论蜀汉的战略失误 On the Strategic Missteps of Shu Han

蜀汉的成败长期以来都是历史圈津津乐道的话题。汉末三国无疑是中国历史中话题度最高的分裂乱世，而蜀汉作为这个乱世中实力最弱的一国，却以其无比传奇的奋斗和不达天命的遗憾成为了这个时代当仁不让的主角。后世之人，有些因为其在逆境下的顽强抵抗而对其由衷赞叹，有些则因为其未能成为最终胜利者而对其严厉批评。最著名的恐怕就是毛泽东的那一句："其始误于隆中对，千里之遥而二分兵力。其终则关羽、刘备、诸葛亮三分兵力，安得不败？" 今日本人也斗胆"粪土当年万户侯"，从我个人的角度来分析蜀汉在战略上的未能尽善尽美之处。

The rise and fall of Shu Han has long been a favorite topic in historical communities. The Three Kingdoms period at the end of the Han dynasty is undoubtedly one of the most discussed eras of fragmentation and chaos in Chinese history. Among the three kingdoms, Shu Han was the weakest in terms of power, yet its legendary struggles and unfulfilled destiny made it an undeniable focal point of the era. In later generations, some praised Shu Han for its tenacious resistance in the face of adversity, while others criticized it harshly for failing to emerge as the ultimate victor. Perhaps the most famous critique comes from Mao Zedong, who remarked, "It erred at the start with the Longzhong Plan, dividing its forces across a thousand miles. In the end, Guan Yu, Liu Bei, and Zhuge Liang each split the army, ensuring defeat." Today, I too will dare to challenge the wisdom of the past and offer my personal perspective on Shu Han’s less-than-perfect strategic decisions.

首先定下一个基调，即蜀汉的失败不应归到诸葛亮的隆中对。必须明确的一点是，魏、蜀、吴并非在对等条件下同时起家竞争；在隆中对提出的时间点，曹操已经击败袁绍、基本统一了北方，即将南下横扫荆、扬；孙权也已经在江东稳定立足，是当时数得上号的列强；除了曹操孙权外，当时还有刘表、刘璋、张鲁、马超、韩遂等雄踞一方的诸侯。而刘备当时作为刘表客将，寄居新野，兵众仅数千，驻在抵抗曹操入侵的第一线，身后的刘表对其也暗中防备，几乎就是处在死局。另一方面，按照当时的历史经验，以曹操的实力，外加其借助汉朝丞相号令天下这个巨大的政治优势，遵循光武帝的故事逐步击败各个诸侯几乎是定局。因此，对于三顾茅庐时期的刘备而言，能够撑过第二年就当属于是老天开眼，想要在这种死亡难度下逆风翻盘近乎幻想。而隆中对作为当时刘备所急需的一个初步方略，不仅帮助刘备在赤壁之战中击败曹操、获得了第一块根据地，还以此夺下了益州、汉中，使得刘备在短短几年的时间里崛起为"一世所惮"的强人，可以说是已经超额完成了它的使命，因此对其无需苛责。实际上，对于成就任何大事业而言，决定最终成败的关键因素都是具体的执行过程；执行过程错漏百出，再宏伟的计划都不可能确保结果的实现。从这个意义上而言，把蜀汉最终的失败归结于隆中对并没有太多的价值，因为它仅仅只是一份集团发展的最初方略而已。至于"千里二分兵力"这样的论点则没有太多讨论的必要，历代取天下者岂有不分兵之理？

