The Rwandan Genocide
Above: A United Nations soldier (right) talks to soldiers belonging to the RPF. Photo source: https://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/historical-background.shtml
Who were the RPF?
The Rwandan Patriotic Front, commonly abbreviated as the RPF, were a Tutsi-led rebellion group that helped to end the genocide by fighting against the Hutu militias and Rwandan military forces (Human Rights Watch [HRW] 2022). On numerous occasions, the RPF mobilized to save the lives of targeted Tutsis, attacking assailants all across the country; “The RPF soldiers saved tens of thousands from annihilation and relentlessly pursued those whom they thought guilty of genocide” (HRW 2022).
While the vast majority of those killed by the RPF were Hutus, the RPF advocated a stance of nationalism rather than ethnically-driven violence (HRW 2022). The group promoted the idea that the ethnic groups lived harmoniously in Rwanda until colonial powers proposed that they were qualitatively different from one another, thus providing a foundation for their nationalist ideologies and victim-driven violence (HRW 2022).
Paul Kagame, Rwanda’s current leader of almost 22 years, was one of the leaders of the RPF (HRW 2022; Encyclopedia Britannica 2021). He was one of the main proponents of the idea that the conflict in Rwanda was the result of politically-derived tensions rather than foundational differences between Hutus and Tutsis (HRW 2022). As such, the RPF claims to be, at its core, an ethnically-unbiased group. This is evidenced by the fact that, despite being a majority-Tutsi organization, one of their leaders—Pasteur Bizimungu—was a Hutu, and was later appointed president of Rwanda.
Above: Rwandan genocidaires stand near a home, bearing their weapons. Photo source: https://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/historical-background.shtml
Below: An identity card, introduced by Belgian officials during their rule of Rwanda, that allowed one to be identified as Tutsi, Hutu, or Twa. Photo source: https://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/historical-background.shtml
Rwanda's History
Rwanda is a landlocked country situated in east-central Africa (African Studies Center). It is a country characterized by many hills, swamp areas, and mountain ranges (African Studies Center). Rwanda is inhabited by three main groups of people: the Twa, the Hutus, and the Tutsis, who migrated there in the 14th century (African Studies Center). The Twa are the smallest group, comprising less than 1% of the country’s population; the Tutsis are the next largest group, and the Hutus make up the majority of the population. Hutus are historically known for their agricultural prowess, and the Tutsis are better known for their cattle, which served as a symbol of wealth (Rusesabagina 2007). Eventually, the Tutsis came to be the favored ethnic group among the European colonizing forces, and, as a result, controlled much of the economic, social, and political spheres (African Studies Center).
In 1858, Hanning Speke—a British explorer—became the first European to set foot in Rwanda (British Broadcasting Corporation [BBC] 2018). It was not long until the 1885 Conference of Berlin declared that Rwanda would be controlled by German powers (African Studies Center), which became official in 1890 with the creation of German East Africa (BBC 2018). Following World War I, with Germany’s defeat as part of the Central Powers, the Belgians took control of Rwanda (African Studies Center); this was followed by the League of Nations officiation of Belgium’s indirect governance in 1923 (BBC 2018). This transformed central Africa by combining both Rwanda and Burundi, now branding the countries Ruanda-Urundi, which was governed indirectly by Belgium via Tutsi kings (BBC 2018). In 1948, Belgium became the official ruler over the countries.
Rwanda’s road to independence largely starts here. “In 1952, Belgium implemented the Ten-Year Development Plan, a series of broad socioeconomic reforms in order to promote political progress and social stability; however, this program subsequently granted the Tutsi minority political, economic and social domination over the Hutu majority” (African Studies Center). This development was cause for increasing civil disobedience in Rwanda, largely as a result of the increasing ethnic tensions between the Hutus and the Tutsis. In 1957, the Hutus gathered into political parties in an effort to increase their representation in the political realm (BBC 2018). They issued a “... manifesto calling for a change in Rwanda’s power structure to give them a voice commensurate with their numbers” (BBC 2018). Following years with lack of progress, the king and many of his Tutsi empire were exiled, fleeing to Uganda in 1959 (BBC 2018).
