道德的一种系统性定义

A Systematic Definition of Morality

道德是属于“人人都在说，但很少有人能说清楚它到底是什么”的一个典型案例；大多数人在进行道德判断时，很少会对其进行精准定义，而是按照多年习得的直觉来进行评判。

Morality is a typical case of something that everyone talks about, yet very few can clearly explain what it actually is. When most people make moral judgments, they rarely begin with a precise definition; instead, they rely on intuitions formed over many years. 

本文试图从一个较少涉及到的系统性视角来给道德下一个概括性的定义。其具体描述如下：

This essay attempts to offer a general definition of morality from a relatively underexplored systemic perspective. Its core formulation is as follows: 

道德是在所处价值场域中进行价值摄取的克制性

Morality is restraint in the extraction of value within the value field one inhabits. 

下面对这一定义进行详细阐释。

What follows is a detailed explanation of this definition. 

价值场域

Value Field

任何一个能够稳定存在的社会、圈层，必然会有一套多数人都认可的公共价值系统。这个系统决定了什么是好的、什么是坏的、什么是高级的、什么是低级的，并在很大程度上塑造了个体的世界观与行事驱动力。例如，在当下这个时代，社会整体上推崇金钱、权力、影响力，这便是整个社会的价值场域的轮廓；而具体到更小的圈层，价值场域会在整体场域的基础上延申出更丰富的形态；或者说是，会根据不同的符号体系来承载价值场域。在主流社会的圈层中，即使不同圈层之间拥有不同的符号体系，它们所承载的价值很大程度上也是可通约的。

Any society or social circle that can exist in a stable way must possess a public value system recognized by most of its members. This system determines what is considered good or bad, elevated or lowly, and to a great extent shapes individuals’ worldviews and motivations for action. For example, in the present age, society as a whole tends to prize wealth, power, and influence; this forms the broad outline of the value field of society at large. Within smaller circles, the value field develops richer and more specific forms on the basis of this broader field; in other words, it is carried through different symbolic systems. Among circles within mainstream society, even when they employ different symbolic systems, the values they carry are still, to a large extent, commensurable.

值得注意的是：到目前为止，几乎所有的价值场域都具有高度的零和性。这种零和性很大程度上来源于社会整体的“心智容量”的有限性 -- 毕竟价值场域是人构建的，其总容量也必然受到“全体人类”对应的天花板约束。人可以创造的财富、知识或许是无上限的，但在一个圈层中创造了多少财富、多少知识，却很容易进行明确比较；而这种比较对应到价值场域中，就必然意味着对存量的争夺。这也就直接关联到了接下来对于“价值摄取”的讨论。

It is worth noting that, up to now, nearly all value fields have been highly zero-sum. This zero-sum character stems largely from the limited “cognitive capacity” of society as a whole. Since value fields are human constructs, their total capacity is necessarily constrained by the upper bound corresponding to humanity as a whole. The wealth or knowledge that human beings can create may be without limit in principle, but within a given circle, the amount of wealth or knowledge one has created can be readily compared. Once such comparison is mapped into a value field, it necessarily implies competition over a limited stock of value. This leads directly to the following discussion of “value extraction.”

价值摄取

Value Extraction

任何在价值场域中占据价值份额的行为都可以被称作是价值摄取。因此，价值摄取并不局限于经济上的贪婪。为何捐钱设立慈善基金在当今社会几乎已经不再被看作是一种赢得广泛尊重的行为？抛开阶层仇恨的因素，更大的原因在于：多数人即使无法准确表达出来，也能准确地感受到，慈善在很多时候已经变成通过消耗一部分钱财来摄取更大的价值份额的行为。钱财、头衔、名气，仅仅是价值场域中的标的物，足够聪明的人可以灵活地交换这些标的物来扩大自己的价值占有。

Any behavior that occupies a share of value within a value field can be called value extraction. Value extraction, therefore, is not limited to economic greed. Why is donating money to establish charitable foundations today no longer widely regarded as an act that naturally earns broad respect? Setting aside the factor of class resentment, a larger reason is that most people, even if they cannot articulate it precisely, can still clearly sense that charity has in many cases become a way of spending a portion of one’s wealth in order to extract a greater share of value. Wealth, titles, and fame are merely tokens within the value field; those who are sufficiently clever can flexibly exchange these tokens so as to expand their own possession of value.

克制性

Restraint

在本文的定义中，克制性表达了“即使有能力进行价值摄取，也有意地不去摄取”的行为倾向。这更多是一种主观能动性的表达：如果一个人没有能力去摄取某种价值，那么不进行摄取就并不体现道德。当然，在任何一个圈层都有各自的可摄取价值，因此克制性并非绝对强者的专属，而是可以广泛地应用于各个社会切片。

In the definition proposed in this essay, restraint refers to the behavioral tendency of intentionally refraining from value extraction even when one has the ability to engage in it. This is more fundamentally an expression of subjective agency: if a person lacks the ability to extract value, then refraining from doing so does not in itself constitute morality. Certainly, every social circle contains its own extractable forms of value; therefore, restraint is not the exclusive preserve of the absolutely powerful, but can be broadly applied across all segments of society.

