We analyze, in a game-theoretic model, the strategic interaction between competing firms that source their inputs from either primary or recycled material. Because the manufacturers' primary production today serves as input for the recyclers' production tomorrow, manufacturers can limit the recyclers' scale of operation by reducing their output. Improving the recycling process generates then two opposite effects: it reduces primary production tomorrow by exposing manufacturers to stronger competition from recyclers, but it also lowers the manufacturers' incentives to reduce their primary production today. If primary production exerts a negative externality on the environment, then making the recycling process too efficient might be counterproductive. This intuition equally applies to remanufacturing.
The interaction between a manufacturer and a platform that organizes the peer-to-peer sharing of the former’s products such as GetAround and Uber is not a mere competition but a ‘coopetition.’ Indeed, such a platform enables consumers to gain short-term access to products without buying them and disrupts the manufacturer’s demand. However, the opportunity for consumers to earn revenue from sharing also increases their willingness to pay for the manufacturer’s product and partially offsets the latter’s loss due to the decreasing demand. Therefore, the manufacturer does not have the incentive to lower its price if the threat from demand reduction is not too high. Consequently, improving the efficiency of the sharing market by reducing the costs associated with sharing may lead to different outcomes: while a cost reduction that is constant across peer suppliers does not trigger the manufacturer’s reaction and increases sharing, a cost reduction that is proportional to the suppliers’ valuation for private ownership triggers the manufacturer’s reaction and decreases sharing. Furthermore, the manufacturer may react to the threat from the P2P platform by integrating (partially or fully) with the latter; while the integration expands further the sharing market, it does so at the cost of consumer surplus. Hence, public policies aiming at supporting the sharing economy for the sake of both the environment and consumers need to target the correct cost reduction and balance the impacts of the firms’ integration.
Pay-per-use as a win-win business model for both the firm and the environment?
I use a simple stylized model to provide some insights on the conditions for PPU to be a sustainable business model: one that generates higher profits for the firm and lower aggregate use levels of the product simultaneously. Indeed, the pay-per-use (PPU) pricing structure allows the firm to segment its customers without necessarily identifying their type, a capacity that is unavailable to the firm under the selling business model. Yet, the firm may still earn lower profits under PPU if the gain from segmenting customers does not offset the loss from incurring a lower use level of its product or not wholly appropriating consumers’ surplus when they encounter a high-utility instance of need. Furthermore, the profitability of PPU does not necessarily align with its potential to reduce the business’ environmental impacts. While the per-use payment encourages some consumers to reduce their usage, it also allows more consumers to participate in the market. Consequently, the product’s aggregate use levels may also be higher under PPU, causing larger impacts on the environment.
Can Lower Corporate Income Tax Rates Raise Firm Profitability? (with Pham The Anh, NEU)
Exploiting a firm-level dataset, we study the impact of corporation income tax changes on the profitability of firms in Vietnam in the period 2013-2018. Using GMM regression with panel data, we found that tax incentives indeed have positive impacts on firms' profitability, measured by ROE and ROA. However, the impacts depend on the level of competition (measured by the HHI index at the industry level) and other factors.