评诸葛亮的《论光武》

On Zhuge Liang's On Emperor Guangwu

三国时代的蜀汉丞相诸葛亮在忙于军国要务的同时，还曾经和同时代另一位大才子曹植有过一次隔空文字交锋。曹植写了一篇文辞华丽的评论：《汉二祖优劣论》，对汉帝国的两位帝王：汉高祖刘邦与汉光武帝刘秀进行了点评，并得出结论：刘秀的个人能力强于刘邦，但刘秀的将相团队却无法与刘邦的团队相比。诸葛亮就这个观点进行了驳斥，写出了如下的文章（翻译为现代汉语的版本）。

While busy with vital military and state affairs, Zhuge Liang, the Chancellor of Shu Han during the Three Kingdoms period, once engaged in a remote literary debate with Cao Zhi, another great literary talent of the same era. Cao Zhi wrote an eloquently worded commentary titled On the Merits and Demerits of the Two Founders of Han, evaluating two emperors of the Han Empire: Emperor Gaozu (Liu Bang) and Emperor Guangwu (Liu Xiu). He concluded that Liu Xiu's personal abilities were superior to Liu Bang's, but Liu Xiu's team of generals and ministers could not compare to Liu Bang's. Zhuge Liang refuted this viewpoint and wrote the following essay (presented here in a modern translation). 

曹植（子建）在评论汉光武帝时曾说：“他的武将很难与韩信、周勃相比，谋臣也比不上张良、陈平。”当时议论此事的人，也都认为他说得对。我认为，这番话确实是想赞美光武帝本人的伟大才干，但却贬低了那一整个时代的杰出人才。为什么这么说呢？

回顾光武帝麾下的“云台二十八将”，往下直到马援等人，他们忠诚、坚定、智慧、勇敢，应有尽有。平心而论，他们决不比以前的那些名臣名将差。张良、陈平之所以在从前显得特别耀眼突出，是因为汉高祖（刘邦）的行动往往有很多疏漏。正因如此，张良、陈平才得以充分施展他们的忠诚与智慧，彭越、周勃也才能够在外面纵横驰骋。

俗话说：“建议把烟囱改弯、把柴草搬走的人被晾在一边，而被火烧得焦头烂额的救火者却被奉为上宾。”这话虽然通俗微小，却非常符合高祖和光武这两朝的情况。光武帝的神机妙算如同天授，所以在军帐之中，不需要谋臣再去苦思冥想，各种奇谋妙计也无需别人去提出。大臣们只是与光武帝的想法契合、意见一致，大家共同成就了帝王霸业罢了。光武帝曾称赞邓禹说：“孔子有了颜回，其他门徒就更加亲近了。”他赞叹吴汉说：“吴将军总算能让我勉强满意了，他的武力或许有人能赶得上，但他的忠诚是别人绝不可企及的。”光武帝和群臣商议国家大事时，经常让马援最后发言，因为他认为马援的计策每次都和自己不谋而合。这些都说明，光武帝是一位深切了解自己臣子的明君。

总而言之，光武帝手下的大将并不比韩信、周勃逊色，谋臣也不比张良、陈平低劣。追根溯源，是因为光武帝深谋远虑，有防患于未然（曲突徙薪）的远见明智；而汉高祖行事常有疏漏，所以陈平、张良、韩信、周勃才有了那些“焦头烂额”去救火的惊天之功罢了。

When commenting on Emperor Guangwu of Han, Cao Zhi (Zijian) once said: "His military generals can hardly compare to Han Xin and Zhou Bo, and his strategists cannot match Zhang Liang and Chen Ping." Those discussing this matter at the time all agreed with him. I believe that while these words were genuinely intended to praise Emperor Guangwu's great personal talents, they simultaneously belittled the outstanding minds of that entire era. Why do I say this?

Looking back at the "Twenty-Eight Generals of Yuntai" under Emperor Guangwu's command, all the way down to Ma Yuan and others, they possessed loyalty, steadfastness, wisdom, and bravery in abundance. In all fairness, they were in no way inferior to those renowned ministers and generals of the past. The reason Zhang Liang and Chen Ping appeared so exceptionally dazzling was that Emperor Gaozu's (Liu Bang's) actions were often riddled with flaws and omissions. Because of this, Zhang Liang and Chen Ping were able to fully showcase their loyalty and wisdom, and Peng Yue and Zhou Bo were able to charge and fight freely across the battlefield.

As the old proverb goes: "The one who advised bending the chimney and moving the firewood away is ignored, while those who are left with scorched heads and burned brows from putting out the fire are treated as honored guests." Although this saying is common and simple, it perfectly captures the contrasting situations of the Gaozu and Guangwu courts. Emperor Guangwu's brilliant strategies were seemingly heaven-sent; therefore, within his military tent, there was no need for his strategists to rack their brains, nor was there a need for others to propose extraordinary schemes. The ministers simply aligned with the Emperor's thoughts, reached a consensus, and together they achieved the imperial hegemony.

