Buyer reputation in auctions

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Behavioral & Experimental Economics

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Buyer reputation in auctions

Second-chance offers and buyer reputation systems: Theory and experiments on auctions with default. (with Dirk Engelmann, Jeff Frank, and Marieta Valente) [pdf working paper version][pdf] [replication data] RAND Journal of Economics, 2023, 54(4), 484-511.

Buyer Reputation in Auctions: Evidence from a Lab Experiment with Endogenous Default  (with Dirk Engelmann), working paper coming soon. 

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