History
THE FIRST EPOCH OF OUTER SPACE DEVELOPMENT
(1957-1979)
This textual narrative comes from my chapter 2 of my dissertation - The Politics of Space Law in a Cold War Era: Understanding Regime Change, Disseration 2006, Northern Arizona University, Department of Politics and International Affairs. What you are about to read should be understood as a critical analytical political science explanation of key historical points regarding space activities. In order to explain why different things tended to occur during different time periods, I created a 3 epoch framework.
It was during the first epoch that the outer space development regime was created, and so was space law. Visionaries had written about outer space for centuries but it was the Soviet Sputnik launch in 1957, which marked the beginning of the space race. At this time, the international political environment was still freshly tempered by World War I and II. The reactions of the international community to the Sputnik launch were shaped by Cold War fears. Shortly after the launch, nation states immediately urged the United Nations to created laws to govern the outer space territory. The UN did as instructed, and it created the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) and the International Institute of Space Law (IISL)[1] for the purpose of creating space law. After nearly ten years of state negotiations, five international space law treaties and five declarations to provide the international community with the principles of space law.
During the first epoch, the new outer space development regime consisted of three main actors: the United States, the Soviet Union, and a group of various states operating through the United Nations. The U.S. and U.S.S.R., two superpowers, constantly vied for alliances with other states in order to maximize their interests in the outer space regime. To this extent, less powerful states had the power to exert their interests during the space law negotiations. This was the international power dynamic at the beginning of the space age. Therefore, although the United States has had an interest in a free market direction for space activities, it had to consider the interests of the U.S.S.R. and other states. Early attempts were made by the U.S. to impose a free market direction to outer space development. For example, as early as 1959, President Eisenhower declared that the U.S. Government “. . . should aggressively encourage private enterprise in the establishment and operation of satellite relays for revenue-producing services" (Jasentuliyana & Lee, 1979-1981, Vol. 1: at 304). U.S. attempts to press from free market commercialization principles were often thwarted by the Soviet Union, and superpower ideological conflicts created severe impasses in the space law negotiations.
The historical record of space law negotiations between nearly 100 nations reflect this power dynamic. This includes how less powerful states negotiated for clauses ensuring the prevention of militarization and colonization of outer space by the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. In exchange for these types of assurances, less powerful states acquiesced to U.S. and Soviet proposals to treat outer space as a commons territory which belonged to no one state. Pursuant to the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, ninety-eight nations agreed that outer space would belong to the “province of mankind”, that all nations would have the freedom to “use” and “explore” outer space, and that both these provisions must be done in a way to “benefit all mankind”. The province of mankind principle was never specifically defined (Jasentuliyana, 1992), thus allowing the superpowers to pursue their interests.
This chapter provides a historical analysis of the politics surrounding the first epoch in the outer space development regime. In addition, it discusses the key legal principles which were created to govern activities in outer space, the key actors instrumental in shaping these laws, and the role played by the United Nations as a key actor in the outer space development regime. As stated in chapter one, a Gramscian analysis best helps explain the dynamics surrounding the three epochs of outer space development. The three epochs are best understood as distinct historic blocs in which the substructure (economic sphere) interacts with the superstructure (political, ideological, spheres etc) to form a new historical epoch in the development of the outer space regime. Thus, each epoch is marked by distinct economic, ideological, political, and social constellations.
Consistent with realism theory, state power, national security, and disarmament dominated space discourse in the first epoch. However, consistent with neoliberal institutionalism, economic interests became key factors in shaping outer space development. Yet, much is left unexplained by these theories. For example, a Gramscian approach explains these two phenomena while also explaining the political-ideological environment which caused space law negotiations to be constantly halted mainly because of ideological conflicts between the two superpowers. In comparison to President Eisenhower’s attitude towards Khrushchev, President Kennedy triggered a new cooperative relationship with Khrushchev, which served to alleviate the impasse, causing space law negotiations to continue. Therefore, personalities of state leaders mattered in forging a direction for outer space development. U.S. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson stand out as being key influencers in the intellectual and moral leadership for outer space development during this period. Thus, organic intellectuals along with the international political-ideological environment played an integral part in the shaping of the outer space development regime in the first epoch. For example, international space lawmaking was most successful during détente, when superpower tensions were relaxed. During this period the core space law treaties were negotiated, drafted, and signed by the international community acting through the United Nations. When political détente between the United States and Soviet Union waned in 1979, so did the process of international space lawmaking.
In the following sections I will discuss the first epoch using a Gramscian lens which highlights how cold war ideology and politics shaped international space law treaties, acceptable economic practices in the outer space development regime, and popular perceptions of outer space. For example, as I will discuss later in the chapter, the term “province of mankind” instead of “the common heritage of mankind” was inserted into the outer space treaty of 1967 in order to get both the USA and the USSR to sign the treaty. Thus competition between the superpowers was instrumental in determining the outcome of space law treaty negotiations during the first epoch. In addition, civil societies’ perception of outer space was also shaped by cold war fears. Reactions to the launching of Sputnik are best explained by the ideological climate of “fear” fostered by superpower rivalry.[2] These fears enabled the centering of national security in outer space discussions and preventing military installations in outer space became a key focus of the first epoch. Also intimately connected to this history is the way organic intellectuals made the general public feel about outer space through discourse. Outer space discourse during the time of Sputnik included science fiction books, films, newspaper reports, speeches and magazine images which constructed outer space and space travel as a scary thing. Therefore, when state leaders proposed increases in the military and defense budget, civil society consented. When state leaders proposed that the nation win the space race to the Moon, the civil society consented.
In this chapter, I begin with a discussion of the role played by the political and ideological environment in shaping outcomes during the first epoch. Second, I explain that despite the presence of the USSR, the United States has played a hegemonic role in influencing international institutions to adopt its interests as international interests regarding outer space development since the first epoch.
The International Political and Ideological Environment
As stated earlier, the superstructure, which includes the political and ideological spheres, was extremely important in structuring the first epoch of the outer space development regime. Cold war ideology was central to the construction of the regime itself, including the five international space treaties. The treaties containing the governing norms for space are still relevant today. In this section I use a Gramscian lens to analyze the history and politics of space lawmaking during the first epoch. This section explains the politics surrounding the creation of space law and how this was influenced by the Cold War ideological-political environment. This includes 1) Sputnik and the space race 2) international space lawmaking within the United Nations 3) détente and 4) the role played by U.S. civil society in influencing government spending on space.
Cold War Ideology
I suggest that the political and ideological environment of the Cold War was an important shaper of the outer space development regime. Most accounts of the Cold War explain the politics of that era by using realism or neorealism theories. However, Cold War ideology can be better explained by using a Gramscian lens. According to most accounts, the Cold War began from around 1945 until 1991.[3] The Cold War was marked by superpower rivalry in which the United States seemed to feel it could not trust the Soviet Union, and vice versa. The United States and the Soviet Union rivaled to be seen by the world as the best - ideologically, technologically, militarily, economically, politically, and culturally.[4] The main characteristic of the Cold War environment was that the ideological contest between communism and capitalism governed political decisions concerning international relations. For example, Painter (1999: 19) notes, “anti-communism became a guiding principle of US foreign policy and a significant force in US domestic politics” (Young, 1999; and Smith, 1998; and Woods & Jones, 1991). A similar sentiment existed on the Soviet side regarding capitalism and the American superpower rival (Mastny, 1979; McCagg, 1978; Taubman, 1982). During this period, tensions and hostilities were high, even though the United States and Soviet Union were not openly fighting a war against each other. Instead, they were involved in wars by supporting allies against their rivals in proxy wars in places such as Korea and Vietnam and many other places in Africa, Asia and the Middle East.[5] The Cuban Missile Crisis is a prime example of the cat and mouse tensions (Raymont, 1988). It was within this context that the “space race" began. At this time, Eisenhower was President of the United States and Secretary Khrushchev was the leader of the Soviet Union. The superpower rivals made political decisions based on the fear that the other might use this burgeoning space technology to launch atomic or nuclear missiles, or to colonize the Moon, other celestial bodies, or outer space in general.
The US and the USSR were not the only state actors in negotiating the space law treaties. Since the US and USSR vied with each other for alliance with other states, less powerful states could exercise a modicum of power. On the issue of space law, less powerful states’ interests were threefold: to protect against the possibility of one of the superpowers causing nuclear war from missiles launched from or stationed in outer space; to prevent the superpowers from colonizing the Moon or other areas of outer space; and to prevent U.S. or U.S.S.R. from greedily appropriating outer space territories and resources before they themselves were able to amass sufficient resources to take advantage of the new space age.
The Cold War environment thus was instrumental in shaping the terms of space law treaties. The power dynamic between the US, USSR and other states working through the United Nations resulted, for example, in a space treaty that remains unclear and vague on the issue of property rights in space. The key factors outlined in the sections below provide a discussion of the politics of the Cold War environment was an important shaper of outer space development regime in the first epoch.