In 1961, Rwanda hit a turning point in becoming a republic, and gained its first Hutu president, Gregoire Kayibanda, just one year later (BBC 2018). This Hutu rise to power created a sense of uneasiness among the Tutsi population, causing many more of them to flee the country (BBC 2018). Ethnic tensions continued to rise, eventually boiling over in 1963 when Tutsi rebels invaded Rwanda; they were pushed back, leaving anywhere from 12 to 20 thousand Tutsis killed (African Studies Center; BBC 2018). Kayibanda was re-elected in 1969, but his presidency was cut short due to a 1973 military coup that drove him out of office (African Studies Center).
This coup was led by Juvenal Habyarimana, who would become Rwanda’s next president in 1978 following the ratification of the constitution (African Studies Center; BBC 2018). Habyarimana was re-elected twice following his initial presidency (African Studies Center). In 1988, the same year of Habyarimana’s second re-election, Rwanda received 50,000 Hutu refugees as a result of ethnic violence in Burundi (BBC 2018). Two years later, in 1990, the mainly-Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded Rwanda, sparking the beginning of the African Civil War (BBC 2018, African Studies Center).
In 1991, a new constitution was signed into effect that legalized opposition parties, thus creating a multi-party government for Rwanda (African Studies Center, BBC 2018). The following year, president Habyarimana made an agreement with some of the newly-formed opposition parties in which Rwanda would operate under a transitional government, “on entering into debate on the issue of the National Conference, on general elections, on the refugee problem, and on opening talks with the RDF [a political opposition group]” (African Studies Center). It was perceived that this agreement would mark the end of the civil war (BBC 2018).
Armed battles continued through 1993 until a cease-fire was agreed upon in March (African Studies Center); while things did seem to calm down on that front, apprehension continued to define the social realm in Rwanda. Eventually, the Hutu population came to disfavor the peace agreement between Rwanda and the RPF, and one of their opposition groups founded a radio station: the Radio/TV Libre des Mille Collines, otherwise known as the RTLM (African Studies Center). This broadcasting network was used to spread hateful messages about the Tutsi population, as Paul Rusesabagina notes in his 2007 memoir, An Ordinary Man: The True Story Behind Hotel Rwanda; these messages started out as sparse and subliminal, but soon became overtly belligerent (Rusesabagina 2007).
As Rusesabagina describes in his memoir, the RTLM started out by playing Congolese music, and soon started to include a handful of segments in which individuals would speak over the radio (Rusesabagina 2007). It was not long after RTLM gained its foothold as a popular station in Rwanda that the hosts began expressing skeptitude toward the then-president, Juvenal Habyarimana, and started to spread a narrative of its own (Rusesabagina 2007). Rusesabagina describes the station as reporting that “... the country was in danger from an internal threat and the only solution was to fight that threat with any means necessary” (Rusesabagina 2007:67).
As time progressed, the RTLM grew less timid and more hostile; Rusesabagina recalls that he began to hear the Tutsi-directed slur, “cockroach,” so often that it lost its shock-value (Rusesabagina 2007). He also recalls hearing sentiments like ‘whatever throat you leave will be the one that cuts yours,’ ‘cut the tall trees’ (referring to the Tutsis, who tend to be taller in stature than Hutus), ‘leave no grave unfilled,’ and ‘do your part’ (Rusesabagina 2007). From these excerpts, it is clear that RTLM pushed an extremely anti-Tutsi narrative that undoubtedly contributed to the ethnically-hostile environment situated in Rwanda at that time.
In April of 1994, president Habyarimana boarded a plane that he would never make it off of. He and other officials, including the president of Burundi, were enroute back to Rwanda when their plane was shot down (BBC 2018); it is believed that it was Hutu extremists—Hutus that unapologetically sought revenge on Tutsis—were responsible for the plane crash. This is the event that marked the beginning of the Rwandan genocide.