在上述的定义下，我们便能够解释很多看起来似乎并不违反道德，但却很容易令人感到不适的现象。例如：

Under the definition above, we are able to explain many phenomena that may not appear, on the surface, to violate morality, yet still easily provoke discomfort. For example:

汉末察举制的变异：察举制本来是古代的郡县制帝国将举荐人才的权力下放地方的一种平衡性制度，考察的重要侧面包括忠、孝等儒家道德。然而，到了汉末，出现了大量为了被推荐而进行表演的案例。例如，青州人赵宣为了彰显孝心，在父母去世后直接住在陵墓中二十多年。在本文的定义下，这可以很容易被判别为不道德的行为 -- 在汉末，入朝为官是社会上绝对的价值高地，而通过孝心表演换取入仕可能性是毫无疑问的价值摄取。

The degeneration of the late Han recommendation system (chaju): The recommendation system was originally a balancing institution in the commandery-county empires of ancient China, whereby the central state delegated to local authorities the power to recommend talented individuals. Important criteria included Confucian moral qualities such as loyalty and filial piety. By the late Han, however, numerous cases emerged in which people performed virtue in order to be recommended. One example is Zhao Xuan of Qingzhou, who, in order to display filial devotion, lived in his parents’ tomb for more than twenty years after their deaths. Under the definition proposed in this essay, this can easily be judged immoral: in the late Han, entry into officialdom was one of the highest value positions in society, and using a performance of filial piety to increase one’s chances of office was unquestionably a form of value extraction.

政治正确表演：这在当今这个时代的很多国家都是一个非常普遍的现象。借助现代媒体，通过高强度的口号宣传，凸显自身在爱国、环保、同情心等议题上的高姿态，从而换取整个社会中的各种稀缺价值资源（流量，声望，钱财）。这本质上和汉末察举制的变异是同构的。

Performative political correctness: This is an extremely common phenomenon in many countries today. Through modern media and the intensive promotion of slogans, individuals highlight their elevated posture on issues such as patriotism, environmentalism, or compassion, thereby exchanging such displays for various scarce value resources in society, including attention, prestige, and money. In essence, this is structurally analogous to the degeneration of the late Han recommendation system.

超级卷王：在工业文明以来的资本主义逻辑中，职场上的超级卷王在表面上并没有什么道德问题。然而，行业声望本身就是一种稀缺价值资源，而超级卷王实质上就是以无节制的姿态去争抢行业声望这一价值高地。在本文的定义下，无论主流的声音如何对这种行为赋予努力奋斗的高尚意义，这也精准地属于一种不道德。

The hyper-competitive overachiever: Within the capitalist logic that has prevailed since the rise of industrial civilization, the extreme workplace grinder does not, on the surface, appear to pose a moral problem. Yet professional prestige is itself a scarce value resource, and such individuals are in substance competing for that high ground in an unrestrained manner. Under the definition offered in this essay, no matter how mainstream discourse may endow such behavior with the noble meaning of diligence and striving, it still falls quite precisely under the category of the immoral.

借助这一系统性的道德定义，我们可以更深入地探讨如下四个衍生问题。

With the aid of this systematic definition of morality, we can explore the following four derivative questions in greater depth.

道德和能力的关系

The relationship between morality and ability

在很多人的理解中，道德和能力似乎是正交的两个维度。古人评价人物也喜欢从才能和道德两个维度去进行评价。但在本文的定义下，这两个概念并不能被区分开来。

In many people’s understanding, morality and ability seem to be two orthogonal dimensions. Ancient thinkers, too, often evaluated a person along the two axes of talent and virtue. Under the definition proposed in this essay, however, these two concepts cannot be cleanly separated.

一方面，正如前文所述，能够进行价值摄取而不进行摄取才能体现道德，这本身就对能力有了一个基本的要求。

On the one hand, as noted above, morality can be manifested only when one has the ability to engage in value extraction yet refrains from doing so; this in itself already presupposes a basic level of ability.

但更深的一个层次在于，在本文的定义中，一个真正具备道德的人，必然需要能够准确地识别所处环境的价值场域。这本身就是一种门槛很高的能力。具备这种能力的人，往往很容易在所处环境中获得相当部分的价值份额 -- 也就是其能够迅速将自己转换为一个被认为是有能力的人。因此，一个具备高道德标准的人，大概率是一个具备能力（至少是潜力）的人。在这个基础之上，其人还能够审慎地对自己的价值摄取行为进行克制；这意味着一个有道德的人往往比一个有能力的人要更稀缺、更难得。

But at a deeper level, according to this definition, a truly moral person must also be capable of accurately identifying the value field of the environment in which they are situated. This is itself a high-threshold ability. Those who possess it can often acquire a considerable share of value within their environment with relative ease—that is, they can quickly convert themselves into someone generally recognized as capable. Therefore, a person with a high moral standard is very likely also someone with ability, or at least strong potential. On that basis, if such a person is still able to exercise careful restraint over their own acts of value extraction, this means that a moral person is often rarer, and more precious, than a merely capable one.