1. Sputnik and the Space Race EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE
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The Sputnik launch[6] by the Soviet Union was the key event prompting the outer space development regime. From a legal perspective, the concern in the United Nations was that launching satellites into orbit would become an acceptable international practice. Unchallenged, the Sputnik launch, and subsequent launches could have become permissible as legal custom (Metcalf, 1999: 82-84). Therefore, when Sputnik was launched on October 4, 1957 President Eisenhower and other state leaders took immediate action urging the United Nations to create laws for outer space (Doyle, 2002).
In addition to the legal concerns prompted by the Sputnik launch, there was the concern that the Soviet’s may be winning the ideological competition and may be seen by other states as superior to the US. Sputnik not only demonstrated the technological ability of the Soviet Union to strategically launch, monitor and track a satellite, it was also visible around the world and was discussed in the US and European media as the “red moon” or “man-made moon”(Collier & Collier, 2002). The Sputnik launch was perceived by US state leaders as a demonstration of the Soviet ability to launch inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) which could pinpoint and target strategic locations. In addition, many people, including the media, were surprised and shocked by the Sputnik launches (Krug, 1991). This was because after World War II there was a boost to the U.S. ego. It was seen by many as the leader of the “free world”. It was known for mass producing consumer items such as shiny new cars, refrigerators and color television sets. It was ideologically referred to as the “New World” and as a land full of optimism, technological innovation, and opportunity. It was generally believed that the U.S. was the world leader in technology and science.
In spite of its image as a technological giant, the U.S. was losing the space race. In addition to being the first in launching the Sputnik satellite, the Soviets were also first to send a human into space - Yuri Gagarin in 1961.[7] Although Alan Shepard was the first American to successfully orbit Earth in 1962, it was clear, the Americans were falling behind in the space race. There was more at stake than just winning the space race. The ideological battle between communism versus capitalism was still going on.[8] Since the launching of Sputnik was perceived as a military threat in the United States and Europe, thus the focus during the first stage of UN discussions was on national security and disarmament. Consistent with a Gramscian analysis, the superstructure of politics and ideology during the cold war determined the focus of the negotiations on outer space. Similar to the early tensions between the superpowers which formed the basis of early discussions on outer space, détente also molded the outcomes of outer space negotiations.
2. Détente
In addition to the start of a space race ideological competition between the two superpowers other factors influences the direction of outer space development. For example, détente - a state of relaxed political tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union (Painter, 1999), which lasted from the late 1960s until around 1979, influenced the most fruitful period of international space lawmaking within the United Nations (Von Bencke, 1997).[9] Jasentuliyana and Lee (1979-1981) discuss the negotiations which resulted in the five UN outer space treaties. After ten years of negotiations between nearly 100 nations, the Outer Space Treaty was opened for signature on January 27, 1966 and entered into force as the Constitution for outer space on October 10, 1967.[10]
The Outer Space Treaty was well received; it was ratified by ninety-six nations and signed by another twenty-seven states.[11] As the first effort to regulate activities occurring in outer space, it established several principles of international law, making it the most important treaty in the field of space law.[12] Moreover, it incorporates the principles of peaceful use of outer space, cooperation between space faring nations and the extension of the rule of law into outer space; thus it is also “considered the cornerstone of international space law and the progenitor of the legal theories which found fruition in the four agreements following it” (Berkeley, 1997: 3).[13] Among the key principles contained in the five international space treaties is the understanding that outer space was deemed to belong to the province of mankind[14], as distinct from the common heritage of mankind. Although this province of mankind principle was vague and undefined, creating such a term demonstrates the eagerness of the international community to finalize a treaty for outer space. Neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union would have agreed to sign the Outer Space Treaty if it had contained the common heritage of mankind wording since neither was willing to “freely share their space technology” with the rest of world (Von Bencke, 1997: 43). This sentiment had been expressed throughout the outer space treaty negotiations from 1958- 1966 (Jasentuliyna and Lee, 1979-1981). The treaty also contained granted all nations the right of freedom of exploration and use of outer space, prohibited anyone from appropriating outer space (in accordance with the already accepted res communis) principle, mandates that all space activities must be carried out for the benefit of all mankind, and insists that outer space must be used for peaceful purposes.
To further demonstrate the impact that the international political environment has had upon the creation of space law, although the first epoch was a fruitful period of international space lawmaking, this situation ended in 1979 when détente ended. The last space law treaty, The Moon Treaty of 1979, unlike the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, was only signed by 7 countries. The reason for its low acceptance is twofold: it was offered for signature, after détente; and it contained language deeming outer space as the common heritage of mankind instead of the vague province of mankind designation contained in the outer space treaty of 1967. The U.S., the Soviet Union, and most other nations rejected the Moon Treaty. Therefore, the Moon Treaty is typically viewed as not being part of international space law.[15] It only took five nations to enter it into force, however it opened for signature on December 18, 1979 and took five years to get the five signatures required in accordance with international treaty law to become formally part of space law.
As compared to the large number of state signatories to the Outer Space Treaty, this treaty arguably is not accepted as a legal norm. The Outer Space Treaty was well received: it was ratified by ninety-six nations and signed by another twenty-seven states. The other three outer space treaties also experienced a high level of international cooperation in terms of signage and ratification. The Moon Treaty goes further by defining the Common Heritage concept in more detail and by imposing specific obligations on the parties engaged in the exploration and/or exploitation of outer space. Unlike the indirect reference to the Common Heritage doctrine in the Outer Space Treaty, the Moon Treaty explicitly designates the moon and its natural resources as part of the Common Heritage of Mankind. This is the main reason that the Moon Treaty is much more controversial than the Outer Space Treaty[16] and this is why it has not gained widespread acceptance (Heim, 1990). Specifically, Article 11 states in Paragraph 1 that "the Moon and its natural resources are the common heritage of mankind" and in Paragraph 3 that the Moon, nor its natural resources shall not "become property of any State, international intergovernmental organization or non-governmental entity or of any natural person. . . ". In Paragraph 5 it calls for "an international regime . . . to govern the exploitation of the natural resources of the Moon . . .", and in Paragraph 7 (d) that an "equitable sharing by all State Parties in the benefits derived from those resources, whereby the interests and needs of the developing countries, as well as the efforts of those countries which have contributed directly or indirectly in the exploration of the Moon, shall be given special consideration".
3. The United Nations as the Designated Forum for Space Lawmaking
A third factor important to understanding the first epoch of the outer space development regime is that the U.S. played the role of the hegemonic state by selecting the United Nations as the forum for space lawmaking. Immediately following the Sputnik launch, U.S. leaders, along with other state leaders, requested that the United Nations be the forum for making space law during the first epoch (Doyle, 2002). The Sputnik launch of 1957 was seen as a matter of national military security since it occurred shortly after World War II had devastated most of Europe, significant parts of Japan, and other countries. Memories of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were still fresh in everyone's mind.[17] The international political environment was such that it was common to view international activities as dangerous. Space technology was viewed in terms of its potential to allow states to annihilate other states. States had grave reservations about placing their trust in other states. Although they also had little trust in international organizations, the United Nations was viewed as the lesser of two evils. The ideological- political environment was such that states were willing to trust the United Nations to manage the international space lawmaking process. The subject of outer space development was taken to the United Nations since it was an organization established to "maintain international peace and security", and its General Assembly has been charged with the task of, "inter alia of encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification" (Jasentuliyana and Lee, 1979-1981: xi). During this historical epoch, the United Nations was seen as "the natural forum for consideration" for these types of questions (Von Bencke, 1997: 40).
A Gramscian analysis provides the insight that phenomena are best understood within the context of their historical moments. The international political-ideological environment determined the politics of space lawmaking during the first epoch. Significant changes occurred within the outer space development regime when the international structure changed. When nations were fearful due to World War II, they trusted the United Nations. When détente was in effect, space lawmaking through international UN treaties was very fruitful. When détente ended, and when the SALT III talks on nuclear detainment where canceled following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (Young, 1999: 163), space lawmaking through the United Nations ended. As Von Bencke (1997: 87) explains, “once again cooperation in space proved itself subject to the broader state of U.S. – Soviet relations”. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan caused U.S. - Soviet relations to enter into “a deep freeze” (Von Bencke, 1997: 87). After this, the Carter Administration took punitive measures and “proactive steps to strengthen its geopolitical posture and reach” (Von Bencke, 1997: 88).[18] At the same time, space lawmaking within the United Nations ceased.[19]
The politics regarding space law creation during the first epoch focused on military and national defense initiatives. While the United Nations seemed to play a primary role in shaping space law, this situation ended when changes occurred within the international structure. Consistent with Gramsci, structural changes within the international environment caused changes within the outer space development regime, either limiting or enhancing the power of the United Nations as demonstrated above.
4. U.S. Civil Society during the First Epoch
A fourth factor in understanding the outer space development regime during the first epoch is the relationship between public perceptions regarding outer space and state action. According to Launius and McCurdy (1997), state leaders have always been cognizant of and sensitive to the general public’s views regarding outer space and have been careful not to offend the general public. These attitudes of the general public have had an impact on government spending on space activities. However, a Gramscian analysis suggests that the relationship between state and civil society is not so much influenced by democratic principles of representation, rather it is a relationship of power in which a hegemonic state seeks to maintain its dominance over civil society by securing its acquiescence to state ideology and policy.
