诸葛亮北伐期间蜀、魏的战略演变

The Strategic Evolution of Shu and Wei during Zhuge Liang's Northern Expeditions

网络上讨论诸葛亮北伐这段历史时，往往陷入粉圈骂战，蜀汉一方的支持者极力赞颂诸葛亮北伐如何以弱攻强、压制了曹魏的众将，而曹魏一方的支持者（或者更广义的“蜀黑”）则会极力突出诸葛亮如何空耗国力、曹魏一方如何轻松化解了蜀汉的进攻。这样的讨论看太多之后不免会觉得有些无趣。诸葛亮北伐从228年到234年一共覆盖七年时间，期间涉及到诸葛亮的五次主动进攻、以及曹魏方面的一次大规模反攻。在这么长的时间内进行如此频繁的交手，蜀汉和曹魏双方的指挥团队显然都不是只会墨守成规的机器，而是会根据局势的变化不断调整战略。这种动态战略调整的相关讨论在网络上相对比较少见，因此本文试图借助有限的史料来给出一种可能的阐释。

When discussions about Zhuge Liang’s Northern Expeditions appear online, they often devolve into fan-based quarrels. Supporters of Shu Han vigorously praise how Zhuge Liang, though weaker, managed to strike the stronger Wei and suppress its generals; meanwhile, supporters of Cao Wei (or, more broadly, “Shu-haters”) emphasize how Zhuge Liang merely exhausted Shu’s resources while Cao Wei easily neutralized his offensives. Reading too many of these arguments inevitably becomes tedious.

Zhuge Liang’s Northern Expeditions spanned seven years, from 228 to 234, involving five major offensives initiated by Zhuge Liang and one large-scale counteroffensive launched by Cao Wei. In such a long period with so many clashes, it is obvious that neither Shu Han nor Cao Wei’s command teams were mechanical actors bound to routine—they constantly adjusted their strategies in response to changing circumstances. Yet such discussions of dynamic strategic adjustment are relatively rare online. This article, therefore, attempts to offer one possible interpretation based on the limited historical sources available.

一、蜀汉方的战略演变

I. The Strategic Evolution of Shu Han

227年，诸葛亮上《出师表》，进驻汉中，开始大规模练兵。此时距离几乎葬送蜀汉主力的夷陵大败仅仅五年，这五年中虽然诸葛亮通过稳定政局、发展国力、平定南中、重建军队，将蜀汉从崩溃边缘拉了回来，但相比于庞大的曹魏，蜀汉的力量依然是极为微弱的。更重要的是，诸葛亮重建的这支军队缺乏实战经验，很可能不是曹魏精锐集团军的对手；而汉中进攻关中、陇右则需要翻越巍峨的秦岭，后勤问题是北伐绕不过去的重大难题。在力量悬殊、战力不足、后勤困难的三大棘手难题面前，似乎可行的战略选择就只剩下了一个：奇袭。如果能够趁曹魏不备，以迅雷不及掩耳之势攻下曹魏西方重要的战略要地，那么蜀汉就不需要担心后勤困难的问题，并且此时攻守之势也就发生了变化，蜀汉可以占据地利等待曹魏的救兵。

In 227, Zhuge Liang submitted the Memorial on the First Northern Expedition and stationed himself in Hanzhong, beginning large-scale military training. At that time, only five years had passed since the disastrous defeat at Yiling, which had nearly destroyed Shu Han’s main forces. During those five years, Zhuge Liang had stabilized the political situation, developed the state’s resources, neutralized the southern rebellions, and rebuilt the army, pulling Shu Han back from the brink of collapse. Even so, compared to the vast power of Cao Wei, Shu Han remained exceedingly weak. More importantly, the newly rebuilt army lacked combat experience and was unlikely to match Wei’s elite corps in battle. Moreover, launching a campaign from Hanzhong into Guanzhong or Longyou required crossing the towering Qinling Mountains, making logistics an unavoidable and serious obstacle to any northern expedition.