The Rwandan Genocide
The president and his companions did not survive the plane crash, and therefore, the government of Rwanda was entirely compromised. The country’s president had been assassinated. While all authorities should have been handed to the prime minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, this was not the case (Rusesabagina 2007). In response to the assassination of the president, the RPF sprung into action, and numerous “organized murders” began to erupt in the country’s capital, Kigali (BBC 2018; African Studies Center). The prime minister herself was directly sought out by rebel forces that night, and was killed near her home by a close-range gunshot wound to the head (Rusesabagina 2007). As time went on, the killing spread beyond Kigali, eventually spanning the majority of the country (African Studies Center). Having lost the majority of its structure, the Rwandan government was unable to effectively fend off the RPF and, as a result, were forced to withdraw, leaving innocent Rwandans with little-to-no protection (African Studies Center).
Paul Rusesabagina recalls the first morning after the president’s assassination, walking out into the street in front of his home:
There was the usual smoky tang of morning mist in the air, the usual dirt street and adobe walls and gray April sky, but it was a scene I could barely recognize. People whom I had known for several years were wearing military uniforms and several were carrying machetes dripping with blood. Quite a few had guns. (Rusesabagina 2007:107)
He also describes an incident that occurred a few days later, in which members of the army came to his house requesting that he take them to the Hotel Diplomates (Rusesabagina 2007). He began to follow them in his own vehicle, family and friends in tow, but was waved to pull over not far from his home; Rusesabagina noticed that, at the spot where they pulled over, dead bodies were amassing on each side of the road (Rusesabagina 2007). People had been slaughtered there, and Rusesabagina was ordered by an army official to kill—immediately—the Tutsis were in his vehicle; however, he used the social skills he had built as a hotel manager to talk himself out of the situation (Rusesabagina 2007).
As the convoy continued down the road toward the Hotel Diplomates, Rusesabagina noticed the red-stained roads, pools of blood that served as signs of the lives lost across the country (Rusesabagina 2007). “Days later,” he describes, “I would see trucks that would normally have been used to haul concrete blocks or other construction material. They would be stacked high with dead bodies: women, men, children, many of them with stumps where their arms and legs had been” (Rusesabagina 2007:120). These bodies were transported away from the sites of their death and relocated to a variety of mass graves (Rusesabagina 2007).
France, a long-time ally of Rwanda, announced in June of 1994 that they would be sending troops to Rwanda in an effort to define a “safe-zone” (African Studies Center). This safe-zone was a part of Operation Turquoise, and allowed for 2,500 troops to be sent into the south-west region of Rwanda, along with a slew of ammunition (Caplan 2004). This French-controlled area provided a safe haven for not only Tutsis, but also Rwandan government officials, soldiers, and various militia members–many of whom were Hutu extremists (Caplan 2004). While Operation Turquoise was meant to be perceived as a positive initiative, France has since received backlash for the role they played in prolonging the safety and security of various Hutu extremists, who are credited with initiating the genocide (Caplan 2004).
Early in July of that same year, the RPF took control of Kigali; by this point, they had occupied all of Rwanda, the only exception being the French-controlled safe-zone (African Studies Center). “On July 17, the RPF announced that one of its leaders, Pasteur Bizimungu, a Hutu, had been chosen to be President of Rwanda,” thus marking the end of the genocide (African Studies Center). Paul Rusesabagina, a survivor and well-known figure from the Rwandan genocide, calls it one of the most efficient genocides in history (Rusesabagina 2007); in just 100 days, opposing forces slaughtered an estimated 800,000 individuals, the majority of them being Tutsis or moderate Hutus (BBC 2018).
The current Rwandan flag, which has flown since the end of 2001 and accompanied the implementation of the new Rwandan national anthem. Photo source: https://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/historical-background.shtml
Rwanda: Post-Genocide
While July 17, 1994 technically marked the end of the genocide, there were still aspects of the genocide that permeated the lives of countless Rwandans. From 1994 to 1996, various refugee camps—located in neighboring country, Zaire (now known as the Democratic Public of Congo [DRC])—were overtaken by the Hutu militias that sparked the genocide (BBC 2018). Meanwhile, in 1995, these militias, along with the government of Zaire (DRC), executed attacks on Zairean Banyamulenge Tutsis, thus continuing the ongoing ethnic violence (BBC 2018). These groups were also attempting to push refugees out of Zaire (DRC) and back into Rwanda (BBC 2018). From these occurrences, it is clear that the newly-appointed leadership in Rwanda did not put an end to the genocidal behaviors that prevailed during this time. Also in 1995, the “UN-appointed international tribunal [began] charging and sentencing a number of people responsible for the Hutu-Tutsi atrocities” (BBC 2018).
