* Quotes

Please scroll down to find quotes from the following persons:

 Bruce Cummings, Ted Galen Darpenter, Leon V. Segal, Dennis Florig,  Robert Carlin and John W. Lewis , Siegfried Hecker, Leon V. Sigal, John Pilger,  John Feffer, Andy Marra,   Jim Walsh,   Siegfried Hecker,  John Gowans, Clyde Prestowitz,  Christine Ahn,  Hyun Jeong-eun,  Jimmy Carter,     Noam Chomsky,   Ron Jacobs,   Boutros Boutros-Ghali,  Peter Hayes,     Kim Myong-chol,      Barack Obama,    Joe Biden,    Hillary Clinton,    Susan Rice,   Donald O. Gregg,  Bruce Cummings,    Selig S. Harrison,   Gwynne Dyer,  Carlton Meyer,    Dwight D. Eisenhower, John Adams.    

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Professor Bruce Cummings, University of Chicago.

North Korea is already the most sanctioned regime in world history and since the 1950s, those sanctions have failed to change its behavior. The only progress we‘ve seen in dialogue with North Korea since the Korean War came in 1994. That was when Bill Clinton decided to negotiate with Pyongyang, and the Yongbyon nuclear facilities were frozen for eight years. Between 1998 and 2008, Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun negotiated on a lot of important issues with North Korea. And in 1998 to 2000, the Perry process [named after Clinton-era US secretary of defense William Perry] led to effective negotiations. We need to note that there is a record of success in dialogue with North Korea, which is different from the case of Iran.

Ted Galen Carpenter

US leaders have painted themselves into a corner regarding policy toward the Democratic People'sRepublic of Korea.....That approach clearly has not worked....

A new, radically different approach is needed. Instead of continuing the futile strategy of isolatingthe DPRK, Washington should adopt a comprehensive strategy to normalize relations withPyongyang. And China has a crucial role to play as the primary facilitator in that process.

 

Leon V. Sigal           Director, Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project   at the Social Science Research Council

Pyongyang’s basic stance is that as long as Washington remains its foe, it feels threatened and will acquire nuclear weapons and missiles to counter that threat. But, it says, if Washington, along with Seoul and Tokyo, moves to end enmity and reconcile with it, it will no longer feel threatened and will not need these weapons. Does Pyongyang mean what it says? Most observers doubt it, but the fact is, nobody knows, with the possible exception of Kim Jong-il. We need to find out. And we need to find out exactly what he wants in return. The only way to do that is to probe through sustained diplomatic give-and-take - offering the DPRK meaningful steps toward a new political, economic and strategic relationship in return for steps toward full denuclearization. All the speculation that it will never give up its weapons only encourages Pyongyang to think it won’t have to – and worse, encourages our allies to think we are abandoning our goal of complete denuclearization.

Prof. Dennis Florig.                     Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Seoul, ROK.

 It would be better if the U.S. gave less advice to the Chinese about how to handle the DPRK and took more advice from the Chinese about how to proceed in their relations with the North.

 Robert Carlin and John W. Lewis               http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/21/AR2010112102276.html

North Korea is on the sad list of countries that, over the years, Americans have convinced themselves they cannot understand and believe, in a self-fulfilling prophecy, that it is impossible to engage. Not so long ago, of course, China and North Vietnam were high on that list.

Siegfried Hecker  November 2010                                      http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/23035/Yongbyonreport.pdf

The only hope appears to be engagement. The United States and its partners should respond to the latest nuclear developments so as to encourage Pyongyang to finally pursue nuclear electricity in lieu of the bomb. That will require addressing North Korea’s underlying insecurity. A high-level North Korean government official told us that the October 2000 Joint Communiqué, which brought Secretary Madeleine Albright to Pyongyang, is a good place to start.