Thus, during the first epoch the views of civil society regarding outer space mirrored U.S. government views of the USSR. Since the initial U.S. response to the Sputnik launch was marked by fear and mistrust of Soviet intentions, the views of US civil society also reflected fear regarding outer space (Dickson, 2007; Collier & Collier, 2002). With the launch of various speeches by President Kennedy, U.S. civil society’s view on outer space development went from absolute fear to pure excitement and the goal became to win the national space race competition against the Soviet Union (Launius & McCurdy, 1997: 52). The Americans were the first to successfully send people on the Moon – Neil Armstrong, Michael Collins and Buzz Aldrin - in 1969 (Launius & McCurdy, 1997: 52) [20]. After the first Moon landing, the mood was one of international victory. As one space historian, Howard Benedict explained that "in London's Trafalgar Square, crowds screamed and applauded. In New York's Yankee Stadium, the baseball scoreboard flashed 'They on the Moon!' The stadium was filled with cheers, then there was a moment of silence before the 35,000 fans sang 'American the Beautiful'. Celebrations were held, ticker-tape parades commenced, and medal-pinnings, hand-shaking, and back-slapping were the order of the day" (Krug, 1991: 47).
The U.S. went back to the Moon several more times and placed Space Station Skylab into orbit. Astronauts were sent to live and work in Skylab months at a time. The Soviets were heavily involved in space activities as well during this time. In spite of all of the technological and scientific space breakthroughs, the American excitement for space had waned right after the first Moon landing during Nixon and Carter’s Presidencies (Krug, 1991: 48). American public was jaded in the post 1960s climate of social unrest. During the Presidencies of Nixon, Ford and Carter, the American people wanted problems at home fixed such as protests, demonstrations, civil unrest, riots, education, housing, employment, issues over the Vietnam War, poverty and many other social issues (Von Bencke, 1997). In spite of winning the space race and in spite of landing an American on the Moon as President Kennedy had promised, the general public (both in the U.S. and abroad) was no longer excited about outer space. Indeed, it has been suggested that civil society views regarding space went from absolute fear, to excitement, to sheer boredom and disillusionment (Krug, 1991: 48; Launius & McCurdy, 1997: 52).[21] The focus for a while shifted to domestic politics rather than what was now viewed as a lofty space program. Carter was aware that the American people could no longer be excited by the lofty space program (McCurdy, 1997).
In accordance with a Gramscian analysis, the above sections demonstrate that to explain the first epoch of outer space development we must account for the international ideological and political environment created by the Cold War, how this shaped perceptions and reactions, key events such as the timing of the Soviet Sputnik launch, customary practices such as space lawmaking within the United Nations, and public perceptions, rejection, and/or endorsement of public spending on outer space development. The following sections discuss the role of the U.S. as a hegemonic state in the first epoch, creating space law to suit its interest while giving concessions to other states in order to sustain power. According to Cox (1993: 264), hegemonic power is achieved by “adherence to universalized principles which are accepted or acquiesced to by a sufficient proportion of subordinate states and social forces.” In the following paragraphs I will discuss the ways in which the United States acquired a hegemonic position in the outer space development regime.
The “Hegemonic State” in the First Epoch: Key Actors
This section demonstrates how the United States played the role of a hegemonic state in influencing space law during the first epoch of outer space development. U.S. dominance involves incentives and sanctions along with what Gill & Law (1993: 93) refer to as “intellectual and moral leadership”. A Gramscian conception of hegemony is different from the realists’ concept of hegemony in that realists focus on state exercises of power over other states, whereas the Gramscian approach explains hegemony by focusing on the influence of coercion and the role played by consent (Cox, 1993).[22] In this section, I outline various instances during the first epoch where the U.S. played a hegemonic role and influenced consent through symbolic and institutional coercion and the use of organic intellectuals and economic concessions during the first epoch. In most cases U.S. interests prevailed, except for situations wherein the U.S. willingly compromised those interests in exchange for faster cooperation on predicable points of contention (Von Bencke, 1997: 40).
Key Actors
Most historical accounts which explain the politics surrounding space lawmaking during the first epoch discuss three key actors 1) United States 2) the Soviet Union, and 3) and a collection of other states acting through the United Nations. However, I am proposing that by using a Gramscian lens we can better understand that the U.S. has played a hegemonic role in the outer space development regime since its beginning. This is difficult to see since many of the space lawmaking activities and actors outline below are inextricably intertwined. Still, as this section explains detailed historical accounts on outer space development during the first epoch reveal that the U.S. had more influence over space law that the U.S.S.R. or any other state.[23] U.S. Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson operated as key actors (“organic intellectuals) in influencing outer space development regime change. In addition, institutions such as the UN Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and the International Telecommunications Union[24] served as instruments to support acceptance of U.S. commercialization interests during the first epoch.
During this time other states played a key role in the balance between the superpower interests. These states voiced their concerns regarding preventing the spread of nuclear proliferation[25] by the space superpowers. This was the dynamic, involving a group of other states working through the United Nations to vying around a balancing of interests of the U.S. and U.S.S.R., describes the politics surrounding outer space development during the first epoch. This dynamic defined negotiations leading to the five international space law treaties. For example, in negotiating the space law treaties, less powerful nations agreed to clearly define outer space as a res communis[26] territory (Jasentuliyana & Lee 1979-1981). Prior to this, outer space could have been defined as belonging to each nation in accordance with its sovereign territory, similar to air space. It is clear from the travaux préparatoires and related documents, leading up to the outer space treaties, the nations of the world were against ownership of outer space territory. This prohibition applies to individuals, private, corporate, international or governmental bodies.[27]
It is also clear from the record that nations participating in the outer space treaty negotiations were making this trade off in exchange for asserting their interest in preventing the U.S. and U.S.S.R. from colonizing outer space through military installations. The legal effect of this concession was that the outer space territory was no longer subject to the possibility of belonging to sovereign nations in conjunction with their air space and land rights. Outer space was deemed as belonging to no state in particular. This benefited the U.S. and the Soviet Union by granting them (since they were the only two space faring nations at the time) legal free reign over outer space to develop satellite communications industry.[28] In exchange for these new legal rights, the developed nations were granted the right to share in the benefits derived from outer space exploration. This is why one of the key principles of space law is that space activities are to be for the "benefit of all nations", "irrespective of their stage of economic or scientific development" (Von Bencke, 1997: 43). In spite of the number of key actors participating in the space law negotiations during the first epoch, the U.S. played a dominant role in the creation and direction of the outer space development regime. The following section explains how the U.S. played the role of the hegemonic state actor by using three examples: 1) U.S. interests prevailed during the international negotiations; 2) American organic intellectuals influenced the creation of space law; and 3) economic concessions through U.S. – led initiatives were granted to the international community.
1. Prevailing U.S. Interests
In various ways during the space law negotiations, U.S. interests prevailed and therefore contributed to the shaping of international space law during the first epoch of outer space development. For example, within days of the Sputnik launch, President Eisenhower and other leaders[29] contacted the United Nations regarding Sputnik (Galloway, 1997). As one space law historian "there were multiple exchanges of formal correspondence between heads of state of major powers” and "multiple proposals submitted to the United Nations for consideration by the General Assembly"[30] (Doyle, 2002: 83). The first debates on space law took place in the United Nations from November 17-24, 1958. During these debates on the first day, November 17, 1958, the United States[31] addressed the United Nations and urged it to adopt the U.S. proposed Resolution 1348(XIII). This Resolution was to form an ad hoc committee to create space law. Nineteen other nations supported this U.S. proposed Resolution. The United Nations General Assembly passed the Resolution on December 13, 1958. In 1959 the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution No. 1472 (XIV). This Resolution created the first space lawmaking institution - the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (hereinafter referred to as the COPUOS[32]) and its Legal Subcommittee.
Another example of U.S. influence in the creation of space law is that during negotiations the Soviets proposed a "United Nations agency for international co-operation in research in cosmic space and to serve as a clearing house and co-ordination for national research". The Soviet Union essentially proposed an organization that would eventually develop into a United Nations Space Agency (Von Bencke, 1997: 42) - like NASA or ESA.[33] In contrast, the U.S. proposed "an ad hoc committee to study this question" (Jasentuliyana and Lee, 1979-1981: xi). The United Nations elected to go with the structure proposed by the United States. On November 24, 1958 the United States' proposal was selected and the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space was created. The U.S. proposal "passed by a vote of 54-9-18", and nine votes against the proposed Ad Hoc committee were "cast by socialist states" (Von Bencke, 1997: 42). The fifty-four votes in favor of it "was a significant victory for the United States . . ." (Von Bencke, 1997: 42). It is clear that "American views dominated" (Von Bencke, 1997: 42), and the ad hoc Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (hereinafter the COPUOS) was for the purpose of forming working groups to study space law; explore cooperation possibilities; information exchanges; the division of radio frequencies; and spacecraft registration and liability (Von Bencke, 1997: 42). Examining the specific historical content of this period allows us to see several reasons for this type of influence. The United States’ political, ideological and economic power greatly increased after World War II and many nations placed a great deal of trust in the United States to lead the global community into post War peace (Leffler, 1992; Duignan, 1992; Hogan, 1987 and Milward, 1984). In addition, the United States held much influence over the United Nations, including its creation. In the aftermath of World War II, most nations wanted peace, and were willing to trust an international institution to facilitate it. This was the international mood, in spite of the strong influence that the United States had over the United Nations during its development (Simons, 1994: 36). The “United Nations was mainly an American idea, and its structure today closely follows the plans prepared by American diplomats during World War II” (Meisler, 1995: 3; and Gati, 1983). The Soviet Union often used the United Nations for its own self-interest too; for example, to garner support for other countries, particularly from nations with less power (Simons, 1994: XII).
