Hisashi Ohtsuki, Lecturer
Hisashi Ohtsuki came to SOKENDAI in April 2011. He is a lecturer as of April 2015. 

He majored in mathematics in his undergraduate days. He graduated from Kyushu University in 2006 (Ph.D: science) under the supervision of Professor Yoh Iwasa. He was a JSPS research fellow in 2005 (DC2), 2006 (DC2 & PD), and 2008 (PD). He was a postdoctoral fellow in mathematical biology at Program for Evolutionary Dynamics at Harvard University in 2007-2008.

Dr. Ohtsuki theoretically studies evolutionary origin of cooperation. In his earlier work on evolution of indirect reciprocity (=reputation-based cooperation), he found social norms that maintain evolutionarily stable cooperation. He is also an evolutionary-game theorist. Using graph theory and inclusive fitness theory, he explores effects of population structure on evolutionary game dynamics. 

Selected publications:

Ohtsuki, H. 
Evolutionary games in Wright's island model: kin selection meets evolutionary game theory.
Evolution (2010) 64, 3344-3353.

Antal, T., Ohtsuki, H., Wakeley, J., Taylor, P. & Nowak, M.
Evolution of cooperation by phenotypic similarity.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (2009) 106, 8597-8600, 6

Ohtsuki, H. & Tsuji, K.
Adaptive colonial reproduction schedule as a cause of worker policing in social Hymenoptera: a dynamic game analysis.
The American Naturalist (2009) 173, 747-758

Ohtsuki, H., Iwasa, Y. & Nowak, M. A.
Indirect reciprocity provides only a narrow margin of efficiency for costly punishment.
Nature (2009) 457, 79-82 

Ohtsuki, H., Hauert, C., Lieberman, E. & Nowak, M. A. 
A simple rule for evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks.
Nature (2006) 441, 502-505 

Last updated: Apr. 6, 2015

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