Leon V. Sigal.  Director of the Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project at the Social Science Research Council

http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_11/Sigal

The most propitious moments in Korea policy have come when Washington and Seoul moved in tandem to reconcile with Pyongyang. That was the case in October 2007, as well as in January 2000 with the first North-South summit and that October with the exchange of visits by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok, the highest-level U.S.-North Korean contacts to date. The most dangerous crises came when Seoul blocked engagement between Washington and Pyongyang in March 1993, prompting North Korea to announce its intention to renounce the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; in May 1994, when it abruptly removed all the spent nuclear fuel from its reactor at Yongbyon; and again now.

John Pilger.   

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2UJ87MptxaU&feature=player_embedded

We live in an imperial age again………..with great powers vying for strategic place, resources in the world. We live in an age of what they call in Washington perpetual war and I am quoting Petraeus.

The paradigm has not changed since 1945.  American foreign policy goes in a straight line….. That Trajectory runs unerringly in one direction. What the Obama administration has done is simply pick up all the policies of Bush and pursue them. For example, for the first time in US presidential history -- it has not happened before -- a president has taken the entire defense department bureaucracy, and the Secretary of State for Defense, from a previous administration – a discredited one. We have basically Robert Gates and the same generals running American foreign policy with a lot of help from people of like mind. Obama has accelerated Bush’s policies.

John Feffer.  

Co-director of Foreign Policy In Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, USA.o-director of Foreign Policy In Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, Washington USA.

Surely if the United States is willing to negotiate in good faith with "Mad Dog" Gaddafi - the name Ronald Reagan bestowed on the Libyan leader - then it can find a way to woo Iran's Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and North Korea's Kim Jong-Il

http://www.fpif.org/articles/the_strange_case_of_libya

Andy Marra        Co-Director, Nodutdol for Korean Community Development      May 4, 2010 07

As a Korean American, I am often asked about the reclusive state with questions ranging from "Were you born in the North or South?" to "Is crazy North Korea going to bomb us?"

For the record, I was born in Seoul. As for the latter, I am left feeling more concerned about potential United States military actions against North Korea instead of North Korea attacking us. This past January, the world witnessed an unprecedented gesture by Pyongyang stating they will permanently dismantle its nuclear program in exchange for a formal treaty with the U.S. to finally end the Korean War. Washington, however, dismissed this historic offer and refused to engage in any meaningful dialogue. Instead, the U.S. responded by conducting Key Resolve Foal Eagle, a full-scale military offensive exercise aimed at invading North Korea. At a Pentagon press conference on April 6, 2010, Defense Secretary Robert Gates threatened North Korea with the possibility of nuclear attack by warning, "All options are on the table in terms of how we deal with you."

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andy-marra/north-koreas-bomb-and-the_b_563533.html

Dr. Jim Walsh       Research Associate at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and  international security expert.

And that's why when you look at the history of the nuclear age, all the countries that have nuclear weapons - the U.S., France, China, Russia, whoever you can point to - they first built a nuclear weapon and then it was years and years and years before they were able to mount one on a missile," he said. "And some nuclear weapon states - I think of India and Pakistan, for example - it's still unclear whether they have that capability. So - in the nuclear world, it's the hardest thing you can do and I don't expect North Korea to be able to do it for quite some time - if ever.

http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-05-14-voa45-68802087.html

Siegfried Hecker               Director, Los Alamos National Laboratory 1986- 97

I use the term deterrent because that is always what the North Koreans have told me. They have essentially never referred to their nuclear arsenal as such. They have always referred to their deterrent and the need to strengthen their deterrent, typically blamed on hostile actions by the United States.

North Korea is saying, "Look, we need to protect ourselves against you, particularly against the United States." It has not threatened to use its weapons against other states. However, as you might imagine, states like Japan get quite nervous when you have a combination of long-range rocket tests and additional nuclear tests that would allow North Korea to get closer to miniaturizing its nuclear warheads. So even though North Korea doesn't threaten directly, nevertheless, that is clearly interpreted as a threat to countries such as Japan.

http://news.stanford.edu/news/2009/may27/hecker-052709.html

Rarely are the stars so aligned for genuine peace in Northeast Asia. President Obama should take advantage of this historic warming by sending special envoy Stephen Bosworth to North Korea to finally resolve the outstanding Korean War.........