First, let us establish a foundational premise: Shu Han’s defeat should not be attributed to Zhuge Liang’s Longzhong Plan. One critical point to clarify is that Wei, Shu, and Wu did not start on equal footing in their struggle for dominance. At the time the Longzhong Plan was proposed, Cao Cao had already defeated Yuan Shao, nearly unified the north, and was preparing to sweep south into Jing and Yang provinces. Sun Quan, meanwhile, had firmly established his power in Jiangdong, making him a major contender of the era. In addition to these two, other warlords such as Liu Biao, Liu Zhang, Zhang Lu, Ma Chao, and Han Sui each controlled significant territories. In contrast, Liu Bei was serving as a guest general under Liu Biao, stationed in Xinye with just a few thousand troops on the front lines of defense against Cao Cao’s invasion. Behind him, Liu Biao harbored mistrust and guarded against him. Liu Bei’s situation was practically a deadlock. Furthermore, based on historical patterns at the time, it seemed almost inevitable that Cao Cao, with his formidable strength and the immense political advantage of wielding the authority of the Han court as Chancellor, would follow the example of Emperor Guangwu and systematically defeat the various warlords. For Liu Bei during the Three Visits to the Thatched Cottage, surviving even one more year would have been a near-miracle. The idea of overturning such dire odds seemed almost fantastical. In this context, the Longzhong Plan was a preliminary strategy that Liu Bei desperately needed. Not only did it enable Liu Bei to defeat Cao Cao at the Battle of Red Cliffs and secure his first base of operations, but it also laid the foundation for his capture of Yizhou and Hanzhong. Within just a few years, Liu Bei had risen to become a formidable figure feared by the entire era. Thus, the Longzhong Plan more than fulfilled its purpose and should not be subjected to undue criticism. In fact, for any great endeavor, the key determinant of success or failure lies in the specifics of execution. Even the most grandiose plan cannot guarantee results if the execution process is riddled with errors. From this perspective, attributing Shu Han’s ultimate failure to the Longzhong Plan is of limited value, as it was merely an initial strategy for the group’s development. As for criticisms like "dividing forces across a thousand miles," such arguments are hardly worth discussing. Throughout history, no ruler has unified the realm without dividing their forces.

既然分析的对象不在隆中对，那么自然就应该把精力集中到刘备集团在隆中对之后的一些战略执行上的问题。毛泽东曾经有过另一句名言："抗日战争急不得，解放战争拖不得。"对这句话的解读，应该上升到政治的高度。在我看来，这句话实际上说的是一个道理：维持既有局面的一方应当遵从持久战略，推翻既有局面的一方则应该追求速战速决。维持既有局面往往是在顺应人心；局面能够维持越久，人们就越倾向于将该局面看作是"自然而然"的事情，从而维持它所需要的成本往往会降低。反过来说，推翻局面则是在挑战人的认知；能够越顺利地挑战人的认知，人们就越倾向于意识到"天下有变"的节点来临，从而在火上在舔一把油。这也是为什么古今战争中常常呈现出"兵败如山倒"的态势，因为事情的进展一旦突破一个节点，很容易会造成倾泻式的突变。回到隆中对时期的天下局面，正如刚才所分析的那样，曹操依托汉室的声望逐步统一天下实际上已经形成了广泛共识，这就是当时的"既有局面"；而刘备集团想要逆风翻盘，则是在打破天下的共识。因而，刘备集团的抵抗作战，属于毛泽东所说的"拖不得"的范畴，应当有意识地追求雷霆之势，让天下人意识到"刘氏天下的回归不可阻挡"，从而一举完成反超。

Since the focus of analysis is not the Longzhong Plan, attention should naturally shift to the strategic execution issues within Liu Bei's faction following its implementation. Mao Zedong once made another famous remark: "The War of Resistance Against Japan cannot be rushed, while the War of Liberation cannot be delayed." This statement, when interpreted from a political perspective, reveals an important principle: the side seeking to maintain the status quo should adopt a prolonged strategy, while the side seeking to overthrow the status quo must aim for swift and decisive action. Maintaining the status quo often aligns with public sentiment. The longer a situation is sustained, the more people tend to view it as "natural," reducing the cost of upholding it over time. Conversely, overturning the status quo challenges people’s perceptions. The more effectively one disrupts these perceptions, the more people begin to sense that a "turning point" has arrived, further fueling momentum for change. This explains why wars throughout history often display a "defeat snowballing" effect: once a critical point is breached, events can cascade into sudden, overwhelming shifts. Returning to the situation during the Longzhong Plan, as previously analyzed, there was already widespread consensus that Cao Cao, leveraging the prestige of the Han court, was steadily unifying the realm. This constituted the "status quo" of the time. For Liu Bei's faction to overturn this and achieve an unexpected reversal, it had to challenge this consensus about the state of the world. Therefore, Liu Bei's resistance effort falls into the category of what Mao Zedong referred to as "cannot be delayed." It required a deliberate pursuit of decisive, thunderous actions to make it clear to all under heaven that "the restoration of the Liu lineage is unstoppable," thereby completing a dramatic turnaround in one bold stroke.