Emperor Guangwu once praised Deng Yu, saying: "Once Confucius had Yan Hui, his other disciples grew even closer." He also admired Wu Han, saying: "General Wu finally manages to meet my expectations; his martial prowess might be matched by some, but his loyalty is absolutely unsurpassed by anyone." Furthermore, when discussing state affairs with his ministers, Emperor Guangwu often let Ma Yuan speak last, because he found that Ma Yuan's strategies naturally coincided with his own every single time. All of these instances demonstrate that Emperor Guangwu was a wise and enlightened ruler who deeply understood his subjects.

In conclusion, Emperor Guangwu's top generals were not inferior to Han Xin and Zhou Bo, nor were his strategists lesser than Zhang Liang and Chen Ping. Tracing it back to the root cause, it is because Emperor Guangwu possessed profound foresight and the wisdom to prevent disasters before they happened (like bending the chimney and moving the firewood). Emperor Gaozu, however, often made errors in his actions, which is exactly why Chen Ping, Zhang Liang, Han Xin, and Zhou Bo had the opportunity to achieve their earth-shattering, "fire-fighting" merits.

诸葛亮与曹植的分歧，展现出了两人看问题的视角的不同。两人都认同光武帝刘秀的个人才能优于刘邦。涉及到两人的辅佐团队时，曹植更像是当下的“键盘历史学家”，详细对比不同人的功绩、评价，然后进行跨时空斗兽；而诸葛亮作为长期的国家执政者，对于领袖和辅佐者之间的协同联动显然有更深入的见解。在关于两位汉朝开国君主的辅佐团队的对比上，我本人更倾向于赞同诸葛亮的看法。

The divergence between Zhuge Liang and Cao Zhi reveals their distinctly different perspectives on analyzing issues. Both agreed that Emperor Guangwu (Liu Xiu) possessed superior personal abilities compared to Liu Bang. When evaluating their respective supporting teams, Cao Zhi acts more like a modern-day "keyboard historian," meticulously comparing the achievements and reputations of different individuals before staging cross-temporal versus debates. Zhuge Liang, on the other hand, as a long-serving head of state, clearly possessed far deeper insights into the synergy and collaboration between a leader and their subordinates. Regarding the comparison between the supporting teams of these two founding emperors of the Han dynasty, I personally lean towards agreeing with Zhuge Liang's view. 

不过，这一篇评述的目的并不在于反复解读诸葛亮的论点，而是聚焦于诸葛亮和曹植都赞同的大前提：刘秀优于刘邦。在诸葛亮看来，刘秀深谋远虑，行事更有规划，因此他的辅佐者们更多只需要执行好刘秀的大棋盘中被分配的角色即可；而刘邦行事多有错漏，为了弥补这些错漏，张良、韩信才有机会展现出经天纬地的才能。这个判断的前半句没有什么问题；但后半句却着实有值得商榷的空间。张良、韩信等人在历史上的精彩发挥，当真就只是因为刘邦的能力有缺陷吗？

However, the purpose of this commentary is not to endlessly re-analyze Zhuge Liang's arguments, but rather to focus on the major premise both he and Cao Zhi agreed upon: that Liu Xiu was superior to Liu Bang. In Zhuge Liang's eyes, Liu Xiu was far-sighted and highly strategic in his planning, meaning his subordinates largely only needed to successfully execute their assigned roles on Liu Xiu's grand chessboard. Liu Bang, conversely, often made mistakes and oversights in his actions; it was only to compensate for these flaws that Zhang Liang and Han Xin had the opportunity to display their world-shaping talents. The first half of this assessment is sound, but the latter half certainly leaves considerable room for debate. Were the spectacular historical achievements of figures like Zhang Liang and Han Xin truly just the result of Liu Bang's personal shortcomings? 

