and relegated to the imaginary, at least in Lacan classic that goes from the first writings of the Mirror Stadium, the Rome Discourse, the Instance of the Letter and the first years of the Seminar until the beginning of the 70's-------that is to say that the subject, on the one hand, is he signifier S1 of the structure of the Other or of the abstract code of the structure of language as an ideal structure abstracted from its sexual experience (passing, as Lévi-Strauss would say, from the state of nature to the state of culture from a structuralist point of view, which is a discreet contrast and a synchronic, non-phenomenological order that would explain these differences from their genesis evolutionarily in the sense of development and deployment of concepts, their conditions of possibility) and on the other hand, the signifier S2 of knowledge or the message, after it has been subjectivated by the instance of the subject constituted by the significant pair (S1-----> S2), that is, of the signifier of the "lack" in the Other after That Other is always incomplete, subject of the signifier, from its properly epistemological or symbolic condition, and also subject of enjoyment, of drives, from an ontological or real point of view. A binary logic of a subject divided between the enjoyment of drives in the real and the significant representations of the unconscious in the symbolic. Yes, this leads, as you say, to the debate of the 17th and 18th centuries about Cartesian dualism currently known within the philosophy of mind as the "mind-body problem", for example.

It seems important to me to highlight here that this incomplete Other that I spoke to you about in the two previous paragraphs, not only has a particularly Hegelian character due to its dialectical condition in the development of this open system in Lacan, but is sustained by the influence exerted by the Lacan's encounter with Gödel's incompleteness theorem, as Lacan explained in his essay "Science and Truth" at the end of the Writings (1966). Gödel's thesis around the 1930s, in his criticism of Hilbert's axiomatics - which Lacan highlights to explain his notion of the subject - is that no mathematical set can be founded on itself or defined by itself but requires a larger arithmetic set in which the first finds its definition there. So, as I was telling you above, it is in the articulation of both signifiers, towards which Lacan points out the significance of that lack or "phallus" that in Derrida always appears deferred as a critique of "phallologocentrism", not without a certain nostalgia for the metaphysics of presence, as Giddens himself has pointed out to Derrida in his critique of structuralism.

As for Lacan, I would like to clarify here that the phallus has nothing to do with the male organ or with its erection at the moment of the sexual act or biological turgor compared to the other sex, whether sex is always taken as Other. with a capital letter A (from Autre in French), at least, with respect to that biological inheritance, which the phallus seems to have already lost, when it has already been situated as a "phallic lack" in the framework of significant substitution ----metaphorical- --- of real and imaginary enjoyment (jouissance that has not yet been symbolized and that consists of a "life world", purely biological and sensory, without linguistic apparatus or logical-syntactic structure) of the fundamental primary scene (pre-verbal or pre-state). -building) of the dyad of the child with the mother. That symbolic framework that is pre-given in the Other as a code is not reached as a subjectivated message until in the next edifice stage, that primordial castration of the substitution of the initial enjoyment by the field of the Other does not reappear except as a redoubled substitution of the signifier of the Other. in the Other in an infinite spiral of significant ideations whose significance does not close the meaning in that symbolic field as the Other of the Other through the paternal metaphor or phallic metaphor, significant of the "lack" after, as Lacan emphasizes in multiple occasions throughout his work: "the lack in the Other means that there is no Other of the Other." Consequently, Lacan himself, with that dialectical development that he reiterates with his denialist procedure, of his own sayings, denies himself by finally saying with a radical expression in the first classes of his Seminar XX "Still" (1972-73) that in fact after dedicating so many years to talking about the Other and trying to catch it by linguistically founding its field, the real as impossible has shown him that "the Other does not exist" thereby underlining that same tenacious thesis of Bertrand Russell when he maintained that the signifier has no referent.

You ask me why the phallus is privileged, thinking that Lacan and consequently I am talking about the male organ in psychoanalysis. In Freud there was still this biological lag. On the other hand, Lacan introduces an epistemological break in a certain sense, not completely since he still continues to think in Freudian terms and continues to support a return to Freud in psychoanalysis but since Seminar 11 (1964) on "The four fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis ( 1964) a different Lacan is drawn, less Freudian and more Lacanian. Hence the transformation that Lacan operates in psychoanalysis itself, making Freud's notion of the ontological unconscious as. dioic reservoir of repressed images and memories, rather an ethical notion of the unconscious located at the very center of the subject's desire and its "lack of being." ; but, it is situated in a register beyond, retroactively pointing to a hereafter before language, a hypothesis that can only be sustained from language as a symbolic register of the Other.

Regarding the criticism that, The wild thought of Lévi-Strauss, Ricoeur has done in the first chapter "Structure and hermeneutics" of his book "The conflict of interpretations" he says that (and I quote) "the awareness of the validity of a method can never be separated from the awareness of its limits." Ricoeur calls into question the Infinite scope of structuralist analysis immune to critical review, to clearing its limits. Regarding philosophical work and the task that calls us to develop to its limits or to "our limits" abstract, scientific, philosophical, critical thought and the theoretical evolution of its concepts, be it from semiotics, phenomenology, hermeneutics, anthropology, psychoanalysis, ethnomethodology, philosophy of language, Anglo-Saxon post-positivist analytical philosophy and other related social sciences, it is our responsibility to recognize these methodological and epistemic. I believe that this, in turn, can be invoked concretely in the analysis of the Freudian method as interpreted by Jacques Lacan. If there is a certain excess of confidence in Lacan, it is in his beginnings as a clinical psychiatrist first and then as a theorist and teacher and interpreter of the Freudian relief, in the linguistic way of approaching the unconscious, in his blind faith in the clinical terrain of linguistic interpretation. of Freud's conceptual apparatus, its immovable certainty in the Freudian interpretation and in the area of ​​bewitching certainty of the notion of "transference" on the part of the analysand or the patient towards the figure of the psychotherapist, towards that role or role played by the clinician in the direction of psychoanalytic cure. I think that Ricoeur's methodological maxim hits the nail on the head because of the impact it has on Jacques Lacan's return to Freud. Only it should be rightly emphasized that Lacan always thought against himself, which allowed him to advance year after year in his Seminar, denying again and again the levels reached in the development of his theorization of Freud. It is worth noting that at the end of his life, Lacan, during the last stage of his teaching, dedicated himself sharply to pointing out the limits of the concept of the unconscious, to disbelieving in it from the framework of the signifier and to rethinking it in the field of the real as " "an out of meaning" and as a consequence show the limits of psychoanalysis, pushing it to a place beyond Freud, the Oedipus complex and psychoanalysis itself.