Another important factor to consider is that the Soviet Union lost trust within the outer space development regime by jumping the gun and launching Sputnik in October of 1957. Prior to the Sputnik launch, various countries were planning to launch a communications satellite into Earth’s orbit as part of the International Geophysical Year in 1958. The purpose of this venture planned by the International Council of Scientific Unions was to demonstrate the advancement of humankind in science and technology (Von Bencke, 1997: 2-3). Although a participant in the International Council, the Soviet Union jumped the gun and launched their satellite – Sputnik I – in 1957 prior to this scheduled event. This action sparked grave concern within the international community (Von Bencke, 1997: 12). The United States, unlike its rival superpower, was viewed by the international community as a team player. The provided the U.S. with an added ideological-political advantage over the Soviet Union.
B. American Organic Intellectuals Influence Outer Space Development
During the international space law negotiations, President Kennedy’s influence stands out from the record. As such, according to a Gramscian analysis, Kennedy would be classified as an organic intellectual. He consistently took state actions which resulted in alleviating impasse situations between the U.S. and Soviet Union. In addition, in contrast to President Eisenhower, Kennedy understood the value of presenting outer space development as a “race”, and he made the U.S. space program and beating the Soviet Union at landing a person on the Moon as a national priority. Under Kennedy’s direction, the American space program was accelerated. The U.S. government began to spend unprecedented amounts on space (Von Bencke, 1997; McCurdy, 1997; Krug, 1991). Therefore, President John F. Kennedy has to be treated as a key actor in the process of creating international space law. This section explains that the personality and mindset of the U.S. President was a key influencer of space law. President Kennedy did several key things that influenced the making of international space law and the development of an outer space development regime.
First, at the U.S. domestic level, Kennedy was able to gather support from both the Congress and the Senate. While campaigning, Kennedy, unlike Eisenhower, acknowledged that the U.S. was in a race to space. President Kennedy promised that if elected he would make the United States a country that would be “not 'first but, first and, first when, first if, but first PERIOD' " (Launius & McCurdy, 1997: 51).[34] Shortly after taking office[35], President Kennedy approved a “crash program to put Americans on the Moon” (McCurdy, 1997: 83), and he shifted the nation’s space program into “high gear” and that he “established the modern U.S. space program with its emphasis on large-scale engineering, big science, and human exploration” (McCurdy, 1997: 83). Most importantly, the budget for NASA “increased from $524 million in fiscal year 1960 to $5.3 billion in fiscal year 1965” (McCurdy, 1997: 257). In justifying the huge expenditures needed to fund this new goal of outer space exploration to the House of Representatives and to the general public, Kennedy argued that "the United States had to beat the Soviet Union into space in order to prevent tyranny from overshadowing democracy . . ." (Krug, 1991: 30). For example, Kennedy stated the following in his address to the nation regarding "urgent national needs":[36]
If we are to win the battle that is now going on around the world between freedom and tyranny, the dramatic achievements in space which occurred in recent weeks should have made clear to us all, as did the Sputnik in 1957, the impact of this adventure on the minds of men everywhere, who are attempting to make a determination of which road they should take.
As part of this speech before the joint session of Congress, Kennedy challenged Americans to "commit themselves 'to achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to earth' " (Launius & McCurdy, 1997: 2). This speech was successful since prior to the speech Kennedy had encountered "opposition from various sectors of the political spectrum" (Launius and McCurdy, 1997: 3). After this speech "Kennedy's space proposals sped through the Congress", and "the bill authorizing the buildup necessary to reach the Moon passed the Senate one month later on June 28. There was so little opposition that the senators did not even both to take a recorded vote. The debate in the House was perfunctory, and the bill passed by a lopsided vote of 354 to 59" (Launius and McCurdy, 1997: 3). Kennedy himself even noted that the "overwhelming support by members of both parties" as he signed the bill[37] which authorized his proposed space expenditures. Through various public speeches, changed the way America and the world viewed space. He asserted a new vision that the U.S. must now become winners in the new frontier instead of losers.[38] For Kennedy, America was the leader of the free world and therefore, we needed to play a leadership role in outer space exploration (Krug, 1991: 31).
Kennedy changed the mood of mutual distrust between the U.S. and the Soviet Union that had existed under Secretary Khrushchev and President Eisenhower. The distinct new attitude between President Kennedy and Secretary Khrushchev began when Kennedy changed the tone through a faxed letter to Khrushchev. Essentially, Kennedy facilitated regime change and cooperation by acknowledging the Soviet lead and Soviet firsts in space.[39] The international political environment was changed after that and as a result the Kennedy-Khrushchev years reflect that international space law progressed significantly.
Kennedy also influenced an end of the impasse and the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. This body had been formed in December 1959, however it was stuck in impasse. Kennedy influenced the end of the impasse and the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space which had been formed in December 1959. Negotiations resumed in September 1961. Subsequently, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1721 (XVI) on December 20, 1961. This Resolution represented "a significant achievement in the formulation of space law". It laid down the fundamental principles of international space law. This was encouraging to the committee; they met in March 1962 and established a Legal Sub-Committee; it held its first session May 28 - June 20, 1962 (Metcalf, 1999: 113) The COPUOS Legal Subcommittee "considered a large number of proposals from many states . . . (Metcalf, 1999: 113). It was given the task of elaborating "legal norms relating to space activities" (Jasentuliyana and Lee, 1979-1981: xviii).
Kennedy triggered cooperation and negotiations resumed in September 1961 the year he took office. Also, in addition to building trust with Premier Khrushchev, in 1961, Kennedy addressed the United Nations General Assembly "urging greater co-operation in this field and proposing that outer space be reserved only for peaceful purposes and that the United Nations Charter be extended to outer space" (Jasentuliyana and Lee, 1979-1981: xviii). Kennedy’s speech prompted intense negotiations on the issue of creating international law to govern outer space. Shortly after Kennedy's prompting, the General Assembly acted by unanimously adopting Resolution 1721 (XVI) on December 20, 1961. This Resolution represented "a significant achievement in the formulation of space law", since it laid down the fundamental principles of international space law. This was encouraging to the committee; they met in March 1962 and established a Legal Sub-Committee; it held its first session May 28 - June 20, 1962 (Metcalf, 1999: 113) The COPUOS Legal Subcommittee "considered a large number of proposals from many states . . . (Metcalf, 1999: 113). It was given the task of elaborating "legal norms relating to space activities" (Jasentuliyana and Lee, 1979-1981: xviii).
The Soviet Union wanted a formal and comprehensive document that would encompass a declaration of basic legal principles governing the activities of states in outer space endeavors, whereas the United States desired an informal document in the form of a UN Resolution laying out the legal principle concerning "the limited areas of rescue and assistance to astronauts and space vehicles, and liability for space vehicle accidents" (Jasentuliyana and Lee, 1979-1981: xviii). This situation created another impasse. The Legal Sub-Committee could not agree on which proposal to give priority to. The General Assembly, "realizing the rapid advances in space science and technology, called upon the Outer Space Committee to continue urgently its work relating to the progressive development of international law in this filed and also called upon all states to collaborate in that effort" (Jasentuliyana and Lee, 1979-1981: xix). But due to disagreements on "the relative priority of general declarations versus agreements dealing with specific problems, as well as on the roles of inter-governmental agreements versus action by the UN General Assembly" and disagreement on "the legality of reconnaissance satellites" (Metcalf, 1999: 113) the Legal Subcommittee was at an impasse again. Again, with Kennedy’s exercise of influence, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was signed in August of 1963, prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons in Outer Space, in the atmosphere and underwater. This ended the deadlock between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. (Metcalf, 1999: 126). Afterwards and about a month before Kennedy's assassination, on October 17, 1963 the General Assembly unanimously adopted Resolution 1884 (XVIII)[40] (Von Bencke, 1997: 71-72).