回顾楚汉争霸的历史，一个后世常常忽略的点在于：从刘邦攻入关中，到垓下之战击败项羽，一共竟然只用了四年左右的时间。如果我们聚焦于刘邦崛起的整个过程，会发现刘邦的决策和行动步伐简直是快得惊人。项羽击败了章邯的秦军主力后，竟然是刘邦率先一路攻城略地，破函谷关，抢先夺取了关中，实行约法三章，而萧何则率先夺取了秦国的治国资料，这位后来刘邦立足关中打下了最初的基础。鸿门宴后，刘邦被封汉中王，但他仅在汉中呆了半年左右，就在韩信的建议下杀回关中；此时关中的三位旧秦将章邯、司马欣、董翳的统治基础都来不及建立，很快就被刘邦的军队攻破。更令人震惊的是，仅仅一年后，刘邦就长驱直入，攻陷了项羽的都城彭城！若非项羽在彭城的惊天逆转，大败刘邦的联军，楚汉争霸在此时就已经结束大半了。之后，刘邦率主力在正面战场与项羽对峙，派遣韩信攻略整个北方战线，并且策动彭越、英布对项羽进行袭扰，又用了三年时间，就在垓下彻底击败了项羽。

Looking back at the history of the Chu-Han Contention, a point often overlooked by later generations is that from the time Liu Bang advanced into Guanzhong until he defeated Xiang Yu at the Battle of Gaixia, it took a total of only about four years. If we focus on the entire process of Liu Bang's rise to power, we will find that the pace of his decision-making and actions was astonishingly fast. After Xiang Yu defeated Zhang Han's main Qin army, it was surprisingly Liu Bang who took the lead in conquering territories along the way, breaching Hangu Pass, preemptively seizing Guanzhong, and implementing the "Three Articles of Law." Meanwhile, Xiao He was the first to secure the Qin state's administrative records and documents, which laid the initial foundation for Liu Bang's subsequent foothold in Guanzhong. Following the Feast at Hongmen, Liu Bang was enfeoffed as the King of Hanzhong. However, he stayed in Hanzhong for only about half a year before fighting his way back to Guanzhong upon Han Xin's advice. At this time, the three former Qin generals in Guanzhong—Zhang Han, Sima Xin, and Dong Yi—had not even had time to establish their ruling foundations before they were swiftly defeated by Liu Bang's army. Even more shockingly, just one year later, Liu Bang drove deep into enemy territory and captured Xiang Yu's capital, Pengcheng! Had it not been for Xiang Yu's stunning reversal at Pengcheng, where he heavily defeated Liu Bang's coalition forces, the Chu-Han Contention would have been largely over right then. Afterward, Liu Bang led his main force in a standoff against Xiang Yu on the frontal battlefield, dispatched Han Xin to conquer the entire northern front, and instigated Peng Yue and Ying Bu to harass Xiang Yu. Taking just another three years, he thoroughly defeated Xiang Yu at Gaixia. 

通过分析刘邦击败项羽的整个历程，不难发现，刘邦在重大战略决策上呈现出极为大胆激进的风格。他似乎总是能抓住当前局面中最有利的一个目标，然后全力推进执行这一目标，并在执行的过程中充分调动所有能够调动的资源。当然，这种风格根本容不得“算无遗策”式的规划，因为目标太大且推进太快，不可能在事先就计算得分毫不差；这也就导致了所谓的“动多疏阔”，似乎整盘棋执行起来错漏百出，需要手下的能臣们到处救火。然而，即使是这样一个错漏百出的盘子，刘邦也只用了几年时间就完成了清盘，效率远高于后世的大多数开国君主。而在这个过程中，也就成就了萧何、韩信、张良、陈平等人的盖世功勋。

By analyzing the entire course of Liu Bang's defeat of Xiang Yu, it is not difficult to see that Liu Bang exhibited an extremely bold and radical style in major strategic decisions. He always seemed able to grasp the most advantageous objective in the current situation, push forward with all his might to execute it, and fully mobilize every available resource during the process. Naturally, this style left absolutely no room for "flawless, calculating" planning. Because the objectives were so massive and the advancement so rapid, it was impossible to calculate everything perfectly in advance. This resulted in what was called "actions riddled with flaws and omissions"; it seemed as if the execution of his entire chessboard was full of holes, requiring his capable ministers to constantly run around putting out fires. Yet, even with such a seemingly porous and flawed game board, Liu Bang managed to clear the board and win the game in just a few years, achieving an efficiency far higher than that of most founding monarchs in later generations. And it was exactly within this process that the unparalleled historical achievements of Xiao He, Han Xin, Zhang Liang, Chen Ping, and others were forged. 

