THE FIRST STEP IN REUNIFICATION – a peace settlement agreement.

Contents

Acronyms and Abbreviations

DPRK Democratic People’s republic of Korea

IFAD International Fund For Agricultural Development

ROK Republic of Korea

UN United Nations

THE FIRST STEP IN REUNIFICATION – a peace settlement agreement.

1. Introduction

Exactly 20 years ago in September 1997 I was on my first visit to North Korea. It was the height of the 1990’s food crisis and I was working with a team from the United Nations agency the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) on a $50 million project for increasing small livestock and food crop production. Since then I have returned to North Korea six times, once working again in the agricultural sector and five times representing the NZ DPRK Society.

From these visits I have made many North Korean friends and learned a lot about how they think and how they operate.

You do not have to spend much time in country to realise that the picture of North Korea as portrayed to the rest of the world is very inaccurate. Between deliberate misinformation, ideological prejudices, parties pushing agendas of self interest and a Western media always seeking sensational headlines, it can be very difficult for the man in the street to discern where the truth lies.

In trying to visualise possible pathways to reunification, how can we sift the wheat from the chaff? How can we strip away this bluff and bluster? How can we get down to the fundamentals? From my time working there I learned a lesson which I believe gives us a pointer as to how things could go.

One thing I have learned over the years is that the North Koreans take any documents they have signed very seriously. In my experience they scrupulously adhere to every clause and commitment. I saw this first hand when doing a detailed post-evaluation (audit) of one of the IFAD projects. It was impressive how they had fastidiously complied with every clause in the project document. Subsequently I have been able to confirm this impression -legal agreements are treated very seriously.

In this paper I will suggest that, bearing in Mind North Korea’s penchant for scrupulous adherence to legal agreements, a workable formula for peace and reunification can be found by examining the various documents that the North has signed since 1953

Figure I. ROK – DPRK Bilateral Agreements

Each of these bilateral South Korea – North Korea documents reflect a mutual belief that reunification must be achieved peacefully without the use of military forces against the other side. This means a peace settlement agreement or treaty as a first step.

In addition there are three multilateral documents which South Korea did not sign which are of relevance.

Figure II. Other relevant Multi or Bilateral Agreements

We will also briefly look at the Armistice Agreement and the role of the United Nations.

2. The Armistice Agreement

When the Armistice was signed in 1953 this was expected to be a temporary measure which might apply for a few months, pending negotiation of a final peace settlement agreement. In order to understand why a peace agreement has never been signed, we need to take a quick look at how Korea got split in the first place.

By mutual agreement between the European WWII Allies, Russia agreed to enter the Pacific War three months after the end of the war in Europe. This they did. By the time the Japanese capitulated in August 1945, the Russians had taken most of North East China (then known by the Japanese name of Manchukuo) and started pushing down the Korea Peninsula.

Not having any troops on the Peninsula at the time the United States suggested that Russia accept the Japanese surrender North of the 38th Parallel and this was agreed upon. Admiral Kinkaid and Lieutenant General Hodge accepted the Japanese surrender in Seoul on the 9th of September 1945.

In October 1945, General MacArthur’s private plane flew Syngman Rhee into Seoul. Rhee who was a conservative nationalist and strongly anti-Communist, had been living in the United States for many decades.

Kim Il-sung arrived in Pyongyang the same month. Kim, primarily a nationalist and secondarily a Communist, had spent most of the previous 20 years waging guerrilla warfare against the Japanese.

In 1946 the struggle for leadership dominance between these two ideologically opposed individuals developed into civil war. The line drawn across the map at the 38th parallel as a temporary expediency became a de-facto frontier in this civil war.

It is important to note that the civil war between 1946 and 1950 both sides crossed the 38th parallel. There were military incursions both north and south across the 38th parallel.

In June 1950, the United States decided to militarily support their man in the South to ensure a market (as against socialist) economy over the whole peninsula. An appeal was made to the United Nations to support Syngman Rhee’s Republic of Korea. In what has proved to be an alarming lack of foresight, Resolution No. 83 was passed on June 27th 1945 stating that the Security Council:

“Recommends that members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repeal the armed attack and restore international peace and security in the area.” [1]

Confident that he could “handle it with one hand tied behind my back” [2] the entry of the Chinese and the ferocity of the fighting was a shock to Commanding General McArthur. By December 1950 Washington and Moscow were talking about a ceasefire.