Faced with these three pressing difficulties—disparity in strength, insufficient combat effectiveness, and logistical challenges—it seemed there was only one viable strategic choice: a surprise strike. If Shu could seize a key strategic location in the western territories of Wei with lightning speed, before Wei could react, then the logistical issue would no longer be a concern. At that point, the balance of offense and defense would shift, with Shu holding the advantageous ground while awaiting Wei’s reinforcements.

毫无疑问，这就是诸葛亮第一次北伐的整体思路。诸葛亮命令赵云、邓芝率军出斜谷进攻关中，吸引了曹魏大将军曹真的注意力；而诸葛亮则亲自率领蜀汉主力突袭布防更薄弱的陇右。应该说，这一战略构想取得了巨大的成功；在诸葛亮的兵威之下，陇右的南安、天水、安定三郡投降诸葛亮，只有部分关键据点（如祁山）还在坚守。诸葛亮也得以将部队分散，一方面攻击各个据点，另一方面则去往关键要点阻击曹魏可能的援军。可惜的是，诸葛亮似乎被这大好开局给弄得有些飘飘然，竟然将关键的阻援任务交给了缺乏指挥经验的马谡；而马谡更是违背诸葛亮的安排，导致前军在街亭被宿将张郃率领的五万大军击败。

Undoubtedly, this was the overall plan behind Zhuge Liang’s first Northern Expedition. He ordered Zhao Yun and Deng Zhi to lead forces out of the Xie Valley to attack Guanzhong, thereby drawing the attention of Cao Wei’s Grand General, Cao Zhen. Meanwhile, Zhuge Liang personally led the main army of Shu Han to strike at Longyou, where the defenses were weaker. This strategic design must be considered a great success: under Zhuge Liang’s military pressure, the three commanderies of Nan’an, Tianshui, and Anding surrendered to him, with only a few key strongholds (such as Qishan) still holding out.

Taking advantage of this momentum, Zhuge Liang split his forces—some to besiege the remaining strongpoints, others to intercept potential Wei reinforcements at crucial locations. Unfortunately, it seems that Zhuge Liang was carried away by this promising start and entrusted the vital task of blocking enemy reinforcements to Ma Su, who lacked command experience. Ma Su, moreover, disobeyed Zhuge Liang’s orders, leading to the vanguard being crushed at Jieting by veteran general Zhang He with a force of fifty thousand.

需要注意的是，这一次北伐不仅仅是马谡在街亭被击败；高翔在列柳城、赵云在箕谷，也分别被郭淮、曹真击败。面对四处溃烂的局面，诸葛亮不得不全线撤退，使得精心策划的声东击西大手笔功败垂成，最终只迁走了西县的千余户人家。

It is worth noting that this Northern Expedition was not only undone by Ma Su’s defeat at Jieting. Gao Xiang at Lieliu City and Zhao Yun at Jigu were also beaten back by Guo Huai and Cao Zhen, respectively. Faced with collapses on multiple fronts, Zhuge Liang was forced to order a general retreat. Thus, the carefully designed “feint east, strike west” grand maneuver fell apart, and in the end, he managed only to relocate a mere thousand or so households from Xixian.

第一次北伐的失败对诸葛亮而言无疑是一次重大打击。一方面，三郡投降的大好局面在不到一个月时间中就葬送掉了；另一方面，这一次北伐恐怕也让诸葛亮发现，曹魏帝国的实力甚至比他想象的更强大。诸葛亮进军陇右后，曹魏中军主力在张郃的带领下竟然只用了20多天就赶到了战场。相比于当年刘邦入关中围困章邯近一年，项羽都没有发一兵一卒救援，曹魏的反应速度和动员能力简直是不可同日而语。这也就意味着：除非极其走运，否则奇袭这一条路恐怕也差不多被堵死了。

The failure of the first Northern Expedition was undoubtedly a major blow to Zhuge Liang. On the one hand, the favorable situation in which three commanderies had surrendered was completely lost in less than a month; on the other hand, this campaign likely made Zhuge Liang realize that the power of the Cao Wei empire was even greater than he had imagined. After he advanced into Longyou, Wei’s central main force under Zhang He managed to arrive on the battlefield in just over twenty days. Compared to the days when Liu Bang entered Guanzhong and besieged Zhang Han for nearly a year without Xiang Yu sending a single soldier to the rescue, Wei’s speed of response and mobilization capacity was simply incomparable. This meant that unless he was extremely lucky, the option of surprise attacks was essentially blocked.