President Lyndon B. Johnson can also be classified as an organic intellectual. He played a key role in keeping the momentum of international space lawmaking going. He was cognizant of the American public’s admiration for the befallen President and his promises to make America first in space. Just as President Kennedy’s interest in space was a key factor in the promotion of outer space development and international space lawmaking, so was his successor, President Lyndon B. Johnson. It is also important to note that it was upon Johnson's advice, while serving as Kennedy's Vice President, that President Kennedy began to the creation of a U.S. space program as a race against the Soviets and to make it a national priority. Krug (1991: 30) explains “space exploration was not very high on his (President Kennedy’s) personal or political agenda”[1] within the first months of taking office as President. It wasn't until after the Bay of Pigs fiasco, when Kennedy asked Vice President Lyndon Johnson to make a determination of ‘”whether there is any program now, regardless of cost, which offers us hope of being pioneers in a project, . . . which could put us first in any new area.” It was Vice President Johnson who proffered that an outer space exploration program should become Kennedy's pet priority. Johnson had already been involved in promoting outer space development and had established an expertise on issues concerning outer space while a Senator during Eisenhower’s Presidency. Kennedy did has Johnson suggested. Before becoming President and before becoming Kennedy’s Vice President, Johnson, while a Senator, took consistent fervent action pushing for international space laws, despite President Eisenhower's cool nonchalant approach to the issue. While a Senator.[41] Johnson was a fervent supporter of an American space program and "a leading critic of the Eisenhower Administration's [lack luster] response" (Krug, 1991:36). In January of 1958, still just a few months after Sputnik, Senator Lyndon B. Johnson gave a speech before a meeting of the Columbia Broadcasting System Affiliates, Senator Johnson calling for "world leadership by the United States in the new dimension offered by space exploration" (Galloway, 1997: 5). In February 1958 the Senate created the Special Committee on Space and Astronautics, and Senator Johnson was named as Chairman. When the first debates on space law took place in the United Nations from November 17-24, 1958 it was Senator Johnson[42] who addressed the United Nations and urged the adoption the U.S. proposed Resolution 1348(XIII) suggesting the formation of an ad hoc committee to create space law.
3. Economic Concessions for Space Commercialization Initiative
The U.S. had an interest in commercializing space technology since the beginning of the first epoch. Consent of the international community by induced by inviting various members to purchase shares a corporation established for the purpose of commercializing space technology - the COMSAT Corporation. President Kennedy had "charged his administration with the need to develop a coherent and cohesive policy with respect to communications satellites” and by July 1961 he called for joint ownership with other nations of a communications satellite system, non-discriminatory access for all countries of the world, and a constructive role for the United Nations in international space communications. This call was at all times with the assumption that "private ownership and operation of the United States portion of the system would be favored and that her leadership in satellite communications would result in establishment of the system at the earliest practicable data the earliest practicable data for the benefit of all peoples in the interest of world peace and brotherhood" (Jasentuliyana & Lee, 1979-1981, Vol. 1: at 304). COMSAT later developed into INTELSAT via a U.S. - led international treaty. It was said it be a commercial venture "intended to produce a minimum of fourteen percent return each year for its shareholders" (Wong, 1998). In order to facilitate the commercial framework, these agreements included allowing the parties to participate in ownership (Wong, 1998). Countries therefore were allowed to own a piece of INTELSAT in proportion to their investment. This provided an incentive for various governments to want INTELSAT to succeed. And, it did. This was achieved through the purchase of shares in INTELSAT. The U.S. (through COMSAT) owns the largest share at "just over 20 % and the remaining foreign ownership is just under 80 percent".[43] This remainder is split in differing proportions between approximately 143 other countries. Similarly, The International Maritime Satellite Organization (IMARSAT) was formed by an international treaty in 1979 pursuant to the Maritime Satellite Act.[44] Seventy-nine countries are members of IMARSAT and it is headquartered in London. It came into being as an IGO in order to "provide global safety and other communications for the maritime community. Starting with a customer base of 900 ships in the early 1980s, it then grew rapidly to offer similar services to other users on land and in the air . . .".[45] Hence, a service that began as a life-line to seafarers by carrying distress communications from failing vessels at sea has turned into a commercial enterprise.[46]
Shortly after the successful launching its first satellite, Telestar I, the U.S. Congress passed the Communications Satellite Act of 1962, in order to commercialize the satellite communications industry. This law authorized the creation of a Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) - a private corporation "to own and operate, either by itself or in conjunction with foreign governments or business entities, a commercial communications satellite system; to furnish, for hire, channels of communications; and to own and operate satellite terminal stations." This private for-profit corporation called the Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT)[47] has "an interim Board of Directors appointed by the President of the United States" (Cheng, 1997: 544). This was done through the creation and passage of the Communications Satellite Act of 1962. According to the language of this Congressional Act it had "twin goals of quickly obtaining the benefits of satellite communications and doing so by creating competition". The Act established the U.S. policy "of developing a global communications satellite system responsive to public needs and national objectives that would provide economical service to lesser developed countries, 'nondiscriminatory' access for all users and 'contribute to would peace and understanding'[48] " (Morgan, 1994: 18). The Act provides that COMSAT "had the responsibility for planning, constructing, and operating the satellite system, either along or with other countries, and for leasing space satellite communications channels to common carriers" (Morgan, 1994: 18). This corporation is authorized to issue stock, fifty percent of which are to be reserved for authorized United States communications common carriers and the rest to the general public. This established the framework for the "first step towards a global communications satellite system" - The Early Bird in 1965 (Cheng, 1997: 545). This 1962 Act has "twin goals of quickly obtaining the benefits of satellite communications and doing so by creating competition". The Act established the U.S. policy "of developing a global communications satellite system responsive to public needs and national objectives that would provide economical service to lesser developed countries, 'nondiscriminatory' access for all users and 'contribute to would peace and understanding'[49] " (Morgan, 1994: 18). The Act provides that COMSAT "had the responsibility for planning, constructing, and operating the satellite system, either along or with other countries, and for leasing space satellite communications channels to common carriers" (Morgan, 1994: 18).
On August 20, 1964 the U.S. and an initial ten other countries entered into two international agreements: the "Agreement Establishing Interim Arrangements for a Global Commercial Communications Satellite System" (an international agreement registered with the United Nations) and the "Special Agreement" (a contractual arrangement between participating governments and certain public corporations) (Murphy, 2001). These agreements established INTELSAT as an organization created for the purpose of operating satellites and providing access to satellites on a commercial basis for profit" (Morgan, 194: 18). Subsequently in a successor INTELSAT organization was created by two new international agreements: the Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization with Annexes (opened for signature August 20, 1971) and the "Operating Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (opened for signature August 20, 1971). Both agreements became effective in 1973.
CONCLUSION
A careful study of primary and secondary sources reveals that space law and the outer space development regime were shaped by the ideological-political environment which was largely dominated by the U.S. as a hegemonic state actor during the first epoch. Actions was shaped by Cold War fears and the bipolar balance of power (DePort, 1986).[50] States were the relevant actors, however they were not willing to trust other state powers. With endorsement of the U.S., the UN was granted the authority to create space law as a form of international law. Issues concerning outer space were contextualized as national security and nuclear/atomic deterrence issues, counterbalanced the secondary desires to see advances made in science and technology.
The space race competition and space “firsts” were motivated by state self-interest, including boosting national security along with national pride and esteem. In the first epoch, private entities were not relevant actors. The only exception was that within the U.S. they served as small subcontractors for the government, and privatization and commercialization of space industries was not important. Commercial issues were thought best left to the future. The ITU and satellite products were in an infancy stage. Satellite technology was primarily used for military reconnaissance and military spying. Private actors such as multinational corporations and transnational organizations were almost unimportant at this time. Private government contractors are mentioned in a few references of historical text. Still, it is clear that space commercialization and privatization were to become important issues within the outer space development regime.
ENDNOTES
[1] Shortly after Sputnik was launched by the Soviet Union in 1957, states pressed the United Nations to act in order to create laws to govern outer space. To this end, the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) was set up by the General Assembly in 1959 via Resolution 1472 (XIV) “to review the scope of international cooperation in peaceful uses of outer space, to devise programmes in this field to be undertaken under United Nations auspices, to encourage continued research and the dissemination of information on outer space matters, and to study legal problems arising from the exploration of outer space”. The Committee and its two Subcommittees meet annually to consider questions put before them by the General Assembly, reports submitted to them and issues raised by the Member States. The COPUOS) and its two Subcommittees – the Scientific and Technical Subcommitte, and the Legal Subcommittee - on the basis of consensus, make recommendations to the General Assembly regarding rules conerning outer space. Another important actor is the International Institute of Space Law (IISL), founded by the International Astronautical Federation in 1960 to foster the development of space law. Although an earlier version of this organization had been created in 1958, this organization as it stands today began in 1960. Membership includes approximately 300 elected individuals and institutions from over 40 countries who are distinguished for their contributions to space law development. The IISL is authorized to function autonomously from the COPUOS and the IAF in accordance with its (the IISL) statutes. See http://www.iafastro-iisl.com. The International Astronautical Federation is the main umbrella organization for outer space development. It was established in 1951, prior to the Sputnik launch. Its members include government agencies, companies, associations and organization from 44 countries. It manages an annual Congress, workshops and networking activities for the various professionals, academics and others who work within the field of outer space development.