事实上，上述的分析在随后的历史发展中也得到了一定的印证。隆中对提出的十年后，刘备在汉中之战正面击败曹操，从曹操手中夺下了汉中；随后不久，关羽在荆州接连击败曹仁、生擒于禁，消灭曹操数万主力军队，受到关羽远程支配的中原群盗已经威胁到许昌城外数十里的地方，史书称之为"威震华夏"。在这样的局面下，虽然曹操一方在绝对实力上还占据优势，但曹操本人已经开始考虑向北迁都到邺城以避开关羽锋芒；这大概就是因为刘备集团的接连胜利已经接近"打破既有认知"的节点，曹操有全面崩盘的危险。可惜此时孙权突然袭击关羽，使得刘备集团的攻击高潮戛然而止。

In fact, the above analysis finds some validation in subsequent historical developments. Ten years after the Longzhong Plan was proposed, Liu Bei achieved a direct victory against Cao Cao in the Battle of Hanzhong, capturing Hanzhong from him. Shortly thereafter, Guan Yu scored a series of victories in Jingzhou, defeating Cao Ren, capturing Yu Jin alive, and destroying tens of thousands of Cao Cao's main forces. Meanwhile, bandit forces in the Central Plains, under Guan Yu's indirect influence, advanced to within dozens of miles of Xuchang, leading to the historical account of Guan Yu "shaking the entirety of China." In this situation, although Cao Cao’s faction still maintained an absolute advantage in strength, Cao Cao himself began considering relocating his capital north to Ye City to avoid the threat posed by Guan Yu. This likely reflects how the successive victories of Liu Bei’s faction had brought them close to breaking the established consensus, placing Cao Cao at risk of a total collapse. Unfortunately, at this critical juncture, Sun Quan launched a sudden attack on Guan Yu, abruptly halting the Liu Bei faction’s momentum at the height of its offensive.

上面的史实也说明，即使是在现实历史时间线中，刘备集团也曾一度有过逆风翻盘的曙光。这就表明按照隆中对的设想实现平定天下的目标是完全有可能的。至于最后为何没能实现，自然就要归因于刘备集团的具体战略执行上犯了一些重大错误。结合上述"翻盘曹操拖不得"这个核心思想，这些错误应该是那些导致刘备集团发展节奏受限、没能用最快速度实现应当实现的战略目标的行为。纵观刘备集团的发展历程，我们大体上可以总结出在战略上最为失策的三个选择。

The historical facts mentioned above demonstrate that, even within the actual timeline of history, Liu Bei’s faction once glimpsed the possibility of overturning unfavorable odds. This indicates that achieving the goal of unifying the realm, as envisioned in the Longzhong Plan, was entirely feasible. As for why this goal was ultimately not realized, the blame naturally falls on significant errors in the strategic execution by Liu Bei’s faction. Considering the core principle of "no delays in overturning Cao Cao’s dominance," these errors were likely actions that constrained the pace of Liu Bei’s development and prevented the rapid achievement of critical strategic objectives. Reviewing the trajectory of Liu Bei’s faction, we can broadly identify three key strategic missteps that represent their most significant errors in judgment.

1、赤壁战前、曹操南下时，未能及时拿下荆州抵抗曹操。这一事件在《三国志》有记载："过襄阳，诸葛亮说先主攻琮，荆州可有。先主曰：'吾不忍也。'"史书同时还记载了："乃驻马呼琮，琮惧不能起。琮左右及荆州人多归先主。"需要注意的是，当时曹操南下荆州，刘表刚去世，其子刘琮以及大量的亲信人物打算归降曹操，曹操又因为屠戮过重名声欠佳，刘备此时以抗曹的名义攻击刘琮夺取荆州，不仅在道义上无可厚非，并且极有可能得到荆州人士的广泛支持，连诸葛亮都认可这个建议。可惜刘备因为"不忍"而没能遵循诸葛亮的建议，带着十余万跟着他逃跑的民众在当阳被曹操追上，最终只带着几十人逃走，荆州几乎没有什么抵抗就被曹操占领，可以说是得到了最坏的结果。如果刘备能够顺势占据荆州，并借助荆州的军事力量与城防抵御曹操，同时去争取孙权的支持，那么曹操有可能在荆州就得铩羽而归，连赤壁之战都打不起来。刘备没能及时占领荆州还导致了后续的两个重大战略缺陷：a) 重镇襄阳永久性落入曹操之手，孙刘联盟无法全据荆州；b）赤壁之战后，周瑜率军从曹仁手里攻下南郡，后面鲁肃又主导把南郡借给刘备，从而导致了孙权和刘备之间因为荆州归属问题而起的深刻矛盾，最终奠定了关羽败亡的结局。