相比于第一次北伐，接下来的第二次北伐和第三次北伐都是目标有限的小规模行动。228年底的第二次北伐，诸葛亮趁曹魏主力正在和东吴纠缠的空隙（同时也是为了减轻东吴的军事压力），走散关道进攻陈仓，遭遇了郝昭的顽强防守。不过这一次进攻只持续了二十多天就退军了，诸葛亮本来也只带了一个月左右的粮草，可见诸葛亮大概并没期望这次北伐能够有太多实质性成果。撤军途中击败了曹魏追军并斩杀将领王双算是意外收获。紧接着来年春天，诸葛亮就命令陈式进攻武都、阴平二郡，自己则亲率主力出建威逼走了曹魏将领郭淮的援军，最终成功收复二郡。可见，这两次紧凑的军事行动同样也是试图趁曹魏不备发动奇袭，但动作都有限，最后也有实实在在的成果进账。我个人猜测，诸葛亮在第一次北伐战败后不到一年就接连发动这两次军事行动，可能有通过有限而可控的战功来恢复第一次北伐失败损耗的士气、信心的考虑。

Compared to the first Northern Expedition, the subsequent second and third expeditions were smaller-scale operations with limited objectives. At the end of 228, during the second expedition, Zhuge Liang seized on the opportunity while Wei’s main forces were entangled with Eastern Wu (and also to relieve military pressure on Wu), and advanced through the San Pass to attack Chencang, where he encountered the stubborn defense of Hao Zhao. This campaign lasted only about twenty days before Zhuge Liang withdrew, as he had brought only about a month’s worth of provisions. Clearly, he did not expect this expedition to achieve major results. On the way back, however, he defeated the pursuing Wei forces and killed the general Wang Shuang—an unexpected gain.

Immediately the following spring, Zhuge Liang ordered Chen Shi to attack Wudu and Yinping commanderies, while he himself led the main force out of Jianwei to drive off the Wei commander Guo Huai’s reinforcements, ultimately succeeding in recovering the two commanderies. These two tightly connected operations were also attempts to launch limited surprise attacks while Wei was unprepared, but their scope was small, and in the end they did produce concrete results. My personal guess is that Zhuge Liang launched these two campaigns less than a year after the defeat of the first expedition in order to use modest and controllable victories to restore the morale and confidence that had been lost.

第三次北伐算是一个战略的转折点。三次北伐之后一年（230年），曹真发动了一次大规模伐蜀，但由于连日大雨被迫班师，诸葛亮还让魏延、吴壹入羌中击破了魏国西线由费曜、郭淮率领的偏军。231年，诸葛亮发动了规模较大的第四次北伐，再次进攻陇右。这一次大概已经并没有什么奇袭的要素了。其一，诸葛亮在这次北伐投入了新开发的运粮工具木牛，显然是有打持久战的准备的；其二，此时的魏国统帅司马懿率军赶往西线，诸葛亮也没有立马撤退；相反，双方在祁山附近的卤城还爆发了一次主力对战。虽然《晋书》记载诸葛亮弃营逃跑，司马懿追击击破之，但这一条记载过于夸张，历来都没什么史家采信；而更有可信度的说法则来自于《汉晋春秋》，诸葛亮在此战中正面击败了司马懿的军队。后来由于后勤困难，诸葛亮撤退，撤退途中还在木门道设伏击杀了魏国名将张郃。

The third Northern Expedition marked a strategic turning point. A year after the third campaign (in 230), Cao Zhen launched a large-scale invasion of Shu, but continuous heavy rains forced him to withdraw. At the same time, Zhuge Liang sent Wei Yan and Wu Yi into Qiang territory, where they defeated a Wei detachment led by Fei Yao and Guo Huai on the western front.