The Obama administration believes that North Korea deliberately placed roadblocks to engagement by launching a missile in April and testing a second nuclear device in May. In other words, in exchange for President Obama's unclenched fist, North Korea gave Washington the finger. Also, North Korea has broken the rules of the global game — such as violating the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty — and must be punished.........

But, in fact, North Korea's belligerence was in reaction to Obama's continuation of the Bush policy: denuclearization before talks. 

Diplomatic negotiations are a means to settle differences. Engaging North Korea through direct negotiations doesn't mean the Obama administration is legitimizing the North Korean leader. Richard Nixon negotiated with China and Ronald Reagan talked with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, and those societies have changed quite a bit since then. President Obama should uphold his commitment to negotiate, and doing so with North Korea means opening up North Korea and the door to peaceful reunification. Given its leadership in the division of the Korean peninsula and in the Korean War, the United States has a moral obligation to engage North Korea. Not doing so is a dangerous repeat of the same mistakes of the past two administrations, which led, eventually, to a nuclear North Korea........

The time is now to engage North Korea diplomatically and finally end the Korean War with a permanent peace treaty. By supporting the winds of peace and reconciliation blowing across the DMZ, President Obama will have one less foreign policy challenge and move one step closer towards his vision of a nuclear free world.

Hyun Jeong-eun. Chairwoman of South Korea's Hyundai group.   (After talking to KimJong Il in Augst 2009)

http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/10/19/nkorea.hyun.korea/index.html

He seems to be very honest and straightforward when he speaks. So I believe that if direct talks with the leader Kim Jong Il are possible, a lot of good results will come out of it. I personally think that if President Obama and Kim Jong Il meet, things can be worked out quite easily.

Jimmy Carter. Former President of the United States 1977 - 1981.

http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/01/26/carter-says-north-korea-nuclear-weapons/     26th January 2009

It could be worked out, in my opinion, in half a day........

North Koreans, in my opinion, whom I know fairly well, have always been willing to forego their nuclear capability if they have diplomatic relations with the United States. ........

And if they have an assurance with the United States that it would not attack them militarily, of course with the proviso that North Korea not attack South Korea.

The rest of the solution is as easy as replacing their old dangerous reactors with new, safer designs with guaranteed IAEA inspection access, and giving North Korea fuel oil to run electric generators until its power grid is improved.

Noam Chomsky.

Key excerpts from op-ed piece written  November 26th 2003.   Noam Chomsky. Interventions. Penguin Books  2007.  ISBN  978-0141-03237-5.

 As the United States struggles to impose order on Iraq, along with a regime that will be subordinated to U.S. interests, another crisis threatens to erupt in North Korea.

North Korea lies within Northeast Asia, a region that presents its own challenge to Washington’s dreams of global dominance.

 Northeast Asia is now the world’s most dynamic economic region, with close to 30% of global domestic product, far more than the United states (19%), and half of global foreign exchange reserves.

 The United States is ambivalent about this Northeast Asian integration. Washington’s concern is that integrated regions like Europe or Northeast Asia might seek a more independent course and become what used to be called a “third force” during the Cold War years.

 The Task Force on U.S. Korea Policy recommends that Washington seek a diplomatic solution to the current  crisis over North Korea.

 A more temperate policy might encourage Northeast Asia, like Europe, to follow a more independent course, which however, would make it harder for the United States to maintain a global order in which others must respect their proper place.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali   Secretary-General of the United Nations from January 1992 to December 1996.

http://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boutros_Boutros-Ghali

It would be some time before I fully realized that the United States sees little need for diplomacy. Power is enough. Only the weak rely on diplomacy … The Roman Empire had no need for diplomacy. Nor does the United States.

Ron Jacobs  

http://www.counterpunch.org/jacobs03072003.html 7th March 2003.