1. Failure to Secure Jingzhou to Resist Cao Cao Before the Battle of Red Cliffs:

When Cao Cao marched south toward Jingzhou and Liu Biao had just passed away, Liu Bei failed to seize Jingzhou to mount a defense against Cao Cao. This incident is recorded in Records of the Three Kingdoms: “Passing Xiangyang, Zhuge Liang advised Liu Bei to attack Liu Cong and secure Jingzhou. Liu Bei replied, ‘I cannot bring myself to do it.’” The historical text also notes: “Stopping his horse, he called out to Liu Cong, who was so terrified he could not respond. Many of Liu Cong’s followers and the people of Jingzhou turned to Liu Bei.” It is worth noting that at the time, Cao Cao’s southern advance into Jingzhou coincided with Liu Biao’s death, leaving his son Liu Cong and many of his confidants intent on surrendering to Cao Cao. Furthermore, Cao Cao’s reputation had been tarnished by excessive slaughter. Liu Bei, under the banner of resisting Cao Cao, could have justifiably attacked Liu Cong and taken control of Jingzhou. Such an action was not only morally defensible but also highly likely to garner widespread support from the people of Jingzhou, as even Zhuge Liang endorsed this strategy. Unfortunately, Liu Bei’s hesitation, driven by his sense of “compassion,” led him to disregard Zhuge Liang’s advice. Instead, he fled with over 100,000 civilians following him, only to be caught by Cao Cao at Changban, escaping with only a few dozen companions. This failure resulted in Jingzhou falling to Cao Cao with virtually no resistance, producing the worst possible outcome. Had Liu Bei seized Jingzhou, he could have utilized its military forces and fortifications to resist Cao Cao while seeking support from Sun Quan. Under such circumstances, it is possible that Cao Cao’s campaign would have failed at Jingzhou, preventing the Battle of Red Cliffs from even taking place. Liu Bei’s failure to secure Jingzhou in a timely manner also led to two significant strategic shortcomings: a) The permanent loss of Xiangyang to Cao Cao: This critical stronghold allowed Cao Cao to control northern Jingzhou, ensuring that the Sun-Liu alliance could never fully dominate the region. b) The deepening conflict over Jingzhou’s ownership between Sun Quan and Liu Bei: After the Battle of Red Cliffs, Zhou Yu led an army to take Nan Jun from Cao Ren. Later, Lu Su arranged for Nan Jun to be temporarily lent to Liu Bei. This decision sparked a long-standing dispute between Sun Quan and Liu Bei over Jingzhou, which ultimately contributed to Guan Yu’s downfall.

2、攻占益州时比较拖沓，两年才攻陷成都。这一点跟上一点近乎有异曲同工之妙。刘备本来以刘璋盟友的身份入川帮助刘璋抵抗张鲁，庞统建议刘备直接翻脸扣押刘璋，后又建议刘备兵贵神速取下成都，刘备都没有听从。然而，最后刘备仍旧采取了突然翻脸的姿态攻击刘璋，但此时已经面临重重防备，刘备又召荆州的诸葛亮、张飞、赵云两路夹攻，花了两年时间才成功。可是，刘备在益州拖沓了那么久，依然没能摆脱"背盟"的污点，还浪费了不少时间，甚至间接导致了庞统中箭身亡。若能听取庞统的建议，虽然也摆脱不了背盟的政治污点，但至少能够早一到两年占据益州，为随后进攻汉中的行动争取更大的战略主动权。

2. Prolonged Campaign to Capture Yizhou, Taking Two Years to Seize Chengdu:

This issue closely mirrors the first. Initially, Liu Bei entered Yizhou as an ally of Liu Zhang, ostensibly to help him defend against Zhang Lu. Pang Tong advised Liu Bei to immediately turn against Liu Zhang and detain him, and later proposed a swift assault to capture Chengdu. However, Liu Bei ignored both suggestions. In the end, Liu Bei did resort to suddenly breaking ties and attacking Liu Zhang, but by that time, Liu Zhang’s defenses were well-prepared. Liu Bei then summoned Zhuge Liang, Zhang Fei, and Zhao Yun from Jingzhou to launch a two-pronged attack, ultimately taking two years to secure victory. This delay in Yizhou not only failed to avoid the political stigma of "betraying an ally" but also wasted precious time and indirectly led to Pang Tong’s death from an arrow wound. Had Liu Bei followed Pang Tong’s advice, he might still have faced criticism for breaking the alliance, but he could have captured Yizhou one or two years earlier. This would have provided more time and a greater strategic advantage for subsequent campaigns, such as the assault on Hanzhong.