In 231, Zhuge Liang initiated the larger-scale fourth Northern Expedition, once again advancing into Longyou. This time, however, the element of surprise was essentially gone. First, Zhuge Liang introduced newly developed logistical devices known as “wooden oxen” (mechanical pack animals), clearly signaling his preparation for a protracted campaign. Second, when the Wei commander Sima Yi led his army to the western front, Zhuge Liang did not immediately retreat; on the contrary, the two sides fought a pitched battle at Lucheng near Mount Qi. Although the Book of Jin claims that Zhuge Liang abandoned his camp and was pursued and routed by Sima Yi, this account is widely regarded as exaggerated and has seldom been accepted by historians. A more credible account, found in the Han Jin Chunqiu, states that Zhuge Liang actually defeated Sima Yi’s army in direct confrontation. Later, due to logistical difficulties, Zhuge Liang withdrew; during the retreat, however, he ambushed the Wei forces at Mumen and killed the renowned Wei general Zhang He.

第四次北伐诸葛亮在魏国境内逗留了三到四个月，在主力对决中占据上风，并且再次击杀敌将（还是魏国军方二号人物的车骑将军），完全不再是第一次北伐时魏军主力突破防线后就立马撤退的模样。这表明诸葛亮此时已经放弃了奇袭的战略，转而去克服更难啃的骨头 -- 也就是之前提到的国力悬殊、战力不足、后勤困难的三大难题。国力悬殊这一点无法改变，但诸葛亮通过其卓越的治国能力可以尽量挖掘蜀汉的战争潜力；战力不足这一点，诸葛亮已经通过严格的治军、战法（八阵图）和军备（连弩）的开发，基本上给予解决，蜀军足以在正面战场与魏军主力硬碰硬；粮运困难的问题得到了部分解决，但对于诸葛亮的雄心而言依然是不够的。

During the fourth Northern Expedition, Zhuge Liang remained within Wei territory for three to four months. In the main confrontation, he gained the upper hand and once again slew a prominent enemy general—none other than the Grand Chariot-General, the second-ranking figure in Wei’s military. This was a far cry from the first Northern Expedition, when the Wei main force broke through the Shu lines and Zhuge Liang had to retreat immediately. It showed that by this point Zhuge Liang had abandoned the strategy of surprise raids and instead turned to tackling the harder problems—the three great difficulties mentioned earlier: disparity in national strength, insufficient combat capability, and logistical challenges.

The disparity in national strength could not be changed, but Zhuge Liang, through his remarkable statecraft, was able to draw out the full war potential of Shu Han. The issue of inadequate combat capability was largely resolved: by means of strict military discipline, tactical innovations (such as the Eight Formations), and advances in weaponry (like the repeating crossbow), the Shu army was able to stand toe-to-toe with Wei’s main forces in open battle. As for logistics, the difficulties were partially overcome, though not yet to the level needed for Zhuge Liang’s full ambitions.

因此，正如司马懿在第四次北伐后预言的那样，诸葛亮在之后精心准备了三年，囤积粮谷、在斜谷修建邸阁（转运建筑，缩小到前线的粮草支援距离），并继续训练军队。234年，诸葛亮发动第五次北伐，以流马运粮，出斜谷直接进攻关中平原。毫无疑问，诸葛亮此时的战略已经彻底转向了正面对决，他对于自己的军队能够在野战中击败魏军这一点有充分的自信。这一次北伐中，诸葛亮甚至为了解决后勤难题，在前线展开了军屯，直接将魏国土地上粮食部分转换为蜀汉军粮。这一次北伐诸葛亮在魏国境内待了六个月，并没有粮草耗尽的记载，或许能证明诸葛亮已经在很大程度上克服了后勤困难。可惜，诸葛亮就算几近克服了所有的客观困难，也没办法决定自己的寿命，最后病逝于前线。在他身亡后，蜀军退军，司马懿不敢深入追击，留下一个“死诸葛走生仲达”的千古名句。