Contributing Factors
While it is challenging to say concretely what caused the Rwandan genocide, one can identify some of the contributing factors that ultimately led to, or failed to stop, the genocide. These factors are discussed below.
Inaction of International Community
As evidenced above, Rwandan citizens were left to fend for themselves when the Rwandan government was forced into inaction. Media coverage and inter-governmental communications made the rest of the world aware of what was happening in Rwanda, but it seemed that no one wanted to extend an offer for help. While France did send troops to set up a safe-zone, the country has since been criticized for not doing enough to end the killing (BBC 2019). The United Nations and Belgium both had units in Rwanda throughout the genocide, but neither were authorized to actively stop the murders, and many were told not to fire their weapons for any reason other than self-defense (BBC 2019; Rusesabagina 2007). Furthermore, these groups did not stand their ground for long, as the majority of these individuals retreated following the deaths of 10 Belgian soldiers (BBC 2019).
The United States, on the other hand, has been denounced by many survivors, including Paul Rusesabagina, for their blatant inaction in the face of senseless deaths; “A year after US troops were killed in Somalia, the US was determined not to get involved in another African conflict” (BBC 2019). In fact, a major factor in America’s inaction was their failure to define the massacres in Rwanda as a genocide. As Rusesabagina points out, the declaration of such conflict as a genocide would create an obligation for the international community to intervene (Rusesabagina 2007).
Colonial Rule, Historical Narratives, & Ethnic Tensions
As outlined in the above section, Rwanda’s History, Rwanda has a long and complicated history with colonial rule. While the Hutus overpowered the Tutsis quantitatively, it was the Tutsis that came to occupy the elite class, giving them considerable power compared to their Hutu counterparts (HRW 2006); this was largely due to the racially-biased viewpoints of the two main colonizing powers: Germany and Belgium.
As Paul Rusesabagina asserts in his memoir, “What divided [the Hutus and the Tutsis] was an invented history” (Rusesabagina 2007:21). This history was invented largely by the European powers that colonized Rwanda, and is largely based on symbols of wealth and physical appearances. Rusesabagina describes these shallow differences as follows:
These people—they called themselves Tutsis—measured their wealth in cows, drank milk, ate beef, and seemed to be taller and have slightly more angular noses than their subjects, who fed their families by growing cassavas, sweet potatoes, and other vegetables. Speke theorized that [the Tutsis] were actually a lost tribe of Christians who had migrated from the deserts of the Middle East and were therefore the carriers of a noble line of blood. The Hutu—what Speke called the “curly-head, flab-nosed, pouch-mouthed negro”—was a different story. The name itself means “one who works,” and Speke thought there was a divine purpose behind the differences in lifestyle. (Rusesabagina 2007:22)
Rusesabagina further describes that Speke theorized that the Hutus were the descendants of Ham—Noah’s son—who, in the book of Genesis, was punished by his father for his sins; as a result, all of Ham’s descendants would be cursed forever (Rusesabagina 2007).
As evidenced above, the Tutsi rise to power was not necessarily based on ability or superiority, but rather on the ideologies that the colonizing nations promoted. Essentially, the closer to European standards a group was in appearance, the more favorable they would have been to European colonizers. Regardless of these factors, though, the colonizing nations created a narrative that led the Hutu and the Tutsi to believe that they descended from two different historical origins (Uvin 2001). This long-held mentality contributed directly to the growing tensions between the two ethnic groups. In short, the perceived differences between the Hutus and the Tutsis ultimately resulted in mutual resentment and hostility, therefore perpetuating the ethnic battle for power and opportunity (Uvin 2001).
Desire for Organic Purity
In his 2001 study, Strauss argued that the genocide was organized around a certain ideal: organic purity. He defines this as “a natural, uncontaminated, interconnected whole” (Strauss 2001:48). This article speaks to a sentiment that Rusesabagina also expressed, which is that Rwanda’s history is of the utmost importance to Rwandans. It arguably defines their lives, in countless ways, and drives their work toward the future. As described previously, Rwanda’s history is ridden with ethnic tensions between the two prominent ethnic groups: the Tutsis and the Hutus.