In an effort to resume the relationship of language with the real beyond the Lacanian approach towards a horizon that involves the philosophy of language from Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein to the later scope and the relief taken by the Anglo-Saxon post-positivist analytical philosophy of the second half of the 20th century, it does not seem to me, however, to be redundant but rather a necessary condition to reaffirm that our access to the world of things is never direct but mediated by the signs that convey our thoughts and our ideas expressed through linguistic signs in the form of words. Karl Popper called them "vicarious" instances that serve as mediators between the organism and its environment, for example, if it is an observation made within the Darwinian paradigm. From the thesis of language as the mediation of thought with the world, whether phenomenological thought or scientific and philosophical thought, Wittgenstein's dichotomy on private language emerged with the advent of logical philosophy of the 20th century. Wittgenstein wondered if our thoughts and ideas were expressible before they were translated through linguistic signs and before we formed words with them. On the other hand, Wittgenstein stated that we could not communicate any thought outside the order of meaning and words and that therefore every thought, consequently, had to be a thought articulated in a social and not a private language, that is, a linguistic thought if we repeat with Quine what he would say --------long after Wittgenstein's dichotomy------ and that is that "language is a social art."

Regarding the topic "Realism" ------I am referring to realism with a capital "R", perhaps immanent when not substantialist ------, there would be two or three main ways to think about it: direct or "naive" realism ( for example: John Searle occasionally when he does not support his emergentist theses), representative realism (for example: Locke) and scientific realism (for example: Hilary Putnam). In your message much earlier than this last one, you had spoken to me about a certain type of realism that you prefer and agree to accept and which you call "common sense" although you distance yourself from the realist label and prefer to replace it with that space of consensus that you define as "common sense". And in fact I could partially agree with that notion of realism that you call, ------I repeat----- of "common sense" and that both for me and for Searle first of all and especially in his book "Intentionality" is above all about a trivial realism that has as its backdrop the intentionality towards a common referent as Frege treats the reference of the same linguistic meaning in his essay "Sinn und Bedeutung". It is an example that I have mentioned to you and to which I have previously referred in the first part of these same "Counterpoints". It is in that trivial sense that it has as a backdrop the same linguistic framework and the same trivial reference to common physical reality. However, both Frege and Searle are truly internalists, as I have been lately -- with certain distinctions of course ----, since they are internalists who believe that meaning is in the head. This will later be known in many analytical philosophers as the mind ("Mind" in English) that leans more towards an objectivity internalized in the thinking agent (e.g. John Searle or Hilary Putnam), of propositional, metaphysical attitudes (Dummett ) of logical propositions (Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Quine, Ayer, for example) and linguistic propositions, of knowledge in general (Wittgenstein) and of scientific knowledge in particular (e.g. Karl Popper, Quine, Putnam)

However, initially after my distancing from Lacan, I began to think initially fiscalist like Quine, then a little more extensionalist without being reductionist. I thought then that meaning subsequently adhered to the same shared referent, and that this common shared referent would be none other than the stimulus that comes from our relationship with the environment, a stimulus that initially generates meaning through our sensations or "sense." data" (captured according to Quine firstly through the "nerve endings" as he calls them) and then through our perceptions which Quine will define as "stimulus meaning". The meaning would be, therefore, in the sensations and in the perception of our "nerve endings" that define the character of our perceptions and, consequently, of our linguistic congratulations according to the behavioral rule of Pavlov, Watson and Skinner, of stimulus-response. . In this sense, what we call significance or meaning would not be in the head as Frege and years later Searle and with detailed distinctions even the first stage of Hilary Putnam thought or believed, I am referring to the functionalist Putnam of the "Turing machines." "for whom machines and brains think in the same way, although on a different material basis, but without this affecting their own thought mechanisms, but who is in a physicalist outside like Quine's.

When I spoke to you about realism, I placed myself, not without a certain hybridity, halfway between the ontological way (ontological commitment) with which Quine identifies his realistic way of thinking about reality (Quine subscribes to the terminological phrase "Mind independent World") while " world" independent of the "mind" (the "mind" that we could identify as the subject without Quine proposing any self-referential phenomenological plane and reflective author), halfway between the "ontological" realism of Quine and the mode of expression of a realist epistemology that found the critical rationalism of Karl Popper, realist in an epistemological sense, and also concurrently in an ontological sense. This "halfway" places me between two types of realism, a material physical realism (Quine) and a realism of the unobservable entities (for example: the propensities or fields of forces, the subatomic elementary particles, etc.) of a hypothetical-conjectural realism (Popper).