Thus, just as Sima Yi predicted after the fourth expedition, Zhuge Liang spent the next three years in meticulous preparation: stockpiling grain, constructing relay depots in the Xie Valley to shorten supply lines to the front, and continuing to drill his troops. In 234, he launched the fifth Northern Expedition, this time using the “flowing horse” transport devices for grain supply, and advanced through the Xie Valley to directly strike the Guanzhong plain. Without a doubt, his strategy had now fully shifted to direct confrontation, and he had complete confidence that his army could defeat Wei forces in open battle.

In this campaign, Zhuge Liang even implemented military colonies at the front, directly converting grain from Wei’s lands into provisions for Shu’s army—an innovative way to resolve the supply issue. He remained in Wei territory for six months, and there is no record of his forces running out of grain. This may indicate that he had largely solved the logistical problem. Unfortunately, even though Zhuge Liang had nearly overcome all the objective difficulties, he could not control his own lifespan. He died at the frontlines, and after his death the Shu army withdrew. Sima Yi, wary of a possible trap, did not dare to pursue deeply, giving rise to the famous saying: “Even dead Zhuge drives away living Zhongda(i.e., Sima).”

二、曹魏方的战略演变

II. The Strategic Evolution of Cao Wei

相比于蜀汉北伐，曹魏方面在抵御诸葛亮的战略上，并没有那么清晰的主线。这主要是两方面原因：其一，蜀汉只是曹魏需要防范的一个方向，并不像诸葛亮那样把大部分的战略精力都放在北伐上；其二，诸葛亮北伐期间曹魏西方的话事人从前期的曹真变成了后期的司马懿，主帅的更换也在某种程度上破坏了战略的连贯性。即便如此，细究起来，依然可以看出曹魏在应对蜀汉的战略上也有显著的演变轨迹。

Compared with Shu Han’s Northern Expeditions, Cao Wei’s response strategy was not as clearly defined. This was mainly due to two reasons: first, Shu Han was only one of the directions Cao Wei needed to defend against, whereas Zhuge Liang concentrated nearly all of his strategic energy on the Northern Expeditions; second, during Zhuge Liang’s campaigns the commander-in-chief on Wei’s western front shifted from Cao Zhen in the early years to Sima Yi later on, and this change of leadership disrupted strategic continuity to some extent. Even so, a closer look still reveals a clear trajectory of evolution in Wei’s response to Shu Han.

诸葛亮第一次北伐前，曹魏对于蜀汉可以说是没有什么明确战略。《魏略》记载，此时曹魏决策层认为刘备已经死了，蜀汉不会有能力威胁到魏国，因此在西线甚至都没有太多的准备。这也是诸葛亮第一次北伐能够在前期进展神速的重要原因。张郃击退诸葛亮后，曹魏才开始加强了布防，例如曹真就命令郝昭拒守陈仓，抵御了诸葛亮的第二次北伐。但很快，由于石亭之战败于陆逊，曹魏的注意力就放在了东线。诸葛亮第二次北伐虽然没有攻克陈仓，但是吸引了张郃率军驰援关中；来年春天曹魏又丢掉了武都、阴平二郡。诸葛亮接连进攻曹魏，还吞掉了曹魏的领土，北方仅能疲于应付，这让曹真非常恼火。于是他决定变被动防御为主动出击，试图一劳永逸地解决蜀汉。230年，曹真率军走子午谷，司马懿沿汉水而上，张郃走斜谷，费曜、郭淮由陇右南下，魏国四路大举进攻蜀汉。由于连月大雨，曹真、司马懿、张郃三路都不得不退军，而另一路则被蜀汉的防守反击大败。此次伐蜀草草收场，曹真也在不久后病逝。