This call to an ideal, pure state of existence, then, encourages the purification of a ‘contaminated’ system, which Strauss asserts was what essentially opened the doors to violence in Rwanda (2001). Strauss lists 3 stages that led to the genocide: the belief in an organic existence prior to the immigration of the Tutsis, the Hutu sense of nationalism that defined the social and economic climate of the 1950s, and the Hutu-focused mindset of Rwandan leaders in the 1990s (2001). All of these things in succession can be seen as contributing to an overall promotion of anti-Tutsi narratives and, thus, a violent attack on Tutsis during the 1994 genocide.
Strauss also lists the ‘5 logical steps’ of the genocide itself: there is this defining idea that all Tutsis are similar, that all Tutsis are invaders that conquered the native Hutus, and that all Tutsis share the same interest: gaining control of Rwanda (2001). The next line of logic that Strauss proposed was that majority rule is a legit form of democracy, and since the Hutus were the majority—and they opposed the Tutsis and the threats that they seemed to carry—that to eliminate the danger brought on by Tutsis, they must be eliminated completely (2001). Thus, the Rwandan genocide of 1994 was sparked.
While Strauss argues some seemingly logical points, it is imperative to acknowledge the danger in each of them. The idea of organic purity is inherently harmful, especially in its unapologetic labeling of an ethnic group as contaminating and undesirable. It is ideologies like these that create interracial/inter-ethnic tensions, and that propagate conflicts that turn into genocides. In considering Strauss's point of view, one must also consider the fact that it is not natural to desire a sort of purebred perfection; our society has long moved away from that line of thinking, and it should arguably be a conscious effort to continue to move away from such damaging narratives.
Poverty & Land Scarcity
One must be very careful when considering poverty and land scarcity as factors in the Rwandan genocide. While these aspects of life have been considered by some as contributing to the probability and ultimate execution of the genocide, they are also dangerous in the sense that they create the narrative that the genocide was a blameless, naturally-occurring phenomenon.
As Peter Uvin (2001) describes in his article, Reading the Rwandan Genocide, “[This theory] basically argues that Rwanda’s scarcity of ecological resources—with the highest population density in Africa for an almost entirely rural country, coupled with one of Africa’s highest population growth rates—constitutes the root cause the genocide” (81). This proposition is situated in the concept of the Malthusian catastrophe, which asserts that overpopulation occurring in tandem with land scarcity inevitably leads to conflict and collective violence (Uvin 2001). Essentially, what this means is that any area that has exceeded its capacity will naturally fall into a state of famine and/or conflict, ultimately restoring a state of equilibrium (Uvin 2001).
There is also a “softer” version of this line of reasoning that asserts that, while land and other resource scarcity certainly contribute to social tensions, there are other factors that play a role in the ultimate outcome of such tensions (Uvin 2001). As further evidence of the unreliable nature of such an argument, Uvin (2001) notes that many of the scholars who cling to this line of reasoning often fail to back up their claims; “... they tend to [argue this point] implicitly, without actually analyzing the matter, as if by default it is too evident to be discussed or too unassailable to be reflected upon” (83).
While it is true that this line of reasoning seems to follow a certain logic, it is also clear how this argument is inherently harmful; the assertion that genocide is natural and, in some ways, occurs for the ‘greater good’ of a population fails to recognize the countless social factors and groups that play a role in it. In the case of the Rwandan genocide, this hypothesis neglects to acknowledge the extremist forces that ultimately orchestrated these murders, the inability of the Rwandan armed forces to effectively fight off the extremist forces, the reluctancy of the international community to intervene in Rwanda, and so much more. As a whole, it is reasonable to acknowledge that Rwanda’s population density may have contributed to overall tensions, and maybe even the efficiency with which the genocide was carried out, but it is integral to realize that these factors are not in themselves responsible for the hundreds of thousands of lives lost.