3、汉中之战前，因为荆州三郡的事和东吴作无谓的对抗，最后不仅没能保住三郡，还坐失了进攻汉中的最佳战略时机。这件事情蜀汉重臣廖立曾经作过评论："昔先帝不取汉中，走与吴人争南三郡，卒以三郡与吴人，徒劳役吏士，无益而还。旣亡汉中，使夏侯渊、张合深入于巴，几丧一州。"南三郡的问题实际上也是上述第一条的后遗症。但无论如何，刘备攻下益州后，不立马向北和曹操抢夺汉中归属权，而是去和孙权争夺荆州三郡，将汉中拱手让与曹操，不得不说是一个重大的战略失策。虽然数年后刘备发动整个益州的力量在汉中击败了曹操，重新夺得汉中，但是曹操占据汉中这段时间已经大量将其民众迁徙到关中，刘备"得其地而不得其民"，使得攻取汉中的战略价值相较之前显著下降，同时也更多消耗了益州的实力。假使刘备能够抢在曹操之前攻下张鲁，或者在曹操降服张鲁后不久就进攻汉中，那么可以设想后来关羽进攻襄阳的时候，刘备集团甚至可以趁虚而入直接夺取关中，在刘备死前就形成蜀汉重新占据长安的战略格局；此后就算关羽依然败亡，诸葛亮以关中为基地向东进攻曹魏，那将会是比史实有利得多的态势，复刻刘邦进攻项羽、苻坚进攻前燕的形势。

3. Pointless Confrontation with Eastern Wu Over the Three Commanderies of Jingzhou Before the Battle of Hanzhong:

Before the Battle of Hanzhong, Liu Bei wasted precious time and resources in an unnecessary confrontation with Eastern Wu over the three commanderies of Jingzhou. This not only failed to retain the territories but also cost him the best strategic opportunity to attack Hanzhong. Shu Han minister Liao Li once commented on this misstep:

"In the past, the late emperor did not secure Hanzhong but instead contended with Wu over the three commanderies of Jingzhou. In the end, the three commanderies were ceded to Wu, labor and resources were expended in vain, and he returned empty-handed. Losing Hanzhong allowed Xiahou Yuan and Zhang He to penetrate deep into Ba Commandery, nearly costing us an entire province."

The issue of the three commanderies in the south was essentially a lingering consequence of Liu Bei’s earlier failure to secure Jingzhou (as noted in the first point). However, after capturing Yizhou, Liu Bei’s decision to compete with Sun Quan over the three commanderies instead of immediately advancing north to seize Hanzhong from Cao Cao was a significant strategic blunder. Although Liu Bei eventually rallied the full strength of Yizhou and defeated Cao Cao in the Battle of Hanzhong, reclaiming the territory, the delay allowed Cao Cao to resettle much of Hanzhong’s population in Guanzhong. As a result, Liu Bei gained control of the land but not its people, diminishing the strategic value of Hanzhong and further depleting Yizhou’s resources. Had Liu Bei acted sooner—either by attacking Zhang Lu in Hanzhong before Cao Cao or by launching a campaign shortly after Cao Cao subdued Zhang Lu—he might have achieved a much more advantageous position. For instance, during Guan Yu’s later offensive against Xiangyang, Liu Bei’s forces could have exploited the opportunity to advance into Guanzhong, potentially seizing control of Chang’an before his death. This would have established a strategic foothold for Shu Han in Guanzhong, similar to how Liu Bang advanced against Xiang Yu or how Fu Jian attacked Former Yan. Even if Guan Yu’s downfall remained inevitable, Zhuge Liang could have launched campaigns against Cao Wei from a stronger position in Guanzhong, creating a far more favorable situation for Shu Han compared to historical reality.