Regarding the semiosis of the dynamics of culture which you call "inferential reality", the conceptual way that you find to rethink this phenomenon that has its genesis in some inaugural dialogues of Plato, and seminal texts of Aristotle, is fascinating. Findings and problems related to thought and language continue in hermeneutic and semiotic questions as they were thought by the medieval patristics (Saint Augustine) and by the grammarians of Port Royal, until the advent of the structural linguistics of Saussure in Geneva, and of Jakobson in the Prague School, at the beginning of the 20th century, in addition to Peirce's semiotics at the end of the 19th century, which in Cuban philosophical thought me I dare to say that to date no one has mastered Peirce's own semiotics and Derrida's bromatology with the masterful skill with which you incorporate their systems (those of Derrida and Peirce) into a new theoretical constellation (which you accompany along with Habermas, Gadamer, Schütz, Todorov and Stephen Tyler) that you have introduced abstract thinking articulated to hermeneutics and grammatology as methodologies in your epistemological heritage to think, from an anthropological, and especially ethnomethodological, framework, culture as a text. I wonder: Here you seem to deliberately neglect the conclusions anticipated by Yuri Lotman regarding what he has called "semisphere"?  Well, curiously, you fail to mention it. I don't know if it's intentional. These linguistic concerns, which I roughly referred to above, have also, as you know, been addressed from other theoretical and philosophical approaches. I am referring to reflections thought out and answered in the history of contemporary thought from the logical turn of analytical philosophy of the 20th century that began with the emergence of the philosophy of language in the inaugural gesture of Frege in Jena and Freiburg, and Russell and Wittgenstein in Cambridge, while Carnap, Gödel and Popper did so in the Vienna Circle. Here I would like to add the enormous linguistic, semiotic and cognitivist systems of Vygotsky, Karl Bühler, Piaget, Hjelmslev, Greimas, W.V.Quine and Chomsky, some of which you know very well. These systems that interrogate with all their controversial discussions about the problems of the genesis and acquisition of language, sometimes language seen as an effect of intersubjectivity or of that language as a product of the constitution of the social, other times language thought of as cause of thought, as original syntax or transformational grammar in Chomsky or perhaps as a linguistic response elicited in the face of a stimulus perceived as "sense data" coming from the physical environment to the nerve endings of the skin according to epistemology naturalized by Quine as I mentioned in the paragraphs above. To this I would add the gigantic work of Ricoeur whose hermeneutic concern for meaning is well in his interpretation of Freud's psychoanalysis with greater incidence as a "thinker of suspicion" along with Marx and Nietzsche in Ricoeur's opus magnum "The conflict of interpretations ", or for his influence and reinterpretation of Greimas's semiotics, for example in his hermeneutic essays "From text to action." Forgive me for this digression, but I was interested in very briefly pointing out the general picture.

Regarding your words about the catwalks and, rather, what you define as "extrinsication of language" between the subject and being and which you explain very well from and through Hegel, I quote you:  

"[...] Indeed, outside of language, the sole extrinsication through which we notice that we are understood as a feeling or certainty that we are, that self-alterity of noticing that we are is itself what distinguishes between being and subject, being only is and becomes, it is not extrinsic, when it is extrinsic as if it could be external to itself there it is subject, two series: one that is only another that notices what it is, the relationship is dialectical as you explained in our first part, the moment that is extrinsic although there is a subject that is already in another way that is not only without exteriority towards it, but that continues to be and conversely the one who is extrinsic is the same as he is (See my. essay "The Chrysalis of Being" on the logic of being in Hegel) [...]"

I would prefer to think Abdel, if you allow me, what you explain so well as extrinsication of language in the terms used by Lacan throughout 1964 during his Seminar 11, dedicated to exploring the four fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis. Why do I mention Lacan, here, at this point? Given that what you call "extrinsication" of language itself with respect to being and the subject is a way of thinking about that inside and outside of language from a simultaneous character, this refers me to the concept of "exemption" as defined by Lacan where The "lack in being" occurs inside and outside of language itself and of the subject barred by Saussure's bar. Its exemption is reflected in the very division of the subject with respect to language through two dialectical moments of the same subjectivity. In Seminar 11 Lacan explains these two moments of the dialectic of being and the subject: 1) Alienation, when the subject is alienated in the Other (that is, language, the symbolic universe as Lacan understands it thinking with Hegel, from of the significant pair S1--->S2 articulated) and 2) Separation, when the subject separates from the Other and simultaneously becomes subject and object of the fundamental fantasy according to the Lacanian algorithm $ <> a. (Lacan calls this object "object a", which operates between the imaginary register and the field of the real as that which has not been and cannot be symbolized and which only finds a phantasmatically imagined place in the subject).

Likewise, this extrinsication of language is constructed just as you have outlined very well in your previous comments, about the format of inside and outside. By the way, you quote Hegel at length and this has evoked in me different passages that are very recurrent throughout Lacan's work and that point to the same problematic of inside and outside that Lacan expresses through his methodological resource to mathematical topology. of the band or Möbius strip whose folding on its own surface is a real sample that expresses that conjuncture in which the inside and the outside are moments of travel on the same surface. This dialectical correlation of inside and outside is explained very well in your extensive quote from Hegel when you say (I open quotes and quote you quoting Hegel):

[Abdel Hernández's Hegel quote begins]:

"[...] what Hegel says about the phenomenology of the internal and the external that I quote here as I quote it within my book, Hegel says

    "This unity of the interior and exterior is the absolute reality," Hegel said. "The interior is determined as the form of the reflected, bone immediacy of the essence, compared to the exterior, determined as the form of being, but both They are just a single identity, this identity is first of all the pure unity of both as a base full of content.

     Therefore this identity is continuity and is the totality that represents the interior which also becomes exterior, but in this it is no longer something that has become or that has been transferred but is equal to itself, the exterior according to This determination is not only equal to the inner according to the content, but both are only one single thing

   However, this thing as a simple identity with itself is different from its determinations of form, that is, these remain extrinsic to it, therefore it is itself an interior that is different from the exteriority of those.

This exteriority, however, consists in the fact that the two determinations themselves, that is, the interior and the exterior, constitute it. Therefore, since the interior and the exterior have been considered as determinations of form, they are firstly only the simple form itself and secondly because they are determined there as opposites their unity is the pure abstract mediation in which one of they are immediately the other and it is the other precisely because it is the first, so the interior is not immediately but the exterior and constitutes the determination of the exteriority precisely by constituting the interior, conversely the exterior is only an interior 461-462-468 [...]"