Before Zhuge Liang’s first expedition, Cao Wei essentially had no concrete strategy against Shu. According to the Weilüe, the Wei leadership believed that since Liu Bei was dead, Shu Han no longer had the strength to threaten the empire. As a result, the western front was left without much preparation—one of the key reasons Zhuge Liang advanced so rapidly at the outset of his first campaign. After Zhang He repelled him, however, Wei began to strengthen its defenses; for example, Cao Zhen ordered Hao Zhao to hold Chencang, successfully resisting Zhuge Liang’s second expedition. But soon, after suffering defeat at the Battle of Shiting at the hands of Lu Xun, Wei’s attention was drawn back to the eastern front. Although Zhuge Liang’s second expedition failed to take Chencang, it still forced Zhang He to rush reinforcements to Guanzhong; the following spring, Wei also lost Wudu and Yinping commanderies. Zhuge Liang kept up the offensive, even annexing Wei territory, leaving Wei struggling just to respond, which greatly infuriated Cao Zhen. Determined to shift from passive defense to active offense and settle the Shu problem once and for all, in 230 Cao Zhen launched a massive four-pronged invasion: he advanced through the Ziwu Valley, Sima Yi along the Han River, Zhang He through the Xie Valley, and Fei Yao with Guo Huai from Longyou. Yet after continuous heavy rains, the first three forces had to retreat, while the fourth was defeated by Shu’s counterattack. The expedition ended in failure, and not long afterward Cao Zhen died.

从228年诸葛亮北伐开始，除了诸葛亮第一次北伐被成功挫败以外，同期曹魏在东线遭遇石亭之败，在西线则只能被动招架，损兵失地，主动出击也没有任何战果。接下来一年诸葛亮进攻陇右，司马懿正面被击败，折损了张郃，甚至根据《华阳国志》的记载，司马懿大军在主场作战都闹了粮荒。这几年可以说是曹魏整体上比较困难的一段时间。面对困局，司马懿之弟司马孚进言道：“孚以为擒敌制胜，宜有备预。每诸葛亮入寇关中，边兵不能制敌，中军奔赴，辄不及事机，宜预选步骑二万，以为二部，为讨贼之备。又以关中连遭贼寇，谷帛不足，遣冀州农丁五千屯于上邽，秋冬习战阵，春夏修田桑。”简单来说，就是开始经营关中的粮草和战备，强化西线的实力。正好司马懿此时也被调往主持西线，经营关中，很大程度上恢复了关中的生产。诸葛亮第五次北伐时，从魏明帝曹睿到大将军司马懿都坚持同一个战略：坚壁不出，通过关中的实力以及曹魏帝国的支持与诸葛亮消耗。可以看到，经历了228-231这几年的低谷期后，曹魏的整体战略开始转向了“保守的长期主义”，依赖曹魏国力强大这一基本前提，着力于恢复实力，并以稳妥的策略应对诸葛亮的进攻。从最终的结果来看，这一战略显然是取得了成功。

From the start of Zhuge Liang’s expeditions in 228, apart from the initial defeat of his first campaign, Wei repeatedly suffered setbacks: in the east, the loss at Shiting; in the west, a string of defensive struggles, territorial losses, and even its one major offensive attempt yielded nothing. The following year Zhuge Liang struck Longyou again, defeating Sima Yi in direct confrontation and killing Zhang He; according to the Huayang Guozhi, Sima Yi’s forces even experienced a grain shortage while fighting on home soil. These years marked a particularly difficult period for Wei overall. In response, Sima Yi’s younger brother, Sima Fu, advised: “To capture the enemy and achieve victory, preparations must be made in advance. Every time Zhuge Liang invades Guanzhong, the border troops cannot check him, and by the time the central army arrives it is already too late. It would be wise to select 20,000 infantry and cavalry beforehand, dividing them into two units, to serve as reserves against the invader. In addition, since Guanzhong has suffered repeated incursions and lacks grain and cloth, 5,000 farm laborers from Jizhou should be sent to garrison Shanggui—practicing battle formations in autumn and winter, and working the fields in spring and summer.” In short, the proposal was to develop Guanzhong’s agricultural base and war preparations, thereby strengthening the western front.