Above: Skulls of victims lined up within a church that served as a place of refuge during the Rwandan genocide. Photo source: https://www.britannica.com/place/Rwanda/Genocide-and-aftermath
Below: A an suspected of being a genocidaire stands trial before a gacaca court. Photo source: https://www.britannica.com/place/Rwanda/Genocide-and-aftermath
Above: Jeanette Niweyangeneye is pictured with a wound from the genocide, stating, "I kept my wounded arm two weeks, and then it detached itself from my body and I threw it away. I was 11." Photo source: https://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/portrait-of-a-genocide.shtml
Below: Samuel Nduwayo is pictured showing the physical wounds that remain from the genocide, stating, "I still receive intimidation letters and death threats. I know it is my neighbors who send them." Photo source: https://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/portrait-of-a-genocide.shtml
Rwanda After the Genocide
Following the genocide, researchers have been interested in the factors that contributed to individuals participating in the active slaughter. An article by Christopher P. Davey (2020) provides a more sociological viewpoint of the genocide and explores the ways in which Tutsi soldiers viewed the concept of genocide; Davey’s (2020) research found that there is evidence of victim/perpetrator identity overlap and a development of identity fluidity among those who experience genocide in any capacity. He cites Christopher Powell—a fellow researcher—and his relational view of genocide in which “genocide is both destructive and productive, ‘it works to produce relations of identity-difference through a process of annihiliation.’” (Powell 2011:82). It is important to note here, though, that the term "productive" is not used to imply a positive impact; instead, it implies the generation of something (in this case, identity differences). This makes sense when considering the long-held Tutsi/Hutu divisive ideologies described earlier on. The relevance here, though, comes when the author explains that this difference results from a conglomeration of social, economic, and political factors of a given society (Davey 2020). Interviews with Banyamulenge individuals who were recruited to serve as part of the RPF demonstrated that many of them were motivated by their shared identities with the Tutsis, their own experiences with marginalization, and the feelings of insecurity that resulted from such marginalization (Davey 2020).
In addition to the aforementioned factors, the Banyamulenge men also became self-aware through the RPF narratives spread by the abakada—the group of RPF officials that trained incoming soldiers—the expansion of their self-perceptions, and the broadening of their understandings of the political environment; these are the principal factors that motivated them to become actors in the genocide (Davey 2020). Many participants also communicated that, during that time, they felt a sense of responsibility to fight, noting that they felt the need to stop the genocide in its tracks and hopefully prevent it from happening again (Davey 2020). In short, the research shows that there was a sense of identity overlap between perpetrators and victims, which, rather than uniting individuals, drove them to act in a destructive way toward perceived out-group members.
Those who survived the genocide were left to cope with many losses, work through traumas, and learn how to navigate within a transformed community. Healing was a necessity for Rwandans, and it seems that a large part of the healing process for many was characterized by rebuilding a sense of community and looking ahead at the future. Otake and Tamming (2020) found that sociality: the shift from a period of isolation to a stage of reconnection, and temporality: a cognitive shift from focusing on the past to focusing on the future, were common factors among the vast majority of their sample. To elaborate, the authors note that a key factor in Rwandan post-genocidal healing has been the sharing of verbal and non-verbal narratives pertaining to that time, which has helped to restore a foundation of trust, nurturing, and community among genocide survivors (Otake & Tamming 2020).
In the aftermath of the massacres, many Rwandans turned to faith-based and mutual-savings groups as a source of social support, which has also contributed to reestablishing a sense of normalcy in the community (Otake & Tamming 2020). These social networks have helped the Rwandan population to feel unified and validated in their experiences, especially in terms of the mental and emotional impacts that the genocide has had; from their interview-oriented research, the authors were able to identify four main categories of distress among their participants: “ibikomere (wounded feelings), ihungabana (mental disturbances), ihahamuka (trauma), and kurwara mu mutwe (illness of the head)” (Otake & Tamming 2020). All but three participants in this study reported having lost at least one family member during the genocide and further identified this as their main source of distress; moreover, virtually all participants spoke to having risked their own lives, and at least three of the women who participated were forced to endure sexual assault or rape (Otake & Tamming 2020). These common experiences are defining of that period for many, and the social support groups are encouraging their members to leave the past behind and build a brighter future.
Works Cited
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