[Up to here quote from Hegel by Abdel Hernández]

From here on, I continue Alberto Méndez, taking up what he was saying many paragraphs above.

Returning to the topic of realism, I think that "reality" as an infinite network of "interpreters" ------and forgive me here for the abusive use I make of Peirce's concept that you have masterfully deployed---- --- is closely related to what an octogenarian Quine called in his last texts at the end of his life "The Web of beliefs" to identify all the protocol and propositional statements that holistically compose and constitute all the system of science as postulated by his own "Duhem-Quine thesis" at the peak of his career, to which widely recognized thesis Quine referred in the 1950s in his seminal essay "Two Dogmas of Empiricism."

The notion of "interpretant" as such, which you describe very well under the strong influence of Peirce, as seen in its relation to the real substrates of pre-linguistic experience ------- as you have reinterpreted it in the semiotic perspective of your system-------, is nothing other than and has an identity relationship with what, in my opinion, Carnap called "protocol statements" while Quine defined this characteristic of predicative language as "observational sentences" (observational statements) that act in Husserl's sense as a reality prior to any phenomenological experience as both prior regional ontologies and pre-phenomenological reality.

Likewise, when you define an idea of ​​culture as an "intertwined network of interpretants", it inevitably makes me think of what the epistemologist Karl Popper defined as "World 3". This popular "World 3" has the same objective character that the interpretants seem to have in Peirce's semiotics. In fact, when Popper puts his entire system into discussion, he does not hesitate to validate his "World 3" as a correlative of the function of "Thirdness" in the role played in Peirce's semiotics.

That's it Abdel, for now, the counter responses to your previous messages that I had promised you. I hope they evoke some theoretical reflection for you to debate or some reference to your work and especially to El correlato de mundo. Not all the topics have been exhausted and there are still many other questions about Lacan that I have yet to answer. He will send you those answers in the near future. I want to see if I make further progress in reading your book The Correlato de Mundo to find out a little more about it. 

You have an incredible power of observation, you have always had it to be able to distance yourself from the events and processes in development simultaneously with their occurrence and reflect on them. I am referring in particular to your "feedback" about the fact that these Counterpoints are more of a dialogue than a debate and that eventually it will be necessary to return to what has already been said because many topics are opened. Thanks for that clarification. Yes, it is essential to be precise with the terms, for example: "dialogue" versus "debate." It is true, it is more of a conversation than a debate, it is more of an exchange of ideas than a refutation of them. They feed each other as we react and counter-react with ideas, observations, reflections and conceptual developments. For that reason, it is an enormous privilege for me to be able to have this dialogue with you, so fruitful, useful and so nutritious from a reflective, theoretical and intellectual point of view. Of course, it is a challenge as you point out, but I still feel comfortable, and at the same time I feel very motivated. I hope that my reflections also motivate you to continue developing this common work. I await your response. Greetings 

I am referring, for example, to "Interpreter and structure in postmodern cultural theory" and to the penultimate chapter "The exegesis of cultural texts." Of course, ethnomethodology, but above all and first phenomenological sociology, the sociology initiated by Schütz, since Everything I work there, including Derrida, Hegel, whatever, phenomenological sociology is my center, my axis, the main thing I do, ethnomethodology and symbolic interaction are a branch of phenomenological sociology, influenced by Schütz like me, Garfinkel, and many others, yes it is true but in a very different way from Geertz although of course I do not stop mentioning him in the bibliography, you cannot do interpretivism ignoring him, but interpretivism is different from his

But my interpretivism is very different from yours.

I have thought about your proposal on the topic of ethics and after rethinking it I tell you with all honesty and I do so with all frankness and transparency that in addition to not feeling comfortable on the subject I feel that I am not going to feel comfortable as I would with other issues and I am very afraid that this condition could substantially affect our work together. And I don't want to be dishonest with you. I would have to devote enormous energy to the topic because honestly I don't find Abdel at all stimulating and requires an enormous amount of time investment from me to update myself regarding new references and soak up the latest debates on the topic, the results achieved, etc. .. I really don't have adequate information to give a rigorous opinion on the topic of ethics. And I really wouldn't feel comfortable improvising on a topic that so far I can only handle superficially. I feel capable of talking about ethics in a certain informal tone, but if it were a more in-depth work it would require enormous dedication from me. However, I could do it, but I fear that the lack of significant enthusiasm will end up exhausting me early, invading me with a feeling of a certain urgency and meager elaborations with insurmountable gaps. But if this is a determining issue for you, as you say, in that case I can collaborate by playing the role of your interlocutor, but I don't want it to not be able to satisfy your theoretical expectations in the long run and it becomes boring and exhausting work. On the other hand, I feel that I am not fully prepared on the subject, I lack experience and depth, perseverance and, as I told you, fundamentally enthusiasm. I have few references on the subject because I think that ethics can only be thought of from the normativity that manages modal logic in the form of a deontic in the terms proposed by a Finnish logician of analytical philosophy such as Georg Henrik von Wright. However, in a certain sense, I am missing some essential readings as such, regardless of the meager interest that a theoretical elaboration in that direction arouses in me with the exception of the treatment of the fact/value dichotomy in the work of Weber, Habermas, Putnam, Richard Rorty or John Rawls. I would like to suggest that we start working on other more related topics in which ethics is involved tangentially, although not in a core way. I propose other topics and related problems such as:

1) Faculty of language, genesis and introduction to language. Adequacy of thought with the Thing. Language and object. Statement and enunciation. Reference and referent.

2) Mind and language. Theory of interpretation. Theory of meaning. Cognition and philosophy of mind. Philosophy of language and epistemology.

3) Metaphysics and ontology. Referent theory. Theory of meaning. Sense and reference. Realism versus nominalism. Realism versus antirealism.