Agreeing on the terms of a ceasefire however proved to be a tortuous process and dragged on for nearly three years. There were a number of factors in this, one of them being the actions of Syngman Rhee who wanted to dominate militarily and was vehemently opposed to a ceasefire.

When the terms of the Armistice were finally arrived at by the negotiating team in June 1953, Rhee refused to agree. The issue was elevated up to President Eisenhower. On June 6th Eisenhower wrote a letter to Rhee in which he stated:

“I am prepared promptly after the conclusion and acceptance of an Armistice to negotiate with you a mutual defence treaty.” [3]

Rhee reluctantly agreed. A couple of months later on October 1 1953, the United States signed a mutual Defence Treaty with the ROK. [4] Article IV and VI of this stated:

“V. The Republic of Korea grants, and the United States of America accepts the right to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and around the territory of the Republic of Korea as determined by mutual agreement.”

“VI. This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely.”

To the DPRK this was a contravention of the spirit and intent of the Armistice which dealt with withdrawal of foreign troops from the peninsula. What they probably did not know at the time was that this was the price Rhee had extracted for his assent to United States signing of the Armistice.

Little known is that on the same day that the Armistice was signed, Ambassadors from the countries who fought alongside the United States in Korea, signed a document affirming their respective country’s determination to support and carry out the terms of the Armistice Agreement. (See Appendix A, Joint Policy Declaration Concerning the Korean Armistice)

3. Armistice Provision for a Peace Settlement Agreement

Reading the Armistice text it becomes obvious that it was written by military personnel. The document comprises 62 paragraphs, the first 59 of which deal with military matters. Paragraph 60 changes tack and states that the next step is up to the politicians.

“Article IV

“60. In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the Military Commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the Governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three (3) months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question etc.” [5]

In Clause 60, the military authors of the Armistice are saying that they have done their job. They have negotiated a ceasefire and now hand it over to the politicians to negotiate the final peace settlement agreement. This the politicians have failed to do.

Two attempts were made to hold the prescribed “political conference of a higher level of both sides,” but agreement was not achieved.

Within the prescribed three months, a Pre-Political Conference was held, commencing October 25th 1953. They could not agree on anything, not even an agenda. On December 12 the United States and South Korea walked out of the talks.

In January 1954 Russian Foreign Minister Molotov suggested a five power international conference to discuss tensions in Asia. This commenced on April 25 1954 and became known as the Geneva Conference. This too ended in failure.

Quote from Chester Ronning, head of the Canadian Delegation:

“I was appalled by the great differences in position taken by the United States and South Korea on the one hand, and most of the rest of us on the other. I thought we had come to participate in a peace conference. Instead emphasis was entirely on preventing a settlement from being realised. I was particularly disturbed by statements – especially from the South Koreans, supported by the Americans – giving the impression that the Conference had been called merely to go through the motions.” [6]

The main sticking point was that the United States and South Korea insisted on Korea-wide elections supervised by the United Nations. DPRK would not agree to this because in their view the United Nations had been a partisan combatant in the war.

Failing to reach agreement on Korea, on May 8 the parties went on to discuss Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos and we all know what that led to. The two months of talks at the 1954 Geneva Conference achieved nothing.

4. Involvement of the United Nations

The Armistice was signed by Mark W. Clark, designated as “Commander in Chief, United Nations Command.” (See Appendix B, Signatories of the Korean War Armistice Agreement) From this one would imply that this is a United Nations document and therefore that the United Nations should be responsible to organise the political conference as called for in Clause 60 and facilitate a peace settlement agreement. But this is not the case.

The Armistice is not a United Nations document. Furthermore, the so called United Nations Command in fact is not United Nations force. In June and July of 1950 the Security Council passed four resolutions on Korea (numbers 82, 83, 84 and 85). None of these resolutions refers to the ‘United Nations Command’ or gives the United States permission to call itself the ‘United Nations Command’. [7]

Resolution 84 “Recommends that all members providing forces and other assistance available........................ to the Unified Command under the United States of America.” [8]

When President Truman appointed McArthur as Commander in Chief, in keeping with his lifelong habit of self-aggrandisement, McArthur in his first press release referred to himself as the Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command.