At this point, Sima Yi himself was reassigned to oversee the western front, where he concentrated on restoring Guanzhong’s productivity. By the time of Zhuge Liang’s fifth expedition, both Emperor Cao Rui and General Sima Yi adhered to a consistent strategy: remain behind fortified defenses, avoid battle, and rely on Guanzhong’s resources together with the broader strength of the Wei empire to wear Zhuge Liang down. It is clear that after the difficult years of 228–231, Cao Wei’s overall strategy shifted toward a “conservative long-term approach”: relying on its fundamental advantage in national strength, focusing on recovery, and adopting cautious, steady measures to counter Zhuge Liang’s offensives. From the ultimate outcome, this strategy proved successful.

三、小结

III. Conclusion

虽然诸葛亮北伐一共只有七年时间，但从上面的分析来看，无论是蜀汉还是曹魏，在这七年之中都有明确的战略演变的轨迹。蜀汉方的统帅诸葛亮最开始试图通过奇袭战略来取得重大突破，但发现曹魏帝国动员力极强，这一想法遭遇了挫折，因此在之后非常明显地转换了战略，开始着力克服军队战力和后勤方面的困难。这一战略转型的成效应当说是显著的，但由于诸葛亮出师未捷身先死，因此无法判断这条路是否可以走到最后。而曹魏方面，在最开始对蜀汉并没有明确战略（在此之前曹魏还试图写信让蜀汉称藩，足见其对蜀汉的轻视），而在接连遭到诸葛亮的进攻后，则一度试图通过大规模出击夺回主动权，但同样遭到了挫败。之后，面对蜀汉的进攻，曹魏整体上转向了在政治上重视实力积累、在军事上以稳妥防御为主的策略，以此成功地限制了诸葛亮的北伐进展。从某种程度上来讲，蜀汉、曹魏两方最后的战略都从激进主义收敛到了长期主义，从比拼拳脚变成了比拼内功。在这个意义上，虽然场面上没有极为夸张的胜败，但诸葛亮和曹魏之间的攻防也堪称高水平的博弈，双方都根据局势变化往正确的方向不断进行调整；曹魏因为正确的战略与实力的优势取得了最终胜利，而诸葛亮治下的蜀汉则成为了从古至今唯一一个与统一的北方帝国拼内功还能不落下风的蜀地政权。

Although Zhuge Liang’s Northern Expeditions lasted only seven years, the analysis above shows that both Shu Han and Cao Wei underwent clear strategic evolutions during this period. On the Shu side, Zhuge Liang initially attempted to achieve a decisive breakthrough through surprise attacks, but upon discovering the extraordinary mobilization capacity of the Wei empire, this approach quickly proved unworkable. He then made a very deliberate shift in strategy, focusing on overcoming the problems of military capability and logistics. This transformation yielded notable results, but because Zhuge Liang died before his campaigns could reach fruition, it is impossible to know how far this path might have ultimately carried Shu. On the Wei side, at first there was no clear strategy against Shu (indeed, before this period Wei even tried sending letters demanding Shu’s submission, which shows their dismissive attitude). After suffering repeated attacks from Zhuge Liang, however, Wei briefly attempted to seize back the initiative through large-scale offensives—efforts that also ended in failure. Subsequently, in the face of Shu’s continued advances, Wei shifted toward a strategy that emphasized the accumulation of strength in politics and relied on cautious defense in military matters. This approach successfully contained the progress of Zhuge Liang’s expeditions.

In a sense, both Shu and Wei eventually moved away from radicalism toward long-termism—shifting from a contest of brute blows to a contest of inner strength. In this light, even though the campaigns did not produce dramatic swings of victory or defeat, the struggle between Zhuge Liang and Cao Wei can be considered a high-level game of strategy, with both sides constantly adjusting in the right direction as circumstances evolved. In the end, Wei prevailed thanks to its sound strategy and superior resources, while Shu Han under Zhuge Liang stood out as the only Sichuan-based regime in history that could match a unified northern empire in terms of “inner strength” without being overpowered.