4) Philosophy of logic. Modus tollens versus modus ponens. Generalization versus individuation (existential). Universality and uniqueness.

5) Referent and identity. Philosophy of language.

6) Structuralism, hermeneutics, phenomenology and semiotics versus Anglo-Saxon post-positivist analytical philosophy.

7) Verificationism and justification. Truth and interpretation. Theory of truth, theory of meaning. Falsifiability Theorem. Holism and significance. Statement and referent. Epistemology versus ontology. Inscrutability of reference and indeterminacy of translation. Analyticity and the Duhem-Quine Thesis.

8) Deductive method versus inductive method. Qualitative method versus quantitative method. Research methodology. Philosophy of science. Epistemology without subject. Logic of scientific research. Semantic correspondence of Tarski's truth. Hypothetico-deductive method and Demarcation criterion. Evolutionary epistemology versus naturalized epistemology.

Yes, Abdel, answering your question Yes, I would prefer to continue working on Counterpoints II until July-August 2023. In September we could start work on the letter essays. As you know and we have already talked about that I am very overloaded with time and worries with my mother, although I hope that everything progresses positively. The prognosis is very good and definitely very favorable. I hope so. Better for her. Thank you for your words of encouragement and support, your good wishes and your concern. In that sense, I want you to wait for my answers to the issues that were pending and that you knew how to work with significant perseverance exhaustively in your latest developments: Derrida, Peirce, catwalks, interpretative semiotics. Derrida's Half Voice Isolated by Stephen Tyler. Your questions about the relevance of the unconscious and its epistemological foundation by Jacques Lacan. I plan to respond to all

Sorry, but in my quick reading of Your messages I had skipped one in between where you tell me about a lunch at your mother's house with your nieces Carmen and Julia, who are your sister Nahila's daughters. In that message you talk to me about Lacan. Don't worry. It is true that said like this the terms seem very confusing. And that opacity has been my responsibility. Lacan is certainly not easy, much less without the texts at hand and without a didactic introduction that breaks down the terms according to levels of complexity and conceptual axes. For example, when you are working from the symbolic? When from the imaginary or from the real? The difference between the imaginary signified and specular other with respect to the symbolic, structural, syntactic and significant Other. But none of this is a difficulty for you who are accustomed to a high theoretical level and argumentative complexity. It is not something that you could not understand and interpret. It is clear to me that you are super capable of understanding Lacan and much more. The point is that, as you yourself emphatically reaffirm, in reality, you as such to your work, Lacan does not contribute much that Derrida has not already contributed from Structuralism and the Saussurean theory of the signifier. I could even tell you that perhaps Ricoeur could replace Lacan's function in phenomenological reflection due to Ricoeur's favorable inclination towards the notion of the Freudian unconscious. In any case I apologize if I have been excessive in my reflection since Lacan. I do not want to bother you with it and I am very far from trying to impose it on our dialogue. Don't feel bad about it. If I have brought it up it has been to explain myself "out loud" let's say ----it is an expression----- to explain to myself passages or fragments of your own phenomenological inquiry. If at some point I make forays into Lacan, please don't take it the wrong way. Remember that Lacan was, let's say, my starting point of argumentative weight. I began reading Lévi-Strauss but it was truly Lacan who kept me working for years until my arrival in the United States when I began to become interested in Anglo-Saxon and North American analytical philosophy. But I understand that your phenomenological reflection has another development and is positioned against other problems. I try to follow you in your reflection. Remember that I have not read Schütz either, and there are concepts that are not clear to me or that I do not know their meaning. I even had to reread Derrida himself from Grammatology to try to understand some terms and the subsequent developments to which you lead him. Likewise, I do not have the knowledge that you have of Peirce's semiotics, but I try to follow you in it.

Thank you for sharing your art work with me. I don't know all of them. I only remember your work on the maker from the late 80s and early 90s and your opinions from that time that were truly fascinating for the young people we were at that time but today would even continue to be high-flying next to the criticism of contemporary art. So I will read them with great pleasure and I am sure I will enjoy them. Thank you for your friendship and for sharing these dialogues and your texts.

I am an omnivorous and voracious, disciplined and tenacious reader who can be studying and consulting with a habit of constant reading a good number of titles and authors at the same time although within related problems already subjectivized that answer my own questions. These questions are not posed within a metaphysical framework that inquires about what is in itself or about what is reality or what is real. I do not ask substantialist questions within that metaphysical framework of being. That is why your observation in this case seems somewhat imprecise to me in which, as you state, I propose to investigate the substance of reality or the ultimate goal or meaning of truth or being. It is very far from what I really propose. Perhaps I have not been able to adequately explain my position from a precise and well-outlined epistemological framework and perhaps for that reason you have formed an imprecise and somewhat misleading opinion. Which is perfectly natural if I have not explained it to you with a correct argument.

With my epistemological investigation, I propose, rather, to expose the difficulties that confront the different arguments or logical-empiricist schools within the Anglo-Saxon post-positivist analytical approach that discuss among themselves, distinguishing their programs and polarizing their gnoseological paradigms with respect to their own and those of others. those of its European continental neighbors around problems that revolve approximately around the modes of articulation of thought with the Thing, that is, the logical modes in which The articulation of language with the world occurs through logical propositions, and those of the mind with the body as a correlative problem that in some way respond, on the other hand, to the fundamentally epistemological and methodological inquiry of scientific research on the subject. of philosophy of science on the corroboration of scientific theories as they have been proposed by Bertrand Russell, Karl Popper, Hempel, Gödel, Carnap and the Vienna Circle at the dawn of the 20th century and as Thomas Kuhn, Kneale, Suppes, Quine, Putnam, Lakatos and von Wright later exhibited it at the end of the 20th century. My research points, undoubtedly with greater emphasis, in that direction, although not exclusively, after my current interest in the proposals presented around similar problems in the work of Habermas, Gadamer and Ricoeur. In no case do I propose the search for ultimate truths perhaps with a teleological and transcendentalist sense -----I regret having conveyed that feeling to you------, but in any case, and more specifically, with the purpose of exposing indeterminacies of scientific theories in their connection with the facts of the physical world, not so much with a materialist or positivist interest, but rather with an epistemological and scientific-methodological purpose. I also propose to show the indeterminacies that condition the relations of assertiveness of logical propositions with the world and the paradoxes of confirmation that the logical status of those propositions and the scientific theories that convey their meaning, these promote, as well as the relationship of representation semantics of truth as a correlation effect between a metalanguage and an object language. I am also interested in exposing the inconsistency and indefinition of language in its quality of representation of reality.