从这个视角出发，我们恐怕不能片面地认为刘邦的能力不如刘秀。更准确地说，相比于刘秀这样谋定而后动的风格，刘邦选择了一种更加大开大合的打法。在这种打法中，决策者有意把节奏提得非常快，并且始终围绕着当前的核心任务去组织和发挥手里有的资源；而在这种局面之中，各个顶尖人才的能动性也就能够被最大限度地调动起来。而作为“做局人”，刘邦随时随刻都要把握整个节奏，推动局面向着自己希望看到的方向移动，即使在过程中遭遇重大挫折也要能够快速进行反馈和调整。这对于决策者本人的战略直觉、心理素质、人格魅力、政治手腕的要求都极高，稍有不慎可能就会崩盘。作为代价，“粗疏”是这种打法必然呈现出的面貌。就如同量子力学草创时期，海森堡所提出的矩阵力学也是错漏百出，远不如狄拉克的工作那么深邃精湛；然而，物理学界往往认为海森堡对于创立量子力学的贡献比狄拉克更高一筹 -- 因为开拓的时代容不下太多的瞻前顾后，只要方向对了，就算有错误，让后来人来补就行了。

From this perspective, we cannot simply assume that Liu Bang's abilities were one-sidedly inferior to Liu Xiu's. More accurately, compared to Liu Xiu's style of "planning thoroughly before acting," Liu Bang opted for a much bolder, more expansive and sweeping strategy. In this approach, the decision-maker intentionally accelerates the tempo and consistently organizes and deploys available resources around the immediate core objective. In such dynamic situations, the initiative and potential of various top-tier talents are mobilized to the absolute maximum. As the "game-maker" shaping the grand design, Liu Bang had to constantly control the overarching rhythm, driving the situation toward his desired outcome, and making rapid adjustments and responses even when faced with major setbacks. This demands incredibly high levels of strategic intuition, psychological resilience, personal charisma, and political acumen from the leader; the slightest misstep could result in total collapse. The inevitable trade-off of this strategy is its apparent "roughness" and lack of granular detail. 

This is much like the founding era of quantum mechanics: the matrix mechanics proposed by Heisenberg was also riddled with gaps and errors, and was far less profound and elegant than Dirac's work. Yet, the physics community generally regards Heisenberg's contribution to the creation of quantum mechanics as a tier above Dirac's—because a pioneering era simply does not allow for excessive hesitation and overthinking. As long as the overarching direction is correct, even if there are mistakes, they can always be patched up by those who come after. 

毫无疑问，诸葛亮本人的风格是非常刘秀式的，甚至比刘秀本人还要更精细。在刘备死后，诸葛亮几乎独自撑起了蜀汉的大局，史载“事无巨细，亮皆专之”。凭借其超常的智谋和精力，他成功地将一个摇摇欲坠的政权打造成了一个政治清明、军力强悍的国家。在《论光武》一文中，诸葛亮对刘秀表达了高度的赞许，其中或许也无意识地展现了他自己的一种工作审美。但或许恰恰也因为他本人在这一审美上做得太极致，让他失去了从另一种视角来对比刘邦、刘秀两人的可能性。诸葛亮最终北伐遗恨，是否正是因为他缺乏了一点刘邦式的疏阔？这一点我们不得而知。也许在他所面对的局面中，无论是刘邦的风格还是刘秀的风格，都难以挽回大局。

Undoubtedly, Zhuge Liang's own leadership style was highly reminiscent of Liu Xiu's, perhaps even more meticulous than Liu Xiu himself. After Liu Bei's death, Zhuge Liang almost single-handedly shouldered the burden of the Shu Han regime. Historical records state that "he personally handled all matters, big or small." Relying on his extraordinary wisdom and boundless energy, he successfully transformed a crumbling regime into a state characterized by clean politics and a formidable military. In his essay On Guangwu, Zhuge Liang expressed immense praise for Liu Xiu, perhaps unconsciously revealing his own aesthetic and ideals regarding administration. Yet, it might be precisely because he took this aesthetic to such an extreme that he lost the ability to compare Liu Bang and Liu Xiu from an alternative perspective. Did Zhuge Liang ultimately die with the regret of his unfinished Northern Expeditions exactly because he lacked a bit of Liu Bang's broad, unconstrained boldness? We will never truly know. Perhaps, given the dire circumstances he faced, neither Liu Bang's nor Liu Xiu's style could have ultimately salvaged the grand scheme of things. 

诸葛亮身后几十年，奴隶出身的石勒成功建立了一个北方大国。石勒曾经讲到：如果他和刘邦生于一个时代，他必然向刘邦称臣、尽心辅佐他；而如果他和刘秀生于一个时代，那么鹿死谁手犹未可知。很多人都是从用人的角度去分析这句话，本文或许能够提供另一个视角来理解石勒试图表达的意涵。

Decades after Zhuge Liang's passing, Shi Le, a man born as a slave, successfully established a major empire in the north. Shi Le once famously remarked: if he had been born in the same era as Liu Bang, he would have undoubtedly submitted to him as a vassal and served him wholeheartedly; but if he had been born in the same era as Liu Xiu, it would be entirely uncertain "at whose hand the deer would die" (meaning who would ultimately win the realm). While many people analyze this quote purely from the perspective of how these leaders managed their personnel, this essay perhaps provides another angle for understanding the deeper meaning Shi Le was trying to convey.