In fact there is no such thing as the United Nations Command. It is a con job, a hoax invented by McArthur’s ego.

The United States military claims that it has always been acting as an agent of the United Nations in Korea since 1950.

The United Nations does not see it this way.

“Recently, several UN Secretary Generals, including Secretary General Boutros Boutros Gali, Secretary General Kofi Anan, and Secretary General Ban Ki-moon have acknowledged that the USA was in charge of the Command structure of the Korean war activity taken under the authority of the ‘Unified Command,’ and that the United Nations had no role in overseeing the actions taken in the name of the UN.” [9]

More specifically in June 2013 a spokesman for Secretary General Ban Ki-moon stated that:

“the United Nations never had any role in command of any armed forces deployed in the Korean Peninsula, In particular, the United Nations did not at any time have any role in the command of forces that operated under the ‘Unified Command’ between 1950 and 1953.” [10]

The North Korean viewpoint is that by recommending other countries to support the United States in 1950 in Korea, the United Nations departed from its principle of impartiality and became a partisan combatant in the Korean War. As it has turned out, this has proved to be the thin end of the wedge. The United States has leveraged this ever since and manipulated the Security Council to the point where today it unashamedly acts as an instrument for the implementation of United States foreign policy. A most unfortunate state of affairs for the people of the Korean nation.

Were common sense to prevail, all of the countries who fought in the Korean War (from both sides) would come together, agree that the state of war has lasted too long, and sign a peace treaty. However, given the conflicting geopolitical agendas and the prejudice that has been cultivated by the United States against the DPRK, the likelihood of this happening is very slim. It would be easier to herd cats.

5. Joint North-South Communiqué 1972

Through the decades of the 1950’s and the 1960’s an uneasy truce prevailed. The South felt secure with the American troops present. The North felt secure, knowing that China stood behind them.

All of this changed when Secretary of State Kissinger visited Peking in 1971, followed by President Nixon in July 1972.

Although we cannot know for sure, we can be fairly certain therefore it was not a coincidence that Kim Il-sung stated in an August 1971 speech “we are ready to establish contact at any time with all political parties, including the (ruling) Democratic Republican Party, and all social organisations and individuals in South Korea.” [11]

In his 1972 New Year Speech he went a step further and suggested an Inter-Korean peace treaty. This led to talks which culminated in the first Joint North-South Communiqué which stated:

“First, unification shall be achieved independently, without depending on foreign powers and without foreign interference.

Second, unification shall be achieved through peaceful means, without resorting to the use of force against each other.

Third, a great national unity as one people shall be sought first, transcending difference in ideas, ideologies and systems.” [12]

Although talks continued, these came to nothing.

In March 1974 the DPRK Supreme People’s Assembly in a letter addressed to both the United States Senate and House of representatives proposed:

“the conclusion of a peace agreement, as a step for converting the Armistice into a durable peace.” [13]

They are still waiting for a reply, although they did get one indirectly nearly 30 years later in 2003 when then Secretary of State Colin Powell replying to a press conference question stated:

“We don’t do nonaggression pacts or treaties, or things of that nature.” [14]

Almost every year since the 1970s Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un successively in their New Year Speeches have called for an end to hostilities in the form of a peace treaty. Further, they have also been advocating for a nuclear free Korean peninsula over the same period of time.

6. Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation 1991

In 1988 President Roh Tae-woo launched his Northern Diplomacy or Nordpolotik foreign policy in which he proposed a ‘Korean Community’. This paralleled North Korea’s proposal for a confederation. High level talks were held which resulted in the 1991 Agreement on reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation and the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. [15] Comprising 15 articles, the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation is longer than the other joint agreements which have been signed over the years. The Preamble states that the two countries are:

“Pledging themselves to exert joint efforts to achieve peaceful unification.”

Article 1 states that:

“South and North Korea shall recognise and respect the system of each other.”

This implicitly supports the concept of a confederation.