[2] Both the USA and the USSR were instrumental in constructing this climate of fear within their own civil societies. Mass media and popular discourse described Sputnik as the “red moon’ and created a sense of panic regarding Soviet intentions behind the launch.
[3] There is some disagreement on whether the Cold War began at the end of World War II with the Yalta Conference between Stalin, Churchhill and Roosevelt in 1945, or whether it began with The Marshall Plan of 1947, which pledged to provide post war non-communist Europe with economic recovery, and Truman Doctrine of 1947, which pledged aid to Greece and Turkey the only two Eastern European countries who were not communist, after World War II (Hogan, 1987; Milward, 1984; Young 1996). There is also disagreement on whether the Cold War ended with the breakup of the Eastern bloc countries in 1989, or whether it ended with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 (Smith, 1998; Ball, 1998; Crockatt, 1995).
[4] This Cold War mood existed during the Presidencies of Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan and Bush, on the U.S. side, and through the leadership of Stalin, Malenkov, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko and Gorbachev on the Soviet side.
[5] Proxy wars were common during the Cold War period since the nuclear superpowers were hesitant to fight each other directly and were anxious to prevent the other from securing additional allies. Proxy wars have continued in spite of the end of the Cold War. For example, the Second Congo War, Uganda and Rwanda. Further a more detailed disucssion see Mamdani, Mahmood, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim : America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror (New York: Pantheon Books, 2004); and Leonardo A. Villalón, Phillip A. Huxtable (eds.) in The African State at a Critical Juncture: Between Disintegration and Reconfiguration (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998).
[6] Sputnik was the world’s first artificial satellite launched directly into the Earth’s orbit in 1957. It circumnavigated the globe about every 96 minutes for 3 months.
[7] For an accounting of space firsts and activities see Rob Nagel, Space Exploration – Almanac (Gale Research, Incorporated, 2004) and Anthony R. Curtis, Space Almanac: Facts, Figures, Names, Dates, Places, Lists, Charts, Tables, Maps, Photos Covering Space From Earth to the Edge of the Universe (Woodsboro, Maryland: Arcsoft Publishers, 1990). For example the Soviet Union was the first to land a flag bearing probe on the Moon in 1959 before the U.S. landed a human on the Moon.
[8] Ball, S. J. (1998), In the Cold War: An International History, 1947-1991 (New York: Arnold) explains that the ideological and political details of the superpower competition.
[9] For further reading see Painter, David S., The Cold War: An International History (London and New York: Routledge, 1999). “The collapse of communism as an ideology paralleled the decline in the Soviet strategic position. Highly regarded by many at the end of World War II, the appeal of communism and the Soviet model of development declined sharply in most of the world over the course of the Cold War. Repression in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and the People’s Republic of China tarnished communism’s image. In the 1960s and 1970s some European communist parties attempted to reform themselves and to divorce communism from the harsh reality of Soviet (and Chinese) practice. These efforts failed to gain sufficient support to wrest leadership of world communism from the Soviet Union and the PRC. Also see Hogan, Michael J., The Marshall Plan: America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-52 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Milward, Alan S., The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51 (London: Methuen, 1984); De Porte, A.W., Europe Between the Superpowers (New York and London: Yale University Press, 1986); Duignan, Paul and Gann, J.H., The Rebirth of the West: The Americanization of the Democratic World 1945-58 (Blackwell, Cambridge, MA, 1992); Young, John W., Cold War Europe, 1945-91: A Political History (2nd ed.)(London: Edward Arnold, 1996); Duignan, Paul and Gann, L.H., The Rebirth of the West: The Americanization of the Democratic World 1945-58 (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1992); Knipping, Franz, Power in Europe: Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany in a Post-War World, 1945-50 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1986); Young, John W., France, the Cold War and the Western Alliance, 1944-49 (London: Leicester University Press, 1990). Regarding the Far East see Yahuda, Michael, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945-95 (London: Routledge, 1996).
[10] The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (The Outer Space Treaty, 1967); The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (The Rescue and Return Agreement, 1968); The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (The Liability Convention, 1971); and The Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (The Registration Convention,1976). The questionable one is The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (The Moon Treaty, 1984). Only nine states (Australia, Austria, Chile, Mexico, Morocco, The Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines and Uruguay) have ratified it and five states (France, Guatemala, India, Peru and Romania) in addition have signed but not ratified. It only took five nations to enter it into force, however it opened for signature on December 18, 1979 and took five years to get the five requisite signatures. Conversely, The Outer Space Treaty was well received: it was ratified by ninety-six nations and signed by another twenty-seven states. See Report of the Legal Subcommittee on Its Fortieth Session, UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 40th Session, 22(a), United Nations' Document A/AC.105763 (2001) see http:www.oosa.unvienna.org/Reports/AC105_763E.pdf. Since the Moon Treaty has garnered such a low level of international support, some space law experts have reasoned it is "obviously unacceptable". Kelly M. Zullo (2002), note 12, citing Eilene Galloway, "Guidelines for the Review and Formulation of Outer Space Treaties", Presentation at the International Astronautical Federation 41st International Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, Melbourne, Australia, at 2, October 2, 1998.
[11] See Report of the Legal Subcommittee on Its Fortieth Session, UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 40th Session, 22(a), United Nations' Document A/AC.105763 (2001). See http:www.oosa.unvienna.org/Reports/AC105_763E.pdf. Since the Moon Treaty has garnered such a low level of international support, some space law experts have reasoned it is "obviously unacceptable". See Eilene Galloway, "Guidelines for the Review and Formulation of Outer Space Treaties", Presentation at the International Astronautical Federation 41st International Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, Melbourne, Australia, at 2, October 2, 1998.
[12] The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Dec. 19, 1966, 18 UST 2410, TIAS No. 6347, 610 UNTS 205 (adopted by the General Assembly in GA Res. 2222 (XXI) (entered into force by the U.S. on October 10, 1967);
[13] In addition to The Outer Space Treaty, others treaties include The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (The Rescue and Return Agreement, 1968); The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects[13] (The Liability Convention, 1971); and The Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space[13] (The Registration Convention, 1976).
[14] It is important to note that the principle of res communis, which means that certain territories shall be treated as community property and cannot be owned by any person(s), states, any other entity or combination of entities, was already adopted as a legal principle for outer space through Resolution 1721. The "Province of Mankind" principle was created specifically for the purpose of ushering in agreement on the terms of the Outer Space Treaty. The Province of Mankind is a vague principle, which has never clearly been defined. See Jasentuliyana and Lee (1981: 259). From the record of negotiations, it is clear that the Common Heritage of Mankind Principle threatened to invoke another impasse and disagreements. Therefore, a special term ("Province of Mankind") was put forth in a treaty draft and apparently was not disagreeable to the signatories. It first appears in the Soviet draft treaty submitted to the UN on June 16, 1965 as UN Document A/6352. See (Jasentuliyana and Lee, 1981: 4) the Province of Mankind clause later appears in a draft resulting from one of the working sessions (Working Group L.3) of July 29, 1966. See Jasentuliyana and Lee (1981: 25) "travaux préparatoires and related documents" in Manual on Space Law.
[15] The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (The Outer Space Treaty, 1967); The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (The Rescue and Return Agreement, 1968); The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (The Liability Convention, 1971); and The Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (The Registration Convention,1976). The questionable one is The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (The Moon Treaty,1984). Only nine states (Australia, Austria, Chile, Mexico, Morocco, The Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines and Uruguay) have ratified it and five states (France, Guatemala, India, Peru and Romania) in addition have signed but not ratified. It only took five nations to enter it into force, however it opened for signature on December 18, 1979 and took five years to get the five requisite signatures. Conversely, The Outer Space Treaty was well received: it was ratified by ninety-six nations and signed by another twenty-seven states. See Report of the Legal Subcommittee on Its Fortieth Session, UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 40th Session, 22(a), United Nations' Document A/AC.105763 (2001). For more information see http:www.oosa.unvienna.org/Reports/AC105_763E.pdf. Since the Moon Treaty has garnered such a low level of international support, some space law experts have reasoned it is "obviously unacceptable". Kelly M. Zullo (2002) at note 12, citing Eilene Galloway, "Guidelines for the Review and Formulation of Outer Space Treaties", Presentation at the International Astronautical Federation 41st International Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, Melbourne, Australia, at 2, October 2, 1998.
[16] The Outer Space Treaty has been ratified by approximately 98 states, whereas the Moon Treaty has been ratified by only 7 nations. For further detail see Kurt Anderson Baca, “Property Rights in Outer Space.” 58 Journal of Air Law and Commerce 1041 (1993).
[17] The United States, by the decision of President Truman, went down in history as being the only country to drop an atomic bomb on a populated city, and this was done twice. According to a White House press release this decision was made due to Japanese leaders’ flat refusal to accept the Potsdam Declaration, President Truman authorized the use of an atomic bomb on August 3, 1945 and August 6th on Hiroshima and Nagasaki respectively. The world saw how devastating the use of atomic weapons could be to mankind. See White House Press Release Draft of a White House press release, "Statement by the President of the United States," 1945 at http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/small/mb10.htm of August 6, 1945 at pp. 1-3.