I would even emphasize that what is truly substantial about you, in addition to your complex reflections of enormous epistemological value, is precisely your methodological project, what you call "research methodology" which I prefer to understand as the methodology of scientific research or anthropological research, in ethnomethodological summary in a reading style that interrogates and questions in depth and sometimes diagonally, generating prisms of interpretation. But you insist on your interest in connecting your phenomenological, hermeneutic and semiotic research with anthropology and ethnomethodology essentially. And how this leads you to the "research methodology". You think there methodologically like a sociologist. Although we are both passionate about abstract thinking, on the other hand my path is more philosophical in argumentation, therefore I have devoted myself more to the logic of scientific and epistemological research, of philosophical argumentation in general, at times scholastic with a didactic inclination, a little tied to naturalism and empiricism but more specifically to the logical empiricism of the Anglo-Saxon approach without abandoning the critical rationalist perspective in the sense of Popper but fundamentally secular and perhaps pedagogical in intention. while you dedicate yourself more to the sociological aspect, not so much experimental ----although it does not exclude it-- but also mainly methodological, from a methodological research skeleton. That is your operational structuralism, which at some point last year you told me about in our "Counterpoints." We have similar concerns that differ according to vivid experience, accumulated readings and studies carried out over the years ("world of life" would say Husserl or Schütz, "forms of life" Wittgenstein, or rather, we could think in the interconnection of the three "worlds", physical, psychic and objective-argumentative as Popper would later maintain) and according to the theoretical path of each one. You have traveled a path from art theory at the end of the 80's and the first years of the 90's and from the markedly futurological concern for cultural, visual and urban anthropology, until reaching, at the end of the 90's, its articulation with an ethics of methodological researcher in the profession of the sociologist dedicated to investigating the phenomenal and hermeneutic imbrications of the plexuses of culture and their connection with the semiotic interpretation of the texts as a scriptural interpretation of culture tested before by Peirce and later by Gadamer and Derrida throughout your work and that you have discussed through the performative theory of Habermas although previously influenced by the phenomenological sociology of Schütz. My question about Lotman's semiotics was based on this constellation of ideas and authors; if his concept of "semiosphere" was articulated with your work on the network of interpretants of Peirce's semiotics and with the place occupied by postmodern anthropology in that same constellation.

However, we have many things in common, having ties of identity with a crucial moment in the political history of our country, having in some way shared elements of the societal imagination of the same generation with aesthetic motivations and philosophical and ethical concerns. We have in common having developed an interest in crucial questions of a present suspended in abstract thought but not, therefore, detached from the world in which we live. We have both been immigrants with all the difficult experience that entails and we have both lived not only in a socialist system but in the world of globalized neoliberal capitalism, and we have lived it as immigrants, and within the North American academic world since we have both lived in United States, you in Austin, Texas and me in Miami, Florida. You as a guest professor in the Anthropology chair at Rice University and I as a Bachelor student in the undergraduate Philosophy program at Florida International University.

Our experience in the North American academic world influenced you decisively in the direction of Schütz's phenomenological sociology, in Searle's philosophy of language of speech acts, in the direction of ethnomethodology and postmodern anthropology from Clifford Geertz to Stephen Tyler interacting with some members of whose generation of thinkers you were part in a certain period of time while I, who came from Cuba with an extensive tour of Lacan's work in the training achieved In the psychoanalysis group in Havana, the North American academic world influenced me in Anglo-Saxon post-positivist analytical philosophy from Russell, Whitehead, G.E. Moore, Wittgenstein, Popper and the Vienna Circle to Quine, Putnam, Davidson and the Harvard logicians by on the one hand and Michael Dummett and the philosophy of language from Oxford, England, on the other, the results obtained from his continuous study being decisive in my current logical-analytical empiricist inclination.

Regarding Lacan, I understand that it is not part of your theoretical references and that you do not have the references at hand to discuss text through. I understand you. I can share all the seminars with you, I have them in PDF scanned directly from the original paper editions. There is no difficulty with this Abdel, except that via Gmail I can only send you those seminars that do not take up much space in megabytes. If they exceed 20 Mb I cannot share them with you because it is the memory limit that Gmail imposes on its regulated users. Gmail won't let me do it unless I pay them an extra fee, which implies an expense that I can't afford at the moment; I also think it is unnecessary if there are other ways in which it is not necessary to pay for it. The thing is that until now the only possible way to share books with you for free -----that I know of----- is by email. There is an application called "We transfer" but both users who want to share books have to download the application on their computers, tablets or smart cell phones. I don't have space right now on my tablet, but if I get another tablet in the future I will definitely download the application, but in that case you should have it too but I don't know how that works in Cuba. It seems to me that this is important, to the extent that in this way we can share books and texts in general, for our work. About five years ago I had a Samsung smartphone and I had that "We transfer" application for a long time but I hardly used it. I only used it to share with an old friend the PDFs of Kolakowski's three volumes published by Alianza Editorial on the "Main Currents of Marxism." A very good book by the way, very descriptive of Marxist programs and schools from the classics of Marxism to the 20th century. The thing is, I only used the app on that one occasion.