总而言之，以上三点都是刘备集团在发展壮大过程中没能抓住一些有利的时机、将精力消耗在了一些无谓的举措上，从而延缓了刘备反攻曹操的节奏的战略失策。正如上面所说，刘备对曹操的反攻是属于"拖不得"的战争，反扑的节奏能够加快一分，对于反攻成功率可能就会有不止一分的增加。即使是在现实时间线中，刘备集团在汉中、襄阳两线击败曹操军队，都已经造成了很大的政治影响，吓得曹操一度想要迁都，那么如果这个节奏能够再加快个一两年呢？谁又能保证隆中对的最终目标不能完全实现呢？至于史实关羽败亡后，刘备东征失败导致蜀军覆败，诸葛亮在街亭错用马谡导致功败垂成，这些或许都不那么影响刘备集团成功翻盘的成功率了。诸葛亮时代，曹魏占据北方已经基本成为了既定事实，"汉"的政治影响力已经消退，蜀汉的实力又远弱于曹魏，再加上从汉中翻越秦岭道途艰险，诸葛亮的北伐虽然一度打得魏军闭门不出，但终究是很难再复刻刘备时代那种即将绝地翻盘的惊涛骇浪了。正所谓"运去英雄不自由"，刘备集团的最佳机会也许就浪费在了上述的几个关键战略错误之中。

In summary, the three points discussed above highlight how Liu Bei’s faction missed several advantageous opportunities and expended efforts on unnecessary actions, ultimately delaying the pace of their counteroffensive against Cao Cao. As previously mentioned, Liu Bei’s counteroffensive against Cao Cao was a "war that could not afford delays." Accelerating the pace of the campaign, even by a small margin, could have significantly increased the likelihood of success. Even within the historical timeline, Liu Bei’s victories over Cao Cao’s forces in Hanzhong and Xiangyang created considerable political shockwaves, to the extent that Cao Cao contemplated relocating his capital. What if this momentum had been advanced by one or two years? Who could definitively claim that the ultimate goals of the Longzhong Plan could not have been fully realized? As for later events, such as Guan Yu’s defeat and death, Liu Bei’s failed eastern campaign leading to the collapse of Shu’s forces, or Zhuge Liang’s failure at Jieting due to misjudging Ma Su, these factors likely had less impact on the overall chances of Shu Han’s success. By Zhuge Liang’s era, Cao Wei’s dominance over the north was largely an established reality. The political influence of the "Han" name had diminished, Shu Han’s strength was far weaker than Cao Wei’s, and the treacherous Qinling Mountains posed significant logistical challenges. Although Zhuge Liang’s northern campaigns briefly forced the Wei army into a defensive posture, replicating the dramatic near-reversals of Liu Bei’s era was no longer feasible. As the saying goes, "When fortune fades, even heroes are constrained." The best opportunities for Liu Bei’s faction may have been squandered due to the critical strategic errors discussed above.

当然，后人论史无非是站着说话不腰疼，当事人的选择很多时候也容不得后人去做太多的假设。刘备拒绝及时夺取荆州、没能果断夺取益州，虽然可能降低了蜀汉翻盘的成功率，却也是刘备这个人物在历史中的独特魅力所在。刘备如若真的能够绝地翻盘再造大汉，那么现代的人谈起那段历史，可能都不会那么津津乐道于刘备的宽厚待人与英雄之器、诸葛亮的才智超群与卓绝努力、关羽的义薄云天与悲惨结局，这段历史可能会如同光武帝开国那段历史一样变得乏人问津。但无论怎样，现代的人坐在空调房里酣畅淋漓地写出雄文一篇，谈古论今，代入古人分析成败，不失为趣事一件。

Of course, analyzing history in hindsight is always easier than making decisions in the moment, and those involved often had little room for the kind of hypothetical choices we can now freely discuss. Liu Bei’s refusal to seize Jingzhou in time or his lack of decisiveness in taking Yizhou may have reduced the chances of Shu Han’s success, but these decisions are also part of what makes Liu Bei such a uniquely compelling figure in history. If Liu Bei had truly managed to overturn the odds and restore the Han dynasty, modern discussions of that era might not focus so passionately on Liu Bei’s kindness and heroism, Zhuge Liang’s unmatched intellect and tireless efforts, or Guan Yu’s unwavering loyalty and tragic end. Instead, that period of history might become as unremarkable and seldom-discussed as Emperor Guangwu’s founding of the Eastern Han. Regardless, for those of us in the present, sitting comfortably in air-conditioned rooms and crafting eloquent essays on past events, analyzing historical successes and failures with the benefit of hindsight is an enjoyable exercise—a fascinating way to connect the past with the present.