[18] Also under President Jimmy Carter, Von Bencke (1997) explains that “the U.S. Navy intensified a massive buildup in the Indian Ocean, and began aggressive military maneuvers”. In addition “Carter sped up the development of the new rapid deployment force, increased his request for the fiscal year 1981 military budget to $154.5 billion and announced a new $400 million aid package to nearby Pakistan”(at pg. 88).
[19] Toward the end of his term, President Carter was on the offensive towards the Soviet Union[19], and Congress was “military-minded”. They allocated a defense budget even higher than Carter had requested – allocating $159.7 billion. This represented an increase of $28.7 billion over the fiscal year 1980 defense budget, “the biggest rise in American peacetime history”. See Von Bencke (1997: 88) in The Politics of Space.
[20] Richard M. Nixon was President from 1969-1974. Nixon was President on July 20, 1969 when Neil Armstrong landed the on the Moon, he was not a key actor in space law’s creation or in outer space development. Similar to Johnson's Presidency, there are no prominent dialogs between President Nixon and Secretary Brezhnev, former leader of the Soviet Union (1964-1982). Like Johnson, Nixon was not new to the issue of outer space development. When Sputnik was launched, Nixon was Eisenhower's Vice President. Nixon had debated with Secretary Khrushchev during the famous "Kitchen Debates". Kennedy used these debates against Nixon while they were competing for Presidential office in 1960. For example, Senator Kennedy told Nixon, “You yourself said to Khrushchev, ‘You may be ahead of us in rocket thrust, but we’re ahead of you in color television’ ” and he argued that “I will take my television in black and white. I want to be ahead of them in rocket thrust” Kennedy was referring to debates Nixon had with Khrushchev while Nixon was Vice President to President Eisenhower. See Senate, Joint Appearances of Senator John F. Kennedy and Vice President Richard M. Nixon, 86th Congress, 2nd session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961) at pg. 211.; and Senate, The Speeches of Senator John F. Kennedy: Presidential Campaign of 1960, 87th Congress, 1st session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961) at pg. 113.
[21] Richard M. Nixon was President from 1969-1974. Nixon was President on July 20, 1969 when Neil Armstrong landed the on the Moon, he was not a key actor in space law’s creation or in outer space development. Similar to Johnson's Presidency, there are no prominent dialogs between President Nixon and Secretary Brezhnev, former leader of the Soviet Union (1964-1982). Like Johnson, Nixon was not new to the issue of outer space development. When Sputnik was launched, Nixon was Eisenhower's Vice President. Nixon had debated with Secretary Khrushchev during the famous "Kitchen Debates". Kennedy used these debates against Nixon while they were competing for Presidential office in 1960. For example, Senator Kennedy told Nixon, “You yourself said to Khrushchev, ‘You may be ahead of us in rocket thrust, but we’re ahead of you in color television’ ” and he argued that “I will take my television in black and white. I want to be ahead of them in rocket thrust” Kennedy was referring to debates Nixon had with Khrushchev while Nixon was Vice President to President Eisenhower. See Senate, Joint Appearances of Senator John F. Kennedy and Vice President Richard M. Nixon, 86th Congress, 2nd session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961) at pg. 211.; and Senate, The Speeches of Senator John F. Kennedy: Presidential Campaign of 1960, 87th Congress, 1st session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961) at pg. 113.
[22] Cox explains that there are two interpretations of “hegemony”. One is the traditional definition used in the international relations literature defining a dominant state in one that has the ability “to determine the conditions in which interstate relations are conducted and to determine the outcomes in these relations”. The second definition of hegemony is one informed by Gramsci’s writings which Cox refers to as “a special case of dominance: it defines the condition of a world society and state system in which the dominant state and dominant social forces sustain their position through adherence to universalized principles which are accepted or acquiesced by a sufficient proportion of subordinate states and social forces”. This definition denotes “intellectual and moral leadership” where the “strong make certain concessions to obtain the consent of the weaker” (Cox, 1993 at 264).
[23] For example, in David Russell Hager's dissertation, Space Law: The United Nations, and the Superpowers: A Study of International legal Development and Codification, 1957-1969, sets forth a study of the development and codification of international space law within the United Nations during the period between 1957 to 1969. (University of Virginia, Ph.D. Political Science, International law and relations, 1970); Similarly Katrin Nyman Metcalf's dissertation subsequently turned into a book entitled "Activities in Space - Appropriation or Use? (Uppsala: Lustus Forlag, 1999) sets forth the complete history of the creation of international space law as it relates to public international law. Nandasiri Jasentuliyana and Roy S.K. Lee (1979-1981) provide a formal detailed written record of the discussions, negotiations, proposals and UN declarations and Resolutions which led up the five international space treaties along with views of the various state representatives in Manual on Space Law, Volumes I, II, III and IV (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publication, Inc., 1979-1981); In The Decision to Go to the Moon: Project Apollo and the National Interest, Logsdon (1976) sets forth a detailed account of how, when and what steps were taken towards America’s goal of going to the Moon. Launius & McCurdy (1997) in Spaceflight and the Myth of Presidential Leadership; Krug (1991) in Presidential Perspectives on Space Exploration; and McCurdy (1997) in Space and the American Imagination provide similar accounts of this significant period of outer space explorations; Von Bencke, M. J. (1997). The Politics of Space: A History of U.S. - Soviet/Russian Competition and Cooperation in Space. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. Also see Galloway, 1997.
[24] The International Telecommunications Union (the ITU), formerly known as the International Telegraph Union, has been around since 1865 developing norms for telegraph communications and later for the telephone industry. However, it was not until the World Administrative Radio Conference in 1959 that policy was formulated by the ITU for space communications (White & White, 1988). ITU conferences held from 1959 until mid- 1960s "followed a trend established in the early 1960s[24] emphasizing the principle of nondiscriminatory, equitable access to the radio spectrum and the geostationary satellite orbit" (White & White, 1988: xix). After the Sputnik launch, states decided that the International Telecommunications Commission (ITU) would play an important role in formulating policy concerning space communications. This is closely related to the commercialization of satellite telecommunications technology. The ITU is a specialized agency of the United Nations with a Convention, and Constitution and two sets of operating regulations, and all these have Treaty status. The international community has granted this intergovernmental organization the authority of being the regulatory regime for assigning rights to various orbital slots for satellite telecommunications services.
[25] For further reading see Painter, David S., The Cold War: An International History (London and New York: Routledge, 1999). Painter examines the structures and processes at the international level and analyzes the Cold War as a product of the domestic histories of the great powers and of the structure and dynamics of international relations. Following World War II, changes in the global distribution of power, weapons technology, the balance of political forces within and among nations, the world economy, and relations between the industrialized nations and the underdeveloped periphery led to the Cold War. He further explains that throughout the Cold War, the global distribution of power influenced US and Soviet perceptions of their respective national interests and consequently their actions at 112.
[26] The Roman law concept, res communis, which means that certain territories shall be treated as community property and cannot be owned by any person(s), states, any other entity or combination of entities, is at the heart of the laws and treaties governing activities involving the Antarctica, the high seas, deep seabed, and outer space (Metcalf, 1999: 105-106). Metcalf (1999: 105-106) explains that "space is a global common and in the legal sense all states are equal, when it comes to activities in space. No state can assert claim of ownership rights to outer space. This is customary international law - binding on all states pursuant to Resolution 1721 (XVI). This UN Resolution laid down two fundamental principles, which formed the basis for the development of contemporary space law: (a) international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, applies to outer space and celestial bodies; (b) outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by all states in conformity with international law and are not subject to national appropriation. It also required launching states to publicize satellite launching by registering them with the United Nations" (Jasentuliyana and Lee, 1979-1981: xviii). To enforce this provision, this Resolution required that UN Secretary-General maintain a public registry of objects launched into outer space.
[27] For discussions/views leading to the space treaties see Nandasiri Jasentuliyana and Roy S.K. Lee (1979-1981) Manual on Space Law, Volumes I, II, III and IV (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publication, Inc., 1979-1981).
[28] International law had already been settled in favor of allowing free flight for satellites, instead of each country claiming the right to airspace (including outer space) above their sovereign territories, in preparation for the IGY (1958) See Rita Lauria White and Harold M. White, Jr., The Law and Regulation of International Space Communication (Artech House, 1988).