7. The Agreed Framework October 21 1994

It is timely at this point to take a quick look at another agreement which North Korea signed at about this time. Following an intervention by former President Jimmy Carter, the Agreed Framework committed the United States and South Korea to build two Light Water Reactor electricity generating plants and an interim supply of fuel oil. In return, North Korea committed to close down the Yongbyon nuclear reactor and abandon construction of two larger plutonium-based nuclear power plants – which they did.

Fuel oil shipments and start of construction of the light water reactors were slow to take place because President Clinton was being advised that he did not have to spend the money as the Pyongyang regime was going to collapse. As a result the Agreed Framework itself collapsed under President Bush in 2003.

This experience reinforced the North Korean view that the Americans cannot be trusted and strengthened their resolve to develop an effective nuclear deterrent as a guard against United States invasion.

8. The North South Joint Declaration

In 1998 President Kim Dae-jung announced a new ‘Comprehensive Engagement Policy towards North Korea’ which popularly became known as the Sunshine Policy. This policy was based on three principles: [16]

“No armed provocation from the North would be tolerated.

The South would not attempt to absorb the North in any way

The South would actively seek cooperation.”

In June 200, Kim Dae-jung met with Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang and this summit produced the North South Declaration. [17]

Excerpt from the June 15 Joint North South Declaration:

“The South and the North have agreed to resolve the question of reunification independently and through the joint efforts of the Korean people, who are masters of the country.

For achievement of reunification, we have agreed that there is a common element in the South’s concept of a confederation and the North’s formula for a loose form of federation. The South and the North agreed to promote reunification in that direction.”

Although it had been agreed that Kim Jong-il would “visit Seoul at an appropriate time in the future” with George W. Bush taking a tough stance against the DPRK, this did not happen. It was another seven years before another summit was held.

9. Declaration for Development of North-South Relations and Peace and Prosperity 2007

In October 2007, President Roh Moo-hyun, against Washington’s wishes, walked across the DMZ at Panmunjom and travelled by road to Pyongyang where he met with Kim Jong-il. This, the last North South summit to be held, resulted in the October 4 Declaration for Development of North-South Relations and Peace and Prosperity. [18]

Excerpt from the Declaration:

“1. The South and the North shall uphold and endeavour actively to realize the June 15 Declaration.

The South and the North have agreed to resolve the issue of unification on their own initiative and according to the spirit of “by-the-Korean-people-themselves.”

The South and the North will work out ways to commemorate the June 15 anniversary of the announcement of the South-North Joint Declaration to reflect the common will to faithfully carry it out.

2.The South and the North have agreed to firmly transform inter-Korean relations into ties of mutual respect and trust, transcending the differences in ideology and systems.

The South and the North have agreed not to interfere in the internal affairs of the other and agreed to resolve inter-Korean issues in the spirit of reconciliation, cooperation and reunification.

The South and the North have agreed to overhaul their respective legislative and institutional apparatuses in a bid to develop inter-Korean relations in a reunification-oriented direction.

The South and the North have agreed to proactively pursue dialogue and contacts in various areas, including the legislatures of the two Koreas, in order to resolve matters concerning the expansion and advancement of inter-Korean relations in a way that meets the aspirations of the entire Korean people.

3. The South and the North have agreed to closely work together to put an end to military hostilities, mitigate tensions and guarantee peace on the Korean Peninsula.

The South and the North have agreed not to antagonize each other, reduce military tension, and resolve issues in dispute through dialogue and negotiation.

The South and the North have agreed to oppose war on the Korean Peninsula and to adhere strictly to their obligation to nonaggression.

4. The South and the North both recognize the need to end the current armistice regime and build a permanent peace regime. The South and the North have also agreed to work together to advance the matter of having the leaders of the three or four parties directly concerned to convene on the Peninsula and declare an end to the war.”

Unfortunately the positive intentions of the October 4th Declaration have never been acted upon. President Lee Myung-bak who assumed office in February 2008, reversed the Sunshine Policy and engaged upon a policy of isolation and confrontation. This was continued by his successor President Park Geun-hye who went further and closed down all contact with North Korea – as indeed has our own New Zealand government, blindly subservient as they are to the United States policies.