价值场域的结构对道德的影响

The Influence of the Structure of the Value Field on Morality

根据定义，道德的本质虽然具备整体性，但其具体表现在不同环境中则是局部性的。价值场域的结构决定了其相应的道德表现形式 -- 这便是所谓的“道德的相对性”。

According to this definition, although the essence of morality has an overall unity, its concrete manifestations in different environments are local and context-dependent. The structure of the value field determines the corresponding form that morality takes—this is what may be called the “relativity of morality.”

一个对道德的表现形式其决定性作用的结构参数，就是价值场域的容量。具体而言，通约性越强、标准越单一的价值场域，对应的价值容量越小；而通约性越差、标准越多元的场域对应的容量则越大。在一个容量高度受限的价值场域，道德标准不可避免地就会被拔高到很夸张的境地 -- 例如在公开场合展现自己的某些长处都会被视为一种不道德的行为。而在一个容量较大的价值场域，道德的标准自然而然就会下降。这实际上就涉及到了一个人在一个特定的环境中是否感到“自由”的深层次原因。

A structural parameter that plays a decisive role in shaping moral expression is the capacity of the value field. More specifically, the stronger the commensurability and the more singular the standards within a value field, the smaller its capacity; conversely, the weaker the commensurability and the more plural the standards, the greater its capacity. In a value field whose capacity is highly constrained, moral standards will inevitably be elevated to an extreme degree—for example, even displaying certain personal strengths in public may come to be seen as immoral. By contrast, in a value field with greater capacity, moral standards will naturally become less severe. This, in fact, touches on a deeper reason why a person may or may not feel “free” within a particular environment.

这也带来了一个逻辑的自然延伸：一个注重个人独立性的人，应当尽量避免那些在社会宣传中有很高的道德成分的圈层。这种圈层往往具有容量极低的价值场域。

This also leads to a natural extension of the argument: a person who values individual independence should, as far as possible, avoid circles that are heavily moralized in social discourse. Such circles often possess value fields of extremely low capacity.

神与彼岸世界

God and the Transcendent World

在上述的意义下，我们应当可以对存在于各种宗教中的精神结构给出一种强有力的功能性阐释。为什么很多宗教都强调独立于现实世界的彼岸世界，强调人不可以僭越的神的存在？

In the sense outlined above, we should be able to offer a powerful functional explanation of the spiritual structures found across religions. Why do so many religions emphasize a transcendent world independent of the empirical world, and the existence of a God whom human beings must not presume to overstep?

其原因就在于：开辟一个独立的价值场域，强行拓展价值场域的总容量，从而降低道德约束所需要的强度。

The reason lies in this: they open up an independent value field, forcibly expanding the total capacity of the value field, and thereby reducing the intensity of moral restraint required within the human world.

在神的世界中，一个人只要做“正确的事”就能够获得稳定的价值回报，而其他人是否做同样的事情并不会稀释这种回报。这便是在认识论的角度破坏了现实世界中的高度零和的价值场域的唯一性，人也因此不必无穷无尽地去摄取总量有限的现实价值。世界上主要宗教无一例外地都具备这种超越性的内容，是因为古代的哲人们早就洞察了价值场域的这一底层规律。

In the world of God, a person need only do what is “right” in order to receive a stable return of value, and whether others do the same does not diminish that return. In epistemic terms, this undermines the singularity of the highly zero-sum value field of the empirical world. As a result, human beings no longer need to engage in endless extraction of the finite value available in worldly life. The fact that all major religions in the world, without exception, contain this transcendent dimension suggests that ancient thinkers had already perceived this underlying law of the value field.

大道德：拓展价值场域

Great Morality: Expanding the Value Field

如果说在已有的价值场域中主动克制，不进行过多的价值摄取是道德的本质；那么开拓新的价值场域的行为自然就是一种大道德。同时，这也是一种顶级稀缺的能力。每一个时代真正做到了在整体层面拓展价值场域的人，都可谓是人中龙凤。但即使做不到这一点，能够在自己所处的环境中尽可能去有限地拓展其价值场域的容量，也足以堪称局部性的大道德。甚至，在一个价值容量极为有限的环境中，仅仅是存在一个不被这套系统所裹挟的“异类”，都足以在无形之中拓宽这一场域的价值容量。

If the essence of morality lies in actively exercising restraint within an existing value field and refraining from excessive value extraction, then the act of opening up new value fields naturally constitutes a form of great morality. At the same time, this is also an exceptionally rare and elevated kind of ability. Those in any age who have truly succeeded in expanding the value field at the level of society as a whole may rightly be regarded as extraordinary figures. Yet even if one cannot achieve this on such a grand scale, being able, within one’s own environment, to expand the capacity of its value field as much as possible in a limited way is already enough to count as a local form of great morality. Indeed, in an environment where the capacity for value is extremely constrained, the mere presence of an “outsider” who is not swept along by the system may itself be enough to invisibly broaden the capacity of that field.

这大概就是为什么“隐士”、或者同类的意象，在几乎所有文明中都具有一种难以言说的正面意义的原因吧。

This is perhaps why the figure of the “recluse,” or similar archetypes, has carried an ineffable positive significance in nearly all civilizations.