I have often wondered (like any thinking individual), why isn't there a peace treaty? Although some US government documents state that it is North Korea who does not want such a treaty, history tells us otherwise. It is Washington that does not want a peace agreement. Washington and its client regime sabotaged the political conference in 1954 that was to have been a forerunner to a peace conference and Washington has ignored most every other opportunity for such a conference since then. This is despite Pyongyang's almost constant calls for this conference. The only exception to the US lack of interest in negotiating a permanent settlement that I can find occurred in 1994 when, after another near-war, the Clinton administration began talks that resulted in agreements that were designed to end Pyongyang's nuclear weapons project and help that country overcome a drought-induced famine........

So, why doesn't the United States want a peace treaty with North Korea? Why are they willing to risk another bloody war with that country's military? The reason is simple: because any peace agreement would require that the United States remove all of its forces, weapons, including its weapons of mass destruction (which include nuclear weapons) from the southern half of the country. This action would limit Washington's ability to bully other governments in the region. In addition, it would end one more rationalization Washington likes to use for its marriage to the defense industry and the accompanying transfer of public funds to that industry in the name of what passes for national security in the warfare state. It seems to me that if Washington were truly interested in national security, it would want peace with Pyongyang, not war. In that case, a peace treaty with Pyongyang is a no-brainer.

Peter Hayes

 Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute, and Scott Bruce, Director of the Institute's San Francisco office

From an article 2nd June 2009

A priority for the Obama Administration is to develop a game-plan to deal with North Korea's nuclear challenge. Until Obama engages directly with Kim Jong Il, we see little prospect for a shift from the current escalatory cycle. Even then, it's unknowable in advance whether the DPRK would spurn direct talks at the leadership level, as it did with low ranking diplomatic overtures earlier this year.

But nothing is lost from trying a direct overture from President Obama. This would not be a reward Kim Jong Il nor lend kudos to the DPRK. It would simply indicate an open mind and willingness to talk tough about the issues that drive policy in both countries rather than making threats that are not realistic for either side to act upon.

In short, it is time to win the game, not play it forever. This is within President Obama's reach, but only if he rises above emotional and unrealistic talk of punishing North Korea and focuses on the big picture changes to the strategic landscape that would be necessary to strike a deal with Kim Jong Il worth having.

Kim Myong-chol   

Kim Myong-chol, Executive Director, Center for Korean-American Peace in Tokyo, is often referred to as an "unofficial" spokesman of Kim Jong-il and North Korea. He actively presents a North Korean viewpoint in international fora.

Excerpts from an article entitled:     Kim Jong-il Shifts to Plan B     21st May 2009 

“………..all indications are that Kim Jong-il, supreme leader of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), has finalized a little-known watershed decision in March to shift to a "plan B" after more than a dozen years of fruitlessly pursuing "plan A". 

Plan A called for the DPRK to consider exploring a shortcut to enhanced independence, peace and prosperity through rapprochement with the US. Plan A obliged the Kim Jong-il administration to negotiate away its nuclear weapons program as part of a verified denuclearization of the whole of the Korean Peninsula in return for Washington's strategic decision to co-exist peacefully with Pyongyang. 

Plan A assumed the US would decide to leave behind its policy of hostility to the DPRK, conclude a peace treaty with North Korea, and pledge in a verifiable way it would not attack it with nuclear and conventional arms. It also assumed the US would establish full relations with North Korea, show respect for its sovereignty and independence, lift sanctions imposed on it, and provide it with fuel oil and light-water reactors.

Plan B sees no point in talking with the US. The Kim Jong-il administration has learned the hard way that there is no point in negotiating with the US government on a bilateral or multilateral basis while the US remains hostile with no intention of adopting a "live and let live" policy towards Pyongyang. 

Plan B envisages the DPRK going it alone as a fully fledged nuclear weapon-armed state, with a military-first policy, and then growing into a mighty and prosperous country. It will put the policy of seeking reconciliation with a tricky US, a helpless superpower with a crippled economy that is losing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, on the back burner.

Source: Asia Times Online.  

Barack Obama   

President of the USA. 

From a Statement on 26th June 2008.