10. President Moon Jae-un

President Moon Jae-in claims to agree with the approach evolved in these four jointly signed ROK – DPRK documents. In his July 7 2017 Berlin speech he said:

“We already know the road that leads to a peaceful Korean Peninsula. It is returning to the June 15 Joint Declaration and the October 4 Declaration.

Through these two declarations, the South and the North clearly stated that the owner of inter-Korean issues is our own nation, and committed to closely cooperate in easing tensions and guaranteeing peace on the Korean Peninsula. The two Koreas also promised to walk the path of common prosperity through cooperative projects in every sector of the society, including in the economic field.” [19]

In so speaking, President Moon is recognising the three principles which have re-occurred in the various joint statements and declarations signed between 1972 and 2007.

(i) “reunification must be achieved peacefully without the use of military forces against the other side.”

(ii) reunification will be solved “by the Korean people themselves.”

(iii) Reunification will be achieved through adopting a confederate structure.

It is said that actions speak louder than words. Unfortunately Moon’s actions are not supporting these principles.

Instead he is supporting the Washington line of increasing isolation and sanctions if North Korea does not stop it ‘nuclear provocations.’ In doing this he is distancing himself from the first two principles – achieving peace without the use of the military and by the ‘Korean people themselves.’

Further he is totalling ignoring North Korea’s genuine and legitimate security concerns. Along with Washington, he also grossly under-estimates North Korea’s determination not to buckle under external pressure. DPRK’s security concerns can only be addressed through a robust peace settlement agreement.

The North Korean belief is that when they have a miniaturised nuclear warhead and an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching North America, the United States will then be forced to sit down and negotiate a peace settlement agreement with them, thus opening the way for a confederated reunification with the South.

11. In Conclusion

The Korean war continues to be fought on many fronts. This includes the battle for the world’s hearts and minds. On this battlefront, the United States is winning 100%. They have got the world conned into believing that the DPRK is an aggressive threat. This is totally wrong. The DPRK wants to end all hostilities. They are sick of war.

DPRK is not a threat and is not aggressive. They are acutely conscious that to be aggressive is to be suicidal. They are not suicidal.

Misinformation flows from both sides. Colourful bluster from the North captures headlines, causing even our own Foreign Affairs Minister to publicly state that he thinks Kim Jong-un is nuts. [20]

The froth and bubble of these words might capture headlines, but they count for little. What will count in the long run are the actual written agreements jointly signed by the South and the North.

The bilateral statements signed by South and North Korea clearly lay out a workable framework for a peaceful cessation of hostilities by the Korean people themselves leading to a confederated reunification.

We now have close to seven decades of experience which prove that the United States policies will never bring peace and reunification.

Having been President Roh Moo-hyun’s chief of staff President Moon Jae-in was heavily involved with the 2007 summit and Declaration for Development of North-South Relations and Peace and Prosperity.

Instead of endorsing Washington’s policies, President Moon should follow through with action on the jointly agreed upon clauses of the 2007 Declaration thereby building – in the words of the declaration – a permanent peace regime.... by the Korean people themselves.

Peter Wilson.

9th September 2017

Peter Wilson is a humanitarian worker who over a period of 40 years worked at field level on rural development, resettlement and post conflict restoration projects in 21 Asian/Pacific countries. These days he is Secretary of the NZ DPRK Society.

Appendix A: Joint Policy Declaration Concerning the Korean Armistice

Signed at Washington July 27, 1953

We, the United Nations Members whose military forces are participating in the Korean action, support the decision of the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command to conclude an armistice agreement. We hereby affirm our determination fully and faithfully to carry out the terms of that armistice.

AUSTRALIA : Percy C. Spender

BELGIUM : Silvercruys

CANADA : W. H. Wrong

COLUMBIA: Ipriano Reestrepo J.

ETHIOPIA : A. Tesemma

FRANCE: H. Bonnet

GREECE : A.G. Politis

LUXEMBOURG : Hugues le Gallais

THE NETHERLANDS: J. H. van Roijen.

NEW ZEALAND: L. K. Munro

THE PHILIPPINES: Melquiades J. Gamboa

THAILAND : P. Sarabin