Returning to Lacan. If I use your concepts in our dialogue it is because they help me understand from my own references those problems raised in your reflections and raised by Husserl's own phenomenology, or in Gadamer's hermeneutics, for example, and in Derrida's post-structuralism. or in Peirce's semiotics that you reinterpret in your system, etc. about language, the adequacy of the text with the referent and its cognition through the sign and the work with the interpretants, etc. ...

It is clear that the terms with which Lacan has thought and then aired the problem of the Saussurean sign, radically reversing its correlation to grant a privileged role to the signifier, reducing the signified to its mere imaginary function, definitely does not exhaust the entire problem nor does it allow it to be exclusively reduced to Lacanian terminology, much less think that it is possible to reduce to psychoanalysis all those problems thought about and reinterpreted by other knowledge and discourses that range from phenomenology and hermeneutics to semiotics or epistemology, but it allows me, on the other hand, to be able to communicate them to you in a way that I can involve Lacan in the way in which I interpret what you tell me, for example, your elaboration of Derrida's bridges between language and non-language and between text, interpretation, sign, and referent I can explain it with the Lacanian formula of the ghost that articulates the subject barred between the signifier and the signified by metaphor or divided between two signifiers by metonymy in their relationship. with the imaginary function of the object "a" that blocks access to the real from subjectivity. I can eventually do the same by relating those semiotic or grammatological philosophical problems with the inscrutability of reference or with the indeterminacy of meaning by Quine, with Tarski's semantic theory of truth used by Popper as a metalanguage to establish a referential truth --- --although transitory and indeterminate------- of science, from its demarcation criterion, properly oriented through the hypothetico-deductive method introduced by Popper himself, with the theory compositional analysis of natural language in Dummett to address Davidson's assertions that language does not exist properly but that it is a concrete consequence of its use by speakers in the same way as you could also discuss these problems from the "communicative theory" of Habermas or from Austin's "speech acts" as used and explained by Searle, for example. When one comes across an object, a sign, or an unknown fact, even if we assume a meaning or logic that we do not know, we still try to decipher it and interpret it according to our own sources, even though our own codes are nothing more than instruments of a transitory heuristic like Wittgenstein's example of the ladder that has helped us reach a certain level and that we then throw away when it no longer serves the task or function for which it was initially intended. That is why I understand that your questions about psychoanalysis are absolutely pertinent and even logically reasonable; they are also your reluctance and distrust, but, on the other hand, your statements against a privileged conception of unconscious discourse, in my opinion, are based on an imprecise background and are They probably start from the epistemological prejudice that considers the unconscious as a capricious and unjustifiable form of the ineffable and, as you say, of the "Dionysian" whose antagonistic function of Cartesian reason must be postponed for clarification until the phenomenological reflections of consciousness itself in its spiral of meaning are exhausted. A point of view that starts from this underlying imprecision would be very far from a properly logical and epistemological conception of the unconscious initiated by Lacan, as you well know, through Saussurean linguistics and the structural opposition introduced by Jakobson and the phonology of the Prague School on the rational background of the invention of psychoanalysis by Freud and the "construction" of the "discovery" of the unconscious. An unconscious that ceases to be the dark reserve of repressed thoughts and images of consciousness, to become the structural, logically structural failure of the effect of the divided subject, subscribed by Lacan, between the significant master of the identity of the One and the signifier. of the knowledge of the Other from which the unconscious itself comes. I would even tell you that you don't even need Lacan or structuralist theses to openly discuss and air the role and epistemological relevance of that Freudian concept of unconscious rationality. The term and the shadow of opacities with which it has been surrounded make us think of what you call "Dionysian" from the distortion generated by a large part of Freud's North American students to which they contributed with more darkness by reinterpreting the second Freudian topic. of the Ego, the Id and the Superego in the light of the American Way of Life. This irresponsible role played by that generation of analysts contributed to reinforcing only the importance of the Self as the executive center of our mind, while at the same time it began to discriminate that fundamental principle in the beginnings of psychoanalysis at the dawn of the 20th century of considering the interpretation of the unconscious in psychoanalysis only through words. The Freudian principle of the unconscious based on the word inspired not only Lacan and the structuralist movement of the 50's, 60's and 70's for its adherence to the possibilities of syntax, but also motivated the phenomenological reflections of thinkers who, like Ricoeur, were somewhat distrustful towards the fundamental theses of structuralism as such, but on the other hand, they welcomed trust in the meaning conveyed by the meaning of language and even character. comprehensive of interpretation in hermeneutics and semiotics. The second and third generations of psychoanalysts were responsible for those deviations in the understanding of the concept of the unconscious and whose distorting effects reach the present day, fueled by deep intellectual prejudices towards decipherment and its rational understanding reintroduced by Lacan.

As I told you: ---You can do without Lacan if you want to have an understanding of the unconscious from a phenomenological perspective------. It is enough to access Ricoeur's theses in "The conflict of interpretations" who highlights Freud's role as a thinker of suspicion along with Marx and Nietzsche to graciously grant the unconscious its place in the epistemological and phenomenological debate, after in certain moment, Husserl himself in his criticism of Kant highlighted the enigmatic place of the "unconditioned" with whose name Husserl identified the place of the epistemological unconscious as a place of absolute intuition to highlight its opacity of meaning with respect to the Cartesian reflection of consciousness; which did not resolve the direct access to the intuition of the essences contrary to the adequate and apodictic expression of the ego in the transcendental reduction nor the transparency of consciousness once that phenomenological epoché had occurred.