"  We should continue to pursue the kind of direct and aggressive diplomacy with North Korea that can yield results. The objective must be clear: the complete and verifiable elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons programs, which only expanded while we refused to talk. As we move forward, we must not cede our leverage in these negotiations unless it is clear that North Korea is living up to its obligations.

  As President, I will work from the very beginning of my term in office to secure the American people and our interests in this vital region. We must work with diligence and determination with our friends and allies to end this dangerous threat, and to secure a lasting peace on the Korean peninsula."

Joe Biden

 Vice President of the United States

Biden is famously on the record as having described North Korea as a “paper tiger, unable to harm America.” Here is what he had to say to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing “Status of the Six Party Talks for the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” on 6th February 2008.

“I look forward to the day that we can close the book on the nuclear issue and turn to other challenges, like how the United States and North Korea might cooperate to expand trade and cultural and educational exchanges between our two nations. But we are not there yet.

Our goal – and the stated objective of the Six Party Talks – is to peacefully dismantle North Korea’s nuclear weapons program in exchange for energy assistance, sanctions relief, and the creation of a permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula.………….

Some say we should never negotiate with North Korea because they can’t be trusted. This view offers no viable solution to a problem – a problem that got much worse when the Bush Administration disengaged from the effort.……………...

There is still no substitute for patient, principled, sustained, high level diplomacy. Moreover, our efforts are more likely to succeed when we enlist our allies South Korea and Japan and other friends to help us.”

Hillary Clinton

 United States of America Secretary of State

From an opinion piece co-authored with Carl Levin entitled “Not Engaging Is Not an Alternative” published in the Washington Post, 5th July 2005.

“This is about more than the stability of the Korean Peninsula and the fate of South Korea and U.S. troops stationed there, important as those things are. What is at stake is the stability of Northeast Asia and, arguably, the global economic and political order. The administration must get serious. It doesn't matter who is at the table as long as we and the North Koreans are there, and as long as both sides negotiate with seriousness and urgency. The administration must inject both into the process.

Seriousness is demonstrated by spelling out a package to the North Koreans that addresses their fundamental need for economic assistance. It is demonstrated by rhetorical restraint. Name-calling aimed at our opponent has only hampered diplomacy. Seriousness means sending a senior U.S. official to meet with Kim Jong Il. And the way to know whether we have been trying hard enough is to determine whether our Asian negotiating partners also think diplomacy has been exhausted.”

Website Comment:  Pity Hillary has not held to these sentiments...............................

Susan Rice

 USA Ambassador to the United Nations.

From an opinion piece entitled “We need to Talk” published in the Washington Post 3rd June 2005.

In exchange for the "complete, verifiable and irreversible" dismantling of North Korea's nuclear programs, the United States should offer security guarantees, economic ties, fuel supplies and diplomatic relations.

Donald O. Gregg

 Chairman of the Board, The Korea society, New York. Former CIA Operations officer (31 years) and US Ambassador to South Korea 1989 -1993.

“North Korea is the longest-running failure in the history of American espionage.”

Bruce Cummings

 Author of “The Origins of the Korean War”, and Professor at University of Chicago. Quoted from the paper – Creating Korean Insecurity: The US Role.

“The United States has committed itself to Korean unification only once, in July and August 1950 in preparation for the march to Yalu; otherwise it has shown little interest in ending the Korean division, before or after the war.”

Selig S. Harrison       

Author of five books on Korea and Asia, a senior Scholar of the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, Washington D.C. USA. Quoted from the paper: – The Preconditions for Korean Security: US Policy and the legacy of 1945

“North Korea initiated its nuclear weapons programme as a direct response to the challenge posed by the deployment of US Honest John, Lance and Nike-Hercules missiles in the south in 1958. In Korea, as in Europe, the United States proclaimed a “first use” strategic doctrine that justified the use of nuclear weapons against conventional forces. In Europe, however, NATO doctrine envisaged primary reliance on conventional  weapons to block invasion for as long as possible. Nuclear weapons were to be used only as a last resort if it became unavoidable. By contrast, in Korea, where the North did not then have nuclear weapons, the United States assumed that it could use them with impunity “within one hour of the outbreak of war”  and made its intention to do so clear through military exercises that included “nuclear fighting” scenarios.