[29] Sputnik was not the first object to be launched into space. The Chinese, Greeks and many others in ancient society were using, experimenting and theorizing about new uses of rockets for thousands of years (Winter, 1990). Scientists such as Robert Goddard and Von Braun and Sergei Korolev had been working on rockets for various purposes. Goddard was the first to achieve flight of a liquid-propellant rocket on March 16 1926. It reached an altitude of 41 feet (12 meters) and 184 feet (56) meters horizontally. This was a significant first step towards space flight[29]. In the 1930s many were seriously writing about rocket uses and space travel and many rocket societies formed at this time. Around 1941 rockets had been launched to 10 miles above the surface of the Earth and by 1951 to an altitude of 135 miles (McCurdy, 1997: 36). The Germans had launched bombs from rockets in World War II. It was little known that the Soviets were not the only nation with the technology to launch a satellite. U.S. also had the technology and funding to launch a satellite into Earth’s orbit, and had planned to do so, in conjunction with the International Council of Scientific Unions. This was a cooperative of government-sponsored programs through bilateral cooperative agreements. There were about 30,000 scientists and technological experts from sixty-six countries involved. The overall aim of IGY was to "pursue intensive observations of the Earth and the cosmic environment" (Metcalf, 1999: 47), and to demonstrate humankind’s technological accomplishments by revealing this new satellite technology to the world during the International Geophysical Year (IGY) scheduled for sometime between July 1, 1957 and December 31, 1958. It was widely publicized that a small satellite would be launched into Earth’s orbit with a tracking device as during the IGY, and the issue had been discussed for many years at symposia and conferences. See Achievements in Space, International Aspects of Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 1954-1962, Senate Documents, Volume 6, No. 1, 88th Congress, 1st Session, 1966 at pg. 3. July 1, 1957 through December 31, 1958 was designated the International Geophysical Year (IGY).
[30] U.S. Senate report, Documents on International Aspects of the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 1954-1962, a Staff Report prepared for the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, May 9, 1963, GPO, Washington, D.C. at pp. 51-52, 55-56, 62-64, and other communications in those pages for examples of letters exchanged between U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower and U.S.S.R. Premier Bulganin. See also C.Q. Christol, The Modern International Law of Outer Space, 12-14 (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982); A.G. Haley, Space Law and Government, 313-314 (New York: Appleton Century Crofts, 1963) and M.S. McDougal, H.D. Lasswell and I.A. Vlasic, Law and Public Order in Space, 205-210 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963).
[31] Lyndon B. Johnson, while a Senator, took consistent fervent action pushing for international space laws, despite President Eisenhower's cool nonchalant approach to the issue. It is also important to note that it was upon Johnson's advice, while serving as Kennedy's Vice President, that President Kennedy began to the creation of a U.S. space program as a race against the Soviets and to make it a national priority.
[32] In 1959, the Committee had 24 members, and since then it has grown to 67 members[32]. This makes it one of the largest Committees in the United Nations. In addition to States a number of international organizations, including both intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, have observer status with COPUOS and its Subcommittees.
[33] Matthew J. Von Bencke in The Politics of Space: A History of U.S. - Soviet/Russian Competition and Cooperation in Space (Boulder Colorado: Westview Press, 1997) pg. 58 note 9 references Arnold W. Frutkin, International Cooperation in Space (Prentice Hall: Englewood Cliffs, 1965: 170).
[34] Launius & McCurdy, 1997: 64) note 1 refers to Michael R. Beschloss, The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963 (New York: Harper, 1991) pg. 28.
[35] Krug (1991: 30) explains “space exploration was not very high on his [President Kennedy] personal or political agenda”[35] within the first months are taking office as President. It wasn't until after the Bay of Pigs fiasco, when Kennedy asked Vice President Lyndon Johnson to make a determination of ‘”whether there is any program now, regardless of cost, which offers us hope of being pioneers in a project, . . . which could put us first in any new area.” It was Vice President Johnson who proffered that an outer space exploration program should become Kennedy's pet priority. Johnson had already been involved in promoting outer space development and had established an expertise on issues concerning outer space while a Senator during Eisenhower’s Presidency. Kennedy did has Johnson suggested.
[36] John F. Kennedy, "Special Message to the Congress on Urgent National Needs," 25 May 1961, PPP, JFK, 1961, 402. Also in 1962, NASA's "budget of $1.1 billion was increased by $665 million"; in the Department of Defense "received $850 million dollars for space, an $226 increase over the previous year" (Von Bencke, 1997: 69).
[37] Bill of July 21, 1961, "Budget summary" Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1961, P. 424.
[38] John F. Kennedy, "Address at Rice University" in Houston Texas, 12 Sept. 1962, PPP, JFK, 1962, 669.
[39] Achievements in Space, International Aspects of Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 1954-1962, Senate Documents, Volume 6, No. 1, 88th Congress, 1st Session, 1966, pp. 23-102. It is important to point out that although Kennedy and Khrushchev spoke of cooperating to explore outer space, their actions were still marked by Cold War suspicions as described by Realism theory. Particularly the assumption that in a Hobbesian scenario, states will behave to further their state self-interest and to maximize their own power. For example Kennedy would respond to part of what Khrushchev expressed and ignore part. Particularly when Khrushchev harped on complete disarmament and removal of U.S. foreign military bases. Likewise, Khrushchev would response to a portion of what Kennedy had conveyed and ignore, for example, profitability and investor relations issues regarding cooperating to create a U.S. - led Comsat Corporation (Von Bencke, 1997: 52-57). The U.S. consistently refused the Soviet request to completely disarm, and the Soviet Union consistently refused to agree to allow non-state actors to participate in outer space development. The Soviet Union was insistent that space activities be carried out "solely and exclusively by states"; hence, "barring private bourgeois corporations" (Von Bencke, 1997: 57). In spite of this tension, Kennedy was seriously considering ways that the U.S. could formally turn the space competition into a joint venture with the Soviet Union. Tensions between Kennedy and Khrushchev arose between the two leaders, for example the Berlin Crisis (the construction of the Berlin Wall, August 13, 1961) the Vienna Summit, the Soviet test of a nuclear weapon (September 1, 1961) and the Cuban Missile crisis in October of 1962 (Von Bencke, 1997). However, there appears to have been an overarching mood of willingness to cooperation between the two leaders. This led to further international cooperation towards the creation of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. This mood of cooperation lingered on through Johnson's term as President.
[40] Specifically, Resolution 1884 called upon all States: (a) to refrain from placing in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, installing such weapons in outer space in any other manner; (b) to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any other way participating in the conduct of the these activities " (Jasentuliyana and Lee, 1979-1981: xix).
[41] Lyndon B. Johnson’s Presidency lasted from 1963 to 1969. The leaders of the Soviet Union were Khrushchev (1953-1964) and Brezhnev (1964-1982). The record does not make a prominent display of correspondence between leaders of the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
[42] Lyndon B. Johnson, while a Senator, took consistent fervent action pushing for international space laws, despite President Eisenhower's cool nonchalant approach to the issue. It is also important to note that it was upon Johnson's advice, while serving as Kennedy's Vice President, that President Kennedy began to the creation of a U.S. space program as a race against the Soviets and to make it a national priority.
[43] Memorandum Opinion and Authorization, Federal Communications Commission, Chairman Kennard, August 2, 2000, In the Matter of the Applications of INTELSAT, LLC for Authority to Operate, and to Further Construct, Launch, and Operate C-band and Ku-band Satellites that form a Global Communications System in Geostationary Orbit; see http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/International/Orders/2000/fcc00287.txt.
[44] Pub. L. No. 87-624, Title V. 501, 92 Stat. 2392 (1978), Convention of the International Maritime Satellite Organization (Inmarsat) Sept. 3, 1976, 31 U.S.T. 1, 4, 1143 U.N.T.S. 105, 107 (effective July 16, 1979).
[45] http://about.inmarsat.com/business
[46] Inmarsat’s website (see note 44) states “Today Inmarsat is at the forefront of 3G wireless telephony, capitalizing on almost a quarter of a century's experience to deliver broadband communications solutions to enterprise, maritime and aeronautical users around the globe" and "a cornerstone of this strategy is the new Inmarsat I-4 satellites, the largest commercial communications spacecraft, currently scheduled to enter service in 2005. Retrieved December 13, 2005.
[47] COMSAT is the US Signatory to both the INTELSAT and INMARSAT Conventions. It is regulated by the Federal Communications Commission and receives its instructions on how to vote on INTELSAT and INMARSAT from the U.S. government; see Richard A. Morgan (1994) "Military Use of Commercial Communication Satellites: A New Look at the Outer Space Treaty and "Peaceful Purposes" 60 J. Air L. & Com. 237 at note 291.
[48] Communications Satellite Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-624, Title I, 102, 76 Statute 419, codified at 47 U.S.C. 701-708 (1988).
[49] Communications Satellite Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-624, Title I, 102, 76 Stat. 419 codified at 47 U.S.C. 701-708 (1988).
[50] For further reading see De Porte, A.W., Europe Between the Superpowers (New York and London: Yale University Press, 1986).
Links:
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http://www.lpb.org/education/classroom/opom/002_curr.htm
http://www.rocketmime.com/space/timeline.html
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http://www.spacefuture.com/tourism/timeline.shtml
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http://members.tripod.com/spacetravel_mdp/all_about_space_travel.htm
http://history.nasa.gov/sputnik/
http://www.amazon.com/Space-Travel-History-Update-Rocketry/dp/0061818984
http://www.infoplease.com/dk/encyclopedia/space-travel.html