That is why I understand that your questions about psychoanalysis are absolutely pertinent and even logically reasonable; they are also your reluctance and distrust, but, on the other hand, your statements against a privileged conception of unconscious discourse, in my opinion, are based on an imprecise background and are They probably start from the epistemological prejudice that considers the unconscious as a capricious and unjustifiable form of the ineffable and, as you say, of the "Dionysian" whose antagonistic function of Cartesian reason must be postponed for clarification until the phenomenological reflections of consciousness itself in its spiral of meaning are exhausted. A point of view that starts from this underlying imprecision would be very far from a properly logical and epistemological conception of the unconscious initiated by Lacan, as you well know, through Saussurean linguistics and the structural opposition introduced by Jakobson and the phonology of the Prague School on the rational background of the invention of psychoanalysis by Freud and the "construction" of the "discovery" of the unconscious. An unconscious that ceases to be the dark reserve of repressed thoughts and images of consciousness, to become the structural, logically structural failure of the effect of the divided subject, subscribed by Lacan, between the significant master of the identity of the One and the signifier. of the knowledge of the Other from which the unconscious itself comes. I would even tell you that you don't even need Lacan or structuralist theses to openly discuss and air the role and epistemological relevance of that Freudian concept of unconscious rationality. The term and the shadow of opacities with which it has been surrounded make us think of what you call "Dionysian" from the distortion generated by a large part of Freud's North American students to which they contributed with more darkness by reinterpreting the second Freudian topic. of the Ego, the Id and the Superego in the light of the American Way of Life. This irresponsible role played by that generation of analysts contributed to reinforcing only the importance of the Self as the executive center of our mind, while at the same time it began to discriminate that fundamental principle in the beginnings of psychoanalysis at the dawn of the 20th century of considering the interpretation of the unconscious in psychoanalysis only through words. The Freudian principle of the unconscious based on the word inspired not only Lacan and the structuralist movement of the 50's, 60's and 70's for its adherence to the possibilities of syntax, but also motivated the phenomenological reflections of thinkers who, like Ricoeur, were somewhat distrustful towards the fundamental theses of structuralism as such, but on the other hand, they welcomed trust in the meaning conveyed by the meaning of language and even character. comprehensive of interpretation in hermeneutics and semiotics. The second and third generations of psychoanalysts were responsible for those deviations in the understanding of the concept of the unconscious and whose distorting effects reach the present day, feeding deep intellectual prejudices towards decipherment and its rational understanding reintroduced by Lacan.

As I told you: ---You can do without Lacan if you want to have an understanding of the unconscious from a phenomenological perspective------. It is enough to access Ricoeur's theses in "The conflict of interpretations" who highlights Freud's role as a thinker of suspicion along with Marx and Nietzsche to graciously grant the unconscious its place in the epistemological and phenomenological debate, after in certain moment, Husserl himself in his criticism of Kant highlighted the enigmatic place of the "unconditioned" with whose name Husserl identified the place of the epistemological unconscious as a place of absolute intuition to highlight its opacity of meaning with respect to the Cartesian reflection of consciousness; which did not resolve the direct access to the intuition of the essences contrary to the adequate and apodictic expression of the ego in the transcendental reduction nor the transparency of consciousness once that phenomenological epoché had occurred.

Theoretical investigations/logic is the theory towards itself as research deploying its own field without external empyrea, field research is investigations of culture within which art is one more (my art criticism)

Alberto Mendez

I understand you separate both Fields. But I had the impression that in El correlato de mundo you went from an interpretation of the text to an interpretation of the culture.

GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abdel Hernandez San Juan

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Derrida Jacques, the Geneva linguistic circle, 175-192, margins of philosophy, chair

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Derrida, Jacques, Form and the Wishes to Say, Notes on the Phenomenology of Language. Margins of Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, USA

Derrida, Jacques, Form and Meaning, Notes on the Phenomenology of Language, Margins of Philosophy, Cathedra, 1989

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Derrida Jacques, Notes on the phenomenology of language, Margins of philosophy, the university of Chicago press

Derrida Jacques, Notes on the Phenomenology of Language, Pp, 195-212, margins of philosophy, chair

Gadamer George, Aesthetics and interpretation, metropolis

Habermas, J 1981, The Theory of Communicative Action: Volume 1, Beacon Press, Boston

Habermas, J 1981, The Theory of Communicative Action: Volume 2, Beacon Press, Boston

Habermas, J, Theory of communicative action, taurus

Hernández San Juan Abdel, The intramundane horizon: phenomenology and hermeneutics of the everyday, https://www.academia.edu/resource/work/88136462

Hernández San Juan Abdel, The correlate of the world: interpretant and structure in postmodern cultural theory, https://www.academia.edu/resource/work/88136460

Hernández San Juan Abdel, Thinking science, new phenomenological avenues between philosophy and sociology, https://www.academia.edu/resource/work/88136461

Hernández San Juan Abdel, Los Enigmas del ground, author's book in preparation, 2022

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sanders peirce charles, Division of signs, pp 21-43, The science of semiotics, collection of semiology and epistemology, new vision editions, Buenos Aires

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sanders peirce Charles, Icon, index, symbol, pp, 45-62, The science of semiotics, collection of semiology and epistemology, new vision editions, Buenos Aires

Schütz Alfred, knowledge in the worlds of everyday life, edited by ilse and luckman, amorrortu editors, buenos aires

Schütz Alfred, the problem of social reality, amorrortu editors, buenos aires

Schütz Alfred, the meaningful construction of the social world, introduction to comprehensive sociology, prologue by Joan Carles Melish, ilse Schütz, Paidós, basic, 1993

Tyler A Stephen, constrains of propositions, context of discourse, semantique analysis, Pp, 116-121, A Point of Order, Rice University studies

Tyler Stephen A., Evocation: The Unwriteable, A Response to Abdel Hernandez San Juan, Sept 9, Rice University, Houston, Texas, USA, 1997

Tyler Stephen A, Post-Modern Ethnography, The Unspeakable, Discourse, Rhetoric and Dialogue in the Posmodern World, Wisconsin University Press

Tyler Stephen A, On Being out of language.

Alberto Mendez Suarez