Gwynne Dyer, Military Historian and Syndicated Columnist    September 2005.

The North Korean negotiating style certainly leaves a good deal to be desired. 

Partly, it is just the normal behaviour of people who have no experience of negotiations between equals -- and indeed, people raised in the authoritarian,

almost Orwellian system that prevails in North Korea are very unlikely to have that experience. But these are also shrewd negotiating tactics for people who 

are so weak that they have practically no cards in their hand. If you have no other way to make other parties pay attention to your concerns, then threatening to be unreasonable and cause a lot of damage is a good way to get them to listen. Even teenagers know that.

North Korea has no real cards in its hand.  With half as many people as South Korea, it has an economy around one-tenth the size, and much of that goes to maintaining a military establishment that is more or less capable of matching the South Korean and American forces that confront it in the Korean peninsula.  Its people live on the brink of starvation(although Kim Jong Il clearly eats very well), and its ability to threaten the United States directly is precisely zero.

http://gwynnedyer.com/articles/Gwynne%20Dyer%20article_%20%20North%20Korean%20_Threat_.txt

Carlton Meyer

 Former US Marine Corps Officer and participant in the massive 1990 ‘Team Spirit’ military war games exercise.

“The Korean conflict is over, but Cold War warriors refuse to accept this reality because they need a “threat.” When Pentagon officials talk about the need to maintain a “two-war” capability, they often refer to Korea. This is absurd since South Korea can crush North Korea without American help……

North Korean soldiers suffer from malnutrition and rarely train due to a scarcity of fuel and ammo……

On the other hand, the entire 700,000 man South Korean active duty army can be devoted to the defense of Seoul. The modern South Korean army is backed by over 5,000,000 well-trained reservists who can be called to duty in hours. South Korea has twice the population of the North, thirty times its economic power, and spends three times more on its military each year. South Korean military equipment is first class whereas most of the North Korean military equipment is over 30 years old and much is inoperable due to a lack of maintenance. If war broke out, South Korea has a massive industrial capacity and $94 billion in foreign currency reserves to sustain a war, while North Korea has no industry and no money. As a result, South Korea is roughly five times more powerful than North Korea.”

For more from CarltonMeyer see:  http://www.g2mil.com/korea.htm

Dwight D. Eisenhower.  

Final Presidential Speech 1961 

"In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist."

 John Adams  (2nd President of the United States 1797 - 1801)

Power always thinks it has a great soul and vast views beyond the comprehension of the weak.

Christine Ahn. Foreign Policy in Focus. Oct.5th 2009http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/6472

With regard to North Korea, we should negotiate a new deal that both guarantees the security of the country from outside attack and assures it sufficient electricity and food; sign a peace treaty to conclude the Korean War and accord the North formal diplomatic recognition; and support South Korea’s efforts at developing trade and investment with the North and its economic development. Internal development is far more likely to change the Kim regime than external threats.

From his book :

Rogue Nation – American Unilateralism and the failure of Good Intentions. Basic Books. 2003. ISBN 0-465-06279-2

John Gowans           Canadian activist and analyst

it’s strikingly easy to alienate a country of outside support by hurling false accusations at it. Damning charges made by the White House are guaranteed to be trumpeted instantaneously throughout the world by the mass media. Given an undeserved instant credibility, they will, in short order, become received truths. Washington could make perfectly absurd claims about Iraq possessing caches of undeclared weapons of mass destruction, despite a decades-long inspection regime, and have those claims treated as beyond doubt by commentators on both the right and left in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq. That they were later acknowledged to be untrue was too little, too late. Turning north Korea into an ugly, disreputable house of horrors, which no sane person would ever think of uttering a kind word about, is firmly within the competence of Washington’s masters of propaganda. 

http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=3818

Clyde Prestowitz.     President  Economic Strategy Institute, Washington.